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@@ -5,10 +5,16 @@ date: '2022-05-23'
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author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
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status: experimental
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type: Hunting
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description: This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user A who has already
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permission to create access keys, makes an API call to create access keys for another
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user B. Attackers have been know to use this technique for Privilege Escalation
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in case new victim(user B) has more permissions than old victim(user B)
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description: This detection rule monitors for the creation of AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) access keys.
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An IAM access key consists of an access key ID and secret access key, which are used to sign programmatic requests to AWS services.
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While IAM access keys can be legitimately used by developers and administrators for API access, their creation can also be indicative
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of malicious activity. Attackers who have gained unauthorized access to an AWS environment might create access keys as a means to
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establish persistence or to exfiltrate data through the APIs. Moreover, because access keys can be used to authenticate with AWS
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services without the need for further interaction, they can be particularly appealing for bad actors looking to operate under the radar.
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Consequently, it's important to vigilantly monitor and scrutinize access key creation events, especially if they are associated with
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unusual activity or are created by users who don't typically perform these actions. This hunting query identifies when a potentially compromised user
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creates a IAM access key for another user who may have higher privilleges, which can be a sign for privilege escalation. Hunting queries are designed to be executed
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manual during threat hunting.
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data_source: []
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search: '`amazon_security_lake` api.operation=CreateAccessKey http_request.user_agent!=console.amazonaws.com api.response.error=null
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| rename unmapped{}.key as unmapped_key , unmapped{}.value as unmapped_value
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@@ -5,10 +5,16 @@ date: '2022-03-03'
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author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
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status: production
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type: Hunting
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description: This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user A who has already
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permission to create access keys, makes an API call to create access keys for another
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user B. Attackers have been know to use this technique for Privilege Escalation
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in case new victim(user B) has more permissions than old victim(user B)
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description: This detection rule monitors for the creation of AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) access keys.
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An IAM access key consists of an access key ID and secret access key, which are used to sign programmatic requests to AWS services.
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While IAM access keys can be legitimately used by developers and administrators for API access, their creation can also be indicative
|
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of malicious activity. Attackers who have gained unauthorized access to an AWS environment might create access keys as a means to
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establish persistence or to exfiltrate data through the APIs. Moreover, because access keys can be used to authenticate with AWS
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services without the need for further interaction, they can be particularly appealing for bad actors looking to operate under the radar.
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Consequently, it's important to vigilantly monitor and scrutinize access key creation events, especially if they are associated with
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unusual activity or are created by users who don't typically perform these actions. This hunting query identifies when a potentially compromised user
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creates a IAM access key for another user who may have higher privilleges, which can be a sign for privilege escalation. Hunting queries are designed to be executed
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manual during threat hunting.
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data_source: []
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search: '`cloudtrail` eventName = CreateAccessKey userAgent !=console.amazonaws.com
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errorCode = success | eval match=if(match(userIdentity.userName,requestParameters.userName),1,0)
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