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name: Detect RTLO In File Name
id: 468b7e11-d362-43b8-b6ec-7a2d3b246678
version: 2
date: '2023-04-26'
author: Steven Dick
status: production
type: TTP
description: This search is used to detect the abuse of the right-to-left override (RTLO or RLO)
character (U+202E) RTLO. This technique is used by adversaries to disguise a string and/or
file name to make it appear benign. The RTLO character is a non-printing Unicode
character that causes the text that follows it to be displayed in reverse.
data_source:
- Sysmon Event ID 11
- Sysmon Event ID 23
- Sysmon Event ID 26
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Filesystem.file_create_time) as file_create_time from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name!=unknown by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.user Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path
| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| regex file_name = "\\x{202E}"
| rex field=file_name "(?<RTLO_file_1>.+)(?<RTLO_exist_file>\\x{202E})(?<RTLO_file_2>.+)"
| eval file_name_with_RTLO=file_name
| eval file_name=RTLO_file_1.RTLO_file_2
| fields - RTLO*
| `detect_rtlo_in_file_name_filter`'
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
on process that includes the full command line of the process being launched on
your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition,
confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the
endpoint product.
known_false_positives: Implementation in regions that use right to left in native language.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/002/
- https://resources.infosecinstitute.com/topic/spoof-using-right-to-left-override-rtlo-technique-2/
- https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/17/f/following-trail-blacktech-cyber-espionage-campaigns.html
tags:
analytic_story:
- Spearphishing Attachments
asset_type: Endpoint
confidence: 80
impact: 50
message: Suspicious RTLO detected in $file_name$ on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.
mitre_attack_id:
- T1036.002
- T1036
observable:
- name: user
type: User
role:
- Victim
- name: dest
type: Endpoint
role:
- Victim
- name: file_name
type: File Name
role:
- Attacker
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
required_fields:
- _time
- Filesystem.dest
- Filesystem.user
- Filesystem.file_name
- Filesystem.file_path
- Filesystem.process_id
risk_score: 40
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036.002/outlook_attachment/rtlo_events.log
source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
sourcetype: xmlwineventlog
@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
name: Detect RTLO In Process
id: 22ac27b4-7189-4a4f-9375-b9017c9620d7
version: 2
date: '2023-04-26'
author: Steven Dick
status: production
type: TTP
description: This search is used to detect the abuse of the right-to-left override (RTLO or RLO)
character (U+202E) RTLO. This technique is used by adversaries to disguise a string and/or
file name to make it appear benign. The RTLO character is a non-printing Unicode
character that causes the text that follows it to be displayed in reverse.
data_source:
- Sysmon Event ID 1
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from
datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process!=unknown AND Processes.action=allowed by Processes.dest
Processes.user Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name
Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.parent_process_id
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| regex process="\\x{202E}"
| rex field=process "(?<RTLO_command_1>.+)(?<RTLO_exist_process>\\x{202E})(?<RTLO_command_2>.+)"
| eval process_with_RTLO=process
| eval process=RTLO_command_1.RTLO_command_2
| fields - RTLO*
| `detect_rtlo_in_process_filter`'
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
on process that includes the full command line of the process being launched on
your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition,
confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the
endpoint product.
known_false_positives: Implementation in regions that use right to left in native language.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/002/
- https://resources.infosecinstitute.com/topic/spoof-using-right-to-left-override-rtlo-technique-2/
- https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/17/f/following-trail-blacktech-cyber-espionage-campaigns.html
tags:
analytic_story:
- Spearphishing Attachments
asset_type: Endpoint
confidence: 80
impact: 50
message: Suspicious RTLO detected in $process_name$ on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.
mitre_attack_id:
- T1036.002
- T1036
observable:
- name: user
type: User
role:
- Victim
- name: dest
type: Endpoint
role:
- Victim
- name: process_name
type: Process Name
role:
- Attacker
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
required_fields:
- _time
- Processes.dest
- Processes.user
- Processes.original_file_name
- Processes.process_name
- Processes.process
- Processes.process_id
- Processes.process_guid
- Processes.parent_process_id
- Processes.parent_process_name
- Processes.parent_process
risk_score: 40
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036.002/outlook_attachment/rtlo_events.log
source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
sourcetype: xmlwineventlog