updating the detection

detections/endpoint/ssa___windows_powershell_connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.yml

@@ -15,10 +15,7 @@ description: The following hunting analytic identifies PowerShell commands utili
   For example w, win, windowsty and so forth. In addition, through our research it
   was identified that PowerShell will interpret different command switch types beyond
   the hyphen. We have added endash, emdash, horizontal bar, and forward slash.
-search: '| from pulsar("d156ed3a-1254-469a-bffc-9dd6eda97ac6", "persistent://ssa/egress/decorated-events-research") 
-| eval input_event=deserialize_json_object(value) 
-| select input_event 
-| eval _datamodels=ucast(map_get(input_event, "_datamodels"), "collection<string>", []), body={} 
+search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
 | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), cmd_line=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"),
   "string", null)), process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_name"),
   "string", null)), process_path=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_path"), "string",

dist/ssa/srs/ssa___windows_powershell_connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+author: Jose Hernandez, David Dorsey, Michael Haag Splunk
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
+date: '2022-02-11'
+description: The following hunting analytic identifies PowerShell commands utilizing
+  the WindowStyle parameter to hide the window on the compromised endpoint. This combination
+  of command-line options is suspicious because it is overriding the default PowerShell
+  execution policy, attempts to hide its activity from the user, and connects to the
+  Internet. Removed in this version of the query is New-Object. The analytic identifies
+  all variations of WindowStyle, as PowerShell allows the ability to shorten the parameter.
+  For example w, win, windowsty and so forth. In addition, through our research it
+  was identified that PowerShell will interpret different command switch types beyond
+  the hyphen. We have added endash, emdash, horizontal bar, and forward slash.
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your
+  hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be
+  ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints.
+  The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data
+  model.
+id: 477e068e-8b6d-11ec-b6c1-81af21670352
+known_false_positives: Legitimate process can have this combination of command-line
+  options, but it's not common.
+name: Windows Powershell Connect to Internet With Hidden Window
+product:
+- Splunk Behavioral Analytics
+references:
+- https://regexr.com/663rr
+- https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses/blob/master/TestHarnesses/T1059.001_PowerShell/OutPowerShellCommandLineParameter.ps1
+- https://ss64.com/ps/powershell.html
+- https://twitter.com/M_haggis/status/1440758396534214658?s=20
+- https://blog.netlab.360.com/ten-families-of-malicious-samples-are-spreading-using-the-log4j2-vulnerability-now/
+risk_message: PowerShell processes $process$ started with parameters to modify the
+  execution policy of the run, run in a hidden window, and connect to the Internet
+  on host $dest$ executed by user $user$.
+search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event,
+  "_time"), "string", null)), cmd_line=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"),
+  "string", null)), process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_name"),
+  "string", null)), process_path=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_path"), "string",
+  null), parent_process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, "parent_process_name"), "string",
+  null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, "event_id"), "string", null) | where
+  cmd_line IS NOT NULL AND process_name IS NOT NULL | where process_name="pwsh.exe"
+  OR process_name="pwsh.exe" OR process_name="sqlps.exe" OR process_name="sqltoolsps.exe"
+  OR process_name="powershell.exe" OR process_name="powershell_ise.exe" | where match_regex(cmd_line,
+  /(?i)[\\-|\\/|\u2013\|\u2014|\u2015]w(in*d*o*w*s*t*y*l*e*)*\\s+[^-]/)=true | eval
+  start_time=timestamp, end_time=timestamp, entities=mvappend(ucast(map_get(input_event,
+  "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"),
+  "string", null)), body=create_map(["event_id", event_id, "cmd_line", cmd_line, "process_name",
+  process_name, "parent_process_name", parent_process_name, "process_path", process_path])
+  | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
+tags:
+  analytic_story:
+  - Malicious PowerShell
+  - Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns
+  - HAFNIUM Group
+  - Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
+  cis20:
+  - CIS 8
+  confidence: 70
+  context:
+  - Source:Endpoint
+  - Stage:Exfiltration
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/hidden_powershell/hidden_windows-security.log
+  impact: 50
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Exfiltration
+  message: PowerShell processes $process$ started with parameters to modify the execution
+    policy of the run, run in a hidden window, and connect to the Internet on host
+    $dest$ executed by user $user$.
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1020
+  nist:
+  - PR.PT
+  - DE.CM
+  observable:
+  - name: dest_user_id
+    role:
+    - Victim
+    type: User
+  - name: dest_device_id
+    role:
+    - Victim
+    type: Hostname
+  - name: parent_process_name
+    role:
+    - Parent Process
+    type: Parent Process
+  - name: process_name
+    role:
+    - Child Process
+    type: Process
+  product:
+  - Splunk Behavioral Analytics
+  required_fields:
+  - _time
+  - dest_device_id
+  - process_name
+  - parent_process_name
+  - process_path
+  - dest_user_id
+  - process
+  - cmd_line
+  risk_score: 35
+  risk_severity: low
+  security_domain: endpoint
+type: Anomaly
+version: 1