Merge branch 'bypass-win-defender2' into 'develop'

bypass-win-defender2

See merge request threat-research/security_content!1335
This commit is contained in:
Bhavin Patel
2024-01-29 20:36:20 +00:00
7 changed files with 505 additions and 0 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
name: Windows Impair Defense Disable PUA Protection
id: fbfef407-cfee-4866-88c1-f8de1c16147c
version: 1
date: '2024-01-08'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
data_source:
- Sysmon Event ID 12
- Sysmon Event ID 13
- Sysmon Event ID 14
description: The following analytic identifies a modification in the Windows registry to disable Windows Defender
PUA protection.
Setting PUAProtection to 0 typically disables the detection and protection against Potentially Unwanted Applications
by Microsoft Defender Antivirus. Potentially Unwanted Applications include software that may not be inherently
malicious but could exhibit behaviors that users may find undesirable, such as adware, browser toolbars, or software bundlers.
Disabling this feature might be preferred in certain situations, but it's essential to consider potential security implications.
Enabling PUA protection provides an additional layer of defense against software that might negatively impact user experience
or security.
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= "*\\Windows Defender\\PUAProtection"
Registry.registry_value_data="0x00000000"
by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.dest
| `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_impair_defense_disable_pua_protection_filter`'
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node.
known_false_positives: It is unusual to turn this feature off a Windows system since
it is a default security control, although it is not rare for some policies to disable
it. Although no false positives have been identified, use the provided filter macro
to tune the search.
references:
- https://x.com/malmoeb/status/1742604217989415386?s=20
- https://github.com/undergroundwires/privacy.sexy
tags:
analytic_story:
- Windows Defense Evasion Tactics
- Windows Registry Abuse
asset_type: Endpoint
confidence: 70
impact: 70
message: Windows Defender PUA protection set to disable on $dest$.
mitre_attack_id:
- T1562.001
- T1562
observable:
- name: dest
type: Endpoint
role:
- Victim
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
risk_score: 49
required_fields:
- _time
- Registry.registry_key_name
- Registry.registry_value_name
- Registry.dest
- Registry.user
- Registry.registry_path
- Registry.action
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/disable-windows-security-defender-features/windefender-bypas-2-sysmon.log
source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
sourcetype: xmlwineventlog
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
name: Windows Impair Defense Disable Realtime Signature Delivery
id: ffd99aea-542f-448e-b737-091c1b417274
version: 1
date: '2024-01-08'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
data_source:
- Sysmon Event ID 12
- Sysmon Event ID 13
- Sysmon Event ID 14
description: The following analytic identifies a modification in the Windows registry to disable windows defender
realtime signature delivery feature. This setting governs how Windows Defender Antivirus receives updated signature
definitions for identifying and combating malware threats in real-time. The actual impact and behaviors associated
with different values for RealtimeSignatureDelivery can vary based on specific Windows Defender configurations and policies.
For instance, setting this value to 0 or 1 might control whether real-time signatures are delivered via different methods
such as through Windows Update or directly from Microsoft's cloud-based services.
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= "*\\Windows Defender\\Signature Updates\\RealtimeSignatureDelivery"
Registry.registry_value_data="0x00000000"
by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.dest
| `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_impair_defense_disable_realtime_signature_delivery_filter`'
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node.
known_false_positives: It is unusual to turn this feature off a Windows system since
it is a default security control, although it is not rare for some policies to disable
it. Although no false positives have been identified, use the provided filter macro
to tune the search.
references:
- https://x.com/malmoeb/status/1742604217989415386?s=20
- https://github.com/undergroundwires/privacy.sexy
tags:
analytic_story:
- Windows Defense Evasion Tactics
- Windows Registry Abuse
asset_type: Endpoint
confidence: 70
impact: 70
message: Windows Defender File realtime signature delivery set to disable on $dest$.
mitre_attack_id:
- T1562.001
- T1562
observable:
- name: dest
type: Endpoint
role:
- Victim
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
risk_score: 49
required_fields:
- _time
- Registry.registry_key_name
- Registry.registry_value_name
- Registry.dest
- Registry.user
- Registry.registry_path
- Registry.action
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/disable-windows-security-defender-features/windefender-bypas-2-sysmon.log
source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
sourcetype: xmlwineventlog
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
name: Windows Impair Defense Disable Web Evaluation
id: e234970c-dcf5-4f80-b6a9-3a562544ca5b
version: 1
date: '2024-01-08'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
data_source:
- Sysmon Event ID 12
- Sysmon Event ID 13
- Sysmon Event ID 14
description: The following analytic identifies a modification in the Windows registry to disable Windows Defender
web content evaluation. The "EnableWebContentEvaluation" registry entry typically relates to security settings
within Microsoft Edge or Internet Explorer, enabling the evaluation of web content for security purposes.
When attackers modify "EnableWebContentEvaluation" to 0, they might attempt to disable the browser's
capability to evaluate web content for security purposes. Disabling this feature could potentially impact
the browser's ability to assess the security risks associated with web content, such as potentially malicious scripts,
active content, or unsafe web elements.
By turning off content evaluation, attackers might aim to exploit security vulnerabilities present in web content without
triggering security warnings or blocks. This manipulation increases the risk of users accessing or interacting with malicious
content, potentially leading to security compromises or system exploitation.
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry
WHERE Registry.registry_path= "*\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\AppHost\\EnableWebContentEvaluation" Registry.registry_value_data= "0x00000000"
BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name
Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid
| `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_impair_defense_disable_web_evaluation_filter`'
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node.
known_false_positives: It is unusual to turn this feature off a Windows system since
it is a default security control, although it is not rare for some policies to disable
it. Although no false positives have been identified, use the provided filter macro
to tune the search.
references:
- https://x.com/malmoeb/status/1742604217989415386?s=20
- https://github.com/undergroundwires/privacy.sexy
tags:
analytic_story:
- Windows Defense Evasion Tactics
- Windows Registry Abuse
asset_type: Endpoint
confidence: 70
impact: 70
message: Windows Defender web content evaluation feature set to disable on $dest$.
mitre_attack_id:
- T1562.001
- T1562
observable:
- name: dest
type: Endpoint
role:
- Victim
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
risk_score: 49
required_fields:
- _time
- Registry.registry_key_name
- Registry.registry_value_name
- Registry.dest
- Registry.user
- Registry.registry_path
- Registry.action
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/disable-windows-security-defender-features/windefender-bypas-2-sysmon.log
source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
sourcetype: xmlwineventlog
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
name: Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender App Guard
id: 8b700d7e-54ad-4d7d-81cc-1456c4703306
version: 1
date: '2024-01-08'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
data_source:
- Sysmon Event ID 12
- Sysmon Event ID 13
- Sysmon Event ID 14
description: The following analytic identifies a modification in the Windows registry to disable Windows Defender
audit application guard.
Microsoft Defender Application Guard provides enhanced security by isolating potentially malicious documents and
websites in a containerized environment, protecting the system against various threats. Auditing and logging are
essential components of security measures, providing visibility into activities within the isolated environment.
Disabling auditing events within Application Guard might not be a standard or recommended practice since auditing
is crucial for security monitoring and threat detection within the isolated container. However, there might be
settings or configurations related to audit policies in the broader Windows Defender or operating system settings.
This registry setting is being abuse by several threat actors, adversaries and red teamers to bypasses Windows defender detections.
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= "*\\Policies\\Microsoft\\AppHVSI\\AuditApplicationGuard"
Registry.registry_value_data="0x00000000"
by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.dest
| `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_impair_defense_disable_win_defender_app_guard_filter`'
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node.
known_false_positives: It is unusual to turn this feature off a Windows system since
it is a default security control, although it is not rare for some policies to disable
it. Although no false positives have been identified, use the provided filter macro
to tune the search.
references:
- https://x.com/malmoeb/status/1742604217989415386?s=20
- https://github.com/undergroundwires/privacy.sexy
tags:
analytic_story:
- Windows Defense Evasion Tactics
- Windows Registry Abuse
asset_type: Endpoint
confidence: 70
impact: 70
message: Windows Defender AuditApplicationGuard feature set to disable on $dest$.
mitre_attack_id:
- T1562.001
- T1562
observable:
- name: dest
type: Endpoint
role:
- Victim
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
risk_score: 49
required_fields:
- _time
- Registry.registry_key_name
- Registry.registry_value_name
- Registry.dest
- Registry.user
- Registry.registry_path
- Registry.action
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/disable-windows-security-defender-features/windefender-bypas-2-sysmon.log
source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
sourcetype: xmlwineventlog
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
name: Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Compute File Hashes
id: fe52c280-98bd-4596-b6f6-a13bbf8ac7c6
version: 1
date: '2024-01-08'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
data_source:
- Sysmon Event ID 12
- Sysmon Event ID 13
- Sysmon Event ID 14
description: The following analytic identifies a modification in the Windows registry to disable Windows Defender file hashes computation.
The EnableFileHashComputation registry setting likely pertains to whether Windows Defender's MpEngine (Malware Protection Engine) computes
file hashes. Setting this value to 0 might disable the file hash computation feature within Windows Defender, which could affect certain
malware detection or scanning functionalities that rely on file hash analysis. This registry setting is being abuse by several threat actors, adversaries
and red teamers to bypasses Windows defender detections.
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= "*\\Windows Defender\\MpEngine\\EnableFileHashComputation"
Registry.registry_value_data="0x00000000"
by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.dest
| `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_impair_defense_disable_win_defender_compute_file_hashes_filter`'
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node.
known_false_positives: It is unusual to turn this feature off a Windows system since
it is a default security control, although it is not rare for some policies to disable
it. Although no false positives have been identified, use the provided filter macro
to tune the search.
references:
- https://x.com/malmoeb/status/1742604217989415386?s=20
- https://github.com/undergroundwires/privacy.sexy
tags:
analytic_story:
- Windows Defense Evasion Tactics
- Windows Registry Abuse
asset_type: Endpoint
confidence: 70
impact: 70
message: Windows Defender File hashes computation set to disable on $dest$.
mitre_attack_id:
- T1562.001
- T1562
observable:
- name: dest
type: Endpoint
role:
- Victim
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
risk_score: 49
required_fields:
- _time
- Registry.registry_key_name
- Registry.registry_value_name
- Registry.dest
- Registry.user
- Registry.registry_path
- Registry.action
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/disable-windows-security-defender-features/windefender-bypas-2-sysmon.log
source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
sourcetype: xmlwineventlog
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
name: Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Gen reports
id: 93f114f6-cb1e-419b-ac3f-9e11a3045e70
version: 1
date: '2024-01-08'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
data_source:
- Sysmon Event ID 12
- Sysmon Event ID 13
- Sysmon Event ID 14
description: The following analytic identifies a modification in the Windows registry to disable Windows Defender
generic ports. This registry can disable the sending of Watson events in Windows Defender. This is by preventing
the transmission of generic or non-specific error reports to Microsoft's Windows Error Reporting service,
commonly known as Watson. This kind of setting could potentially be employed to limit or control the data sent to
Microsoft for error analysis, often in scenarios where privacy or specific reporting requirements are in place.
This registry setting is being abuse by several threat actors, adversaries and red teamers to bypasses Windows defender detections.
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= "*\\Windows Defender\\Reporting\\DisableGenericRePorts"
Registry.registry_value_data="0x00000001"
by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.dest
| `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_impair_defense_disable_win_defender_gen_reports_filter`'
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node.
known_false_positives: It is unusual to turn this feature off a Windows system since
it is a default security control, although it is not rare for some policies to disable
it. Although no false positives have been identified, use the provided filter macro
to tune the search.
references:
- https://x.com/malmoeb/status/1742604217989415386?s=20
- https://github.com/undergroundwires/privacy.sexy
tags:
analytic_story:
- Windows Defense Evasion Tactics
- Windows Registry Abuse
asset_type: Endpoint
confidence: 70
impact: 70
message: Windows Defender DisableGenericRePorts registry is set to enable on $dest$.
mitre_attack_id:
- T1562.001
- T1562
observable:
- name: dest
type: Endpoint
role:
- Victim
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
risk_score: 49
required_fields:
- _time
- Registry.registry_key_name
- Registry.registry_value_name
- Registry.dest
- Registry.user
- Registry.registry_path
- Registry.action
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/disable-windows-security-defender-features/windefender-bypas-2-sysmon.log
source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
sourcetype: xmlwineventlog
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
name: Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Network Protection
id: 8b6c15c7-5556-463d-83c7-986326c21f12
version: 1
date: '2024-01-08'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
data_source:
- Sysmon Event ID 12
- Sysmon Event ID 13
- Sysmon Event ID 14
description: The following analytic identifies a modification in the Windows registry to disable Windows Defender
exploit guard network protection. The EnableNetworkProtection registry entry controls the activation or deactivation
of Network Protection within Windows Defender Exploit Guard. When set to 1, it typically signifies that Network Protection
is enabled, offering additional security measures against network-based threats by analyzing and blocking potentially
malicious network activity. This registry setting is being abuse by several threat actors, adversaries
and red teamers to bypasses Windows defender detections.
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= "*\\Windows Defender\\Windows Defender Exploit Guard\\Network Protection\\EnableNetworkProtection"
Registry.registry_value_data="0x00000000"
by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.dest
| `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_impair_defense_disable_win_defender_network_protection_filter`'
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node.
known_false_positives: It is unusual to turn this feature off a Windows system since
it is a default security control, although it is not rare for some policies to disable
it. Although no false positives have been identified, use the provided filter macro
to tune the search.
references:
- https://x.com/malmoeb/status/1742604217989415386?s=20
- https://github.com/undergroundwires/privacy.sexy
tags:
analytic_story:
- Windows Defense Evasion Tactics
- Windows Registry Abuse
asset_type: Endpoint
confidence: 70
impact: 70
message: Windows Defender Exploit Guard network protection set to disable on $dest$.
mitre_attack_id:
- T1562.001
- T1562
observable:
- name: dest
type: Endpoint
role:
- Victim
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
risk_score: 49
required_fields:
- _time
- Registry.registry_key_name
- Registry.registry_value_name
- Registry.dest
- Registry.user
- Registry.registry_path
- Registry.action
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/disable-windows-security-defender-features/windefender-bypas-2-sysmon.log
source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
sourcetype: xmlwineventlog