mirror of
https://github.com/splunk/security_content
synced 2026-06-08 17:32:49 +00:00
Merge branch 'bypass-win-defender2' into 'develop'
bypass-win-defender2 See merge request threat-research/security_content!1335
This commit is contained in:
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
|
||||
name: Windows Impair Defense Disable PUA Protection
|
||||
id: fbfef407-cfee-4866-88c1-f8de1c16147c
|
||||
version: 1
|
||||
date: '2024-01-08'
|
||||
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
|
||||
status: production
|
||||
type: TTP
|
||||
data_source:
|
||||
- Sysmon Event ID 12
|
||||
- Sysmon Event ID 13
|
||||
- Sysmon Event ID 14
|
||||
description: The following analytic identifies a modification in the Windows registry to disable Windows Defender
|
||||
PUA protection.
|
||||
Setting PUAProtection to 0 typically disables the detection and protection against Potentially Unwanted Applications
|
||||
by Microsoft Defender Antivirus. Potentially Unwanted Applications include software that may not be inherently
|
||||
malicious but could exhibit behaviors that users may find undesirable, such as adware, browser toolbars, or software bundlers.
|
||||
Disabling this feature might be preferred in certain situations, but it's essential to consider potential security implications.
|
||||
Enabling PUA protection provides an additional layer of defense against software that might negatively impact user experience
|
||||
or security.
|
||||
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
|
||||
as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= "*\\Windows Defender\\PUAProtection"
|
||||
Registry.registry_value_data="0x00000000"
|
||||
by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.dest
|
||||
| `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`
|
||||
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
|
||||
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
|
||||
| `windows_impair_defense_disable_pua_protection_filter`'
|
||||
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
|
||||
on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
|
||||
your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node.
|
||||
known_false_positives: It is unusual to turn this feature off a Windows system since
|
||||
it is a default security control, although it is not rare for some policies to disable
|
||||
it. Although no false positives have been identified, use the provided filter macro
|
||||
to tune the search.
|
||||
references:
|
||||
- https://x.com/malmoeb/status/1742604217989415386?s=20
|
||||
- https://github.com/undergroundwires/privacy.sexy
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- Windows Defense Evasion Tactics
|
||||
- Windows Registry Abuse
|
||||
asset_type: Endpoint
|
||||
confidence: 70
|
||||
impact: 70
|
||||
message: Windows Defender PUA protection set to disable on $dest$.
|
||||
mitre_attack_id:
|
||||
- T1562.001
|
||||
- T1562
|
||||
observable:
|
||||
- name: dest
|
||||
type: Endpoint
|
||||
role:
|
||||
- Victim
|
||||
product:
|
||||
- Splunk Enterprise
|
||||
- Splunk Enterprise Security
|
||||
- Splunk Cloud
|
||||
risk_score: 49
|
||||
required_fields:
|
||||
- _time
|
||||
- Registry.registry_key_name
|
||||
- Registry.registry_value_name
|
||||
- Registry.dest
|
||||
- Registry.user
|
||||
- Registry.registry_path
|
||||
- Registry.action
|
||||
security_domain: endpoint
|
||||
tests:
|
||||
- name: True Positive Test
|
||||
attack_data:
|
||||
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/disable-windows-security-defender-features/windefender-bypas-2-sysmon.log
|
||||
source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
|
||||
sourcetype: xmlwineventlog
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
|
||||
name: Windows Impair Defense Disable Realtime Signature Delivery
|
||||
id: ffd99aea-542f-448e-b737-091c1b417274
|
||||
version: 1
|
||||
date: '2024-01-08'
|
||||
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
|
||||
status: production
|
||||
type: TTP
|
||||
data_source:
|
||||
- Sysmon Event ID 12
|
||||
- Sysmon Event ID 13
|
||||
- Sysmon Event ID 14
|
||||
description: The following analytic identifies a modification in the Windows registry to disable windows defender
|
||||
realtime signature delivery feature. This setting governs how Windows Defender Antivirus receives updated signature
|
||||
definitions for identifying and combating malware threats in real-time. The actual impact and behaviors associated
|
||||
with different values for RealtimeSignatureDelivery can vary based on specific Windows Defender configurations and policies.
|
||||
For instance, setting this value to 0 or 1 might control whether real-time signatures are delivered via different methods
|
||||
such as through Windows Update or directly from Microsoft's cloud-based services.
|
||||
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
|
||||
as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= "*\\Windows Defender\\Signature Updates\\RealtimeSignatureDelivery"
|
||||
Registry.registry_value_data="0x00000000"
|
||||
by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.dest
|
||||
| `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`
|
||||
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
|
||||
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
|
||||
| `windows_impair_defense_disable_realtime_signature_delivery_filter`'
|
||||
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
|
||||
on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
|
||||
your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node.
|
||||
known_false_positives: It is unusual to turn this feature off a Windows system since
|
||||
it is a default security control, although it is not rare for some policies to disable
|
||||
it. Although no false positives have been identified, use the provided filter macro
|
||||
to tune the search.
|
||||
references:
|
||||
- https://x.com/malmoeb/status/1742604217989415386?s=20
|
||||
- https://github.com/undergroundwires/privacy.sexy
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- Windows Defense Evasion Tactics
|
||||
- Windows Registry Abuse
|
||||
asset_type: Endpoint
|
||||
confidence: 70
|
||||
impact: 70
|
||||
message: Windows Defender File realtime signature delivery set to disable on $dest$.
|
||||
mitre_attack_id:
|
||||
- T1562.001
|
||||
- T1562
|
||||
observable:
|
||||
- name: dest
|
||||
type: Endpoint
|
||||
role:
|
||||
- Victim
|
||||
product:
|
||||
- Splunk Enterprise
|
||||
- Splunk Enterprise Security
|
||||
- Splunk Cloud
|
||||
risk_score: 49
|
||||
required_fields:
|
||||
- _time
|
||||
- Registry.registry_key_name
|
||||
- Registry.registry_value_name
|
||||
- Registry.dest
|
||||
- Registry.user
|
||||
- Registry.registry_path
|
||||
- Registry.action
|
||||
security_domain: endpoint
|
||||
tests:
|
||||
- name: True Positive Test
|
||||
attack_data:
|
||||
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/disable-windows-security-defender-features/windefender-bypas-2-sysmon.log
|
||||
source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
|
||||
sourcetype: xmlwineventlog
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
|
||||
name: Windows Impair Defense Disable Web Evaluation
|
||||
id: e234970c-dcf5-4f80-b6a9-3a562544ca5b
|
||||
version: 1
|
||||
date: '2024-01-08'
|
||||
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
|
||||
status: production
|
||||
type: TTP
|
||||
data_source:
|
||||
- Sysmon Event ID 12
|
||||
- Sysmon Event ID 13
|
||||
- Sysmon Event ID 14
|
||||
description: The following analytic identifies a modification in the Windows registry to disable Windows Defender
|
||||
web content evaluation. The "EnableWebContentEvaluation" registry entry typically relates to security settings
|
||||
within Microsoft Edge or Internet Explorer, enabling the evaluation of web content for security purposes.
|
||||
When attackers modify "EnableWebContentEvaluation" to 0, they might attempt to disable the browser's
|
||||
capability to evaluate web content for security purposes. Disabling this feature could potentially impact
|
||||
the browser's ability to assess the security risks associated with web content, such as potentially malicious scripts,
|
||||
active content, or unsafe web elements.
|
||||
By turning off content evaluation, attackers might aim to exploit security vulnerabilities present in web content without
|
||||
triggering security warnings or blocks. This manipulation increases the risk of users accessing or interacting with malicious
|
||||
content, potentially leading to security compromises or system exploitation.
|
||||
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry
|
||||
WHERE Registry.registry_path= "*\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\AppHost\\EnableWebContentEvaluation" Registry.registry_value_data= "0x00000000"
|
||||
BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name
|
||||
Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid
|
||||
| `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`
|
||||
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
|
||||
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
|
||||
| `windows_impair_defense_disable_web_evaluation_filter`'
|
||||
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
|
||||
on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
|
||||
your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node.
|
||||
known_false_positives: It is unusual to turn this feature off a Windows system since
|
||||
it is a default security control, although it is not rare for some policies to disable
|
||||
it. Although no false positives have been identified, use the provided filter macro
|
||||
to tune the search.
|
||||
references:
|
||||
- https://x.com/malmoeb/status/1742604217989415386?s=20
|
||||
- https://github.com/undergroundwires/privacy.sexy
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- Windows Defense Evasion Tactics
|
||||
- Windows Registry Abuse
|
||||
asset_type: Endpoint
|
||||
confidence: 70
|
||||
impact: 70
|
||||
message: Windows Defender web content evaluation feature set to disable on $dest$.
|
||||
mitre_attack_id:
|
||||
- T1562.001
|
||||
- T1562
|
||||
observable:
|
||||
- name: dest
|
||||
type: Endpoint
|
||||
role:
|
||||
- Victim
|
||||
product:
|
||||
- Splunk Enterprise
|
||||
- Splunk Enterprise Security
|
||||
- Splunk Cloud
|
||||
risk_score: 49
|
||||
required_fields:
|
||||
- _time
|
||||
- Registry.registry_key_name
|
||||
- Registry.registry_value_name
|
||||
- Registry.dest
|
||||
- Registry.user
|
||||
- Registry.registry_path
|
||||
- Registry.action
|
||||
security_domain: endpoint
|
||||
tests:
|
||||
- name: True Positive Test
|
||||
attack_data:
|
||||
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/disable-windows-security-defender-features/windefender-bypas-2-sysmon.log
|
||||
source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
|
||||
sourcetype: xmlwineventlog
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
|
||||
name: Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender App Guard
|
||||
id: 8b700d7e-54ad-4d7d-81cc-1456c4703306
|
||||
version: 1
|
||||
date: '2024-01-08'
|
||||
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
|
||||
status: production
|
||||
type: TTP
|
||||
data_source:
|
||||
- Sysmon Event ID 12
|
||||
- Sysmon Event ID 13
|
||||
- Sysmon Event ID 14
|
||||
description: The following analytic identifies a modification in the Windows registry to disable Windows Defender
|
||||
audit application guard.
|
||||
Microsoft Defender Application Guard provides enhanced security by isolating potentially malicious documents and
|
||||
websites in a containerized environment, protecting the system against various threats. Auditing and logging are
|
||||
essential components of security measures, providing visibility into activities within the isolated environment.
|
||||
Disabling auditing events within Application Guard might not be a standard or recommended practice since auditing
|
||||
is crucial for security monitoring and threat detection within the isolated container. However, there might be
|
||||
settings or configurations related to audit policies in the broader Windows Defender or operating system settings.
|
||||
This registry setting is being abuse by several threat actors, adversaries and red teamers to bypasses Windows defender detections.
|
||||
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
|
||||
as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= "*\\Policies\\Microsoft\\AppHVSI\\AuditApplicationGuard"
|
||||
Registry.registry_value_data="0x00000000"
|
||||
by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.dest
|
||||
| `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`
|
||||
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
|
||||
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
|
||||
| `windows_impair_defense_disable_win_defender_app_guard_filter`'
|
||||
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
|
||||
on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
|
||||
your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node.
|
||||
known_false_positives: It is unusual to turn this feature off a Windows system since
|
||||
it is a default security control, although it is not rare for some policies to disable
|
||||
it. Although no false positives have been identified, use the provided filter macro
|
||||
to tune the search.
|
||||
references:
|
||||
- https://x.com/malmoeb/status/1742604217989415386?s=20
|
||||
- https://github.com/undergroundwires/privacy.sexy
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- Windows Defense Evasion Tactics
|
||||
- Windows Registry Abuse
|
||||
asset_type: Endpoint
|
||||
confidence: 70
|
||||
impact: 70
|
||||
message: Windows Defender AuditApplicationGuard feature set to disable on $dest$.
|
||||
mitre_attack_id:
|
||||
- T1562.001
|
||||
- T1562
|
||||
observable:
|
||||
- name: dest
|
||||
type: Endpoint
|
||||
role:
|
||||
- Victim
|
||||
product:
|
||||
- Splunk Enterprise
|
||||
- Splunk Enterprise Security
|
||||
- Splunk Cloud
|
||||
risk_score: 49
|
||||
required_fields:
|
||||
- _time
|
||||
- Registry.registry_key_name
|
||||
- Registry.registry_value_name
|
||||
- Registry.dest
|
||||
- Registry.user
|
||||
- Registry.registry_path
|
||||
- Registry.action
|
||||
security_domain: endpoint
|
||||
tests:
|
||||
- name: True Positive Test
|
||||
attack_data:
|
||||
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/disable-windows-security-defender-features/windefender-bypas-2-sysmon.log
|
||||
source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
|
||||
sourcetype: xmlwineventlog
|
||||
+70
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
|
||||
name: Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Compute File Hashes
|
||||
id: fe52c280-98bd-4596-b6f6-a13bbf8ac7c6
|
||||
version: 1
|
||||
date: '2024-01-08'
|
||||
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
|
||||
status: production
|
||||
type: TTP
|
||||
data_source:
|
||||
- Sysmon Event ID 12
|
||||
- Sysmon Event ID 13
|
||||
- Sysmon Event ID 14
|
||||
description: The following analytic identifies a modification in the Windows registry to disable Windows Defender file hashes computation.
|
||||
The EnableFileHashComputation registry setting likely pertains to whether Windows Defender's MpEngine (Malware Protection Engine) computes
|
||||
file hashes. Setting this value to 0 might disable the file hash computation feature within Windows Defender, which could affect certain
|
||||
malware detection or scanning functionalities that rely on file hash analysis. This registry setting is being abuse by several threat actors, adversaries
|
||||
and red teamers to bypasses Windows defender detections.
|
||||
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
|
||||
as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= "*\\Windows Defender\\MpEngine\\EnableFileHashComputation"
|
||||
Registry.registry_value_data="0x00000000"
|
||||
by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.dest
|
||||
| `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`
|
||||
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
|
||||
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
|
||||
| `windows_impair_defense_disable_win_defender_compute_file_hashes_filter`'
|
||||
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
|
||||
on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
|
||||
your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node.
|
||||
known_false_positives: It is unusual to turn this feature off a Windows system since
|
||||
it is a default security control, although it is not rare for some policies to disable
|
||||
it. Although no false positives have been identified, use the provided filter macro
|
||||
to tune the search.
|
||||
references:
|
||||
- https://x.com/malmoeb/status/1742604217989415386?s=20
|
||||
- https://github.com/undergroundwires/privacy.sexy
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- Windows Defense Evasion Tactics
|
||||
- Windows Registry Abuse
|
||||
asset_type: Endpoint
|
||||
confidence: 70
|
||||
impact: 70
|
||||
message: Windows Defender File hashes computation set to disable on $dest$.
|
||||
mitre_attack_id:
|
||||
- T1562.001
|
||||
- T1562
|
||||
observable:
|
||||
- name: dest
|
||||
type: Endpoint
|
||||
role:
|
||||
- Victim
|
||||
product:
|
||||
- Splunk Enterprise
|
||||
- Splunk Enterprise Security
|
||||
- Splunk Cloud
|
||||
risk_score: 49
|
||||
required_fields:
|
||||
- _time
|
||||
- Registry.registry_key_name
|
||||
- Registry.registry_value_name
|
||||
- Registry.dest
|
||||
- Registry.user
|
||||
- Registry.registry_path
|
||||
- Registry.action
|
||||
security_domain: endpoint
|
||||
tests:
|
||||
- name: True Positive Test
|
||||
attack_data:
|
||||
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/disable-windows-security-defender-features/windefender-bypas-2-sysmon.log
|
||||
source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
|
||||
sourcetype: xmlwineventlog
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
|
||||
name: Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Gen reports
|
||||
id: 93f114f6-cb1e-419b-ac3f-9e11a3045e70
|
||||
version: 1
|
||||
date: '2024-01-08'
|
||||
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
|
||||
status: production
|
||||
type: TTP
|
||||
data_source:
|
||||
- Sysmon Event ID 12
|
||||
- Sysmon Event ID 13
|
||||
- Sysmon Event ID 14
|
||||
description: The following analytic identifies a modification in the Windows registry to disable Windows Defender
|
||||
generic ports. This registry can disable the sending of Watson events in Windows Defender. This is by preventing
|
||||
the transmission of generic or non-specific error reports to Microsoft's Windows Error Reporting service,
|
||||
commonly known as Watson. This kind of setting could potentially be employed to limit or control the data sent to
|
||||
Microsoft for error analysis, often in scenarios where privacy or specific reporting requirements are in place.
|
||||
This registry setting is being abuse by several threat actors, adversaries and red teamers to bypasses Windows defender detections.
|
||||
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
|
||||
as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= "*\\Windows Defender\\Reporting\\DisableGenericRePorts"
|
||||
Registry.registry_value_data="0x00000001"
|
||||
by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.dest
|
||||
| `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`
|
||||
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
|
||||
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
|
||||
| `windows_impair_defense_disable_win_defender_gen_reports_filter`'
|
||||
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
|
||||
on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
|
||||
your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node.
|
||||
known_false_positives: It is unusual to turn this feature off a Windows system since
|
||||
it is a default security control, although it is not rare for some policies to disable
|
||||
it. Although no false positives have been identified, use the provided filter macro
|
||||
to tune the search.
|
||||
references:
|
||||
- https://x.com/malmoeb/status/1742604217989415386?s=20
|
||||
- https://github.com/undergroundwires/privacy.sexy
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- Windows Defense Evasion Tactics
|
||||
- Windows Registry Abuse
|
||||
asset_type: Endpoint
|
||||
confidence: 70
|
||||
impact: 70
|
||||
message: Windows Defender DisableGenericRePorts registry is set to enable on $dest$.
|
||||
mitre_attack_id:
|
||||
- T1562.001
|
||||
- T1562
|
||||
observable:
|
||||
- name: dest
|
||||
type: Endpoint
|
||||
role:
|
||||
- Victim
|
||||
product:
|
||||
- Splunk Enterprise
|
||||
- Splunk Enterprise Security
|
||||
- Splunk Cloud
|
||||
risk_score: 49
|
||||
required_fields:
|
||||
- _time
|
||||
- Registry.registry_key_name
|
||||
- Registry.registry_value_name
|
||||
- Registry.dest
|
||||
- Registry.user
|
||||
- Registry.registry_path
|
||||
- Registry.action
|
||||
security_domain: endpoint
|
||||
tests:
|
||||
- name: True Positive Test
|
||||
attack_data:
|
||||
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/disable-windows-security-defender-features/windefender-bypas-2-sysmon.log
|
||||
source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
|
||||
sourcetype: xmlwineventlog
|
||||
+71
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
|
||||
name: Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Network Protection
|
||||
id: 8b6c15c7-5556-463d-83c7-986326c21f12
|
||||
version: 1
|
||||
date: '2024-01-08'
|
||||
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
|
||||
status: production
|
||||
type: TTP
|
||||
data_source:
|
||||
- Sysmon Event ID 12
|
||||
- Sysmon Event ID 13
|
||||
- Sysmon Event ID 14
|
||||
description: The following analytic identifies a modification in the Windows registry to disable Windows Defender
|
||||
exploit guard network protection. The EnableNetworkProtection registry entry controls the activation or deactivation
|
||||
of Network Protection within Windows Defender Exploit Guard. When set to 1, it typically signifies that Network Protection
|
||||
is enabled, offering additional security measures against network-based threats by analyzing and blocking potentially
|
||||
malicious network activity. This registry setting is being abuse by several threat actors, adversaries
|
||||
and red teamers to bypasses Windows defender detections.
|
||||
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
|
||||
as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= "*\\Windows Defender\\Windows Defender Exploit Guard\\Network Protection\\EnableNetworkProtection"
|
||||
Registry.registry_value_data="0x00000000"
|
||||
by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.dest
|
||||
| `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`
|
||||
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
|
||||
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
|
||||
| `windows_impair_defense_disable_win_defender_network_protection_filter`'
|
||||
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
|
||||
on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
|
||||
your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node.
|
||||
known_false_positives: It is unusual to turn this feature off a Windows system since
|
||||
it is a default security control, although it is not rare for some policies to disable
|
||||
it. Although no false positives have been identified, use the provided filter macro
|
||||
to tune the search.
|
||||
references:
|
||||
- https://x.com/malmoeb/status/1742604217989415386?s=20
|
||||
- https://github.com/undergroundwires/privacy.sexy
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- Windows Defense Evasion Tactics
|
||||
- Windows Registry Abuse
|
||||
asset_type: Endpoint
|
||||
confidence: 70
|
||||
impact: 70
|
||||
message: Windows Defender Exploit Guard network protection set to disable on $dest$.
|
||||
mitre_attack_id:
|
||||
- T1562.001
|
||||
- T1562
|
||||
observable:
|
||||
- name: dest
|
||||
type: Endpoint
|
||||
role:
|
||||
- Victim
|
||||
product:
|
||||
- Splunk Enterprise
|
||||
- Splunk Enterprise Security
|
||||
- Splunk Cloud
|
||||
risk_score: 49
|
||||
required_fields:
|
||||
- _time
|
||||
- Registry.registry_key_name
|
||||
- Registry.registry_value_name
|
||||
- Registry.dest
|
||||
- Registry.user
|
||||
- Registry.registry_path
|
||||
- Registry.action
|
||||
security_domain: endpoint
|
||||
tests:
|
||||
- name: True Positive Test
|
||||
attack_data:
|
||||
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/disable-windows-security-defender-features/windefender-bypas-2-sysmon.log
|
||||
source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
|
||||
sourcetype: xmlwineventlog
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user