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Merge branch 'develop' into inspired_2194

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patel-bhavin
2022-06-21 11:04:27 -07:00
parent 529faf008b fc06b83cf6
commit 2ea683be87
1047 changed files with 13663 additions and 7314 deletions
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.github/workflows/build-and-validate.yml
+5
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@@ -426,6 +426,11 @@ jobs:
source venv/bin/activate
python3 contentctl.py -p . docgen -o docs
- name: Run reporting
run: |
source venv/bin/activate
python3 contentctl.py -p . reporting
- name: Update github with new docs and package bits
run: |
rm -rf dist
baselines/splunk_command_and_scripting_interpreter_risky_spl_mltk_baseline.yml
+80
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@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
name: Splunk Command and Scripting Interpreter Risky SPL MLTK Baseline
id: 273df2f7-643a-451a-8d4d-637e39eadc87
version: 1
date: '2022-05-27'
author: Abhinav Mishra, Kumar Sharad and Xiao Lin, Splunk
type: Baseline
datamodel:
- Splunk_Audit
description: 'This search supports an analyst looking for abuse or misuse of the risky commands listed here: https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/Splunk/latest/Security/SPLsafeguards#Commands_that_trigger_the_warning
This is accomplished by using the time spent executing one of these risky commands as a proxy for misuse/abuse of interest during investigation and/or hunting.
The search builds a model utilizes the MLTK DensityFunction algorithm on Splunk app audit log data. The model uses the past 7 days of user history executing the above referenced commands then aggregates the total search run time for each hour as indicator of user behavior.
The model identifies the top 0.1% of user search run time, indicating a risky use of these commands. Users can adjust this threshold 0.1% as interested however this will correlate to missed/false positive rates. This search should be scheduled to run at least every 7 days. The name of machine learning model generated is "risky_command_abuse" and should be configured to be globally shared (not private) in MLTK app as documented here:
https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/MLApp/5.3.1/User/Models#Sharing_models_from_other_Splunk_apps
unless the same account of training this model will be used to perform inference using this model for anomaly
detection.'
search: '| tstats sum(Search_Activity.total_run_time) as run_time, count
FROM datamodel=Splunk_Audit.Search_Activity WHERE (Search_Activity.user!="")
AND (Search_Activity.total_run_time>1) AND (earliest=-7d@d latest=now)
AND (Search_Activity.search IN ("*| runshellscript *", "*| collect *","*| delete *", "*| fit *", "*| outputcsv *",
"*| outputlookup *", "*| run *", "*| script *", "*| sendalert *", "*| sendemail *", "*| tscolle*"))
AND (Search_Activity.search_type=adhoc) AND (Search_Activity.user!=splunk-system-user)
BY _time, Search_Activity.user span=1h
| fit DensityFunction "run_time" dist=auto lower_threshold=0.000001 upper_threshold=0.001 show_density=true
by Search_Activity.user into "risky_command_abuse" '
how_to_implement: The corresponding detection of using this model is "Splunk Command and Scripting Interpreter Risky
SPL MLTK". This detection depends on MLTK app which can be found here - https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/2890/
and it assumes Splunk accelerated audit data model is available. For large enterprises, training the model might
take significant computing resources. It might require dedicated search head. The underlined machine learning
algorithm this detection used is DensityFunction. It might need to increase its settings default values, such as
max_fit_time, max_groups, etc. More details of achieving optimal performance and configuring DensityFunction
parameters can be found here - https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/MLApp/5.3.1/User/Configurefitandapply
Users can modify earliest=-7d@d in the search to other value so that the search can collect enough data points
to build a good baseline model. Users can also modify list of risky commands in "Search_Activity.search IN" to better
suit users' violation policy and their usage environment.
known_false_positives: If the run time of a search exceeds the boundaries of outlier defined by the fitted density
function model, false positives can occur, incorrectly labeling a long running search as potentially risky.
references:
- https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/Splunk/latest/Security/SPLsafeguards#Commands_that_trigger_the_warning
tags:
analytic_story:
- Splunk Vulnerabilities
asset_type: Web Server
cis20:
- CIS 3
- CIS 6
confidence: 40
cve:
- CVE-2022-32154
context:
- Source: Endpoint
dataset:
- https://github.com/splunk/attack_data/raw/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1203/search_activity.txt
impact: 50
kill_chain_phases:
- Actions on Objectives
message: ML model "risky_command_abuse" training is completed.
mitre_attack_id:
- T1059
nist:
- DE.AE
observable:
- name: user
type: User
role:
- Victim
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
required_fields:
- _time
- Search_Activity.search
- Search_Activity.total_run_time
- Search_Activity.user
- Search_Activity.search_type
risk_score: 20
security_domain: audit
detections:
- Splunk Command and Scripting Interpreter Risky SPL MLTK
bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_core/domain/entities/enums/enums.py
+1
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@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ class DataModel(enum.Enum):
Endpoint_Filesystem = 14
Endpoint_Registry = 15
Risk = 16
Splunk_Audit = 17
class SecurityContentType(enum.Enum):
detections = 1
bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter.py
-1
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@@ -36,7 +36,6 @@ class ObjToJsonAdapter(Adapter):
obj_array.append(story.dict(exclude_none=True,
exclude =
{
"detections": True,
"investigations": True
}
))
bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/templates/doc_detections.j2
+7 -3
View File
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ tags:
---
{% if object.experimental is sameas true -%}
### ⚠️ WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object
### :warning: WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL analytic
We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported.
{% endif %}
@@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use
</div>
</details>
#### Search
#### Search
```
{{ object.search|replace("|", "\n|")|safe }}
@@ -150,7 +150,8 @@ The SPL above uses the following Macros:
{% endfor %}
{% endif -%}
Note that **{{object.name | lower | replace(" ", "_") }}_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
> :information_source:
> **{{object.name | lower | replace(" ", "_") }}_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
{% if object.lookups -%}
#### Lookups
@@ -186,6 +187,9 @@ The SPL above uses the following Lookups:
| {{(object.tags.impact * object.tags.confidence)/100}} | {{ object.tags.impact }} | {{ object.tags.confidence }} | {{object.tags.message}} |
{% endif %}
> :information_source:
> The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.
#### Reference
{% if object.references %}
{% for reference in object.references -%}
bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/builder/security_content_story_builder.py
+14 -1
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@@ -41,7 +41,20 @@ class SecurityContentStoryBuilder(StoryBuilder):
for detection_analytic_story in detection.tags.analytic_story:
if detection_analytic_story == self.story.name:
matched_detection_names.append(str('ESCU - ' + detection.name + ' - Rule'))
matched_detections.append(detection)
# SSE-638: detections object should at least contain the name attribute.
# We also need a minimal set of the following attributes to satisfy docgen (doc_stories.j2):
# name, source, type, tags.mitre_attack_enrichments.mitre_attack_technique
mitre_attack_enrichments_list = []
if (detection.tags.mitre_attack_enrichments):
for attack in detection.tags.mitre_attack_enrichments:
mitre_attack_enrichments_list.append({"mitre_attack_technique": attack.mitre_attack_technique})
tags_obj = {"mitre_attack_enrichments": mitre_attack_enrichments_list}
matched_detections.append({
"name": detection.name,
"source": detection.source,
"type": detection.type,
"tags": tags_obj
})
datamodels.update(detection.datamodel)
if detection.tags.kill_chain_phases:
kill_chain_phases.update(detection.tags.kill_chain_phases)
bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/mitre_enrichment.csv
+172 -160
View File
@@ -1,18 +1,30 @@
mitre_id,technique,tactics,groups
T1647,Plist File Modification,Defense Evasion,no
T1622,Debugger Evasion,Defense Evasion|Discovery,no
T1621,Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation,Credential Access,APT29
T1505.005,Terminal Services DLL,Persistence,no
T1557.003,DHCP Spoofing,Credential Access|Collection,no
T1595.003,Wordlist Scanning,Reconnaissance,Volatile Cedar
T1098.005,Device Registration,Persistence,APT29
T1574.013,KernelCallbackTable,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,Lazarus Group
T1556.005,Reversible Encryption,Credential Access|Defense Evasion|Persistence,no
T1055.015,ListPlanting,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
T1564.010,Process Argument Spoofing,Defense Evasion,no
T1564.009,Resource Forking,Defense Evasion,no
T1559.003,XPC Services,Execution,no
T1562.010,Downgrade Attack,Defense Evasion,no
T1547.015,Login Items,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
T1620,Reflective Code Loading,Defense Evasion,no
T1620,Reflective Code Loading,Defense Evasion,Lazarus Group
T1619,Cloud Storage Object Discovery,Discovery,no
T1218.014,MMC,Defense Evasion,no
T1218.013,Mavinject,Defense Evasion,no
T1614.001,System Language Discovery,Discovery,no
T1614.001,System Language Discovery,Discovery,Ke3chang|Lazarus Group
T1615,Group Policy Discovery,Discovery,Turla
T1036.007,Double File Extension,Defense Evasion,Mustang Panda
T1562.009,Safe Mode Boot,Defense Evasion,no
T1564.008,Email Hiding Rules,Defense Evasion,FIN4
T1505.004,IIS Components,Persistence,no
T1027.006,HTML Smuggling,Defense Evasion,no
T1027.006,HTML Smuggling,Defense Evasion,APT29
T1213.003,Code Repositories,Collection,APT29
T1553.006,Code Signing Policy Modification,Defense Evasion,Turla|APT39
T1614,System Location Discovery,Discovery,no
@@ -25,14 +37,14 @@ T1053.007,Container Orchestration Job,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation
T1610,Deploy Container,Defense Evasion|Execution,TeamTNT
T1609,Container Administration Command,Execution,TeamTNT
T1608.005,Link Target,Resource Development,Silent Librarian
T1608.004,Drive-by Target,Resource Development,Transparent Tribe|APT32|Threat Group-3390
T1608.004,Drive-by Target,Resource Development,Dragonfly|Transparent Tribe|APT32|Threat Group-3390
T1608.003,Install Digital Certificate,Resource Development,no
T1608.002,Upload Tool,Resource Development,Threat Group-3390
T1608.001,Upload Malware,Resource Development,TeamTNT|APT32
T1608,Stage Capabilities,Resource Development,no
T1016.001,Internet Connection Discovery,Discovery,APT29|Turla
T1553.005,Mark-of-the-Web Bypass,Defense Evasion,TA505
T1555.005,Password Managers,Credential Access,Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao
T1608.002,Upload Tool,Resource Development,Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390
T1608.001,Upload Malware,Resource Development,Threat Group-3390|LazyScripter|Mustang Panda|Gamaredon Group|Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|TeamTNT|APT32
T1608,Stage Capabilities,Resource Development,Mustang Panda
T1016.001,Internet Connection Discovery,Discovery,Gamaredon Group|APT29|Turla
T1553.005,Mark-of-the-Web Bypass,Defense Evasion,APT29|TA505
T1555.005,Password Managers,Credential Access,Threat Group-3390|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao
T1484.002,Domain Trust Modification,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,APT29
T1484.001,Group Policy Modification,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Indrik Spider
T1547.014,Active Setup,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
@@ -61,8 +73,8 @@ T1588.006,Vulnerabilities,Resource Development,Sandworm Team
T1053.006,Systemd Timers,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
T1562.008,Disable Cloud Logs,Defense Evasion,no
T1547.012,Print Processors,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
T1598.003,Spearphishing Link,Reconnaissance,Magic Hound|Silent Librarian|Sidewinder|Sandworm Team|APT32|Kimsuky
T1598.002,Spearphishing Attachment,Reconnaissance,Sidewinder
T1598.003,Spearphishing Link,Reconnaissance,APT28|Dragonfly|Magic Hound|Silent Librarian|Sidewinder|Sandworm Team|APT32|Kimsuky
T1598.002,Spearphishing Attachment,Reconnaissance,Dragonfly|Sidewinder
T1598.001,Spearphishing Service,Reconnaissance,no
T1598,Phishing for Information,Reconnaissance,ZIRCONIUM|APT28
T1597.002,Purchase Technical Data,Reconnaissance,no
@@ -74,23 +86,23 @@ T1596.003,Digital Certificates,Reconnaissance,no
T1596.001,DNS/Passive DNS,Reconnaissance,no
T1596.002,WHOIS,Reconnaissance,no
T1596,Search Open Technical Databases,Reconnaissance,no
T1595.002,Vulnerability Scanning,Reconnaissance,TeamTNT|APT29|Volatile Cedar|APT28|Sandworm Team
T1595.002,Vulnerability Scanning,Reconnaissance,Magic Hound|Aquatic Panda|Dragonfly|TeamTNT|APT29|Volatile Cedar|APT28|Sandworm Team
T1595.001,Scanning IP Blocks,Reconnaissance,TeamTNT
T1595,Active Scanning,Reconnaissance,no
T1594,Search Victim-Owned Websites,Reconnaissance,Silent Librarian|Sandworm Team
T1593.002,Search Engines,Reconnaissance,no
T1593.001,Social Media,Reconnaissance,Kimsuky
T1594,Search Victim-Owned Websites,Reconnaissance,Kimsuky|Silent Librarian|Sandworm Team
T1593.002,Search Engines,Reconnaissance,Kimsuky
T1593.001,Social Media,Reconnaissance,Lazarus Group|Kimsuky
T1593,Search Open Websites/Domains,Reconnaissance,Sandworm Team
T1592.004,Client Configurations,Reconnaissance,HAFNIUM
T1592.003,Firmware,Reconnaissance,no
T1592.002,Software,Reconnaissance,Andariel|Sandworm Team
T1592.001,Hardware,Reconnaissance,no
T1592,Gather Victim Host Information,Reconnaissance,no
T1591.004,Identify Roles,Reconnaissance,no
T1591.004,Identify Roles,Reconnaissance,Lazarus Group
T1591.003,Identify Business Tempo,Reconnaissance,no
T1591.001,Determine Physical Locations,Reconnaissance,no
T1591.002,Business Relationships,Reconnaissance,Sandworm Team
T1591,Gather Victim Org Information,Reconnaissance,no
T1591.002,Business Relationships,Reconnaissance,Dragonfly|Sandworm Team
T1591,Gather Victim Org Information,Reconnaissance,Kimsuky|Lazarus Group
T1590.006,Network Security Appliances,Reconnaissance,no
T1590.005,IP Addresses,Reconnaissance,Andariel|HAFNIUM
T1590.004,Network Topology,Reconnaissance,no
@@ -98,40 +110,40 @@ T1590.003,Network Trust Dependencies,Reconnaissance,no
T1590.002,DNS,Reconnaissance,no
T1590.001,Domain Properties,Reconnaissance,Sandworm Team
T1590,Gather Victim Network Information,Reconnaissance,HAFNIUM
T1589.003,Employee Names,Reconnaissance,Silent Librarian|Sandworm Team
T1589.002,Email Addresses,Reconnaissance,Kimsuky|Magic Hound|TA551|MuddyWater|HAFNIUM|APT32|Silent Librarian|Sandworm Team
T1589.001,Credentials,Reconnaissance,Leviathan|APT28|Magic Hound|Chimera
T1589.003,Employee Names,Reconnaissance,Kimsuky|Silent Librarian|Sandworm Team
T1589.002,Email Addresses,Reconnaissance,Lazarus Group|Kimsuky|Magic Hound|TA551|MuddyWater|HAFNIUM|APT32|Silent Librarian|Sandworm Team
T1589.001,Credentials,Reconnaissance,APT29|Leviathan|APT28|Magic Hound|Chimera
T1589,Gather Victim Identity Information,Reconnaissance,Magic Hound|APT32
T1588.005,Exploits,Resource Development,no
T1588.004,Digital Certificates,Resource Development,Lazarus Group|Silent Librarian
T1588.003,Code Signing Certificates,Resource Development,Wizard Spider
T1588.002,Tool,Resource Development,CostaRicto|Night Dragon|DarkVishnya|FIN5|Gorgon Group|Patchwork|Chimera|Dragonfly|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|APT41|FIN6|TEMP.Veles|Kimsuky|PittyTiger|Cobalt Group|APT29|Thrip|Ke3chang|DarkHydrus|APT32|APT38|BRONZE BUTLER|Carbanak|Cleaver|Inception|Leafminer|Threat Group-3390|Ferocious Kitten|IndigoZebra|BackdoorDiplomacy|menuPass|APT-C-36|Magic Hound|APT28|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Silence|WIRTE|Turla|APT33|APT19|FIN10|CopyKittens|APT39|APT1|MuddyWater|Silent Librarian|GALLIUM|Sandworm Team
T1588.001,Malware,Resource Development,Andariel|BackdoorDiplomacy|Turla|APT1
T1588.005,Exploits,Resource Development,Kimsuky
T1588.004,Digital Certificates,Resource Development,BlackTech|Lazarus Group|Silent Librarian
T1588.003,Code Signing Certificates,Resource Development,BlackTech|Lazarus Group|Wizard Spider
T1588.002,Tool,Resource Development,Aquatic Panda|BlackTech|Lazarus Group|CostaRicto|Night Dragon|DarkVishnya|FIN5|Gorgon Group|Patchwork|Chimera|Dragonfly|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|APT41|FIN6|TEMP.Veles|Kimsuky|PittyTiger|Cobalt Group|APT29|Thrip|Ke3chang|DarkHydrus|APT32|APT38|BRONZE BUTLER|Carbanak|Cleaver|Inception|Leafminer|Threat Group-3390|Ferocious Kitten|IndigoZebra|BackdoorDiplomacy|menuPass|APT-C-36|Magic Hound|APT28|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Silence|WIRTE|Turla|APT33|APT19|FIN10|CopyKittens|APT39|APT1|MuddyWater|Silent Librarian|GALLIUM|Sandworm Team
T1588.001,Malware,Resource Development,Aquatic Panda|LazyScripter|Andariel|BackdoorDiplomacy|Turla|APT1
T1588,Obtain Capabilities,Resource Development,no
T1587.004,Exploits,Resource Development,no
T1587.003,Digital Certificates,Resource Development,APT29|PROMETHIUM
T1587.002,Code Signing Certificates,Resource Development,PROMETHIUM|Patchwork
T1587.001,Malware,Resource Development,TeamTNT|APT29|Lazarus Group|Sandworm Team|Turla|FIN7|Night Dragon|Cleaver
T1587.001,Malware,Resource Development,Ke3chang|Kimsuky|TeamTNT|APT29|Lazarus Group|Sandworm Team|Turla|FIN7|Night Dragon|Cleaver
T1587,Develop Capabilities,Resource Development,Kimsuky
T1586.002,Email Accounts,Resource Development,IndigoZebra|Leviathan|Magic Hound|Kimsuky
T1586.002,Email Accounts,Resource Development,APT29|APT28|IndigoZebra|Leviathan|Magic Hound|Kimsuky
T1586.001,Social Media Accounts,Resource Development,Leviathan
T1586,Compromise Accounts,Resource Development,no
T1585.002,Email Accounts,Resource Development,Leviathan|Magic Hound|Silent Librarian|Sandworm Team|APT1
T1585.001,Social Media Accounts,Resource Development,Leviathan|Magic Hound|Fox Kitten|Sandworm Team|APT32|Cleaver
T1585.002,Email Accounts,Resource Development,Mustang Panda|Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|Leviathan|Magic Hound|Silent Librarian|Sandworm Team|APT1
T1585.001,Social Media Accounts,Resource Development,Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|Leviathan|Magic Hound|Fox Kitten|Sandworm Team|APT32|Cleaver
T1585,Establish Accounts,Resource Development,Fox Kitten|APT17
T1584.006,Web Services,Resource Development,Turla
T1584.005,Botnet,Resource Development,no
T1584.004,Server,Resource Development,Indrik Spider|Turla|APT16
T1584.005,Botnet,Resource Development,Sandworm Team|Axiom
T1584.004,Server,Resource Development,Lazarus Group|Dragonfly|Indrik Spider|Turla|APT16
T1584.003,Virtual Private Server,Resource Development,Turla
T1584.002,DNS Server,Resource Development,no
T1584.001,Domains,Resource Development,Transparent Tribe|Magic Hound|APT29|APT1
T1583.006,Web Services,Resource Development,IndigoZebra|ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|HAFNIUM|Lazarus Group|Turla|APT32|APT17|APT29
T1584.001,Domains,Resource Development,Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|Transparent Tribe|Magic Hound|APT29|APT1
T1583.006,Web Services,Resource Development,APT28|Confucius|LazyScripter|Kimsuky|Magic Hound|IndigoZebra|ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|HAFNIUM|Lazarus Group|Turla|APT32|APT17|APT29
T1583.005,Botnet,Resource Development,no
T1583.004,Server,Resource Development,GALLIUM|Sandworm Team
T1583.003,Virtual Private Server,Resource Development,HAFNIUM|TEMP.Veles
T1583.002,DNS Server,Resource Development,no
T1583.004,Server,Resource Development,Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|Gelsemium|GALLIUM|Sandworm Team
T1583.003,Virtual Private Server,Resource Development,Axiom|Dragonfly|HAFNIUM|TEMP.Veles
T1583.002,DNS Server,Resource Development,Axiom
T1584,Compromise Infrastructure,Resource Development,no
T1583.001,Domains,Resource Development,IndigoZebra|TeamTNT|Ferocious Kitten|FIN7|Transparent Tribe|Leviathan|Magic Hound|APT29|Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|Lazarus Group|Silent Librarian|menuPass|Sandworm Team|APT32|Kimsuky|APT1|APT28
T1583.001,Domains,Resource Development,LazyScripter|Gamaredon Group|Winnti Group|Dragonfly|IndigoZebra|TeamTNT|Ferocious Kitten|FIN7|Transparent Tribe|Leviathan|Magic Hound|APT29|Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|Lazarus Group|Silent Librarian|menuPass|Sandworm Team|APT32|Kimsuky|APT1|APT28
T1583,Acquire Infrastructure,Resource Development,no
T1564.007,VBA Stomping,Defense Evasion,no
T1558.004,AS-REP Roasting,Credential Access,no
@@ -145,7 +157,7 @@ T1574.012,COR_PROFILER,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,Blue Moc
T1562.007,Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall,Defense Evasion,no
T1098.004,SSH Authorized Keys,Persistence,TeamTNT
T1480.001,Environmental Keying,Defense Evasion,APT41|Equation
T1059.007,JavaScript,Execution,Indrik Spider|MuddyWater|Turla|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Evilnum|Kimsuky|FIN6|APT32|FIN7|Cobalt Group|Molerats|TA505|Silence|Leafminer
T1059.007,JavaScript,Execution,LazyScripter|Indrik Spider|MuddyWater|Turla|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Evilnum|Kimsuky|FIN6|APT32|FIN7|Cobalt Group|Molerats|TA505|Silence|Leafminer
T1578.004,Revert Cloud Instance,Defense Evasion,no
T1578.003,Delete Cloud Instance,Defense Evasion,no
T1578.001,Create Snapshot,Defense Evasion,no
@@ -155,14 +167,14 @@ T1027.005,Indicator Removal from Tools,Defense Evasion,Operation Wocao|GALLIUM|T
T1562.006,Indicator Blocking,Defense Evasion,no
T1573.002,Asymmetric Cryptography,Command And Control,Operation Wocao|Tropic Trooper|Cobalt Group|OilRig|FIN8|FIN6
T1573.001,Symmetric Cryptography,Command And Control,Mustang Panda|Darkhotel|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Frankenstein|Inception|APT28|APT33|BRONZE BUTLER|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group
T1573,Encrypted Channel,Command And Control,Tropic Trooper
T1573,Encrypted Channel,Command And Control,APT29|Tropic Trooper
T1027.004,Compile After Delivery,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|Rocke|MuddyWater
T1574.004,Dylib Hijacking,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
T1546.015,Component Object Model Hijacking,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,APT28
T1071.004,DNS,Command And Control,Chimera|APT39|Tropic Trooper|OilRig|Ke3chang|Cobalt Group|APT18|APT41|FIN7
T1071.004,DNS,Command And Control,LazyScripter|Chimera|APT39|Tropic Trooper|OilRig|Ke3chang|Cobalt Group|APT18|APT41|FIN7
T1071.003,Mail Protocols,Command And Control,Turla|Kimsuky|APT32|SilverTerrier|APT28
T1071.002,File Transfer Protocols,Command And Control,Kimsuky|APT41|SilverTerrier|Honeybee
T1071.001,Web Protocols,Command And Control,TeamTNT|FIN8|APT29|Mustang Panda|Windshift|TA551|Higaisa|HAFNIUM|Sidewinder|Chimera|Sandworm Team|TA505|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Inception|APT41|SilverTerrier|APT28|WIRTE|APT33|FIN4|Night Dragon|APT18|APT38|Rancor|Ke3chang|Orangeworm|APT37|APT19|Cobalt Group|Threat Group-3390|Dark Caracal|Turla|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|APT32|OilRig|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon
T1071.001,Web Protocols,Command And Control,Kimsuky|Confucius|TeamTNT|FIN8|APT29|Mustang Panda|Windshift|TA551|Higaisa|HAFNIUM|Sidewinder|Chimera|Sandworm Team|TA505|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Inception|APT41|SilverTerrier|APT28|WIRTE|APT33|FIN4|Night Dragon|APT18|APT38|Rancor|Ke3chang|Orangeworm|APT37|APT19|Cobalt Group|Threat Group-3390|Dark Caracal|Turla|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|APT32|OilRig|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon
T1572,Protocol Tunneling,Command And Control,Leviathan|CostaRicto|Chimera|Fox Kitten|OilRig|Cobalt Group|FIN6
T1048.003,Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol,Exfiltration,Wizard Spider|FIN6|APT32|APT33|Thrip|FIN8|OilRig|Lazarus Group
T1048.002,Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol,Exfiltration,APT28|APT29
@@ -175,23 +187,23 @@ T1132.001,Standard Encoding,Command And Control,HAFNIUM|TA551|Sandworm Team|Trop
T1090.004,Domain Fronting,Command And Control,APT29
T1090.003,Multi-hop Proxy,Command And Control,Leviathan|CostaRicto|APT28|Operation Wocao|Inception|FIN4|APT29
T1090.002,External Proxy,Command And Control,Tonto Team|APT39|Silence|GALLIUM|MuddyWater|APT3|FIN5|Lazarus Group|menuPass|APT28
T1090.001,Internal Proxy,Command And Control,APT29|Higaisa|Operation Wocao|APT39|Strider
T1090.001,Internal Proxy,Command And Control,Lazarus Group|Turla|APT29|Higaisa|Operation Wocao|APT39|Strider
T1102.003,One-Way Communication,Command And Control,Leviathan
T1102.002,Bidirectional Communication,Command And Control,ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|APT28|APT29|Sandworm Team|APT39|APT12|Turla|FIN7|APT37|Magic Hound|Carbanak
T1102.002,Bidirectional Communication,Command And Control,Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|APT28|APT29|Sandworm Team|APT39|APT12|Turla|FIN7|APT37|Magic Hound|Carbanak
T1102.001,Dead Drop Resolver,Command And Control,Rocke|APT41|BRONZE BUTLER|RTM|Patchwork
T1571,Non-Standard Port,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|Rocke|DarkVishnya|Silence|APT-C-36|Magic Hound|APT33|APT32|TEMP.Veles|Lazarus Group|FIN7
T1571,Non-Standard Port,Command And Control,WIRTE|Sandworm Team|Rocke|DarkVishnya|Silence|APT-C-36|Magic Hound|APT33|APT32|TEMP.Veles|Lazarus Group|FIN7
T1074.002,Remote Data Staging,Collection,Leviathan|APT28|APT29|Chimera|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|FIN6|Night Dragon|FIN8
T1074.001,Local Data Staging,Collection,Indrik Spider|BackdoorDiplomacy|Mustang Panda|Sidewinder|Chimera|Kimsuky|APT39|Operation Wocao|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|Patchwork|Honeybee|Dragonfly 2.0|Leviathan|APT3|FIN5|menuPass|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28
T1078.004,Cloud Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,APT28|APT33
T1074.001,Local Data Staging,Collection,Dragonfly|Indrik Spider|BackdoorDiplomacy|Mustang Panda|Sidewinder|Chimera|Kimsuky|APT39|Operation Wocao|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|Patchwork|Honeybee|Dragonfly 2.0|Leviathan|APT3|FIN5|menuPass|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28
T1078.004,Cloud Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,Ke3chang|APT29|APT28|APT33
T1564.004,NTFS File Attributes,Defense Evasion,APT32
T1564.003,Hidden Window,Defense Evasion,Nomadic Octopus|Higaisa|Gorgon Group|Deep Panda|DarkHydrus|CopyKittens|APT19|APT32|APT28|APT3|Magic Hound
T1078.003,Local Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,Kimsuky|HAFNIUM|Turla|Operation Wocao|PROMETHIUM|Tropic Trooper|FIN10|APT32
T1564.003,Hidden Window,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|Kimsuky|Nomadic Octopus|Higaisa|Gorgon Group|Deep Panda|DarkHydrus|CopyKittens|APT19|APT32|APT28|APT3|Magic Hound
T1078.003,Local Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,APT29|Kimsuky|HAFNIUM|Turla|Operation Wocao|PROMETHIUM|Tropic Trooper|FIN10|APT32
T1078.002,Domain Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,Naikon|Indrik Spider|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|APT29|TA505|APT3|Threat Group-1314
T1078.001,Default Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,no
T1564.002,Hidden Users,Defense Evasion,Dragonfly 2.0
T1564.002,Hidden Users,Defense Evasion,Kimsuky|Dragonfly|Dragonfly 2.0
T1574.006,Dynamic Linker Hijacking,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,APT41|Rocke
T1574.002,DLL Side-Loading,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,Mustang Panda|Higaisa|BlackTech|Sidewinder|Chimera|BRONZE BUTLER|Naikon|APT41|GALLIUM|Tropic Trooper|APT19|Patchwork|APT32|APT3|menuPass|Threat Group-3390
T1574.001,DLL Search Order Hijacking,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,BackdoorDiplomacy|Tonto Team|Evilnum|APT41|Whitefly|RTM|Threat Group-3390|menuPass
T1574.002,DLL Side-Loading,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,Lazarus Group|Mustang Panda|Higaisa|BlackTech|Sidewinder|Chimera|BRONZE BUTLER|Naikon|APT41|GALLIUM|Tropic Trooper|APT19|Patchwork|APT32|APT3|menuPass|Threat Group-3390
T1574.001,DLL Search Order Hijacking,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,Aquatic Panda|BackdoorDiplomacy|Tonto Team|Evilnum|APT41|Whitefly|RTM|Threat Group-3390|menuPass
T1574.008,Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
T1574.007,Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
T1574.009,Path Interception by Unquoted Path,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
@@ -202,10 +214,10 @@ T1574,Hijack Execution Flow,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
T1069.001,Local Groups,Discovery,Tonto Team|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Turla|OilRig|admin@338
T1570,Lateral Tool Transfer,Lateral Movement,Sandworm Team|Chimera|GALLIUM|Operation Wocao|APT32|Wizard Spider|Turla|FIN10
T1568.003,DNS Calculation,Command And Control,APT12
T1204.002,Malicious File,Execution,Nomadic Octopus|Indrik Spider|APT38|Andariel|Ferocious Kitten|IndigoZebra|Transparent Tribe|Tonto Team|Magic Hound|Ajax Security Team|Mustang Panda|TA551|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Kimsuky|FIN6|PROMETHIUM|APT30|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|RTM|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|Machete|admin@338|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN7|BRONZE BUTLER|Gorgon Group|OilRig|Dark Caracal|Cobalt Group|DarkHydrus|Rancor|Patchwork|APT32|APT19|MuddyWater|Lazarus Group|menuPass|APT37|Leviathan|TA459|APT29|APT28|FIN8|PLATINUM|Elderwood
T1204.001,Malicious Link,Execution,FIN7|Transparent Tribe|APT3|Magic Hound|APT28|APT29|Mustang Panda|Sidewinder|ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|Evilnum|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|Patchwork|Windshift|APT32|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|TA505|OilRig|Machete|Leviathan|FIN8|FIN4|Elderwood|Dragonfly 2.0|Cobalt Group|APT39|Night Dragon|Turla|APT33
T1204.002,Malicious File,Execution,LazyScripter|WIRTE|Confucius|Dragonfly|Threat Group-3390|Nomadic Octopus|Indrik Spider|APT38|Andariel|Ferocious Kitten|IndigoZebra|Transparent Tribe|Tonto Team|Magic Hound|Ajax Security Team|Mustang Panda|TA551|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Kimsuky|FIN6|PROMETHIUM|APT30|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|RTM|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|Machete|admin@338|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN7|BRONZE BUTLER|Gorgon Group|OilRig|Dark Caracal|Cobalt Group|DarkHydrus|Rancor|Patchwork|APT32|APT19|MuddyWater|Lazarus Group|menuPass|APT37|Leviathan|TA459|APT29|APT28|FIN8|PLATINUM|Elderwood
T1204.001,Malicious Link,Execution,LazyScripter|Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|Confucius|FIN7|Transparent Tribe|APT3|Magic Hound|APT28|APT29|Mustang Panda|Sidewinder|ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|Evilnum|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|Patchwork|Windshift|APT32|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|TA505|OilRig|Machete|Leviathan|FIN8|FIN4|Elderwood|Dragonfly 2.0|Cobalt Group|APT39|Night Dragon|Turla|APT33
T1195.003,Compromise Hardware Supply Chain,Initial Access,no
T1195.002,Compromise Software Supply Chain,Initial Access,APT29|Cobalt Group|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Dragonfly|Sandworm Team|APT41
T1195.002,Compromise Software Supply Chain,Initial Access,Gelsemium|Threat Group-3390|APT29|Cobalt Group|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Dragonfly|Sandworm Team|APT41
T1195.001,Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools,Initial Access,no
T1568.001,Fast Flux DNS,Command And Control,menuPass|TA505
T1052.001,Exfiltration over USB,Exfiltration,Mustang Panda|Tropic Trooper
@@ -213,65 +225,65 @@ T1569.002,Service Execution,Execution,APT38|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spide
T1569.001,Launchctl,Execution,no
T1569,System Services,Execution,no
T1568.002,Domain Generation Algorithms,Command And Control,TA551|APT41
T1568,Dynamic Resolution,Command And Control,Transparent Tribe|APT29
T1568,Dynamic Resolution,Command And Control,Gamaredon Group|Gelsemium|Transparent Tribe|APT29
T1011.001,Exfiltration Over Bluetooth,Exfiltration,no
T1567.002,Exfiltration to Cloud Storage,Exfiltration,FIN7|ZIRCONIUM|HAFNIUM|Chimera|Leviathan|Turla
T1567.002,Exfiltration to Cloud Storage,Exfiltration,Kimsuky|Threat Group-3390|Confucius|Lazarus Group|FIN7|ZIRCONIUM|HAFNIUM|Chimera|Leviathan|Turla
T1567.001,Exfiltration to Code Repository,Exfiltration,no
T1059.006,Python,Execution,Tonto Team|APT37|ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|Turla|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|APT29|Rocke|BRONZE BUTLER|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|Machete
T1059.005,Visual Basic,Execution,OilRig|APT38|Transparent Tribe|APT29|Mustang Panda|Windshift|Higaisa|Sidewinder|APT39|Machete|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|APT33|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|Rancor|Patchwork|MuddyWater|Honeybee|FIN7|APT37|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|Turla|TA505|Silence|WIRTE|FIN4|Cobalt Group|Gorgon Group|Leviathan|TA459|Magic Hound
T1059.006,Python,Execution,Dragonfly|Tonto Team|APT37|ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|Turla|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|APT29|Rocke|BRONZE BUTLER|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|Machete
T1059.005,Visual Basic,Execution,Confucius|Lazarus Group|LazyScripter|OilRig|APT38|Transparent Tribe|APT29|Mustang Panda|Windshift|Higaisa|Sidewinder|APT39|Machete|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|APT33|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|Rancor|Patchwork|MuddyWater|Honeybee|FIN7|APT37|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|Turla|TA505|Silence|WIRTE|FIN4|Cobalt Group|Gorgon Group|Leviathan|TA459|Magic Hound
T1059.004,Unix Shell,Execution,TeamTNT|Rocke|APT41
T1059.003,Windows Command Shell,Execution,Sandworm Team|Nomadic Octopus|TeamTNT|APT29|Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|TA551|Higaisa|Indrik Spider|Chimera|Fox Kitten|Machete|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|FIN6|TA505|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|OilRig|Lazarus Group|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|FIN7|APT41|GALLIUM|Turla|Silence|APT32|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Gorgon Group|Dark Caracal|Ke3chang|Dragonfly 2.0|Rancor|FIN8|APT28|APT37|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|Sowbug|menuPass|FIN10|Threat Group-3390|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Suckfly|Threat Group-1314|APT3|admin@338|APT1
T1059.003,Windows Command Shell,Execution,Kimsuky|Aquatic Panda|Dragonfly|LazyScripter|Sandworm Team|Nomadic Octopus|TeamTNT|APT29|Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|TA551|Higaisa|Indrik Spider|Chimera|Fox Kitten|Machete|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|FIN6|TA505|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|OilRig|Lazarus Group|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|FIN7|APT41|GALLIUM|Turla|Silence|APT32|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Gorgon Group|Dark Caracal|Ke3chang|Dragonfly 2.0|Rancor|FIN8|APT28|APT37|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|Sowbug|menuPass|FIN10|Threat Group-3390|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Suckfly|Threat Group-1314|APT3|admin@338|APT1
T1059.002,AppleScript,Execution,no
T1059.001,PowerShell,Execution,Nomadic Octopus|TeamTNT|APT38|Tonto Team|Mustang Panda|Indrik Spider|HAFNIUM|Sidewinder|Fox Kitten|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|APT39|DarkVishnya|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Inception|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|GALLIUM|TA505|WIRTE|TEMP.Veles|APT33|Gallmaker|Turla|Thrip|Cobalt Group|APT28|DarkHydrus|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|Gorgon Group|TA459|Leviathan|MuddyWater|FIN8|CopyKittens|OilRig|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN7|APT32|menuPass|FIN10|Threat Group-3390|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Poseidon Group|APT3|APT29|Deep Panda
T1059.001,PowerShell,Execution,Gamaredon Group|Lazarus Group|Aquatic Panda|Confucius|Dragonfly|LazyScripter|Nomadic Octopus|TeamTNT|APT38|Tonto Team|Mustang Panda|Indrik Spider|HAFNIUM|Sidewinder|Fox Kitten|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|APT39|DarkVishnya|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Inception|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|GALLIUM|TA505|WIRTE|TEMP.Veles|APT33|Gallmaker|Turla|Thrip|Cobalt Group|APT28|DarkHydrus|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|Gorgon Group|TA459|Leviathan|MuddyWater|FIN8|CopyKittens|OilRig|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN7|APT32|menuPass|FIN10|Threat Group-3390|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Poseidon Group|APT3|APT29|Deep Panda
T1567,Exfiltration Over Web Service,Exfiltration,APT28
T1497.003,Time Based Evasion,Defense Evasion|Discovery,no
T1497.002,User Activity Based Checks,Defense Evasion|Discovery,Darkhotel|FIN7
T1497.001,System Checks,Defense Evasion|Discovery,OilRig|Darkhotel|Evilnum|Frankenstein
T1497.001,System Checks,Defense Evasion|Discovery,Lazarus Group|OilRig|Darkhotel|Evilnum|Frankenstein
T1498.002,Reflection Amplification,Impact,no
T1498.001,Direct Network Flood,Impact,no
T1566.003,Spearphishing via Service,Initial Access,APT29|Ajax Security Team|Magic Hound|Windshift|FIN6|OilRig|Dark Caracal
T1566.002,Spearphishing Link,Initial Access,Transparent Tribe|FIN7|APT3|Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|Sidewinder|Evilnum|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|APT1|Windshift|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|Machete|Kimsuky|TA505|APT39|FIN4|APT32|Night Dragon|APT28|Cobalt Group|Turla|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|Elderwood|APT33|APT29|Leviathan|FIN8|Patchwork|Magic Hound
T1566.001,Spearphishing Attachment,Initial Access,APT38|Andariel|Ferocious Kitten|IndigoZebra|Transparent Tribe|Nomadic Octopus|Tonto Team|Ajax Security Team|Mustang Panda|TA551|Higaisa|Sidewinder|APT1|FIN6|APT30|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Mofang|Wizard Spider|RTM|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|APT41|Machete|admin@338|Kimsuky|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|Tropic Trooper|DarkHydrus|Lazarus Group|Gorgon Group|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|APT19|APT32|Cobalt Group|Rancor|FIN7|Dragonfly 2.0|MuddyWater|APT28|TA459|APT29|APT37|Leviathan|FIN8|Patchwork|menuPass|Elderwood|PLATINUM
T1566,Phishing,Initial Access,GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Dragonfly
T1566.003,Spearphishing via Service,Initial Access,Lazarus Group|APT29|Ajax Security Team|Magic Hound|Windshift|FIN6|OilRig|Dark Caracal
T1566.002,Spearphishing Link,Initial Access,Lazarus Group|Confucius|LazyScripter|Transparent Tribe|FIN7|APT3|Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|Sidewinder|Evilnum|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|APT1|Windshift|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|Machete|Kimsuky|TA505|APT39|FIN4|APT32|Night Dragon|APT28|Cobalt Group|Turla|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|Elderwood|APT33|APT29|Leviathan|FIN8|Patchwork|Magic Hound
T1566.001,Spearphishing Attachment,Initial Access,WIRTE|Confucius|Dragonfly|LazyScripter|Threat Group-3390|APT38|Andariel|Ferocious Kitten|IndigoZebra|Transparent Tribe|Nomadic Octopus|Tonto Team|Ajax Security Team|Mustang Panda|TA551|Higaisa|Sidewinder|APT1|FIN6|APT30|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Mofang|Wizard Spider|RTM|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|APT41|Machete|admin@338|Kimsuky|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|Tropic Trooper|DarkHydrus|Lazarus Group|Gorgon Group|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|APT19|APT32|Cobalt Group|Rancor|FIN7|Dragonfly 2.0|MuddyWater|APT28|TA459|APT29|APT37|Leviathan|FIN8|Patchwork|menuPass|Elderwood|PLATINUM
T1566,Phishing,Initial Access,Axiom|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Dragonfly
T1565.003,Runtime Data Manipulation,Impact,APT38
T1565.002,Transmitted Data Manipulation,Impact,APT38
T1565.001,Stored Data Manipulation,Impact,APT38
T1565,Data Manipulation,Impact,no
T1564.001,Hidden Files and Directories,Defense Evasion,Transparent Tribe|Mustang Panda|Rocke|APT32|Tropic Trooper|APT28|Lazarus Group
T1564,Hide Artifacts,Defense Evasion,no
T1563.002,RDP Hijacking,Lateral Movement,no
T1563.002,RDP Hijacking,Lateral Movement,Axiom
T1563.001,SSH Hijacking,Lateral Movement,no
T1563,Remote Service Session Hijacking,Lateral Movement,no
T1518.001,Security Software Discovery,Discovery,TeamTNT|APT38|Windshift|Sidewinder|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Turla|Rocke|Frankenstein|The White Company|Cobalt Group|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|Tropic Trooper|FIN8|Patchwork|Naikon
T1518.001,Security Software Discovery,Discovery,Kimsuky|Aquatic Panda|TeamTNT|APT38|Windshift|Sidewinder|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Turla|Rocke|Frankenstein|The White Company|Cobalt Group|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|Tropic Trooper|FIN8|Patchwork|Naikon
T1069.003,Cloud Groups,Discovery,no
T1069.002,Domain Groups,Discovery,Turla|Inception|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|Ke3chang
T1087.004,Cloud Account,Discovery,no
T1069.002,Domain Groups,Discovery,APT29|Dragonfly|Turla|Inception|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|Ke3chang
T1087.004,Cloud Account,Discovery,APT29
T1087.003,Email Account,Discovery,Sandworm Team|TA505
T1087.002,Domain Account,Discovery,MuddyWater|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Chimera|Turla|Sandworm Team|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN6|Poseidon Group|Ke3chang
T1087.002,Domain Account,Discovery,APT29|Lazarus Group|Dragonfly|MuddyWater|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Chimera|Turla|Sandworm Team|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN6|Poseidon Group|Ke3chang
T1087.001,Local Account,Discovery,Chimera|Fox Kitten|Turla|Poseidon Group|OilRig|Ke3chang|APT32|APT1|Threat Group-3390|APT3|admin@338
T1553.004,Install Root Certificate,Defense Evasion,no
T1562.004,Disable or Modify System Firewall,Defense Evasion,TeamTNT|APT38|APT29|Operation Wocao|Rocke|Lazarus Group|Kimsuky|Dragonfly 2.0|Carbanak
T1562.004,Disable or Modify System Firewall,Defense Evasion,Dragonfly|TeamTNT|APT38|APT29|Operation Wocao|Rocke|Lazarus Group|Kimsuky|Dragonfly 2.0|Carbanak
T1562.003,Impair Command History Logging,Defense Evasion,APT38
T1562.002,Disable Windows Event Logging,Defense Evasion,Sandworm Team|APT29|Threat Group-3390
T1562.001,Disable or Modify Tools,Defense Evasion,TeamTNT|Indrik Spider|APT29|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|FIN6|Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Rocke|Kimsuky|Turla|Night Dragon|Gorgon Group|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda
T1562.001,Disable or Modify Tools,Defense Evasion,Aquatic Panda|TeamTNT|Indrik Spider|APT29|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|FIN6|Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Rocke|Kimsuky|Turla|Night Dragon|Gorgon Group|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda
T1562,Impair Defenses,Defense Evasion,no
T1003.004,LSA Secrets,Credential Access,OilRig|MuddyWater|menuPass|Leafminer|Ke3chang|Dragonfly 2.0|APT33|Threat Group-3390
T1003.004,LSA Secrets,Credential Access,Dragonfly|OilRig|MuddyWater|menuPass|Leafminer|Ke3chang|Dragonfly 2.0|APT33|Threat Group-3390
T1003.005,Cached Domain Credentials,Credential Access,OilRig|MuddyWater|Leafminer|APT33
T1561.002,Disk Structure Wipe,Impact,Sandworm Team|Lazarus Group|APT38|APT37
T1561.001,Disk Content Wipe,Impact,Lazarus Group
T1561,Disk Wipe,Impact,no
T1560.003,Archive via Custom Method,Collection,Mustang Panda|Lazarus Group|Kimsuky|CopyKittens|FIN6
T1560.002,Archive via Library,Collection,Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390
T1560.001,Archive via Utility,Collection,APT28|APT29|Mustang Panda|HAFNIUM|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Chimera|APT41|GALLIUM|Turla|Gallmaker|APT33|APT39|MuddyWater|Magic Hound|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|CopyKittens|Sowbug|APT3|menuPass|APT1|Ke3chang
T1560,Archive Collected Data,Collection,Leviathan|menuPass|APT32|Honeybee|Patchwork|APT28|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Ke3chang
T1560.001,Archive via Utility,Collection,Kimsuky|Aquatic Panda|APT28|APT29|Mustang Panda|HAFNIUM|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Chimera|APT41|GALLIUM|Turla|Gallmaker|APT33|APT39|MuddyWater|Magic Hound|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|CopyKittens|Sowbug|APT3|menuPass|APT1|Ke3chang
T1560,Archive Collected Data,Collection,Axiom|Dragonfly|Leviathan|menuPass|APT32|Honeybee|Patchwork|APT28|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Ke3chang
T1499.004,Application or System Exploitation,Impact,no
T1499.003,Application Exhaustion Flood,Impact,no
T1499.002,Service Exhaustion Flood,Impact,no
T1499.001,OS Exhaustion Flood,Impact,no
T1491.002,External Defacement,Impact,Sandworm Team
T1491.001,Internal Defacement,Impact,Lazarus Group
T1491.001,Internal Defacement,Impact,Gamaredon Group|Lazarus Group
T1114.003,Email Forwarding Rule,Collection,Silent Librarian|Kimsuky
T1114.002,Remote Email Collection,Collection,APT29|HAFNIUM|Chimera|APT1|FIN4|Ke3chang|Leafminer|Dragonfly 2.0|APT28
T1114.002,Remote Email Collection,Collection,Kimsuky|Dragonfly|APT29|HAFNIUM|Chimera|APT1|FIN4|Ke3chang|Leafminer|Dragonfly 2.0|APT28
T1114.001,Local Email Collection,Collection,Chimera|Magic Hound|APT1
T1134.005,SID-History Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
T1134.004,Parent PID Spoofing,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
@@ -280,7 +292,7 @@ T1134.002,Create Process with Token,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Turla|L
T1134.001,Token Impersonation/Theft,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,FIN8|APT28
T1213.002,Sharepoint,Collection,Chimera|Ke3chang|APT28
T1213.001,Confluence,Collection,no
T1555.003,Credentials from Web Browsers,Credential Access,Ajax Security Team|ZIRCONIUM|FIN6|Sandworm Team|Inception|Stealth Falcon|OilRig|Leafminer|APT33|APT3|Kimsuky|TA505|MuddyWater|APT37|Patchwork|Molerats
T1555.003,Credentials from Web Browsers,Credential Access,APT29|Ajax Security Team|ZIRCONIUM|FIN6|Sandworm Team|Inception|Stealth Falcon|OilRig|Leafminer|APT33|APT3|Kimsuky|TA505|MuddyWater|APT37|Patchwork|Molerats
T1555.002,Securityd Memory,Credential Access,no
T1555.001,Keychain,Credential Access,no
T1559.002,Dynamic Data Exchange,Execution,Leviathan|Sidewinder|Sharpshooter|TA505|MuddyWater|Gallmaker|Patchwork|Cobalt Group|APT37|FIN7|APT28
@@ -289,7 +301,7 @@ T1559,Inter-Process Communication,Execution,no
T1558.002,Silver Ticket,Credential Access,no
T1558.001,Golden Ticket,Credential Access,Ke3chang
T1558,Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets,Credential Access,no
T1557.001,LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay,Credential Access|Collection,Wizard Spider
T1557.001,LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay,Credential Access|Collection,Lazarus Group|Wizard Spider
T1557,Adversary-in-the-Middle,Credential Access|Collection,Kimsuky
T1556.002,Password Filter DLL,Credential Access|Defense Evasion|Persistence,Strider
T1556.001,Domain Controller Authentication,Credential Access|Defense Evasion|Persistence,Chimera
@@ -305,32 +317,32 @@ T1003.007,Proc Filesystem,Credential Access,no
T1003.006,DCSync,Credential Access,APT29|Operation Wocao
T1558.003,Kerberoasting,Credential Access,FIN7|APT29|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider
T1552.006,Group Policy Preferences,Credential Access,APT33
T1003.003,NTDS,Credential Access,APT28|Mustang Panda|HAFNIUM|Fox Kitten|menuPass|Wizard Spider|Chimera|FIN6|Dragonfly 2.0
T1003.002,Security Account Manager,Credential Access,Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390|Ke3chang|GALLIUM|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|menuPass
T1003.001,LSASS Memory,Credential Access,Indrik Spider|HAFNIUM|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Blue Mockingbird|Silence|Threat Group-3390|Leviathan|APT41|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|APT32|Leafminer|Magic Hound|FIN8|PLATINUM|MuddyWater|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN6|APT3|APT28|APT1|Ke3chang|Cleaver
T1003.003,NTDS,Credential Access,Ke3chang|Dragonfly|APT28|Mustang Panda|HAFNIUM|Fox Kitten|menuPass|Wizard Spider|Chimera|FIN6|Dragonfly 2.0
T1003.002,Security Account Manager,Credential Access,Dragonfly|Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390|Ke3chang|GALLIUM|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|menuPass
T1003.001,LSASS Memory,Credential Access,Aquatic Panda|Indrik Spider|HAFNIUM|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Blue Mockingbird|Silence|Threat Group-3390|Leviathan|APT41|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|APT32|Leafminer|Magic Hound|FIN8|PLATINUM|MuddyWater|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN6|APT3|APT28|APT1|Ke3chang|Cleaver
T1110.004,Credential Stuffing,Credential Access,Chimera
T1110.003,Password Spraying,Credential Access,Sandworm Team|APT29|Silent Librarian|Chimera|APT28|APT33|Leafminer|Lazarus Group
T1110.002,Password Cracking,Credential Access,FIN6|APT41|Dragonfly 2.0|APT3
T1110.002,Password Cracking,Credential Access,Dragonfly|FIN6|APT41|Dragonfly 2.0|APT3
T1110.001,Password Guessing,Credential Access,APT28
T1021.006,Windows Remote Management,Lateral Movement,APT29|Chimera|Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390
T1021.005,VNC,Lateral Movement,FIN7|Fox Kitten|GCMAN
T1021.004,SSH,Lateral Movement,TeamTNT|FIN7|Fox Kitten|Rocke|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|OilRig|menuPass|GCMAN
T1021.005,VNC,Lateral Movement,Gamaredon Group|FIN7|Fox Kitten|GCMAN
T1021.004,SSH,Lateral Movement,BlackTech|Lazarus Group|TeamTNT|FIN7|Fox Kitten|Rocke|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|OilRig|menuPass|GCMAN
T1021.003,Distributed Component Object Model,Lateral Movement,no
T1021.002,SMB/Windows Admin Shares,Lateral Movement,Sandworm Team|APT28|Fox Kitten|APT41|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|APT39|APT32|Orangeworm|FIN8|APT3|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-1314|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang
T1021.001,Remote Desktop Protocol,Lateral Movement,Kimsuky|FIN7|Fox Kitten|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|APT3|OilRig|FIN10|menuPass|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|APT1|Axiom
T1021.002,SMB/Windows Admin Shares,Lateral Movement,APT29|Sandworm Team|APT28|Fox Kitten|APT41|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|APT39|APT32|Orangeworm|FIN8|APT3|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-1314|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang
T1021.001,Remote Desktop Protocol,Lateral Movement,APT29|Dragonfly|Kimsuky|FIN7|Fox Kitten|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|APT3|OilRig|FIN10|menuPass|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|APT1|Axiom
T1554,Compromise Client Software Binary,Persistence,no
T1036.006,Space after Filename,Defense Evasion,no
T1036.005,Match Legitimate Name or Location,Defense Evasion,APT28|Ferocious Kitten|FIN7|BackdoorDiplomacy|Transparent Tribe|Naikon|APT29|Mustang Panda|Sidewinder|Darkhotel|Lazarus Group|Indrik Spider|Fox Kitten|Machete|Chimera|PROMETHIUM|Rocke|Sandworm Team|APT39|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Silence|APT41|menuPass|TEMP.Veles|MuddyWater|Sowbug|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|Patchwork|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Carbanak|APT1
T1036.004,Masquerade Task or Service,Defense Evasion,BackdoorDiplomacy|APT41|Naikon|ZIRCONIUM|APT29|Higaisa|Fox Kitten|Kimsuky|PROMETHIUM|Wizard Spider|APT-C-36|Carbanak|APT32|FIN6|FIN7
T1036.003,Rename System Utilities,Defense Evasion,menuPass|APT32|GALLIUM
T1036.005,Match Legitimate Name or Location,Defense Evasion,Ke3chang|Kimsuky|Gamaredon Group|WIRTE|APT28|Ferocious Kitten|FIN7|BackdoorDiplomacy|Transparent Tribe|Naikon|APT29|Mustang Panda|Sidewinder|Darkhotel|Lazarus Group|Indrik Spider|Fox Kitten|Machete|Chimera|PROMETHIUM|Rocke|Sandworm Team|APT39|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Silence|APT41|menuPass|TEMP.Veles|MuddyWater|Sowbug|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|Patchwork|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Carbanak|APT1
T1036.004,Masquerade Task or Service,Defense Evasion,Lazarus Group|BackdoorDiplomacy|APT41|Naikon|ZIRCONIUM|APT29|Higaisa|Fox Kitten|Kimsuky|PROMETHIUM|Wizard Spider|APT-C-36|Carbanak|APT32|FIN6|FIN7
T1036.003,Rename System Utilities,Defense Evasion,Lazarus Group|menuPass|APT32|GALLIUM
T1036.002,Right-to-Left Override,Defense Evasion,Ferocious Kitten|BRONZE BUTLER|BlackTech|Ke3chang|Scarlet Mimic
T1036.001,Invalid Code Signature,Defense Evasion,Windshift|APT37
T1553.003,SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking,Defense Evasion,no
T1553.002,Code Signing,Defense Evasion,menuPass|APT29|GALLIUM|Wizard Spider|Kimsuky|PROMETHIUM|Patchwork|Silence|APT41|FIN6|TA505|FIN7|Honeybee|Leviathan|CopyKittens|Winnti Group|Suckfly|Molerats|Darkhotel
T1553.002,Code Signing,Defense Evasion,Lazarus Group|menuPass|APT29|GALLIUM|Wizard Spider|Kimsuky|PROMETHIUM|Patchwork|Silence|APT41|FIN6|TA505|FIN7|Honeybee|Leviathan|CopyKittens|Winnti Group|Suckfly|Molerats|Darkhotel
T1553.001,Gatekeeper Bypass,Defense Evasion,no
T1553,Subvert Trust Controls,Defense Evasion,no
T1553,Subvert Trust Controls,Defense Evasion,Axiom
T1027.003,Steganography,Defense Evasion,Andariel|Leviathan|TA551|BRONZE BUTLER|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|APT37
T1027.002,Software Packing,Defense Evasion,Sandworm Team|Kimsuky|TeamTNT|ZIRCONIUM|TA505|Rocke|GALLIUM|The White Company|APT39|APT38|Dark Caracal|Elderwood|APT3|Patchwork|APT29|Night Dragon
T1027.002,Software Packing,Defense Evasion,Threat Group-3390|Lazarus Group|Sandworm Team|Kimsuky|TeamTNT|ZIRCONIUM|TA505|Rocke|GALLIUM|The White Company|APT39|APT38|Dark Caracal|Elderwood|APT3|Patchwork|APT29|Night Dragon
T1027.001,Binary Padding,Defense Evasion,APT29|Mustang Panda|Higaisa|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|APT32|Leviathan|BRONZE BUTLER|Moafee
T1222.002,Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification,Defense Evasion,TeamTNT|Rocke|APT32
T1222.001,Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification,Defense Evasion,Wizard Spider
@@ -342,10 +354,10 @@ T1552,Unsecured Credentials,Credential Access,no
T1216.001,PubPrn,Defense Evasion,APT32
T1070.006,Timestomp,Defense Evasion,APT38|APT29|Chimera|Kimsuky|Rocke|TEMP.Veles|APT32|Lazarus Group|APT28
T1070.005,Network Share Connection Removal,Defense Evasion,Threat Group-3390
T1070.004,File Deletion,Defense Evasion,TeamTNT|APT39|Mustang Panda|Chimera|Evilnum|Operation Wocao|FIN6|Sandworm Team|Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Wizard Spider|APT41|Kimsuky|Silence|The White Company|TEMP.Veles|APT32|APT38|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Honeybee|Patchwork|menuPass|FIN8|OilRig|FIN5|BRONZE BUTLER|APT3|Magic Hound|Threat Group-3390|APT28|FIN10|Group5|Lazarus Group|APT18|APT29
T1070.003,Clear Command History,Defense Evasion,TeamTNT|menuPass|APT41
T1070.004,File Deletion,Defense Evasion,Aquatic Panda|Dragonfly|TeamTNT|APT39|Mustang Panda|Chimera|Evilnum|Operation Wocao|FIN6|Sandworm Team|Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Wizard Spider|APT41|Kimsuky|Silence|The White Company|TEMP.Veles|APT32|APT38|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Honeybee|Patchwork|menuPass|FIN8|OilRig|FIN5|BRONZE BUTLER|APT3|Magic Hound|Threat Group-3390|APT28|FIN10|Group5|Lazarus Group|APT18|APT29
T1070.003,Clear Command History,Defense Evasion,Lazarus Group|TeamTNT|menuPass|APT41
T1550.004,Web Session Cookie,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,APT29
T1550.001,Application Access Token,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,APT28
T1550.001,Application Access Token,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,APT29|APT28
T1550.003,Pass the Ticket,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|APT29
T1550.002,Pass the Hash,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,Chimera|Kimsuky|GALLIUM|APT32|Night Dragon|APT28|APT1
T1550,Use Alternate Authentication Material,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,APT29
@@ -354,14 +366,14 @@ T1548.003,Sudo and Sudo Caching,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
T1548.002,Bypass User Account Control,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,Evilnum|APT37|MuddyWater|Threat Group-3390|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork|APT29
T1548.001,Setuid and Setgid,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
T1548,Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
T1136.003,Cloud Account,Persistence,no
T1136.003,Cloud Account,Persistence,APT29
T1070.002,Clear Linux or Mac System Logs,Defense Evasion,TeamTNT|Rocke
T1070.001,Clear Windows Event Logs,Defense Evasion,Indrik Spider|Chimera|Operation Wocao|APT41|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|APT32|FIN8|FIN5|APT28
T1070.001,Clear Windows Event Logs,Defense Evasion,Dragonfly|Indrik Spider|Chimera|Operation Wocao|APT41|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|APT32|FIN8|FIN5|APT28
T1136.002,Domain Account,Persistence,Sandworm Team|HAFNIUM|GALLIUM
T1136.001,Local Account,Persistence,TeamTNT|Fox Kitten|APT39|APT41|Leafminer|Dragonfly 2.0|APT3
T1136.001,Local Account,Persistence,Kimsuky|Dragonfly|TeamTNT|Fox Kitten|APT39|APT41|Leafminer|Dragonfly 2.0|APT3
T1547.011,Plist Modification,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
T1547.010,Port Monitors,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
T1547.009,Shortcut Modification,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,APT39|Darkhotel|APT29|Gorgon Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Lazarus Group|Leviathan
T1547.009,Shortcut Modification,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Dragonfly|APT39|Darkhotel|APT29|Gorgon Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Lazarus Group|Leviathan
T1547.008,LSASS Driver,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
T1547.007,Re-opened Applications,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
T1547.006,Kernel Modules and Extensions,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
@@ -385,18 +397,18 @@ T1546.004,Unix Shell Configuration Modification,Privilege Escalation|Persistence
T1546.003,Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,FIN8|Mustang Panda|APT33|Blue Mockingbird|Turla|Leviathan|APT29
T1546.002,Screensaver,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
T1546.001,Change Default File Association,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,Kimsuky
T1547.001,Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,TeamTNT|Naikon|Windshift|Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Sidewinder|APT28|Wizard Spider|PROMETHIUM|Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Silence|RTM|Inception|APT41|Kimsuky|APT33|APT39|APT32|APT18|Dark Caracal|Threat Group-3390|Honeybee|Turla|Cobalt Group|Ke3chang|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|Gorgon Group|MuddyWater|APT37|Leviathan|BRONZE BUTLER|APT3|Magic Hound|FIN10|FIN7|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT29|Darkhotel
T1547.001,Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Confucius|Dragonfly|LazyScripter|TeamTNT|Naikon|Windshift|Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Sidewinder|APT28|Wizard Spider|PROMETHIUM|Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Silence|RTM|Inception|APT41|Kimsuky|APT33|APT39|APT32|APT18|Dark Caracal|Threat Group-3390|Honeybee|Turla|Cobalt Group|Ke3chang|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|Gorgon Group|MuddyWater|APT37|Leviathan|BRONZE BUTLER|APT3|Magic Hound|FIN10|FIN7|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT29|Darkhotel
T1218.002,Control Panel,Defense Evasion,no
T1218.010,Regsvr32,Defense Evasion,TA551|Blue Mockingbird|Inception|WIRTE|Cobalt Group|APT19|Leviathan|APT32|Deep Panda
T1218.010,Regsvr32,Defense Evasion,Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|TA551|Blue Mockingbird|Inception|WIRTE|Cobalt Group|APT19|Leviathan|APT32|Deep Panda
T1218.009,Regsvcs/Regasm,Defense Evasion,no
T1218.005,Mshta,Defense Evasion,Mustang Panda|TA551|Sidewinder|Inception|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|FIN7
T1218.005,Mshta,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|Confucius|Lazarus Group|APT29|LazyScripter|Mustang Panda|TA551|Sidewinder|Inception|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|FIN7
T1218.004,InstallUtil,Defense Evasion,Mustang Panda|menuPass
T1218.001,Compiled HTML File,Defense Evasion,APT41|Silence|Dark Caracal|OilRig|Lazarus Group
T1218.001,Compiled HTML File,Defense Evasion,APT38|APT41|Silence|Dark Caracal|OilRig|Lazarus Group
T1218.003,CMSTP,Defense Evasion,Cobalt Group|MuddyWater
T1218.011,Rundll32,Defense Evasion,APT38|HAFNIUM|TA551|APT41|Gamaredon Group|APT32|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|TA505|MuddyWater|APT29|APT19|CopyKittens|APT3|Carbanak|APT28
T1218.011,Rundll32,Defense Evasion,Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|LazyScripter|APT38|HAFNIUM|TA551|APT41|Gamaredon Group|APT32|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|TA505|MuddyWater|APT29|APT19|CopyKittens|APT3|Carbanak|APT28
T1547,Boot or Logon Autostart Execution,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
T1546,Event Triggered Execution,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
T1098.003,Add Office 365 Global Administrator Role,Persistence,no
T1098.003,Add Office 365 Global Administrator Role,Persistence,APT29
T1098.002,Exchange Email Delegate Permissions,Persistence,APT28|APT29|Magic Hound
T1098.001,Additional Cloud Credentials,Persistence,APT29
T1543.004,Launch Daemon,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
@@ -405,7 +417,7 @@ T1543.002,Systemd Service,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,TeamTNT|Rocke
T1543.001,Launch Agent,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
T1037.005,Startup Items,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
T1037.004,RC Scripts,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
T1055.012,Process Hollowing,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Gorgon Group|Patchwork
T1055.012,Process Hollowing,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Kimsuky|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Gorgon Group|Patchwork
T1055.013,Process Doppelgänging,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Leafminer
T1055.011,Extra Window Memory Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
T1055.014,VDSO Hijacking,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
@@ -423,12 +435,12 @@ T1037.001,Logon Script (Windows),Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Cobalt Group|A
T1542.003,Bootkit,Persistence|Defense Evasion,APT41|Lazarus Group|APT28
T1542.002,Component Firmware,Persistence|Defense Evasion,Equation
T1542.001,System Firmware,Persistence|Defense Evasion,no
T1505.003,Web Shell,Persistence,BackdoorDiplomacy|APT38|APT29|APT28|Tonto Team|Sandworm Team|HAFNIUM|Volatile Cedar|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|Tropic Trooper|GALLIUM|Threat Group-3390|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|APT32|OilRig|Deep Panda
T1505.003,Web Shell,Persistence,Dragonfly|BackdoorDiplomacy|APT38|APT29|APT28|Tonto Team|Sandworm Team|HAFNIUM|Volatile Cedar|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|Tropic Trooper|GALLIUM|Threat Group-3390|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|APT32|OilRig|Deep Panda
T1505.002,Transport Agent,Persistence,no
T1505.001,SQL Stored Procedures,Persistence,Sandworm Team
T1053.003,Cron,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,APT38|Rocke
T1053.001,At (Linux),Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
T1053.005,Scheduled Task,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,APT37|APT38|Naikon|CostaRicto|Mustang Panda|Higaisa|Fox Kitten|Molerats|Machete|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT-C-36|BRONZE BUTLER|APT41|GALLIUM|Silence|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|Rancor|OilRig|Patchwork|Dragonfly 2.0|Cobalt Group|FIN8|menuPass|FIN10|FIN7|APT32|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|APT3|APT29
T1053.005,Scheduled Task,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|Confucius|Dragonfly|APT37|APT38|Naikon|CostaRicto|Mustang Panda|Higaisa|Fox Kitten|Molerats|Machete|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT-C-36|BRONZE BUTLER|APT41|GALLIUM|Silence|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|Rancor|OilRig|Patchwork|Dragonfly 2.0|Cobalt Group|FIN8|menuPass|FIN10|FIN7|APT32|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|APT3|APT29
T1053.002,At (Windows),Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,BRONZE BUTLER|Threat Group-3390|APT18
T1542,Pre-OS Boot,Defense Evasion|Persistence,no
T1137.001,Office Template Macros,Persistence,MuddyWater
@@ -438,11 +450,11 @@ T1137.005,Outlook Rules,Persistence,no
T1137.006,Add-ins,Persistence,Naikon
T1137.002,Office Test,Persistence,APT28
T1531,Account Access Removal,Impact,no
T1539,Steal Web Session Cookie,Credential Access,Evilnum
T1539,Steal Web Session Cookie,Credential Access,APT29|Evilnum
T1529,System Shutdown/Reboot,Impact,Lazarus Group|APT38|APT37
T1518,Software Discovery,Discovery,Mustang Panda|Windshift|MuddyWater|Windigo|Sidewinder|Operation Wocao|BRONZE BUTLER|Tropic Trooper|Inception
T1547.013,XDG Autostart Entries,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
T1534,Internal Spearphishing,Lateral Movement,Leviathan|Gamaredon Group
T1534,Internal Spearphishing,Lateral Movement,Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|Leviathan|Gamaredon Group
T1528,Steal Application Access Token,Credential Access,APT28
T1535,Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions,Defense Evasion,no
T1525,Implant Internal Image,Persistence,no
@@ -461,42 +473,42 @@ T1491,Defacement,Impact,no
T1490,Inhibit System Recovery,Impact,no
T1489,Service Stop,Impact,Indrik Spider|Wizard Spider|Lazarus Group
T1486,Data Encrypted for Impact,Impact,FIN7|Indrik Spider|APT41|TA505|APT38
T1485,Data Destruction,Impact,Sandworm Team|Lazarus Group|APT38
T1485,Data Destruction,Impact,Gamaredon Group|Sandworm Team|Lazarus Group|APT38
T1484,Domain Policy Modification,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
T1482,Domain Trust Discovery,Discovery,FIN8|APT29|Chimera
T1480,Execution Guardrails,Defense Evasion,no
T1221,Template Injection,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|Frankenstein|Inception|APT28|Tropic Trooper|DarkHydrus|Dragonfly 2.0
T1221,Template Injection,Defense Evasion,Lazarus Group|Confucius|Dragonfly|Gamaredon Group|Frankenstein|Inception|APT28|Tropic Trooper|DarkHydrus|Dragonfly 2.0
T1222,File and Directory Permissions Modification,Defense Evasion,no
T1220,XSL Script Processing,Defense Evasion,Higaisa|Cobalt Group
T1220,XSL Script Processing,Defense Evasion,Lazarus Group|Higaisa|Cobalt Group
T1217,Browser Bookmark Discovery,Discovery,APT38|Chimera|Fox Kitten
T1212,Exploitation for Credential Access,Credential Access,no
T1189,Drive-by Compromise,Initial Access,Transparent Tribe|Andariel|Leviathan|Machete|Windigo|Dragonfly|PROMETHIUM|Turla|Windshift|RTM|Darkhotel|APT38|APT19|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|Dark Caracal|Dragonfly 2.0|Leafminer|Patchwork|APT37|Elderwood|PLATINUM
T1189,Drive-by Compromise,Initial Access,Magic Hound|APT28|Axiom|Transparent Tribe|Andariel|Leviathan|Machete|Windigo|Dragonfly|PROMETHIUM|Turla|Windshift|RTM|Darkhotel|APT38|APT19|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|Dark Caracal|Dragonfly 2.0|Leafminer|Patchwork|APT37|Elderwood|PLATINUM
T1211,Exploitation for Defense Evasion,Defense Evasion,APT28
T1197,BITS Jobs,Defense Evasion|Persistence,APT39|Patchwork|APT41|Leviathan
T1203,Exploitation for Client Execution,Execution,Andariel|Transparent Tribe|APT3|Tonto Team|Mustang Panda|Darkhotel|Higaisa|HAFNIUM|Sidewinder|Sandworm Team|MuddyWater|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT41|admin@338|Threat Group-3390|APT12|The White Company|APT33|APT32|APT28|Tropic Trooper|BRONZE BUTLER|Cobalt Group|Lazarus Group|Patchwork|Elderwood|APT29|TA459|APT37|Leviathan
T1203,Exploitation for Client Execution,Execution,Axiom|Confucius|Dragonfly|Andariel|Transparent Tribe|APT3|Tonto Team|Mustang Panda|Darkhotel|Higaisa|HAFNIUM|Sidewinder|Sandworm Team|MuddyWater|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT41|admin@338|Threat Group-3390|APT12|The White Company|APT33|APT32|APT28|Tropic Trooper|BRONZE BUTLER|Cobalt Group|Lazarus Group|Patchwork|Elderwood|APT29|TA459|APT37|Leviathan
T1201,Password Policy Discovery,Discovery,Chimera|Turla|OilRig
T1195,Supply Chain Compromise,Initial Access,no
T1199,Trusted Relationship,Initial Access,APT29|Sandworm Team|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|APT28|menuPass
T1218,Signed Binary Proxy Execution,Defense Evasion,no
T1199,Trusted Relationship,Initial Access,Threat Group-3390|APT29|Sandworm Team|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|APT28|menuPass
T1218,Signed Binary Proxy Execution,Defense Evasion,Lazarus Group
T1204,User Execution,Execution,no
T1213,Data from Information Repositories,Collection,APT28|Fox Kitten|FIN6|Turla
T1190,Exploit Public-Facing Application,Initial Access,BackdoorDiplomacy|menuPass|Volatile Cedar|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|APT28|APT29|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Blue Mockingbird|Rocke|APT39|BlackTech|APT41|GALLIUM|Night Dragon|Axiom
T1210,Exploitation of Remote Services,Lateral Movement,Tonto Team|FIN7|Fox Kitten|menuPass|Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390|APT28
T1213,Data from Information Repositories,Collection,APT29|APT28|Fox Kitten|FIN6|Turla
T1190,Exploit Public-Facing Application,Initial Access,Threat Group-3390|Ke3chang|Kimsuky|Magic Hound|Dragonfly|BackdoorDiplomacy|menuPass|Volatile Cedar|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|APT28|APT29|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Blue Mockingbird|Rocke|APT39|BlackTech|APT41|GALLIUM|Night Dragon|Axiom
T1210,Exploitation of Remote Services,Lateral Movement,Dragonfly|Tonto Team|FIN7|Fox Kitten|menuPass|Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390|APT28
T1200,Hardware Additions,Initial Access,DarkVishnya
T1202,Indirect Command Execution,Defense Evasion,no
T1202,Indirect Command Execution,Defense Evasion,Lazarus Group
T1219,Remote Access Software,Command And Control,TeamTNT|Mustang Panda|MuddyWater|Evilnum|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Sandworm Team|DarkVishnya|RTM|Kimsuky|Night Dragon|Cobalt Group|Thrip|Carbanak
T1207,Rogue Domain Controller,Defense Evasion,no
T1216,Signed Script Proxy Execution,Defense Evasion,no
T1205,Traffic Signaling,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Command And Control,no
T1176,Browser Extensions,Persistence,Kimsuky
T1187,Forced Authentication,Credential Access,DarkHydrus|Dragonfly 2.0
T1187,Forced Authentication,Credential Access,Dragonfly|DarkHydrus|Dragonfly 2.0
T1185,Browser Session Hijacking,Collection,no
T1140,Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information,Defense Evasion,APT39|APT29|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Molerats|Frankenstein|Turla|WIRTE|Darkhotel|Tropic Trooper|Honeybee|Gorgon Group|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|APT19|Leviathan|MuddyWater|APT28|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER
T1140,Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information,Defense Evasion,Lazarus Group|Ke3chang|Kimsuky|APT39|APT29|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Molerats|Frankenstein|Turla|WIRTE|Darkhotel|Tropic Trooper|Honeybee|Gorgon Group|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|APT19|Leviathan|MuddyWater|APT28|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER
T1134,Access Token Manipulation,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,FIN6|Blue Mockingbird
T1136,Create Account,Persistence,Sandworm Team|Indrik Spider
T1135,Network Share Discovery,Discovery,Tonto Team|APT38|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|APT32|APT39|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT1|Dragonfly 2.0|Sowbug
T1135,Network Share Discovery,Discovery,Dragonfly|Tonto Team|APT38|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|APT32|APT39|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT1|Dragonfly 2.0|Sowbug
T1137,Office Application Startup,Persistence,Gamaredon Group|APT32
T1133,External Remote Services,Persistence|Initial Access,TeamTNT|Leviathan|APT28|APT29|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Kimsuky|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Chimera|Sandworm Team|APT41|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|Night Dragon|Ke3chang|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|APT18
T1133,External Remote Services,Persistence|Initial Access,Dragonfly|TeamTNT|Leviathan|APT28|APT29|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Kimsuky|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Chimera|Sandworm Team|APT41|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|Night Dragon|Ke3chang|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|APT18
T1132,Data Encoding,Command And Control,no
T1129,Shared Modules,Execution,no
T1127,Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution,Defense Evasion,no
@@ -504,64 +516,64 @@ T1125,Video Capture,Collection,Silence|FIN7
T1124,System Time Discovery,Discovery,Darkhotel|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Chimera|Operation Wocao|The White Company|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Turla
T1123,Audio Capture,Collection,APT37
T1120,Peripheral Device Discovery,Discovery,OilRig|BackdoorDiplomacy|Operation Wocao|Turla|APT37|Gamaredon Group|Equation|APT28
T1119,Automated Collection,Collection,Mustang Panda|Sidewinder|Chimera|menuPass|Operation Wocao|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT1|APT28|Patchwork|OilRig|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|FIN6
T1119,Automated Collection,Collection,Ke3chang|Confucius|Mustang Panda|Sidewinder|Chimera|menuPass|Operation Wocao|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT1|APT28|Patchwork|OilRig|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|FIN6
T1115,Clipboard Data,Collection,Operation Wocao|APT39|APT38
T1114,Email Collection,Collection,Magic Hound|Silent Librarian
T1113,Screen Capture,Collection,GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Gamaredon Group|APT39|Silence|MuddyWater|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|Dark Caracal|FIN7|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|Group5|APT28
T1112,Modify Registry,Defense Evasion,Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|Turla|APT32|APT38|Patchwork|Gorgon Group|Threat Group-3390|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|Honeybee|FIN8
T1111,Two-Factor Authentication Interception,Credential Access,Chimera|Operation Wocao
T1110,Brute Force,Credential Access,APT38|APT28|Fox Kitten|DarkVishnya|APT39|OilRig|FIN5|Turla
T1106,Native API,Execution,APT38|Higaisa|menuPass|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Turla|Silence|APT37|Gorgon Group
T1105,Ingress Tool Transfer,Command And Control,TeamTNT|Nomadic Octopus|IndigoZebra|Andariel|BackdoorDiplomacy|Tonto Team|HAFNIUM|APT29|Ajax Security Team|Mustang Panda|Windshift|Darkhotel|ZIRCONIUM|TA551|Volatile Cedar|Indrik Spider|Evilnum|Sidewinder|Fox Kitten|Kimsuky|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Silence|APT-C-36|APT41|GALLIUM|TA505|WIRTE|APT33|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Rancor|Gorgon Group|OilRig|Turla|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|PLATINUM|APT37|Elderwood|Leviathan|APT32|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|APT3|menuPass|FIN7|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28
T1104,Multi-Stage Channels,Command And Control,APT41|MuddyWater|APT3
T1102,Web Service,Command And Control,TeamTNT|FIN8|Fox Kitten|Turla|APT32|Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Inception|FIN6
T1098,Account Manipulation,Persistence,Sandworm Team|APT3|Dragonfly 2.0|Lazarus Group
T1113,Screen Capture,Collection,Dragonfly|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Gamaredon Group|APT39|Silence|MuddyWater|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|Dark Caracal|FIN7|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|Group5|APT28
T1112,Modify Registry,Defense Evasion,Dragonfly|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|Turla|APT32|APT38|Patchwork|Gorgon Group|Threat Group-3390|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|Honeybee|FIN8
T1111,Two-Factor Authentication Interception,Credential Access,Kimsuky|Chimera|Operation Wocao
T1110,Brute Force,Credential Access,Lazarus Group|Dragonfly|APT38|APT28|Fox Kitten|DarkVishnya|APT39|OilRig|FIN5|Turla
T1106,Native API,Execution,BlackTech|Lazarus Group|APT38|Higaisa|menuPass|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Turla|Silence|APT37|Gorgon Group
T1105,Ingress Tool Transfer,Command And Control,LazyScripter|Ke3chang|Aquatic Panda|Winnti Group|Confucius|Dragonfly|TeamTNT|Nomadic Octopus|IndigoZebra|Andariel|BackdoorDiplomacy|Tonto Team|HAFNIUM|APT29|Ajax Security Team|Mustang Panda|Windshift|Darkhotel|ZIRCONIUM|TA551|Volatile Cedar|Indrik Spider|Evilnum|Sidewinder|Fox Kitten|Kimsuky|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Silence|APT-C-36|APT41|GALLIUM|TA505|WIRTE|APT33|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Rancor|Gorgon Group|OilRig|Turla|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|PLATINUM|APT37|Elderwood|Leviathan|APT32|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|APT3|menuPass|FIN7|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28
T1104,Multi-Stage Channels,Command And Control,Lazarus Group|APT41|MuddyWater|APT3
T1102,Web Service,Command And Control,Mustang Panda|LazyScripter|TeamTNT|FIN8|Fox Kitten|Turla|APT32|Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Inception|FIN6
T1098,Account Manipulation,Persistence,Kimsuky|Dragonfly|Sandworm Team|APT3|Dragonfly 2.0|Lazarus Group
T1095,Non-Application Layer Protocol,Command And Control,BackdoorDiplomacy|HAFNIUM|Operation Wocao|FIN6|APT29|PLATINUM|APT3
T1092,Communication Through Removable Media,Command And Control,APT28
T1091,Replication Through Removable Media,Lateral Movement|Initial Access,Mustang Panda|Tropic Trooper|Darkhotel|APT28
T1091,Replication Through Removable Media,Lateral Movement|Initial Access,FIN7|Mustang Panda|Tropic Trooper|Darkhotel|APT28
T1090,Proxy,Command And Control,Windigo|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|APT41|Turla
T1087,Account Discovery,Discovery,APT29
T1083,File and Directory Discovery,Discovery,APT38|APT29|Mustang Panda|Darkhotel|Windigo|Sidewinder|Chimera|Fox Kitten|menuPass|APT39|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Inception|APT41|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|APT18|Leafminer|Honeybee|Dark Caracal|Dragonfly 2.0|APT3|Sowbug|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|APT28|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
T1082,System Information Discovery,Discovery,TeamTNT|APT38|APT29|Mustang Panda|Windshift|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Windigo|Sidewinder|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|APT32|APT37|Honeybee|APT19|Magic Hound|Sowbug|OilRig|APT3|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
T1083,File and Directory Discovery,Discovery,Winnti Group|Confucius|Dragonfly|APT38|APT29|Mustang Panda|Darkhotel|Windigo|Sidewinder|Chimera|Fox Kitten|menuPass|APT39|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Inception|APT41|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|APT18|Leafminer|Honeybee|Dark Caracal|Dragonfly 2.0|APT3|Sowbug|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|APT28|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
T1082,System Information Discovery,Discovery,Aquatic Panda|Confucius|TeamTNT|APT38|APT29|Mustang Panda|Windshift|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Windigo|Sidewinder|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|APT32|APT37|Honeybee|APT19|Magic Hound|Sowbug|OilRig|APT3|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
T1080,Taint Shared Content,Lateral Movement,Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Darkhotel
T1078,Valid Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,FIN7|Leviathan|APT29|Silent Librarian|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|APT39|FIN4|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|APT33|FIN5|OilRig|APT28|menuPass|FIN10|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390|APT18|PittyTiger|Carbanak
T1078,Valid Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,Ke3chang|Lazarus Group|Axiom|Dragonfly|FIN7|Leviathan|APT29|Silent Librarian|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|APT39|FIN4|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|APT33|FIN5|OilRig|APT28|menuPass|FIN10|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390|APT18|PittyTiger|Carbanak
T1074,Data Staged,Collection,Wizard Spider
T1072,Software Deployment Tools,Execution|Lateral Movement,Silence|APT32|Threat Group-1314
T1071,Application Layer Protocol,Command And Control,TeamTNT|Rocke|Magic Hound|Dragonfly 2.0
T1070,Indicator Removal on Host,Defense Evasion,APT29
T1071,Application Layer Protocol,Command And Control,Dragonfly|TeamTNT|Rocke|Magic Hound|Dragonfly 2.0
T1070,Indicator Removal on Host,Defense Evasion,Lazarus Group|APT29
T1069,Permission Groups Discovery,Discovery,APT29|TA505|APT3
T1068,Exploitation for Privilege Escalation,Privilege Escalation,Tonto Team|ZIRCONIUM|Turla|Whitefly|APT33|Cobalt Group|PLATINUM|FIN8|APT32|Threat Group-3390|FIN6|APT28
T1059,Command and Scripting Interpreter,Execution,APT37|Windigo|Fox Kitten|APT32|Whitefly|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN7|APT19|OilRig|FIN5|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Ke3chang
T1057,Process Discovery,Discovery,TeamTNT|Andariel|APT29|Mustang Panda|Windshift|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Rocke|Frankenstein|Inception|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|APT38|Tropic Trooper|APT37|Honeybee|OilRig|APT3|Magic Hound|APT28|Winnti Group|Stealth Falcon|Poseidon Group|Lazarus Group|Molerats|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang
T1068,Exploitation for Privilege Escalation,Privilege Escalation,APT29|Tonto Team|ZIRCONIUM|Turla|Whitefly|APT33|Cobalt Group|PLATINUM|FIN8|APT32|Threat Group-3390|FIN6|APT28
T1059,Command and Scripting Interpreter,Execution,Dragonfly|APT37|Windigo|Fox Kitten|APT32|Whitefly|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN7|APT19|OilRig|FIN5|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Ke3chang
T1057,Process Discovery,Discovery,Gamaredon Group|Kimsuky|TeamTNT|Andariel|APT29|Mustang Panda|Windshift|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Rocke|Frankenstein|Inception|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|APT38|Tropic Trooper|APT37|Honeybee|OilRig|APT3|Magic Hound|APT28|Winnti Group|Stealth Falcon|Poseidon Group|Lazarus Group|Molerats|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang
T1056,Input Capture,Collection|Credential Access,APT39
T1055,Process Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Operation Wocao|APT32|Sharpshooter|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|Cobalt Group|Turla|APT37|Honeybee|PLATINUM
T1053,Scheduled Task/Job,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
T1052,Exfiltration Over Physical Medium,Exfiltration,no
T1049,System Network Connections Discovery,Discovery,TeamTNT|Andariel|BackdoorDiplomacy|Mustang Panda|MuddyWater|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Tropic Trooper|APT41|APT38|GALLIUM|APT32|APT1|OilRig|APT3|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
T1049,System Network Connections Discovery,Discovery,Lazarus Group|TeamTNT|Andariel|BackdoorDiplomacy|Mustang Panda|MuddyWater|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Tropic Trooper|APT41|APT38|GALLIUM|APT32|APT1|OilRig|APT3|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
T1048,Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol,Exfiltration,no
T1047,Windows Management Instrumentation,Execution,Sandworm Team|FIN7|Indrik Spider|Naikon|Mustang Panda|Windshift|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT41|FIN6|GALLIUM|APT32|MuddyWater|Threat Group-3390|OilRig|FIN8|Leviathan|menuPass|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT29|Deep Panda
T1046,Network Service Scanning,Discovery,TeamTNT|BackdoorDiplomacy|Naikon|CostaRicto|Chimera|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Rocke|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT39|APT32|OilRig|Cobalt Group|Leafminer|menuPass|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390
T1041,Exfiltration Over C2 Channel,Exfiltration,Leviathan|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Chimera|APT39|Operation Wocao|Sandworm Team|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Kimsuky|GALLIUM|APT32|APT3|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Ke3chang
T1047,Windows Management Instrumentation,Execution,Gamaredon Group|Sandworm Team|FIN7|Indrik Spider|Naikon|Mustang Panda|Windshift|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT41|FIN6|GALLIUM|APT32|MuddyWater|Threat Group-3390|OilRig|FIN8|Leviathan|menuPass|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT29|Deep Panda
T1046,Network Service Scanning,Discovery,BlackTech|Lazarus Group|TeamTNT|BackdoorDiplomacy|Naikon|CostaRicto|Chimera|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Rocke|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT39|APT32|OilRig|Cobalt Group|Leafminer|menuPass|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390
T1041,Exfiltration Over C2 Channel,Exfiltration,Confucius|Leviathan|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Chimera|APT39|Operation Wocao|Sandworm Team|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Kimsuky|GALLIUM|APT32|APT3|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Ke3chang
T1040,Network Sniffing,Credential Access|Discovery,Kimsuky|Sandworm Team|DarkVishnya|APT33|APT28
T1039,Data from Network Shared Drive,Collection,APT28|Chimera|Fox Kitten|Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Sowbug|menuPass
T1037,Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Rocke
T1036,Masquerading,Defense Evasion,APT28|Nomadic Octopus|OilRig|APT29|ZIRCONIUM|TA551|Windshift|APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|PLATINUM|Dragonfly 2.0
T1033,System Owner/User Discovery,Discovery,APT38|Windshift|ZIRCONIUM|Sidewinder|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT41|GALLIUM|Tropic Trooper|APT39|MuddyWater|APT37|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|APT32|Magic Hound|OilRig|FIN10|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3
T1036,Masquerading,Defense Evasion,Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|Dragonfly|LazyScripter|APT28|Nomadic Octopus|OilRig|APT29|ZIRCONIUM|TA551|Windshift|APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|PLATINUM|Dragonfly 2.0
T1033,System Owner/User Discovery,Discovery,Threat Group-3390|Ke3chang|Dragonfly|APT38|Windshift|ZIRCONIUM|Sidewinder|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT41|GALLIUM|Tropic Trooper|APT39|MuddyWater|APT37|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|APT32|Magic Hound|OilRig|FIN10|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3
T1030,Data Transfer Size Limits,Exfiltration,APT28|Threat Group-3390
T1029,Scheduled Transfer,Exfiltration,Higaisa
T1027,Obfuscated Files or Information,Defense Evasion,TeamTNT|BackdoorDiplomacy|Transparent Tribe|APT39|Mustang Panda|Windshift|TA551|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Fox Kitten|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|FIN6|Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|APT41|GALLIUM|Turla|TA505|Silence|APT33|Night Dragon|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|APT29|APT18|Tropic Trooper|Patchwork|menuPass|APT37|Threat Group-3390|Cobalt Group|Dark Caracal|Leafminer|Honeybee|APT19|BlackOasis|Leviathan|FIN8|MuddyWater|FIN7|Elderwood|OilRig|Magic Hound|APT3|APT32|Group5|Dust Storm|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT28
T1027,Obfuscated Files or Information,Defense Evasion,Aquatic Panda|Ke3chang|LazyScripter|TeamTNT|BackdoorDiplomacy|Transparent Tribe|APT39|Mustang Panda|Windshift|TA551|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Fox Kitten|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|FIN6|Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|APT41|GALLIUM|Turla|TA505|Silence|APT33|Night Dragon|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|APT29|APT18|Tropic Trooper|Patchwork|menuPass|APT37|Threat Group-3390|Cobalt Group|Dark Caracal|Leafminer|Honeybee|APT19|BlackOasis|Leviathan|FIN8|MuddyWater|FIN7|Elderwood|OilRig|Magic Hound|APT3|APT32|Group5|Dust Storm|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT28
T1025,Data from Removable Media,Collection,Turla|Gamaredon Group|APT28
T1021,Remote Services,Lateral Movement,no
T1020,Automated Exfiltration,Exfiltration,Sidewinder|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Honeybee
T1018,Remote System Discovery,Discovery,Indrik Spider|Naikon|APT29|Chimera|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Sandworm Team|Rocke|Wizard Spider|Silence|GALLIUM|APT39|APT32|Deep Panda|Ke3chang|Threat Group-3390|Dragonfly 2.0|Leafminer|FIN8|FIN5|APT3|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN6|Turla
T1016,System Network Configuration Discovery,Discovery,TeamTNT|ZIRCONIUM|Mustang Panda|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Sandworm Team|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT41|GALLIUM|APT32|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|Magic Hound|OilRig|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3|Naikon|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
T1020,Automated Exfiltration,Exfiltration,Ke3chang|Sidewinder|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Honeybee
T1018,Remote System Discovery,Discovery,Dragonfly|Indrik Spider|Naikon|APT29|Chimera|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Sandworm Team|Rocke|Wizard Spider|Silence|GALLIUM|APT39|APT32|Deep Panda|Ke3chang|Threat Group-3390|Dragonfly 2.0|Leafminer|FIN8|FIN5|APT3|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN6|Turla
T1016,System Network Configuration Discovery,Discovery,Kimsuky|Dragonfly|TeamTNT|ZIRCONIUM|Mustang Panda|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Sandworm Team|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT41|GALLIUM|APT32|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|Magic Hound|OilRig|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3|Naikon|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
T1014,Rootkit,Defense Evasion,TeamTNT|Rocke|APT41|APT28|Winnti Group
T1012,Query Registry,Discovery,ZIRCONIUM|Chimera|Fox Kitten|APT39|Operation Wocao|APT32|Dragonfly 2.0|Threat Group-3390|OilRig|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Turla
T1012,Query Registry,Discovery,Kimsuky|Dragonfly|ZIRCONIUM|Chimera|Fox Kitten|APT39|Operation Wocao|APT32|Dragonfly 2.0|Threat Group-3390|OilRig|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Turla
T1011,Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium,Exfiltration,no
T1010,Application Window Discovery,Discovery,Lazarus Group
T1008,Fallback Channels,Command And Control,FIN7|APT41|OilRig|Lazarus Group
T1007,System Service Discovery,Discovery,Indrik Spider|Chimera|Operation Wocao|BRONZE BUTLER|APT1|OilRig|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
T1007,System Service Discovery,Discovery,Kimsuky|Aquatic Panda|Indrik Spider|Chimera|Operation Wocao|BRONZE BUTLER|APT1|OilRig|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
T1006,Direct Volume Access,Defense Evasion,no
T1005,Data from Local System,Collection,FIN7|APT41|APT38|Andariel|APT29|Windigo|Fox Kitten|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|FIN6|Gamaredon Group|APT39|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|GALLIUM|Turla|menuPass|Dark Caracal|Dragonfly 2.0|Honeybee|APT37|APT28|APT3|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|Threat Group-3390|APT1|Ke3chang
T1005,Data from Local System,Collection,Axiom|Dragonfly|FIN7|APT41|APT38|Andariel|APT29|Windigo|Fox Kitten|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|FIN6|Gamaredon Group|APT39|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|GALLIUM|Turla|menuPass|Dark Caracal|Dragonfly 2.0|Honeybee|APT37|APT28|APT3|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|Threat Group-3390|APT1|Ke3chang
T1003,OS Credential Dumping,Credential Access,Tonto Team|APT39|Frankenstein|APT32|APT28|Leviathan|Sowbug|Suckfly|Poseidon Group|Axiom
T1001,Data Obfuscation,Command And Control,Operation Wocao|Axiom
1 mitre_id technique tactics groups
2 T1647 Plist File Modification Defense Evasion no
3 T1622 Debugger Evasion Defense Evasion|Discovery no
4 T1621 Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation Credential Access APT29
5 T1505.005 Terminal Services DLL Persistence no
6 T1557.003 DHCP Spoofing Credential Access|Collection no
7 T1595.003 Wordlist Scanning Reconnaissance Volatile Cedar
8 T1098.005 Device Registration Persistence APT29
9 T1574.013 KernelCallbackTable Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion Lazarus Group
10 T1556.005 Reversible Encryption Credential Access|Defense Evasion|Persistence no
11 T1055.015 ListPlanting Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation no
12 T1564.010 Process Argument Spoofing Defense Evasion no
13 T1564.009 Resource Forking Defense Evasion no
14 T1559.003 XPC Services Execution no
15 T1562.010 Downgrade Attack Defense Evasion no
16 T1547.015 Login Items Persistence|Privilege Escalation no
17 T1620 Reflective Code Loading Defense Evasion no Lazarus Group
18 T1619 Cloud Storage Object Discovery Discovery no
19 T1218.014 MMC Defense Evasion no
20 T1218.013 Mavinject Defense Evasion no
21 T1614.001 System Language Discovery Discovery no Ke3chang|Lazarus Group
22 T1615 Group Policy Discovery Discovery Turla
23 T1036.007 Double File Extension Defense Evasion Mustang Panda
24 T1562.009 Safe Mode Boot Defense Evasion no
25 T1564.008 Email Hiding Rules Defense Evasion FIN4
26 T1505.004 IIS Components Persistence no
27 T1027.006 HTML Smuggling Defense Evasion no APT29
28 T1213.003 Code Repositories Collection APT29
29 T1553.006 Code Signing Policy Modification Defense Evasion Turla|APT39
30 T1614 System Location Discovery Discovery no
37 T1610 Deploy Container Defense Evasion|Execution TeamTNT
38 T1609 Container Administration Command Execution TeamTNT
39 T1608.005 Link Target Resource Development Silent Librarian
40 T1608.004 Drive-by Target Resource Development Transparent Tribe|APT32|Threat Group-3390 Dragonfly|Transparent Tribe|APT32|Threat Group-3390
41 T1608.003 Install Digital Certificate Resource Development no
42 T1608.002 Upload Tool Resource Development Threat Group-3390 Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390
43 T1608.001 Upload Malware Resource Development TeamTNT|APT32 Threat Group-3390|LazyScripter|Mustang Panda|Gamaredon Group|Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|TeamTNT|APT32
44 T1608 Stage Capabilities Resource Development no Mustang Panda
45 T1016.001 Internet Connection Discovery Discovery APT29|Turla Gamaredon Group|APT29|Turla
46 T1553.005 Mark-of-the-Web Bypass Defense Evasion TA505 APT29|TA505
47 T1555.005 Password Managers Credential Access Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao Threat Group-3390|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao
48 T1484.002 Domain Trust Modification Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation APT29
49 T1484.001 Group Policy Modification Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation Indrik Spider
50 T1547.014 Active Setup Persistence|Privilege Escalation no
73 T1053.006 Systemd Timers Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation no
74 T1562.008 Disable Cloud Logs Defense Evasion no
75 T1547.012 Print Processors Persistence|Privilege Escalation no
76 T1598.003 Spearphishing Link Reconnaissance Magic Hound|Silent Librarian|Sidewinder|Sandworm Team|APT32|Kimsuky APT28|Dragonfly|Magic Hound|Silent Librarian|Sidewinder|Sandworm Team|APT32|Kimsuky
77 T1598.002 Spearphishing Attachment Reconnaissance Sidewinder Dragonfly|Sidewinder
78 T1598.001 Spearphishing Service Reconnaissance no
79 T1598 Phishing for Information Reconnaissance ZIRCONIUM|APT28
80 T1597.002 Purchase Technical Data Reconnaissance no
86 T1596.001 DNS/Passive DNS Reconnaissance no
87 T1596.002 WHOIS Reconnaissance no
88 T1596 Search Open Technical Databases Reconnaissance no
89 T1595.002 Vulnerability Scanning Reconnaissance TeamTNT|APT29|Volatile Cedar|APT28|Sandworm Team Magic Hound|Aquatic Panda|Dragonfly|TeamTNT|APT29|Volatile Cedar|APT28|Sandworm Team
90 T1595.001 Scanning IP Blocks Reconnaissance TeamTNT
91 T1595 Active Scanning Reconnaissance no
92 T1594 Search Victim-Owned Websites Reconnaissance Silent Librarian|Sandworm Team Kimsuky|Silent Librarian|Sandworm Team
93 T1593.002 Search Engines Reconnaissance no Kimsuky
94 T1593.001 Social Media Reconnaissance Kimsuky Lazarus Group|Kimsuky
95 T1593 Search Open Websites/Domains Reconnaissance Sandworm Team
96 T1592.004 Client Configurations Reconnaissance HAFNIUM
97 T1592.003 Firmware Reconnaissance no
98 T1592.002 Software Reconnaissance Andariel|Sandworm Team
99 T1592.001 Hardware Reconnaissance no
100 T1592 Gather Victim Host Information Reconnaissance no
101 T1591.004 Identify Roles Reconnaissance no Lazarus Group
102 T1591.003 Identify Business Tempo Reconnaissance no
103 T1591.001 Determine Physical Locations Reconnaissance no
104 T1591.002 Business Relationships Reconnaissance Sandworm Team Dragonfly|Sandworm Team
105 T1591 Gather Victim Org Information Reconnaissance no Kimsuky|Lazarus Group
106 T1590.006 Network Security Appliances Reconnaissance no
107 T1590.005 IP Addresses Reconnaissance Andariel|HAFNIUM
108 T1590.004 Network Topology Reconnaissance no
110 T1590.002 DNS Reconnaissance no
111 T1590.001 Domain Properties Reconnaissance Sandworm Team
112 T1590 Gather Victim Network Information Reconnaissance HAFNIUM
113 T1589.003 Employee Names Reconnaissance Silent Librarian|Sandworm Team Kimsuky|Silent Librarian|Sandworm Team
114 T1589.002 Email Addresses Reconnaissance Kimsuky|Magic Hound|TA551|MuddyWater|HAFNIUM|APT32|Silent Librarian|Sandworm Team Lazarus Group|Kimsuky|Magic Hound|TA551|MuddyWater|HAFNIUM|APT32|Silent Librarian|Sandworm Team
115 T1589.001 Credentials Reconnaissance Leviathan|APT28|Magic Hound|Chimera APT29|Leviathan|APT28|Magic Hound|Chimera
116 T1589 Gather Victim Identity Information Reconnaissance Magic Hound|APT32
117 T1588.005 Exploits Resource Development no Kimsuky
118 T1588.004 Digital Certificates Resource Development Lazarus Group|Silent Librarian BlackTech|Lazarus Group|Silent Librarian
119 T1588.003 Code Signing Certificates Resource Development Wizard Spider BlackTech|Lazarus Group|Wizard Spider
120 T1588.002 Tool Resource Development CostaRicto|Night Dragon|DarkVishnya|FIN5|Gorgon Group|Patchwork|Chimera|Dragonfly|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|APT41|FIN6|TEMP.Veles|Kimsuky|PittyTiger|Cobalt Group|APT29|Thrip|Ke3chang|DarkHydrus|APT32|APT38|BRONZE BUTLER|Carbanak|Cleaver|Inception|Leafminer|Threat Group-3390|Ferocious Kitten|IndigoZebra|BackdoorDiplomacy|menuPass|APT-C-36|Magic Hound|APT28|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Silence|WIRTE|Turla|APT33|APT19|FIN10|CopyKittens|APT39|APT1|MuddyWater|Silent Librarian|GALLIUM|Sandworm Team Aquatic Panda|BlackTech|Lazarus Group|CostaRicto|Night Dragon|DarkVishnya|FIN5|Gorgon Group|Patchwork|Chimera|Dragonfly|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|APT41|FIN6|TEMP.Veles|Kimsuky|PittyTiger|Cobalt Group|APT29|Thrip|Ke3chang|DarkHydrus|APT32|APT38|BRONZE BUTLER|Carbanak|Cleaver|Inception|Leafminer|Threat Group-3390|Ferocious Kitten|IndigoZebra|BackdoorDiplomacy|menuPass|APT-C-36|Magic Hound|APT28|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Silence|WIRTE|Turla|APT33|APT19|FIN10|CopyKittens|APT39|APT1|MuddyWater|Silent Librarian|GALLIUM|Sandworm Team
121 T1588.001 Malware Resource Development Andariel|BackdoorDiplomacy|Turla|APT1 Aquatic Panda|LazyScripter|Andariel|BackdoorDiplomacy|Turla|APT1
122 T1588 Obtain Capabilities Resource Development no
123 T1587.004 Exploits Resource Development no
124 T1587.003 Digital Certificates Resource Development APT29|PROMETHIUM
125 T1587.002 Code Signing Certificates Resource Development PROMETHIUM|Patchwork
126 T1587.001 Malware Resource Development TeamTNT|APT29|Lazarus Group|Sandworm Team|Turla|FIN7|Night Dragon|Cleaver Ke3chang|Kimsuky|TeamTNT|APT29|Lazarus Group|Sandworm Team|Turla|FIN7|Night Dragon|Cleaver
127 T1587 Develop Capabilities Resource Development Kimsuky
128 T1586.002 Email Accounts Resource Development IndigoZebra|Leviathan|Magic Hound|Kimsuky APT29|APT28|IndigoZebra|Leviathan|Magic Hound|Kimsuky
129 T1586.001 Social Media Accounts Resource Development Leviathan
130 T1586 Compromise Accounts Resource Development no
131 T1585.002 Email Accounts Resource Development Leviathan|Magic Hound|Silent Librarian|Sandworm Team|APT1 Mustang Panda|Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|Leviathan|Magic Hound|Silent Librarian|Sandworm Team|APT1
132 T1585.001 Social Media Accounts Resource Development Leviathan|Magic Hound|Fox Kitten|Sandworm Team|APT32|Cleaver Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|Leviathan|Magic Hound|Fox Kitten|Sandworm Team|APT32|Cleaver
133 T1585 Establish Accounts Resource Development Fox Kitten|APT17
134 T1584.006 Web Services Resource Development Turla
135 T1584.005 Botnet Resource Development no Sandworm Team|Axiom
136 T1584.004 Server Resource Development Indrik Spider|Turla|APT16 Lazarus Group|Dragonfly|Indrik Spider|Turla|APT16
137 T1584.003 Virtual Private Server Resource Development Turla
138 T1584.002 DNS Server Resource Development no
139 T1584.001 Domains Resource Development Transparent Tribe|Magic Hound|APT29|APT1 Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|Transparent Tribe|Magic Hound|APT29|APT1
140 T1583.006 Web Services Resource Development IndigoZebra|ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|HAFNIUM|Lazarus Group|Turla|APT32|APT17|APT29 APT28|Confucius|LazyScripter|Kimsuky|Magic Hound|IndigoZebra|ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|HAFNIUM|Lazarus Group|Turla|APT32|APT17|APT29
141 T1583.005 Botnet Resource Development no
142 T1583.004 Server Resource Development GALLIUM|Sandworm Team Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|Gelsemium|GALLIUM|Sandworm Team
143 T1583.003 Virtual Private Server Resource Development HAFNIUM|TEMP.Veles Axiom|Dragonfly|HAFNIUM|TEMP.Veles
144 T1583.002 DNS Server Resource Development no Axiom
145 T1584 Compromise Infrastructure Resource Development no
146 T1583.001 Domains Resource Development IndigoZebra|TeamTNT|Ferocious Kitten|FIN7|Transparent Tribe|Leviathan|Magic Hound|APT29|Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|Lazarus Group|Silent Librarian|menuPass|Sandworm Team|APT32|Kimsuky|APT1|APT28 LazyScripter|Gamaredon Group|Winnti Group|Dragonfly|IndigoZebra|TeamTNT|Ferocious Kitten|FIN7|Transparent Tribe|Leviathan|Magic Hound|APT29|Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|Lazarus Group|Silent Librarian|menuPass|Sandworm Team|APT32|Kimsuky|APT1|APT28
147 T1583 Acquire Infrastructure Resource Development no
148 T1564.007 VBA Stomping Defense Evasion no
149 T1558.004 AS-REP Roasting Credential Access no
157 T1562.007 Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall Defense Evasion no
158 T1098.004 SSH Authorized Keys Persistence TeamTNT
159 T1480.001 Environmental Keying Defense Evasion APT41|Equation
160 T1059.007 JavaScript Execution Indrik Spider|MuddyWater|Turla|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Evilnum|Kimsuky|FIN6|APT32|FIN7|Cobalt Group|Molerats|TA505|Silence|Leafminer LazyScripter|Indrik Spider|MuddyWater|Turla|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Evilnum|Kimsuky|FIN6|APT32|FIN7|Cobalt Group|Molerats|TA505|Silence|Leafminer
161 T1578.004 Revert Cloud Instance Defense Evasion no
162 T1578.003 Delete Cloud Instance Defense Evasion no
163 T1578.001 Create Snapshot Defense Evasion no
167 T1562.006 Indicator Blocking Defense Evasion no
168 T1573.002 Asymmetric Cryptography Command And Control Operation Wocao|Tropic Trooper|Cobalt Group|OilRig|FIN8|FIN6
169 T1573.001 Symmetric Cryptography Command And Control Mustang Panda|Darkhotel|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Frankenstein|Inception|APT28|APT33|BRONZE BUTLER|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group
170 T1573 Encrypted Channel Command And Control Tropic Trooper APT29|Tropic Trooper
171 T1027.004 Compile After Delivery Defense Evasion Gamaredon Group|Rocke|MuddyWater
172 T1574.004 Dylib Hijacking Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion no
173 T1546.015 Component Object Model Hijacking Privilege Escalation|Persistence APT28
174 T1071.004 DNS Command And Control Chimera|APT39|Tropic Trooper|OilRig|Ke3chang|Cobalt Group|APT18|APT41|FIN7 LazyScripter|Chimera|APT39|Tropic Trooper|OilRig|Ke3chang|Cobalt Group|APT18|APT41|FIN7
175 T1071.003 Mail Protocols Command And Control Turla|Kimsuky|APT32|SilverTerrier|APT28
176 T1071.002 File Transfer Protocols Command And Control Kimsuky|APT41|SilverTerrier|Honeybee
177 T1071.001 Web Protocols Command And Control TeamTNT|FIN8|APT29|Mustang Panda|Windshift|TA551|Higaisa|HAFNIUM|Sidewinder|Chimera|Sandworm Team|TA505|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Inception|APT41|SilverTerrier|APT28|WIRTE|APT33|FIN4|Night Dragon|APT18|APT38|Rancor|Ke3chang|Orangeworm|APT37|APT19|Cobalt Group|Threat Group-3390|Dark Caracal|Turla|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|APT32|OilRig|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon Kimsuky|Confucius|TeamTNT|FIN8|APT29|Mustang Panda|Windshift|TA551|Higaisa|HAFNIUM|Sidewinder|Chimera|Sandworm Team|TA505|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Inception|APT41|SilverTerrier|APT28|WIRTE|APT33|FIN4|Night Dragon|APT18|APT38|Rancor|Ke3chang|Orangeworm|APT37|APT19|Cobalt Group|Threat Group-3390|Dark Caracal|Turla|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|APT32|OilRig|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon
178 T1572 Protocol Tunneling Command And Control Leviathan|CostaRicto|Chimera|Fox Kitten|OilRig|Cobalt Group|FIN6
179 T1048.003 Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol Exfiltration Wizard Spider|FIN6|APT32|APT33|Thrip|FIN8|OilRig|Lazarus Group
180 T1048.002 Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol Exfiltration APT28|APT29
187 T1090.004 Domain Fronting Command And Control APT29
188 T1090.003 Multi-hop Proxy Command And Control Leviathan|CostaRicto|APT28|Operation Wocao|Inception|FIN4|APT29
189 T1090.002 External Proxy Command And Control Tonto Team|APT39|Silence|GALLIUM|MuddyWater|APT3|FIN5|Lazarus Group|menuPass|APT28
190 T1090.001 Internal Proxy Command And Control APT29|Higaisa|Operation Wocao|APT39|Strider Lazarus Group|Turla|APT29|Higaisa|Operation Wocao|APT39|Strider
191 T1102.003 One-Way Communication Command And Control Leviathan
192 T1102.002 Bidirectional Communication Command And Control ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|APT28|APT29|Sandworm Team|APT39|APT12|Turla|FIN7|APT37|Magic Hound|Carbanak Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|APT28|APT29|Sandworm Team|APT39|APT12|Turla|FIN7|APT37|Magic Hound|Carbanak
193 T1102.001 Dead Drop Resolver Command And Control Rocke|APT41|BRONZE BUTLER|RTM|Patchwork
194 T1571 Non-Standard Port Command And Control Sandworm Team|Rocke|DarkVishnya|Silence|APT-C-36|Magic Hound|APT33|APT32|TEMP.Veles|Lazarus Group|FIN7 WIRTE|Sandworm Team|Rocke|DarkVishnya|Silence|APT-C-36|Magic Hound|APT33|APT32|TEMP.Veles|Lazarus Group|FIN7
195 T1074.002 Remote Data Staging Collection Leviathan|APT28|APT29|Chimera|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|FIN6|Night Dragon|FIN8
196 T1074.001 Local Data Staging Collection Indrik Spider|BackdoorDiplomacy|Mustang Panda|Sidewinder|Chimera|Kimsuky|APT39|Operation Wocao|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|Patchwork|Honeybee|Dragonfly 2.0|Leviathan|APT3|FIN5|menuPass|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28 Dragonfly|Indrik Spider|BackdoorDiplomacy|Mustang Panda|Sidewinder|Chimera|Kimsuky|APT39|Operation Wocao|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|Patchwork|Honeybee|Dragonfly 2.0|Leviathan|APT3|FIN5|menuPass|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28
197 T1078.004 Cloud Accounts Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access APT28|APT33 Ke3chang|APT29|APT28|APT33
198 T1564.004 NTFS File Attributes Defense Evasion APT32
199 T1564.003 Hidden Window Defense Evasion Nomadic Octopus|Higaisa|Gorgon Group|Deep Panda|DarkHydrus|CopyKittens|APT19|APT32|APT28|APT3|Magic Hound Gamaredon Group|Kimsuky|Nomadic Octopus|Higaisa|Gorgon Group|Deep Panda|DarkHydrus|CopyKittens|APT19|APT32|APT28|APT3|Magic Hound
200 T1078.003 Local Accounts Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access Kimsuky|HAFNIUM|Turla|Operation Wocao|PROMETHIUM|Tropic Trooper|FIN10|APT32 APT29|Kimsuky|HAFNIUM|Turla|Operation Wocao|PROMETHIUM|Tropic Trooper|FIN10|APT32
201 T1078.002 Domain Accounts Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access Naikon|Indrik Spider|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|APT29|TA505|APT3|Threat Group-1314
202 T1078.001 Default Accounts Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access no
203 T1564.002 Hidden Users Defense Evasion Dragonfly 2.0 Kimsuky|Dragonfly|Dragonfly 2.0
204 T1574.006 Dynamic Linker Hijacking Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion APT41|Rocke
205 T1574.002 DLL Side-Loading Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion Mustang Panda|Higaisa|BlackTech|Sidewinder|Chimera|BRONZE BUTLER|Naikon|APT41|GALLIUM|Tropic Trooper|APT19|Patchwork|APT32|APT3|menuPass|Threat Group-3390 Lazarus Group|Mustang Panda|Higaisa|BlackTech|Sidewinder|Chimera|BRONZE BUTLER|Naikon|APT41|GALLIUM|Tropic Trooper|APT19|Patchwork|APT32|APT3|menuPass|Threat Group-3390
206 T1574.001 DLL Search Order Hijacking Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion BackdoorDiplomacy|Tonto Team|Evilnum|APT41|Whitefly|RTM|Threat Group-3390|menuPass Aquatic Panda|BackdoorDiplomacy|Tonto Team|Evilnum|APT41|Whitefly|RTM|Threat Group-3390|menuPass
207 T1574.008 Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion no
208 T1574.007 Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion no
209 T1574.009 Path Interception by Unquoted Path Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion no
214 T1069.001 Local Groups Discovery Tonto Team|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Turla|OilRig|admin@338
215 T1570 Lateral Tool Transfer Lateral Movement Sandworm Team|Chimera|GALLIUM|Operation Wocao|APT32|Wizard Spider|Turla|FIN10
216 T1568.003 DNS Calculation Command And Control APT12
217 T1204.002 Malicious File Execution Nomadic Octopus|Indrik Spider|APT38|Andariel|Ferocious Kitten|IndigoZebra|Transparent Tribe|Tonto Team|Magic Hound|Ajax Security Team|Mustang Panda|TA551|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Kimsuky|FIN6|PROMETHIUM|APT30|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|RTM|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|Machete|admin@338|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN7|BRONZE BUTLER|Gorgon Group|OilRig|Dark Caracal|Cobalt Group|DarkHydrus|Rancor|Patchwork|APT32|APT19|MuddyWater|Lazarus Group|menuPass|APT37|Leviathan|TA459|APT29|APT28|FIN8|PLATINUM|Elderwood LazyScripter|WIRTE|Confucius|Dragonfly|Threat Group-3390|Nomadic Octopus|Indrik Spider|APT38|Andariel|Ferocious Kitten|IndigoZebra|Transparent Tribe|Tonto Team|Magic Hound|Ajax Security Team|Mustang Panda|TA551|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Kimsuky|FIN6|PROMETHIUM|APT30|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|RTM|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|Machete|admin@338|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN7|BRONZE BUTLER|Gorgon Group|OilRig|Dark Caracal|Cobalt Group|DarkHydrus|Rancor|Patchwork|APT32|APT19|MuddyWater|Lazarus Group|menuPass|APT37|Leviathan|TA459|APT29|APT28|FIN8|PLATINUM|Elderwood
218 T1204.001 Malicious Link Execution FIN7|Transparent Tribe|APT3|Magic Hound|APT28|APT29|Mustang Panda|Sidewinder|ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|Evilnum|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|Patchwork|Windshift|APT32|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|TA505|OilRig|Machete|Leviathan|FIN8|FIN4|Elderwood|Dragonfly 2.0|Cobalt Group|APT39|Night Dragon|Turla|APT33 LazyScripter|Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|Confucius|FIN7|Transparent Tribe|APT3|Magic Hound|APT28|APT29|Mustang Panda|Sidewinder|ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|Evilnum|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|Patchwork|Windshift|APT32|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|TA505|OilRig|Machete|Leviathan|FIN8|FIN4|Elderwood|Dragonfly 2.0|Cobalt Group|APT39|Night Dragon|Turla|APT33
219 T1195.003 Compromise Hardware Supply Chain Initial Access no
220 T1195.002 Compromise Software Supply Chain Initial Access APT29|Cobalt Group|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Dragonfly|Sandworm Team|APT41 Gelsemium|Threat Group-3390|APT29|Cobalt Group|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Dragonfly|Sandworm Team|APT41
221 T1195.001 Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools Initial Access no
222 T1568.001 Fast Flux DNS Command And Control menuPass|TA505
223 T1052.001 Exfiltration over USB Exfiltration Mustang Panda|Tropic Trooper
225 T1569.001 Launchctl Execution no
226 T1569 System Services Execution no
227 T1568.002 Domain Generation Algorithms Command And Control TA551|APT41
228 T1568 Dynamic Resolution Command And Control Transparent Tribe|APT29 Gamaredon Group|Gelsemium|Transparent Tribe|APT29
229 T1011.001 Exfiltration Over Bluetooth Exfiltration no
230 T1567.002 Exfiltration to Cloud Storage Exfiltration FIN7|ZIRCONIUM|HAFNIUM|Chimera|Leviathan|Turla Kimsuky|Threat Group-3390|Confucius|Lazarus Group|FIN7|ZIRCONIUM|HAFNIUM|Chimera|Leviathan|Turla
231 T1567.001 Exfiltration to Code Repository Exfiltration no
232 T1059.006 Python Execution Tonto Team|APT37|ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|Turla|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|APT29|Rocke|BRONZE BUTLER|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|Machete Dragonfly|Tonto Team|APT37|ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|Turla|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|APT29|Rocke|BRONZE BUTLER|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|Machete
233 T1059.005 Visual Basic Execution OilRig|APT38|Transparent Tribe|APT29|Mustang Panda|Windshift|Higaisa|Sidewinder|APT39|Machete|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|APT33|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|Rancor|Patchwork|MuddyWater|Honeybee|FIN7|APT37|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|Turla|TA505|Silence|WIRTE|FIN4|Cobalt Group|Gorgon Group|Leviathan|TA459|Magic Hound Confucius|Lazarus Group|LazyScripter|OilRig|APT38|Transparent Tribe|APT29|Mustang Panda|Windshift|Higaisa|Sidewinder|APT39|Machete|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|APT33|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|Rancor|Patchwork|MuddyWater|Honeybee|FIN7|APT37|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|Turla|TA505|Silence|WIRTE|FIN4|Cobalt Group|Gorgon Group|Leviathan|TA459|Magic Hound
234 T1059.004 Unix Shell Execution TeamTNT|Rocke|APT41
235 T1059.003 Windows Command Shell Execution Sandworm Team|Nomadic Octopus|TeamTNT|APT29|Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|TA551|Higaisa|Indrik Spider|Chimera|Fox Kitten|Machete|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|FIN6|TA505|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|OilRig|Lazarus Group|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|FIN7|APT41|GALLIUM|Turla|Silence|APT32|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Gorgon Group|Dark Caracal|Ke3chang|Dragonfly 2.0|Rancor|FIN8|APT28|APT37|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|Sowbug|menuPass|FIN10|Threat Group-3390|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Suckfly|Threat Group-1314|APT3|admin@338|APT1 Kimsuky|Aquatic Panda|Dragonfly|LazyScripter|Sandworm Team|Nomadic Octopus|TeamTNT|APT29|Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|TA551|Higaisa|Indrik Spider|Chimera|Fox Kitten|Machete|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|FIN6|TA505|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|OilRig|Lazarus Group|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|FIN7|APT41|GALLIUM|Turla|Silence|APT32|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Gorgon Group|Dark Caracal|Ke3chang|Dragonfly 2.0|Rancor|FIN8|APT28|APT37|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|Sowbug|menuPass|FIN10|Threat Group-3390|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Suckfly|Threat Group-1314|APT3|admin@338|APT1
236 T1059.002 AppleScript Execution no
237 T1059.001 PowerShell Execution Nomadic Octopus|TeamTNT|APT38|Tonto Team|Mustang Panda|Indrik Spider|HAFNIUM|Sidewinder|Fox Kitten|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|APT39|DarkVishnya|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Inception|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|GALLIUM|TA505|WIRTE|TEMP.Veles|APT33|Gallmaker|Turla|Thrip|Cobalt Group|APT28|DarkHydrus|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|Gorgon Group|TA459|Leviathan|MuddyWater|FIN8|CopyKittens|OilRig|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN7|APT32|menuPass|FIN10|Threat Group-3390|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Poseidon Group|APT3|APT29|Deep Panda Gamaredon Group|Lazarus Group|Aquatic Panda|Confucius|Dragonfly|LazyScripter|Nomadic Octopus|TeamTNT|APT38|Tonto Team|Mustang Panda|Indrik Spider|HAFNIUM|Sidewinder|Fox Kitten|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|APT39|DarkVishnya|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Inception|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|GALLIUM|TA505|WIRTE|TEMP.Veles|APT33|Gallmaker|Turla|Thrip|Cobalt Group|APT28|DarkHydrus|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|Gorgon Group|TA459|Leviathan|MuddyWater|FIN8|CopyKittens|OilRig|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN7|APT32|menuPass|FIN10|Threat Group-3390|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Poseidon Group|APT3|APT29|Deep Panda
238 T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service Exfiltration APT28
239 T1497.003 Time Based Evasion Defense Evasion|Discovery no
240 T1497.002 User Activity Based Checks Defense Evasion|Discovery Darkhotel|FIN7
241 T1497.001 System Checks Defense Evasion|Discovery OilRig|Darkhotel|Evilnum|Frankenstein Lazarus Group|OilRig|Darkhotel|Evilnum|Frankenstein
242 T1498.002 Reflection Amplification Impact no
243 T1498.001 Direct Network Flood Impact no
244 T1566.003 Spearphishing via Service Initial Access APT29|Ajax Security Team|Magic Hound|Windshift|FIN6|OilRig|Dark Caracal Lazarus Group|APT29|Ajax Security Team|Magic Hound|Windshift|FIN6|OilRig|Dark Caracal
245 T1566.002 Spearphishing Link Initial Access Transparent Tribe|FIN7|APT3|Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|Sidewinder|Evilnum|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|APT1|Windshift|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|Machete|Kimsuky|TA505|APT39|FIN4|APT32|Night Dragon|APT28|Cobalt Group|Turla|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|Elderwood|APT33|APT29|Leviathan|FIN8|Patchwork|Magic Hound Lazarus Group|Confucius|LazyScripter|Transparent Tribe|FIN7|APT3|Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|Sidewinder|Evilnum|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|APT1|Windshift|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|Machete|Kimsuky|TA505|APT39|FIN4|APT32|Night Dragon|APT28|Cobalt Group|Turla|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|Elderwood|APT33|APT29|Leviathan|FIN8|Patchwork|Magic Hound
246 T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment Initial Access APT38|Andariel|Ferocious Kitten|IndigoZebra|Transparent Tribe|Nomadic Octopus|Tonto Team|Ajax Security Team|Mustang Panda|TA551|Higaisa|Sidewinder|APT1|FIN6|APT30|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Mofang|Wizard Spider|RTM|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|APT41|Machete|admin@338|Kimsuky|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|Tropic Trooper|DarkHydrus|Lazarus Group|Gorgon Group|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|APT19|APT32|Cobalt Group|Rancor|FIN7|Dragonfly 2.0|MuddyWater|APT28|TA459|APT29|APT37|Leviathan|FIN8|Patchwork|menuPass|Elderwood|PLATINUM WIRTE|Confucius|Dragonfly|LazyScripter|Threat Group-3390|APT38|Andariel|Ferocious Kitten|IndigoZebra|Transparent Tribe|Nomadic Octopus|Tonto Team|Ajax Security Team|Mustang Panda|TA551|Higaisa|Sidewinder|APT1|FIN6|APT30|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Mofang|Wizard Spider|RTM|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|APT41|Machete|admin@338|Kimsuky|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|Tropic Trooper|DarkHydrus|Lazarus Group|Gorgon Group|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|APT19|APT32|Cobalt Group|Rancor|FIN7|Dragonfly 2.0|MuddyWater|APT28|TA459|APT29|APT37|Leviathan|FIN8|Patchwork|menuPass|Elderwood|PLATINUM
247 T1566 Phishing Initial Access GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Dragonfly Axiom|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Dragonfly
248 T1565.003 Runtime Data Manipulation Impact APT38
249 T1565.002 Transmitted Data Manipulation Impact APT38
250 T1565.001 Stored Data Manipulation Impact APT38
251 T1565 Data Manipulation Impact no
252 T1564.001 Hidden Files and Directories Defense Evasion Transparent Tribe|Mustang Panda|Rocke|APT32|Tropic Trooper|APT28|Lazarus Group
253 T1564 Hide Artifacts Defense Evasion no
254 T1563.002 RDP Hijacking Lateral Movement no Axiom
255 T1563.001 SSH Hijacking Lateral Movement no
256 T1563 Remote Service Session Hijacking Lateral Movement no
257 T1518.001 Security Software Discovery Discovery TeamTNT|APT38|Windshift|Sidewinder|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Turla|Rocke|Frankenstein|The White Company|Cobalt Group|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|Tropic Trooper|FIN8|Patchwork|Naikon Kimsuky|Aquatic Panda|TeamTNT|APT38|Windshift|Sidewinder|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Turla|Rocke|Frankenstein|The White Company|Cobalt Group|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|Tropic Trooper|FIN8|Patchwork|Naikon
258 T1069.003 Cloud Groups Discovery no
259 T1069.002 Domain Groups Discovery Turla|Inception|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|Ke3chang APT29|Dragonfly|Turla|Inception|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|Ke3chang
260 T1087.004 Cloud Account Discovery no APT29
261 T1087.003 Email Account Discovery Sandworm Team|TA505
262 T1087.002 Domain Account Discovery MuddyWater|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Chimera|Turla|Sandworm Team|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN6|Poseidon Group|Ke3chang APT29|Lazarus Group|Dragonfly|MuddyWater|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Chimera|Turla|Sandworm Team|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN6|Poseidon Group|Ke3chang
263 T1087.001 Local Account Discovery Chimera|Fox Kitten|Turla|Poseidon Group|OilRig|Ke3chang|APT32|APT1|Threat Group-3390|APT3|admin@338
264 T1553.004 Install Root Certificate Defense Evasion no
265 T1562.004 Disable or Modify System Firewall Defense Evasion TeamTNT|APT38|APT29|Operation Wocao|Rocke|Lazarus Group|Kimsuky|Dragonfly 2.0|Carbanak Dragonfly|TeamTNT|APT38|APT29|Operation Wocao|Rocke|Lazarus Group|Kimsuky|Dragonfly 2.0|Carbanak
266 T1562.003 Impair Command History Logging Defense Evasion APT38
267 T1562.002 Disable Windows Event Logging Defense Evasion Sandworm Team|APT29|Threat Group-3390
268 T1562.001 Disable or Modify Tools Defense Evasion TeamTNT|Indrik Spider|APT29|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|FIN6|Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Rocke|Kimsuky|Turla|Night Dragon|Gorgon Group|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda Aquatic Panda|TeamTNT|Indrik Spider|APT29|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|FIN6|Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Rocke|Kimsuky|Turla|Night Dragon|Gorgon Group|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda
269 T1562 Impair Defenses Defense Evasion no
270 T1003.004 LSA Secrets Credential Access OilRig|MuddyWater|menuPass|Leafminer|Ke3chang|Dragonfly 2.0|APT33|Threat Group-3390 Dragonfly|OilRig|MuddyWater|menuPass|Leafminer|Ke3chang|Dragonfly 2.0|APT33|Threat Group-3390
271 T1003.005 Cached Domain Credentials Credential Access OilRig|MuddyWater|Leafminer|APT33
272 T1561.002 Disk Structure Wipe Impact Sandworm Team|Lazarus Group|APT38|APT37
273 T1561.001 Disk Content Wipe Impact Lazarus Group
274 T1561 Disk Wipe Impact no
275 T1560.003 Archive via Custom Method Collection Mustang Panda|Lazarus Group|Kimsuky|CopyKittens|FIN6
276 T1560.002 Archive via Library Collection Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390
277 T1560.001 Archive via Utility Collection APT28|APT29|Mustang Panda|HAFNIUM|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Chimera|APT41|GALLIUM|Turla|Gallmaker|APT33|APT39|MuddyWater|Magic Hound|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|CopyKittens|Sowbug|APT3|menuPass|APT1|Ke3chang Kimsuky|Aquatic Panda|APT28|APT29|Mustang Panda|HAFNIUM|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Chimera|APT41|GALLIUM|Turla|Gallmaker|APT33|APT39|MuddyWater|Magic Hound|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|CopyKittens|Sowbug|APT3|menuPass|APT1|Ke3chang
278 T1560 Archive Collected Data Collection Leviathan|menuPass|APT32|Honeybee|Patchwork|APT28|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Ke3chang Axiom|Dragonfly|Leviathan|menuPass|APT32|Honeybee|Patchwork|APT28|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Ke3chang
279 T1499.004 Application or System Exploitation Impact no
280 T1499.003 Application Exhaustion Flood Impact no
281 T1499.002 Service Exhaustion Flood Impact no
282 T1499.001 OS Exhaustion Flood Impact no
283 T1491.002 External Defacement Impact Sandworm Team
284 T1491.001 Internal Defacement Impact Lazarus Group Gamaredon Group|Lazarus Group
285 T1114.003 Email Forwarding Rule Collection Silent Librarian|Kimsuky
286 T1114.002 Remote Email Collection Collection APT29|HAFNIUM|Chimera|APT1|FIN4|Ke3chang|Leafminer|Dragonfly 2.0|APT28 Kimsuky|Dragonfly|APT29|HAFNIUM|Chimera|APT1|FIN4|Ke3chang|Leafminer|Dragonfly 2.0|APT28
287 T1114.001 Local Email Collection Collection Chimera|Magic Hound|APT1
288 T1134.005 SID-History Injection Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation no
289 T1134.004 Parent PID Spoofing Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation no
292 T1134.001 Token Impersonation/Theft Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation FIN8|APT28
293 T1213.002 Sharepoint Collection Chimera|Ke3chang|APT28
294 T1213.001 Confluence Collection no
295 T1555.003 Credentials from Web Browsers Credential Access Ajax Security Team|ZIRCONIUM|FIN6|Sandworm Team|Inception|Stealth Falcon|OilRig|Leafminer|APT33|APT3|Kimsuky|TA505|MuddyWater|APT37|Patchwork|Molerats APT29|Ajax Security Team|ZIRCONIUM|FIN6|Sandworm Team|Inception|Stealth Falcon|OilRig|Leafminer|APT33|APT3|Kimsuky|TA505|MuddyWater|APT37|Patchwork|Molerats
296 T1555.002 Securityd Memory Credential Access no
297 T1555.001 Keychain Credential Access no
298 T1559.002 Dynamic Data Exchange Execution Leviathan|Sidewinder|Sharpshooter|TA505|MuddyWater|Gallmaker|Patchwork|Cobalt Group|APT37|FIN7|APT28
301 T1558.002 Silver Ticket Credential Access no
302 T1558.001 Golden Ticket Credential Access Ke3chang
303 T1558 Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets Credential Access no
304 T1557.001 LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay Credential Access|Collection Wizard Spider Lazarus Group|Wizard Spider
305 T1557 Adversary-in-the-Middle Credential Access|Collection Kimsuky
306 T1556.002 Password Filter DLL Credential Access|Defense Evasion|Persistence Strider
307 T1556.001 Domain Controller Authentication Credential Access|Defense Evasion|Persistence Chimera
317 T1003.006 DCSync Credential Access APT29|Operation Wocao
318 T1558.003 Kerberoasting Credential Access FIN7|APT29|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider
319 T1552.006 Group Policy Preferences Credential Access APT33
320 T1003.003 NTDS Credential Access APT28|Mustang Panda|HAFNIUM|Fox Kitten|menuPass|Wizard Spider|Chimera|FIN6|Dragonfly 2.0 Ke3chang|Dragonfly|APT28|Mustang Panda|HAFNIUM|Fox Kitten|menuPass|Wizard Spider|Chimera|FIN6|Dragonfly 2.0
321 T1003.002 Security Account Manager Credential Access Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390|Ke3chang|GALLIUM|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|menuPass Dragonfly|Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390|Ke3chang|GALLIUM|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|menuPass
322 T1003.001 LSASS Memory Credential Access Indrik Spider|HAFNIUM|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Blue Mockingbird|Silence|Threat Group-3390|Leviathan|APT41|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|APT32|Leafminer|Magic Hound|FIN8|PLATINUM|MuddyWater|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN6|APT3|APT28|APT1|Ke3chang|Cleaver Aquatic Panda|Indrik Spider|HAFNIUM|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Blue Mockingbird|Silence|Threat Group-3390|Leviathan|APT41|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|APT32|Leafminer|Magic Hound|FIN8|PLATINUM|MuddyWater|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN6|APT3|APT28|APT1|Ke3chang|Cleaver
323 T1110.004 Credential Stuffing Credential Access Chimera
324 T1110.003 Password Spraying Credential Access Sandworm Team|APT29|Silent Librarian|Chimera|APT28|APT33|Leafminer|Lazarus Group
325 T1110.002 Password Cracking Credential Access FIN6|APT41|Dragonfly 2.0|APT3 Dragonfly|FIN6|APT41|Dragonfly 2.0|APT3
326 T1110.001 Password Guessing Credential Access APT28
327 T1021.006 Windows Remote Management Lateral Movement APT29|Chimera|Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390
328 T1021.005 VNC Lateral Movement FIN7|Fox Kitten|GCMAN Gamaredon Group|FIN7|Fox Kitten|GCMAN
329 T1021.004 SSH Lateral Movement TeamTNT|FIN7|Fox Kitten|Rocke|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|OilRig|menuPass|GCMAN BlackTech|Lazarus Group|TeamTNT|FIN7|Fox Kitten|Rocke|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|OilRig|menuPass|GCMAN
330 T1021.003 Distributed Component Object Model Lateral Movement no
331 T1021.002 SMB/Windows Admin Shares Lateral Movement Sandworm Team|APT28|Fox Kitten|APT41|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|APT39|APT32|Orangeworm|FIN8|APT3|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-1314|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang APT29|Sandworm Team|APT28|Fox Kitten|APT41|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|APT39|APT32|Orangeworm|FIN8|APT3|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-1314|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang
332 T1021.001 Remote Desktop Protocol Lateral Movement Kimsuky|FIN7|Fox Kitten|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|APT3|OilRig|FIN10|menuPass|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|APT1|Axiom APT29|Dragonfly|Kimsuky|FIN7|Fox Kitten|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|APT3|OilRig|FIN10|menuPass|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|APT1|Axiom
333 T1554 Compromise Client Software Binary Persistence no
334 T1036.006 Space after Filename Defense Evasion no
335 T1036.005 Match Legitimate Name or Location Defense Evasion APT28|Ferocious Kitten|FIN7|BackdoorDiplomacy|Transparent Tribe|Naikon|APT29|Mustang Panda|Sidewinder|Darkhotel|Lazarus Group|Indrik Spider|Fox Kitten|Machete|Chimera|PROMETHIUM|Rocke|Sandworm Team|APT39|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Silence|APT41|menuPass|TEMP.Veles|MuddyWater|Sowbug|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|Patchwork|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Carbanak|APT1 Ke3chang|Kimsuky|Gamaredon Group|WIRTE|APT28|Ferocious Kitten|FIN7|BackdoorDiplomacy|Transparent Tribe|Naikon|APT29|Mustang Panda|Sidewinder|Darkhotel|Lazarus Group|Indrik Spider|Fox Kitten|Machete|Chimera|PROMETHIUM|Rocke|Sandworm Team|APT39|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Silence|APT41|menuPass|TEMP.Veles|MuddyWater|Sowbug|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|Patchwork|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Carbanak|APT1
336 T1036.004 Masquerade Task or Service Defense Evasion BackdoorDiplomacy|APT41|Naikon|ZIRCONIUM|APT29|Higaisa|Fox Kitten|Kimsuky|PROMETHIUM|Wizard Spider|APT-C-36|Carbanak|APT32|FIN6|FIN7 Lazarus Group|BackdoorDiplomacy|APT41|Naikon|ZIRCONIUM|APT29|Higaisa|Fox Kitten|Kimsuky|PROMETHIUM|Wizard Spider|APT-C-36|Carbanak|APT32|FIN6|FIN7
337 T1036.003 Rename System Utilities Defense Evasion menuPass|APT32|GALLIUM Lazarus Group|menuPass|APT32|GALLIUM
338 T1036.002 Right-to-Left Override Defense Evasion Ferocious Kitten|BRONZE BUTLER|BlackTech|Ke3chang|Scarlet Mimic
339 T1036.001 Invalid Code Signature Defense Evasion Windshift|APT37
340 T1553.003 SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking Defense Evasion no
341 T1553.002 Code Signing Defense Evasion menuPass|APT29|GALLIUM|Wizard Spider|Kimsuky|PROMETHIUM|Patchwork|Silence|APT41|FIN6|TA505|FIN7|Honeybee|Leviathan|CopyKittens|Winnti Group|Suckfly|Molerats|Darkhotel Lazarus Group|menuPass|APT29|GALLIUM|Wizard Spider|Kimsuky|PROMETHIUM|Patchwork|Silence|APT41|FIN6|TA505|FIN7|Honeybee|Leviathan|CopyKittens|Winnti Group|Suckfly|Molerats|Darkhotel
342 T1553.001 Gatekeeper Bypass Defense Evasion no
343 T1553 Subvert Trust Controls Defense Evasion no Axiom
344 T1027.003 Steganography Defense Evasion Andariel|Leviathan|TA551|BRONZE BUTLER|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|APT37
345 T1027.002 Software Packing Defense Evasion Sandworm Team|Kimsuky|TeamTNT|ZIRCONIUM|TA505|Rocke|GALLIUM|The White Company|APT39|APT38|Dark Caracal|Elderwood|APT3|Patchwork|APT29|Night Dragon Threat Group-3390|Lazarus Group|Sandworm Team|Kimsuky|TeamTNT|ZIRCONIUM|TA505|Rocke|GALLIUM|The White Company|APT39|APT38|Dark Caracal|Elderwood|APT3|Patchwork|APT29|Night Dragon
346 T1027.001 Binary Padding Defense Evasion APT29|Mustang Panda|Higaisa|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|APT32|Leviathan|BRONZE BUTLER|Moafee
347 T1222.002 Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification Defense Evasion TeamTNT|Rocke|APT32
348 T1222.001 Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification Defense Evasion Wizard Spider
354 T1216.001 PubPrn Defense Evasion APT32
355 T1070.006 Timestomp Defense Evasion APT38|APT29|Chimera|Kimsuky|Rocke|TEMP.Veles|APT32|Lazarus Group|APT28
356 T1070.005 Network Share Connection Removal Defense Evasion Threat Group-3390
357 T1070.004 File Deletion Defense Evasion TeamTNT|APT39|Mustang Panda|Chimera|Evilnum|Operation Wocao|FIN6|Sandworm Team|Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Wizard Spider|APT41|Kimsuky|Silence|The White Company|TEMP.Veles|APT32|APT38|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Honeybee|Patchwork|menuPass|FIN8|OilRig|FIN5|BRONZE BUTLER|APT3|Magic Hound|Threat Group-3390|APT28|FIN10|Group5|Lazarus Group|APT18|APT29 Aquatic Panda|Dragonfly|TeamTNT|APT39|Mustang Panda|Chimera|Evilnum|Operation Wocao|FIN6|Sandworm Team|Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Wizard Spider|APT41|Kimsuky|Silence|The White Company|TEMP.Veles|APT32|APT38|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Honeybee|Patchwork|menuPass|FIN8|OilRig|FIN5|BRONZE BUTLER|APT3|Magic Hound|Threat Group-3390|APT28|FIN10|Group5|Lazarus Group|APT18|APT29
358 T1070.003 Clear Command History Defense Evasion TeamTNT|menuPass|APT41 Lazarus Group|TeamTNT|menuPass|APT41
359 T1550.004 Web Session Cookie Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement APT29
360 T1550.001 Application Access Token Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement APT28 APT29|APT28
361 T1550.003 Pass the Ticket Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|APT29
362 T1550.002 Pass the Hash Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement Chimera|Kimsuky|GALLIUM|APT32|Night Dragon|APT28|APT1
363 T1550 Use Alternate Authentication Material Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement APT29
366 T1548.002 Bypass User Account Control Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion Evilnum|APT37|MuddyWater|Threat Group-3390|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork|APT29
367 T1548.001 Setuid and Setgid Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion no
368 T1548 Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion no
369 T1136.003 Cloud Account Persistence no APT29
370 T1070.002 Clear Linux or Mac System Logs Defense Evasion TeamTNT|Rocke
371 T1070.001 Clear Windows Event Logs Defense Evasion Indrik Spider|Chimera|Operation Wocao|APT41|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|APT32|FIN8|FIN5|APT28 Dragonfly|Indrik Spider|Chimera|Operation Wocao|APT41|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|APT32|FIN8|FIN5|APT28
372 T1136.002 Domain Account Persistence Sandworm Team|HAFNIUM|GALLIUM
373 T1136.001 Local Account Persistence TeamTNT|Fox Kitten|APT39|APT41|Leafminer|Dragonfly 2.0|APT3 Kimsuky|Dragonfly|TeamTNT|Fox Kitten|APT39|APT41|Leafminer|Dragonfly 2.0|APT3
374 T1547.011 Plist Modification Persistence|Privilege Escalation no
375 T1547.010 Port Monitors Persistence|Privilege Escalation no
376 T1547.009 Shortcut Modification Persistence|Privilege Escalation APT39|Darkhotel|APT29|Gorgon Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Lazarus Group|Leviathan Dragonfly|APT39|Darkhotel|APT29|Gorgon Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Lazarus Group|Leviathan
377 T1547.008 LSASS Driver Persistence|Privilege Escalation no
378 T1547.007 Re-opened Applications Persistence|Privilege Escalation no
379 T1547.006 Kernel Modules and Extensions Persistence|Privilege Escalation no
397 T1546.003 Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription Privilege Escalation|Persistence FIN8|Mustang Panda|APT33|Blue Mockingbird|Turla|Leviathan|APT29
398 T1546.002 Screensaver Privilege Escalation|Persistence no
399 T1546.001 Change Default File Association Privilege Escalation|Persistence Kimsuky
400 T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder Persistence|Privilege Escalation TeamTNT|Naikon|Windshift|Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Sidewinder|APT28|Wizard Spider|PROMETHIUM|Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Silence|RTM|Inception|APT41|Kimsuky|APT33|APT39|APT32|APT18|Dark Caracal|Threat Group-3390|Honeybee|Turla|Cobalt Group|Ke3chang|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|Gorgon Group|MuddyWater|APT37|Leviathan|BRONZE BUTLER|APT3|Magic Hound|FIN10|FIN7|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT29|Darkhotel Confucius|Dragonfly|LazyScripter|TeamTNT|Naikon|Windshift|Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Sidewinder|APT28|Wizard Spider|PROMETHIUM|Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Silence|RTM|Inception|APT41|Kimsuky|APT33|APT39|APT32|APT18|Dark Caracal|Threat Group-3390|Honeybee|Turla|Cobalt Group|Ke3chang|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|Gorgon Group|MuddyWater|APT37|Leviathan|BRONZE BUTLER|APT3|Magic Hound|FIN10|FIN7|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT29|Darkhotel
401 T1218.002 Control Panel Defense Evasion no
402 T1218.010 Regsvr32 Defense Evasion TA551|Blue Mockingbird|Inception|WIRTE|Cobalt Group|APT19|Leviathan|APT32|Deep Panda Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|TA551|Blue Mockingbird|Inception|WIRTE|Cobalt Group|APT19|Leviathan|APT32|Deep Panda
403 T1218.009 Regsvcs/Regasm Defense Evasion no
404 T1218.005 Mshta Defense Evasion Mustang Panda|TA551|Sidewinder|Inception|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|FIN7 Gamaredon Group|Confucius|Lazarus Group|APT29|LazyScripter|Mustang Panda|TA551|Sidewinder|Inception|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|FIN7
405 T1218.004 InstallUtil Defense Evasion Mustang Panda|menuPass
406 T1218.001 Compiled HTML File Defense Evasion APT41|Silence|Dark Caracal|OilRig|Lazarus Group APT38|APT41|Silence|Dark Caracal|OilRig|Lazarus Group
407 T1218.003 CMSTP Defense Evasion Cobalt Group|MuddyWater
408 T1218.011 Rundll32 Defense Evasion APT38|HAFNIUM|TA551|APT41|Gamaredon Group|APT32|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|TA505|MuddyWater|APT29|APT19|CopyKittens|APT3|Carbanak|APT28 Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|LazyScripter|APT38|HAFNIUM|TA551|APT41|Gamaredon Group|APT32|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|TA505|MuddyWater|APT29|APT19|CopyKittens|APT3|Carbanak|APT28
409 T1547 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution Persistence|Privilege Escalation no
410 T1546 Event Triggered Execution Privilege Escalation|Persistence no
411 T1098.003 Add Office 365 Global Administrator Role Persistence no APT29
412 T1098.002 Exchange Email Delegate Permissions Persistence APT28|APT29|Magic Hound
413 T1098.001 Additional Cloud Credentials Persistence APT29
414 T1543.004 Launch Daemon Persistence|Privilege Escalation no
417 T1543.001 Launch Agent Persistence|Privilege Escalation no
418 T1037.005 Startup Items Persistence|Privilege Escalation no
419 T1037.004 RC Scripts Persistence|Privilege Escalation no
420 T1055.012 Process Hollowing Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Gorgon Group|Patchwork Kimsuky|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Gorgon Group|Patchwork
421 T1055.013 Process Doppelgänging Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation Leafminer
422 T1055.011 Extra Window Memory Injection Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation no
423 T1055.014 VDSO Hijacking Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation no
435 T1542.003 Bootkit Persistence|Defense Evasion APT41|Lazarus Group|APT28
436 T1542.002 Component Firmware Persistence|Defense Evasion Equation
437 T1542.001 System Firmware Persistence|Defense Evasion no
438 T1505.003 Web Shell Persistence BackdoorDiplomacy|APT38|APT29|APT28|Tonto Team|Sandworm Team|HAFNIUM|Volatile Cedar|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|Tropic Trooper|GALLIUM|Threat Group-3390|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|APT32|OilRig|Deep Panda Dragonfly|BackdoorDiplomacy|APT38|APT29|APT28|Tonto Team|Sandworm Team|HAFNIUM|Volatile Cedar|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|Tropic Trooper|GALLIUM|Threat Group-3390|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|APT32|OilRig|Deep Panda
439 T1505.002 Transport Agent Persistence no
440 T1505.001 SQL Stored Procedures Persistence Sandworm Team
441 T1053.003 Cron Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation APT38|Rocke
442 T1053.001 At (Linux) Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation no
443 T1053.005 Scheduled Task Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation APT37|APT38|Naikon|CostaRicto|Mustang Panda|Higaisa|Fox Kitten|Molerats|Machete|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT-C-36|BRONZE BUTLER|APT41|GALLIUM|Silence|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|Rancor|OilRig|Patchwork|Dragonfly 2.0|Cobalt Group|FIN8|menuPass|FIN10|FIN7|APT32|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|APT3|APT29 Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|Confucius|Dragonfly|APT37|APT38|Naikon|CostaRicto|Mustang Panda|Higaisa|Fox Kitten|Molerats|Machete|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT-C-36|BRONZE BUTLER|APT41|GALLIUM|Silence|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|Rancor|OilRig|Patchwork|Dragonfly 2.0|Cobalt Group|FIN8|menuPass|FIN10|FIN7|APT32|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|APT3|APT29
444 T1053.002 At (Windows) Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation BRONZE BUTLER|Threat Group-3390|APT18
445 T1542 Pre-OS Boot Defense Evasion|Persistence no
446 T1137.001 Office Template Macros Persistence MuddyWater
450 T1137.006 Add-ins Persistence Naikon
451 T1137.002 Office Test Persistence APT28
452 T1531 Account Access Removal Impact no
453 T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie Credential Access Evilnum APT29|Evilnum
454 T1529 System Shutdown/Reboot Impact Lazarus Group|APT38|APT37
455 T1518 Software Discovery Discovery Mustang Panda|Windshift|MuddyWater|Windigo|Sidewinder|Operation Wocao|BRONZE BUTLER|Tropic Trooper|Inception
456 T1547.013 XDG Autostart Entries Persistence|Privilege Escalation no
457 T1534 Internal Spearphishing Lateral Movement Leviathan|Gamaredon Group Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|Leviathan|Gamaredon Group
458 T1528 Steal Application Access Token Credential Access APT28
459 T1535 Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions Defense Evasion no
460 T1525 Implant Internal Image Persistence no
473 T1490 Inhibit System Recovery Impact no
474 T1489 Service Stop Impact Indrik Spider|Wizard Spider|Lazarus Group
475 T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact Impact FIN7|Indrik Spider|APT41|TA505|APT38
476 T1485 Data Destruction Impact Sandworm Team|Lazarus Group|APT38 Gamaredon Group|Sandworm Team|Lazarus Group|APT38
477 T1484 Domain Policy Modification Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation no
478 T1482 Domain Trust Discovery Discovery FIN8|APT29|Chimera
479 T1480 Execution Guardrails Defense Evasion no
480 T1221 Template Injection Defense Evasion Gamaredon Group|Frankenstein|Inception|APT28|Tropic Trooper|DarkHydrus|Dragonfly 2.0 Lazarus Group|Confucius|Dragonfly|Gamaredon Group|Frankenstein|Inception|APT28|Tropic Trooper|DarkHydrus|Dragonfly 2.0
481 T1222 File and Directory Permissions Modification Defense Evasion no
482 T1220 XSL Script Processing Defense Evasion Higaisa|Cobalt Group Lazarus Group|Higaisa|Cobalt Group
483 T1217 Browser Bookmark Discovery Discovery APT38|Chimera|Fox Kitten
484 T1212 Exploitation for Credential Access Credential Access no
485 T1189 Drive-by Compromise Initial Access Transparent Tribe|Andariel|Leviathan|Machete|Windigo|Dragonfly|PROMETHIUM|Turla|Windshift|RTM|Darkhotel|APT38|APT19|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|Dark Caracal|Dragonfly 2.0|Leafminer|Patchwork|APT37|Elderwood|PLATINUM Magic Hound|APT28|Axiom|Transparent Tribe|Andariel|Leviathan|Machete|Windigo|Dragonfly|PROMETHIUM|Turla|Windshift|RTM|Darkhotel|APT38|APT19|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|Dark Caracal|Dragonfly 2.0|Leafminer|Patchwork|APT37|Elderwood|PLATINUM
486 T1211 Exploitation for Defense Evasion Defense Evasion APT28
487 T1197 BITS Jobs Defense Evasion|Persistence APT39|Patchwork|APT41|Leviathan
488 T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution Execution Andariel|Transparent Tribe|APT3|Tonto Team|Mustang Panda|Darkhotel|Higaisa|HAFNIUM|Sidewinder|Sandworm Team|MuddyWater|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT41|admin@338|Threat Group-3390|APT12|The White Company|APT33|APT32|APT28|Tropic Trooper|BRONZE BUTLER|Cobalt Group|Lazarus Group|Patchwork|Elderwood|APT29|TA459|APT37|Leviathan Axiom|Confucius|Dragonfly|Andariel|Transparent Tribe|APT3|Tonto Team|Mustang Panda|Darkhotel|Higaisa|HAFNIUM|Sidewinder|Sandworm Team|MuddyWater|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT41|admin@338|Threat Group-3390|APT12|The White Company|APT33|APT32|APT28|Tropic Trooper|BRONZE BUTLER|Cobalt Group|Lazarus Group|Patchwork|Elderwood|APT29|TA459|APT37|Leviathan
489 T1201 Password Policy Discovery Discovery Chimera|Turla|OilRig
490 T1195 Supply Chain Compromise Initial Access no
491 T1199 Trusted Relationship Initial Access APT29|Sandworm Team|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|APT28|menuPass Threat Group-3390|APT29|Sandworm Team|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|APT28|menuPass
492 T1218 Signed Binary Proxy Execution Defense Evasion no Lazarus Group
493 T1204 User Execution Execution no
494 T1213 Data from Information Repositories Collection APT28|Fox Kitten|FIN6|Turla APT29|APT28|Fox Kitten|FIN6|Turla
495 T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application Initial Access BackdoorDiplomacy|menuPass|Volatile Cedar|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|APT28|APT29|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Blue Mockingbird|Rocke|APT39|BlackTech|APT41|GALLIUM|Night Dragon|Axiom Threat Group-3390|Ke3chang|Kimsuky|Magic Hound|Dragonfly|BackdoorDiplomacy|menuPass|Volatile Cedar|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|APT28|APT29|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Blue Mockingbird|Rocke|APT39|BlackTech|APT41|GALLIUM|Night Dragon|Axiom
496 T1210 Exploitation of Remote Services Lateral Movement Tonto Team|FIN7|Fox Kitten|menuPass|Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390|APT28 Dragonfly|Tonto Team|FIN7|Fox Kitten|menuPass|Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390|APT28
497 T1200 Hardware Additions Initial Access DarkVishnya
498 T1202 Indirect Command Execution Defense Evasion no Lazarus Group
499 T1219 Remote Access Software Command And Control TeamTNT|Mustang Panda|MuddyWater|Evilnum|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Sandworm Team|DarkVishnya|RTM|Kimsuky|Night Dragon|Cobalt Group|Thrip|Carbanak
500 T1207 Rogue Domain Controller Defense Evasion no
501 T1216 Signed Script Proxy Execution Defense Evasion no
502 T1205 Traffic Signaling Defense Evasion|Persistence|Command And Control no
503 T1176 Browser Extensions Persistence Kimsuky
504 T1187 Forced Authentication Credential Access DarkHydrus|Dragonfly 2.0 Dragonfly|DarkHydrus|Dragonfly 2.0
505 T1185 Browser Session Hijacking Collection no
506 T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information Defense Evasion APT39|APT29|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Molerats|Frankenstein|Turla|WIRTE|Darkhotel|Tropic Trooper|Honeybee|Gorgon Group|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|APT19|Leviathan|MuddyWater|APT28|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER Lazarus Group|Ke3chang|Kimsuky|APT39|APT29|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Molerats|Frankenstein|Turla|WIRTE|Darkhotel|Tropic Trooper|Honeybee|Gorgon Group|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|APT19|Leviathan|MuddyWater|APT28|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER
507 T1134 Access Token Manipulation Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation FIN6|Blue Mockingbird
508 T1136 Create Account Persistence Sandworm Team|Indrik Spider
509 T1135 Network Share Discovery Discovery Tonto Team|APT38|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|APT32|APT39|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT1|Dragonfly 2.0|Sowbug Dragonfly|Tonto Team|APT38|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|APT32|APT39|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT1|Dragonfly 2.0|Sowbug
510 T1137 Office Application Startup Persistence Gamaredon Group|APT32
511 T1133 External Remote Services Persistence|Initial Access TeamTNT|Leviathan|APT28|APT29|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Kimsuky|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Chimera|Sandworm Team|APT41|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|Night Dragon|Ke3chang|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|APT18 Dragonfly|TeamTNT|Leviathan|APT28|APT29|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Kimsuky|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Chimera|Sandworm Team|APT41|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|Night Dragon|Ke3chang|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|APT18
512 T1132 Data Encoding Command And Control no
513 T1129 Shared Modules Execution no
514 T1127 Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution Defense Evasion no
516 T1124 System Time Discovery Discovery Darkhotel|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Chimera|Operation Wocao|The White Company|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Turla
517 T1123 Audio Capture Collection APT37
518 T1120 Peripheral Device Discovery Discovery OilRig|BackdoorDiplomacy|Operation Wocao|Turla|APT37|Gamaredon Group|Equation|APT28
519 T1119 Automated Collection Collection Mustang Panda|Sidewinder|Chimera|menuPass|Operation Wocao|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT1|APT28|Patchwork|OilRig|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|FIN6 Ke3chang|Confucius|Mustang Panda|Sidewinder|Chimera|menuPass|Operation Wocao|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT1|APT28|Patchwork|OilRig|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|FIN6
520 T1115 Clipboard Data Collection Operation Wocao|APT39|APT38
521 T1114 Email Collection Collection Magic Hound|Silent Librarian
522 T1113 Screen Capture Collection GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Gamaredon Group|APT39|Silence|MuddyWater|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|Dark Caracal|FIN7|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|Group5|APT28 Dragonfly|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Gamaredon Group|APT39|Silence|MuddyWater|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|Dark Caracal|FIN7|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|Group5|APT28
523 T1112 Modify Registry Defense Evasion Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|Turla|APT32|APT38|Patchwork|Gorgon Group|Threat Group-3390|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|Honeybee|FIN8 Dragonfly|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|Turla|APT32|APT38|Patchwork|Gorgon Group|Threat Group-3390|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|Honeybee|FIN8
524 T1111 Two-Factor Authentication Interception Credential Access Chimera|Operation Wocao Kimsuky|Chimera|Operation Wocao
525 T1110 Brute Force Credential Access APT38|APT28|Fox Kitten|DarkVishnya|APT39|OilRig|FIN5|Turla Lazarus Group|Dragonfly|APT38|APT28|Fox Kitten|DarkVishnya|APT39|OilRig|FIN5|Turla
526 T1106 Native API Execution APT38|Higaisa|menuPass|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Turla|Silence|APT37|Gorgon Group BlackTech|Lazarus Group|APT38|Higaisa|menuPass|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Turla|Silence|APT37|Gorgon Group
527 T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer Command And Control TeamTNT|Nomadic Octopus|IndigoZebra|Andariel|BackdoorDiplomacy|Tonto Team|HAFNIUM|APT29|Ajax Security Team|Mustang Panda|Windshift|Darkhotel|ZIRCONIUM|TA551|Volatile Cedar|Indrik Spider|Evilnum|Sidewinder|Fox Kitten|Kimsuky|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Silence|APT-C-36|APT41|GALLIUM|TA505|WIRTE|APT33|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Rancor|Gorgon Group|OilRig|Turla|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|PLATINUM|APT37|Elderwood|Leviathan|APT32|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|APT3|menuPass|FIN7|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28 LazyScripter|Ke3chang|Aquatic Panda|Winnti Group|Confucius|Dragonfly|TeamTNT|Nomadic Octopus|IndigoZebra|Andariel|BackdoorDiplomacy|Tonto Team|HAFNIUM|APT29|Ajax Security Team|Mustang Panda|Windshift|Darkhotel|ZIRCONIUM|TA551|Volatile Cedar|Indrik Spider|Evilnum|Sidewinder|Fox Kitten|Kimsuky|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Silence|APT-C-36|APT41|GALLIUM|TA505|WIRTE|APT33|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Rancor|Gorgon Group|OilRig|Turla|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|PLATINUM|APT37|Elderwood|Leviathan|APT32|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|APT3|menuPass|FIN7|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28
528 T1104 Multi-Stage Channels Command And Control APT41|MuddyWater|APT3 Lazarus Group|APT41|MuddyWater|APT3
529 T1102 Web Service Command And Control TeamTNT|FIN8|Fox Kitten|Turla|APT32|Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Inception|FIN6 Mustang Panda|LazyScripter|TeamTNT|FIN8|Fox Kitten|Turla|APT32|Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Inception|FIN6
530 T1098 Account Manipulation Persistence Sandworm Team|APT3|Dragonfly 2.0|Lazarus Group Kimsuky|Dragonfly|Sandworm Team|APT3|Dragonfly 2.0|Lazarus Group
531 T1095 Non-Application Layer Protocol Command And Control BackdoorDiplomacy|HAFNIUM|Operation Wocao|FIN6|APT29|PLATINUM|APT3
532 T1092 Communication Through Removable Media Command And Control APT28
533 T1091 Replication Through Removable Media Lateral Movement|Initial Access Mustang Panda|Tropic Trooper|Darkhotel|APT28 FIN7|Mustang Panda|Tropic Trooper|Darkhotel|APT28
534 T1090 Proxy Command And Control Windigo|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|APT41|Turla
535 T1087 Account Discovery Discovery APT29
536 T1083 File and Directory Discovery Discovery APT38|APT29|Mustang Panda|Darkhotel|Windigo|Sidewinder|Chimera|Fox Kitten|menuPass|APT39|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Inception|APT41|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|APT18|Leafminer|Honeybee|Dark Caracal|Dragonfly 2.0|APT3|Sowbug|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|APT28|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang Winnti Group|Confucius|Dragonfly|APT38|APT29|Mustang Panda|Darkhotel|Windigo|Sidewinder|Chimera|Fox Kitten|menuPass|APT39|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Inception|APT41|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|APT18|Leafminer|Honeybee|Dark Caracal|Dragonfly 2.0|APT3|Sowbug|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|APT28|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
537 T1082 System Information Discovery Discovery TeamTNT|APT38|APT29|Mustang Panda|Windshift|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Windigo|Sidewinder|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|APT32|APT37|Honeybee|APT19|Magic Hound|Sowbug|OilRig|APT3|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang Aquatic Panda|Confucius|TeamTNT|APT38|APT29|Mustang Panda|Windshift|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Windigo|Sidewinder|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|APT32|APT37|Honeybee|APT19|Magic Hound|Sowbug|OilRig|APT3|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
538 T1080 Taint Shared Content Lateral Movement Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Darkhotel
539 T1078 Valid Accounts Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access FIN7|Leviathan|APT29|Silent Librarian|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|APT39|FIN4|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|APT33|FIN5|OilRig|APT28|menuPass|FIN10|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390|APT18|PittyTiger|Carbanak Ke3chang|Lazarus Group|Axiom|Dragonfly|FIN7|Leviathan|APT29|Silent Librarian|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|APT39|FIN4|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|APT33|FIN5|OilRig|APT28|menuPass|FIN10|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390|APT18|PittyTiger|Carbanak
540 T1074 Data Staged Collection Wizard Spider
541 T1072 Software Deployment Tools Execution|Lateral Movement Silence|APT32|Threat Group-1314
542 T1071 Application Layer Protocol Command And Control TeamTNT|Rocke|Magic Hound|Dragonfly 2.0 Dragonfly|TeamTNT|Rocke|Magic Hound|Dragonfly 2.0
543 T1070 Indicator Removal on Host Defense Evasion APT29 Lazarus Group|APT29
544 T1069 Permission Groups Discovery Discovery APT29|TA505|APT3
545 T1068 Exploitation for Privilege Escalation Privilege Escalation Tonto Team|ZIRCONIUM|Turla|Whitefly|APT33|Cobalt Group|PLATINUM|FIN8|APT32|Threat Group-3390|FIN6|APT28 APT29|Tonto Team|ZIRCONIUM|Turla|Whitefly|APT33|Cobalt Group|PLATINUM|FIN8|APT32|Threat Group-3390|FIN6|APT28
546 T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter Execution APT37|Windigo|Fox Kitten|APT32|Whitefly|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN7|APT19|OilRig|FIN5|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Ke3chang Dragonfly|APT37|Windigo|Fox Kitten|APT32|Whitefly|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN7|APT19|OilRig|FIN5|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Ke3chang
547 T1057 Process Discovery Discovery TeamTNT|Andariel|APT29|Mustang Panda|Windshift|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Rocke|Frankenstein|Inception|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|APT38|Tropic Trooper|APT37|Honeybee|OilRig|APT3|Magic Hound|APT28|Winnti Group|Stealth Falcon|Poseidon Group|Lazarus Group|Molerats|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang Gamaredon Group|Kimsuky|TeamTNT|Andariel|APT29|Mustang Panda|Windshift|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Rocke|Frankenstein|Inception|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|APT38|Tropic Trooper|APT37|Honeybee|OilRig|APT3|Magic Hound|APT28|Winnti Group|Stealth Falcon|Poseidon Group|Lazarus Group|Molerats|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang
548 T1056 Input Capture Collection|Credential Access APT39
549 T1055 Process Injection Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation Operation Wocao|APT32|Sharpshooter|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|Cobalt Group|Turla|APT37|Honeybee|PLATINUM
550 T1053 Scheduled Task/Job Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation no
551 T1052 Exfiltration Over Physical Medium Exfiltration no
552 T1049 System Network Connections Discovery Discovery TeamTNT|Andariel|BackdoorDiplomacy|Mustang Panda|MuddyWater|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Tropic Trooper|APT41|APT38|GALLIUM|APT32|APT1|OilRig|APT3|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang Lazarus Group|TeamTNT|Andariel|BackdoorDiplomacy|Mustang Panda|MuddyWater|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Tropic Trooper|APT41|APT38|GALLIUM|APT32|APT1|OilRig|APT3|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
553 T1048 Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol Exfiltration no
554 T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation Execution Sandworm Team|FIN7|Indrik Spider|Naikon|Mustang Panda|Windshift|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT41|FIN6|GALLIUM|APT32|MuddyWater|Threat Group-3390|OilRig|FIN8|Leviathan|menuPass|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT29|Deep Panda Gamaredon Group|Sandworm Team|FIN7|Indrik Spider|Naikon|Mustang Panda|Windshift|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT41|FIN6|GALLIUM|APT32|MuddyWater|Threat Group-3390|OilRig|FIN8|Leviathan|menuPass|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT29|Deep Panda
555 T1046 Network Service Scanning Discovery TeamTNT|BackdoorDiplomacy|Naikon|CostaRicto|Chimera|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Rocke|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT39|APT32|OilRig|Cobalt Group|Leafminer|menuPass|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390 BlackTech|Lazarus Group|TeamTNT|BackdoorDiplomacy|Naikon|CostaRicto|Chimera|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Rocke|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT39|APT32|OilRig|Cobalt Group|Leafminer|menuPass|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390
556 T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel Exfiltration Leviathan|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Chimera|APT39|Operation Wocao|Sandworm Team|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Kimsuky|GALLIUM|APT32|APT3|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Ke3chang Confucius|Leviathan|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Chimera|APT39|Operation Wocao|Sandworm Team|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Kimsuky|GALLIUM|APT32|APT3|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Ke3chang
557 T1040 Network Sniffing Credential Access|Discovery Kimsuky|Sandworm Team|DarkVishnya|APT33|APT28
558 T1039 Data from Network Shared Drive Collection APT28|Chimera|Fox Kitten|Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Sowbug|menuPass
559 T1037 Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts Persistence|Privilege Escalation Rocke
560 T1036 Masquerading Defense Evasion APT28|Nomadic Octopus|OilRig|APT29|ZIRCONIUM|TA551|Windshift|APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|PLATINUM|Dragonfly 2.0 Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|Dragonfly|LazyScripter|APT28|Nomadic Octopus|OilRig|APT29|ZIRCONIUM|TA551|Windshift|APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|PLATINUM|Dragonfly 2.0
561 T1033 System Owner/User Discovery Discovery APT38|Windshift|ZIRCONIUM|Sidewinder|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT41|GALLIUM|Tropic Trooper|APT39|MuddyWater|APT37|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|APT32|Magic Hound|OilRig|FIN10|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3 Threat Group-3390|Ke3chang|Dragonfly|APT38|Windshift|ZIRCONIUM|Sidewinder|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT41|GALLIUM|Tropic Trooper|APT39|MuddyWater|APT37|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|APT32|Magic Hound|OilRig|FIN10|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3
562 T1030 Data Transfer Size Limits Exfiltration APT28|Threat Group-3390
563 T1029 Scheduled Transfer Exfiltration Higaisa
564 T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information Defense Evasion TeamTNT|BackdoorDiplomacy|Transparent Tribe|APT39|Mustang Panda|Windshift|TA551|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Fox Kitten|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|FIN6|Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|APT41|GALLIUM|Turla|TA505|Silence|APT33|Night Dragon|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|APT29|APT18|Tropic Trooper|Patchwork|menuPass|APT37|Threat Group-3390|Cobalt Group|Dark Caracal|Leafminer|Honeybee|APT19|BlackOasis|Leviathan|FIN8|MuddyWater|FIN7|Elderwood|OilRig|Magic Hound|APT3|APT32|Group5|Dust Storm|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT28 Aquatic Panda|Ke3chang|LazyScripter|TeamTNT|BackdoorDiplomacy|Transparent Tribe|APT39|Mustang Panda|Windshift|TA551|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Fox Kitten|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|FIN6|Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|APT41|GALLIUM|Turla|TA505|Silence|APT33|Night Dragon|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|APT29|APT18|Tropic Trooper|Patchwork|menuPass|APT37|Threat Group-3390|Cobalt Group|Dark Caracal|Leafminer|Honeybee|APT19|BlackOasis|Leviathan|FIN8|MuddyWater|FIN7|Elderwood|OilRig|Magic Hound|APT3|APT32|Group5|Dust Storm|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT28
565 T1025 Data from Removable Media Collection Turla|Gamaredon Group|APT28
566 T1021 Remote Services Lateral Movement no
567 T1020 Automated Exfiltration Exfiltration Sidewinder|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Honeybee Ke3chang|Sidewinder|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Honeybee
568 T1018 Remote System Discovery Discovery Indrik Spider|Naikon|APT29|Chimera|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Sandworm Team|Rocke|Wizard Spider|Silence|GALLIUM|APT39|APT32|Deep Panda|Ke3chang|Threat Group-3390|Dragonfly 2.0|Leafminer|FIN8|FIN5|APT3|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN6|Turla Dragonfly|Indrik Spider|Naikon|APT29|Chimera|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Sandworm Team|Rocke|Wizard Spider|Silence|GALLIUM|APT39|APT32|Deep Panda|Ke3chang|Threat Group-3390|Dragonfly 2.0|Leafminer|FIN8|FIN5|APT3|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN6|Turla
569 T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery Discovery TeamTNT|ZIRCONIUM|Mustang Panda|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Sandworm Team|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT41|GALLIUM|APT32|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|Magic Hound|OilRig|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3|Naikon|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang Kimsuky|Dragonfly|TeamTNT|ZIRCONIUM|Mustang Panda|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Sandworm Team|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT41|GALLIUM|APT32|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|Magic Hound|OilRig|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3|Naikon|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
570 T1014 Rootkit Defense Evasion TeamTNT|Rocke|APT41|APT28|Winnti Group
571 T1012 Query Registry Discovery ZIRCONIUM|Chimera|Fox Kitten|APT39|Operation Wocao|APT32|Dragonfly 2.0|Threat Group-3390|OilRig|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Turla Kimsuky|Dragonfly|ZIRCONIUM|Chimera|Fox Kitten|APT39|Operation Wocao|APT32|Dragonfly 2.0|Threat Group-3390|OilRig|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Turla
572 T1011 Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium Exfiltration no
573 T1010 Application Window Discovery Discovery Lazarus Group
574 T1008 Fallback Channels Command And Control FIN7|APT41|OilRig|Lazarus Group
575 T1007 System Service Discovery Discovery Indrik Spider|Chimera|Operation Wocao|BRONZE BUTLER|APT1|OilRig|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang Kimsuky|Aquatic Panda|Indrik Spider|Chimera|Operation Wocao|BRONZE BUTLER|APT1|OilRig|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
576 T1006 Direct Volume Access Defense Evasion no
577 T1005 Data from Local System Collection FIN7|APT41|APT38|Andariel|APT29|Windigo|Fox Kitten|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|FIN6|Gamaredon Group|APT39|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|GALLIUM|Turla|menuPass|Dark Caracal|Dragonfly 2.0|Honeybee|APT37|APT28|APT3|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|Threat Group-3390|APT1|Ke3chang Axiom|Dragonfly|FIN7|APT41|APT38|Andariel|APT29|Windigo|Fox Kitten|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|FIN6|Gamaredon Group|APT39|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|GALLIUM|Turla|menuPass|Dark Caracal|Dragonfly 2.0|Honeybee|APT37|APT28|APT3|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|Threat Group-3390|APT1|Ke3chang
578 T1003 OS Credential Dumping Credential Access Tonto Team|APT39|Frankenstein|APT32|APT28|Leviathan|Sowbug|Suckfly|Poseidon Group|Axiom
579 T1001 Data Obfuscation Command And Control Operation Wocao|Axiom
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@@ -1 +1 @@
{"detections": [{"name": "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe", "id": "e9fb4a59-c5fb-440a-9f24-191fbc6b2911", "version": 6, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "Monitor for execution of reg.exe with parameters specifying an export of keys that contain hashed credentials that attackers may try to crack offline.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_reg` OR `process_cmd` Processes.process=*save* (Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\Security* OR Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\SAM* OR Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\System* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\\\Security* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\\\System* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\\\SAM*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "None identified.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.md#atomic-test-1---registry-dump-of-sam-creds-and-secrets"], "tags": {"name": "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe", "analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping", "DarkSide Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to export the registry keys.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1003.002", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 90, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly", "Dragonfly 2.0", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "Night Dragon", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Frankenstein", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "process_reg", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=reg.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=reg.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/lstella/ThreatResearch/security_content/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/../builder/test_data/detection/valid.yml", "source": "detection"}]}
{"detections": [{"name": "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe", "id": "e9fb4a59-c5fb-440a-9f24-191fbc6b2911", "version": 6, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "Monitor for execution of reg.exe with parameters specifying an export of keys that contain hashed credentials that attackers may try to crack offline.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_reg` OR `process_cmd` Processes.process=*save* (Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\Security* OR Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\SAM* OR Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\System* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\\\Security* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\\\System* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\\\SAM*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "None identified.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.md#atomic-test-1---registry-dump-of-sam-creds-and-secrets"], "tags": {"name": "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe", "analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping", "DarkSide Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to export the registry keys.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1003.002", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 90, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "Night Dragon", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Frankenstein", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "process_reg", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=reg.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=reg.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/home/jhernandez/splunk/security_content/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/../builder/test_data/detection/valid.yml", "source": "detection"}]}
bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/stories.json
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1 +1 @@
{"stories": [{"name": "DarkSide Ransomware", "id": "507edc74-13d5-4339-878e-b9114ded1f35", "version": 1, "date": "2021-05-12", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the DarkSide Ransomware", "narrative": "This story addresses Darkside ransomware. This ransomware payload has many similarities to common ransomware however there are certain items particular to it. The creation of a .TXT log that shows every item being encrypted as well as the creation of ransomware notes and files adding a machine ID created based on CRC32 checksum algorithm. This ransomware payload leaves machines in minimal operation level,enough to browse the attackers websites. A customized URI with leaked information is presented to each victim.This is the ransomware payload that shut down the Colonial pipeline. The story is composed of several detection searches covering similar items to other ransomware payloads and those particular to Darkside payload.", "references": ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/the-darkside-of-the-ransomware-pipeline.htmlbig-game-hunting-with-ryuk-another-lucrative-targeted-ransomware/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html"], "tags": {"name": "DarkSide Ransomware", "analytic_story": "DarkSide Ransomware", "category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly", "Dragonfly 2.0", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "Night Dragon", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Frankenstein", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"], "baseline_names": ["ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched"], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Bhavin Patel"}]}
{"stories": [{"name": "DarkSide Ransomware", "id": "507edc74-13d5-4339-878e-b9114ded1f35", "version": 1, "date": "2021-05-12", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the DarkSide Ransomware", "narrative": "This story addresses Darkside ransomware. This ransomware payload has many similarities to common ransomware however there are certain items particular to it. The creation of a .TXT log that shows every item being encrypted as well as the creation of ransomware notes and files adding a machine ID created based on CRC32 checksum algorithm. This ransomware payload leaves machines in minimal operation level,enough to browse the attackers websites. A customized URI with leaked information is presented to each victim.This is the ransomware payload that shut down the Colonial pipeline. The story is composed of several detection searches covering similar items to other ransomware payloads and those particular to Darkside payload.", "references": ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/the-darkside-of-the-ransomware-pipeline.htmlbig-game-hunting-with-ryuk-another-lucrative-targeted-ransomware/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html"], "tags": {"name": "DarkSide Ransomware", "analytic_story": "DarkSide Ransomware", "category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "Night Dragon", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Frankenstein", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"], "baseline_names": ["ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched"], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Bhavin Patel"}]}
bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_md_data/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_new_user_aws_console_login.md
+6 -2
View File
@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a u
</div>
</details>
#### Search
#### Search
```
`cloudtrail` eventName=ConsoleLogin
@@ -114,7 +114,8 @@ This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a u
#### Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
Note that **detect_new_user_aws_console_login_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
> :information_source:
> **detect_new_user_aws_console_login_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
#### Required field
* _time
@@ -141,6 +142,9 @@ When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be dete
| 90.0 | 90 | 100 | tbd |
> :information_source:
> The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.
#### Reference
bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_md_data/_posts/2021-09-16-attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.md
+6 -2
View File
@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ Monitor for execution of reg.exe with parameters specifying an export of keys th
</div>
</details>
#### Search
#### Search
```
@@ -114,7 +114,8 @@ Monitor for execution of reg.exe with parameters specifying an export of keys th
#### Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
Note that **attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
> :information_source:
> **attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
#### Required field
* _time
@@ -151,6 +152,9 @@ None identified.
| 90.0 | 90 | 100 | An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to export the registry keys. |
> :information_source:
> The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.
#### Reference
* [https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.md#atomic-test-1---registry-dump-of-sam-creds-and-secrets](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.md#atomic-test-1---registry-dump-of-sam-creds-and-secrets)
bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_md_data_ref/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_new_user_aws_console_login.md
+6 -2
View File
@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a u
</div>
</details>
#### Search
#### Search
```
`cloudtrail` eventName=ConsoleLogin
@@ -114,7 +114,8 @@ This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a u
#### Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
Note that **detect_new_user_aws_console_login_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
> :information_source:
> **detect_new_user_aws_console_login_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
#### Required field
* _time
@@ -141,6 +142,9 @@ When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be dete
| 90.0 | 90 | 100 | tbd |
> :information_source:
> The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.
#### Reference
bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_md_data_ref/_posts/2021-09-16-attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.md
+6 -2
View File
@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ Monitor for execution of reg.exe with parameters specifying an export of keys th
</div>
</details>
#### Search
#### Search
```
@@ -114,7 +114,8 @@ Monitor for execution of reg.exe with parameters specifying an export of keys th
#### Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
Note that **attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
> :information_source:
> **attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
#### Required field
* _time
@@ -151,6 +152,9 @@ None identified.
| 90.0 | 90 | 100 | An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to export the registry keys. |
> :information_source:
> The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.
#### Reference
* [https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.md#atomic-test-1---registry-dump-of-sam-creds-and-secrets](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.md#atomic-test-1---registry-dump-of-sam-creds-and-secrets)
bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/test_obj_to_md_adapter.py
+1 -1
View File
@@ -101,4 +101,4 @@ def test_md_writer():
for file in files_to_compare:
path = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), 'obj_to_md_data', file)
path_ref = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), 'obj_to_md_data_ref', file)
assert filecmp.cmp(path, path_ref, shallow=False)
assert filecmp.cmp(path, path_ref, shallow=False)
bin/docker_detection_tester/modules/splunk_sdk.py
+45 -42
View File
@@ -9,6 +9,9 @@ import timeit
import datetime
from typing import Union
DEFAULT_EVENT_HOST = "ATTACK_DATA_HOST"
DEFAULT_DATA_INDEX = "main"
def enable_delete_for_admin(splunk_host:str, splunk_port:int, splunk_password:str)->bool:
try:
service = client.connect(
@@ -58,7 +61,7 @@ def enable_delete_for_admin(splunk_host:str, splunk_port:int, splunk_password:st
def get_number_of_indexed_events(splunk_host, splunk_port, splunk_password, index:str, sourcetype:Union[str,None]=None )->int:
def get_number_of_indexed_events(splunk_host, splunk_port, splunk_password, index:str, event_host:str=DEFAULT_EVENT_HOST, sourcetype:Union[str,None]=None )->int:
try:
service = client.connect(
@@ -71,9 +74,9 @@ def get_number_of_indexed_events(splunk_host, splunk_port, splunk_password, inde
raise(Exception("Unable to connect to Splunk instance: " + str(e)))
if sourcetype is not None:
search = '''search index="%s" sourcetype="%s" | stats count'''%(index,sourcetype)
search = f'''search index="{index}" sourcetype="{sourcetype}" host="{event_host}" | stats count'''
else:
search = '''search index="%s" | stats count'''%(index)
search = f'''search index="{index}" host="{event_host}" | stats count'''
kwargs = {"exec_mode":"blocking"}
try:
search_result = service.jobs.create(search, **kwargs)
@@ -94,7 +97,6 @@ def get_number_of_indexed_events(splunk_host, splunk_port, splunk_password, inde
def wait_for_indexing_to_complete(splunk_host, splunk_port, splunk_password, sourcetype:str, index:str, check_interval_seconds:int=10)->bool:
startTime = timeit.default_timer()
previous_count = -1
time.sleep(check_interval_seconds)
@@ -300,7 +302,7 @@ def test_detection_search(splunk_host:str, splunk_port:int, splunk_password:str,
return test_results
def delete_attack_data(splunk_host:str, splunk_password:str, splunk_port:int, wait_on_delete:Union[dict,None], search_string:str, detection_filename:str, index:str="main")->bool:
def delete_attack_data(splunk_host:str, splunk_password:str, splunk_port:int, wait_on_delete:Union[dict,None], search_string:str, detection_filename:str, indices:list[str]=[DEFAULT_DATA_INDEX], host:str=DEFAULT_EVENT_HOST)->bool:
try:
service = client.connect(
@@ -324,47 +326,48 @@ def delete_attack_data(splunk_host:str, splunk_password:str, splunk_port:int, wa
data_exists = True
#print(f"Deleting data for {detection_filename}: {indices}")
for index in indices:
while (get_number_of_indexed_events(splunk_host, splunk_port, splunk_password, index=index, event_host=host) != 0) :
splunk_search = f'search index="{index}" host="{host}" | delete'
while (get_number_of_indexed_events(splunk_host, splunk_port, splunk_password, index=index) != 0) :
splunk_search = f'search index={index} | delete'
kwargs = {
"exec_mode": "blocking",
"dispatch.earliest_time": "-1d",
"dispatch.latest_time": "now"}
try:
job = service.jobs.create(splunk_search, **kwargs)
reader = results.ResultsReader(job)
kwargs = {
"exec_mode": "blocking",
"dispatch.earliest_time": "-1d",
"dispatch.latest_time": "now"}
try:
job = service.jobs.create(splunk_search, **kwargs)
reader = results.ResultsReader(job)
'''
error_in_results = False
for result in reader:
if hasattr(result,"message") and hasattr(result,"type") and ("You have insufficient privileges to delete events" in result.message or result.type == "FATAL"):
print("Delete is not enabled for admin: [%s] - enabling delete and trying to delete again..."%(result.message), file=sys.stderr)
if already_enabled_delete is True:
print("We already enabled delete, but the setting did not take effect.")
raise(Exception("Enabling delete command failed to take effect"))
if enable_delete_for_admin(splunk_host, splunk_port,splunk_password) != True:
raise(Exception("Failure enabling delete for admin. We cannot continue"))
# We enabled delete, so now we will try to delete again
already_enabled_delete = True
break
else:
#This is not one of the error messages, do nothing
pass
'''
#No need to issue Delete command again, we will now break out of the loop
#if error_in_results is False:
# data_exists = False
'''
error_in_results = False
for result in reader:
if hasattr(result,"message") and hasattr(result,"type") and ("You have insufficient privileges to delete events" in result.message or result.type == "FATAL"):
print("Delete is not enabled for admin: [%s] - enabling delete and trying to delete again..."%(result.message), file=sys.stderr)
if already_enabled_delete is True:
print("We already enabled delete, but the setting did not take effect.")
raise(Exception("Enabling delete command failed to take effect"))
if enable_delete_for_admin(splunk_host, splunk_port,splunk_password) != True:
raise(Exception("Failure enabling delete for admin. We cannot continue"))
# We enabled delete, so now we will try to delete again
already_enabled_delete = True
break
else:
#This is not one of the error messages, do nothing
pass
'''
#No need to issue Delete command again, we will now break out of the loop
#if error_in_results is False:
# data_exists = False
#Otherwise, we will loop again
#Otherwise, we will loop again
except Exception as e:
print(f"Trouble deleting data from a run.... we will try again: {str(e)}")
time.sleep(5)
#raise(Exception("Unable to delete data from a run: " + str(e)))
except Exception as e:
print(f"Trouble deleting data from a run.... we will try again: {str(e)}")
time.sleep(5)
#raise(Exception("Unable to delete data from a run: " + str(e)))
return True
bin/docker_detection_tester/modules/testing_service.py
+21 -9
View File
@@ -11,19 +11,21 @@ import requests
from modules.DataManipulation import DataManipulation
from modules import splunk_sdk
import timeit
from typing import Union
from typing import Union, Tuple
from os.path import relpath
from tempfile import mkdtemp
import datetime
import http.client
def test_detection_wrapper(container_name:str, splunk_ip:str, splunk_password:str, splunk_port:int,
test_file:str, attack_data_root_folder, wait_on_failure:bool=False, wait_on_completion:bool=False)->dict:
one_test_start = timeit.default_timer()
uuid_var = str(uuid.uuid4())
result_test = test_detection(splunk_ip, splunk_port, container_name, splunk_password, test_file, uuid_var, attack_data_root_folder)
result_test, indices_to_delete = test_detection(splunk_ip, splunk_port, container_name, splunk_password, test_file, uuid_var, attack_data_root_folder)
one_test_stop = timeit.default_timer()
if result_test is None:
@@ -45,8 +47,9 @@ def test_detection_wrapper(container_name:str, splunk_ip:str, splunk_password:st
wait_on_delete = {'message':"\n\n\n****SEARCH SUCCESS : Allowing time to examine search/data****"}
else:
wait_on_delete = None
splunk_sdk.delete_attack_data(splunk_ip, splunk_password, splunk_port, wait_on_delete, search_string, test_file)
splunk_sdk.delete_attack_data(splunk_ip, splunk_password, splunk_port, wait_on_delete, search_string, test_file, indices = indices_to_delete)
return result_test
@@ -66,7 +69,7 @@ def get_service(splunk_ip:str, splunk_port:int, splunk_password:str):
raise(Exception("Unable to connect to Splunk instance: " + str(e)))
return service
def test_detection(splunk_ip:str, splunk_port:int, container_name:str, splunk_password:str, test_file:str, uuid_var, attack_data_root_folder)->Union[dict,None]:
def test_detection(splunk_ip:str, splunk_port:int, container_name:str, splunk_password:str, test_file:str, uuid_var, attack_data_root_folder)->Tuple[Union[dict,None], set[str]]:
test_file_obj = load_file(os.path.join("security_content/", test_file))
@@ -89,9 +92,18 @@ def test_detection(splunk_ip:str, splunk_port:int, container_name:str, splunk_pa
indices_to_delete = set()
for attack_data in test_file_obj['tests'][0]['attack_data']:
url = attack_data['data']
if 'custom_index' in attack_data:
print(f"Found a custom index for {test_file}: {attack_data['custom_index']}")
data_upload_index = attack_data['custom_index']
else:
data_upload_index = splunk_sdk.DEFAULT_DATA_INDEX
indices_to_delete.add(data_upload_index)
r = requests.get(url, allow_redirects=True)
target_file = os.path.join(folder_name, attack_data['file_name'])
with open(target_file, 'wb') as target:
@@ -108,7 +120,7 @@ def test_detection(splunk_ip:str, splunk_port:int, container_name:str, splunk_pa
try:
service = get_service(splunk_ip, splunk_port, splunk_password)
test_index = service.indexes["main"]
test_index = service.indexes[data_upload_index]
with open(target_file, 'rb') as target:
test_index.submit(target.read(), sourcetype=attack_data['sourcetype'], source=attack_data['source'])
@@ -122,7 +134,7 @@ def test_detection(splunk_ip:str, splunk_port:int, container_name:str, splunk_pa
if not splunk_sdk.wait_for_indexing_to_complete(splunk_ip, splunk_port, splunk_password, attack_data['sourcetype'], "main"):
if not splunk_sdk.wait_for_indexing_to_complete(splunk_ip, splunk_port, splunk_password, attack_data['sourcetype'], data_upload_index):
raise Exception("There was an error waiting for indexing to complete.")
#Allow some time for the data to be ingested and processed
@@ -169,7 +181,7 @@ def test_detection(splunk_ip:str, splunk_port:int, container_name:str, splunk_pa
result_test['attack_data_directory'] = abs_folder_path
return result_test
return result_test, indices_to_delete
def load_file(file_path):
bin/reporting/detection_count.svg
+1 -1
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@@ -13,6 +13,6 @@
<rect rx="3" width="105" height="20" fill="url(#a)"/>
<g fill="#fff" text-anchor="middle" font-family="DejaVu Sans,Verdana,Geneva,sans-serif" font-size="11">
<text x="30" y="14">detections</text>
<text x="83" y="14">790</text>
<text x="83" y="14">806</text>
</g>
</svg>
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detections/application/splunk_command_and_scripting_interpreter_delete_usage.yml
+62
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@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
name: Splunk Command and Scripting Interpreter Delete Usage
id: 8d3d5d5e-ca43-42be-aa1f-bc64375f6b04
version: 1
date: '2022-05-27'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
type: Anomaly
datamodel:
- Splunk_Audit
description: The following analytic identifies the use of the risky command - Delete - that may be utilized in Splunk to delete some or all data queried for. In order to use Delete in Splunk, one must be assigned the role. This is typically not used and should generate an anomaly if it is used.
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Splunk_Audit.Search_Activity where Search_Activity.search IN ("*| delete*") Search_Activity.search_type=adhoc Search_Activity.user!=splunk-system-user
by Search_Activity.search Search_Activity.info Search_Activity.total_run_time Search_Activity.user Search_Activity.search_type
| `drop_dm_object_name(Search_Activity)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `splunk_command_and_scripting_interpreter_delete_usage_filter`'
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search acceleration is recommended against the Search_Activity datamodel that runs against the splunk _audit index. In addition, this analytic requires the Common Information Model App which includes the Splunk Audit Datamodel https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1621/.
known_false_positives: False positives may be present if this command is used as a common practice. Filter as needed.
references:
- https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/Splunk/latest/Security/SPLsafeguards#Commands_that_trigger_the_warning
tags:
analytic_story:
- Splunk Vulnerabilities
asset_type: Web Server
cis20:
- CIS 3
- CIS 5
- CIS 16
cve:
- CVE-2022-32154
confidence: 30
context:
- Source:Endpoint
dataset:
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1213/audittrail/audittrail.log
impact: 90
kill_chain_phases:
- Actions on Objectives
message: $user$ executed the 'delete' command, if this is unexpected it should be reviewed.
mitre_attack_id:
- T1059
nist:
- DE.CM
observable:
- name: user
type: User
role:
- Victim
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
required_fields:
- _time
- Search_Activity.search
- Search_Activity.info
- Search_Activity.total_run_time
- Search_Activity.user
- Search_Activity.savedsearch_name
- Search_Activity.search_type
risk_score: 27
security_domain: audit
detections/application/splunk_command_and_scripting_interpreter_risky_commands.yml
+67
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@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
name: Splunk Command and Scripting Interpreter Risky Commands
id: 1cf58ae1-9177-40b8-a26c-8966040f11ae
version: 1
date: '2022-05-23'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
type: Hunting
datamodel:
- Splunk_Audit
description: 'The Splunk platform contains built-in search processing language (SPL) safeguards to warn you when you are about to unknowingly run a search that contains commands that might be a security risk. This warning appears when you click a link or type a URL that loads a search that contains risky commands. The warning does not appear when you create ad hoc searches. This warning alerts you to the possibility of unauthorized actions by a malicious user. Unauthorized actions include -
Copying or transferring data (data exfiltration), Deleting data and Overwriting data. All risky commands may be found here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/Splunk/latest/Security/SPLsafeguards#Commands_that_trigger_the_warninga.
A possible scenario when this might occur is when a malicious actor creates a search that includes commands that exfiltrate or damage data. The malicious actor then sends an unsuspecting user a link to the search. The URL contains a query string (q) and a search identifier (sid), but the sid is not valid. The malicious actor hopes the user will use the link and the search will run.
During analysis, pivot based on user name and filter any user or queries not needed. Queries ran from a dashboard are seen as adhoc queries. When a query runs from a dashboard it will not show in audittrail logs the source dashboard name. The query defaults to adhoc and no Splunk system user activity.
In addition, modify this query by removing key commands that generate too much noise, or too little, and create separate queries with higher confidence to alert on.'
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Splunk_Audit.Search_Activity where Search_Activity.search IN ("*| runshellscript *", "*| collect *","*| delete *", "*| fit *", "*| outputcsv *", "*| outputlookup *", "*| run *", "*| script *", "*| sendalert *", "*| sendemail *", "*| tscolle*") Search_Activity.search_type=adhoc Search_Activity.user!=splunk-system-user
by Search_Activity.search Search_Activity.info Search_Activity.total_run_time Search_Activity.user Search_Activity.search_type
| `drop_dm_object_name(Search_Activity)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `splunk_command_and_scripting_interpreter_risky_commands_filter`'
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search acceleration is recommended against the Search_Activity datamodel that runs against the splunk _audit index. In addition, this analytic requires the Common Information Model App which includes the Splunk Audit Datamodel https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1621/. Splunk SOAR customers can find a SOAR workbook that walks an analyst through the process of running these hunting searches in the references list of this detection. In order to use this workbook, a user will need to run a curl command to post the file to their SOAR instance such as "curl -u username:password https://soar.instance.name/rest/rest/workbook_template -d @splunk_psa_0622.json". A user should then create an empty container or case, attach the workbook, and begin working through the tasks.
known_false_positives: False positives will be present until properly filtered by Username and search name.
references:
- https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/Splunk/latest/Security/SPLsafeguards#Commands_that_trigger_the_warning
- https://www.github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/workbooks/splunk_psa_0622.json
tags:
analytic_story:
- Splunk Vulnerabilities
asset_type: Web Server
cis20:
- CIS 3
- CIS 5
- CIS 16
confidence: 40
cve:
- CVE-2022-32154
context:
- Source:Endpoint
dataset:
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1213/audittrail/audittrail.log
impact: 50
kill_chain_phases:
- Actions on Objectives
message: A risky Splunk command has ran by $user$ and should be reviewed.
mitre_attack_id:
- T1059
nist:
- DE.CM
observable:
- name: user
type: User
role:
- Victim
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
required_fields:
- _time
- Search_Activity.search
- Search_Activity.info
- Search_Activity.total_run_time
- Search_Activity.user
- Search_Activity.savedsearch_name
- Search_Activity.search_type
risk_score: 20
security_domain: audit
detections/application/splunk_command_and_scripting_interpreter_risky_spl_mltk.yml
+75
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@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
name: Splunk Command and Scripting Interpreter Risky SPL MLTK
id: 19d0146c-2eae-4e53-8d39-1198a78fa9ca
version: 1
date: '2022-05-27'
author: Abhinav Mishra, Kumar Sharad and Xiao Lin, Splunk
type: Anomaly
datamodel:
- Splunk_Audit
description: 'This detection utilizes machine learning model named "risky_command_abuse" trained from "Splunk Command
and Scripting Interpreter Risky SPL MLTK Baseline". It should be scheduled to run hourly to detect whether a user
has run searches containing risky SPL from this list
https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/Splunk/latest/Security/SPLsafeguards#Commands_that_trigger_the_warninga
with abnormally long running time in the past one hour, comparing with his/her past seven days history. This search
uses the trained baseline to infer whether a search is an outlier (isOutlier ~= 1.0) or not (isOutlier~= 0.0)'
search: '| tstats sum(Search_Activity.total_run_time) AS run_time,
values(Search_Activity.search) as searches, count
FROM datamodel=Splunk_Audit.Search_Activity WHERE (Search_Activity.user!="")
AND (Search_Activity.total_run_time>1) AND (earliest=-1h@h latest=now)
AND (Search_Activity.search IN ("*| runshellscript *", "*| collect *","*| delete *", "*| fit *", "*| outputcsv *",
"*| outputlookup *", "*| run *", "*| script *", "*| sendalert *", "*| sendemail *", "*| tscolle*"))
AND (Search_Activity.search_type=adhoc) AND (Search_Activity.user!=splunk-system-user)
BY _time, Search_Activity.user span=1h
| apply risky_command_abuse
| fields _time, Search_Activity.user, searches, run_time, IsOutlier(run_time)
| rename IsOutlier(run_time) as isOutlier, _time as timestamp
| where isOutlier>0.5
| `splunk_command_and_scripting_interpreter_risky_spl_mltk_filter`'
how_to_implement: This detection depends on MLTK app which can be found here - https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/2890/
and the Splunk Audit datamodel which can be found here - https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1621/. Baseline model
needs to be built using "Splunk Command and Scripting Interpreter Risky SPL MLTK Baseline" before this search can run.
Please note that the current search only finds matches exactly one space between separator bar and risky commands.
known_false_positives: If the run time of a search exceeds the boundaries of outlier defined by the fitted density
function model, false positives can occur, incorrectly labeling a long running search as potentially risky.
references:
- https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/Splunk/latest/Security/SPLsafeguards#Commands_that_trigger_the_warning
tags:
analytic_story:
- Splunk Vulnerabilities
asset_type: Web Server
cis20:
- CIS 3
- CIS 6
confidence: 40
cve:
- CVE-2022-32154
context:
- Source:Endpoint
dataset:
- https://github.com/splunk/attack_data/raw/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1203/search_activity.txt
impact: 50
kill_chain_phases:
- Actions on Objectives
message: Abnormally long run time for risk SPL command seen by user $(Search_Activity.user).
mitre_attack_id:
- T1059
nist:
- DE.AE
observable:
- name: user
type: User
role:
- Victim
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
required_fields:
- _time
- Search_Activity.search
- Search_Activity.total_run_time
- Search_Activity.user
- Search_Activity.search_type
risk_score: 20
security_domain: audit
detections/application/splunk_digital_certificates_infrastructure_version.yml
+51
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@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
name: Splunk Digital Certificates Infrastructure Version
id: 3c162281-7edb-4ebc-b9a4-5087aaf28fa7
version: 1
date: '2022-05-26'
author: Lou Stella, Splunk
type: Hunting
datamodel: []
description: This search will check the TLS validation is properly configured on the search head it is run from as well as its search peers after Splunk version 9. Other components such as additional search heads or anything this rest command cannot be distributed to will need to be manually checked.
search: '| rest /services/server/info | table splunk_server version server_roles | join splunk_server [| rest /servicesNS/nobody/search/configs/conf-server/ search="sslConfig"| table splunk_server sslVerifyServerCert sslVerifyServerName serverCert] | fillnull value="Not Set" | rename sslVerifyServerCert as "Server.conf:SslConfig:sslVerifyServerCert", sslVerifyServerName as "Server.conf:SslConfig:sslVerifyServerName", serverCert as "Server.conf:SslConfig:serverCert" | `splunk_digital_certificates_infrastructure_version_filter`'
how_to_implement: The user running this search is required to have a permission allowing them to dispatch REST requests to indexers (the `dispatch_rest_to_indexers` capability) in some architectures. Splunk SOAR customers can find a SOAR workbook that walks an analyst through the process of running these hunting searches in the references list of this detection. In order to use this workbook, a user will need to run a curl command to post the file to their SOAR instance such as "curl -u username:password https://soar.instance.name/rest/rest/workbook_template -d @splunk_psa_0622.json". A user should then create an empty container or case, attach the workbook, and begin working through the tasks.
known_false_positives: No known at this time.
references:
- https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/Splunk/9.0.0/Security/EnableTLSCertHostnameValidation#Configure_TLS_host_name_validation_for_Splunk-to-Splunk_communication
- https://www.splunk.com/en_us/product-security/announcements/svd-2022-0602.html
- https://www.github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/workbooks/splunk_psa_0622.json
tags:
analytic_story:
- Splunk Vulnerabilities
asset_type: Endpoint
cis20:
- CIS 3
- CIS 5
- CIS 16
cve:
- CVE-2022-32153
confidence: 100
context:
- Source:Endpoint
dataset:
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1213/audittrail/audittrail.log
impact: 50
kill_chain_phases:
- Exploitation
message: $splunk_server$ may not be properly validating TLS Certificates
mitre_attack_id:
- T1587.003
nist:
- DE.CM
observable:
- name: splunk_server
type: Hostname
role:
- Victim
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
required_fields:
- none
risk_score: 50
security_domain: threat
detections/application/splunk_digital_certificates_lack_of_encryption.yml
+56
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@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
name: Splunk Digital Certificates Lack of Encryption
id: 386a7ebc-737b-48cf-9ca8-5405459ed508
version: 1
date: '2022-05-26'
author: Lou Stella, Splunk
type: Anomaly
datamodel: []
description: On June 14th, 2022, Splunk released a security advisory relating to the authentication that happens between Universal Forwarders and Deployment Servers. In some circumstances, an unauthenticated client can download forwarder bundles from the Deployment Server. In other circumstances, a client may be allowed to publish a forwarder bundle to other clients, which may allow for arbitrary code execution. The fixes for these require upgrading to at least Splunk 9.0 on the forwarder as well. This is a great opportunity to configure TLS across the environment. This search looks for forwarders that are not using TLS and adds risk to those entities.
search: '`splunkd` group="tcpin_connections" ssl="false" | stats values(sourceIp) latest(fwdType) latest(version) by hostname | `splunk_digital_certificates_lack_of_encryption_filter`'
how_to_implement: This anomaly search looks for forwarder connections that are not currently using TLS. It then presents the source IP, the type of forwarder, and the version of the forwarder. You can also remove the "ssl=false" argument from the initial stanza in order to get a full list of all your forwarders that are sending data, and the version of Splunk software they are running, for audit purposes. Splunk SOAR customers can find a SOAR workbook that walks an analyst through the process of running these hunting searches in the references list of this detection. In order to use this workbook, a user will need to run a curl command to post the file to their SOAR instance such as "curl -u username:password https://soar.instance.name/rest/rest/workbook_template -d @splunk_psa_0622.json". A user should then create an empty container or case, attach the workbook, and begin working through the tasks.
known_false_positives: None at this time
references:
- https://www.splunk.com/en_us/product-security/announcements/svd-2022-0607.html
- https://www.splunk.com/en_us/product-security/announcements/svd-2022-0601.html
- https://www.github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/workbooks/splunk_psa_0622.json
tags:
analytic_story:
- Splunk Vulnerabilities
asset_type: endpoint
cis20:
- CIS 3
- CIS 5
- CIS 16
cve:
- CVE-2022-32151
confidence: 80
context:
- Source:Endpoint
dataset:
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1587.003/splunk_fwder/splunkd.log
impact: 25
kill_chain_phases:
- Exploitation
message: $hostname$ is not using TLS when forwarding data
mitre_attack_id:
- T1587.003
nist:
- DE.CM
observable:
- name: hostname
type: Hostname
role:
- Victim
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
required_fields:
- group
- ssl
- sourceIp
- fwdType
- version
- hostname
risk_score: 20
security_domain: threat
detections/application/splunk_process_injection_forwarder_bundle_downloads.yml
+54
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@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
name: Splunk Process Injection Forwarder Bundle Downloads
id: 8ea57d78-1aac-45d2-a913-0cd603fb6e9e
version: 1
date: '2022-05-26'
author: Lou Stella, Splunk
type: Hunting
datamodel: []
description: On June 14th, 2022, Splunk released a security advisory relating to the authentication that happens between Universal Forwarders and Deployment Servers. In some circumstances, an unauthenticated client can download forwarder bundles from the Deployment Server. This hunting search pulls a full list of forwarder bundle downloads where the peer column is the forwarder, the host column is the Deployment Server, and then you have a list of the apps downloaded and the serverclasses in which the peer is a member of. You should look for apps or clients that you do not recognize as being part of your environment.
search: '`splunkd` component="PackageDownloadRestHandler" | stats values(app) values(serverclass) by peer, host | `splunk_process_injection_forwarder_bundle_downloads_filter`'
how_to_implement: This hunting search uses native logs produced when a deployment server is within your environment. Splunk SOAR customers can find a SOAR workbook that walks an analyst through the process of running these hunting searches in the references list of this detection. In order to use this workbook, a user will need to run a curl command to post the file to their SOAR instance such as "curl -u username:password https://soar.instance.name/rest/rest/workbook_template -d @splunk_psa_0622.json". A user should then create an empty container or case, attach the workbook, and begin working through the tasks.
known_false_positives: None at this time.
references:
- https://www.splunk.com/en_us/product-security/announcements/svd-2022-0607.html
- https://www.github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/workbooks/splunk_psa_0622.json
tags:
analytic_story:
- Splunk Vulnerabilities
asset_type: Endpoint
cis20:
- CIS 3
- CIS 5
- CIS 16
cve:
- CVE-2022-32157
confidence: 70
context:
- Source:Endpoint
dataset:
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/splunk_ds/splunkd.log
impact: 50
kill_chain_phases:
- Exploitation
message: $peer$ downloaded apps from $host$
mitre_attack_id:
- T1055
nist:
- DE.CM
observable:
- name: host
type: Hostname
role:
- Victim
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
required_fields:
- component
- app
- serverclass
- peer
- host
risk_score: 35
security_domain: threat
detections/application/splunk_protocol_impersonation_weak_encryption_configuration.yml
+51
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@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
name: Splunk Protocol Impersonation Weak Encryption Configuration
id: 900892bf-70a9-4787-8c99-546dd98ce461
version: 1
date: '2022-05-25'
author: Lou Stella, Splunk
type: Hunting
datamodel: []
description: On June 14th, 2022, Splunk released a security advisory relating to TLS validation occuring within the httplib and urllib python libraries shipped with Splunk. In addition to upgrading to Splunk Enterprise 9.0 or later, several configuration settings need to be set. This search will check those configurations on the search head it is run from as well as its search peers. In addition to these settings, the PYTHONHTTPSVERIFY setting in $SPLUNK_HOME/etc/splunk-launch.conf needs to be enabled as well. Other components such as additional search heads or anything this rest command cannot be distributed to will need to be manually checked.
search: '| rest /services/server/info | table splunk_server version server_roles | join splunk_server [| rest /servicesNS/nobody/search/configs/conf-server/ search="PythonSslClientConfig" | table splunk_server sslVerifyServerCert sslVerifyServerName] | join splunk_server [| rest /servicesNS/nobody/search/configs/conf-web/settings | table splunk_server serverCert sslVersions] | rename sslVerifyServerCert as "Server.conf:PythonSSLClientConfig:sslVerifyServerCert", sslVerifyServerName as "Server.conf:PythonSSLClientConfig:sslVerifyServerName", serverCert as "Web.conf:Settings:serverCert", sslVersions as "Web.conf:Settings:sslVersions" | `splunk_protocol_impersonation_weak_encryption_configuration_filter`'
how_to_implement: The user running this search is required to have a permission allowing them to dispatch REST requests to indexers (The `dispatch_rest_to_indexers` capability). Splunk SOAR customers can find a SOAR workbook that walks an analyst through the process of running these hunting searches in the references list of this detection. In order to use this workbook, a user will need to run a curl command to post the file to their SOAR instance such as "curl -u username:password https://soar.instance.name/rest/rest/workbook_template -d @splunk_psa_0622.json". A user should then create an empty container or case, attach the workbook, and begin working through the tasks.
known_false_positives: While all of the settings on each device returned by this search may appear to be hardened, you will still need to verify the value of PYTHONHTTPSVERIFY in $SPLUNK_HOME/etc/splunk-launch.conf on each device in order to harden the python configuration.
references:
- https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/Splunk/9.0.0/Security/EnableTLSCertHostnameValidation
- https://www.splunk.com/en_us/product-security/announcements/svd-2022-0601.html
- https://www.github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/workbooks/splunk_psa_0622.json
tags:
analytic_story:
- Splunk Vulnerabilities
asset_type: Endpoint
cis20:
- CIS 3
- CIS 5
- CIS 16
cve:
- CVE-2022-32151
confidence: 100
context:
- Source:Endpoint
dataset:
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1213/audittrail/audittrail.log
impact: 50
kill_chain_phases:
- Exploitation
message: $splunk_server$ may not be properly validating TLS Certificates
mitre_attack_id:
- T1001.003
nist:
- DE.CM
observable:
- name: splunk_server
type: Hostname
role:
- Victim
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
required_fields:
- none
risk_score: 50
security_domain: threat
detections/application/splunk_protocol_impersonation_weak_encryption_selfsigned.yml
+53
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@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
name: Splunk protocol impersonation weak encryption selfsigned
id: c76c7a2e-df49-414a-bb36-dce2683770de
version: 1
date: '2022-05-26'
author: Rod Soto, Splunk
type: Hunting
datamodel: []
search: '`splunkd` certificate event_message="X509 certificate* should not be used*" | stats count by host CN component log_level | `splunk_protocol_impersonation_weak_encryption_selfsigned_filter`'
description: On June 14th 2022, Splunk released vulnerability advisory addresing Python TLS validation which was not set before Splunk version 9. This search displays events showing WARNING of using Splunk issued default selfsigned certificates.
how_to_implement: Must upgrade to Splunk version 9 and Configure TLS in order to apply this search. Splunk SOAR customers can find a SOAR workbook that walks an analyst through the process of running these hunting searches in the references list of this detection. In order to use this workbook, a user will need to run a curl command to post the file to their SOAR instance such as "curl -u username:password https://soar.instance.name/rest/rest/workbook_template -d @splunk_psa_0622.json". A user should then create an empty container or case, attach the workbook, and begin working through the tasks.
known_false_positives: This searches finds self signed certificates issued by Splunk which are not recommended from Splunk version 9 forward.
references:
- https://www.splunk.com/en_us/product-security
- https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/Splunk/9.0.0/Security/EnableTLSCertHostnameValidation
- https://www.github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/workbooks/splunk_psa_0622.json
tags:
analytic_story:
- Splunk Vulnerabilities
asset_type: Endpoint
cis20:
- CIS 3
- CIS 5
- CIS 16
cve:
- CVE-2022-32152
confidence: 80
context:
- Source:Endpoint
dataset:
- https://raw.githubusercontent.com/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1558.004/splunk_protocol_impersonation_weak_encryption_selfsigned.txt
impact: 50
kill_chain_phases:
- Exploitation
message: Splunk default issued certificate at $host$
mitre_attack_id:
- T1588.004
nist:
- DE.CM
observable:
- name: Hostname
type: Hostname
role:
- Victim
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
required_fields:
- host
- CN
- event_message
risk_score: 40
security_domain: threat
detections/application/splunk_protocol_impersonation_weak_encryption_simplerequest.yml
+53
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@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
name: Splunk protocol impersonation weak encryption simplerequest
id: 839d12a6-b119-4d44-ac4f-13eed95412c8
version: 1
date: '2022-05-24'
author: Rod Soto, Splunk
type: Hunting
datamodel: []
search: '`splunk_python` "simpleRequest SSL certificate validation is enabled without hostname verification" | stats count by host path | `splunk_protocol_impersonation_weak_encryption_simplerequest_filter`'
description: On Splunk version 9 on Python3 client libraries verify server certificates by default and use CA certificate store. This search warns a user about a failure to validate a certificate using python3 request.
how_to_implement: Must upgrade to Splunk version 9 and Configure TLS host name validation for Splunk Python modules in order to apply this search. Splunk SOAR customers can find a SOAR workbook that walks an analyst through the process of running these hunting searches in the references list of this detection. In order to use this workbook, a user will need to run a curl command to post the file to their SOAR instance such as "curl -u username:password https://soar.instance.name/rest/rest/workbook_template -d @splunk_psa_0622.json". A user should then create an empty container or case, attach the workbook, and begin working through the tasks.
known_false_positives: This search tries to address validation of server and client certificates within Splunk infrastructure, it might produce results from accidental or unintended requests to port 8089.
references:
- https://www.splunk.com/en_us/product-security
- https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/Splunk/9.0.0/Security/EnableTLSCertHostnameValidation
- https://www.github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/workbooks/splunk_psa_0622.json
tags:
analytic_story:
- Splunk Vulnerabilities
asset_type: Endpoint
cve:
- CVE-2022-32152
cis20:
- CIS 3
- CIS 5
- CIS 16
confidence: 80
context:
- Source:Endpoint
dataset:
- https://raw.githubusercontent.com/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1558.004/splk_protocol_impersonation_weak_encryption_simplerequest.txt
impact: 50
kill_chain_phases:
- Exploitation
message: Failed to validate certificate on $host$
mitre_attack_id:
- T1588.004
nist:
- DE.CM
observable:
- name: Hostname
type: Hostname
role:
- Victim
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
required_fields:
- host
- event_message
- path
risk_score: 40
security_domain: threat
detections/endpoint/excessive_usage_of_nslookup_app.yml
+13 -8
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
name: Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App
id: 0a69fdaa-a2b8-11eb-b16d-acde48001122
version: 1
date: '2021-04-21'
version: 2
date: '2022-06-03'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk
type: Anomaly
datamodel:
@@ -12,12 +12,16 @@ description: This search is to detect potential DNS exfiltration using nslookup
use of nslookup where it tries to use specific record type (TXT, A, AAAA) that are
commonly used by attacker and also the retry parameter which is designed to query
C2 DNS multiple tries.
search: '`sysmon` EventCode = 1 process_name = "nslookup.exe" | bucket _time span=15m
| stats count as numNsLookup by Computer, _time | eventstats avg(numNsLookup) as
avgNsLookup, stdev(numNsLookup) as stdNsLookup, count as numSlots by Computer | eval
upperThreshold=(avgNsLookup + stdNsLookup *3) | eval isOutlier=if(avgNsLookup >
20 and avgNsLookup >= upperThreshold, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_usage_of_nslookup_app_filter`'
search: '`sysmon` EventCode = 1 process_name = "nslookup.exe"
| bucket _time span=1m
| stats count as numNsLookup by Computer, _time
| eventstats avg(numNsLookup) as avgNsLookup, stdev(numNsLookup) as stdNsLookup, count as numSlots by Computer
| eval upperThreshold=(avgNsLookup + stdNsLookup *3)
| eval isOutlier=if(numNsLookup > 20 and numNsLookup >= upperThreshold, 1, 0)
| search isOutlier=1
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `excessive_usage_of_nslookup_app_filter`'
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting
logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your
endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the
@@ -39,6 +43,7 @@ tags:
- Scope:Local
- Stage:Exfiltration
dataset:
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1048.003/nslookup_exfil/sysmon.log
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1048.003/nslookup_exfil/windows-sysmon.log
impact: 40
kill_chain_phases:
detections/endpoint/java_writing_jsp_file.yml
+4 -2
View File
@@ -1,12 +1,13 @@
name: Java Writing JSP File
id: eb65619c-4f8d-4383-a975-d352765d344b
version: 1
date: '2022-04-05'
version: 2
date: '2022-06-03'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
type: TTP
datamodel:
- Endpoint
description: The following analytic identifies the process java writing a .jsp to disk. This is potentially indicative of a web shell being written to disk.
Modify and tune the analytic based on data ingested. For instance, it may be worth running a broad query for jsp file writes first before performing a join.
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN ("java","java.exe", "javaw.exe")
by _time Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_guid
Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid [| tstats
@@ -26,6 +27,7 @@ references:
tags:
analytic_story:
- Spring4Shell CVE-2022-22965
- Atlassian Confluence Server and Data Center CVE-2022-26134
cve:
- CVE-2022-22965
asset_type: Endpoint
detections/endpoint/linux_iptables_firewall_modification.yml
+5 -4
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
name: Linux Iptables Firewall Modification
id: 309d59dc-1e1b-49b2-9800-7cf18d12f7b7
version: 2
date: '2022-04-30'
version: 3
date: '2022-06-03'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
type: Anomaly
datamodel:
@@ -12,10 +12,11 @@ description: This analytic looks for suspicious commandline that modify the ipta
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
where Processes.process = "*iptables *" AND Processes.process = "* --dport *" AND Processes.process = "* ACCEPT*" AND Processes.process = "*&amp;&gt;/dev/null*"
AND Processes.process = "* tcp *" AND NOT(Processes.parent_process_path IN("/bin/*", "/lib/*", "/usr/bin/*", "/sbin/*"))
by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.dest
by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.dest _time span=10s
Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path Processes.process_path
| rex field=Processes.process "--dport (?<port>3269|636|989|994|995|8443)"
| stats values(Processes.process) as processes_exec values(port) as ports values(Processes.process_guid) as guids values(Processes.process_id) as pids dc(port) as port_count count by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_id Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_path Processes.process_path firstTime lastTime | where port_count >=3
| stats values(Processes.process) as processes_exec values(port) as ports values(Processes.process_guid) as guids values(Processes.process_id) as pids dc(port) as port_count count
by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_id Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_path Processes.process_path | where port_count >=3
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
detections/endpoint/mshtml_module_load_in_office_product.yml
+4 -4
View File
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
name: MSHTML Module Load in Office Product
id: 5f1c168e-118b-11ec-84ff-acde48001122
version: 1
date: '2021-09-09'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
version: 2
date: '2022-06-01'
author: Michael Haag, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk
type: TTP
datamodel:
- Endpoint
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ description: The following detection identifies the module load of mshtml.dll in
search: '`sysmon` EventID=7 process_name IN ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe","wordpad.exe","wordview.exe")
ImageLoaded IN ("*\\mshtml.dll", "*\\Microsoft.mshtml.dll","*\\IE.Interop.MSHTML.dll","*\\MshtmlDac.dll","*\\MshtmlDed.dll","*\\MshtmlDer.dll")
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, process_name,
ImageLoaded, OriginalFileName, process_id | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
ImageLoaded, OriginalFileName, ProcessGuid | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `mshtml_module_load_in_office_product_filter`'
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting
logs with the process names and image loads from your endpoints. If you are using
detections/endpoint/spoolsv_suspicious_loaded_modules.yml
+2 -2
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
name: Spoolsv Suspicious Loaded Modules
id: a5e451f8-da81-11eb-b245-acde48001122
version: 1
version: 2
date: '2021-07-01'
author: Mauricio Velazco, Michael Haag, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
type: TTP
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ description: This search is to detect suspicious loading of dll in specific path
search: '`sysmon` EventCode=7 Image ="*\\spoolsv.exe" ImageLoaded="*\\Windows\\System32\\spool\\drivers\\x64\\*"
ImageLoaded = "*.dll" | stats dc(ImageLoaded) as countImgloaded values(ImageLoaded)
as ImgLoaded count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image Computer
process_id EventCode | where countImgloaded >= 3 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
ProcessId EventCode | where countImgloaded >= 3 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `spoolsv_suspicious_loaded_modules_filter`'
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting
logs with the process name and imageloaded executions from your endpoints. If you
detections/endpoint/suspicious_process_with_discord_dns_query.yml
+6 -7
View File
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
name: Suspicious Process With Discord DNS Query
id: 4d4332ae-792c-11ec-89c1-acde48001122
version: 1
date: '2022-01-19'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
version: 2
date: '2022-06-01'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk
type: Anomaly
datamodel:
- Endpoint
@@ -11,10 +11,10 @@ description: This analytic identifies a process making a DNS query to Discord, a
by adversaries, as seen in the WhisperGate campaign, to host and download malicious.
external files. A process resolving a Discord DNS name could be an indicator of
malware trying to download files from Discord for further execution.
search: '`sysmon` EventCode=22 QueryName IN ("*discord*") process_path != "*\\AppData\\Local\\Discord\\*"
AND process_path != "*\\Program Files*" AND process_name != "discord.exe" | stats
search: '`sysmon` EventCode=22 QueryName IN ("*discord*") Image != "*\\AppData\\Local\\Discord\\*"
AND Image != "*\\Program Files*" AND Image != "discord.exe" | stats
count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image QueryName QueryStatus
process_name QueryResults Computer process_path | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
process_name QueryResults Computer | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_process_with_discord_dns_query_filter`'
how_to_implement: his detection relies on sysmon logs with the Event ID 22, DNS Query.
known_false_positives: Noise and false positive can be seen if the following instant
@@ -68,7 +68,6 @@ tags:
- process_name
- QueryResults
- Computer
- process_path
risk_score: 64
security_domain: endpoint
asset_type: Endpoint
detections/endpoint/unload_sysmon_filter_driver.yml
+7 -6
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
name: Unload Sysmon Filter Driver
id: e5928ff3-23eb-4d8b-b8a4-dcbc844fdfbe
version: 3
date: '2020-07-22'
version: 4
date: '2022-06-01'
author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
type: TTP
datamodel:
@@ -22,12 +22,13 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from
The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data
model. This search is also shipped with `unload_sysmon_filter_driver_filter` macro,
update this macro to filter out false positives.
known_false_positives: ''
references: []
known_false_positives: 'Unknown at the moment'
references:
- https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/defense-evasion/unloading-sysmon-driver
tags:
analytic_story:
- Disabling Security Tools
asset_type: ''
asset_type: Endpoint
cis20:
- CIS 8
confidence: 90
@@ -35,7 +36,7 @@ tags:
- Source:Endpoint
- Stage:Defense Evasion
dataset:
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/unload_sysmon/windows-sysmon.log
impact: 50
kill_chain_phases:
- Actions on Objectives
detections/endpoint/wermgr_process_connecting_to_ip_check_web_services.yml
+5 -5
View File
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
name: Wermgr Process Connecting To IP Check Web Services
id: ed313326-a0f9-11eb-a89c-acde48001122
version: 1
date: '2021-04-19'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
version: 2
date: '2022-06-01'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk
type: TTP
datamodel:
- Endpoint
@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ search: '`sysmon` EventCode =22 process_name = wermgr.exe QueryName IN ("*wtfism
"*checkip.amazonaws.com", "*ipecho.net", "*ipinfo.io", "*api.ipify.org", "*icanhazip.com",
"*ip.anysrc.com","*api.ip.sb", "ident.me", "www.myexternalip.com", "*zen.spamhaus.org",
"*cbl.abuseat.org", "*b.barracudacentral.org","*dnsbl-1.uceprotect.net", "*spam.dnsbl.sorbs.net")
| stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by process_path
process_name process_id QueryName QueryStatus QueryResults Computer EventCode |
| stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Image
process_name ProcessId QueryName QueryStatus QueryResults Computer EventCode |
`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wermgr_process_connecting_to_ip_check_web_services_filter`'
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting
logs with the process name, dns query name process path , and query ststus from
detections/endpoint/windows_command_and_scripting_interpreter_hunting_path_traversal.yml
+79
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@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
name: Windows Command and Scripting Interpreter Hunting Path Traversal
id: d0026380-b3c4-4da0-ac8e-02790063ff6b
version: 1
date: '2022-06-01'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Michael Haag, Splunk
type: Hunting
datamodel:
- Endpoint
description: The following analytic identifies path traversal command-line execution and should be used to tune and driver other more higher fidelity analytics. This technique was seen in malicious document that execute malicious code
using msdt.exe and path traversal technique that serve as defense evasion. This Hunting query is a good pivot to look for possible suspicious process and command-line
that runs execute path traversal technique to run malicious code. This may help you to find possible downloaded malware or other lolbin execution.
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by
Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_hash
Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process
| `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| eval count_of_pattern1 = (mvcount(split(process,"/.."))-1)
| eval count_of_pattern2 = (mvcount(split(process,"\.."))-1)
| eval count_of_pattern3 = (mvcount(split(process,"\\.."))-1)
| eval count_of_pattern4 = (mvcount(split(process,"//.."))-1)
| search count_of_pattern1 > 1 OR count_of_pattern2 > 1 OR count_of_pattern3 > 1 OR count_of_pattern4 > 1
| `windows_command_and_scripting_interpreter_hunting_path_traversal_filter`'
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition,
confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the
endpoint product
known_false_positives: false positive may vary depends on the score you want to check. The bigger number of path traversal string count the better.
references:
- https://app.any.run/tasks/713f05d2-fe78-4b9d-a744-f7c133e3fafb/
tags:
analytic_story:
- Windows Defense Evasion Tactics
- Microsoft Support Diagnostic Tool Vulnerability CVE-2022-30190
asset_type: Endpoint
cis20:
- CIS 3
- CIS 5
- CIS 16
confidence: 60
context:
- Source:Endpoint
- Stage:Defense Evasion
dataset:
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059/path_traversal/sysmon.log
impact: 60
kill_chain_phases:
- Exploitation
message: A parent process $parent_process_name$ has spawned a child $process_name$ with path traversal commandline $process$ in $dest$
mitre_attack_id:
- T1059
nist:
- DE.CM
observable:
- name: dest
type: Hostname
role:
- Victim
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
required_fields:
- _time
- Processes.dest
- Processes.user
- Processes.parent_process_name #parent process name
- Processes.parent_process #parent cmdline
- Processes.original_file_name
- Processes.process_name #process name
- Processes.process #process cmdline
- Processes.process_id
- Processes.parent_process_path
- Processes.process_path
- Processes.parent_process_id
risk_score: 36
security_domain: endpoint
detections/endpoint/windows_command_and_scripting_interpreter_path_traversal_exec.yml
+74
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
name: Windows Command and Scripting Interpreter Path Traversal Exec
id: 58fcdeb1-728d-415d-b0d7-3ab18a275ec2
version: 2
date: '2022-06-01'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
type: TTP
datamodel:
- Endpoint
description: The following analytic identifies path traversal command-line execution. This technique was seen in malicious document that execute malicious code
using msdt.exe and path traversal technique that serve as defense evasion. This TTP is a good pivot to look for more suspicious process and command-line
that runs before and after this execution. This may help you to find possible downloaded malware or other lolbin execution.
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process="*\/..\/..\/..\/*" OR Processes.process="*\\..\\..\\..\\*" OR Processes.process="*\/\/..\/\/..\/\/..\/\/*" by
Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process
Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_hash
| `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_command_and_scripting_interpreter_path_traversal_exec_filter`'
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition,
confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the
endpoint product
known_false_positives: Not known at this moment.
references:
- https://app.any.run/tasks/713f05d2-fe78-4b9d-a744-f7c133e3fafb/
tags:
analytic_story:
- Windows Defense Evasion Tactics
- Microsoft Support Diagnostic Tool Vulnerability CVE-2022-30190
asset_type: Endpoint
cis20:
- CIS 3
- CIS 5
- CIS 16
confidence: 100
context:
- Source:Endpoint
- Stage:Defense Evasion
dataset:
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059/path_traversal/sysmon.log
impact: 90
kill_chain_phases:
- Exploitation
message: A parent process $parent_process_name$ has spawned a child $process_name$ with path traversal commandline $process$ in $dest$
mitre_attack_id:
- T1059
nist:
- DE.CM
observable:
- name: dest
type: Hostname
role:
- Victim
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
required_fields:
- _time
- Processes.dest
- Processes.user
- Processes.parent_process_name #parent process name
- Processes.parent_process #parent cmdline
- Processes.original_file_name
- Processes.process_name #process name
- Processes.process #process cmdline
- Processes.process_id
- Processes.parent_process_path
- Processes.process_path
- Processes.parent_process_id
risk_score: 90
security_domain: endpoint
detections/endpoint/windows_execute_arbitrary_commands_with_msdt.yml
+87
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@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
name: Windows Execute Arbitrary Commands with MSDT
id: e1d5145f-38fe-42b9-a5d5-457796715f97
version: 2
date: '2022-05-30'
author: Michael Haag, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
type: TTP
datamodel:
- Endpoint
description: The following analytic identifies a recently disclosed arbitraty command execution using Windows msdt.exe - a Diagnostics Troubleshooting Wizard. The sample identified will use the ms-msdt:/ protocol handler to load msdt.exe to retrieve a remote payload.
During triage, review file modifications for html. Identify parallel process execution that may be related, including an Office Product.
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=msdt.exe
Processes.process IN ("*ms-msdt:/id*","*ms-msdt:-id*","*/id*") AND (Processes.process="*IT_BrowseForFile=*" OR Processes.process="*IT_RebrowseForFile=*" OR Processes.process="*.xml*") AND Processes.process="*PCWDiagnostic*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name
Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `windows_execute_arbitrary_commands_with_msdt_filter`'
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.
known_false_positives: False positives may be present, filter as needed. Added .xml to potentially capture any answer file usage. Remove as needed.
references:
- https://isc.sans.edu/diary/rss/28694
- https://doublepulsar.com/follina-a-microsoft-office-code-execution-vulnerability-1a47fce5629e
- https://twitter.com/nao_sec/status/1530196847679401984?s=20&t=ZiXYI4dQuA-0_dzQzSUb3A
- https://app.any.run/tasks/713f05d2-fe78-4b9d-a744-f7c133e3fafb/
- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/4a24048f81afbe9fb62e7a6a49adbd1faf41f266b5f9feecdceb567aec096784/detection
- https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/msdt.exe-152D4C9F63EFB332CCB134C6953C0104.html
tags:
analytic_story:
- Microsoft Support Diagnostic Tool Vulnerability CVE-2022-30190
asset_type: Endpoint
cve:
- CVE-2022-30190
cis20:
- CIS 3
- CIS 5
- CIS 16
confidence: 100
context:
- Source:Endpoint
- Stage:Defense Evasion
dataset:
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/msdt.log
impact: 100
kill_chain_phases:
- Exploitation
message: A parent process $parent_process_name$ has spawned a child
process $process_name$ on host $dest$ possibly indicative of indirect command execution.
mitre_attack_id:
- T1218
nist:
- DE.CM
observable:
- name: user
type: User
role:
- Victim
- name: dest
type: Hostname
role:
- Victim
- name: parent_process_name
type: Process
role:
- Parent Process
- name: process_name
type: Process
role:
- Child Process
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
required_fields:
- _time
- Processes.dest
- Processes.user
- Processes.parent_process_name #parent process name
- Processes.parent_process #parent cmdline
- Processes.original_file_name
- Processes.process_name #process name
- Processes.process #process cmdline
- Processes.process_id
- Processes.parent_process_path
- Processes.process_path
- Processes.parent_process_id
risk_score: 100
security_domain: endpoint
detections/endpoint/windows_installutil_credential_theft.yml
+4 -4
View File
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
name: Windows InstallUtil Credential Theft
id: ccfeddec-43ec-11ec-b494-acde48001122
version: 1
date: '2021-11-12'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
version: 2
date: '2022-06-01'
author: Michael Haag, Mauricio Velazo, Splunk
type: TTP
datamodel:
- Endpoint
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ description: 'The following analytic identifies the Windows InstallUtil.exe bina
processes. Capture any artifacts and review further.'
search: '`sysmon` EventCode=7 process_name=installutil.exe ImageLoaded IN ("*\\samlib.dll",
"*\\vaultcli.dll") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
by Computer, process_name, ImageLoaded, OriginalFileName, process_id | rename Computer
by Computer, process_name, ImageLoaded, OriginalFileName, ProcessId | rename Computer
as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_installutil_credential_theft_filter`'
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting
detections/endpoint/windows_office_product_spawning_msdt.yml
+89
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@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
name: Windows Office Product Spawning MSDT
id: 127eba64-c981-40bf-8589-1830638864a7
version: 1
date: '2022-05-30'
author: Michael Haag, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
type: TTP
datamodel:
- Endpoint
description: The following analytic identifies a Microsoft Office product spawning the Windows msdt.exe process. MSDT is a Diagnostics Troubleshooting Wizard native to Windows. This behavior is related to a recently identified sample utilizing protocol handlers to evade preventative controls, including if macros are disabled in the document.
During triage, review file modifications for html. In addition, parallel processes including PowerShell and CertUtil.
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name
IN ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","outlook.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe") Processes.process_name=msdt.exe
by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name
Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_office_product_spawning_msdt_filter`'
how_to_implement: how To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.
known_false_positives: False positives should be limited, however filter as needed.
references:
- https://isc.sans.edu/diary/rss/28694
- https://doublepulsar.com/follina-a-microsoft-office-code-execution-vulnerability-1a47fce5629e
- https://twitter.com/nao_sec/status/1530196847679401984?s=20&t=ZiXYI4dQuA-0_dzQzSUb3A
- https://app.any.run/tasks/713f05d2-fe78-4b9d-a744-f7c133e3fafb/
- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/4a24048f81afbe9fb62e7a6a49adbd1faf41f266b5f9feecdceb567aec096784/detection
- https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/msdt.exe-152D4C9F63EFB332CCB134C6953C0104.html
tags:
analytic_story:
- Spearphishing Attachments
- Microsoft Support Diagnostic Tool Vulnerability CVE-2022-30190
asset_type: Endpoint
cve:
- CVE-2022-30190
cis20:
- CIS 3
- CIS 5
- CIS 16
confidence: 100
context:
- Source:Endpoint
- Stage:Defense Evasion
dataset:
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/msdt.log
impact: 100
kill_chain_phases:
- Exploitation
message: Office parent process $parent_process_name$ has spawned a child
process $process_name$ on host $dest$.
mitre_attack_id:
- T1566
- T1566.001
nist:
- DE.CM
observable:
- name: user
type: User
role:
- Victim
- name: dest
type: Hostname
role:
- Victim
- name: parent_process_name
type: Process
role:
- Parent Process
- name: process_name
type: Process
role:
- Child Process
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
required_fields:
- _time
- Processes.dest
- Processes.user
- Processes.parent_process_name #parent process name
- Processes.parent_process #parent cmdline
- Processes.original_file_name
- Processes.process_name #process name
- Processes.process #process cmdline
- Processes.process_id
- Processes.parent_process_path
- Processes.process_path
- Processes.parent_process_id
risk_score: 100
security_domain: endpoint
detections/experimental/network/detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address.yml
+2 -2
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
name: Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address
id: dcfd6b40-42f9-469d-a433-2e53f7489ff4
version: 1
version: 2
date: '2017-09-13'
author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
type: TTP
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ description: By populating the organization's assets within the assets_by_str.cs
associated with the source of the DHCP request is checked against the list of known
devices, and reports on those that are not found.
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Sessions
where nodename=All_Sessions.DHCP All_Sessions.signature=DHCPREQUEST by All_Sessions.src_ip
where nodename=All_Sessions.DHCP All_Sessions.tag=dhcp by All_Sessions.dest_ip
All_Sessions.dest_mac | dedup All_Sessions.dest_mac| `drop_dm_object_name("Network_Sessions")`|`drop_dm_object_name("All_Sessions")`
| search NOT [| inputlookup asset_lookup_by_str |rename mac as dest_mac | fields
+ dest_mac] | `detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address_filter`'
detections/network/splunk_identified_ssl_tls_certificates.yml
+57
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@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
name: Splunk Identified SSL TLS Certificates
id: 620fbb89-86fd-4e2e-925f-738374277586
version: 1
date: '2022-05-25'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
type: Hunting
datamodel: []
description: The following analytic uses tags of SSL, TLS and certificate to identify the usage of the Splunk default certificates being utilized in the environment. Recommended guidance is to utilize valid TLS certificates which documentation may be found in Splunk Docs - https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/Splunk/8.2.6/Security/AboutsecuringyourSplunkconfigurationwithSSL.
search: 'tag IN (ssl, tls, certificate) ssl_issuer_common_name=*splunk* | stats values(src) AS "Host(s) with Default Cert" count by ssl_issuer ssl_subject_common_name ssl_subject_organization ssl_subject host sourcetype
| `splunk_identified_ssl_tls_certificates_filter`'
how_to_implement: Ingestion of SSL/TLS data is needed and to be tagged properly as ssl, tls or certificate. This data may come from a proxy, zeek, or Splunk Streams. Splunk SOAR customers can find a SOAR workbook that walks an analyst through the process of running these hunting searches in the references list of this detection. In order to use this workbook, a user will need to run a curl command to post the file to their SOAR instance such as "curl -u username:password https://soar.instance.name/rest/rest/workbook_template -d @splunk_psa_0622.json". A user should then create an empty container or case, attach the workbook, and begin working through the tasks.
known_false_positives: False positives will not be present as it is meant to assist with identifying default certificates being utilized.
references:
- https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/Splunk/8.2.6/Security/AboutsecuringyourSplunkconfigurationwithSSL
- https://www.github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/workbooks/splunk_psa_0622.json
tags:
analytic_story:
- Splunk Vulnerabilities
asset_type: Proxy
cis20:
- CIS 3
- CIS 5
- CIS 16
cve:
- CVE-2022-32151
- CVE-2022-32152
confidence: 70
context:
- Source:Application Log
dataset:
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1040/ssltls/ssl_splunk.log
impact: 60
kill_chain_phases:
- Reconnaissance
message: The following $dest$ is using the self signed Splunk certificate.
mitre_attack_id:
- T1040
nist:
- DE.CM
observable:
- name: dest
type: Hostname
role:
- Victim
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
required_fields:
- ssl_issuer
- ssl_subject_common_name
- ssl_subject_organization
- ssl_subject
- host
- sourcetype
risk_score: 42
security_domain: network
detections/web/confluence_unauthenticated_remote_code_execution_cve_2022_26134.yml
+72
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@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
name: Confluence Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution CVE-2022-26134
id: fcf4bd3f-a79f-4b7a-83bf-2692d60b859c
version: 1
date: '2022-06-03'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
type: TTP
datamodel:
- Endpoint
description: The following analytic assists with identifying CVE-2022-26134 based exploitation utilizing the Web datamodel to cover network and CIM compliant web logs. The parameters were captured from live scanning and the POC provided by Rapid7. This analytic is written against multiple proof of concept codes released and seen in the wild (scanning).
During triage, review any endpoint based logs for further activity including writing a jsp file to disk and commands/processes spawning running as root from the Confluence process.
search: '| tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
as lastTime from datamodel=Web where Web.url IN ("*${*", "*%2F%7B*") (Web.url="*org.apache.commons.io.IOUtils*" Web.url="*java.lang.Runtime@getRuntime().exec*") OR (Web.url="*java.lang.Runtime%40getRuntime%28%29.exec*") OR (Web.url="*getEngineByName*" AND Web.url="*nashorn*" AND Web.url="*ProcessBuilder*")
by Web.http_user_agent Web.http_method, Web.url,Web.url_length Web.src, Web.dest sourcetype
| `drop_dm_object_name("Web")`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `confluence_unauthenticated_remote_code_execution_cve_2022_26134_filter`'
how_to_implement: This detection requires the Web datamodel to be populated from a
supported Technology Add-On like Splunk for Apache or Splunk for Nginx. In addition, network based logs or event data like PAN Threat.
known_false_positives: Tune based on assets if possible, or restrict to known Confluence servers. Remove the ${ for a more broad query. To identify more exec, remove everything up to the last parameter (Runtime().exec) for a broad query.
references:
- https://confluence.atlassian.com/doc/confluence-security-advisory-2022-06-02-1130377146.html
- https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/atlassian-confluence-vulnerability-cve-2022-26134.html
- https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2022/06/02/active-exploitation-of-confluence-cve-2022-26134/
- https://www.volexity.com/blog/2022/06/02/zero-day-exploitation-of-atlassian-confluence/
tags:
analytic_story:
- Atlassian Confluence Server and Data Center CVE-2022-26134
asset_type: Web Server
cve:
- CVE-2022-26134
cis20:
- CIS 3
- CIS 5
- CIS 16
confidence: 100
context:
- Scope:Network
dataset:
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/java/confluence.log
impact: 100
kill_chain_phases:
- Exploitation
message: A URL was requested related to CVE-2022-26134, a unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability, on $dest$ by $src$.
mitre_attack_id:
- T1505
- T1190
nist:
- DE.CM
observable:
- name: dest
type: IP Address
role:
- Victim
- name: src
type: IP Address
role:
- Attacker
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
required_fields:
- _time
- Web.http_method
- Web.url
- Web.url_length
- Web.src
- Web.dest
- Web.http_user_agent
risk_score: 100
security_domain: network
dist/escu/app.manifest
Vendored
+1 -1
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
"id": {
"group": null,
"name": "DA-ESS-ContentUpdate",
"version": "3.40.0"
"version": "3.43.0"
},
"author": [
{
dist/escu/default/analyticstories.conf
Vendored
+183 -11
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
#############
# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
# On Date: 2022-05-23T20:35:38 UTC
# On Date: 2022-06-14T13:52:57 UTC
# Author: Splunk Security Research
# Contact: research@splunk.com
#############
@@ -17,6 +17,56 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exp
known_false_positives = This search may find additional path traversal exploitation attempts.
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - Splunk Command and Scripting Interpreter Delete Usage - Rule]
type = detection
asset_type = Web Server
confidence = medium
explanation = The following analytic identifies the use of the risky command - Delete - that may be utilized in Splunk to delete some or all data queried for. In order to use Delete in Splunk, one must be assigned the role. This is typically not used and should generate an anomaly if it is used.
how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search acceleration is recommended against the Search_Activity datamodel that runs against the splunk _audit index. In addition, this analytic requires the Common Information Model App which includes the Splunk Audit Datamodel https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1621/.
annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
known_false_positives = False positives may be present if this command is used as a common practice. Filter as needed.
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - Splunk Command and Scripting Interpreter Risky Commands - Rule]
type = detection
asset_type = Web Server
confidence = medium
explanation = The Splunk platform contains built-in search processing language (SPL) safeguards to warn you when you are about to unknowingly run a search that contains commands that might be a security risk. This warning appears when you click a link or type a URL that loads a search that contains risky commands. The warning does not appear when you create ad hoc searches. This warning alerts you to the possibility of unauthorized actions by a malicious user. Unauthorized actions include - Copying or transferring data (data exfiltration), Deleting data and Overwriting data. All risky commands may be found here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/Splunk/latest/Security/SPLsafeguards#Commands_that_trigger_the_warninga. A possible scenario when this might occur is when a malicious actor creates a search that includes commands that exfiltrate or damage data. The malicious actor then sends an unsuspecting user a link to the search. The URL contains a query string (q) and a search identifier (sid), but the sid is not valid. The malicious actor hopes the user will use the link and the search will run. During analysis, pivot based on user name and filter any user or queries not needed. Queries ran from a dashboard are seen as adhoc queries. When a query runs from a dashboard it will not show in audittrail logs the source dashboard name. The query defaults to adhoc and no Splunk system user activity. In addition, modify this query by removing key commands that generate too much noise, or too little, and create separate queries with higher confidence to alert on.
how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search acceleration is recommended against the Search_Activity datamodel that runs against the splunk _audit index. In addition, this analytic requires the Common Information Model App which includes the Splunk Audit Datamodel https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1621/. Splunk SOAR customers can find a SOAR workbook that walks an analyst through the process of running these hunting searches in the references list of this detection. In order to use this workbook, a user will need to run a curl command to post the file to their SOAR instance such as "curl -u username:password https://soar.instance.name/rest/rest/workbook_template -d @splunk_psa_0622.json". A user should then create an empty container or case, attach the workbook, and begin working through the tasks.
annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
known_false_positives = False positives will be present until properly filtered by Username and search name.
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - Splunk Command and Scripting Interpreter Risky SPL MLTK - Rule]
type = detection
asset_type = Web Server
confidence = medium
explanation = This detection utilizes machine learning model named "risky_command_abuse" trained from "Splunk Command and Scripting Interpreter Risky SPL MLTK Baseline". It should be scheduled to run hourly to detect whether a user has run searches containing risky SPL from this list https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/Splunk/latest/Security/SPLsafeguards#Commands_that_trigger_the_warninga with abnormally long running time in the past one hour, comparing with his/her past seven days history. This search uses the trained baseline to infer whether a search is an outlier (isOutlier ~= 1.0) or not (isOutlier~= 0.0)
how_to_implement = This detection depends on MLTK app which can be found here - https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/2890/ and the Splunk Audit datamodel which can be found here - https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1621/. Baseline model needs to be built using "Splunk Command and Scripting Interpreter Risky SPL MLTK Baseline" before this search can run. Please note that the current search only finds matches exactly one space between separator bar and risky commands.
annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 6"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059"], "nist": ["DE.AE"]}
known_false_positives = If the run time of a search exceeds the boundaries of outlier defined by the fitted density function model, false positives can occur, incorrectly labeling a long running search as potentially risky.
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - Splunk Digital Certificates Infrastructure Version - Rule]
type = detection
asset_type = Endpoint
confidence = medium
explanation = This search will check the TLS validation is properly configured on the search head it is run from as well as its search peers after Splunk version 9. Other components such as additional search heads or anything this rest command cannot be distributed to will need to be manually checked.
how_to_implement = The user running this search is required to have a permission allowing them to dispatch REST requests to indexers (the `dispatch_rest_to_indexers` capability) in some architectures. Splunk SOAR customers can find a SOAR workbook that walks an analyst through the process of running these hunting searches in the references list of this detection. In order to use this workbook, a user will need to run a curl command to post the file to their SOAR instance such as "curl -u username:password https://soar.instance.name/rest/rest/workbook_template -d @splunk_psa_0622.json". A user should then create an empty container or case, attach the workbook, and begin working through the tasks.
annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1587.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
known_false_positives = No known at this time.
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - Splunk Digital Certificates Lack of Encryption - Rule]
type = detection
asset_type = endpoint
confidence = medium
explanation = On June 14th, 2022, Splunk released a security advisory relating to the authentication that happens between Universal Forwarders and Deployment Servers. In some circumstances, an unauthenticated client can download forwarder bundles from the Deployment Server. In other circumstances, a client may be allowed to publish a forwarder bundle to other clients, which may allow for arbitrary code execution. The fixes for these require upgrading to at least Splunk 9.0 on the forwarder as well. This is a great opportunity to configure TLS across the environment. This search looks for forwarders that are not using TLS and adds risk to those entities.
how_to_implement = This anomaly search looks for forwarder connections that are not currently using TLS. It then presents the source IP, the type of forwarder, and the version of the forwarder. You can also remove the "ssl=false" argument from the initial stanza in order to get a full list of all your forwarders that are sending data, and the version of Splunk software they are running, for audit purposes. Splunk SOAR customers can find a SOAR workbook that walks an analyst through the process of running these hunting searches in the references list of this detection. In order to use this workbook, a user will need to run a curl command to post the file to their SOAR instance such as "curl -u username:password https://soar.instance.name/rest/rest/workbook_template -d @splunk_psa_0622.json". A user should then create an empty container or case, attach the workbook, and begin working through the tasks.
annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1587.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
known_false_positives = None at this time
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - Splunk DoS via Malformed S2S Request - Rule]
type = detection
asset_type = Endpoint
@@ -27,6 +77,46 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exp
known_false_positives = None.
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - Splunk Process Injection Forwarder Bundle Downloads - Rule]
type = detection
asset_type = Endpoint
confidence = medium
explanation = On June 14th, 2022, Splunk released a security advisory relating to the authentication that happens between Universal Forwarders and Deployment Servers. In some circumstances, an unauthenticated client can download forwarder bundles from the Deployment Server. This hunting search pulls a full list of forwarder bundle downloads where the peer column is the forwarder, the host column is the Deployment Server, and then you have a list of the apps downloaded and the serverclasses in which the peer is a member of. You should look for apps or clients that you do not recognize as being part of your environment.
how_to_implement = This hunting search uses native logs produced when a deployment server is within your environment. Splunk SOAR customers can find a SOAR workbook that walks an analyst through the process of running these hunting searches in the references list of this detection. In order to use this workbook, a user will need to run a curl command to post the file to their SOAR instance such as "curl -u username:password https://soar.instance.name/rest/rest/workbook_template -d @splunk_psa_0622.json". A user should then create an empty container or case, attach the workbook, and begin working through the tasks.
annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
known_false_positives = None at this time.
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - Splunk Protocol Impersonation Weak Encryption Configuration - Rule]
type = detection
asset_type = Endpoint
confidence = medium
explanation = On June 14th, 2022, Splunk released a security advisory relating to TLS validation occuring within the httplib and urllib python libraries shipped with Splunk. In addition to upgrading to Splunk Enterprise 9.0 or later, several configuration settings need to be set. This search will check those configurations on the search head it is run from as well as its search peers. In addition to these settings, the PYTHONHTTPSVERIFY setting in $SPLUNK_HOME/etc/splunk-launch.conf needs to be enabled as well. Other components such as additional search heads or anything this rest command cannot be distributed to will need to be manually checked.
how_to_implement = The user running this search is required to have a permission allowing them to dispatch REST requests to indexers (The `dispatch_rest_to_indexers` capability). Splunk SOAR customers can find a SOAR workbook that walks an analyst through the process of running these hunting searches in the references list of this detection. In order to use this workbook, a user will need to run a curl command to post the file to their SOAR instance such as "curl -u username:password https://soar.instance.name/rest/rest/workbook_template -d @splunk_psa_0622.json". A user should then create an empty container or case, attach the workbook, and begin working through the tasks.
annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1001.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
known_false_positives = While all of the settings on each device returned by this search may appear to be hardened, you will still need to verify the value of PYTHONHTTPSVERIFY in $SPLUNK_HOME/etc/splunk-launch.conf on each device in order to harden the python configuration.
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - Splunk protocol impersonation weak encryption selfsigned - Rule]
type = detection
asset_type = Endpoint
confidence = medium
explanation = On June 14th 2022, Splunk released vulnerability advisory addresing Python TLS validation which was not set before Splunk version 9. This search displays events showing WARNING of using Splunk issued default selfsigned certificates.
how_to_implement = Must upgrade to Splunk version 9 and Configure TLS in order to apply this search. Splunk SOAR customers can find a SOAR workbook that walks an analyst through the process of running these hunting searches in the references list of this detection. In order to use this workbook, a user will need to run a curl command to post the file to their SOAR instance such as "curl -u username:password https://soar.instance.name/rest/rest/workbook_template -d @splunk_psa_0622.json". A user should then create an empty container or case, attach the workbook, and begin working through the tasks.
annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1588.004"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
known_false_positives = This searches finds self signed certificates issued by Splunk which are not recommended from Splunk version 9 forward.
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - Splunk protocol impersonation weak encryption simplerequest - Rule]
type = detection
asset_type = Endpoint
confidence = medium
explanation = On Splunk version 9 on Python3 client libraries verify server certificates by default and use CA certificate store. This search warns a user about a failure to validate a certificate using python3 request.
how_to_implement = Must upgrade to Splunk version 9 and Configure TLS host name validation for Splunk Python modules in order to apply this search. Splunk SOAR customers can find a SOAR workbook that walks an analyst through the process of running these hunting searches in the references list of this detection. In order to use this workbook, a user will need to run a curl command to post the file to their SOAR instance such as "curl -u username:password https://soar.instance.name/rest/rest/workbook_template -d @splunk_psa_0622.json". A user should then create an empty container or case, attach the workbook, and begin working through the tasks.
annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1588.004"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
known_false_positives = This search tries to address validation of server and client certificates within Splunk infrastructure, it might produce results from accidental or unintended requests to port 8089.
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - Splunk User Enumeration Attempt - Rule]
type = detection
asset_type = endpoint
@@ -4008,7 +4098,7 @@ providing_technologies = []
type = detection
asset_type = Endpoint
confidence = medium
explanation = The following analytic identifies the process java writing a .jsp to disk. This is potentially indicative of a web shell being written to disk.
explanation = The following analytic identifies the process java writing a .jsp to disk. This is potentially indicative of a web shell being written to disk. Modify and tune the analytic based on data ingested. For instance, it may be worth running a broad query for jsp file writes first before performing a join.
how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Filesystem` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.
annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
known_false_positives = False positives are possible and filtering may be required. Restrict by assets or filter known jsp files that are common for the environment.
@@ -4150,7 +4240,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint
confidence = medium
explanation = The following analytic identifies a suspicious process creation of At application. This process can be used by malware, adversaries and red teamers to create persistence entry to the targeted or compromised host with their malicious code. This anomaly detection can be a good indicator to investigate the event before and after this process execution, when it was executed and what schedule task it will execute.
how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.
annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.001", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.002", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can use this application for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.
providing_technologies = []
@@ -4430,7 +4520,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint
confidence = medium
explanation = This analytic looks for suspicious commandline that may use to append user entry to /etc/at.allow or /etc/at.deny. These 2 files are commonly abused by malware, adversaries or red teamers to persist on the targeted or compromised host. These config file can restrict user that can only execute at application (another schedule task application in linux). attacker can create a user or add the compromised username to that config file to execute at to schedule it malicious code. This anomaly detection can be a good indicator to investigate further the entry in created config file and who created it to verify if it is a false positive.
how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.
annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.001", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.002", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can use this commandline for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.
providing_technologies = []
@@ -4660,7 +4750,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint
confidence = medium
explanation = Detect usage of plutil to modify plist files. Adversaries can modiy plist files to executed binaries or add command line arguments. Plist files in auto-run locations are executed upon user logon or system startup.
how_to_implement = This detection uses osquery and endpoint security on MacOS. Follow the link in references, which describes how to setup process auditing in MacOS with endpoint security and osquery.
annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.011"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1647"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
known_false_positives = Administrators using plutil to change plist files.
providing_technologies = []
@@ -6815,12 +6905,12 @@ providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - Unload Sysmon Filter Driver - Rule]
type = detection
asset_type =
asset_type = Endpoint
confidence = medium
explanation = Attackers often disable security tools to avoid detection. This search looks for the usage of process `fltMC.exe` to unload a Sysmon Driver that will stop sysmon from collecting the data.
how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. This search is also shipped with `unload_sysmon_filter_driver_filter` macro, update this macro to filter out false positives.
annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
known_false_positives =
known_false_positives = Unknown at the moment
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - Unloading AMSI via Reflection - Rule]
@@ -6976,6 +7066,26 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre
known_false_positives = administrators rarely use adfind, usually not used for legitimate reasons
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Command and Scripting Interpreter Hunting Path Traversal - Rule]
type = detection
asset_type = Endpoint
confidence = medium
explanation = The following analytic identifies path traversal command-line execution and should be used to tune and driver other more higher fidelity analytics. This technique was seen in malicious document that execute malicious code using msdt.exe and path traversal technique that serve as defense evasion. This Hunting query is a good pivot to look for possible suspicious process and command-line that runs execute path traversal technique to run malicious code. This may help you to find possible downloaded malware or other lolbin execution.
how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product
annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
known_false_positives = false positive may vary depends on the score you want to check. The bigger number of path traversal string count the better.
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Command and Scripting Interpreter Path Traversal Exec - Rule]
type = detection
asset_type = Endpoint
confidence = medium
explanation = The following analytic identifies path traversal command-line execution. This technique was seen in malicious document that execute malicious code using msdt.exe and path traversal technique that serve as defense evasion. This TTP is a good pivot to look for more suspicious process and command-line that runs before and after this execution. This may help you to find possible downloaded malware or other lolbin execution.
how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product
annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
known_false_positives = Not known at this moment.
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Computer Account Created by Computer Account - Rule]
type = detection
asset_type = Endpoint
@@ -7235,6 +7345,16 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exp
known_false_positives = Unknown
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Execute Arbitrary Commands with MSDT - Rule]
type = detection
asset_type = Endpoint
confidence = medium
explanation = The following analytic identifies a recently disclosed arbitraty command execution using Windows msdt.exe - a Diagnostics Troubleshooting Wizard. The sample identified will use the ms-msdt:/ protocol handler to load msdt.exe to retrieve a remote payload. During triage, review file modifications for html. Identify parallel process execution that may be related, including an Office Product.
how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.
annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
known_false_positives = False positives may be present, filter as needed. Added .xml to potentially capture any answer file usage. Remove as needed.
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows File Without Extension In Critical Folder - Rule]
type = detection
asset_type = Endpoint
@@ -7485,6 +7605,16 @@ annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": [
known_false_positives = False positives will occur based on legitimate application requests, filter based on source image as needed.
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Office Product Spawning MSDT - Rule]
type = detection
asset_type = Endpoint
confidence = medium
explanation = The following analytic identifies a Microsoft Office product spawning the Windows msdt.exe process. MSDT is a Diagnostics Troubleshooting Wizard native to Windows. This behavior is related to a recently identified sample utilizing protocol handlers to evade preventative controls, including if macros are disabled in the document. During triage, review file modifications for html. In addition, parallel processes including PowerShell and CertUtil.
how_to_implement = how To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.
annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
known_false_positives = False positives should be limited, however filter as needed.
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Possible Credential Dumping - Rule]
type = detection
asset_type = Endpoint
@@ -9059,6 +9189,26 @@ annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.00
known_false_positives = unknown
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - Splunk Identified SSL TLS Certificates - Rule]
type = detection
asset_type = Proxy
confidence = medium
explanation = The following analytic uses tags of SSL, TLS and certificate to identify the usage of the Splunk default certificates being utilized in the environment. Recommended guidance is to utilize valid TLS certificates which documentation may be found in Splunk Docs - https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/Splunk/8.2.6/Security/AboutsecuringyourSplunkconfigurationwithSSL.
how_to_implement = Ingestion of SSL/TLS data is needed and to be tagged properly as ssl, tls or certificate. This data may come from a proxy, zeek, or Splunk Streams. Splunk SOAR customers can find a SOAR workbook that walks an analyst through the process of running these hunting searches in the references list of this detection. In order to use this workbook, a user will need to run a curl command to post the file to their SOAR instance such as "curl -u username:password https://soar.instance.name/rest/rest/workbook_template -d @splunk_psa_0622.json". A user should then create an empty container or case, attach the workbook, and begin working through the tasks.
annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1040"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
known_false_positives = False positives will not be present as it is meant to assist with identifying default certificates being utilized.
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - Confluence Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution CVE-2022-26134 - Rule]
type = detection
asset_type = Web Server
confidence = medium
explanation = The following analytic assists with identifying CVE-2022-26134 based exploitation utilizing the Web datamodel to cover network and CIM compliant web logs. The parameters were captured from live scanning and the POC provided by Rapid7. This analytic is written against multiple proof of concept codes released and seen in the wild (scanning). During triage, review any endpoint based logs for further activity including writing a jsp file to disk and commands/processes spawning running as root from the Confluence process.
how_to_implement = This detection requires the Web datamodel to be populated from a supported Technology Add-On like Splunk for Apache or Splunk for Nginx. In addition, network based logs or event data like PAN Threat.
annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1505", "T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
known_false_positives = Tune based on assets if possible, or restrict to known Confluence servers. Remove the ${ for a more broad query. To identify more exec, remove everything up to the last parameter (Runtime().exec) for a broad query.
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt - Rule]
type = detection
asset_type = Endpoint
@@ -9251,6 +9401,17 @@ searches = ["ESCU - Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address - Rule", "ESCU - G
description = Keep a careful inventory of every asset on your network to make it easier to detect rogue devices. Unauthorized/unmanaged devices could be an indication of malicious behavior that should be investigated further.
narrative = This Analytic Story is designed to help you develop a better understanding of what authorized and unauthorized devices are part of your enterprise. This story can help you better categorize and classify assets, providing critical business context and awareness of their assets during an incident. Information derived from this Analytic Story can be used to better inform and support other analytic stories. For successful detection, you will need to leverage the Assets and Identity Framework from Enterprise Security to populate your known assets.
[analytic_story://Atlassian Confluence Server and Data Center CVE-2022-26134]
category = Adversary Tactics
last_updated = 2022-06-03
version = 1
references = ["https://confluence.atlassian.com/doc/confluence-security-advisory-2022-06-02-1130377146.html", "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/atlassian-confluence-vulnerability-cve-2022-26134.html", "https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2022/06/02/active-exploitation-of-confluence-cve-2022-26134/", "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2022/06/02/zero-day-exploitation-of-atlassian-confluence/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Java Writing JSP File - Rule", "ESCU - Confluence Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution CVE-2022-26134 - Rule"]
description = On June 2, security researchers at Volexity published a blog outlining the discovery of an unauthenticated remote code execution zero day vulnerability (CVE-2022-26134) being actively exploited in Atlassian Confluence Server and Data Center instances in the wild. Atlassian released a fix within 24 hours of the blog''s release.
narrative = Atlassian describes the vulnerability as an Object-Graph Navigation Language (OGNL) injection allowing an unauthenticated user to execute arbitrary code on a Confluence Server or Data Server instance. Volexity did not release proof-of-concept (POC) exploit code, but researchers there have observed coordinated, widespread exploitation. Volexity first discovered the vulnerability over the weekend on two Internet-facing web servers running Confluence Server software. The investigation was due to suspicious activity on the hosts, including JSP webshells that were written to disk.
[analytic_story://AWS Cross Account Activity]
category = Cloud Security
last_updated = 2018-06-04
@@ -10089,6 +10250,17 @@ description = CVE-2021-40444 is a remote code execution vulnerability in MSHTML,
narrative = Microsoft is aware of targeted attacks that attempt to exploit this vulnerability, CVE-2021-40444 by using specially-crafted Microsoft Office documents. MSHTML is a software component used to render web pages on Windows. Although it is 2019s most commonly associated with Internet Explorer, it is also used in other software. CVE-2021-40444 received a CVSS score of 8.8 out of 10. MSHTML is the beating heart of Internet Explorer, the vulnerability also exists in that browser. Although given its limited use, there is little risk of infection by that vector. Microsoft Office applications use the MSHTML component to display web content in Office documents. The attack depends on MSHTML loading a specially crafted ActiveX control when the target opens a malicious Office document. The loaded ActiveX control can then run arbitrary code to infect the system with more malware. At the moment all supported Windows versions are vulnerable. Since there is no patch available yet, Microsoft proposes a few methods to block these attacks. \
1. Disable the installation of all ActiveX controls in Internet Explorer via the registry. Previously-installed ActiveX controls will still run, but no new ones will be added, including malicious ones. Open documents from the Internet in Protected View or Application Guard for Office, both of which prevent the current attack. This is a default setting but it may have been changed.
[analytic_story://Microsoft Support Diagnostic Tool Vulnerability CVE-2022-30190]
category = Adversary Tactics
last_updated = 2022-05-31
version = 1
references = ["https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2022/05/30/guidance-for-cve-2022-30190-microsoft-support-diagnostic-tool-vulnerability/", "https://isc.sans.edu/diary/rss/28694", "https://doublepulsar.com/follina-a-microsoft-office-code-execution-vulnerability-1a47fce5629e", "https://twitter.com/nao_sec/status/1530196847679401984?s=20\u0026t=ZiXYI4dQuA-0_dzQzSUb3A", "https://app.any.run/tasks/713f05d2-fe78-4b9d-a744-f7c133e3fafb/", "https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/4a24048f81afbe9fb62e7a6a49adbd1faf41f266b5f9feecdceb567aec096784/detection", "https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/msdt.exe-152D4C9F63EFB332CCB134C6953C0104.html"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Windows Command and Scripting Interpreter Hunting Path Traversal - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Command and Scripting Interpreter Path Traversal Exec - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Execute Arbitrary Commands with MSDT - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Office Product Spawning MSDT - Rule"]
description = On Monday May 30, 2022, Microsoft issued CVE-2022-30190 regarding the Microsoft Support Diagnostic Tool (MSDT) in Windows vulnerability.
narrative = A remote code execution vulnerability exists when MSDT is called using the URL protocol from a calling application such as Word. An attacker who successfully exploits this vulnerability can run arbitrary code with the privileges of the calling application. The attacker can then install programs, view, change, or delete data, or create new accounts in the context allowed by the user''s rights.
[analytic_story://Monitor for Updates]
category = Best Practices
last_updated = 2017-09-15
@@ -10397,7 +10569,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/spear-phishing-campaign-targets-ukraine-government.html"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Splunk Research Team"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Excel Spawning PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Excel Spawning Windows Script Host - Rule", "ESCU - MSHTML Module Load in Office Product - Rule", "ESCU - Office Application Spawn rundll32 process - Rule", "ESCU - Office Document Creating Schedule Task - Rule", "ESCU - Office Document Executing Macro Code - Rule", "ESCU - Office Document Spawned Child Process To Download - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning BITSAdmin - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning CertUtil - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning MSHTA - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning Rundll32 with no DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning Wmic - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Writing cab or inf - Rule", "ESCU - Office Spawning Control - Rule", "ESCU - Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location - Rule", "ESCU - Windows ISO LNK File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Winword Spawning Cmd - Rule", "ESCU - Winword Spawning PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Gdrive suspicious file sharing - Rule", "ESCU - Gsuite suspicious calendar invite - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outlook exe writing a zip file - Rule"]
searches = ["ESCU - Excel Spawning PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Excel Spawning Windows Script Host - Rule", "ESCU - MSHTML Module Load in Office Product - Rule", "ESCU - Office Application Spawn rundll32 process - Rule", "ESCU - Office Document Creating Schedule Task - Rule", "ESCU - Office Document Executing Macro Code - Rule", "ESCU - Office Document Spawned Child Process To Download - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning BITSAdmin - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning CertUtil - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning MSHTA - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning Rundll32 with no DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning Wmic - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Writing cab or inf - Rule", "ESCU - Office Spawning Control - Rule", "ESCU - Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location - Rule", "ESCU - Windows ISO LNK File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Office Product Spawning MSDT - Rule", "ESCU - Winword Spawning Cmd - Rule", "ESCU - Winword Spawning PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Gdrive suspicious file sharing - Rule", "ESCU - Gsuite suspicious calendar invite - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outlook exe writing a zip file - Rule"]
description = Detect signs of malicious payloads that may indicate that your environment has been breached via a phishing attack.
narrative = Despite its simplicity, phishing remains the most pervasive and dangerous cyberthreat. In fact, research shows that as many as [91% of all successful attacks](https://digitalguardian.com/blog/91-percent-cyber-attacks-start-phishing-email-heres-how-protect-against-phishing) are initiated via a phishing email. \
As most people know, these emails use fraudulent domains, [email scraping](https://www.cyberscoop.com/emotet-trojan-phishing-scraping-templates-cofense-geodo/), familiar contact names inserted as senders, and other tactics to lure targets into clicking a malicious link, opening an attachment with a [nefarious payload](https://www.cyberscoop.com/emotet-trojan-phishing-scraping-templates-cofense-geodo/), or entering sensitive personal information that perpetrators may intercept. This attack technique requires a relatively low level of skill and allows adversaries to easily cast a wide net. Worse, because its success relies on the gullibility of humans, it's impossible to completely "automate" it out of your environment. However, you can use ES and ESCU to detect and investigate potentially malicious payloads injected into your environment subsequent to a phishing attack. \
@@ -10415,7 +10587,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/product-security/announcements.html"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Lou Stella"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Path traversal SPL injection - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk DoS via Malformed S2S Request - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk User Enumeration Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk XSS in Monitoring Console - Rule", "ESCU - Open Redirect in Splunk Web - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure - Rule"]
searches = ["ESCU - Path traversal SPL injection - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk Command and Scripting Interpreter Delete Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk Command and Scripting Interpreter Risky Commands - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk Command and Scripting Interpreter Risky SPL MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk Digital Certificates Infrastructure Version - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk Digital Certificates Lack of Encryption - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk DoS via Malformed S2S Request - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk Protocol Impersonation Weak Encryption Configuration - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk protocol impersonation weak encryption selfsigned - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk protocol impersonation weak encryption simplerequest - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk User Enumeration Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk XSS in Monitoring Console - Rule", "ESCU - Open Redirect in Splunk Web - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk Identified SSL TLS Certificates - Rule"]
description = Keeping your Splunk Enterprise deployment up to date is critical and will help you reduce the risk associated with vulnerabilities in the product.
narrative = This analytic story includes detections that focus on attacker behavior targeted at your Splunk environment directly.
@@ -10800,7 +10972,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Defense_Evasion"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion - Rule", "ESCU - CSC Net On The Fly Compilation - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Registry Tool - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Security Logs Using MiniNt Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Show Hidden Files - Rule", "ESCU - Disable UAC Remote Restriction - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Windows SmartScreen Protection - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling CMD Application - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling ControlPanel - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Firewall with Netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling FolderOptions Windows Feature - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling NoRun Windows App - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling SystemRestore In Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Task Manager - Rule", "ESCU - Eventvwr UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive number of service control start as disabled - Rule", "ESCU - Firewall Allowed Program Enable - Rule", "ESCU - FodHelper UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - NET Profiler UAC bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands - Rule", "ESCU - Sdclt UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - SilentCleanup UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - SLUI RunAs Elevated - Rule", "ESCU - SLUI Spawning a Process - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - UAC Bypass MMC Load Unsigned Dll - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Defender Exclusion Registry Entry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Change Password Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Lock Workstation Feature Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Notification Center - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Windows Group Policy Features Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DISM Remove Defender - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event For Service Disabled - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Excessive Disabled Services Event - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Hide Notification Features Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Show Compress Color And Info Tip Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Process With NamedPipe CommandLine - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Rasautou DLL Execution - Rule", "ESCU - WSReset UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion - Rule", "ESCU - CSC Net On The Fly Compilation - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Registry Tool - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Security Logs Using MiniNt Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Show Hidden Files - Rule", "ESCU - Disable UAC Remote Restriction - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Windows SmartScreen Protection - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling CMD Application - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling ControlPanel - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Firewall with Netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling FolderOptions Windows Feature - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling NoRun Windows App - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling SystemRestore In Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Task Manager - Rule", "ESCU - Eventvwr UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive number of service control start as disabled - Rule", "ESCU - Firewall Allowed Program Enable - Rule", "ESCU - FodHelper UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - NET Profiler UAC bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands - Rule", "ESCU - Sdclt UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - SilentCleanup UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - SLUI RunAs Elevated - Rule", "ESCU - SLUI Spawning a Process - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - UAC Bypass MMC Load Unsigned Dll - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Command and Scripting Interpreter Hunting Path Traversal - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Command and Scripting Interpreter Path Traversal Exec - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Defender Exclusion Registry Entry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Change Password Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Lock Workstation Feature Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Notification Center - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Windows Group Policy Features Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DISM Remove Defender - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event For Service Disabled - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Excessive Disabled Services Event - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Hide Notification Features Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Show Compress Color And Info Tip Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Process With NamedPipe CommandLine - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Rasautou DLL Execution - Rule", "ESCU - WSReset UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
description = Detect tactics used by malware to evade defenses on Windows endpoints. A few of these include suspicious `reg.exe` processes, files hidden with `attrib.exe` and disabling user-account control, among many others
narrative = Defense evasion is a tactic--identified in the MITRE ATT&CK framework--that adversaries employ in a variety of ways to bypass or defeat defensive security measures. There are many techniques enumerated by the MITRE ATT&CK framework that are applicable in this context. This Analytic Story includes searches designed to identify the use of such techniques on Windows platforms.
@@ -10827,7 +10999,7 @@ description = Uncover activity consistent with CVE-2020-1350, or SIGRed. Discove
narrative = When a client requests a DNS record for a particular domain, that request gets routed first through the client's locally configured DNS server, then to any DNS server(s) configured as forwarders, and then onto the target domain's own DNS server(s). If a attacker wanted to, they could host a malicious DNS server that responds to the initial request with a specially crafted large response (~65KB). This response would flow through to the client's local DNS server, which if not patched for CVE-2020-1350, would cause the buffer overflow. The detection searches in this Analytic Story use wire data to detect the malicious behavior. Searches for Splunk Stream and Zeek are included. The Splunk Stream search correlates across stream:dns and stream:tcp, while the Zeek search correlates across bro:dns:json and bro:conn:json. These correlations are required to pick up both the DNS record types (SIG and KEY) along with the payload size (>65KB).
[analytic_story://Windows Drivers]
category =
category = Adversary Tactics
last_updated = 2022-03-30
version = 1
references = ["https://redcanary.com/blog/tracking-driver-inventory-to-expose-rootkits/", "https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/22/e/avoslocker-ransomware-variant-abuses-driver-file-to-disable-anti-Virus-scans-log4shell.html", "https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/daxin-backdoor-espionage", "https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/08064459/Equation_group_questions_and_answers.pdf", "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2022/01/11/signed-kernel-drivers-unguarded-gateway-windows-core/"]
dist/escu/default/app.conf
Vendored
+2 -2
View File
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
is_configured = false
state = enabled
state_change_requires_restart = false
build = 7910
build = 8305
[triggers]
reload.analytic_stories = simple
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ reload.es_investigations = simple
[launcher]
author = Splunk
version = 3.40.0
version = 3.43.0
description = Explore the Analytic Stories included with ES Content Updates.
[ui]
dist/escu/default/collections.conf
Vendored
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
#############
# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
# On Date: 2022-05-23T20:35:38 UTC
# On Date: 2022-06-14T13:52:57 UTC
# Author: Splunk Security Research
# Contact: research@splunk.com
#############
dist/escu/default/content-version.conf
Vendored
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
[content-version]
version = 3.40.0
version = 3.43.0
dist/escu/default/es_investigations.conf
Vendored
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
#############
# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
# On Date: 2022-05-23T20:35:38 UTC
# On Date: 2022-06-14T13:52:57 UTC
# Author: Splunk Security Research
# Contact: research@splunk.com
#############
dist/escu/default/macros.conf
Vendored
+67 -3
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
#############
# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
# On Date: 2022-05-23T20:35:38 UTC
# On Date: 2022-06-14T13:52:57 UTC
# Author: Splunk Security Research
# Contact: research@splunk.com
#############
@@ -9,10 +9,46 @@
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[splunk_command_and_scripting_interpreter_delete_usage_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[splunk_command_and_scripting_interpreter_risky_commands_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[splunk_command_and_scripting_interpreter_risky_spl_mltk_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[splunk_digital_certificates_infrastructure_version_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[splunk_digital_certificates_lack_of_encryption_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[splunk_dos_via_malformed_s2s_request_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[splunk_process_injection_forwarder_bundle_downloads_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[splunk_protocol_impersonation_weak_encryption_configuration_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[splunk_protocol_impersonation_weak_encryption_selfsigned_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[splunk_protocol_impersonation_weak_encryption_simplerequest_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[splunk_user_enumeration_attempt_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
@@ -2733,6 +2769,14 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[windows_command_and_scripting_interpreter_hunting_path_traversal_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[windows_command_and_scripting_interpreter_path_traversal_exec_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[windows_computer_account_created_by_computer_account_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
@@ -2833,6 +2877,10 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[windows_execute_arbitrary_commands_with_msdt_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[windows_file_without_extension_in_critical_folder_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
@@ -2925,6 +2973,10 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[windows_office_product_spawning_msdt_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[windows_possible_credential_dumping_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
@@ -3529,6 +3581,14 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[splunk_identified_ssl_tls_certificates_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[confluence_unauthenticated_remote_code_execution_cve_2022_26134_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
@@ -3843,7 +3903,7 @@ definition = "-70m@m"
description = Use this macro to determine how far back you should be checking for new provisioning activities
[printservice]
definition = source="wineventlog:microsoft-windows-printservice/operational" OR sourcetype="WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PrintService/Admin"
definition = source="wineventlog:microsoft-windows-printservice/operational" OR source="WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PrintService/Admin"
description = customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.
[process_bitsadmin]
@@ -4051,12 +4111,16 @@ description = This macro is a list of AWS event names associated with security g
definition = index=signals
description = customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.
[splunk_python]
definition = index=_internal sourcetype=splunk_python
description = customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.
[splunkd]
definition = index=_internal sourcetype=splunkd
description = customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.
[splunkd_failed_auths]
definition = index=_audit action="login attempt" info="failed"
definition = index=_audit "action=login attempt" "info=failed"
description = customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.
[splunkd_web]
dist/escu/default/savedsearches.conf
Vendored
+688 -42
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
#############
# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
# On Date: 2022-05-23T20:35:38 UTC
# On Date: 2022-06-14T13:52:57 UTC
# Author: Splunk Security Research
# Contact: research@splunk.com
#############
@@ -52,6 +52,206 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
is_visible = false
search = `path_traversal_spl_injection` | search "\/..\/..\/..\/..\/..\/..\/..\/..\/..\/" | stats count by status clientip method uri_path uri_query | `path_traversal_spl_injection_filter`
[ESCU - Splunk Command and Scripting Interpreter Delete Usage - Rule]
action.escu = 0
action.escu.enabled = 1
description = The following analytic identifies the use of the risky command - Delete - that may be utilized in Splunk to delete some or all data queried for. In order to use Delete in Splunk, one must be assigned the role. This is typically not used and should generate an anomaly if it is used.
action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
action.escu.data_models = ["Splunk_Audit"]
action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies the use of the risky command - Delete - that may be utilized in Splunk to delete some or all data queried for. In order to use Delete in Splunk, one must be assigned the role. This is typically not used and should generate an anomaly if it is used.
action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search acceleration is recommended against the Search_Activity datamodel that runs against the splunk _audit index. In addition, this analytic requires the Common Information Model App which includes the Splunk Audit Datamodel https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1621/.
action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present if this command is used as a common practice. Filter as needed.
action.escu.creation_date = 2022-05-27
action.escu.modification_date = 2022-05-27
action.escu.confidence = high
action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Splunk Command and Scripting Interpreter Delete Usage - Rule
action.escu.search_type = detection
action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
action.escu.providing_technologies = []
action.escu.analytic_story = ["Splunk Vulnerabilities"]
action.risk = 1
action.risk.param._risk_message = $user$ executed the 'delete' command, if this is unexpected it should be reviewed.
action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 27}]
action.risk.param._risk_score = 0
action.risk.param.verbose = 0
cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Splunk Command and Scripting Interpreter Delete Usage - Rule
action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Splunk Vulnerabilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint"], "cve": ["CVE-2022-32154"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]}
schedule_window = auto
alert.digest_mode = 1
disabled = true
enableSched = 1
allow_skew = 100%
counttype = number of events
relation = greater than
quantity = 0
realtime_schedule = 0
is_visible = false
search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Splunk_Audit.Search_Activity where Search_Activity.search IN ("*| delete*") Search_Activity.search_type=adhoc Search_Activity.user!=splunk-system-user by Search_Activity.search Search_Activity.info Search_Activity.total_run_time Search_Activity.user Search_Activity.search_type | `drop_dm_object_name(Search_Activity)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `splunk_command_and_scripting_interpreter_delete_usage_filter`
[ESCU - Splunk Command and Scripting Interpreter Risky Commands - Rule]
action.escu = 0
action.escu.enabled = 1
description = The Splunk platform contains built-in search processing language (SPL) safeguards to warn you when you are about to unknowingly run a search that contains commands that might be a security risk. This warning appears when you click a link or type a URL that loads a search that contains risky commands. The warning does not appear when you create ad hoc searches. This warning alerts you to the possibility of unauthorized actions by a malicious user. Unauthorized actions include - Copying or transferring data (data exfiltration), Deleting data and Overwriting data. All risky commands may be found here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/Splunk/latest/Security/SPLsafeguards#Commands_that_trigger_the_warninga. A possible scenario when this might occur is when a malicious actor creates a search that includes commands that exfiltrate or damage data. The malicious actor then sends an unsuspecting user a link to the search. The URL contains a query string (q) and a search identifier (sid), but the sid is not valid. The malicious actor hopes the user will use the link and the search will run. During analysis, pivot based on user name and filter any user or queries not needed. Queries ran from a dashboard are seen as adhoc queries. When a query runs from a dashboard it will not show in audittrail logs the source dashboard name. The query defaults to adhoc and no Splunk system user activity. In addition, modify this query by removing key commands that generate too much noise, or too little, and create separate queries with higher confidence to alert on.
action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
action.escu.data_models = ["Splunk_Audit"]
action.escu.eli5 = The Splunk platform contains built-in search processing language (SPL) safeguards to warn you when you are about to unknowingly run a search that contains commands that might be a security risk. This warning appears when you click a link or type a URL that loads a search that contains risky commands. The warning does not appear when you create ad hoc searches. This warning alerts you to the possibility of unauthorized actions by a malicious user. Unauthorized actions include - Copying or transferring data (data exfiltration), Deleting data and Overwriting data. All risky commands may be found here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/Splunk/latest/Security/SPLsafeguards#Commands_that_trigger_the_warninga. A possible scenario when this might occur is when a malicious actor creates a search that includes commands that exfiltrate or damage data. The malicious actor then sends an unsuspecting user a link to the search. The URL contains a query string (q) and a search identifier (sid), but the sid is not valid. The malicious actor hopes the user will use the link and the search will run. During analysis, pivot based on user name and filter any user or queries not needed. Queries ran from a dashboard are seen as adhoc queries. When a query runs from a dashboard it will not show in audittrail logs the source dashboard name. The query defaults to adhoc and no Splunk system user activity. In addition, modify this query by removing key commands that generate too much noise, or too little, and create separate queries with higher confidence to alert on.
action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search acceleration is recommended against the Search_Activity datamodel that runs against the splunk _audit index. In addition, this analytic requires the Common Information Model App which includes the Splunk Audit Datamodel https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1621/. Splunk SOAR customers can find a SOAR workbook that walks an analyst through the process of running these hunting searches in the references list of this detection. In order to use this workbook, a user will need to run a curl command to post the file to their SOAR instance such as "curl -u username:password https://soar.instance.name/rest/rest/workbook_template -d @splunk_psa_0622.json". A user should then create an empty container or case, attach the workbook, and begin working through the tasks.
action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives will be present until properly filtered by Username and search name.
action.escu.creation_date = 2022-05-23
action.escu.modification_date = 2022-05-23
action.escu.confidence = high
action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Splunk Command and Scripting Interpreter Risky Commands - Rule
action.escu.search_type = detection
action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
action.escu.providing_technologies = []
action.escu.analytic_story = ["Splunk Vulnerabilities"]
action.risk = 1
action.risk.param._risk_message = A risky Splunk command has ran by $user$ and should be reviewed.
action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 20}]
action.risk.param._risk_score = 0
action.risk.param.verbose = 0
cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Splunk Command and Scripting Interpreter Risky Commands - Rule
action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Splunk Vulnerabilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 40, "context": ["Source:Endpoint"], "cve": ["CVE-2022-32154"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]}
schedule_window = auto
alert.digest_mode = 1
disabled = true
enableSched = 1
allow_skew = 100%
counttype = number of events
relation = greater than
quantity = 0
realtime_schedule = 0
is_visible = false
search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Splunk_Audit.Search_Activity where Search_Activity.search IN ("*| runshellscript *", "*| collect *","*| delete *", "*| fit *", "*| outputcsv *", "*| outputlookup *", "*| run *", "*| script *", "*| sendalert *", "*| sendemail *", "*| tscolle*") Search_Activity.search_type=adhoc Search_Activity.user!=splunk-system-user by Search_Activity.search Search_Activity.info Search_Activity.total_run_time Search_Activity.user Search_Activity.search_type | `drop_dm_object_name(Search_Activity)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `splunk_command_and_scripting_interpreter_risky_commands_filter`
[ESCU - Splunk Command and Scripting Interpreter Risky SPL MLTK - Rule]
action.escu = 0
action.escu.enabled = 1
description = This detection utilizes machine learning model named "risky_command_abuse" trained from "Splunk Command and Scripting Interpreter Risky SPL MLTK Baseline". It should be scheduled to run hourly to detect whether a user has run searches containing risky SPL from this list https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/Splunk/latest/Security/SPLsafeguards#Commands_that_trigger_the_warninga with abnormally long running time in the past one hour, comparing with his/her past seven days history. This search uses the trained baseline to infer whether a search is an outlier (isOutlier ~= 1.0) or not (isOutlier~= 0.0)
action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 6"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059"], "nist": ["DE.AE"]}
action.escu.data_models = ["Splunk_Audit"]
action.escu.eli5 = This detection utilizes machine learning model named "risky_command_abuse" trained from "Splunk Command and Scripting Interpreter Risky SPL MLTK Baseline". It should be scheduled to run hourly to detect whether a user has run searches containing risky SPL from this list https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/Splunk/latest/Security/SPLsafeguards#Commands_that_trigger_the_warninga with abnormally long running time in the past one hour, comparing with his/her past seven days history. This search uses the trained baseline to infer whether a search is an outlier (isOutlier ~= 1.0) or not (isOutlier~= 0.0)
action.escu.how_to_implement = This detection depends on MLTK app which can be found here - https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/2890/ and the Splunk Audit datamodel which can be found here - https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1621/. Baseline model needs to be built using "Splunk Command and Scripting Interpreter Risky SPL MLTK Baseline" before this search can run. Please note that the current search only finds matches exactly one space between separator bar and risky commands.
action.escu.known_false_positives = If the run time of a search exceeds the boundaries of outlier defined by the fitted density function model, false positives can occur, incorrectly labeling a long running search as potentially risky.
action.escu.creation_date = 2022-05-27
action.escu.modification_date = 2022-05-27
action.escu.confidence = high
action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Splunk Command and Scripting Interpreter Risky SPL MLTK - Rule
action.escu.search_type = detection
action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
action.escu.providing_technologies = []
action.escu.analytic_story = ["Splunk Vulnerabilities"]
action.risk = 1
action.risk.param._risk_message = Abnormally long run time for risk SPL command seen by user $(Search_Activity.user).
action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 20}]
action.risk.param._risk_score = 0
action.risk.param.verbose = 0
cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Splunk Command and Scripting Interpreter Risky SPL MLTK - Rule
action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Splunk Vulnerabilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 6"], "confidence": 40, "context": ["Source:Endpoint"], "cve": ["CVE-2022-32154"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]}
schedule_window = auto
alert.digest_mode = 1
disabled = true
enableSched = 1
allow_skew = 100%
counttype = number of events
relation = greater than
quantity = 0
realtime_schedule = 0
is_visible = false
search = | tstats sum(Search_Activity.total_run_time) AS run_time, values(Search_Activity.search) as searches, count FROM datamodel=Splunk_Audit.Search_Activity WHERE (Search_Activity.user!="") AND (Search_Activity.total_run_time>1) AND (earliest=-1h@h latest=now) AND (Search_Activity.search IN ("*| runshellscript *", "*| collect *","*| delete *", "*| fit *", "*| outputcsv *", "*| outputlookup *", "*| run *", "*| script *", "*| sendalert *", "*| sendemail *", "*| tscolle*")) AND (Search_Activity.search_type=adhoc) AND (Search_Activity.user!=splunk-system-user) BY _time, Search_Activity.user span=1h | apply risky_command_abuse | fields _time, Search_Activity.user, searches, run_time, IsOutlier(run_time) | rename IsOutlier(run_time) as isOutlier, _time as timestamp | where isOutlier>0.5 | `splunk_command_and_scripting_interpreter_risky_spl_mltk_filter`
[ESCU - Splunk Digital Certificates Infrastructure Version - Rule]
action.escu = 0
action.escu.enabled = 1
description = This search will check the TLS validation is properly configured on the search head it is run from as well as its search peers after Splunk version 9. Other components such as additional search heads or anything this rest command cannot be distributed to will need to be manually checked.
action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1587.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
action.escu.data_models = []
action.escu.eli5 = This search will check the TLS validation is properly configured on the search head it is run from as well as its search peers after Splunk version 9. Other components such as additional search heads or anything this rest command cannot be distributed to will need to be manually checked.
action.escu.how_to_implement = The user running this search is required to have a permission allowing them to dispatch REST requests to indexers (the `dispatch_rest_to_indexers` capability) in some architectures. Splunk SOAR customers can find a SOAR workbook that walks an analyst through the process of running these hunting searches in the references list of this detection. In order to use this workbook, a user will need to run a curl command to post the file to their SOAR instance such as "curl -u username:password https://soar.instance.name/rest/rest/workbook_template -d @splunk_psa_0622.json". A user should then create an empty container or case, attach the workbook, and begin working through the tasks.
action.escu.known_false_positives = No known at this time.
action.escu.creation_date = 2022-05-26
action.escu.modification_date = 2022-05-26
action.escu.confidence = high
action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Splunk Digital Certificates Infrastructure Version - Rule
action.escu.search_type = detection
action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
action.escu.providing_technologies = []
action.escu.analytic_story = ["Splunk Vulnerabilities"]
action.risk = 1
action.risk.param._risk_message = $splunk_server$ may not be properly validating TLS Certificates
action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "splunk_server", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 50}]
action.risk.param._risk_score = 0
action.risk.param.verbose = 0
cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Splunk Digital Certificates Infrastructure Version - Rule
action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Splunk Vulnerabilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint"], "cve": ["CVE-2022-32153"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1587.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "splunk_server", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]}
schedule_window = auto
alert.digest_mode = 1
disabled = true
enableSched = 1
allow_skew = 100%
counttype = number of events
relation = greater than
quantity = 0
realtime_schedule = 0
is_visible = false
search = | rest /services/server/info | table splunk_server version server_roles | join splunk_server [| rest /servicesNS/nobody/search/configs/conf-server/ search="sslConfig"| table splunk_server sslVerifyServerCert sslVerifyServerName serverCert] | fillnull value="Not Set" | rename sslVerifyServerCert as "Server.conf:SslConfig:sslVerifyServerCert", sslVerifyServerName as "Server.conf:SslConfig:sslVerifyServerName", serverCert as "Server.conf:SslConfig:serverCert" | `splunk_digital_certificates_infrastructure_version_filter`
[ESCU - Splunk Digital Certificates Lack of Encryption - Rule]
action.escu = 0
action.escu.enabled = 1
description = On June 14th, 2022, Splunk released a security advisory relating to the authentication that happens between Universal Forwarders and Deployment Servers. In some circumstances, an unauthenticated client can download forwarder bundles from the Deployment Server. In other circumstances, a client may be allowed to publish a forwarder bundle to other clients, which may allow for arbitrary code execution. The fixes for these require upgrading to at least Splunk 9.0 on the forwarder as well. This is a great opportunity to configure TLS across the environment. This search looks for forwarders that are not using TLS and adds risk to those entities.
action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1587.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
action.escu.data_models = []
action.escu.eli5 = On June 14th, 2022, Splunk released a security advisory relating to the authentication that happens between Universal Forwarders and Deployment Servers. In some circumstances, an unauthenticated client can download forwarder bundles from the Deployment Server. In other circumstances, a client may be allowed to publish a forwarder bundle to other clients, which may allow for arbitrary code execution. The fixes for these require upgrading to at least Splunk 9.0 on the forwarder as well. This is a great opportunity to configure TLS across the environment. This search looks for forwarders that are not using TLS and adds risk to those entities.
action.escu.how_to_implement = This anomaly search looks for forwarder connections that are not currently using TLS. It then presents the source IP, the type of forwarder, and the version of the forwarder. You can also remove the "ssl=false" argument from the initial stanza in order to get a full list of all your forwarders that are sending data, and the version of Splunk software they are running, for audit purposes. Splunk SOAR customers can find a SOAR workbook that walks an analyst through the process of running these hunting searches in the references list of this detection. In order to use this workbook, a user will need to run a curl command to post the file to their SOAR instance such as "curl -u username:password https://soar.instance.name/rest/rest/workbook_template -d @splunk_psa_0622.json". A user should then create an empty container or case, attach the workbook, and begin working through the tasks.
action.escu.known_false_positives = None at this time
action.escu.creation_date = 2022-05-26
action.escu.modification_date = 2022-05-26
action.escu.confidence = high
action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Splunk Digital Certificates Lack of Encryption - Rule
action.escu.search_type = detection
action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
action.escu.providing_technologies = []
action.escu.analytic_story = ["Splunk Vulnerabilities"]
action.risk = 1
action.risk.param._risk_message = $hostname$ is not using TLS when forwarding data
action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "hostname", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 20}]
action.risk.param._risk_score = 0
action.risk.param.verbose = 0
cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Splunk Digital Certificates Lack of Encryption - Rule
action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Splunk Vulnerabilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint"], "cve": ["CVE-2022-32151"], "impact": 25, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1587.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "hostname", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]}
schedule_window = auto
alert.digest_mode = 1
disabled = true
enableSched = 1
allow_skew = 100%
counttype = number of events
relation = greater than
quantity = 0
realtime_schedule = 0
is_visible = false
search = `splunkd` group="tcpin_connections" ssl="false" | stats values(sourceIp) latest(fwdType) latest(version) by hostname | `splunk_digital_certificates_lack_of_encryption_filter`
[ESCU - Splunk DoS via Malformed S2S Request - Rule]
action.escu = 0
action.escu.enabled = 1
@@ -98,6 +298,166 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
is_visible = false
search = `splunkd` log_level="ERROR" component="TcpInputProc" thread_name="FwdDataReceiverThread" "Invalid _meta atom" | table host, src | `splunk_dos_via_malformed_s2s_request_filter`
[ESCU - Splunk Process Injection Forwarder Bundle Downloads - Rule]
action.escu = 0
action.escu.enabled = 1
description = On June 14th, 2022, Splunk released a security advisory relating to the authentication that happens between Universal Forwarders and Deployment Servers. In some circumstances, an unauthenticated client can download forwarder bundles from the Deployment Server. This hunting search pulls a full list of forwarder bundle downloads where the peer column is the forwarder, the host column is the Deployment Server, and then you have a list of the apps downloaded and the serverclasses in which the peer is a member of. You should look for apps or clients that you do not recognize as being part of your environment.
action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
action.escu.data_models = []
action.escu.eli5 = On June 14th, 2022, Splunk released a security advisory relating to the authentication that happens between Universal Forwarders and Deployment Servers. In some circumstances, an unauthenticated client can download forwarder bundles from the Deployment Server. This hunting search pulls a full list of forwarder bundle downloads where the peer column is the forwarder, the host column is the Deployment Server, and then you have a list of the apps downloaded and the serverclasses in which the peer is a member of. You should look for apps or clients that you do not recognize as being part of your environment.
action.escu.how_to_implement = This hunting search uses native logs produced when a deployment server is within your environment. Splunk SOAR customers can find a SOAR workbook that walks an analyst through the process of running these hunting searches in the references list of this detection. In order to use this workbook, a user will need to run a curl command to post the file to their SOAR instance such as "curl -u username:password https://soar.instance.name/rest/rest/workbook_template -d @splunk_psa_0622.json". A user should then create an empty container or case, attach the workbook, and begin working through the tasks.
action.escu.known_false_positives = None at this time.
action.escu.creation_date = 2022-05-26
action.escu.modification_date = 2022-05-26
action.escu.confidence = high
action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Splunk Process Injection Forwarder Bundle Downloads - Rule
action.escu.search_type = detection
action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
action.escu.providing_technologies = []
action.escu.analytic_story = ["Splunk Vulnerabilites"]
action.risk = 1
action.risk.param._risk_message = $peer$ downloaded apps from $host$
action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "host", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 35}]
action.risk.param._risk_score = 0
action.risk.param.verbose = 0
cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Splunk Process Injection Forwarder Bundle Downloads - Rule
action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Splunk Vulnerabilites"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint"], "cve": ["CVE-2022-32157", "CVE-2022-32158"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "host", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]}
schedule_window = auto
alert.digest_mode = 1
disabled = true
enableSched = 1
allow_skew = 100%
counttype = number of events
relation = greater than
quantity = 0
realtime_schedule = 0
is_visible = false
search = `splunkd` component="PackageDownloadRestHandler" | stats values(app) values(serverclass) by peer, host | `splunk_process_injection_forwarder_bundle_downloads_filter`
[ESCU - Splunk Protocol Impersonation Weak Encryption Configuration - Rule]
action.escu = 0
action.escu.enabled = 1
description = On June 14th, 2022, Splunk released a security advisory relating to TLS validation occuring within the httplib and urllib python libraries shipped with Splunk. In addition to upgrading to Splunk Enterprise 9.0 or later, several configuration settings need to be set. This search will check those configurations on the search head it is run from as well as its search peers. In addition to these settings, the PYTHONHTTPSVERIFY setting in $SPLUNK_HOME/etc/splunk-launch.conf needs to be enabled as well. Other components such as additional search heads or anything this rest command cannot be distributed to will need to be manually checked.
action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1001.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
action.escu.data_models = []
action.escu.eli5 = On June 14th, 2022, Splunk released a security advisory relating to TLS validation occuring within the httplib and urllib python libraries shipped with Splunk. In addition to upgrading to Splunk Enterprise 9.0 or later, several configuration settings need to be set. This search will check those configurations on the search head it is run from as well as its search peers. In addition to these settings, the PYTHONHTTPSVERIFY setting in $SPLUNK_HOME/etc/splunk-launch.conf needs to be enabled as well. Other components such as additional search heads or anything this rest command cannot be distributed to will need to be manually checked.
action.escu.how_to_implement = The user running this search is required to have a permission allowing them to dispatch REST requests to indexers (The `dispatch_rest_to_indexers` capability). Splunk SOAR customers can find a SOAR workbook that walks an analyst through the process of running these hunting searches in the references list of this detection. In order to use this workbook, a user will need to run a curl command to post the file to their SOAR instance such as "curl -u username:password https://soar.instance.name/rest/rest/workbook_template -d @splunk_psa_0622.json". A user should then create an empty container or case, attach the workbook, and begin working through the tasks.
action.escu.known_false_positives = While all of the settings on each device returned by this search may appear to be hardened, you will still need to verify the value of PYTHONHTTPSVERIFY in $SPLUNK_HOME/etc/splunk-launch.conf on each device in order to harden the python configuration.
action.escu.creation_date = 2022-05-25
action.escu.modification_date = 2022-05-25
action.escu.confidence = high
action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Splunk Protocol Impersonation Weak Encryption Configuration - Rule
action.escu.search_type = detection
action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
action.escu.providing_technologies = []
action.escu.analytic_story = ["Splunk Vulnerabilities"]
action.risk = 1
action.risk.param._risk_message = $splunk_server$ may not be properly validating TLS Certificates
action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "splunk_server", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 50}]
action.risk.param._risk_score = 0
action.risk.param.verbose = 0
cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Splunk Protocol Impersonation Weak Encryption Configuration - Rule
action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Splunk Vulnerabilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint"], "cve": ["CVE-2022-32151"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1001.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "splunk_server", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]}
schedule_window = auto
alert.digest_mode = 1
disabled = true
enableSched = 1
allow_skew = 100%
counttype = number of events
relation = greater than
quantity = 0
realtime_schedule = 0
is_visible = false
search = | rest /services/server/info | table splunk_server version server_roles | join splunk_server [| rest /servicesNS/nobody/search/configs/conf-server/ search="PythonSslClientConfig" | table splunk_server sslVerifyServerCert sslVerifyServerName] | join splunk_server [| rest /servicesNS/nobody/search/configs/conf-web/settings | table splunk_server serverCert sslVersions] | rename sslVerifyServerCert as "Server.conf:PythonSSLClientConfig:sslVerifyServerCert", sslVerifyServerName as "Server.conf:PythonSSLClientConfig:sslVerifyServerName", serverCert as "Web.conf:Settings:serverCert", sslVersions as "Web.conf:Settings:sslVersions" | `splunk_protocol_impersonation_weak_encryption_configuration_filter`
[ESCU - Splunk protocol impersonation weak encryption selfsigned - Rule]
action.escu = 0
action.escu.enabled = 1
description = On June 14th 2022, Splunk released vulnerability advisory addresing Python TLS validation which was not set before Splunk version 9. This search displays events showing WARNING of using Splunk issued default selfsigned certificates.
action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1588.004"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
action.escu.data_models = []
action.escu.eli5 = On June 14th 2022, Splunk released vulnerability advisory addresing Python TLS validation which was not set before Splunk version 9. This search displays events showing WARNING of using Splunk issued default selfsigned certificates.
action.escu.how_to_implement = Must upgrade to Splunk version 9 and Configure TLS in order to apply this search. Splunk SOAR customers can find a SOAR workbook that walks an analyst through the process of running these hunting searches in the references list of this detection. In order to use this workbook, a user will need to run a curl command to post the file to their SOAR instance such as "curl -u username:password https://soar.instance.name/rest/rest/workbook_template -d @splunk_psa_0622.json". A user should then create an empty container or case, attach the workbook, and begin working through the tasks.
action.escu.known_false_positives = This searches finds self signed certificates issued by Splunk which are not recommended from Splunk version 9 forward.
action.escu.creation_date = 2022-05-26
action.escu.modification_date = 2022-05-26
action.escu.confidence = high
action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Splunk protocol impersonation weak encryption selfsigned - Rule
action.escu.search_type = detection
action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
action.escu.providing_technologies = []
action.escu.analytic_story = ["Splunk Vulnerabilities"]
action.risk = 1
action.risk.param._risk_message = Splunk default issued certificate at $host$
action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "Hostname", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 40}]
action.risk.param._risk_score = 0
action.risk.param.verbose = 0
cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Splunk protocol impersonation weak encryption selfsigned - Rule
action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Splunk Vulnerabilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint"], "cve": ["CVE-2022-32152"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1588.004"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]}
schedule_window = auto
alert.digest_mode = 1
disabled = true
enableSched = 1
allow_skew = 100%
counttype = number of events
relation = greater than
quantity = 0
realtime_schedule = 0
is_visible = false
search = `splunkd` certificate event_message="X509 certificate* should not be used*" | stats count by host CN component log_level | `splunk_protocol_impersonation_weak_encryption_selfsigned_filter`
[ESCU - Splunk protocol impersonation weak encryption simplerequest - Rule]
action.escu = 0
action.escu.enabled = 1
description = On Splunk version 9 on Python3 client libraries verify server certificates by default and use CA certificate store. This search warns a user about a failure to validate a certificate using python3 request.
action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1588.004"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
action.escu.data_models = []
action.escu.eli5 = On Splunk version 9 on Python3 client libraries verify server certificates by default and use CA certificate store. This search warns a user about a failure to validate a certificate using python3 request.
action.escu.how_to_implement = Must upgrade to Splunk version 9 and Configure TLS host name validation for Splunk Python modules in order to apply this search. Splunk SOAR customers can find a SOAR workbook that walks an analyst through the process of running these hunting searches in the references list of this detection. In order to use this workbook, a user will need to run a curl command to post the file to their SOAR instance such as "curl -u username:password https://soar.instance.name/rest/rest/workbook_template -d @splunk_psa_0622.json". A user should then create an empty container or case, attach the workbook, and begin working through the tasks.
action.escu.known_false_positives = This search tries to address validation of server and client certificates within Splunk infrastructure, it might produce results from accidental or unintended requests to port 8089.
action.escu.creation_date = 2022-05-24
action.escu.modification_date = 2022-05-24
action.escu.confidence = high
action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Splunk protocol impersonation weak encryption simplerequest - Rule
action.escu.search_type = detection
action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
action.escu.providing_technologies = []
action.escu.analytic_story = ["Splunk Vulnerabilities"]
action.risk = 1
action.risk.param._risk_message = Failed to validate certificate on $host$
action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "Hostname", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 40}]
action.risk.param._risk_score = 0
action.risk.param.verbose = 0
cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Splunk protocol impersonation weak encryption simplerequest - Rule
action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Splunk Vulnerabilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint"], "cve": ["CVE-2022-32152"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1588.004"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]}
schedule_window = auto
alert.digest_mode = 1
disabled = true
enableSched = 1
allow_skew = 100%
counttype = number of events
relation = greater than
quantity = 0
realtime_schedule = 0
is_visible = false
search = `splunk_python` "simpleRequest SSL certificate validation is enabled without hostname verification" | stats count by host path | `splunk_protocol_impersonation_weak_encryption_simplerequest_filter`
[ESCU - Splunk User Enumeration Attempt - Rule]
action.escu = 0
action.escu.enabled = 1
@@ -14349,8 +14709,8 @@ action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"]
action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect potential DNS exfiltration using nslookup application. This technique are seen in couple of malware and APT group to exfiltrated collected data in a infected machine or infected network. This detection is looking for unique use of nslookup where it tries to use specific record type (TXT, A, AAAA) that are commonly used by attacker and also the retry parameter which is designed to query C2 DNS multiple tries.
action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances of nslookup.exe may be used.
action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-21
action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-21
action.escu.creation_date = 2022-06-03
action.escu.modification_date = 2022-06-03
action.escu.confidence = high
action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App - Rule
action.escu.search_type = detection
@@ -14378,7 +14738,7 @@ relation = greater than
quantity = 0
realtime_schedule = 0
is_visible = false
search = `sysmon` EventCode = 1 process_name = "nslookup.exe" | bucket _time span=15m | stats count as numNsLookup by Computer, _time | eventstats avg(numNsLookup) as avgNsLookup, stdev(numNsLookup) as stdNsLookup, count as numSlots by Computer | eval upperThreshold=(avgNsLookup + stdNsLookup *3) | eval isOutlier=if(avgNsLookup > 20 and avgNsLookup >= upperThreshold, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_usage_of_nslookup_app_filter`
search = `sysmon` EventCode = 1 process_name = "nslookup.exe" | bucket _time span=1m | stats count as numNsLookup by Computer, _time | eventstats avg(numNsLookup) as avgNsLookup, stdev(numNsLookup) as stdNsLookup, count as numSlots by Computer | eval upperThreshold=(avgNsLookup + stdNsLookup *3) | eval isOutlier=if(numNsLookup > 20 and numNsLookup >= upperThreshold, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_usage_of_nslookup_app_filter`
[ESCU - Excessive Usage Of SC Service Utility - Rule]
action.escu = 0
@@ -17173,20 +17533,20 @@ search = | tstats count from datamodel=Web where Web.http_user_agent="*Java*" We
[ESCU - Java Writing JSP File - Rule]
action.escu = 0
action.escu.enabled = 1
description = The following analytic identifies the process java writing a .jsp to disk. This is potentially indicative of a web shell being written to disk.
description = The following analytic identifies the process java writing a .jsp to disk. This is potentially indicative of a web shell being written to disk. Modify and tune the analytic based on data ingested. For instance, it may be worth running a broad query for jsp file writes first before performing a join.
action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"]
action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies the process java writing a .jsp to disk. This is potentially indicative of a web shell being written to disk.
action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies the process java writing a .jsp to disk. This is potentially indicative of a web shell being written to disk. Modify and tune the analytic based on data ingested. For instance, it may be worth running a broad query for jsp file writes first before performing a join.
action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Filesystem` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.
action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives are possible and filtering may be required. Restrict by assets or filter known jsp files that are common for the environment.
action.escu.creation_date = 2022-04-05
action.escu.modification_date = 2022-04-05
action.escu.creation_date = 2022-06-03
action.escu.modification_date = 2022-06-03
action.escu.confidence = high
action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Java Writing JSP File - Rule
action.escu.search_type = detection
action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
action.escu.providing_technologies = []
action.escu.analytic_story = ["Spring4Shell CVE-2022-22965"]
action.escu.analytic_story = ["Spring4Shell CVE-2022-22965", "Atlassian Confluence Server and Data Center CVE-2022-26134"]
action.risk = 1
action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ writing a jsp file to disk, potentially indicative of exploitation.
action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 42}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}]
@@ -17197,11 +17557,11 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Java Writing JSP File - Rule
action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Spring4Shell CVE-2022-22965"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "cve": ["CVE-2022-22965"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]}
action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Spring4Shell CVE-2022-22965", "Atlassian Confluence Server and Data Center CVE-2022-26134"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "cve": ["CVE-2022-22965"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]}
schedule_window = auto
action.notable = 1
action.notable.param.nes_fields = user,dest
action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies the process java writing a .jsp to disk. This is potentially indicative of a web shell being written to disk.
action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies the process java writing a .jsp to disk. This is potentially indicative of a web shell being written to disk. Modify and tune the analytic based on data ingested. For instance, it may be worth running a broad query for jsp file writes first before performing a join.
action.notable.param.rule_title = Java Writing JSP File
action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint
action.notable.param.severity = high
@@ -17782,13 +18142,13 @@ search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
action.escu = 0
action.escu.enabled = 1
description = The following analytic identifies a suspicious process creation of At application. This process can be used by malware, adversaries and red teamers to create persistence entry to the targeted or compromised host with their malicious code. This anomaly detection can be a good indicator to investigate the event before and after this process execution, when it was executed and what schedule task it will execute.
action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.001", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.002", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"]
action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies a suspicious process creation of At application. This process can be used by malware, adversaries and red teamers to create persistence entry to the targeted or compromised host with their malicious code. This anomaly detection can be a good indicator to investigate the event before and after this process execution, when it was executed and what schedule task it will execute.
action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.
action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can use this application for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.
action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-17
action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-17
action.escu.creation_date = 2022-05-26
action.escu.modification_date = 2022-05-26
action.escu.confidence = high
action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux At Application Execution - Rule
action.escu.search_type = detection
@@ -17805,7 +18165,7 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux At Application Execution - Rule
action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.001", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]}
action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.002", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]}
schedule_window = auto
alert.digest_mode = 1
disabled = true
@@ -18623,8 +18983,8 @@ action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"]
action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for suspicious commandline that modify the iptables firewall setting of a linux machine. This technique was seen in cyclopsblink malware where it modifies the firewall setting of the compromised machine to allow traffic to its tcp port that will be used to communicate with its C2 server.
action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.
action.escu.known_false_positives = administrator may do this commandline for auditing and testing purposes. In this scenario filter is needed.
action.escu.creation_date = 2022-04-30
action.escu.modification_date = 2022-04-30
action.escu.creation_date = 2022-06-03
action.escu.modification_date = 2022-06-03
action.escu.confidence = high
action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Iptables Firewall Modification - Rule
action.escu.search_type = detection
@@ -18652,7 +19012,7 @@ relation = greater than
quantity = 0
realtime_schedule = 0
is_visible = false
search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = "*iptables *" AND Processes.process = "* --dport *" AND Processes.process = "* ACCEPT*" AND Processes.process = "*&amp;&gt;/dev/null*" AND Processes.process = "* tcp *" AND NOT(Processes.parent_process_path IN("/bin/*", "/lib/*", "/usr/bin/*", "/sbin/*")) by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path Processes.process_path | rex field=Processes.process "--dport (?<port>3269|636|989|994|995|8443)" | stats values(Processes.process) as processes_exec values(port) as ports values(Processes.process_guid) as guids values(Processes.process_id) as pids dc(port) as port_count count by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_id Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_path Processes.process_path firstTime lastTime | where port_count >=3 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_iptables_firewall_modification_filter`
search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = "*iptables *" AND Processes.process = "* --dport *" AND Processes.process = "* ACCEPT*" AND Processes.process = "*&amp;&gt;/dev/null*" AND Processes.process = "* tcp *" AND NOT(Processes.parent_process_path IN("/bin/*", "/lib/*", "/usr/bin/*", "/sbin/*")) by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.dest _time span=10s Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path Processes.process_path | rex field=Processes.process "--dport (?<port>3269|636|989|994|995|8443)" | stats values(Processes.process) as processes_exec values(port) as ports values(Processes.process_guid) as guids values(Processes.process_id) as pids dc(port) as port_count count by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_id Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_path Processes.process_path | where port_count >=3 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_iptables_firewall_modification_filter`
[ESCU - Linux Java Spawning Shell - Rule]
action.escu = 0
@@ -18950,13 +19310,13 @@ search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
action.escu = 0
action.escu.enabled = 1
description = This analytic looks for suspicious commandline that may use to append user entry to /etc/at.allow or /etc/at.deny. These 2 files are commonly abused by malware, adversaries or red teamers to persist on the targeted or compromised host. These config file can restrict user that can only execute at application (another schedule task application in linux). attacker can create a user or add the compromised username to that config file to execute at to schedule it malicious code. This anomaly detection can be a good indicator to investigate further the entry in created config file and who created it to verify if it is a false positive.
action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.001", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.002", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"]
action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for suspicious commandline that may use to append user entry to /etc/at.allow or /etc/at.deny. These 2 files are commonly abused by malware, adversaries or red teamers to persist on the targeted or compromised host. These config file can restrict user that can only execute at application (another schedule task application in linux). attacker can create a user or add the compromised username to that config file to execute at to schedule it malicious code. This anomaly detection can be a good indicator to investigate further the entry in created config file and who created it to verify if it is a false positive.
action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.
action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can use this commandline for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.
action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-17
action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-17
action.escu.creation_date = 2022-05-26
action.escu.modification_date = 2022-05-26
action.escu.confidence = high
action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Possible Append Command To At Allow Config File - Rule
action.escu.search_type = detection
@@ -18973,7 +19333,7 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Possible Append Command To At Allow Config File - Rule
action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.001", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]}
action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.002", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]}
schedule_window = auto
alert.digest_mode = 1
disabled = true
@@ -19912,13 +20272,13 @@ search = `osquery` name=es_process_events columns.cmdline IN ("find*", "crontab*
action.escu = 0
action.escu.enabled = 1
description = Detect usage of plutil to modify plist files. Adversaries can modiy plist files to executed binaries or add command line arguments. Plist files in auto-run locations are executed upon user logon or system startup.
action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.011"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1647"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"]
action.escu.eli5 = Detect usage of plutil to modify plist files. Adversaries can modiy plist files to executed binaries or add command line arguments. Plist files in auto-run locations are executed upon user logon or system startup.
action.escu.how_to_implement = This detection uses osquery and endpoint security on MacOS. Follow the link in references, which describes how to setup process auditing in MacOS with endpoint security and osquery.
action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators using plutil to change plist files.
action.escu.creation_date = 2022-03-29
action.escu.modification_date = 2022-03-29
action.escu.creation_date = 2022-05-26
action.escu.modification_date = 2022-05-26
action.escu.confidence = high
action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - MacOS plutil - Rule
action.escu.search_type = detection
@@ -19935,7 +20295,7 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - MacOS plutil - Rule
action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Living Off The Land"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.011"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "process", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]}
action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Living Off The Land"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1647"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "process", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]}
schedule_window = auto
action.notable = 1
action.notable.param.nes_fields = user,dest
@@ -20635,8 +20995,8 @@ action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"]
action.escu.eli5 = The following detection identifies the module load of mshtml.dll into an Office product. This behavior has been related to CVE-2021-40444, whereas the malicious document will load ActiveX, which activates the MSHTML component. The vulnerability resides in the MSHTML component. During triage, identify parallel processes and capture any file modifications for analysis.
action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process names and image loads from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.
action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited false positives will be present, however, tune as necessary.
action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-09
action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-09
action.escu.creation_date = 2022-06-01
action.escu.modification_date = 2022-06-01
action.escu.confidence = high
action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - MSHTML Module Load in Office Product - Rule
action.escu.search_type = detection
@@ -20670,7 +21030,7 @@ relation = greater than
quantity = 0
realtime_schedule = 0
is_visible = false
search = `sysmon` EventID=7 process_name IN ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe","wordpad.exe","wordview.exe") ImageLoaded IN ("*\\mshtml.dll", "*\\Microsoft.mshtml.dll","*\\IE.Interop.MSHTML.dll","*\\MshtmlDac.dll","*\\MshtmlDed.dll","*\\MshtmlDer.dll") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, process_name, ImageLoaded, OriginalFileName, process_id | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `mshtml_module_load_in_office_product_filter`
search = `sysmon` EventID=7 process_name IN ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe","wordpad.exe","wordview.exe") ImageLoaded IN ("*\\mshtml.dll", "*\\Microsoft.mshtml.dll","*\\IE.Interop.MSHTML.dll","*\\MshtmlDac.dll","*\\MshtmlDed.dll","*\\MshtmlDer.dll") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, process_name, ImageLoaded, OriginalFileName, ProcessGuid | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `mshtml_module_load_in_office_product_filter`
[ESCU - MSI Module Loaded by Non-System Binary - Rule]
action.escu = 0
@@ -27245,7 +27605,7 @@ relation = greater than
quantity = 0
realtime_schedule = 0
is_visible = false
search = `sysmon` EventCode=7 Image ="*\\spoolsv.exe" ImageLoaded="*\\Windows\\System32\\spool\\drivers\\x64\\*" ImageLoaded = "*.dll" | stats dc(ImageLoaded) as countImgloaded values(ImageLoaded) as ImgLoaded count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image Computer process_id EventCode | where countImgloaded >= 3 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `spoolsv_suspicious_loaded_modules_filter`
search = `sysmon` EventCode=7 Image ="*\\spoolsv.exe" ImageLoaded="*\\Windows\\System32\\spool\\drivers\\x64\\*" ImageLoaded = "*.dll" | stats dc(ImageLoaded) as countImgloaded values(ImageLoaded) as ImgLoaded count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image Computer ProcessId EventCode | where countImgloaded >= 3 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `spoolsv_suspicious_loaded_modules_filter`
[ESCU - Spoolsv Suspicious Process Access - Rule]
action.escu = 0
@@ -28305,8 +28665,8 @@ action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"]
action.escu.eli5 = This analytic identifies a process making a DNS query to Discord, a well known instant messaging and digital distribution platform. Discord can be abused by adversaries, as seen in the WhisperGate campaign, to host and download malicious. external files. A process resolving a Discord DNS name could be an indicator of malware trying to download files from Discord for further execution.
action.escu.how_to_implement = his detection relies on sysmon logs with the Event ID 22, DNS Query.
action.escu.known_false_positives = Noise and false positive can be seen if the following instant messaging is allowed to use within corporate network. In this case, a filter is needed.
action.escu.creation_date = 2022-01-19
action.escu.modification_date = 2022-01-19
action.escu.creation_date = 2022-06-01
action.escu.modification_date = 2022-06-01
action.escu.confidence = high
action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious Process With Discord DNS Query - Rule
action.escu.search_type = detection
@@ -28334,7 +28694,7 @@ relation = greater than
quantity = 0
realtime_schedule = 0
is_visible = false
search = `sysmon` EventCode=22 QueryName IN ("*discord*") process_path != "*\\AppData\\Local\\Discord\\*" AND process_path != "*\\Program Files*" AND process_name != "discord.exe" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image QueryName QueryStatus process_name QueryResults Computer process_path | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_process_with_discord_dns_query_filter`
search = `sysmon` EventCode=22 QueryName IN ("*discord*") Image != "*\\AppData\\Local\\Discord\\*" AND Image != "*\\Program Files*" AND Image != "discord.exe" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image QueryName QueryStatus process_name QueryResults Computer | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_process_with_discord_dns_query_filter`
[ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule]
action.escu = 0
@@ -29470,9 +29830,9 @@ action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Ob
action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"]
action.escu.eli5 = Attackers often disable security tools to avoid detection. This search looks for the usage of process `fltMC.exe` to unload a Sysmon Driver that will stop sysmon from collecting the data.
action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. This search is also shipped with `unload_sysmon_filter_driver_filter` macro, update this macro to filter out false positives.
action.escu.known_false_positives =
action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-22
action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-22
action.escu.known_false_positives = Unknown at the moment
action.escu.creation_date = 2022-06-01
action.escu.modification_date = 2022-06-01
action.escu.confidence = high
action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Unload Sysmon Filter Driver - Rule
action.escu.search_type = detection
@@ -29961,8 +30321,8 @@ action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"]
action.escu.eli5 = this search is designed to detect suspicious wermgr.exe process that tries to connect to known IP web services. This technique is know for trickbot and other trojan spy malware to recon the infected machine and look for its ip address without so much finger print on the commandline process. Since wermgr.exe is designed for error handling process of windows it is really suspicious that this process is trying to connect to this IP web services cause that maybe cause of some malicious code injection.
action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, dns query name process path , and query ststus from your endpoints like EventCode 22. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 12 of the Sysmon TA.
action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-19
action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-19
action.escu.creation_date = 2022-06-01
action.escu.modification_date = 2022-06-01
action.escu.confidence = high
action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Wermgr Process Connecting To IP Check Web Services - Rule
action.escu.search_type = detection
@@ -29996,7 +30356,7 @@ relation = greater than
quantity = 0
realtime_schedule = 0
is_visible = false
search = `sysmon` EventCode =22 process_name = wermgr.exe QueryName IN ("*wtfismyip.com", "*checkip.amazonaws.com", "*ipecho.net", "*ipinfo.io", "*api.ipify.org", "*icanhazip.com", "*ip.anysrc.com","*api.ip.sb", "ident.me", "www.myexternalip.com", "*zen.spamhaus.org", "*cbl.abuseat.org", "*b.barracudacentral.org","*dnsbl-1.uceprotect.net", "*spam.dnsbl.sorbs.net") | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by process_path process_name process_id QueryName QueryStatus QueryResults Computer EventCode | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wermgr_process_connecting_to_ip_check_web_services_filter`
search = `sysmon` EventCode =22 process_name = wermgr.exe QueryName IN ("*wtfismyip.com", "*checkip.amazonaws.com", "*ipecho.net", "*ipinfo.io", "*api.ipify.org", "*icanhazip.com", "*ip.anysrc.com","*api.ip.sb", "ident.me", "www.myexternalip.com", "*zen.spamhaus.org", "*cbl.abuseat.org", "*b.barracudacentral.org","*dnsbl-1.uceprotect.net", "*spam.dnsbl.sorbs.net") | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Image process_name ProcessId QueryName QueryStatus QueryResults Computer EventCode | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wermgr_process_connecting_to_ip_check_web_services_filter`
[ESCU - Wermgr Process Create Executable File - Rule]
action.escu = 0
@@ -30182,6 +30542,92 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
is_visible = false
search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process="* -f *" OR Processes.process="* -b *") AND (Processes.process=*objectcategory* OR Processes.process="* -gcb *" OR Processes.process="* -sc *") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_adfind_exe_filter`
[ESCU - Windows Command and Scripting Interpreter Hunting Path Traversal - Rule]
action.escu = 0
action.escu.enabled = 1
description = The following analytic identifies path traversal command-line execution and should be used to tune and driver other more higher fidelity analytics. This technique was seen in malicious document that execute malicious code using msdt.exe and path traversal technique that serve as defense evasion. This Hunting query is a good pivot to look for possible suspicious process and command-line that runs execute path traversal technique to run malicious code. This may help you to find possible downloaded malware or other lolbin execution.
action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"]
action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies path traversal command-line execution and should be used to tune and driver other more higher fidelity analytics. This technique was seen in malicious document that execute malicious code using msdt.exe and path traversal technique that serve as defense evasion. This Hunting query is a good pivot to look for possible suspicious process and command-line that runs execute path traversal technique to run malicious code. This may help you to find possible downloaded malware or other lolbin execution.
action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product
action.escu.known_false_positives = false positive may vary depends on the score you want to check. The bigger number of path traversal string count the better.
action.escu.creation_date = 2022-06-01
action.escu.modification_date = 2022-06-01
action.escu.confidence = high
action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Command and Scripting Interpreter Hunting Path Traversal - Rule
action.escu.search_type = detection
action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
action.escu.providing_technologies = []
action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Microsoft Support Diagnostic Tool Vulnerability CVE-2022-30190"]
action.risk = 1
action.risk.param._risk_message = A parent process $parent_process_name$ has spawned a child $process_name$ with path traversal commandline $process$ in $dest$
action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 36}]
action.risk.param._risk_score = 0
action.risk.param.verbose = 0
cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Command and Scripting Interpreter Hunting Path Traversal - Rule
action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Microsoft Support Diagnostic Tool Vulnerability CVE-2022-30190"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]}
schedule_window = auto
alert.digest_mode = 1
disabled = true
enableSched = 1
allow_skew = 100%
counttype = number of events
relation = greater than
quantity = 0
realtime_schedule = 0
is_visible = false
search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_hash Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | eval count_of_pattern1 = (mvcount(split(process,"/.."))-1) | eval count_of_pattern2 = (mvcount(split(process,"\.."))-1) | eval count_of_pattern3 = (mvcount(split(process,"\\.."))-1) | eval count_of_pattern4 = (mvcount(split(process,"//.."))-1) | search count_of_pattern1 > 1 OR count_of_pattern2 > 1 OR count_of_pattern3 > 1 OR count_of_pattern4 > 1 | `windows_command_and_scripting_interpreter_hunting_path_traversal_filter`
[ESCU - Windows Command and Scripting Interpreter Path Traversal Exec - Rule]
action.escu = 0
action.escu.enabled = 1
description = The following analytic identifies path traversal command-line execution. This technique was seen in malicious document that execute malicious code using msdt.exe and path traversal technique that serve as defense evasion. This TTP is a good pivot to look for more suspicious process and command-line that runs before and after this execution. This may help you to find possible downloaded malware or other lolbin execution.
action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"]
action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies path traversal command-line execution. This technique was seen in malicious document that execute malicious code using msdt.exe and path traversal technique that serve as defense evasion. This TTP is a good pivot to look for more suspicious process and command-line that runs before and after this execution. This may help you to find possible downloaded malware or other lolbin execution.
action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product
action.escu.known_false_positives = Not known at this moment.
action.escu.creation_date = 2022-06-01
action.escu.modification_date = 2022-06-01
action.escu.confidence = high
action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Command and Scripting Interpreter Path Traversal Exec - Rule
action.escu.search_type = detection
action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
action.escu.providing_technologies = []
action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Microsoft Support Diagnostic Tool Vulnerability CVE-2022-30190"]
action.risk = 1
action.risk.param._risk_message = A parent process $parent_process_name$ has spawned a child $process_name$ with path traversal commandline $process$ in $dest$
action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 90}]
action.risk.param._risk_score = 0
action.risk.param.verbose = 0
cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Command and Scripting Interpreter Path Traversal Exec - Rule
action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Microsoft Support Diagnostic Tool Vulnerability CVE-2022-30190"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]}
schedule_window = auto
action.notable = 1
action.notable.param.nes_fields = user,dest
action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies path traversal command-line execution. This technique was seen in malicious document that execute malicious code using msdt.exe and path traversal technique that serve as defense evasion. This TTP is a good pivot to look for more suspicious process and command-line that runs before and after this execution. This may help you to find possible downloaded malware or other lolbin execution.
action.notable.param.rule_title = Windows Command and Scripting Interpreter Path Traversal Exec
action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint
action.notable.param.severity = high
alert.digest_mode = 1
disabled = true
enableSched = 1
allow_skew = 100%
counttype = number of events
relation = greater than
quantity = 0
realtime_schedule = 0
is_visible = false
search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process="*\/..\/..\/..\/*" OR Processes.process="*\\..\\..\\..\\*" OR Processes.process="*\/\/..\/\/..\/\/..\/\/*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_hash | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_command_and_scripting_interpreter_path_traversal_exec_filter`
[ESCU - Windows Computer Account Created by Computer Account - Rule]
action.escu = 0
action.escu.enabled = 1
@@ -31290,6 +31736,52 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
is_visible = false
search = `wineventlog_system` EventCode=7040 Message = "*service was changed from demand start to disabled." | stats count values(Message) as MessageList dc(Message) as MessageCount min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by ComputerName EventCode User Sid | where MessageCount >=10 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_excessive_disabled_services_event_filter`
[ESCU - Windows Execute Arbitrary Commands with MSDT - Rule]
action.escu = 0
action.escu.enabled = 1
description = The following analytic identifies a recently disclosed arbitraty command execution using Windows msdt.exe - a Diagnostics Troubleshooting Wizard. The sample identified will use the ms-msdt:/ protocol handler to load msdt.exe to retrieve a remote payload. During triage, review file modifications for html. Identify parallel process execution that may be related, including an Office Product.
action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"]
action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies a recently disclosed arbitraty command execution using Windows msdt.exe - a Diagnostics Troubleshooting Wizard. The sample identified will use the ms-msdt:/ protocol handler to load msdt.exe to retrieve a remote payload. During triage, review file modifications for html. Identify parallel process execution that may be related, including an Office Product.
action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.
action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present, filter as needed. Added .xml to potentially capture any answer file usage. Remove as needed.
action.escu.creation_date = 2022-05-30
action.escu.modification_date = 2022-05-30
action.escu.confidence = high
action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Execute Arbitrary Commands with MSDT - Rule
action.escu.search_type = detection
action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
action.escu.providing_technologies = []
action.escu.analytic_story = ["Microsoft Support Diagnostic Tool Vulnerability CVE-2022-30190"]
action.risk = 1
action.risk.param._risk_message = A parent process $parent_process_name$ has spawned a child process $process_name$ on host $dest$ possibly indicative of indirect command execution.
action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 100}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 100}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}]
action.risk.param._risk_score = 0
action.risk.param.verbose = 0
cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Execute Arbitrary Commands with MSDT - Rule
action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Microsoft Support Diagnostic Tool Vulnerability CVE-2022-30190"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "cve": ["CVE-2022-30190"], "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]}
schedule_window = auto
action.notable = 1
action.notable.param.nes_fields = user,dest
action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies a recently disclosed arbitraty command execution using Windows msdt.exe - a Diagnostics Troubleshooting Wizard. The sample identified will use the ms-msdt:/ protocol handler to load msdt.exe to retrieve a remote payload. During triage, review file modifications for html. Identify parallel process execution that may be related, including an Office Product.
action.notable.param.rule_title = Windows Execute Arbitrary Commands with MSDT
action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint
action.notable.param.severity = high
alert.digest_mode = 1
disabled = true
enableSched = 1
allow_skew = 100%
counttype = number of events
relation = greater than
quantity = 0
realtime_schedule = 0
is_visible = false
search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=msdt.exe Processes.process IN ("*ms-msdt:/id*","*ms-msdt:-id*","*/id*") AND (Processes.process="*IT_BrowseForFile=*" OR Processes.process="*IT_RebrowseForFile=*" OR Processes.process="*.xml*") AND Processes.process="*PCWDiagnostic*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `windows_execute_arbitrary_commands_with_msdt_filter`
[ESCU - Windows File Without Extension In Critical Folder - Rule]
action.escu = 0
action.escu.enabled = 1
@@ -31655,8 +32147,8 @@ If used by a developer, typically this will be found with multiple command-line
During triage review resulting network connections, file modifications, and parallel processes. Capture any artifacts and review further.
action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and module loads from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.
action.escu.known_false_positives = Typically this will not trigger as by it's very nature InstallUtil does not need credentials. Filter as needed.
action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-12
action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-12
action.escu.creation_date = 2022-06-01
action.escu.modification_date = 2022-06-01
action.escu.confidence = high
action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows InstallUtil Credential Theft - Rule
action.escu.search_type = detection
@@ -31693,7 +32185,7 @@ relation = greater than
quantity = 0
realtime_schedule = 0
is_visible = false
search = `sysmon` EventCode=7 process_name=installutil.exe ImageLoaded IN ("*\\samlib.dll", "*\\vaultcli.dll") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, process_name, ImageLoaded, OriginalFileName, process_id | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_installutil_credential_theft_filter`
search = `sysmon` EventCode=7 process_name=installutil.exe ImageLoaded IN ("*\\samlib.dll", "*\\vaultcli.dll") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, process_name, ImageLoaded, OriginalFileName, ProcessId | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_installutil_credential_theft_filter`
[ESCU - Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path - Rule]
action.escu = 0
@@ -32363,6 +32855,52 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
is_visible = false
search = `sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=*lsass.exe SourceUser!="NT AUTHORITY\\*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, TargetImage, GrantedAccess, SourceImage, SourceProcessId, SourceUser, TargetUser | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_non_system_account_targeting_lsass_filter`
[ESCU - Windows Office Product Spawning MSDT - Rule]
action.escu = 0
action.escu.enabled = 1
description = The following analytic identifies a Microsoft Office product spawning the Windows msdt.exe process. MSDT is a Diagnostics Troubleshooting Wizard native to Windows. This behavior is related to a recently identified sample utilizing protocol handlers to evade preventative controls, including if macros are disabled in the document. During triage, review file modifications for html. In addition, parallel processes including PowerShell and CertUtil.
action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"]
action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies a Microsoft Office product spawning the Windows msdt.exe process. MSDT is a Diagnostics Troubleshooting Wizard native to Windows. This behavior is related to a recently identified sample utilizing protocol handlers to evade preventative controls, including if macros are disabled in the document. During triage, review file modifications for html. In addition, parallel processes including PowerShell and CertUtil.
action.escu.how_to_implement = how To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.
action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives should be limited, however filter as needed.
action.escu.creation_date = 2022-05-30
action.escu.modification_date = 2022-05-30
action.escu.confidence = high
action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Office Product Spawning MSDT - Rule
action.escu.search_type = detection
action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
action.escu.providing_technologies = []
action.escu.analytic_story = ["Spearphishing Attachments", "Microsoft Support Diagnostic Tool Vulnerability CVE-2022-30190"]
action.risk = 1
action.risk.param._risk_message = Office parent process $parent_process_name$ has spawned a child process $process_name$ on host $dest$.
action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 100}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 100}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}]
action.risk.param._risk_score = 0
action.risk.param.verbose = 0
cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Office Product Spawning MSDT - Rule
action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments", "Microsoft Support Diagnostic Tool Vulnerability CVE-2022-30190"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "cve": ["CVE-2022-30190"], "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]}
schedule_window = auto
action.notable = 1
action.notable.param.nes_fields = user,dest
action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies a Microsoft Office product spawning the Windows msdt.exe process. MSDT is a Diagnostics Troubleshooting Wizard native to Windows. This behavior is related to a recently identified sample utilizing protocol handlers to evade preventative controls, including if macros are disabled in the document. During triage, review file modifications for html. In addition, parallel processes including PowerShell and CertUtil.
action.notable.param.rule_title = Windows Office Product Spawning MSDT
action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint
action.notable.param.severity = high
alert.digest_mode = 1
disabled = true
enableSched = 1
allow_skew = 100%
counttype = number of events
relation = greater than
quantity = 0
realtime_schedule = 0
is_visible = false
search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","outlook.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe") Processes.process_name=msdt.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_office_product_spawning_msdt_filter`
[ESCU - Windows Possible Credential Dumping - Rule]
action.escu = 0
action.escu.enabled = 1
@@ -39078,6 +39616,92 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
is_visible = false
search = `stream_http` http_method=POST form_data IN ("*wermgr.exe*","*svchost.exe*", "*name=\"proclist\"*","*ipconfig*", "*name=\"sysinfo\"*", "*net view*") |stats values(form_data) as http_request_body min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by http_method http_user_agent uri_path url bytes_in bytes_out | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `plain_http_post_exfiltrated_data_filter`
[ESCU - Splunk Identified SSL TLS Certificates - Rule]
action.escu = 0
action.escu.enabled = 1
description = The following analytic uses tags of SSL, TLS and certificate to identify the usage of the Splunk default certificates being utilized in the environment. Recommended guidance is to utilize valid TLS certificates which documentation may be found in Splunk Docs - https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/Splunk/8.2.6/Security/AboutsecuringyourSplunkconfigurationwithSSL.
action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1040"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
action.escu.data_models = []
action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic uses tags of SSL, TLS and certificate to identify the usage of the Splunk default certificates being utilized in the environment. Recommended guidance is to utilize valid TLS certificates which documentation may be found in Splunk Docs - https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/Splunk/8.2.6/Security/AboutsecuringyourSplunkconfigurationwithSSL.
action.escu.how_to_implement = Ingestion of SSL/TLS data is needed and to be tagged properly as ssl, tls or certificate. This data may come from a proxy, zeek, or Splunk Streams. Splunk SOAR customers can find a SOAR workbook that walks an analyst through the process of running these hunting searches in the references list of this detection. In order to use this workbook, a user will need to run a curl command to post the file to their SOAR instance such as "curl -u username:password https://soar.instance.name/rest/rest/workbook_template -d @splunk_psa_0622.json". A user should then create an empty container or case, attach the workbook, and begin working through the tasks.
action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives will not be present as it is meant to assist with identifying default certificates being utilized.
action.escu.creation_date = 2022-05-25
action.escu.modification_date = 2022-05-25
action.escu.confidence = high
action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Splunk Identified SSL TLS Certificates - Rule
action.escu.search_type = detection
action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
action.escu.providing_technologies = []
action.escu.analytic_story = ["Splunk Vulnerabilities"]
action.risk = 1
action.risk.param._risk_message = The following $dest$ is using the self signed Splunk certificate.
action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 42}]
action.risk.param._risk_score = 0
action.risk.param.verbose = 0
cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Splunk Identified SSL TLS Certificates - Rule
action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Splunk Vulnerabilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Application Log"], "cve": ["CVE-2022-32151", "CVE-2022-32152"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1040"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]}
schedule_window = auto
alert.digest_mode = 1
disabled = true
enableSched = 1
allow_skew = 100%
counttype = number of events
relation = greater than
quantity = 0
realtime_schedule = 0
is_visible = false
search = tag IN (ssl, tls, certificate) ssl_issuer_common_name=*splunk* | stats values(src) AS "Host(s) with Default Cert" count by ssl_issuer ssl_subject_common_name ssl_subject_organization ssl_subject host sourcetype | `splunk_identified_ssl_tls_certificates_filter`
[ESCU - Confluence Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution CVE-2022-26134 - Rule]
action.escu = 0
action.escu.enabled = 1
description = The following analytic assists with identifying CVE-2022-26134 based exploitation utilizing the Web datamodel to cover network and CIM compliant web logs. The parameters were captured from live scanning and the POC provided by Rapid7. This analytic is written against multiple proof of concept codes released and seen in the wild (scanning). During triage, review any endpoint based logs for further activity including writing a jsp file to disk and commands/processes spawning running as root from the Confluence process.
action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1505", "T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"]
action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic assists with identifying CVE-2022-26134 based exploitation utilizing the Web datamodel to cover network and CIM compliant web logs. The parameters were captured from live scanning and the POC provided by Rapid7. This analytic is written against multiple proof of concept codes released and seen in the wild (scanning). During triage, review any endpoint based logs for further activity including writing a jsp file to disk and commands/processes spawning running as root from the Confluence process.
action.escu.how_to_implement = This detection requires the Web datamodel to be populated from a supported Technology Add-On like Splunk for Apache or Splunk for Nginx. In addition, network based logs or event data like PAN Threat.
action.escu.known_false_positives = Tune based on assets if possible, or restrict to known Confluence servers. Remove the ${ for a more broad query. To identify more exec, remove everything up to the last parameter (Runtime().exec) for a broad query.
action.escu.creation_date = 2022-06-03
action.escu.modification_date = 2022-06-03
action.escu.confidence = high
action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Confluence Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution CVE-2022-26134 - Rule
action.escu.search_type = detection
action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
action.escu.providing_technologies = []
action.escu.analytic_story = ["Atlassian Confluence Server and Data Center CVE-2022-26134"]
action.risk = 1
action.risk.param._risk_message = A URL was requested related to CVE-2022-26134, a unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability, on $dest$ by $src$.
action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 100}, {"risk_object_field": "src", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 100}]
action.risk.param._risk_score = 0
action.risk.param.verbose = 0
cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Confluence Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution CVE-2022-26134 - Rule
action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Atlassian Confluence Server and Data Center CVE-2022-26134"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Scope:Network"], "cve": ["CVE-2022-26134"], "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1505", "T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "IP Address"}, {"name": "src", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "IP Address"}]}
schedule_window = auto
action.notable = 1
action.notable.param.nes_fields = user,dest
action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic assists with identifying CVE-2022-26134 based exploitation utilizing the Web datamodel to cover network and CIM compliant web logs. The parameters were captured from live scanning and the POC provided by Rapid7. This analytic is written against multiple proof of concept codes released and seen in the wild (scanning). During triage, review any endpoint based logs for further activity including writing a jsp file to disk and commands/processes spawning running as root from the Confluence process.
action.notable.param.rule_title = Confluence Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution CVE-2022-26134
action.notable.param.security_domain = network
action.notable.param.severity = high
alert.digest_mode = 1
disabled = true
enableSched = 1
allow_skew = 100%
counttype = number of events
relation = greater than
quantity = 0
realtime_schedule = 0
is_visible = false
search = | tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where Web.url IN ("*${*", "*%2F%7B*") (Web.url="*org.apache.commons.io.IOUtils*" Web.url="*java.lang.Runtime@getRuntime().exec*") OR (Web.url="*java.lang.Runtime%40getRuntime%28%29.exec*") OR (Web.url="*getEngineByName*" AND Web.url="*nashorn*" AND Web.url="*ProcessBuilder*") by Web.http_user_agent Web.http_method, Web.url,Web.url_length Web.src, Web.dest sourcetype | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `confluence_unauthenticated_remote_code_execution_cve_2022_26134_filter`
[ESCU - Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt - Rule]
action.escu = 0
action.escu.enabled = 1
@@ -40730,6 +41354,28 @@ disabled = true
is_visible = false
search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTimeSeen max(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=zoom.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=zoom.us) by Processes.process_name Processes.dest| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | table firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, process_name, dest | inputlookup zoom_first_time_child_process append=t | stats min(firstTimeSeen) as firstTimeSeen max(lastTimeSeen) as lastTimeSeen by process_name, dest | where lastTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), "`previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_forget_window`") | outputlookup zoom_first_time_child_process
[ESCU - Splunk Command and Scripting Interpreter Risky SPL MLTK Baseline]
action.escu = 0
action.escu.enabled = 1
action.escu.search_type = support
action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Splunk Command and Scripting Interpreter Risky SPL MLTK Baseline
description = This search supports an analyst looking for abuse or misuse of the risky commands listed here: https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/Splunk/latest/Security/SPLsafeguards#Commands_that_trigger_the_warning This is accomplished by using the time spent executing one of these risky commands as a proxy for misuse/abuse of interest during investigation and/or hunting. The search builds a model utilizes the MLTK DensityFunction algorithm on Splunk app audit log data. The model uses the past 7 days of user history executing the above referenced commands then aggregates the total search run time for each hour as indicator of user behavior. The model identifies the top 0.1% of user search run time, indicating a risky use of these commands. Users can adjust this threshold 0.1% as interested however this will correlate to missed/false positive rates. This search should be scheduled to run at least every 7 days. The name of machine learning model generated is "risky_command_abuse" and should be configured to be globally shared (not private) in MLTK app as documented here: https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/MLApp/5.3.1/User/Models#Sharing_models_from_other_Splunk_apps unless the same account of training this model will be used to perform inference using this model for anomaly detection.
action.escu.creation_date = 2022-05-27
action.escu.modification_date = 2022-05-27
action.escu.analytic_story = ["Splunk Vulnerabilities"]
action.escu.data_models = ["Splunk_Audit"]
cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
enableSched = 1
dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
schedule_window = auto
action.escu.providing_technologies = []
action.escu.eli5 = This search supports an analyst looking for abuse or misuse of the risky commands listed here: https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/Splunk/latest/Security/SPLsafeguards#Commands_that_trigger_the_warning This is accomplished by using the time spent executing one of these risky commands as a proxy for misuse/abuse of interest during investigation and/or hunting. The search builds a model utilizes the MLTK DensityFunction algorithm on Splunk app audit log data. The model uses the past 7 days of user history executing the above referenced commands then aggregates the total search run time for each hour as indicator of user behavior. The model identifies the top 0.1% of user search run time, indicating a risky use of these commands. Users can adjust this threshold 0.1% as interested however this will correlate to missed/false positive rates. This search should be scheduled to run at least every 7 days. The name of machine learning model generated is "risky_command_abuse" and should be configured to be globally shared (not private) in MLTK app as documented here: https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/MLApp/5.3.1/User/Models#Sharing_models_from_other_Splunk_apps unless the same account of training this model will be used to perform inference using this model for anomaly detection.
action.escu.how_to_implement = The corresponding detection of using this model is "Splunk Command and Scripting Interpreter Risky SPL MLTK". This detection depends on MLTK app which can be found here - https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/2890/ and it assumes Splunk accelerated audit data model is available. For large enterprises, training the model might take significant computing resources. It might require dedicated search head. The underlined machine learning algorithm this detection used is DensityFunction. It might need to increase its settings default values, such as max_fit_time, max_groups, etc. More details of achieving optimal performance and configuring DensityFunction parameters can be found here - https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/MLApp/5.3.1/User/Configurefitandapply Users can modify earliest=-7d@d in the search to other value so that the search can collect enough data points to build a good baseline model. Users can also modify list of risky commands in "Search_Activity.search IN" to better suit users' violation policy and their usage environment.
disabled = true
is_visible = false
search = | tstats sum(Search_Activity.total_run_time) as run_time, count FROM datamodel=Splunk_Audit.Search_Activity WHERE (Search_Activity.user!="") AND (Search_Activity.total_run_time>1) AND (earliest=-7d@d latest=now) AND (Search_Activity.search IN ("*| runshellscript *", "*| collect *","*| delete *", "*| fit *", "*| outputcsv *", "*| outputlookup *", "*| run *", "*| script *", "*| sendalert *", "*| sendemail *", "*| tscolle*")) AND (Search_Activity.search_type=adhoc) AND (Search_Activity.user!=splunk-system-user) BY _time, Search_Activity.user span=1h | fit DensityFunction "run_time" dist=auto lower_threshold=0.000001 upper_threshold=0.001 show_density=true by Search_Activity.user into "risky_command_abuse"
[ESCU - Systems Ready for Spectre-Meltdown Windows Patch]
action.escu = 0
action.escu.enabled = 1
dist/escu/default/transforms.conf
Vendored
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
#############
# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
# On Date: 2022-05-23T20:35:38 UTC
# On Date: 2022-06-14T13:52:57 UTC
# Author: Splunk Security Research
# Contact: research@splunk.com
#############
dist/escu/default/workflow_actions.conf
Vendored
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
#############
# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
# On Date: 2022-05-23T20:35:38 UTC
# On Date: 2022-06-14T13:52:57 UTC
# Author: Splunk Security Research
# Contact: research@splunk.com
#############
dist/escu/lookups/mitre_enrichment.csv
Vendored
+97 -99
View File
@@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ T1584.002,DNS Server,Resource Development,no
T1584.001,Domains,Resource Development,Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|Transparent Tribe|Magic Hound|APT29|APT1
T1583.006,Web Services,Resource Development,APT28|Confucius|LazyScripter|Kimsuky|Magic Hound|IndigoZebra|ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|HAFNIUM|Lazarus Group|Turla|APT32|APT17|APT29
T1583.005,Botnet,Resource Development,no
T1583.004,Server,Resource Development,Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|Gelsemium|GALLIUM|Sandworm Team
T1583.004,Server,Resource Development,Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|GALLIUM|Sandworm Team
T1583.003,Virtual Private Server,Resource Development,Axiom|Dragonfly|HAFNIUM|TEMP.Veles
T1583.002,DNS Server,Resource Development,Axiom
T1584,Compromise Infrastructure,Resource Development,no
@@ -174,9 +174,9 @@ T1546.015,Component Object Model Hijacking,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,APT2
T1071.004,DNS,Command And Control,LazyScripter|Chimera|APT39|Tropic Trooper|OilRig|Ke3chang|Cobalt Group|APT18|APT41|FIN7
T1071.003,Mail Protocols,Command And Control,Turla|Kimsuky|APT32|SilverTerrier|APT28
T1071.002,File Transfer Protocols,Command And Control,Kimsuky|APT41|SilverTerrier|Honeybee
T1071.001,Web Protocols,Command And Control,Kimsuky|Confucius|TeamTNT|FIN8|APT29|Mustang Panda|Windshift|TA551|Higaisa|HAFNIUM|Sidewinder|Chimera|Sandworm Team|TA505|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Inception|APT41|SilverTerrier|APT28|WIRTE|APT33|FIN4|Night Dragon|APT18|APT38|Rancor|Ke3chang|Orangeworm|APT37|APT19|Cobalt Group|Threat Group-3390|Dark Caracal|Turla|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|APT32|OilRig|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon
T1071.001,Web Protocols,Command And Control,Kimsuky|Confucius|TeamTNT|FIN8|APT29|Mustang Panda|Windshift|TA551|Higaisa|HAFNIUM|Sidewinder|Chimera|Sandworm Team|TA505|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Inception|APT41|SilverTerrier|APT28|WIRTE|APT33|FIN4|Night Dragon|APT18|APT38|Dark Caracal|Cobalt Group|Orangeworm|Rancor|Threat Group-3390|Turla|APT19|APT37|Ke3chang|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|OilRig|APT32|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon
T1572,Protocol Tunneling,Command And Control,Leviathan|CostaRicto|Chimera|Fox Kitten|OilRig|Cobalt Group|FIN6
T1048.003,Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol,Exfiltration,Wizard Spider|FIN6|APT32|APT33|Thrip|FIN8|OilRig|Lazarus Group
T1048.003,Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol,Exfiltration,Wizard Spider|FIN6|APT32|APT33|Thrip|FIN8|OilRig|Lazarus Group
T1048.002,Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol,Exfiltration,APT28|APT29
T1048.001,Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol,Exfiltration,no
T1001.003,Protocol Impersonation,Command And Control,Higaisa|Lazarus Group
@@ -189,18 +189,18 @@ T1090.003,Multi-hop Proxy,Command And Control,Leviathan|CostaRicto|APT28|Operati
T1090.002,External Proxy,Command And Control,Tonto Team|APT39|Silence|GALLIUM|MuddyWater|APT3|FIN5|Lazarus Group|menuPass|APT28
T1090.001,Internal Proxy,Command And Control,Lazarus Group|Turla|APT29|Higaisa|Operation Wocao|APT39|Strider
T1102.003,One-Way Communication,Command And Control,Leviathan
T1102.002,Bidirectional Communication,Command And Control,Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|APT28|APT29|Sandworm Team|APT39|APT12|Turla|FIN7|APT37|Magic Hound|Carbanak
T1102.002,Bidirectional Communication,Command And Control,Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|APT28|APT29|Sandworm Team|APT39|APT12|FIN7|Turla|APT37|Magic Hound|Carbanak
T1102.001,Dead Drop Resolver,Command And Control,Rocke|APT41|BRONZE BUTLER|RTM|Patchwork
T1571,Non-Standard Port,Command And Control,WIRTE|Sandworm Team|Rocke|DarkVishnya|Silence|APT-C-36|Magic Hound|APT33|APT32|TEMP.Veles|Lazarus Group|FIN7
T1074.002,Remote Data Staging,Collection,Leviathan|APT28|APT29|Chimera|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|FIN6|Night Dragon|FIN8
T1074.001,Local Data Staging,Collection,Dragonfly|Indrik Spider|BackdoorDiplomacy|Mustang Panda|Sidewinder|Chimera|Kimsuky|APT39|Operation Wocao|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|Patchwork|Honeybee|Dragonfly 2.0|Leviathan|APT3|FIN5|menuPass|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28
T1074.001,Local Data Staging,Collection,Dragonfly|Indrik Spider|BackdoorDiplomacy|Mustang Panda|Sidewinder|Chimera|Kimsuky|APT39|Operation Wocao|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|Honeybee|Patchwork|Leviathan|APT3|FIN5|menuPass|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28
T1078.004,Cloud Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,Ke3chang|APT29|APT28|APT33
T1564.004,NTFS File Attributes,Defense Evasion,APT32
T1564.003,Hidden Window,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|Kimsuky|Nomadic Octopus|Higaisa|Gorgon Group|Deep Panda|DarkHydrus|CopyKittens|APT19|APT32|APT28|APT3|Magic Hound
T1078.003,Local Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,APT29|Kimsuky|HAFNIUM|Turla|Operation Wocao|PROMETHIUM|Tropic Trooper|FIN10|APT32
T1078.002,Domain Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,Naikon|Indrik Spider|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|APT29|TA505|APT3|Threat Group-1314
T1078.001,Default Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,no
T1564.002,Hidden Users,Defense Evasion,Kimsuky|Dragonfly|Dragonfly 2.0
T1564.002,Hidden Users,Defense Evasion,Kimsuky|Dragonfly
T1574.006,Dynamic Linker Hijacking,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,APT41|Rocke
T1574.002,DLL Side-Loading,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,Lazarus Group|Mustang Panda|Higaisa|BlackTech|Sidewinder|Chimera|BRONZE BUTLER|Naikon|APT41|GALLIUM|Tropic Trooper|APT19|Patchwork|APT32|APT3|menuPass|Threat Group-3390
T1574.001,DLL Search Order Hijacking,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,Aquatic Panda|BackdoorDiplomacy|Tonto Team|Evilnum|APT41|Whitefly|RTM|Threat Group-3390|menuPass
@@ -214,10 +214,10 @@ T1574,Hijack Execution Flow,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
T1069.001,Local Groups,Discovery,Tonto Team|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Turla|OilRig|admin@338
T1570,Lateral Tool Transfer,Lateral Movement,Sandworm Team|Chimera|GALLIUM|Operation Wocao|APT32|Wizard Spider|Turla|FIN10
T1568.003,DNS Calculation,Command And Control,APT12
T1204.002,Malicious File,Execution,LazyScripter|WIRTE|Confucius|Dragonfly|Threat Group-3390|Nomadic Octopus|Indrik Spider|APT38|Andariel|Ferocious Kitten|IndigoZebra|Transparent Tribe|Tonto Team|Magic Hound|Ajax Security Team|Mustang Panda|TA551|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Kimsuky|FIN6|PROMETHIUM|APT30|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|RTM|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|Machete|admin@338|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN7|BRONZE BUTLER|Gorgon Group|OilRig|Dark Caracal|Cobalt Group|DarkHydrus|Rancor|Patchwork|APT32|APT19|MuddyWater|Lazarus Group|menuPass|APT37|Leviathan|TA459|APT29|APT28|FIN8|PLATINUM|Elderwood
T1204.001,Malicious Link,Execution,LazyScripter|Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|Confucius|FIN7|Transparent Tribe|APT3|Magic Hound|APT28|APT29|Mustang Panda|Sidewinder|ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|Evilnum|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|Patchwork|Windshift|APT32|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|TA505|OilRig|Machete|Leviathan|FIN8|FIN4|Elderwood|Dragonfly 2.0|Cobalt Group|APT39|Night Dragon|Turla|APT33
T1204.002,Malicious File,Execution,LazyScripter|WIRTE|Confucius|Dragonfly|Threat Group-3390|Nomadic Octopus|Indrik Spider|APT38|Andariel|Ferocious Kitten|IndigoZebra|Transparent Tribe|Tonto Team|Magic Hound|Ajax Security Team|Mustang Panda|TA551|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Kimsuky|FIN6|PROMETHIUM|APT30|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|RTM|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|Machete|admin@338|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|MuddyWater|Rancor|Gorgon Group|OilRig|FIN7|APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|Cobalt Group|APT19|DarkHydrus|Dark Caracal|PLATINUM|menuPass|Leviathan|APT28|APT29|TA459|APT37|Elderwood|FIN8
T1204.001,Malicious Link,Execution,LazyScripter|Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|Confucius|FIN7|Transparent Tribe|APT3|Magic Hound|APT28|APT29|Mustang Panda|Sidewinder|ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|Evilnum|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|Patchwork|Windshift|APT32|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|TA505|OilRig|Machete|Leviathan|FIN8|FIN4|Elderwood|Cobalt Group|APT39|Night Dragon|APT33|Turla
T1195.003,Compromise Hardware Supply Chain,Initial Access,no
T1195.002,Compromise Software Supply Chain,Initial Access,Gelsemium|Threat Group-3390|APT29|Cobalt Group|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Dragonfly|Sandworm Team|APT41
T1195.002,Compromise Software Supply Chain,Initial Access,Threat Group-3390|APT29|Cobalt Group|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Dragonfly|Sandworm Team|APT41
T1195.001,Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools,Initial Access,no
T1568.001,Fast Flux DNS,Command And Control,menuPass|TA505
T1052.001,Exfiltration over USB,Exfiltration,Mustang Panda|Tropic Trooper
@@ -225,16 +225,16 @@ T1569.002,Service Execution,Execution,APT38|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spide
T1569.001,Launchctl,Execution,no
T1569,System Services,Execution,no
T1568.002,Domain Generation Algorithms,Command And Control,TA551|APT41
T1568,Dynamic Resolution,Command And Control,Gamaredon Group|Gelsemium|Transparent Tribe|APT29
T1568,Dynamic Resolution,Command And Control,Gamaredon Group|Transparent Tribe|APT29
T1011.001,Exfiltration Over Bluetooth,Exfiltration,no
T1567.002,Exfiltration to Cloud Storage,Exfiltration,Kimsuky|Threat Group-3390|Confucius|Lazarus Group|FIN7|ZIRCONIUM|HAFNIUM|Chimera|Leviathan|Turla
T1567.001,Exfiltration to Code Repository,Exfiltration,no
T1059.006,Python,Execution,Dragonfly|Tonto Team|APT37|ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|Turla|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|APT29|Rocke|BRONZE BUTLER|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|Machete
T1059.005,Visual Basic,Execution,Confucius|Lazarus Group|LazyScripter|OilRig|APT38|Transparent Tribe|APT29|Mustang Panda|Windshift|Higaisa|Sidewinder|APT39|Machete|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|APT33|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|Rancor|Patchwork|MuddyWater|Honeybee|FIN7|APT37|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|Turla|TA505|Silence|WIRTE|FIN4|Cobalt Group|Gorgon Group|Leviathan|TA459|Magic Hound
T1059.006,Python,Execution,Dragonfly|Tonto Team|APT37|ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|Turla|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|APT29|Rocke|BRONZE BUTLER|APT39|Machete
T1059.005,Visual Basic,Execution,Confucius|Lazarus Group|LazyScripter|OilRig|APT38|Transparent Tribe|APT29|Mustang Panda|Windshift|Higaisa|Sidewinder|APT39|Machete|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|APT33|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|Rancor|Patchwork|MuddyWater|Honeybee|FIN7|APT37|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|Turla|TA505|Silence|WIRTE|FIN4|Gorgon Group|Cobalt Group|Leviathan|TA459|Magic Hound
T1059.004,Unix Shell,Execution,TeamTNT|Rocke|APT41
T1059.003,Windows Command Shell,Execution,Kimsuky|Aquatic Panda|Dragonfly|LazyScripter|Sandworm Team|Nomadic Octopus|TeamTNT|APT29|Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|TA551|Higaisa|Indrik Spider|Chimera|Fox Kitten|Machete|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|FIN6|TA505|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|OilRig|Lazarus Group|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|FIN7|APT41|GALLIUM|Turla|Silence|APT32|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Gorgon Group|Dark Caracal|Ke3chang|Dragonfly 2.0|Rancor|FIN8|APT28|APT37|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|Sowbug|menuPass|FIN10|Threat Group-3390|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Suckfly|Threat Group-1314|APT3|admin@338|APT1
T1059.003,Windows Command Shell,Execution,Kimsuky|Aquatic Panda|Dragonfly|LazyScripter|Sandworm Team|Nomadic Octopus|TeamTNT|APT29|Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|TA551|Higaisa|Indrik Spider|Chimera|Fox Kitten|Machete|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|FIN6|TA505|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|OilRig|Lazarus Group|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|FIN7|APT41|GALLIUM|Turla|Silence|APT32|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Dark Caracal|Ke3chang|Gorgon Group|Rancor|FIN8|APT28|APT37|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|Sowbug|menuPass|FIN10|Threat Group-3390|Gamaredon Group|Suckfly|Patchwork|Threat Group-1314|APT3|admin@338|APT1
T1059.002,AppleScript,Execution,no
T1059.001,PowerShell,Execution,Gamaredon Group|Lazarus Group|Aquatic Panda|Confucius|Dragonfly|LazyScripter|Nomadic Octopus|TeamTNT|APT38|Tonto Team|Mustang Panda|Indrik Spider|HAFNIUM|Sidewinder|Fox Kitten|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|APT39|DarkVishnya|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Inception|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|GALLIUM|TA505|WIRTE|TEMP.Veles|APT33|Gallmaker|Turla|Thrip|Cobalt Group|APT28|DarkHydrus|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|Gorgon Group|TA459|Leviathan|MuddyWater|FIN8|CopyKittens|OilRig|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN7|APT32|menuPass|FIN10|Threat Group-3390|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Poseidon Group|APT3|APT29|Deep Panda
T1059.001,PowerShell,Execution,Gamaredon Group|Lazarus Group|Aquatic Panda|Confucius|Dragonfly|LazyScripter|Nomadic Octopus|TeamTNT|APT38|Tonto Team|Mustang Panda|Indrik Spider|HAFNIUM|Sidewinder|Fox Kitten|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|APT39|DarkVishnya|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Inception|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|GALLIUM|TA505|WIRTE|TEMP.Veles|APT33|Gallmaker|APT19|DarkHydrus|APT28|Turla|Gorgon Group|Thrip|Cobalt Group|Leviathan|MuddyWater|FIN8|TA459|CopyKittens|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|Threat Group-3390|FIN10|APT32|FIN7|menuPass|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Poseidon Group|APT3|APT29|Deep Panda
T1567,Exfiltration Over Web Service,Exfiltration,APT28
T1497.003,Time Based Evasion,Defense Evasion|Discovery,no
T1497.002,User Activity Based Checks,Defense Evasion|Discovery,Darkhotel|FIN7
@@ -242,40 +242,40 @@ T1497.001,System Checks,Defense Evasion|Discovery,Lazarus Group|OilRig|Darkhotel
T1498.002,Reflection Amplification,Impact,no
T1498.001,Direct Network Flood,Impact,no
T1566.003,Spearphishing via Service,Initial Access,Lazarus Group|APT29|Ajax Security Team|Magic Hound|Windshift|FIN6|OilRig|Dark Caracal
T1566.002,Spearphishing Link,Initial Access,Lazarus Group|Confucius|LazyScripter|Transparent Tribe|FIN7|APT3|Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|Sidewinder|Evilnum|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|APT1|Windshift|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|Machete|Kimsuky|TA505|APT39|FIN4|APT32|Night Dragon|APT28|Cobalt Group|Turla|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|Elderwood|APT33|APT29|Leviathan|FIN8|Patchwork|Magic Hound
T1566.001,Spearphishing Attachment,Initial Access,WIRTE|Confucius|Dragonfly|LazyScripter|Threat Group-3390|APT38|Andariel|Ferocious Kitten|IndigoZebra|Transparent Tribe|Nomadic Octopus|Tonto Team|Ajax Security Team|Mustang Panda|TA551|Higaisa|Sidewinder|APT1|FIN6|APT30|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Mofang|Wizard Spider|RTM|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|APT41|Machete|admin@338|Kimsuky|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|Tropic Trooper|DarkHydrus|Lazarus Group|Gorgon Group|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|APT19|APT32|Cobalt Group|Rancor|FIN7|Dragonfly 2.0|MuddyWater|APT28|TA459|APT29|APT37|Leviathan|FIN8|Patchwork|menuPass|Elderwood|PLATINUM
T1566,Phishing,Initial Access,Axiom|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Dragonfly
T1566.002,Spearphishing Link,Initial Access,Lazarus Group|Confucius|LazyScripter|Transparent Tribe|FIN7|APT3|Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|Sidewinder|Evilnum|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|APT1|Windshift|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|Machete|Kimsuky|TA505|APT39|FIN4|APT32|Night Dragon|Cobalt Group|APT28|Turla|OilRig|APT33|Patchwork|Magic Hound|APT29|FIN8|Elderwood|Leviathan
T1566.001,Spearphishing Attachment,Initial Access,WIRTE|Confucius|Dragonfly|LazyScripter|Threat Group-3390|APT38|Andariel|Ferocious Kitten|IndigoZebra|Transparent Tribe|Nomadic Octopus|Tonto Team|Ajax Security Team|Mustang Panda|TA551|Higaisa|Sidewinder|APT1|FIN6|APT30|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Mofang|Wizard Spider|RTM|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|APT41|Machete|admin@338|Kimsuky|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|Tropic Trooper|APT19|Gorgon Group|Cobalt Group|FIN7|Rancor|APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|OilRig|Lazarus Group|DarkHydrus|Patchwork|APT28|Leviathan|menuPass|APT29|FIN8|PLATINUM|Elderwood|APT37|TA459|MuddyWater
T1566,Phishing,Initial Access,Axiom|GOLD SOUTHFIELD
T1565.003,Runtime Data Manipulation,Impact,APT38
T1565.002,Transmitted Data Manipulation,Impact,APT38
T1565.001,Stored Data Manipulation,Impact,APT38
T1565,Data Manipulation,Impact,no
T1564.001,Hidden Files and Directories,Defense Evasion,Transparent Tribe|Mustang Panda|Rocke|APT32|Tropic Trooper|APT28|Lazarus Group
T1564.001,Hidden Files and Directories,Defense Evasion,Transparent Tribe|Mustang Panda|Rocke|APT32|Tropic Trooper|Lazarus Group|APT28
T1564,Hide Artifacts,Defense Evasion,no
T1563.002,RDP Hijacking,Lateral Movement,Axiom
T1563.001,SSH Hijacking,Lateral Movement,no
T1563,Remote Service Session Hijacking,Lateral Movement,no
T1518.001,Security Software Discovery,Discovery,Kimsuky|Aquatic Panda|TeamTNT|APT38|Windshift|Sidewinder|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Turla|Rocke|Frankenstein|The White Company|Cobalt Group|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|Tropic Trooper|FIN8|Patchwork|Naikon
T1069.003,Cloud Groups,Discovery,no
T1069.002,Domain Groups,Discovery,APT29|Dragonfly|Turla|Inception|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|Ke3chang
T1069.002,Domain Groups,Discovery,APT29|Dragonfly|Turla|Inception|OilRig|Ke3chang
T1087.004,Cloud Account,Discovery,APT29
T1087.003,Email Account,Discovery,Sandworm Team|TA505
T1087.002,Domain Account,Discovery,APT29|Lazarus Group|Dragonfly|MuddyWater|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Chimera|Turla|Sandworm Team|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN6|Poseidon Group|Ke3chang
T1087.002,Domain Account,Discovery,APT29|Lazarus Group|Dragonfly|MuddyWater|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Chimera|Turla|Sandworm Team|BRONZE BUTLER|OilRig|menuPass|FIN6|Poseidon Group|Ke3chang
T1087.001,Local Account,Discovery,Chimera|Fox Kitten|Turla|Poseidon Group|OilRig|Ke3chang|APT32|APT1|Threat Group-3390|APT3|admin@338
T1553.004,Install Root Certificate,Defense Evasion,no
T1562.004,Disable or Modify System Firewall,Defense Evasion,Dragonfly|TeamTNT|APT38|APT29|Operation Wocao|Rocke|Lazarus Group|Kimsuky|Dragonfly 2.0|Carbanak
T1562.004,Disable or Modify System Firewall,Defense Evasion,Dragonfly|TeamTNT|APT38|APT29|Operation Wocao|Rocke|Lazarus Group|Kimsuky|Carbanak
T1562.003,Impair Command History Logging,Defense Evasion,APT38
T1562.002,Disable Windows Event Logging,Defense Evasion,Sandworm Team|APT29|Threat Group-3390
T1562.001,Disable or Modify Tools,Defense Evasion,Aquatic Panda|TeamTNT|Indrik Spider|APT29|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|FIN6|Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Rocke|Kimsuky|Turla|Night Dragon|Gorgon Group|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda
T1562,Impair Defenses,Defense Evasion,no
T1003.004,LSA Secrets,Credential Access,Dragonfly|OilRig|MuddyWater|menuPass|Leafminer|Ke3chang|Dragonfly 2.0|APT33|Threat Group-3390
T1003.004,LSA Secrets,Credential Access,Dragonfly|OilRig|MuddyWater|menuPass|Leafminer|Ke3chang|APT33|Threat Group-3390
T1003.005,Cached Domain Credentials,Credential Access,OilRig|MuddyWater|Leafminer|APT33
T1561.002,Disk Structure Wipe,Impact,Sandworm Team|Lazarus Group|APT38|APT37
T1561.001,Disk Content Wipe,Impact,Lazarus Group
T1561,Disk Wipe,Impact,no
T1560.003,Archive via Custom Method,Collection,Mustang Panda|Lazarus Group|Kimsuky|CopyKittens|FIN6
T1560.002,Archive via Library,Collection,Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390
T1560.001,Archive via Utility,Collection,Kimsuky|Aquatic Panda|APT28|APT29|Mustang Panda|HAFNIUM|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Chimera|APT41|GALLIUM|Turla|Gallmaker|APT33|APT39|MuddyWater|Magic Hound|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|CopyKittens|Sowbug|APT3|menuPass|APT1|Ke3chang
T1560,Archive Collected Data,Collection,Axiom|Dragonfly|Leviathan|menuPass|APT32|Honeybee|Patchwork|APT28|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Ke3chang
T1560.001,Archive via Utility,Collection,Kimsuky|Aquatic Panda|APT28|APT29|Mustang Panda|HAFNIUM|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Chimera|APT41|GALLIUM|Turla|Gallmaker|APT33|APT39|MuddyWater|Magic Hound|FIN8|Sowbug|CopyKittens|APT3|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|APT1|Ke3chang
T1560,Archive Collected Data,Collection,Axiom|Dragonfly|Leviathan|menuPass|APT32|APT28|Patchwork|Honeybee|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Ke3chang
T1499.004,Application or System Exploitation,Impact,no
T1499.003,Application Exhaustion Flood,Impact,no
T1499.002,Service Exhaustion Flood,Impact,no
@@ -283,7 +283,7 @@ T1499.001,OS Exhaustion Flood,Impact,no
T1491.002,External Defacement,Impact,Sandworm Team
T1491.001,Internal Defacement,Impact,Gamaredon Group|Lazarus Group
T1114.003,Email Forwarding Rule,Collection,Silent Librarian|Kimsuky
T1114.002,Remote Email Collection,Collection,Kimsuky|Dragonfly|APT29|HAFNIUM|Chimera|APT1|FIN4|Ke3chang|Leafminer|Dragonfly 2.0|APT28
T1114.002,Remote Email Collection,Collection,Kimsuky|Dragonfly|APT29|HAFNIUM|Chimera|APT1|FIN4|Leafminer|Ke3chang|APT28
T1114.001,Local Email Collection,Collection,Chimera|Magic Hound|APT1
T1134.005,SID-History Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
T1134.004,Parent PID Spoofing,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
@@ -295,7 +295,7 @@ T1213.001,Confluence,Collection,no
T1555.003,Credentials from Web Browsers,Credential Access,APT29|Ajax Security Team|ZIRCONIUM|FIN6|Sandworm Team|Inception|Stealth Falcon|OilRig|Leafminer|APT33|APT3|Kimsuky|TA505|MuddyWater|APT37|Patchwork|Molerats
T1555.002,Securityd Memory,Credential Access,no
T1555.001,Keychain,Credential Access,no
T1559.002,Dynamic Data Exchange,Execution,Leviathan|Sidewinder|Sharpshooter|TA505|MuddyWater|Gallmaker|Patchwork|Cobalt Group|APT37|FIN7|APT28
T1559.002,Dynamic Data Exchange,Execution,Leviathan|Sidewinder|Sharpshooter|TA505|MuddyWater|Gallmaker|Cobalt Group|Patchwork|APT37|FIN7|APT28
T1559.001,Component Object Model,Execution,Gamaredon Group|MuddyWater
T1559,Inter-Process Communication,Execution,no
T1558.002,Silver Ticket,Credential Access,no
@@ -309,7 +309,7 @@ T1556,Modify Authentication Process,Credential Access|Defense Evasion|Persistenc
T1056.004,Credential API Hooking,Collection|Credential Access,PLATINUM
T1056.003,Web Portal Capture,Collection|Credential Access,no
T1056.002,GUI Input Capture,Collection|Credential Access,FIN4
T1056.001,Keylogging,Collection|Credential Access,Tonto Team|Ajax Security Team|Operation Wocao|APT32|Sandworm Team|APT39|APT41|Kimsuky|menuPass|FIN4|APT38|OilRig|Ke3chang|PLATINUM|Sowbug|Magic Hound|Group5|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT3|Darkhotel|APT28
T1056.001,Keylogging,Collection|Credential Access,Tonto Team|Ajax Security Team|Operation Wocao|APT32|Sandworm Team|APT39|APT41|Kimsuky|menuPass|FIN4|APT38|Ke3chang|OilRig|PLATINUM|Sowbug|Magic Hound|Group5|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT3|Darkhotel|APT28
T1555,Credentials from Password Stores,Credential Access,APT29|Evilnum|FIN6|APT39|OilRig|MuddyWater|Leafminer|APT33|Stealth Falcon
T1552.005,Cloud Instance Metadata API,Credential Access,TeamTNT
T1003.008,/etc/passwd and /etc/shadow,Credential Access,no
@@ -317,19 +317,19 @@ T1003.007,Proc Filesystem,Credential Access,no
T1003.006,DCSync,Credential Access,APT29|Operation Wocao
T1558.003,Kerberoasting,Credential Access,FIN7|APT29|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider
T1552.006,Group Policy Preferences,Credential Access,APT33
T1003.003,NTDS,Credential Access,Ke3chang|Dragonfly|APT28|Mustang Panda|HAFNIUM|Fox Kitten|menuPass|Wizard Spider|Chimera|FIN6|Dragonfly 2.0
T1003.002,Security Account Manager,Credential Access,Dragonfly|Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390|Ke3chang|GALLIUM|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|menuPass
T1003.001,LSASS Memory,Credential Access,Aquatic Panda|Indrik Spider|HAFNIUM|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Blue Mockingbird|Silence|Threat Group-3390|Leviathan|APT41|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|APT32|Leafminer|Magic Hound|FIN8|PLATINUM|MuddyWater|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN6|APT3|APT28|APT1|Ke3chang|Cleaver
T1003.003,NTDS,Credential Access,Ke3chang|Dragonfly|APT28|Mustang Panda|HAFNIUM|Fox Kitten|menuPass|Wizard Spider|Chimera|FIN6
T1003.002,Security Account Manager,Credential Access,Dragonfly|Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390|Ke3chang|GALLIUM|Night Dragon|menuPass
T1003.001,LSASS Memory,Credential Access,Aquatic Panda|Indrik Spider|HAFNIUM|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Blue Mockingbird|Silence|Threat Group-3390|Leviathan|APT41|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|APT32|Leafminer|Magic Hound|FIN8|MuddyWater|PLATINUM|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN6|APT3|APT28|APT1|Ke3chang|Cleaver
T1110.004,Credential Stuffing,Credential Access,Chimera
T1110.003,Password Spraying,Credential Access,Sandworm Team|APT29|Silent Librarian|Chimera|APT28|APT33|Leafminer|Lazarus Group
T1110.002,Password Cracking,Credential Access,Dragonfly|FIN6|APT41|Dragonfly 2.0|APT3
T1110.002,Password Cracking,Credential Access,Dragonfly|FIN6|APT41|APT3
T1110.001,Password Guessing,Credential Access,APT28
T1021.006,Windows Remote Management,Lateral Movement,APT29|Chimera|Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390
T1021.005,VNC,Lateral Movement,Gamaredon Group|FIN7|Fox Kitten|GCMAN
T1021.004,SSH,Lateral Movement,BlackTech|Lazarus Group|TeamTNT|FIN7|Fox Kitten|Rocke|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|OilRig|menuPass|GCMAN
T1021.003,Distributed Component Object Model,Lateral Movement,no
T1021.002,SMB/Windows Admin Shares,Lateral Movement,APT29|Sandworm Team|APT28|Fox Kitten|APT41|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|APT39|APT32|Orangeworm|FIN8|APT3|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-1314|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang
T1021.001,Remote Desktop Protocol,Lateral Movement,APT29|Dragonfly|Kimsuky|FIN7|Fox Kitten|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|APT3|OilRig|FIN10|menuPass|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|APT1|Axiom
T1021.001,Remote Desktop Protocol,Lateral Movement,APT29|Dragonfly|Kimsuky|FIN7|Fox Kitten|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Cobalt Group|FIN8|OilRig|APT3|menuPass|FIN10|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|APT1|Axiom
T1554,Compromise Client Software Binary,Persistence,no
T1036.006,Space after Filename,Defense Evasion,no
T1036.005,Match Legitimate Name or Location,Defense Evasion,Ke3chang|Kimsuky|Gamaredon Group|WIRTE|APT28|Ferocious Kitten|FIN7|BackdoorDiplomacy|Transparent Tribe|Naikon|APT29|Mustang Panda|Sidewinder|Darkhotel|Lazarus Group|Indrik Spider|Fox Kitten|Machete|Chimera|PROMETHIUM|Rocke|Sandworm Team|APT39|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Silence|APT41|menuPass|TEMP.Veles|MuddyWater|Sowbug|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|Patchwork|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Carbanak|APT1
@@ -338,12 +338,12 @@ T1036.003,Rename System Utilities,Defense Evasion,Lazarus Group|menuPass|APT32|G
T1036.002,Right-to-Left Override,Defense Evasion,Ferocious Kitten|BRONZE BUTLER|BlackTech|Ke3chang|Scarlet Mimic
T1036.001,Invalid Code Signature,Defense Evasion,Windshift|APT37
T1553.003,SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking,Defense Evasion,no
T1553.002,Code Signing,Defense Evasion,Lazarus Group|menuPass|APT29|GALLIUM|Wizard Spider|Kimsuky|PROMETHIUM|Patchwork|Silence|APT41|FIN6|TA505|FIN7|Honeybee|Leviathan|CopyKittens|Winnti Group|Suckfly|Molerats|Darkhotel
T1553.002,Code Signing,Defense Evasion,Lazarus Group|menuPass|APT29|GALLIUM|Wizard Spider|Kimsuky|PROMETHIUM|Patchwork|Silence|APT41|FIN6|TA505|Honeybee|FIN7|Leviathan|CopyKittens|Winnti Group|Suckfly|Molerats|Darkhotel
T1553.001,Gatekeeper Bypass,Defense Evasion,no
T1553,Subvert Trust Controls,Defense Evasion,Axiom
T1027.003,Steganography,Defense Evasion,Andariel|Leviathan|TA551|BRONZE BUTLER|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|APT37
T1027.002,Software Packing,Defense Evasion,Threat Group-3390|Lazarus Group|Sandworm Team|Kimsuky|TeamTNT|ZIRCONIUM|TA505|Rocke|GALLIUM|The White Company|APT39|APT38|Dark Caracal|Elderwood|APT3|Patchwork|APT29|Night Dragon
T1027.001,Binary Padding,Defense Evasion,APT29|Mustang Panda|Higaisa|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|APT32|Leviathan|BRONZE BUTLER|Moafee
T1027.001,Binary Padding,Defense Evasion,APT29|Mustang Panda|Higaisa|Gamaredon Group|APT32|Patchwork|Leviathan|BRONZE BUTLER|Moafee
T1222.002,Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification,Defense Evasion,TeamTNT|Rocke|APT32
T1222.001,Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification,Defense Evasion,Wizard Spider
T1552.004,Private Keys,Credential Access,TeamTNT|APT29|Operation Wocao|Rocke
@@ -354,7 +354,7 @@ T1552,Unsecured Credentials,Credential Access,no
T1216.001,PubPrn,Defense Evasion,APT32
T1070.006,Timestomp,Defense Evasion,APT38|APT29|Chimera|Kimsuky|Rocke|TEMP.Veles|APT32|Lazarus Group|APT28
T1070.005,Network Share Connection Removal,Defense Evasion,Threat Group-3390
T1070.004,File Deletion,Defense Evasion,Aquatic Panda|Dragonfly|TeamTNT|APT39|Mustang Panda|Chimera|Evilnum|Operation Wocao|FIN6|Sandworm Team|Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Wizard Spider|APT41|Kimsuky|Silence|The White Company|TEMP.Veles|APT32|APT38|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Honeybee|Patchwork|menuPass|FIN8|OilRig|FIN5|BRONZE BUTLER|APT3|Magic Hound|Threat Group-3390|APT28|FIN10|Group5|Lazarus Group|APT18|APT29
T1070.004,File Deletion,Defense Evasion,Aquatic Panda|Dragonfly|TeamTNT|APT39|Mustang Panda|Chimera|Evilnum|Operation Wocao|FIN6|Sandworm Team|Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Wizard Spider|APT41|Kimsuky|Silence|The White Company|TEMP.Veles|APT32|APT38|Patchwork|Honeybee|menuPass|Cobalt Group|FIN8|Magic Hound|FIN5|BRONZE BUTLER|APT3|OilRig|APT28|Threat Group-3390|FIN10|Group5|Lazarus Group|APT18|APT29
T1070.003,Clear Command History,Defense Evasion,Lazarus Group|TeamTNT|menuPass|APT41
T1550.004,Web Session Cookie,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,APT29
T1550.001,Application Access Token,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,APT29|APT28
@@ -363,17 +363,16 @@ T1550.002,Pass the Hash,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,Chimera|Kimsuky|GALLIUM
T1550,Use Alternate Authentication Material,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,APT29
T1548.004,Elevated Execution with Prompt,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
T1548.003,Sudo and Sudo Caching,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
T1548.002,Bypass User Account Control,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,Evilnum|APT37|MuddyWater|Threat Group-3390|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork|APT29
T1548.002,Bypass User Account Control,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,Evilnum|APT37|MuddyWater|Threat Group-3390|Cobalt Group|Honeybee|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork|APT29
T1548.001,Setuid and Setgid,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
T1548,Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
T1136.003,Cloud Account,Persistence,APT29
T1070.002,Clear Linux or Mac System Logs,Defense Evasion,TeamTNT|Rocke
T1070.001,Clear Windows Event Logs,Defense Evasion,Dragonfly|Indrik Spider|Chimera|Operation Wocao|APT41|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|APT32|FIN8|FIN5|APT28
T1070.001,Clear Windows Event Logs,Defense Evasion,Dragonfly|Indrik Spider|Chimera|Operation Wocao|APT41|APT38|APT32|FIN8|FIN5|APT28
T1136.002,Domain Account,Persistence,Sandworm Team|HAFNIUM|GALLIUM
T1136.001,Local Account,Persistence,Kimsuky|Dragonfly|TeamTNT|Fox Kitten|APT39|APT41|Leafminer|Dragonfly 2.0|APT3
T1547.011,Plist Modification,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
T1136.001,Local Account,Persistence,Kimsuky|Dragonfly|TeamTNT|Fox Kitten|APT39|APT41|Leafminer|APT3
T1547.010,Port Monitors,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
T1547.009,Shortcut Modification,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Dragonfly|APT39|Darkhotel|APT29|Gorgon Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Lazarus Group|Leviathan
T1547.009,Shortcut Modification,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Dragonfly|APT39|Darkhotel|APT29|Gorgon Group|Lazarus Group|Leviathan
T1547.008,LSASS Driver,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
T1547.007,Re-opened Applications,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
T1547.006,Kernel Modules and Extensions,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
@@ -397,27 +396,27 @@ T1546.004,Unix Shell Configuration Modification,Privilege Escalation|Persistence
T1546.003,Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,FIN8|Mustang Panda|APT33|Blue Mockingbird|Turla|Leviathan|APT29
T1546.002,Screensaver,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
T1546.001,Change Default File Association,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,Kimsuky
T1547.001,Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Confucius|Dragonfly|LazyScripter|TeamTNT|Naikon|Windshift|Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Sidewinder|APT28|Wizard Spider|PROMETHIUM|Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Silence|RTM|Inception|APT41|Kimsuky|APT33|APT39|APT32|APT18|Dark Caracal|Threat Group-3390|Honeybee|Turla|Cobalt Group|Ke3chang|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|Gorgon Group|MuddyWater|APT37|Leviathan|BRONZE BUTLER|APT3|Magic Hound|FIN10|FIN7|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT29|Darkhotel
T1547.001,Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Confucius|Dragonfly|LazyScripter|TeamTNT|Naikon|Windshift|Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Sidewinder|APT28|Wizard Spider|PROMETHIUM|Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Silence|RTM|Inception|APT41|Kimsuky|APT33|APT39|APT32|APT18|Dark Caracal|Gorgon Group|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|Threat Group-3390|Turla|Ke3chang|APT19|MuddyWater|APT37|Leviathan|Magic Hound|APT3|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN7|FIN10|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT29|Darkhotel
T1218.002,Control Panel,Defense Evasion,no
T1218.010,Regsvr32,Defense Evasion,Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|TA551|Blue Mockingbird|Inception|WIRTE|Cobalt Group|APT19|Leviathan|APT32|Deep Panda
T1218.009,Regsvcs/Regasm,Defense Evasion,no
T1218.005,Mshta,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|Confucius|Lazarus Group|APT29|LazyScripter|Mustang Panda|TA551|Sidewinder|Inception|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|FIN7
T1218.004,InstallUtil,Defense Evasion,Mustang Panda|menuPass
T1218.001,Compiled HTML File,Defense Evasion,APT38|APT41|Silence|Dark Caracal|OilRig|Lazarus Group
T1218.001,Compiled HTML File,Defense Evasion,APT38|APT41|Silence|OilRig|Dark Caracal
T1218.003,CMSTP,Defense Evasion,Cobalt Group|MuddyWater
T1218.011,Rundll32,Defense Evasion,Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|LazyScripter|APT38|HAFNIUM|TA551|APT41|Gamaredon Group|APT32|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|TA505|MuddyWater|APT29|APT19|CopyKittens|APT3|Carbanak|APT28
T1547,Boot or Logon Autostart Execution,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
T1546,Event Triggered Execution,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
T1098.003,Add Office 365 Global Administrator Role,Persistence,APT29
T1098.002,Exchange Email Delegate Permissions,Persistence,APT28|APT29|Magic Hound
T1098.003,Additional Cloud Roles,Persistence,APT29
T1098.002,Additional Email Delegate Permissions,Persistence,APT28|APT29|Magic Hound
T1098.001,Additional Cloud Credentials,Persistence,APT29
T1543.004,Launch Daemon,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
T1543.003,Windows Service,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,TeamTNT|APT38|PROMETHIUM|Blue Mockingbird|DarkVishnya|Wizard Spider|APT32|APT41|Kimsuky|Tropic Trooper|Cobalt Group|Ke3chang|FIN7|APT19|Threat Group-3390|Honeybee|APT3|Lazarus Group|Carbanak
T1543.003,Windows Service,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,TeamTNT|APT38|PROMETHIUM|Blue Mockingbird|DarkVishnya|Wizard Spider|APT32|APT41|Kimsuky|Tropic Trooper|Threat Group-3390|Ke3chang|Cobalt Group|Honeybee|APT19|FIN7|APT3|Lazarus Group|Carbanak
T1543.002,Systemd Service,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,TeamTNT|Rocke
T1543.001,Launch Agent,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
T1037.005,Startup Items,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
T1037.004,RC Scripts,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
T1055.012,Process Hollowing,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Kimsuky|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Gorgon Group|Patchwork
T1055.012,Process Hollowing,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Kimsuky|Threat Group-3390|Gorgon Group|menuPass|Patchwork
T1055.013,Process Doppelgänging,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Leafminer
T1055.011,Extra Window Memory Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
T1055.014,VDSO Hijacking,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
@@ -430,18 +429,17 @@ T1055.002,Portable Executable Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Roc
T1055.001,Dynamic-link Library Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,BackdoorDiplomacy|Leviathan|Wizard Spider|TA505|Turla|Tropic Trooper|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda
T1037.003,Network Logon Script,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
T1543,Create or Modify System Process,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
T1037.002,Logon Script (Mac),Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
T1037.002,Login Hook,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
T1037.001,Logon Script (Windows),Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Cobalt Group|APT28
T1542.003,Bootkit,Persistence|Defense Evasion,APT41|Lazarus Group|APT28
T1542.002,Component Firmware,Persistence|Defense Evasion,Equation
T1542.001,System Firmware,Persistence|Defense Evasion,no
T1505.003,Web Shell,Persistence,Dragonfly|BackdoorDiplomacy|APT38|APT29|APT28|Tonto Team|Sandworm Team|HAFNIUM|Volatile Cedar|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|Tropic Trooper|GALLIUM|Threat Group-3390|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|APT32|OilRig|Deep Panda
T1505.003,Web Shell,Persistence,Dragonfly|BackdoorDiplomacy|APT38|APT29|APT28|Tonto Team|Sandworm Team|HAFNIUM|Volatile Cedar|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|Tropic Trooper|GALLIUM|Threat Group-3390|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|OilRig|APT32|Deep Panda
T1505.002,Transport Agent,Persistence,no
T1505.001,SQL Stored Procedures,Persistence,Sandworm Team
T1053.003,Cron,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,APT38|Rocke
T1053.001,At (Linux),Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
T1053.005,Scheduled Task,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|Confucius|Dragonfly|APT37|APT38|Naikon|CostaRicto|Mustang Panda|Higaisa|Fox Kitten|Molerats|Machete|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT-C-36|BRONZE BUTLER|APT41|GALLIUM|Silence|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|Rancor|OilRig|Patchwork|Dragonfly 2.0|Cobalt Group|FIN8|menuPass|FIN10|FIN7|APT32|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|APT3|APT29
T1053.002,At (Windows),Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,BRONZE BUTLER|Threat Group-3390|APT18
T1053.005,Scheduled Task,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|Confucius|Dragonfly|APT37|APT38|Naikon|CostaRicto|Mustang Panda|Higaisa|Fox Kitten|Molerats|Machete|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT-C-36|BRONZE BUTLER|APT41|GALLIUM|Silence|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|OilRig|Rancor|Cobalt Group|Patchwork|FIN8|FIN10|menuPass|APT32|FIN7|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|APT3|APT29
T1053.002,At,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,BRONZE BUTLER|Threat Group-3390|APT18
T1542,Pre-OS Boot,Defense Evasion|Persistence,no
T1137.001,Office Template Macros,Persistence,MuddyWater
T1137.004,Outlook Home Page,Persistence,OilRig
@@ -477,38 +475,38 @@ T1485,Data Destruction,Impact,Gamaredon Group|Sandworm Team|Lazarus Group|APT38
T1484,Domain Policy Modification,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
T1482,Domain Trust Discovery,Discovery,FIN8|APT29|Chimera
T1480,Execution Guardrails,Defense Evasion,no
T1221,Template Injection,Defense Evasion,Lazarus Group|Confucius|Dragonfly|Gamaredon Group|Frankenstein|Inception|APT28|Tropic Trooper|DarkHydrus|Dragonfly 2.0
T1222,File and Directory Permissions Modification,Defense Evasion,no
T1221,Template Injection,Defense Evasion,Lazarus Group|Confucius|Dragonfly|Gamaredon Group|Frankenstein|Inception|APT28|Tropic Trooper|DarkHydrus
T1220,XSL Script Processing,Defense Evasion,Lazarus Group|Higaisa|Cobalt Group
T1217,Browser Bookmark Discovery,Discovery,APT38|Chimera|Fox Kitten
T1212,Exploitation for Credential Access,Credential Access,no
T1189,Drive-by Compromise,Initial Access,Magic Hound|APT28|Axiom|Transparent Tribe|Andariel|Leviathan|Machete|Windigo|Dragonfly|PROMETHIUM|Turla|Windshift|RTM|Darkhotel|APT38|APT19|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|Dark Caracal|Dragonfly 2.0|Leafminer|Patchwork|APT37|Elderwood|PLATINUM
T1211,Exploitation for Defense Evasion,Defense Evasion,APT28
T1197,BITS Jobs,Defense Evasion|Persistence,APT39|Patchwork|APT41|Leviathan
T1203,Exploitation for Client Execution,Execution,Axiom|Confucius|Dragonfly|Andariel|Transparent Tribe|APT3|Tonto Team|Mustang Panda|Darkhotel|Higaisa|HAFNIUM|Sidewinder|Sandworm Team|MuddyWater|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT41|admin@338|Threat Group-3390|APT12|The White Company|APT33|APT32|APT28|Tropic Trooper|BRONZE BUTLER|Cobalt Group|Lazarus Group|Patchwork|Elderwood|APT29|TA459|APT37|Leviathan
T1201,Password Policy Discovery,Discovery,Chimera|Turla|OilRig
T1195,Supply Chain Compromise,Initial Access,no
T1199,Trusted Relationship,Initial Access,Threat Group-3390|APT29|Sandworm Team|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|APT28|menuPass
T1218,Signed Binary Proxy Execution,Defense Evasion,Lazarus Group
T1204,User Execution,Execution,no
T1213,Data from Information Repositories,Collection,APT29|APT28|Fox Kitten|FIN6|Turla
T1190,Exploit Public-Facing Application,Initial Access,Threat Group-3390|Ke3chang|Kimsuky|Magic Hound|Dragonfly|BackdoorDiplomacy|menuPass|Volatile Cedar|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|APT28|APT29|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Blue Mockingbird|Rocke|APT39|BlackTech|APT41|GALLIUM|Night Dragon|Axiom
T1210,Exploitation of Remote Services,Lateral Movement,Dragonfly|Tonto Team|FIN7|Fox Kitten|menuPass|Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390|APT28
T1200,Hardware Additions,Initial Access,DarkVishnya
T1222,File and Directory Permissions Modification,Defense Evasion,no
T1202,Indirect Command Execution,Defense Evasion,Lazarus Group
T1195,Supply Chain Compromise,Initial Access,no
T1219,Remote Access Software,Command And Control,TeamTNT|Mustang Panda|MuddyWater|Evilnum|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Sandworm Team|DarkVishnya|RTM|Kimsuky|Night Dragon|Cobalt Group|Thrip|Carbanak
T1213,Data from Information Repositories,Collection,APT29|APT28|Fox Kitten|FIN6|Turla
T1200,Hardware Additions,Initial Access,DarkVishnya
T1216,System Script Proxy Execution,Defense Evasion,no
T1190,Exploit Public-Facing Application,Initial Access,Threat Group-3390|Ke3chang|Kimsuky|Magic Hound|Dragonfly|BackdoorDiplomacy|menuPass|HAFNIUM|Volatile Cedar|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|APT28|APT29|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Blue Mockingbird|Rocke|APT39|BlackTech|APT41|GALLIUM|Night Dragon|Axiom
T1201,Password Policy Discovery,Discovery,Chimera|Turla|OilRig
T1218,System Binary Proxy Execution,Defense Evasion,Lazarus Group
T1207,Rogue Domain Controller,Defense Evasion,no
T1216,Signed Script Proxy Execution,Defense Evasion,no
T1199,Trusted Relationship,Initial Access,Threat Group-3390|APT29|Sandworm Team|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|APT28|menuPass
T1205,Traffic Signaling,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Command And Control,no
T1217,Browser Bookmark Discovery,Discovery,APT38|Chimera|Fox Kitten
T1204,User Execution,Execution,no
T1210,Exploitation of Remote Services,Lateral Movement,Dragonfly|Tonto Team|FIN7|Fox Kitten|menuPass|Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390|APT28
T1189,Drive-by Compromise,Initial Access,Magic Hound|APT28|Axiom|Transparent Tribe|Andariel|Leviathan|Machete|Windigo|Dragonfly|PROMETHIUM|Turla|Windshift|RTM|Darkhotel|APT38|BRONZE BUTLER|Dark Caracal|Leafminer|APT32|APT19|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|Patchwork|Elderwood|APT37|PLATINUM
T1211,Exploitation for Defense Evasion,Defense Evasion,APT28
T1212,Exploitation for Credential Access,Credential Access,no
T1203,Exploitation for Client Execution,Execution,Axiom|Confucius|Dragonfly|Andariel|Transparent Tribe|APT3|Tonto Team|Mustang Panda|Darkhotel|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Sandworm Team|MuddyWater|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT41|admin@338|Threat Group-3390|APT12|The White Company|APT33|APT32|APT28|Tropic Trooper|Lazarus Group|Cobalt Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Elderwood|APT37|Leviathan|Patchwork|TA459|APT29
T1197,BITS Jobs,Defense Evasion|Persistence,APT39|Patchwork|APT41|Leviathan
T1176,Browser Extensions,Persistence,Kimsuky
T1187,Forced Authentication,Credential Access,Dragonfly|DarkHydrus|Dragonfly 2.0
T1185,Browser Session Hijacking,Collection,no
T1140,Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information,Defense Evasion,Lazarus Group|Ke3chang|Kimsuky|APT39|APT29|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Molerats|Frankenstein|Turla|WIRTE|Darkhotel|Tropic Trooper|Honeybee|Gorgon Group|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|APT19|Leviathan|MuddyWater|APT28|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER
T1187,Forced Authentication,Credential Access,Dragonfly|DarkHydrus
T1140,Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information,Defense Evasion,Lazarus Group|Ke3chang|Kimsuky|APT39|APT29|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Molerats|Frankenstein|Turla|WIRTE|Darkhotel|Tropic Trooper|menuPass|Gorgon Group|Threat Group-3390|APT19|Honeybee|Leviathan|MuddyWater|APT28|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER
T1137,Office Application Startup,Persistence,Gamaredon Group|APT32
T1134,Access Token Manipulation,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,FIN6|Blue Mockingbird
T1136,Create Account,Persistence,Sandworm Team|Indrik Spider
T1135,Network Share Discovery,Discovery,Dragonfly|Tonto Team|APT38|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|APT32|APT39|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT1|Dragonfly 2.0|Sowbug
T1137,Office Application Startup,Persistence,Gamaredon Group|APT32
T1133,External Remote Services,Persistence|Initial Access,Dragonfly|TeamTNT|Leviathan|APT28|APT29|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Kimsuky|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Chimera|Sandworm Team|APT41|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|Night Dragon|Ke3chang|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|APT18
T1135,Network Share Discovery,Discovery,Dragonfly|Tonto Team|APT38|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|APT32|APT39|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT1|Sowbug
T1133,External Remote Services,Persistence|Initial Access,Dragonfly|TeamTNT|Leviathan|APT28|APT29|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Kimsuky|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Chimera|Sandworm Team|APT41|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|Night Dragon|Ke3chang|OilRig|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|APT18
T1132,Data Encoding,Command And Control,no
T1129,Shared Modules,Execution,no
T1127,Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution,Defense Evasion,no
@@ -516,64 +514,64 @@ T1125,Video Capture,Collection,Silence|FIN7
T1124,System Time Discovery,Discovery,Darkhotel|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Chimera|Operation Wocao|The White Company|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Turla
T1123,Audio Capture,Collection,APT37
T1120,Peripheral Device Discovery,Discovery,OilRig|BackdoorDiplomacy|Operation Wocao|Turla|APT37|Gamaredon Group|Equation|APT28
T1119,Automated Collection,Collection,Ke3chang|Confucius|Mustang Panda|Sidewinder|Chimera|menuPass|Operation Wocao|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT1|APT28|Patchwork|OilRig|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|FIN6
T1119,Automated Collection,Collection,Ke3chang|Confucius|Mustang Panda|Sidewinder|Chimera|menuPass|Operation Wocao|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT1|Patchwork|APT28|FIN5|OilRig|Threat Group-3390|FIN6
T1115,Clipboard Data,Collection,Operation Wocao|APT39|APT38
T1114,Email Collection,Collection,Magic Hound|Silent Librarian
T1113,Screen Capture,Collection,Dragonfly|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Gamaredon Group|APT39|Silence|MuddyWater|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|Dark Caracal|FIN7|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|Group5|APT28
T1112,Modify Registry,Defense Evasion,Dragonfly|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|Turla|APT32|APT38|Patchwork|Gorgon Group|Threat Group-3390|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|Honeybee|FIN8
T1111,Two-Factor Authentication Interception,Credential Access,Kimsuky|Chimera|Operation Wocao
T1113,Screen Capture,Collection,Dragonfly|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Gamaredon Group|APT39|Silence|MuddyWater|FIN7|OilRig|Dark Caracal|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|Group5|APT28
T1112,Modify Registry,Defense Evasion,Dragonfly|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|Turla|APT32|APT38|APT19|Threat Group-3390|Patchwork|Honeybee|Gorgon Group|FIN8
T1111,Multi-Factor Authentication Interception,Credential Access,Kimsuky|Chimera|Operation Wocao
T1110,Brute Force,Credential Access,Lazarus Group|Dragonfly|APT38|APT28|Fox Kitten|DarkVishnya|APT39|OilRig|FIN5|Turla
T1106,Native API,Execution,BlackTech|Lazarus Group|APT38|Higaisa|menuPass|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Turla|Silence|APT37|Gorgon Group
T1105,Ingress Tool Transfer,Command And Control,LazyScripter|Ke3chang|Aquatic Panda|Winnti Group|Confucius|Dragonfly|TeamTNT|Nomadic Octopus|IndigoZebra|Andariel|BackdoorDiplomacy|Tonto Team|HAFNIUM|APT29|Ajax Security Team|Mustang Panda|Windshift|Darkhotel|ZIRCONIUM|TA551|Volatile Cedar|Indrik Spider|Evilnum|Sidewinder|Fox Kitten|Kimsuky|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Silence|APT-C-36|APT41|GALLIUM|TA505|WIRTE|APT33|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Rancor|Gorgon Group|OilRig|Turla|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|PLATINUM|APT37|Elderwood|Leviathan|APT32|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|APT3|menuPass|FIN7|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28
T1105,Ingress Tool Transfer,Command And Control,LazyScripter|Ke3chang|Aquatic Panda|Winnti Group|Confucius|Dragonfly|TeamTNT|Nomadic Octopus|IndigoZebra|Andariel|BackdoorDiplomacy|Tonto Team|HAFNIUM|APT29|Ajax Security Team|Mustang Panda|Windshift|Darkhotel|ZIRCONIUM|TA551|Volatile Cedar|Indrik Spider|Evilnum|Sidewinder|Fox Kitten|Kimsuky|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Silence|APT-C-36|APT41|GALLIUM|TA505|WIRTE|APT33|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Gorgon Group|Turla|Cobalt Group|Rancor|OilRig|Leviathan|Elderwood|APT37|PLATINUM|FIN8|APT32|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|APT3|menuPass|FIN7|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28
T1104,Multi-Stage Channels,Command And Control,Lazarus Group|APT41|MuddyWater|APT3
T1102,Web Service,Command And Control,Mustang Panda|LazyScripter|TeamTNT|FIN8|Fox Kitten|Turla|APT32|Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Inception|FIN6
T1098,Account Manipulation,Persistence,Kimsuky|Dragonfly|Sandworm Team|APT3|Dragonfly 2.0|Lazarus Group
T1098,Account Manipulation,Persistence,Kimsuky|Dragonfly|Sandworm Team|APT3|Lazarus Group
T1095,Non-Application Layer Protocol,Command And Control,BackdoorDiplomacy|HAFNIUM|Operation Wocao|FIN6|APT29|PLATINUM|APT3
T1092,Communication Through Removable Media,Command And Control,APT28
T1091,Replication Through Removable Media,Lateral Movement|Initial Access,FIN7|Mustang Panda|Tropic Trooper|Darkhotel|APT28
T1090,Proxy,Command And Control,Windigo|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|APT41|Turla
T1087,Account Discovery,Discovery,APT29
T1083,File and Directory Discovery,Discovery,Winnti Group|Confucius|Dragonfly|APT38|APT29|Mustang Panda|Darkhotel|Windigo|Sidewinder|Chimera|Fox Kitten|menuPass|APT39|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Inception|APT41|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|APT18|Leafminer|Honeybee|Dark Caracal|Dragonfly 2.0|APT3|Sowbug|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|APT28|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
T1082,System Information Discovery,Discovery,Aquatic Panda|Confucius|TeamTNT|APT38|APT29|Mustang Panda|Windshift|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Windigo|Sidewinder|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|APT32|APT37|Honeybee|APT19|Magic Hound|Sowbug|OilRig|APT3|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
T1083,File and Directory Discovery,Discovery,Winnti Group|Confucius|Dragonfly|APT38|APT29|Mustang Panda|Darkhotel|Windigo|Sidewinder|Chimera|Fox Kitten|menuPass|APT39|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Inception|APT41|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|APT18|Dark Caracal|Leafminer|Honeybee|BRONZE BUTLER|Sowbug|Magic Hound|APT3|APT28|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
T1082,System Information Discovery,Discovery,Aquatic Panda|Confucius|TeamTNT|APT38|APT29|Mustang Panda|Windshift|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Windigo|Sidewinder|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|APT19|APT32|Honeybee|APT37|APT3|OilRig|Sowbug|Magic Hound|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
T1080,Taint Shared Content,Lateral Movement,Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Darkhotel
T1078,Valid Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,Ke3chang|Lazarus Group|Axiom|Dragonfly|FIN7|Leviathan|APT29|Silent Librarian|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|APT39|FIN4|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|APT33|FIN5|OilRig|APT28|menuPass|FIN10|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390|APT18|PittyTiger|Carbanak
T1078,Valid Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,Ke3chang|Lazarus Group|Axiom|Dragonfly|FIN7|Leviathan|APT29|Silent Librarian|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|APT39|FIN4|Night Dragon|FIN8|APT33|OilRig|FIN5|FIN10|APT28|menuPass|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390|APT18|PittyTiger|Carbanak
T1074,Data Staged,Collection,Wizard Spider
T1072,Software Deployment Tools,Execution|Lateral Movement,Silence|APT32|Threat Group-1314
T1071,Application Layer Protocol,Command And Control,Dragonfly|TeamTNT|Rocke|Magic Hound|Dragonfly 2.0
T1071,Application Layer Protocol,Command And Control,Dragonfly|TeamTNT|Rocke|Magic Hound
T1070,Indicator Removal on Host,Defense Evasion,Lazarus Group|APT29
T1069,Permission Groups Discovery,Discovery,APT29|TA505|APT3
T1068,Exploitation for Privilege Escalation,Privilege Escalation,APT29|Tonto Team|ZIRCONIUM|Turla|Whitefly|APT33|Cobalt Group|PLATINUM|FIN8|APT32|Threat Group-3390|FIN6|APT28
T1059,Command and Scripting Interpreter,Execution,Dragonfly|APT37|Windigo|Fox Kitten|APT32|Whitefly|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN7|APT19|OilRig|FIN5|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Ke3chang
T1057,Process Discovery,Discovery,Gamaredon Group|Kimsuky|TeamTNT|Andariel|APT29|Mustang Panda|Windshift|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Rocke|Frankenstein|Inception|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|APT38|Tropic Trooper|APT37|Honeybee|OilRig|APT3|Magic Hound|APT28|Winnti Group|Stealth Falcon|Poseidon Group|Lazarus Group|Molerats|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang
T1068,Exploitation for Privilege Escalation,Privilege Escalation,APT29|Tonto Team|ZIRCONIUM|Turla|Whitefly|APT33|Cobalt Group|PLATINUM|FIN8|Threat Group-3390|APT32|FIN6|APT28
T1059,Command and Scripting Interpreter,Execution,Dragonfly|APT37|Windigo|Fox Kitten|APT32|Whitefly|APT39|APT19|FIN7|OilRig|FIN5|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Ke3chang
T1057,Process Discovery,Discovery,Gamaredon Group|Kimsuky|TeamTNT|Andariel|APT29|Mustang Panda|Windshift|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Rocke|Frankenstein|Inception|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|APT38|Tropic Trooper|APT37|Honeybee|Magic Hound|APT3|OilRig|APT28|Winnti Group|Stealth Falcon|Poseidon Group|Lazarus Group|Molerats|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang
T1056,Input Capture,Collection|Credential Access,APT39
T1055,Process Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Operation Wocao|APT32|Sharpshooter|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|Cobalt Group|Turla|APT37|Honeybee|PLATINUM
T1055,Process Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Operation Wocao|APT32|Sharpshooter|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|Cobalt Group|APT37|Turla|Honeybee|PLATINUM
T1053,Scheduled Task/Job,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
T1052,Exfiltration Over Physical Medium,Exfiltration,no
T1049,System Network Connections Discovery,Discovery,Lazarus Group|TeamTNT|Andariel|BackdoorDiplomacy|Mustang Panda|MuddyWater|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Tropic Trooper|APT41|APT38|GALLIUM|APT32|APT1|OilRig|APT3|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
T1049,System Network Connections Discovery,Discovery,Lazarus Group|TeamTNT|Andariel|BackdoorDiplomacy|Mustang Panda|MuddyWater|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Tropic Trooper|APT41|APT38|GALLIUM|APT32|APT1|OilRig|APT3|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
T1048,Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol,Exfiltration,no
T1047,Windows Management Instrumentation,Execution,Gamaredon Group|Sandworm Team|FIN7|Indrik Spider|Naikon|Mustang Panda|Windshift|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT41|FIN6|GALLIUM|APT32|MuddyWater|Threat Group-3390|OilRig|FIN8|Leviathan|menuPass|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT29|Deep Panda
T1046,Network Service Scanning,Discovery,BlackTech|Lazarus Group|TeamTNT|BackdoorDiplomacy|Naikon|CostaRicto|Chimera|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Rocke|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT39|APT32|OilRig|Cobalt Group|Leafminer|menuPass|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390
T1047,Windows Management Instrumentation,Execution,Gamaredon Group|Sandworm Team|FIN7|Indrik Spider|Naikon|Mustang Panda|Windshift|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT41|FIN6|GALLIUM|APT32|MuddyWater|OilRig|Threat Group-3390|Leviathan|FIN8|menuPass|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT29|Deep Panda
T1046,Network Service Discovery,Discovery,BlackTech|Lazarus Group|TeamTNT|BackdoorDiplomacy|Naikon|CostaRicto|Chimera|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Rocke|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT39|APT32|Leafminer|Cobalt Group|OilRig|menuPass|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390
T1041,Exfiltration Over C2 Channel,Exfiltration,Confucius|Leviathan|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Chimera|APT39|Operation Wocao|Sandworm Team|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Kimsuky|GALLIUM|APT32|APT3|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Ke3chang
T1040,Network Sniffing,Credential Access|Discovery,Kimsuky|Sandworm Team|DarkVishnya|APT33|APT28
T1039,Data from Network Shared Drive,Collection,APT28|Chimera|Fox Kitten|Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Sowbug|menuPass
T1037,Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Rocke
T1036,Masquerading,Defense Evasion,Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|Dragonfly|LazyScripter|APT28|Nomadic Octopus|OilRig|APT29|ZIRCONIUM|TA551|Windshift|APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|PLATINUM|Dragonfly 2.0
T1033,System Owner/User Discovery,Discovery,Threat Group-3390|Ke3chang|Dragonfly|APT38|Windshift|ZIRCONIUM|Sidewinder|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT41|GALLIUM|Tropic Trooper|APT39|MuddyWater|APT37|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|APT32|Magic Hound|OilRig|FIN10|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3
T1036,Masquerading,Defense Evasion,Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|Dragonfly|LazyScripter|APT28|Nomadic Octopus|OilRig|APT29|ZIRCONIUM|TA551|Windshift|APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|PLATINUM
T1033,System Owner/User Discovery,Discovery,Threat Group-3390|Ke3chang|Dragonfly|APT38|Windshift|ZIRCONIUM|Sidewinder|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT41|GALLIUM|Tropic Trooper|APT39|MuddyWater|APT32|APT37|APT19|OilRig|Magic Hound|FIN10|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3
T1030,Data Transfer Size Limits,Exfiltration,APT28|Threat Group-3390
T1029,Scheduled Transfer,Exfiltration,Higaisa
T1027,Obfuscated Files or Information,Defense Evasion,Aquatic Panda|Ke3chang|LazyScripter|TeamTNT|BackdoorDiplomacy|Transparent Tribe|APT39|Mustang Panda|Windshift|TA551|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Fox Kitten|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|FIN6|Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|APT41|GALLIUM|Turla|TA505|Silence|APT33|Night Dragon|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|APT29|APT18|Tropic Trooper|Patchwork|menuPass|APT37|Threat Group-3390|Cobalt Group|Dark Caracal|Leafminer|Honeybee|APT19|BlackOasis|Leviathan|FIN8|MuddyWater|FIN7|Elderwood|OilRig|Magic Hound|APT3|APT32|Group5|Dust Storm|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT28
T1027,Obfuscated Files or Information,Defense Evasion,Aquatic Panda|Ke3chang|LazyScripter|TeamTNT|BackdoorDiplomacy|Transparent Tribe|APT39|Mustang Panda|Windshift|TA551|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Fox Kitten|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|FIN6|Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|APT41|GALLIUM|Turla|TA505|Silence|APT33|Night Dragon|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|APT29|APT18|Tropic Trooper|APT37|Cobalt Group|Dark Caracal|menuPass|Leafminer|Honeybee|APT19|Threat Group-3390|Patchwork|Elderwood|MuddyWater|Leviathan|FIN7|BlackOasis|FIN8|OilRig|APT3|Magic Hound|APT32|Group5|Dust Storm|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT28
T1025,Data from Removable Media,Collection,Turla|Gamaredon Group|APT28
T1021,Remote Services,Lateral Movement,no
T1020,Automated Exfiltration,Exfiltration,Ke3chang|Sidewinder|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Honeybee
T1018,Remote System Discovery,Discovery,Dragonfly|Indrik Spider|Naikon|APT29|Chimera|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Sandworm Team|Rocke|Wizard Spider|Silence|GALLIUM|APT39|APT32|Deep Panda|Ke3chang|Threat Group-3390|Dragonfly 2.0|Leafminer|FIN8|FIN5|APT3|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN6|Turla
T1016,System Network Configuration Discovery,Discovery,Kimsuky|Dragonfly|TeamTNT|ZIRCONIUM|Mustang Panda|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Sandworm Team|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT41|GALLIUM|APT32|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|Magic Hound|OilRig|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3|Naikon|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
T1018,Remote System Discovery,Discovery,Dragonfly|Indrik Spider|Naikon|APT29|Chimera|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Sandworm Team|Rocke|Wizard Spider|Silence|GALLIUM|APT39|APT32|Leafminer|Ke3chang|Threat Group-3390|Deep Panda|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN5|APT3|menuPass|FIN6|Turla
T1016,System Network Configuration Discovery,Discovery,Kimsuky|Dragonfly|TeamTNT|ZIRCONIUM|Mustang Panda|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Sandworm Team|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT41|GALLIUM|APT32|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|APT19|Magic Hound|OilRig|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3|Naikon|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
T1014,Rootkit,Defense Evasion,TeamTNT|Rocke|APT41|APT28|Winnti Group
T1012,Query Registry,Discovery,Kimsuky|Dragonfly|ZIRCONIUM|Chimera|Fox Kitten|APT39|Operation Wocao|APT32|Dragonfly 2.0|Threat Group-3390|OilRig|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Turla
T1012,Query Registry,Discovery,Kimsuky|Dragonfly|ZIRCONIUM|Chimera|Fox Kitten|APT39|Operation Wocao|APT32|Threat Group-3390|OilRig|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Turla
T1011,Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium,Exfiltration,no
T1010,Application Window Discovery,Discovery,Lazarus Group
T1008,Fallback Channels,Command And Control,FIN7|APT41|OilRig|Lazarus Group
T1007,System Service Discovery,Discovery,Kimsuky|Aquatic Panda|Indrik Spider|Chimera|Operation Wocao|BRONZE BUTLER|APT1|OilRig|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
T1006,Direct Volume Access,Defense Evasion,no
T1005,Data from Local System,Collection,Axiom|Dragonfly|FIN7|APT41|APT38|Andariel|APT29|Windigo|Fox Kitten|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|FIN6|Gamaredon Group|APT39|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|GALLIUM|Turla|menuPass|Dark Caracal|Dragonfly 2.0|Honeybee|APT37|APT28|APT3|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|Threat Group-3390|APT1|Ke3chang
T1005,Data from Local System,Collection,Axiom|Dragonfly|FIN7|APT41|APT38|Andariel|APT29|Windigo|Fox Kitten|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|FIN6|Gamaredon Group|APT39|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|GALLIUM|Turla|menuPass|Honeybee|Dark Caracal|APT37|APT28|BRONZE BUTLER|APT3|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|Threat Group-3390|APT1|Ke3chang
T1003,OS Credential Dumping,Credential Access,Tonto Team|APT39|Frankenstein|APT32|APT28|Leviathan|Sowbug|Suckfly|Poseidon Group|Axiom
T1001,Data Obfuscation,Command And Control,Operation Wocao|Axiom
T1001,Data Obfuscation,Command And Control,Operation Wocao
1 mitre_id technique tactics groups
139 T1584.001 Domains Resource Development Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|Transparent Tribe|Magic Hound|APT29|APT1
140 T1583.006 Web Services Resource Development APT28|Confucius|LazyScripter|Kimsuky|Magic Hound|IndigoZebra|ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|HAFNIUM|Lazarus Group|Turla|APT32|APT17|APT29
141 T1583.005 Botnet Resource Development no
142 T1583.004 Server Resource Development Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|Gelsemium|GALLIUM|Sandworm Team Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|GALLIUM|Sandworm Team
143 T1583.003 Virtual Private Server Resource Development Axiom|Dragonfly|HAFNIUM|TEMP.Veles
144 T1583.002 DNS Server Resource Development Axiom
145 T1584 Compromise Infrastructure Resource Development no
174 T1071.004 DNS Command And Control LazyScripter|Chimera|APT39|Tropic Trooper|OilRig|Ke3chang|Cobalt Group|APT18|APT41|FIN7
175 T1071.003 Mail Protocols Command And Control Turla|Kimsuky|APT32|SilverTerrier|APT28
176 T1071.002 File Transfer Protocols Command And Control Kimsuky|APT41|SilverTerrier|Honeybee
177 T1071.001 Web Protocols Command And Control Kimsuky|Confucius|TeamTNT|FIN8|APT29|Mustang Panda|Windshift|TA551|Higaisa|HAFNIUM|Sidewinder|Chimera|Sandworm Team|TA505|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Inception|APT41|SilverTerrier|APT28|WIRTE|APT33|FIN4|Night Dragon|APT18|APT38|Rancor|Ke3chang|Orangeworm|APT37|APT19|Cobalt Group|Threat Group-3390|Dark Caracal|Turla|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|APT32|OilRig|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon Kimsuky|Confucius|TeamTNT|FIN8|APT29|Mustang Panda|Windshift|TA551|Higaisa|HAFNIUM|Sidewinder|Chimera|Sandworm Team|TA505|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Inception|APT41|SilverTerrier|APT28|WIRTE|APT33|FIN4|Night Dragon|APT18|APT38|Dark Caracal|Cobalt Group|Orangeworm|Rancor|Threat Group-3390|Turla|APT19|APT37|Ke3chang|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|OilRig|APT32|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon
178 T1572 Protocol Tunneling Command And Control Leviathan|CostaRicto|Chimera|Fox Kitten|OilRig|Cobalt Group|FIN6
179 T1048.003 Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol Exfiltration Wizard Spider|FIN6|APT32|APT33|Thrip|FIN8|OilRig|Lazarus Group
180 T1048.002 Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol Exfiltration APT28|APT29
181 T1048.001 Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol Exfiltration no
182 T1001.003 Protocol Impersonation Command And Control Higaisa|Lazarus Group
189 T1090.002 External Proxy Command And Control Tonto Team|APT39|Silence|GALLIUM|MuddyWater|APT3|FIN5|Lazarus Group|menuPass|APT28
190 T1090.001 Internal Proxy Command And Control Lazarus Group|Turla|APT29|Higaisa|Operation Wocao|APT39|Strider
191 T1102.003 One-Way Communication Command And Control Leviathan
192 T1102.002 Bidirectional Communication Command And Control Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|APT28|APT29|Sandworm Team|APT39|APT12|Turla|FIN7|APT37|Magic Hound|Carbanak Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|APT28|APT29|Sandworm Team|APT39|APT12|FIN7|Turla|APT37|Magic Hound|Carbanak
193 T1102.001 Dead Drop Resolver Command And Control Rocke|APT41|BRONZE BUTLER|RTM|Patchwork
194 T1571 Non-Standard Port Command And Control WIRTE|Sandworm Team|Rocke|DarkVishnya|Silence|APT-C-36|Magic Hound|APT33|APT32|TEMP.Veles|Lazarus Group|FIN7
195 T1074.002 Remote Data Staging Collection Leviathan|APT28|APT29|Chimera|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|FIN6|Night Dragon|FIN8
196 T1074.001 Local Data Staging Collection Dragonfly|Indrik Spider|BackdoorDiplomacy|Mustang Panda|Sidewinder|Chimera|Kimsuky|APT39|Operation Wocao|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|Patchwork|Honeybee|Dragonfly 2.0|Leviathan|APT3|FIN5|menuPass|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28 Dragonfly|Indrik Spider|BackdoorDiplomacy|Mustang Panda|Sidewinder|Chimera|Kimsuky|APT39|Operation Wocao|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|Honeybee|Patchwork|Leviathan|APT3|FIN5|menuPass|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28
197 T1078.004 Cloud Accounts Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access Ke3chang|APT29|APT28|APT33
198 T1564.004 NTFS File Attributes Defense Evasion APT32
199 T1564.003 Hidden Window Defense Evasion Gamaredon Group|Kimsuky|Nomadic Octopus|Higaisa|Gorgon Group|Deep Panda|DarkHydrus|CopyKittens|APT19|APT32|APT28|APT3|Magic Hound
200 T1078.003 Local Accounts Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access APT29|Kimsuky|HAFNIUM|Turla|Operation Wocao|PROMETHIUM|Tropic Trooper|FIN10|APT32
201 T1078.002 Domain Accounts Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access Naikon|Indrik Spider|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|APT29|TA505|APT3|Threat Group-1314
202 T1078.001 Default Accounts Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access no
203 T1564.002 Hidden Users Defense Evasion Kimsuky|Dragonfly|Dragonfly 2.0 Kimsuky|Dragonfly
204 T1574.006 Dynamic Linker Hijacking Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion APT41|Rocke
205 T1574.002 DLL Side-Loading Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion Lazarus Group|Mustang Panda|Higaisa|BlackTech|Sidewinder|Chimera|BRONZE BUTLER|Naikon|APT41|GALLIUM|Tropic Trooper|APT19|Patchwork|APT32|APT3|menuPass|Threat Group-3390
206 T1574.001 DLL Search Order Hijacking Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion Aquatic Panda|BackdoorDiplomacy|Tonto Team|Evilnum|APT41|Whitefly|RTM|Threat Group-3390|menuPass
214 T1069.001 Local Groups Discovery Tonto Team|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Turla|OilRig|admin@338
215 T1570 Lateral Tool Transfer Lateral Movement Sandworm Team|Chimera|GALLIUM|Operation Wocao|APT32|Wizard Spider|Turla|FIN10
216 T1568.003 DNS Calculation Command And Control APT12
217 T1204.002 Malicious File Execution LazyScripter|WIRTE|Confucius|Dragonfly|Threat Group-3390|Nomadic Octopus|Indrik Spider|APT38|Andariel|Ferocious Kitten|IndigoZebra|Transparent Tribe|Tonto Team|Magic Hound|Ajax Security Team|Mustang Panda|TA551|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Kimsuky|FIN6|PROMETHIUM|APT30|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|RTM|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|Machete|admin@338|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN7|BRONZE BUTLER|Gorgon Group|OilRig|Dark Caracal|Cobalt Group|DarkHydrus|Rancor|Patchwork|APT32|APT19|MuddyWater|Lazarus Group|menuPass|APT37|Leviathan|TA459|APT29|APT28|FIN8|PLATINUM|Elderwood LazyScripter|WIRTE|Confucius|Dragonfly|Threat Group-3390|Nomadic Octopus|Indrik Spider|APT38|Andariel|Ferocious Kitten|IndigoZebra|Transparent Tribe|Tonto Team|Magic Hound|Ajax Security Team|Mustang Panda|TA551|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Kimsuky|FIN6|PROMETHIUM|APT30|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|RTM|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|Machete|admin@338|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|MuddyWater|Rancor|Gorgon Group|OilRig|FIN7|APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|Cobalt Group|APT19|DarkHydrus|Dark Caracal|PLATINUM|menuPass|Leviathan|APT28|APT29|TA459|APT37|Elderwood|FIN8
218 T1204.001 Malicious Link Execution LazyScripter|Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|Confucius|FIN7|Transparent Tribe|APT3|Magic Hound|APT28|APT29|Mustang Panda|Sidewinder|ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|Evilnum|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|Patchwork|Windshift|APT32|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|TA505|OilRig|Machete|Leviathan|FIN8|FIN4|Elderwood|Dragonfly 2.0|Cobalt Group|APT39|Night Dragon|Turla|APT33 LazyScripter|Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|Confucius|FIN7|Transparent Tribe|APT3|Magic Hound|APT28|APT29|Mustang Panda|Sidewinder|ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|Evilnum|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|Patchwork|Windshift|APT32|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|TA505|OilRig|Machete|Leviathan|FIN8|FIN4|Elderwood|Cobalt Group|APT39|Night Dragon|APT33|Turla
219 T1195.003 Compromise Hardware Supply Chain Initial Access no
220 T1195.002 Compromise Software Supply Chain Initial Access Gelsemium|Threat Group-3390|APT29|Cobalt Group|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Dragonfly|Sandworm Team|APT41 Threat Group-3390|APT29|Cobalt Group|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Dragonfly|Sandworm Team|APT41
221 T1195.001 Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools Initial Access no
222 T1568.001 Fast Flux DNS Command And Control menuPass|TA505
223 T1052.001 Exfiltration over USB Exfiltration Mustang Panda|Tropic Trooper
225 T1569.001 Launchctl Execution no
226 T1569 System Services Execution no
227 T1568.002 Domain Generation Algorithms Command And Control TA551|APT41
228 T1568 Dynamic Resolution Command And Control Gamaredon Group|Gelsemium|Transparent Tribe|APT29 Gamaredon Group|Transparent Tribe|APT29
229 T1011.001 Exfiltration Over Bluetooth Exfiltration no
230 T1567.002 Exfiltration to Cloud Storage Exfiltration Kimsuky|Threat Group-3390|Confucius|Lazarus Group|FIN7|ZIRCONIUM|HAFNIUM|Chimera|Leviathan|Turla
231 T1567.001 Exfiltration to Code Repository Exfiltration no
232 T1059.006 Python Execution Dragonfly|Tonto Team|APT37|ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|Turla|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|APT29|Rocke|BRONZE BUTLER|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|Machete Dragonfly|Tonto Team|APT37|ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|Turla|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|APT29|Rocke|BRONZE BUTLER|APT39|Machete
233 T1059.005 Visual Basic Execution Confucius|Lazarus Group|LazyScripter|OilRig|APT38|Transparent Tribe|APT29|Mustang Panda|Windshift|Higaisa|Sidewinder|APT39|Machete|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|APT33|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|Rancor|Patchwork|MuddyWater|Honeybee|FIN7|APT37|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|Turla|TA505|Silence|WIRTE|FIN4|Cobalt Group|Gorgon Group|Leviathan|TA459|Magic Hound Confucius|Lazarus Group|LazyScripter|OilRig|APT38|Transparent Tribe|APT29|Mustang Panda|Windshift|Higaisa|Sidewinder|APT39|Machete|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|APT33|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|Rancor|Patchwork|MuddyWater|Honeybee|FIN7|APT37|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|Turla|TA505|Silence|WIRTE|FIN4|Gorgon Group|Cobalt Group|Leviathan|TA459|Magic Hound
234 T1059.004 Unix Shell Execution TeamTNT|Rocke|APT41
235 T1059.003 Windows Command Shell Execution Kimsuky|Aquatic Panda|Dragonfly|LazyScripter|Sandworm Team|Nomadic Octopus|TeamTNT|APT29|Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|TA551|Higaisa|Indrik Spider|Chimera|Fox Kitten|Machete|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|FIN6|TA505|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|OilRig|Lazarus Group|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|FIN7|APT41|GALLIUM|Turla|Silence|APT32|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Gorgon Group|Dark Caracal|Ke3chang|Dragonfly 2.0|Rancor|FIN8|APT28|APT37|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|Sowbug|menuPass|FIN10|Threat Group-3390|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Suckfly|Threat Group-1314|APT3|admin@338|APT1 Kimsuky|Aquatic Panda|Dragonfly|LazyScripter|Sandworm Team|Nomadic Octopus|TeamTNT|APT29|Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|TA551|Higaisa|Indrik Spider|Chimera|Fox Kitten|Machete|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|FIN6|TA505|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|OilRig|Lazarus Group|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|FIN7|APT41|GALLIUM|Turla|Silence|APT32|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Dark Caracal|Ke3chang|Gorgon Group|Rancor|FIN8|APT28|APT37|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|Sowbug|menuPass|FIN10|Threat Group-3390|Gamaredon Group|Suckfly|Patchwork|Threat Group-1314|APT3|admin@338|APT1
236 T1059.002 AppleScript Execution no
237 T1059.001 PowerShell Execution Gamaredon Group|Lazarus Group|Aquatic Panda|Confucius|Dragonfly|LazyScripter|Nomadic Octopus|TeamTNT|APT38|Tonto Team|Mustang Panda|Indrik Spider|HAFNIUM|Sidewinder|Fox Kitten|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|APT39|DarkVishnya|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Inception|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|GALLIUM|TA505|WIRTE|TEMP.Veles|APT33|Gallmaker|Turla|Thrip|Cobalt Group|APT28|DarkHydrus|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|Gorgon Group|TA459|Leviathan|MuddyWater|FIN8|CopyKittens|OilRig|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN7|APT32|menuPass|FIN10|Threat Group-3390|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Poseidon Group|APT3|APT29|Deep Panda Gamaredon Group|Lazarus Group|Aquatic Panda|Confucius|Dragonfly|LazyScripter|Nomadic Octopus|TeamTNT|APT38|Tonto Team|Mustang Panda|Indrik Spider|HAFNIUM|Sidewinder|Fox Kitten|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|APT39|DarkVishnya|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Inception|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|GALLIUM|TA505|WIRTE|TEMP.Veles|APT33|Gallmaker|APT19|DarkHydrus|APT28|Turla|Gorgon Group|Thrip|Cobalt Group|Leviathan|MuddyWater|FIN8|TA459|CopyKittens|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|Threat Group-3390|FIN10|APT32|FIN7|menuPass|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Poseidon Group|APT3|APT29|Deep Panda
238 T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service Exfiltration APT28
239 T1497.003 Time Based Evasion Defense Evasion|Discovery no
240 T1497.002 User Activity Based Checks Defense Evasion|Discovery Darkhotel|FIN7
242 T1498.002 Reflection Amplification Impact no
243 T1498.001 Direct Network Flood Impact no
244 T1566.003 Spearphishing via Service Initial Access Lazarus Group|APT29|Ajax Security Team|Magic Hound|Windshift|FIN6|OilRig|Dark Caracal
245 T1566.002 Spearphishing Link Initial Access Lazarus Group|Confucius|LazyScripter|Transparent Tribe|FIN7|APT3|Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|Sidewinder|Evilnum|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|APT1|Windshift|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|Machete|Kimsuky|TA505|APT39|FIN4|APT32|Night Dragon|APT28|Cobalt Group|Turla|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|Elderwood|APT33|APT29|Leviathan|FIN8|Patchwork|Magic Hound Lazarus Group|Confucius|LazyScripter|Transparent Tribe|FIN7|APT3|Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|Sidewinder|Evilnum|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|APT1|Windshift|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|Machete|Kimsuky|TA505|APT39|FIN4|APT32|Night Dragon|Cobalt Group|APT28|Turla|OilRig|APT33|Patchwork|Magic Hound|APT29|FIN8|Elderwood|Leviathan
246 T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment Initial Access WIRTE|Confucius|Dragonfly|LazyScripter|Threat Group-3390|APT38|Andariel|Ferocious Kitten|IndigoZebra|Transparent Tribe|Nomadic Octopus|Tonto Team|Ajax Security Team|Mustang Panda|TA551|Higaisa|Sidewinder|APT1|FIN6|APT30|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Mofang|Wizard Spider|RTM|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|APT41|Machete|admin@338|Kimsuky|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|Tropic Trooper|DarkHydrus|Lazarus Group|Gorgon Group|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|APT19|APT32|Cobalt Group|Rancor|FIN7|Dragonfly 2.0|MuddyWater|APT28|TA459|APT29|APT37|Leviathan|FIN8|Patchwork|menuPass|Elderwood|PLATINUM WIRTE|Confucius|Dragonfly|LazyScripter|Threat Group-3390|APT38|Andariel|Ferocious Kitten|IndigoZebra|Transparent Tribe|Nomadic Octopus|Tonto Team|Ajax Security Team|Mustang Panda|TA551|Higaisa|Sidewinder|APT1|FIN6|APT30|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Mofang|Wizard Spider|RTM|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|APT41|Machete|admin@338|Kimsuky|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|Tropic Trooper|APT19|Gorgon Group|Cobalt Group|FIN7|Rancor|APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|OilRig|Lazarus Group|DarkHydrus|Patchwork|APT28|Leviathan|menuPass|APT29|FIN8|PLATINUM|Elderwood|APT37|TA459|MuddyWater
247 T1566 Phishing Initial Access Axiom|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Dragonfly Axiom|GOLD SOUTHFIELD
248 T1565.003 Runtime Data Manipulation Impact APT38
249 T1565.002 Transmitted Data Manipulation Impact APT38
250 T1565.001 Stored Data Manipulation Impact APT38
251 T1565 Data Manipulation Impact no
252 T1564.001 Hidden Files and Directories Defense Evasion Transparent Tribe|Mustang Panda|Rocke|APT32|Tropic Trooper|APT28|Lazarus Group Transparent Tribe|Mustang Panda|Rocke|APT32|Tropic Trooper|Lazarus Group|APT28
253 T1564 Hide Artifacts Defense Evasion no
254 T1563.002 RDP Hijacking Lateral Movement Axiom
255 T1563.001 SSH Hijacking Lateral Movement no
256 T1563 Remote Service Session Hijacking Lateral Movement no
257 T1518.001 Security Software Discovery Discovery Kimsuky|Aquatic Panda|TeamTNT|APT38|Windshift|Sidewinder|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Turla|Rocke|Frankenstein|The White Company|Cobalt Group|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|Tropic Trooper|FIN8|Patchwork|Naikon
258 T1069.003 Cloud Groups Discovery no
259 T1069.002 Domain Groups Discovery APT29|Dragonfly|Turla|Inception|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|Ke3chang APT29|Dragonfly|Turla|Inception|OilRig|Ke3chang
260 T1087.004 Cloud Account Discovery APT29
261 T1087.003 Email Account Discovery Sandworm Team|TA505
262 T1087.002 Domain Account Discovery APT29|Lazarus Group|Dragonfly|MuddyWater|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Chimera|Turla|Sandworm Team|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN6|Poseidon Group|Ke3chang APT29|Lazarus Group|Dragonfly|MuddyWater|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Chimera|Turla|Sandworm Team|BRONZE BUTLER|OilRig|menuPass|FIN6|Poseidon Group|Ke3chang
263 T1087.001 Local Account Discovery Chimera|Fox Kitten|Turla|Poseidon Group|OilRig|Ke3chang|APT32|APT1|Threat Group-3390|APT3|admin@338
264 T1553.004 Install Root Certificate Defense Evasion no
265 T1562.004 Disable or Modify System Firewall Defense Evasion Dragonfly|TeamTNT|APT38|APT29|Operation Wocao|Rocke|Lazarus Group|Kimsuky|Dragonfly 2.0|Carbanak Dragonfly|TeamTNT|APT38|APT29|Operation Wocao|Rocke|Lazarus Group|Kimsuky|Carbanak
266 T1562.003 Impair Command History Logging Defense Evasion APT38
267 T1562.002 Disable Windows Event Logging Defense Evasion Sandworm Team|APT29|Threat Group-3390
268 T1562.001 Disable or Modify Tools Defense Evasion Aquatic Panda|TeamTNT|Indrik Spider|APT29|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|FIN6|Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Rocke|Kimsuky|Turla|Night Dragon|Gorgon Group|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda
269 T1562 Impair Defenses Defense Evasion no
270 T1003.004 LSA Secrets Credential Access Dragonfly|OilRig|MuddyWater|menuPass|Leafminer|Ke3chang|Dragonfly 2.0|APT33|Threat Group-3390 Dragonfly|OilRig|MuddyWater|menuPass|Leafminer|Ke3chang|APT33|Threat Group-3390
271 T1003.005 Cached Domain Credentials Credential Access OilRig|MuddyWater|Leafminer|APT33
272 T1561.002 Disk Structure Wipe Impact Sandworm Team|Lazarus Group|APT38|APT37
273 T1561.001 Disk Content Wipe Impact Lazarus Group
274 T1561 Disk Wipe Impact no
275 T1560.003 Archive via Custom Method Collection Mustang Panda|Lazarus Group|Kimsuky|CopyKittens|FIN6
276 T1560.002 Archive via Library Collection Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390
277 T1560.001 Archive via Utility Collection Kimsuky|Aquatic Panda|APT28|APT29|Mustang Panda|HAFNIUM|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Chimera|APT41|GALLIUM|Turla|Gallmaker|APT33|APT39|MuddyWater|Magic Hound|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|CopyKittens|Sowbug|APT3|menuPass|APT1|Ke3chang Kimsuky|Aquatic Panda|APT28|APT29|Mustang Panda|HAFNIUM|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Chimera|APT41|GALLIUM|Turla|Gallmaker|APT33|APT39|MuddyWater|Magic Hound|FIN8|Sowbug|CopyKittens|APT3|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|APT1|Ke3chang
278 T1560 Archive Collected Data Collection Axiom|Dragonfly|Leviathan|menuPass|APT32|Honeybee|Patchwork|APT28|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Ke3chang Axiom|Dragonfly|Leviathan|menuPass|APT32|APT28|Patchwork|Honeybee|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Ke3chang
279 T1499.004 Application or System Exploitation Impact no
280 T1499.003 Application Exhaustion Flood Impact no
281 T1499.002 Service Exhaustion Flood Impact no
283 T1491.002 External Defacement Impact Sandworm Team
284 T1491.001 Internal Defacement Impact Gamaredon Group|Lazarus Group
285 T1114.003 Email Forwarding Rule Collection Silent Librarian|Kimsuky
286 T1114.002 Remote Email Collection Collection Kimsuky|Dragonfly|APT29|HAFNIUM|Chimera|APT1|FIN4|Ke3chang|Leafminer|Dragonfly 2.0|APT28 Kimsuky|Dragonfly|APT29|HAFNIUM|Chimera|APT1|FIN4|Leafminer|Ke3chang|APT28
287 T1114.001 Local Email Collection Collection Chimera|Magic Hound|APT1
288 T1134.005 SID-History Injection Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation no
289 T1134.004 Parent PID Spoofing Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation no
295 T1555.003 Credentials from Web Browsers Credential Access APT29|Ajax Security Team|ZIRCONIUM|FIN6|Sandworm Team|Inception|Stealth Falcon|OilRig|Leafminer|APT33|APT3|Kimsuky|TA505|MuddyWater|APT37|Patchwork|Molerats
296 T1555.002 Securityd Memory Credential Access no
297 T1555.001 Keychain Credential Access no
298 T1559.002 Dynamic Data Exchange Execution Leviathan|Sidewinder|Sharpshooter|TA505|MuddyWater|Gallmaker|Patchwork|Cobalt Group|APT37|FIN7|APT28 Leviathan|Sidewinder|Sharpshooter|TA505|MuddyWater|Gallmaker|Cobalt Group|Patchwork|APT37|FIN7|APT28
299 T1559.001 Component Object Model Execution Gamaredon Group|MuddyWater
300 T1559 Inter-Process Communication Execution no
301 T1558.002 Silver Ticket Credential Access no
309 T1056.004 Credential API Hooking Collection|Credential Access PLATINUM
310 T1056.003 Web Portal Capture Collection|Credential Access no
311 T1056.002 GUI Input Capture Collection|Credential Access FIN4
312 T1056.001 Keylogging Collection|Credential Access Tonto Team|Ajax Security Team|Operation Wocao|APT32|Sandworm Team|APT39|APT41|Kimsuky|menuPass|FIN4|APT38|OilRig|Ke3chang|PLATINUM|Sowbug|Magic Hound|Group5|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT3|Darkhotel|APT28 Tonto Team|Ajax Security Team|Operation Wocao|APT32|Sandworm Team|APT39|APT41|Kimsuky|menuPass|FIN4|APT38|Ke3chang|OilRig|PLATINUM|Sowbug|Magic Hound|Group5|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT3|Darkhotel|APT28
313 T1555 Credentials from Password Stores Credential Access APT29|Evilnum|FIN6|APT39|OilRig|MuddyWater|Leafminer|APT33|Stealth Falcon
314 T1552.005 Cloud Instance Metadata API Credential Access TeamTNT
315 T1003.008 /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow Credential Access no
317 T1003.006 DCSync Credential Access APT29|Operation Wocao
318 T1558.003 Kerberoasting Credential Access FIN7|APT29|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider
319 T1552.006 Group Policy Preferences Credential Access APT33
320 T1003.003 NTDS Credential Access Ke3chang|Dragonfly|APT28|Mustang Panda|HAFNIUM|Fox Kitten|menuPass|Wizard Spider|Chimera|FIN6|Dragonfly 2.0 Ke3chang|Dragonfly|APT28|Mustang Panda|HAFNIUM|Fox Kitten|menuPass|Wizard Spider|Chimera|FIN6
321 T1003.002 Security Account Manager Credential Access Dragonfly|Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390|Ke3chang|GALLIUM|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|menuPass Dragonfly|Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390|Ke3chang|GALLIUM|Night Dragon|menuPass
322 T1003.001 LSASS Memory Credential Access Aquatic Panda|Indrik Spider|HAFNIUM|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Blue Mockingbird|Silence|Threat Group-3390|Leviathan|APT41|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|APT32|Leafminer|Magic Hound|FIN8|PLATINUM|MuddyWater|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN6|APT3|APT28|APT1|Ke3chang|Cleaver Aquatic Panda|Indrik Spider|HAFNIUM|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Blue Mockingbird|Silence|Threat Group-3390|Leviathan|APT41|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|APT32|Leafminer|Magic Hound|FIN8|MuddyWater|PLATINUM|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN6|APT3|APT28|APT1|Ke3chang|Cleaver
323 T1110.004 Credential Stuffing Credential Access Chimera
324 T1110.003 Password Spraying Credential Access Sandworm Team|APT29|Silent Librarian|Chimera|APT28|APT33|Leafminer|Lazarus Group
325 T1110.002 Password Cracking Credential Access Dragonfly|FIN6|APT41|Dragonfly 2.0|APT3 Dragonfly|FIN6|APT41|APT3
326 T1110.001 Password Guessing Credential Access APT28
327 T1021.006 Windows Remote Management Lateral Movement APT29|Chimera|Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390
328 T1021.005 VNC Lateral Movement Gamaredon Group|FIN7|Fox Kitten|GCMAN
329 T1021.004 SSH Lateral Movement BlackTech|Lazarus Group|TeamTNT|FIN7|Fox Kitten|Rocke|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|OilRig|menuPass|GCMAN
330 T1021.003 Distributed Component Object Model Lateral Movement no
331 T1021.002 SMB/Windows Admin Shares Lateral Movement APT29|Sandworm Team|APT28|Fox Kitten|APT41|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|APT39|APT32|Orangeworm|FIN8|APT3|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-1314|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang
332 T1021.001 Remote Desktop Protocol Lateral Movement APT29|Dragonfly|Kimsuky|FIN7|Fox Kitten|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|APT3|OilRig|FIN10|menuPass|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|APT1|Axiom APT29|Dragonfly|Kimsuky|FIN7|Fox Kitten|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Cobalt Group|FIN8|OilRig|APT3|menuPass|FIN10|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|APT1|Axiom
333 T1554 Compromise Client Software Binary Persistence no
334 T1036.006 Space after Filename Defense Evasion no
335 T1036.005 Match Legitimate Name or Location Defense Evasion Ke3chang|Kimsuky|Gamaredon Group|WIRTE|APT28|Ferocious Kitten|FIN7|BackdoorDiplomacy|Transparent Tribe|Naikon|APT29|Mustang Panda|Sidewinder|Darkhotel|Lazarus Group|Indrik Spider|Fox Kitten|Machete|Chimera|PROMETHIUM|Rocke|Sandworm Team|APT39|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Silence|APT41|menuPass|TEMP.Veles|MuddyWater|Sowbug|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|Patchwork|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Carbanak|APT1
338 T1036.002 Right-to-Left Override Defense Evasion Ferocious Kitten|BRONZE BUTLER|BlackTech|Ke3chang|Scarlet Mimic
339 T1036.001 Invalid Code Signature Defense Evasion Windshift|APT37
340 T1553.003 SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking Defense Evasion no
341 T1553.002 Code Signing Defense Evasion Lazarus Group|menuPass|APT29|GALLIUM|Wizard Spider|Kimsuky|PROMETHIUM|Patchwork|Silence|APT41|FIN6|TA505|FIN7|Honeybee|Leviathan|CopyKittens|Winnti Group|Suckfly|Molerats|Darkhotel Lazarus Group|menuPass|APT29|GALLIUM|Wizard Spider|Kimsuky|PROMETHIUM|Patchwork|Silence|APT41|FIN6|TA505|Honeybee|FIN7|Leviathan|CopyKittens|Winnti Group|Suckfly|Molerats|Darkhotel
342 T1553.001 Gatekeeper Bypass Defense Evasion no
343 T1553 Subvert Trust Controls Defense Evasion Axiom
344 T1027.003 Steganography Defense Evasion Andariel|Leviathan|TA551|BRONZE BUTLER|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|APT37
345 T1027.002 Software Packing Defense Evasion Threat Group-3390|Lazarus Group|Sandworm Team|Kimsuky|TeamTNT|ZIRCONIUM|TA505|Rocke|GALLIUM|The White Company|APT39|APT38|Dark Caracal|Elderwood|APT3|Patchwork|APT29|Night Dragon
346 T1027.001 Binary Padding Defense Evasion APT29|Mustang Panda|Higaisa|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|APT32|Leviathan|BRONZE BUTLER|Moafee APT29|Mustang Panda|Higaisa|Gamaredon Group|APT32|Patchwork|Leviathan|BRONZE BUTLER|Moafee
347 T1222.002 Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification Defense Evasion TeamTNT|Rocke|APT32
348 T1222.001 Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification Defense Evasion Wizard Spider
349 T1552.004 Private Keys Credential Access TeamTNT|APT29|Operation Wocao|Rocke
354 T1216.001 PubPrn Defense Evasion APT32
355 T1070.006 Timestomp Defense Evasion APT38|APT29|Chimera|Kimsuky|Rocke|TEMP.Veles|APT32|Lazarus Group|APT28
356 T1070.005 Network Share Connection Removal Defense Evasion Threat Group-3390
357 T1070.004 File Deletion Defense Evasion Aquatic Panda|Dragonfly|TeamTNT|APT39|Mustang Panda|Chimera|Evilnum|Operation Wocao|FIN6|Sandworm Team|Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Wizard Spider|APT41|Kimsuky|Silence|The White Company|TEMP.Veles|APT32|APT38|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Honeybee|Patchwork|menuPass|FIN8|OilRig|FIN5|BRONZE BUTLER|APT3|Magic Hound|Threat Group-3390|APT28|FIN10|Group5|Lazarus Group|APT18|APT29 Aquatic Panda|Dragonfly|TeamTNT|APT39|Mustang Panda|Chimera|Evilnum|Operation Wocao|FIN6|Sandworm Team|Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Wizard Spider|APT41|Kimsuky|Silence|The White Company|TEMP.Veles|APT32|APT38|Patchwork|Honeybee|menuPass|Cobalt Group|FIN8|Magic Hound|FIN5|BRONZE BUTLER|APT3|OilRig|APT28|Threat Group-3390|FIN10|Group5|Lazarus Group|APT18|APT29
358 T1070.003 Clear Command History Defense Evasion Lazarus Group|TeamTNT|menuPass|APT41
359 T1550.004 Web Session Cookie Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement APT29
360 T1550.001 Application Access Token Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement APT29|APT28
363 T1550 Use Alternate Authentication Material Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement APT29
364 T1548.004 Elevated Execution with Prompt Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion no
365 T1548.003 Sudo and Sudo Caching Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion no
366 T1548.002 Bypass User Account Control Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion Evilnum|APT37|MuddyWater|Threat Group-3390|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork|APT29 Evilnum|APT37|MuddyWater|Threat Group-3390|Cobalt Group|Honeybee|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork|APT29
367 T1548.001 Setuid and Setgid Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion no
368 T1548 Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion no
369 T1136.003 Cloud Account Persistence APT29
370 T1070.002 Clear Linux or Mac System Logs Defense Evasion TeamTNT|Rocke
371 T1070.001 Clear Windows Event Logs Defense Evasion Dragonfly|Indrik Spider|Chimera|Operation Wocao|APT41|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|APT32|FIN8|FIN5|APT28 Dragonfly|Indrik Spider|Chimera|Operation Wocao|APT41|APT38|APT32|FIN8|FIN5|APT28
372 T1136.002 Domain Account Persistence Sandworm Team|HAFNIUM|GALLIUM
373 T1136.001 Local Account Persistence Kimsuky|Dragonfly|TeamTNT|Fox Kitten|APT39|APT41|Leafminer|Dragonfly 2.0|APT3 Kimsuky|Dragonfly|TeamTNT|Fox Kitten|APT39|APT41|Leafminer|APT3
T1547.011 Plist Modification Persistence|Privilege Escalation no
374 T1547.010 Port Monitors Persistence|Privilege Escalation no
375 T1547.009 Shortcut Modification Persistence|Privilege Escalation Dragonfly|APT39|Darkhotel|APT29|Gorgon Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Lazarus Group|Leviathan Dragonfly|APT39|Darkhotel|APT29|Gorgon Group|Lazarus Group|Leviathan
376 T1547.008 LSASS Driver Persistence|Privilege Escalation no
377 T1547.007 Re-opened Applications Persistence|Privilege Escalation no
378 T1547.006 Kernel Modules and Extensions Persistence|Privilege Escalation no
396 T1546.003 Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription Privilege Escalation|Persistence FIN8|Mustang Panda|APT33|Blue Mockingbird|Turla|Leviathan|APT29
397 T1546.002 Screensaver Privilege Escalation|Persistence no
398 T1546.001 Change Default File Association Privilege Escalation|Persistence Kimsuky
399 T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder Persistence|Privilege Escalation Confucius|Dragonfly|LazyScripter|TeamTNT|Naikon|Windshift|Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Sidewinder|APT28|Wizard Spider|PROMETHIUM|Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Silence|RTM|Inception|APT41|Kimsuky|APT33|APT39|APT32|APT18|Dark Caracal|Threat Group-3390|Honeybee|Turla|Cobalt Group|Ke3chang|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|Gorgon Group|MuddyWater|APT37|Leviathan|BRONZE BUTLER|APT3|Magic Hound|FIN10|FIN7|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT29|Darkhotel Confucius|Dragonfly|LazyScripter|TeamTNT|Naikon|Windshift|Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Sidewinder|APT28|Wizard Spider|PROMETHIUM|Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Silence|RTM|Inception|APT41|Kimsuky|APT33|APT39|APT32|APT18|Dark Caracal|Gorgon Group|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|Threat Group-3390|Turla|Ke3chang|APT19|MuddyWater|APT37|Leviathan|Magic Hound|APT3|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN7|FIN10|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT29|Darkhotel
400 T1218.002 Control Panel Defense Evasion no
401 T1218.010 Regsvr32 Defense Evasion Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|TA551|Blue Mockingbird|Inception|WIRTE|Cobalt Group|APT19|Leviathan|APT32|Deep Panda
402 T1218.009 Regsvcs/Regasm Defense Evasion no
403 T1218.005 Mshta Defense Evasion Gamaredon Group|Confucius|Lazarus Group|APT29|LazyScripter|Mustang Panda|TA551|Sidewinder|Inception|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|FIN7
404 T1218.004 InstallUtil Defense Evasion Mustang Panda|menuPass
405 T1218.001 Compiled HTML File Defense Evasion APT38|APT41|Silence|Dark Caracal|OilRig|Lazarus Group APT38|APT41|Silence|OilRig|Dark Caracal
406 T1218.003 CMSTP Defense Evasion Cobalt Group|MuddyWater
407 T1218.011 Rundll32 Defense Evasion Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|LazyScripter|APT38|HAFNIUM|TA551|APT41|Gamaredon Group|APT32|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|TA505|MuddyWater|APT29|APT19|CopyKittens|APT3|Carbanak|APT28
408 T1547 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution Persistence|Privilege Escalation no
409 T1546 Event Triggered Execution Privilege Escalation|Persistence no
410 T1098.003 Add Office 365 Global Administrator Role Additional Cloud Roles Persistence APT29
411 T1098.002 Exchange Email Delegate Permissions Additional Email Delegate Permissions Persistence APT28|APT29|Magic Hound
412 T1098.001 Additional Cloud Credentials Persistence APT29
413 T1543.004 Launch Daemon Persistence|Privilege Escalation no
414 T1543.003 Windows Service Persistence|Privilege Escalation TeamTNT|APT38|PROMETHIUM|Blue Mockingbird|DarkVishnya|Wizard Spider|APT32|APT41|Kimsuky|Tropic Trooper|Cobalt Group|Ke3chang|FIN7|APT19|Threat Group-3390|Honeybee|APT3|Lazarus Group|Carbanak TeamTNT|APT38|PROMETHIUM|Blue Mockingbird|DarkVishnya|Wizard Spider|APT32|APT41|Kimsuky|Tropic Trooper|Threat Group-3390|Ke3chang|Cobalt Group|Honeybee|APT19|FIN7|APT3|Lazarus Group|Carbanak
415 T1543.002 Systemd Service Persistence|Privilege Escalation TeamTNT|Rocke
416 T1543.001 Launch Agent Persistence|Privilege Escalation no
417 T1037.005 Startup Items Persistence|Privilege Escalation no
418 T1037.004 RC Scripts Persistence|Privilege Escalation no
419 T1055.012 Process Hollowing Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation Kimsuky|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Gorgon Group|Patchwork Kimsuky|Threat Group-3390|Gorgon Group|menuPass|Patchwork
420 T1055.013 Process Doppelgänging Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation Leafminer
421 T1055.011 Extra Window Memory Injection Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation no
422 T1055.014 VDSO Hijacking Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation no
429 T1055.001 Dynamic-link Library Injection Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation BackdoorDiplomacy|Leviathan|Wizard Spider|TA505|Turla|Tropic Trooper|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda
430 T1037.003 Network Logon Script Persistence|Privilege Escalation no
431 T1543 Create or Modify System Process Persistence|Privilege Escalation no
432 T1037.002 Logon Script (Mac) Login Hook Persistence|Privilege Escalation no
433 T1037.001 Logon Script (Windows) Persistence|Privilege Escalation Cobalt Group|APT28
434 T1542.003 Bootkit Persistence|Defense Evasion APT41|Lazarus Group|APT28
435 T1542.002 Component Firmware Persistence|Defense Evasion Equation
436 T1542.001 System Firmware Persistence|Defense Evasion no
437 T1505.003 Web Shell Persistence Dragonfly|BackdoorDiplomacy|APT38|APT29|APT28|Tonto Team|Sandworm Team|HAFNIUM|Volatile Cedar|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|Tropic Trooper|GALLIUM|Threat Group-3390|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|APT32|OilRig|Deep Panda Dragonfly|BackdoorDiplomacy|APT38|APT29|APT28|Tonto Team|Sandworm Team|HAFNIUM|Volatile Cedar|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|Tropic Trooper|GALLIUM|Threat Group-3390|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|OilRig|APT32|Deep Panda
438 T1505.002 Transport Agent Persistence no
439 T1505.001 SQL Stored Procedures Persistence Sandworm Team
440 T1053.003 Cron Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation APT38|Rocke
441 T1053.001 T1053.005 At (Linux) Scheduled Task Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation no Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|Confucius|Dragonfly|APT37|APT38|Naikon|CostaRicto|Mustang Panda|Higaisa|Fox Kitten|Molerats|Machete|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT-C-36|BRONZE BUTLER|APT41|GALLIUM|Silence|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|OilRig|Rancor|Cobalt Group|Patchwork|FIN8|FIN10|menuPass|APT32|FIN7|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|APT3|APT29
442 T1053.005 T1053.002 Scheduled Task At Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|Confucius|Dragonfly|APT37|APT38|Naikon|CostaRicto|Mustang Panda|Higaisa|Fox Kitten|Molerats|Machete|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT-C-36|BRONZE BUTLER|APT41|GALLIUM|Silence|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|Rancor|OilRig|Patchwork|Dragonfly 2.0|Cobalt Group|FIN8|menuPass|FIN10|FIN7|APT32|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|APT3|APT29 BRONZE BUTLER|Threat Group-3390|APT18
T1053.002 At (Windows) Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation BRONZE BUTLER|Threat Group-3390|APT18
443 T1542 Pre-OS Boot Defense Evasion|Persistence no
444 T1137.001 Office Template Macros Persistence MuddyWater
445 T1137.004 Outlook Home Page Persistence OilRig
475 T1484 Domain Policy Modification Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation no
476 T1482 Domain Trust Discovery Discovery FIN8|APT29|Chimera
477 T1480 Execution Guardrails Defense Evasion no
478 T1221 Template Injection Defense Evasion Lazarus Group|Confucius|Dragonfly|Gamaredon Group|Frankenstein|Inception|APT28|Tropic Trooper|DarkHydrus|Dragonfly 2.0 Lazarus Group|Confucius|Dragonfly|Gamaredon Group|Frankenstein|Inception|APT28|Tropic Trooper|DarkHydrus
T1222 File and Directory Permissions Modification Defense Evasion no
479 T1220 XSL Script Processing Defense Evasion Lazarus Group|Higaisa|Cobalt Group
480 T1217 T1222 Browser Bookmark Discovery File and Directory Permissions Modification Discovery Defense Evasion APT38|Chimera|Fox Kitten no
T1212 Exploitation for Credential Access Credential Access no
T1189 Drive-by Compromise Initial Access Magic Hound|APT28|Axiom|Transparent Tribe|Andariel|Leviathan|Machete|Windigo|Dragonfly|PROMETHIUM|Turla|Windshift|RTM|Darkhotel|APT38|APT19|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|Dark Caracal|Dragonfly 2.0|Leafminer|Patchwork|APT37|Elderwood|PLATINUM
T1211 Exploitation for Defense Evasion Defense Evasion APT28
T1197 BITS Jobs Defense Evasion|Persistence APT39|Patchwork|APT41|Leviathan
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution Execution Axiom|Confucius|Dragonfly|Andariel|Transparent Tribe|APT3|Tonto Team|Mustang Panda|Darkhotel|Higaisa|HAFNIUM|Sidewinder|Sandworm Team|MuddyWater|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT41|admin@338|Threat Group-3390|APT12|The White Company|APT33|APT32|APT28|Tropic Trooper|BRONZE BUTLER|Cobalt Group|Lazarus Group|Patchwork|Elderwood|APT29|TA459|APT37|Leviathan
T1201 Password Policy Discovery Discovery Chimera|Turla|OilRig
T1195 Supply Chain Compromise Initial Access no
T1199 Trusted Relationship Initial Access Threat Group-3390|APT29|Sandworm Team|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|APT28|menuPass
T1218 Signed Binary Proxy Execution Defense Evasion Lazarus Group
T1204 User Execution Execution no
T1213 Data from Information Repositories Collection APT29|APT28|Fox Kitten|FIN6|Turla
T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application Initial Access Threat Group-3390|Ke3chang|Kimsuky|Magic Hound|Dragonfly|BackdoorDiplomacy|menuPass|Volatile Cedar|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|APT28|APT29|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Blue Mockingbird|Rocke|APT39|BlackTech|APT41|GALLIUM|Night Dragon|Axiom
T1210 Exploitation of Remote Services Lateral Movement Dragonfly|Tonto Team|FIN7|Fox Kitten|menuPass|Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390|APT28
T1200 Hardware Additions Initial Access DarkVishnya
481 T1202 Indirect Command Execution Defense Evasion Lazarus Group
482 T1195 Supply Chain Compromise Initial Access no
483 T1219 Remote Access Software Command And Control TeamTNT|Mustang Panda|MuddyWater|Evilnum|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Sandworm Team|DarkVishnya|RTM|Kimsuky|Night Dragon|Cobalt Group|Thrip|Carbanak
484 T1213 Data from Information Repositories Collection APT29|APT28|Fox Kitten|FIN6|Turla
485 T1200 Hardware Additions Initial Access DarkVishnya
486 T1216 System Script Proxy Execution Defense Evasion no
487 T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application Initial Access Threat Group-3390|Ke3chang|Kimsuky|Magic Hound|Dragonfly|BackdoorDiplomacy|menuPass|HAFNIUM|Volatile Cedar|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|APT28|APT29|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Blue Mockingbird|Rocke|APT39|BlackTech|APT41|GALLIUM|Night Dragon|Axiom
488 T1201 Password Policy Discovery Discovery Chimera|Turla|OilRig
489 T1218 System Binary Proxy Execution Defense Evasion Lazarus Group
490 T1207 Rogue Domain Controller Defense Evasion no
491 T1216 T1199 Signed Script Proxy Execution Trusted Relationship Defense Evasion Initial Access no Threat Group-3390|APT29|Sandworm Team|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|APT28|menuPass
492 T1205 Traffic Signaling Defense Evasion|Persistence|Command And Control no
493 T1217 Browser Bookmark Discovery Discovery APT38|Chimera|Fox Kitten
494 T1204 User Execution Execution no
495 T1210 Exploitation of Remote Services Lateral Movement Dragonfly|Tonto Team|FIN7|Fox Kitten|menuPass|Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390|APT28
496 T1189 Drive-by Compromise Initial Access Magic Hound|APT28|Axiom|Transparent Tribe|Andariel|Leviathan|Machete|Windigo|Dragonfly|PROMETHIUM|Turla|Windshift|RTM|Darkhotel|APT38|BRONZE BUTLER|Dark Caracal|Leafminer|APT32|APT19|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|Patchwork|Elderwood|APT37|PLATINUM
497 T1211 Exploitation for Defense Evasion Defense Evasion APT28
498 T1212 Exploitation for Credential Access Credential Access no
499 T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution Execution Axiom|Confucius|Dragonfly|Andariel|Transparent Tribe|APT3|Tonto Team|Mustang Panda|Darkhotel|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Sandworm Team|MuddyWater|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT41|admin@338|Threat Group-3390|APT12|The White Company|APT33|APT32|APT28|Tropic Trooper|Lazarus Group|Cobalt Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Elderwood|APT37|Leviathan|Patchwork|TA459|APT29
500 T1197 BITS Jobs Defense Evasion|Persistence APT39|Patchwork|APT41|Leviathan
501 T1176 Browser Extensions Persistence Kimsuky
T1187 Forced Authentication Credential Access Dragonfly|DarkHydrus|Dragonfly 2.0
502 T1185 Browser Session Hijacking Collection no
503 T1140 T1187 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information Forced Authentication Defense Evasion Credential Access Lazarus Group|Ke3chang|Kimsuky|APT39|APT29|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Molerats|Frankenstein|Turla|WIRTE|Darkhotel|Tropic Trooper|Honeybee|Gorgon Group|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|APT19|Leviathan|MuddyWater|APT28|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER Dragonfly|DarkHydrus
504 T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information Defense Evasion Lazarus Group|Ke3chang|Kimsuky|APT39|APT29|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Molerats|Frankenstein|Turla|WIRTE|Darkhotel|Tropic Trooper|menuPass|Gorgon Group|Threat Group-3390|APT19|Honeybee|Leviathan|MuddyWater|APT28|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER
505 T1137 Office Application Startup Persistence Gamaredon Group|APT32
506 T1134 Access Token Manipulation Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation FIN6|Blue Mockingbird
507 T1136 Create Account Persistence Sandworm Team|Indrik Spider
508 T1135 Network Share Discovery Discovery Dragonfly|Tonto Team|APT38|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|APT32|APT39|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT1|Dragonfly 2.0|Sowbug Dragonfly|Tonto Team|APT38|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|APT32|APT39|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT1|Sowbug
509 T1137 T1133 Office Application Startup External Remote Services Persistence Persistence|Initial Access Gamaredon Group|APT32 Dragonfly|TeamTNT|Leviathan|APT28|APT29|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Kimsuky|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Chimera|Sandworm Team|APT41|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|Night Dragon|Ke3chang|OilRig|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|APT18
T1133 External Remote Services Persistence|Initial Access Dragonfly|TeamTNT|Leviathan|APT28|APT29|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Kimsuky|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Chimera|Sandworm Team|APT41|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|Night Dragon|Ke3chang|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|APT18
510 T1132 Data Encoding Command And Control no
511 T1129 Shared Modules Execution no
512 T1127 Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution Defense Evasion no
514 T1124 System Time Discovery Discovery Darkhotel|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Chimera|Operation Wocao|The White Company|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Turla
515 T1123 Audio Capture Collection APT37
516 T1120 Peripheral Device Discovery Discovery OilRig|BackdoorDiplomacy|Operation Wocao|Turla|APT37|Gamaredon Group|Equation|APT28
517 T1119 Automated Collection Collection Ke3chang|Confucius|Mustang Panda|Sidewinder|Chimera|menuPass|Operation Wocao|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT1|APT28|Patchwork|OilRig|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|FIN6 Ke3chang|Confucius|Mustang Panda|Sidewinder|Chimera|menuPass|Operation Wocao|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT1|Patchwork|APT28|FIN5|OilRig|Threat Group-3390|FIN6
518 T1115 Clipboard Data Collection Operation Wocao|APT39|APT38
519 T1114 Email Collection Collection Magic Hound|Silent Librarian
520 T1113 Screen Capture Collection Dragonfly|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Gamaredon Group|APT39|Silence|MuddyWater|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|Dark Caracal|FIN7|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|Group5|APT28 Dragonfly|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Gamaredon Group|APT39|Silence|MuddyWater|FIN7|OilRig|Dark Caracal|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|Group5|APT28
521 T1112 Modify Registry Defense Evasion Dragonfly|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|Turla|APT32|APT38|Patchwork|Gorgon Group|Threat Group-3390|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|Honeybee|FIN8 Dragonfly|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|Turla|APT32|APT38|APT19|Threat Group-3390|Patchwork|Honeybee|Gorgon Group|FIN8
522 T1111 Two-Factor Authentication Interception Multi-Factor Authentication Interception Credential Access Kimsuky|Chimera|Operation Wocao
523 T1110 Brute Force Credential Access Lazarus Group|Dragonfly|APT38|APT28|Fox Kitten|DarkVishnya|APT39|OilRig|FIN5|Turla
524 T1106 Native API Execution BlackTech|Lazarus Group|APT38|Higaisa|menuPass|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Turla|Silence|APT37|Gorgon Group
525 T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer Command And Control LazyScripter|Ke3chang|Aquatic Panda|Winnti Group|Confucius|Dragonfly|TeamTNT|Nomadic Octopus|IndigoZebra|Andariel|BackdoorDiplomacy|Tonto Team|HAFNIUM|APT29|Ajax Security Team|Mustang Panda|Windshift|Darkhotel|ZIRCONIUM|TA551|Volatile Cedar|Indrik Spider|Evilnum|Sidewinder|Fox Kitten|Kimsuky|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Silence|APT-C-36|APT41|GALLIUM|TA505|WIRTE|APT33|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Rancor|Gorgon Group|OilRig|Turla|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|PLATINUM|APT37|Elderwood|Leviathan|APT32|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|APT3|menuPass|FIN7|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28 LazyScripter|Ke3chang|Aquatic Panda|Winnti Group|Confucius|Dragonfly|TeamTNT|Nomadic Octopus|IndigoZebra|Andariel|BackdoorDiplomacy|Tonto Team|HAFNIUM|APT29|Ajax Security Team|Mustang Panda|Windshift|Darkhotel|ZIRCONIUM|TA551|Volatile Cedar|Indrik Spider|Evilnum|Sidewinder|Fox Kitten|Kimsuky|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Silence|APT-C-36|APT41|GALLIUM|TA505|WIRTE|APT33|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Gorgon Group|Turla|Cobalt Group|Rancor|OilRig|Leviathan|Elderwood|APT37|PLATINUM|FIN8|APT32|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|APT3|menuPass|FIN7|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28
526 T1104 Multi-Stage Channels Command And Control Lazarus Group|APT41|MuddyWater|APT3
527 T1102 Web Service Command And Control Mustang Panda|LazyScripter|TeamTNT|FIN8|Fox Kitten|Turla|APT32|Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Inception|FIN6
528 T1098 Account Manipulation Persistence Kimsuky|Dragonfly|Sandworm Team|APT3|Dragonfly 2.0|Lazarus Group Kimsuky|Dragonfly|Sandworm Team|APT3|Lazarus Group
529 T1095 Non-Application Layer Protocol Command And Control BackdoorDiplomacy|HAFNIUM|Operation Wocao|FIN6|APT29|PLATINUM|APT3
530 T1092 Communication Through Removable Media Command And Control APT28
531 T1091 Replication Through Removable Media Lateral Movement|Initial Access FIN7|Mustang Panda|Tropic Trooper|Darkhotel|APT28
532 T1090 Proxy Command And Control Windigo|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|APT41|Turla
533 T1087 Account Discovery Discovery APT29
534 T1083 File and Directory Discovery Discovery Winnti Group|Confucius|Dragonfly|APT38|APT29|Mustang Panda|Darkhotel|Windigo|Sidewinder|Chimera|Fox Kitten|menuPass|APT39|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Inception|APT41|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|APT18|Leafminer|Honeybee|Dark Caracal|Dragonfly 2.0|APT3|Sowbug|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|APT28|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang Winnti Group|Confucius|Dragonfly|APT38|APT29|Mustang Panda|Darkhotel|Windigo|Sidewinder|Chimera|Fox Kitten|menuPass|APT39|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Inception|APT41|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|APT18|Dark Caracal|Leafminer|Honeybee|BRONZE BUTLER|Sowbug|Magic Hound|APT3|APT28|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
535 T1082 System Information Discovery Discovery Aquatic Panda|Confucius|TeamTNT|APT38|APT29|Mustang Panda|Windshift|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Windigo|Sidewinder|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|APT32|APT37|Honeybee|APT19|Magic Hound|Sowbug|OilRig|APT3|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang Aquatic Panda|Confucius|TeamTNT|APT38|APT29|Mustang Panda|Windshift|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Windigo|Sidewinder|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|APT19|APT32|Honeybee|APT37|APT3|OilRig|Sowbug|Magic Hound|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
536 T1080 Taint Shared Content Lateral Movement Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Darkhotel
537 T1078 Valid Accounts Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access Ke3chang|Lazarus Group|Axiom|Dragonfly|FIN7|Leviathan|APT29|Silent Librarian|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|APT39|FIN4|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|APT33|FIN5|OilRig|APT28|menuPass|FIN10|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390|APT18|PittyTiger|Carbanak Ke3chang|Lazarus Group|Axiom|Dragonfly|FIN7|Leviathan|APT29|Silent Librarian|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|APT39|FIN4|Night Dragon|FIN8|APT33|OilRig|FIN5|FIN10|APT28|menuPass|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390|APT18|PittyTiger|Carbanak
538 T1074 Data Staged Collection Wizard Spider
539 T1072 Software Deployment Tools Execution|Lateral Movement Silence|APT32|Threat Group-1314
540 T1071 Application Layer Protocol Command And Control Dragonfly|TeamTNT|Rocke|Magic Hound|Dragonfly 2.0 Dragonfly|TeamTNT|Rocke|Magic Hound
541 T1070 Indicator Removal on Host Defense Evasion Lazarus Group|APT29
542 T1069 Permission Groups Discovery Discovery APT29|TA505|APT3
543 T1068 Exploitation for Privilege Escalation Privilege Escalation APT29|Tonto Team|ZIRCONIUM|Turla|Whitefly|APT33|Cobalt Group|PLATINUM|FIN8|APT32|Threat Group-3390|FIN6|APT28 APT29|Tonto Team|ZIRCONIUM|Turla|Whitefly|APT33|Cobalt Group|PLATINUM|FIN8|Threat Group-3390|APT32|FIN6|APT28
544 T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter Execution Dragonfly|APT37|Windigo|Fox Kitten|APT32|Whitefly|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN7|APT19|OilRig|FIN5|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Ke3chang Dragonfly|APT37|Windigo|Fox Kitten|APT32|Whitefly|APT39|APT19|FIN7|OilRig|FIN5|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Ke3chang
545 T1057 Process Discovery Discovery Gamaredon Group|Kimsuky|TeamTNT|Andariel|APT29|Mustang Panda|Windshift|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Rocke|Frankenstein|Inception|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|APT38|Tropic Trooper|APT37|Honeybee|OilRig|APT3|Magic Hound|APT28|Winnti Group|Stealth Falcon|Poseidon Group|Lazarus Group|Molerats|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang Gamaredon Group|Kimsuky|TeamTNT|Andariel|APT29|Mustang Panda|Windshift|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Rocke|Frankenstein|Inception|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|APT38|Tropic Trooper|APT37|Honeybee|Magic Hound|APT3|OilRig|APT28|Winnti Group|Stealth Falcon|Poseidon Group|Lazarus Group|Molerats|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang
546 T1056 Input Capture Collection|Credential Access APT39
547 T1055 Process Injection Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation Operation Wocao|APT32|Sharpshooter|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|Cobalt Group|Turla|APT37|Honeybee|PLATINUM Operation Wocao|APT32|Sharpshooter|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|Cobalt Group|APT37|Turla|Honeybee|PLATINUM
548 T1053 Scheduled Task/Job Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation no
549 T1052 Exfiltration Over Physical Medium Exfiltration no
550 T1049 System Network Connections Discovery Discovery Lazarus Group|TeamTNT|Andariel|BackdoorDiplomacy|Mustang Panda|MuddyWater|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Tropic Trooper|APT41|APT38|GALLIUM|APT32|APT1|OilRig|APT3|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang Lazarus Group|TeamTNT|Andariel|BackdoorDiplomacy|Mustang Panda|MuddyWater|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Tropic Trooper|APT41|APT38|GALLIUM|APT32|APT1|OilRig|APT3|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
551 T1048 Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol Exfiltration no
552 T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation Execution Gamaredon Group|Sandworm Team|FIN7|Indrik Spider|Naikon|Mustang Panda|Windshift|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT41|FIN6|GALLIUM|APT32|MuddyWater|Threat Group-3390|OilRig|FIN8|Leviathan|menuPass|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT29|Deep Panda Gamaredon Group|Sandworm Team|FIN7|Indrik Spider|Naikon|Mustang Panda|Windshift|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT41|FIN6|GALLIUM|APT32|MuddyWater|OilRig|Threat Group-3390|Leviathan|FIN8|menuPass|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT29|Deep Panda
553 T1046 Network Service Scanning Network Service Discovery Discovery BlackTech|Lazarus Group|TeamTNT|BackdoorDiplomacy|Naikon|CostaRicto|Chimera|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Rocke|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT39|APT32|OilRig|Cobalt Group|Leafminer|menuPass|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390 BlackTech|Lazarus Group|TeamTNT|BackdoorDiplomacy|Naikon|CostaRicto|Chimera|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Rocke|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT39|APT32|Leafminer|Cobalt Group|OilRig|menuPass|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390
554 T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel Exfiltration Confucius|Leviathan|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Chimera|APT39|Operation Wocao|Sandworm Team|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Kimsuky|GALLIUM|APT32|APT3|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Ke3chang
555 T1040 Network Sniffing Credential Access|Discovery Kimsuky|Sandworm Team|DarkVishnya|APT33|APT28
556 T1039 Data from Network Shared Drive Collection APT28|Chimera|Fox Kitten|Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Sowbug|menuPass
557 T1037 Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts Persistence|Privilege Escalation Rocke
558 T1036 Masquerading Defense Evasion Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|Dragonfly|LazyScripter|APT28|Nomadic Octopus|OilRig|APT29|ZIRCONIUM|TA551|Windshift|APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|PLATINUM|Dragonfly 2.0 Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|Dragonfly|LazyScripter|APT28|Nomadic Octopus|OilRig|APT29|ZIRCONIUM|TA551|Windshift|APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|PLATINUM
559 T1033 System Owner/User Discovery Discovery Threat Group-3390|Ke3chang|Dragonfly|APT38|Windshift|ZIRCONIUM|Sidewinder|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT41|GALLIUM|Tropic Trooper|APT39|MuddyWater|APT37|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|APT32|Magic Hound|OilRig|FIN10|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3 Threat Group-3390|Ke3chang|Dragonfly|APT38|Windshift|ZIRCONIUM|Sidewinder|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT41|GALLIUM|Tropic Trooper|APT39|MuddyWater|APT32|APT37|APT19|OilRig|Magic Hound|FIN10|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3
560 T1030 Data Transfer Size Limits Exfiltration APT28|Threat Group-3390
561 T1029 Scheduled Transfer Exfiltration Higaisa
562 T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information Defense Evasion Aquatic Panda|Ke3chang|LazyScripter|TeamTNT|BackdoorDiplomacy|Transparent Tribe|APT39|Mustang Panda|Windshift|TA551|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Fox Kitten|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|FIN6|Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|APT41|GALLIUM|Turla|TA505|Silence|APT33|Night Dragon|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|APT29|APT18|Tropic Trooper|Patchwork|menuPass|APT37|Threat Group-3390|Cobalt Group|Dark Caracal|Leafminer|Honeybee|APT19|BlackOasis|Leviathan|FIN8|MuddyWater|FIN7|Elderwood|OilRig|Magic Hound|APT3|APT32|Group5|Dust Storm|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT28 Aquatic Panda|Ke3chang|LazyScripter|TeamTNT|BackdoorDiplomacy|Transparent Tribe|APT39|Mustang Panda|Windshift|TA551|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Fox Kitten|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|FIN6|Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|APT41|GALLIUM|Turla|TA505|Silence|APT33|Night Dragon|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|APT29|APT18|Tropic Trooper|APT37|Cobalt Group|Dark Caracal|menuPass|Leafminer|Honeybee|APT19|Threat Group-3390|Patchwork|Elderwood|MuddyWater|Leviathan|FIN7|BlackOasis|FIN8|OilRig|APT3|Magic Hound|APT32|Group5|Dust Storm|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT28
563 T1025 Data from Removable Media Collection Turla|Gamaredon Group|APT28
564 T1021 Remote Services Lateral Movement no
565 T1020 Automated Exfiltration Exfiltration Ke3chang|Sidewinder|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Honeybee
566 T1018 Remote System Discovery Discovery Dragonfly|Indrik Spider|Naikon|APT29|Chimera|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Sandworm Team|Rocke|Wizard Spider|Silence|GALLIUM|APT39|APT32|Deep Panda|Ke3chang|Threat Group-3390|Dragonfly 2.0|Leafminer|FIN8|FIN5|APT3|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN6|Turla Dragonfly|Indrik Spider|Naikon|APT29|Chimera|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Sandworm Team|Rocke|Wizard Spider|Silence|GALLIUM|APT39|APT32|Leafminer|Ke3chang|Threat Group-3390|Deep Panda|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN5|APT3|menuPass|FIN6|Turla
567 T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery Discovery Kimsuky|Dragonfly|TeamTNT|ZIRCONIUM|Mustang Panda|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Sandworm Team|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT41|GALLIUM|APT32|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|Magic Hound|OilRig|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3|Naikon|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang Kimsuky|Dragonfly|TeamTNT|ZIRCONIUM|Mustang Panda|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Sandworm Team|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT41|GALLIUM|APT32|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|APT19|Magic Hound|OilRig|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3|Naikon|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
568 T1014 Rootkit Defense Evasion TeamTNT|Rocke|APT41|APT28|Winnti Group
569 T1012 Query Registry Discovery Kimsuky|Dragonfly|ZIRCONIUM|Chimera|Fox Kitten|APT39|Operation Wocao|APT32|Dragonfly 2.0|Threat Group-3390|OilRig|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Turla Kimsuky|Dragonfly|ZIRCONIUM|Chimera|Fox Kitten|APT39|Operation Wocao|APT32|Threat Group-3390|OilRig|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Turla
570 T1011 Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium Exfiltration no
571 T1010 Application Window Discovery Discovery Lazarus Group
572 T1008 Fallback Channels Command And Control FIN7|APT41|OilRig|Lazarus Group
573 T1007 System Service Discovery Discovery Kimsuky|Aquatic Panda|Indrik Spider|Chimera|Operation Wocao|BRONZE BUTLER|APT1|OilRig|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
574 T1006 Direct Volume Access Defense Evasion no
575 T1005 Data from Local System Collection Axiom|Dragonfly|FIN7|APT41|APT38|Andariel|APT29|Windigo|Fox Kitten|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|FIN6|Gamaredon Group|APT39|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|GALLIUM|Turla|menuPass|Dark Caracal|Dragonfly 2.0|Honeybee|APT37|APT28|APT3|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|Threat Group-3390|APT1|Ke3chang Axiom|Dragonfly|FIN7|APT41|APT38|Andariel|APT29|Windigo|Fox Kitten|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|FIN6|Gamaredon Group|APT39|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|GALLIUM|Turla|menuPass|Honeybee|Dark Caracal|APT37|APT28|BRONZE BUTLER|APT3|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|Threat Group-3390|APT1|Ke3chang
576 T1003 OS Credential Dumping Credential Access Tonto Team|APT39|Frankenstein|APT32|APT28|Leviathan|Sowbug|Suckfly|Poseidon Group|Axiom
577 T1001 Data Obfuscation Command And Control Operation Wocao|Axiom Operation Wocao
docs/_data/navigation.yml
+2
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@@ -60,6 +60,8 @@ detections:
url: /detections/network_traffic/
- title: Risk
url: /detections/risk/
- title: Splunk_Audit
url: /detections/splunk_audit/
- title: UEBA
url: /detections/ueba/
- title: Updates
docs/_pages/detections.md
+79 -64
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@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ sidebar:
| [CHCP Command Execution](/endpoint/chcp_command_execution/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter](/endpoint/cmd_carry_out_string_command_parameter/) | [Windows Command Shell](/tags/#windows-command-shell), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter) | [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [CMD Echo Pipe - Escalation](/endpoint/cmd_echo_pipe_-_escalation/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [Windows Command Shell](/tags/#windows-command-shell), [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [CMLUA Or CMSTPLUA UAC Bypass](/endpoint/cmlua_or_cmstplua_uac_bypass/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [CMSTP](/tags/#cmstp) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [CMLUA Or CMSTPLUA UAC Bypass](/endpoint/cmlua_or_cmstplua_uac_bypass/) | [System Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#system-binary-proxy-execution), [CMSTP](/tags/#cmstp) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [CSC Net On The Fly Compilation](/endpoint/csc_net_on_the_fly_compilation/) | [Compile After Delivery](/tags/#compile-after-delivery), [Obfuscated Files or Information](/tags/#obfuscated-files-or-information) | [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments](/endpoint/certutil_download_with_urlcache_and_split_arguments/) | [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [CertUtil Download With VerifyCtl and Split Arguments](/endpoint/certutil_download_with_verifyctl_and_split_arguments/) | [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ sidebar:
| [Circle CI Disable Security Job](/cloud/circle_ci_disable_security_job/) | [Compromise Client Software Binary](/tags/#compromise-client-software-binary) | [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Circle CI Disable Security Step](/cloud/circle_ci_disable_security_step/) | [Compromise Client Software Binary](/tags/#compromise-client-software-binary) | [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Clear Unallocated Sector Using Cipher App](/endpoint/clear_unallocated_sector_using_cipher_app/) | [File Deletion](/tags/#file-deletion), [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers](/deprecated/clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers/) | [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-unencrypted/obfuscated-non-c2-protocol) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers](/deprecated/clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers/) | [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-unencrypted-non-c2-protocol) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Clop Common Exec Parameter](/endpoint/clop_common_exec_parameter/) | [User Execution](/tags/#user-execution) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Clop Ransomware Known Service Name](/endpoint/clop_ransomware_known_service_name/) | [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles](/cloud/cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles/) | [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts) | [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
@@ -108,8 +108,9 @@ sidebar:
| [Cobalt Strike Named Pipes](/endpoint/cobalt_strike_named_pipes/) | [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Common Ransomware Extensions](/endpoint/common_ransomware_extensions/) | [Data Destruction](/tags/#data-destruction) | [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Common Ransomware Notes](/endpoint/common_ransomware_notes/) | [Data Destruction](/tags/#data-destruction) | [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Confluence Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution CVE-2022-26134](/web/confluence_unauthenticated_remote_code_execution_cve-2022-26134/) | [Server Software Component](/tags/#server-software-component), [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Conti Common Exec parameter](/endpoint/conti_common_exec_parameter/) | [User Execution](/tags/#user-execution) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Control Loading from World Writable Directory](/endpoint/control_loading_from_world_writable_directory/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Control Panel](/tags/#control-panel) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Control Loading from World Writable Directory](/endpoint/control_loading_from_world_writable_directory/) | [System Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#system-binary-proxy-execution), [Control Panel](/tags/#control-panel) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Correlation by Repository and Risk](/cloud/correlation_by_repository_and_risk/) | [Malicious Image](/tags/#malicious-image), [User Execution](/tags/#user-execution) | [Correlation](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Correlation by User and Risk](/cloud/correlation_by_user_and_risk/) | [Malicious Image](/tags/#malicious-image), [User Execution](/tags/#user-execution) | [Correlation](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Create Remote Thread In Shell Application](/endpoint/create_remote_thread_in_shell_application/) | [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
@@ -125,7 +126,7 @@ sidebar:
| [DLLHost with no Command Line Arguments with Network](/endpoint/dllhost_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network/) | [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App](/endpoint/dns_exfiltration_using_nslookup_app/) | [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK](/network/dns_query_length_outliers_-_mltk/) | [DNS](/tags/#dns), [Application Layer Protocol](/tags/#application-layer-protocol) | [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation](/network/dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation/) | [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-unencrypted/obfuscated-non-c2-protocol), [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol) | [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation](/network/dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation/) | [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-unencrypted-non-c2-protocol), [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol) | [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers](/deprecated/dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers/) | [DNS](/tags/#dns) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [DNS record changed](/deprecated/dns_record_changed/) | [DNS](/tags/#dns) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [DSQuery Domain Discovery](/endpoint/dsquery_domain_discovery/) | [Domain Trust Discovery](/tags/#domain-trust-discovery) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
@@ -155,14 +156,14 @@ sidebar:
| [Detect Exchange Web Shell](/endpoint/detect_exchange_web_shell/) | [Server Software Component](/tags/#server-software-component), [Web Shell](/tags/#web-shell), [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Detect F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902](/web/detect_f5_tmui_rce_cve-2020-5902/) | [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Detect GCP Storage access from a new IP](/cloud/detect_gcp_storage_access_from_a_new_ip/) | [Data from Cloud Storage Object](/tags/#data-from-cloud-storage-object) | [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Detect HTML Help Renamed](/endpoint/detect_html_help_renamed/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Compiled HTML File](/tags/#compiled-html-file) | [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Detect HTML Help Spawn Child Process](/endpoint/detect_html_help_spawn_child_process/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Compiled HTML File](/tags/#compiled-html-file) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Detect HTML Help URL in Command Line](/endpoint/detect_html_help_url_in_command_line/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Compiled HTML File](/tags/#compiled-html-file) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Detect HTML Help Using InfoTech Storage Handlers](/endpoint/detect_html_help_using_infotech_storage_handlers/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Compiled HTML File](/tags/#compiled-html-file) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Detect HTML Help Renamed](/endpoint/detect_html_help_renamed/) | [System Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#system-binary-proxy-execution), [Compiled HTML File](/tags/#compiled-html-file) | [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Detect HTML Help Spawn Child Process](/endpoint/detect_html_help_spawn_child_process/) | [System Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#system-binary-proxy-execution), [Compiled HTML File](/tags/#compiled-html-file) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Detect HTML Help URL in Command Line](/endpoint/detect_html_help_url_in_command_line/) | [System Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#system-binary-proxy-execution), [Compiled HTML File](/tags/#compiled-html-file) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Detect HTML Help Using InfoTech Storage Handlers](/endpoint/detect_html_help_using_infotech_storage_handlers/) | [System Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#system-binary-proxy-execution), [Compiled HTML File](/tags/#compiled-html-file) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Detect IPv6 Network Infrastructure Threats](/network/detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats/) | [Hardware Additions](/tags/#hardware-additions), [Network Denial of Service](/tags/#network-denial-of-service), [Adversary-in-the-Middle](/tags/#adversary-in-the-middle), [ARP Cache Poisoning](/tags/#arp-cache-poisoning) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets](/network/detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets/) | [Non-Application Layer Protocol](/tags/#non-application-layer-protocol) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response](/deprecated/detect_long_dns_txt_record_response/) | [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-unencrypted/obfuscated-non-c2-protocol) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line](/endpoint/detect_mshta_url_in_command_line/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Mshta](/tags/#mshta) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response](/deprecated/detect_long_dns_txt_record_response/) | [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-unencrypted-non-c2-protocol) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line](/endpoint/detect_mshta_url_in_command_line/) | [System Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#system-binary-proxy-execution), [Mshta](/tags/#mshta) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images](/endpoint/detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images/) | [LSASS Memory](/tags/#lsass-memory), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Detect Mimikatz Via PowerShell And EventCode 4703](/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703/) | [LSASS Memory](/tags/#lsass-memory) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Detect Mimikatz With PowerShell Script Block Logging](/endpoint/detect_mimikatz_with_powershell_script_block_logging/) | [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
@@ -180,22 +181,22 @@ sidebar:
| [Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag](/endpoint/detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag/) | [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](/tags/#smb/windows-admin-shares) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Detect RClone Command-Line Usage](/endpoint/detect_rclone_command-line_usage/) | [Automated Exfiltration](/tags/#automated-exfiltration) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Detect Rare Executables](/endpoint/detect_rare_executables/) | None | [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Detect Regasm Spawning a Process](/endpoint/detect_regasm_spawning_a_process/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Regsvcs/Regasm](/tags/#regsvcs/regasm) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Detect Regasm with Network Connection](/endpoint/detect_regasm_with_network_connection/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Regsvcs/Regasm](/tags/#regsvcs/regasm) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Detect Regasm with no Command Line Arguments](/endpoint/detect_regasm_with_no_command_line_arguments/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Regsvcs/Regasm](/tags/#regsvcs/regasm) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Detect Regsvcs Spawning a Process](/endpoint/detect_regsvcs_spawning_a_process/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Regsvcs/Regasm](/tags/#regsvcs/regasm) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Detect Regsvcs with Network Connection](/endpoint/detect_regsvcs_with_network_connection/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Regsvcs/Regasm](/tags/#regsvcs/regasm) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Detect Regsvcs with No Command Line Arguments](/endpoint/detect_regsvcs_with_no_command_line_arguments/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Regsvcs/Regasm](/tags/#regsvcs/regasm) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass](/endpoint/detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Regsvr32](/tags/#regsvr32) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Detect Regasm Spawning a Process](/endpoint/detect_regasm_spawning_a_process/) | [System Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#system-binary-proxy-execution), [Regsvcs/Regasm](/tags/#regsvcs/regasm) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Detect Regasm with Network Connection](/endpoint/detect_regasm_with_network_connection/) | [System Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#system-binary-proxy-execution), [Regsvcs/Regasm](/tags/#regsvcs/regasm) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Detect Regasm with no Command Line Arguments](/endpoint/detect_regasm_with_no_command_line_arguments/) | [System Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#system-binary-proxy-execution), [Regsvcs/Regasm](/tags/#regsvcs/regasm) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Detect Regsvcs Spawning a Process](/endpoint/detect_regsvcs_spawning_a_process/) | [System Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#system-binary-proxy-execution), [Regsvcs/Regasm](/tags/#regsvcs/regasm) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Detect Regsvcs with Network Connection](/endpoint/detect_regsvcs_with_network_connection/) | [System Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#system-binary-proxy-execution), [Regsvcs/Regasm](/tags/#regsvcs/regasm) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Detect Regsvcs with No Command Line Arguments](/endpoint/detect_regsvcs_with_no_command_line_arguments/) | [System Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#system-binary-proxy-execution), [Regsvcs/Regasm](/tags/#regsvcs/regasm) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass](/endpoint/detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass/) | [System Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#system-binary-proxy-execution), [Regsvr32](/tags/#regsvr32) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Detect Renamed 7-Zip](/endpoint/detect_renamed_7-zip/) | [Archive via Utility](/tags/#archive-via-utility), [Archive Collected Data](/tags/#archive-collected-data) | [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Detect Renamed PSExec](/endpoint/detect_renamed_psexec/) | [System Services](/tags/#system-services), [Service Execution](/tags/#service-execution) | [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Detect Renamed RClone](/endpoint/detect_renamed_rclone/) | [Automated Exfiltration](/tags/#automated-exfiltration) | [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Detect Renamed WinRAR](/endpoint/detect_renamed_winrar/) | [Archive via Utility](/tags/#archive-via-utility), [Archive Collected Data](/tags/#archive-collected-data) | [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Detect Rogue DHCP Server](/network/detect_rogue_dhcp_server/) | [Hardware Additions](/tags/#hardware-additions), [Network Denial of Service](/tags/#network-denial-of-service), [Adversary-in-the-Middle](/tags/#adversary-in-the-middle) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - advpack](/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass_-_advpack/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - setupapi](/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass_-_setupapi/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - syssetup](/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass_-_syssetup/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution](/endpoint/detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Mshta](/tags/#mshta) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - advpack](/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass_-_advpack/) | [System Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#system-binary-proxy-execution), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - setupapi](/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass_-_setupapi/) | [System Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#system-binary-proxy-execution), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - syssetup](/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass_-_syssetup/) | [System Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#system-binary-proxy-execution), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution](/endpoint/detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution/) | [System Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#system-binary-proxy-execution), [Mshta](/tags/#mshta) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Detect S3 access from a new IP](/cloud/detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip/) | [Data from Cloud Storage Object](/tags/#data-from-cloud-storage-object) | [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Detect SNICat SNI Exfiltration](/network/detect_snicat_sni_exfiltration/) | [Exfiltration Over C2 Channel](/tags/#exfiltration-over-c2-channel) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Detect SharpHound Command-Line Arguments](/endpoint/detect_sharphound_command-line_arguments/) | [Domain Account](/tags/#domain-account), [Local Groups](/tags/#local-groups), [Domain Trust Discovery](/tags/#domain-trust-discovery), [Local Account](/tags/#local-account), [Account Discovery](/tags/#account-discovery), [Domain Groups](/tags/#domain-groups), [Permission Groups Discovery](/tags/#permission-groups-discovery) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
@@ -220,14 +221,14 @@ sidebar:
| [Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers](/web/detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers/) | [System Information Discovery](/tags/#system-information-discovery) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers](/network/detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers/) | [Drive-by Compromise](/tags/#drive-by-compromise) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers](/web/detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers/) | None | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Detect mshta inline hta execution](/endpoint/detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Mshta](/tags/#mshta) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Detect mshta renamed](/endpoint/detect_mshta_renamed/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Mshta](/tags/#mshta) | [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Detect mshta inline hta execution](/endpoint/detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution/) | [System Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#system-binary-proxy-execution), [Mshta](/tags/#mshta) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Detect mshta renamed](/endpoint/detect_mshta_renamed/) | [System Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#system-binary-proxy-execution), [Mshta](/tags/#mshta) | [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Detect new API calls from user roles](/deprecated/detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles/) | [Cloud Accounts](/tags/#cloud-accounts) | [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Detect new user AWS Console Login](/deprecated/detect_new_user_aws_console_login/) | [Cloud Accounts](/tags/#cloud-accounts) | [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery](/endpoint/detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery/) | [System Network Configuration Discovery](/tags/#system-network-configuration-discovery) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Detect shared ec2 snapshot](/cloud/detect_shared_ec2_snapshot/) | [Transfer Data to Cloud Account](/tags/#transfer-data-to-cloud-account) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers](/deprecated/detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers/) | [Web Protocols](/tags/#web-protocols) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Detection of DNS Tunnels](/deprecated/detection_of_dns_tunnels/) | [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-unencrypted/obfuscated-non-c2-protocol) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Detection of DNS Tunnels](/deprecated/detection_of_dns_tunnels/) | [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-unencrypted-non-c2-protocol) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Detection of tools built by NirSoft](/endpoint/detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft/) | [Software Deployment Tools](/tags/#software-deployment-tools) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Disable AMSI Through Registry](/endpoint/disable_amsi_through_registry/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Disable Defender AntiVirus Registry](/endpoint/disable_defender_antivirus_registry/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
@@ -377,7 +378,7 @@ sidebar:
| [Gsuite Drive Share In External Email](/cloud/gsuite_drive_share_in_external_email/) | [Exfiltration to Cloud Storage](/tags/#exfiltration-to-cloud-storage), [Exfiltration Over Web Service](/tags/#exfiltration-over-web-service) | [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Gsuite Email Suspicious Subject With Attachment](/cloud/gsuite_email_suspicious_subject_with_attachment/) | [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment), [Phishing](/tags/#phishing) | [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Gsuite Email With Known Abuse Web Service Link](/cloud/gsuite_email_with_known_abuse_web_service_link/) | [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment), [Phishing](/tags/#phishing) | [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Gsuite Outbound Email With Attachment To External Domain](/cloud/gsuite_outbound_email_with_attachment_to_external_domain/) | [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-unencrypted/obfuscated-non-c2-protocol), [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol) | [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Gsuite Outbound Email With Attachment To External Domain](/cloud/gsuite_outbound_email_with_attachment_to_external_domain/) | [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-unencrypted-non-c2-protocol), [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol) | [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Gsuite Suspicious Shared File Name](/cloud/gsuite_suspicious_shared_file_name/) | [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment), [Phishing](/tags/#phishing) | [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Gsuite suspicious calendar invite](/cloud/gsuite_suspicious_calendar_invite/) | [Phishing](/tags/#phishing) | [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Hide User Account From Sign-In Screen](/endpoint/hide_user_account_from_sign-in_screen/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
@@ -431,7 +432,7 @@ sidebar:
| [Linux Add User Account](/endpoint/linux_add_user_account/) | [Local Account](/tags/#local-account), [Create Account](/tags/#create-account) | [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Linux Adding Crontab Using List Parameter](/endpoint/linux_adding_crontab_using_list_parameter/) | [Cron](/tags/#cron), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job) | [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Linux At Allow Config File Creation](/endpoint/linux_at_allow_config_file_creation/) | [Cron](/tags/#cron), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job) | [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Linux At Application Execution](/endpoint/linux_at_application_execution/) | [At (Linux)](/tags/#at-(linux)), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job) | [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Linux At Application Execution](/endpoint/linux_at_application_execution/) | [At](/tags/#at), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job) | [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Linux Change File Owner To Root](/endpoint/linux_change_file_owner_to_root/) | [Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification](/tags/#linux-and-mac-file-and-directory-permissions-modification), [File and Directory Permissions Modification](/tags/#file-and-directory-permissions-modification) | [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Linux Common Process For Elevation Control](/endpoint/linux_common_process_for_elevation_control/) | [Setuid and Setgid](/tags/#setuid-and-setgid), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism) | [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Linux DD File Overwrite](/endpoint/linux_dd_file_overwrite/) | [Data Destruction](/tags/#data-destruction) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
@@ -458,7 +459,7 @@ sidebar:
| [Linux Possible Access Or Modification Of sshd Config File](/endpoint/linux_possible_access_or_modification_of_sshd_config_file/) | [SSH Authorized Keys](/tags/#ssh-authorized-keys), [Account Manipulation](/tags/#account-manipulation) | [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Linux Possible Access To Credential Files](/endpoint/linux_possible_access_to_credential_files/) | [/etc/passwd and /etc/shadow](/tags/#/etc/passwd-and-/etc/shadow), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping) | [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Linux Possible Access To Sudoers File](/endpoint/linux_possible_access_to_sudoers_file/) | [Sudo and Sudo Caching](/tags/#sudo-and-sudo-caching), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism) | [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Linux Possible Append Command To At Allow Config File](/endpoint/linux_possible_append_command_to_at_allow_config_file/) | [At (Linux)](/tags/#at-(linux)), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job) | [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Linux Possible Append Command To At Allow Config File](/endpoint/linux_possible_append_command_to_at_allow_config_file/) | [At](/tags/#at), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job) | [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Linux Possible Append Command To Profile Config File](/endpoint/linux_possible_append_command_to_profile_config_file/) | [Unix Shell Configuration Modification](/tags/#unix-shell-configuration-modification), [Event Triggered Execution](/tags/#event-triggered-execution) | [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Linux Possible Append Cronjob Entry on Existing Cronjob File](/endpoint/linux_possible_append_cronjob_entry_on_existing_cronjob_file/) | [Cron](/tags/#cron), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job) | [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Linux Possible Cronjob Modification With Editor](/endpoint/linux_possible_cronjob_modification_with_editor/) | [Cron](/tags/#cron), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job) | [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
@@ -492,7 +493,7 @@ sidebar:
| [MSI Module Loaded by Non-System Binary](/endpoint/msi_module_loaded_by_non-system_binary/) | [DLL Side-Loading](/tags/#dll-side-loading), [Hijack Execution Flow](/tags/#hijack-execution-flow) | [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [MacOS - Re-opened Applications](/endpoint/macos_-_re-opened_applications/) | None | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [MacOS LOLbin](/endpoint/macos_lolbin/) | [Unix Shell](/tags/#unix-shell), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [MacOS plutil](/endpoint/macos_plutil/) | [Plist Modification](/tags/#plist-modification) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [MacOS plutil](/endpoint/macos_plutil/) | [Plist File Modification](/tags/#plist-file-modification) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Mailsniper Invoke functions](/endpoint/mailsniper_invoke_functions/) | [Email Collection](/tags/#email-collection), [Local Email Collection](/tags/#local-email-collection) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Malicious InProcServer32 Modification](/endpoint/malicious_inprocserver32_modification/) | [Regsvr32](/tags/#regsvr32), [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command](/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process_-_encoded_command/) | [Obfuscated Files or Information](/tags/#obfuscated-files-or-information) | [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
@@ -507,9 +508,9 @@ sidebar:
| [Monitor Email For Brand Abuse](/application/monitor_email_for_brand_abuse/) | None | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors](/endpoint/monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors/) | [Port Monitors](/tags/#port-monitors), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse](/web/monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse/) | None | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Mshta spawning Rundll32 OR Regsvr32 Process](/endpoint/mshta_spawning_rundll32_or_regsvr32_process/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Mshta](/tags/#mshta) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Mshta spawning Rundll32 OR Regsvr32 Process](/endpoint/mshta_spawning_rundll32_or_regsvr32_process/) | [System Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#system-binary-proxy-execution), [Mshta](/tags/#mshta) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Msmpeng Application DLL Side Loading](/endpoint/msmpeng_application_dll_side_loading/) | [DLL Side-Loading](/tags/#dll-side-loading), [Hijack Execution Flow](/tags/#hijack-execution-flow) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Multiple Archive Files Http Post Traffic](/network/multiple_archive_files_http_post_traffic/) | [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-unencrypted/obfuscated-non-c2-protocol), [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Multiple Archive Files Http Post Traffic](/network/multiple_archive_files_http_post_traffic/) | [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-unencrypted-non-c2-protocol), [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Multiple Invalid Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using NTLM](/endpoint/multiple_invalid_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_ntlm/) | [Password Spraying](/tags/#password-spraying), [Brute Force](/tags/#brute-force) | [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentials From The Same IP](/application/multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentials_from_the_same_ip/) | [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts), [Default Accounts](/tags/#default-accounts) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos](/endpoint/multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos/) | [Password Spraying](/tags/#password-spraying), [Brute Force](/tags/#brute-force) | [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
@@ -546,7 +547,7 @@ sidebar:
| [Office Document Creating Schedule Task](/endpoint/office_document_creating_schedule_task/) | [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Office Document Executing Macro Code](/endpoint/office_document_executing_macro_code/) | [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Office Document Spawned Child Process To Download](/endpoint/office_document_spawned_child_process_to_download/) | [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Office Product Spawn CMD Process](/endpoint/office_product_spawn_cmd_process/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Mshta](/tags/#mshta) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Office Product Spawn CMD Process](/endpoint/office_product_spawn_cmd_process/) | [System Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#system-binary-proxy-execution), [Mshta](/tags/#mshta) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Office Product Spawning BITSAdmin](/endpoint/office_product_spawning_bitsadmin/) | [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Office Product Spawning CertUtil](/endpoint/office_product_spawning_certutil/) | [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Office Product Spawning MSHTA](/endpoint/office_product_spawning_mshta/) | [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
@@ -567,7 +568,7 @@ sidebar:
| [PetitPotam Network Share Access Request](/endpoint/petitpotam_network_share_access_request/) | [Forced Authentication](/tags/#forced-authentication) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [PetitPotam Suspicious Kerberos TGT Request](/endpoint/petitpotam_suspicious_kerberos_tgt_request/) | [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Ping Sleep Batch Command](/endpoint/ping_sleep_batch_command/) | [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](/tags/#virtualization/sandbox-evasion), [Time Based Evasion](/tags/#time-based-evasion) | [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Plain HTTP POST Exfiltrated Data](/network/plain_http_post_exfiltrated_data/) | [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-unencrypted/obfuscated-non-c2-protocol), [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Plain HTTP POST Exfiltrated Data](/network/plain_http_post_exfiltrated_data/) | [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-unencrypted-non-c2-protocol), [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Possible Browser Pass View Parameter](/endpoint/possible_browser_pass_view_parameter/) | [Credentials from Web Browsers](/tags/#credentials-from-web-browsers), [Credentials from Password Stores](/tags/#credentials-from-password-stores) | [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn](/endpoint/possible_lateral_movement_powershell_spawn/) | [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [Distributed Component Object Model](/tags/#distributed-component-object-model), [Windows Remote Management](/tags/#windows-remote-management), [Windows Management Instrumentation](/tags/#windows-management-instrumentation), [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task), [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Potentially malicious code on commandline](/endpoint/potentially_malicious_code_on_commandline/) | [Windows Command Shell](/tags/#windows-command-shell) | [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
@@ -603,7 +604,7 @@ sidebar:
| [Processes launching netsh](/endpoint/processes_launching_netsh/) | [Disable or Modify System Firewall](/tags/#disable-or-modify-system-firewall), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed](/network/prohibited_network_traffic_allowed/) | [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Prohibited Software On Endpoint](/deprecated/prohibited_software_on_endpoint/) | None | [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Protocol or Port Mismatch](/network/protocol_or_port_mismatch/) | [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-unencrypted/obfuscated-non-c2-protocol), [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol) | [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Protocol or Port Mismatch](/network/protocol_or_port_mismatch/) | [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-unencrypted-non-c2-protocol), [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol) | [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Protocols passing authentication in cleartext](/network/protocols_passing_authentication_in_cleartext/) | None | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Randomly Generated Scheduled Task Name](/endpoint/randomly_generated_scheduled_task_name/) | [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job), [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task) | [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Randomly Generated Windows Service Name](/endpoint/randomly_generated_windows_service_name/) | [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process), [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service) | [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
@@ -616,8 +617,8 @@ sidebar:
| [Registry Keys Used For Persistence](/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence/) | [Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder](/tags/#registry-run-keys-/-startup-folder), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation](/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation/) | [Image File Execution Options Injection](/tags/#image-file-execution-options-injection), [Event Triggered Execution](/tags/#event-triggered-execution) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases](/endpoint/registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases/) | [Application Shimming](/tags/#application-shimming), [Event Triggered Execution](/tags/#event-triggered-execution) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading](/endpoint/regsvr32_silent_and_install_param_dll_loading/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Regsvr32](/tags/#regsvr32) | [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline](/endpoint/regsvr32_with_known_silent_switch_cmdline/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Regsvr32](/tags/#regsvr32) | [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading](/endpoint/regsvr32_silent_and_install_param_dll_loading/) | [System Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#system-binary-proxy-execution), [Regsvr32](/tags/#regsvr32) | [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline](/endpoint/regsvr32_with_known_silent_switch_cmdline/) | [System Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#system-binary-proxy-execution), [Regsvr32](/tags/#regsvr32) | [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Remcos RAT File Creation in Remcos Folder](/endpoint/remcos_rat_file_creation_in_remcos_folder/) | [Screen Capture](/tags/#screen-capture) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Remcos client registry install entry](/endpoint/remcos_client_registry_install_entry/) | [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce](/network/remote_desktop_network_bruteforce/) | [Remote Desktop Protocol](/tags/#remote-desktop-protocol), [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
@@ -642,16 +643,16 @@ sidebar:
| [Revil Registry Entry](/endpoint/revil_registry_entry/) | [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Rubeus Command Line Parameters](/endpoint/rubeus_command_line_parameters/) | [Use Alternate Authentication Material](/tags/#use-alternate-authentication-material), [Pass the Ticket](/tags/#pass-the-ticket), [Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets](/tags/#steal-or-forge-kerberos-tickets), [Kerberoasting](/tags/#kerberoasting), [AS-REP Roasting](/tags/#as-rep-roasting) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Rubeus Kerberos Ticket Exports Through Winlogon Access](/endpoint/rubeus_kerberos_ticket_exports_through_winlogon_access/) | [Use Alternate Authentication Material](/tags/#use-alternate-authentication-material), [Pass the Ticket](/tags/#pass-the-ticket) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal](/endpoint/rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal](/endpoint/rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal/) | [System Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#system-binary-proxy-execution), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Runas Execution in CommandLine](/endpoint/runas_execution_in_commandline/) | [Access Token Manipulation](/tags/#access-token-manipulation), [Token Impersonation/Theft](/tags/#token-impersonation/theft) | [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Rundll32 Control RunDLL Hunt](/endpoint/rundll32_control_rundll_hunt/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32) | [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Rundll32 Control RunDLL World Writable Directory](/endpoint/rundll32_control_rundll_world_writable_directory/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Rundll32 Control RunDLL Hunt](/endpoint/rundll32_control_rundll_hunt/) | [System Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#system-binary-proxy-execution), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32) | [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Rundll32 Control RunDLL World Writable Directory](/endpoint/rundll32_control_rundll_world_writable_directory/) | [System Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#system-binary-proxy-execution), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Rundll32 Create Remote Thread To A Process](/endpoint/rundll32_create_remote_thread_to_a_process/) | [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Rundll32 CreateRemoteThread In Browser](/endpoint/rundll32_createremotethread_in_browser/) | [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Rundll32 DNSQuery](/endpoint/rundll32_dnsquery/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Rundll32 Process Creating Exe Dll Files](/endpoint/rundll32_process_creating_exe_dll_files/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Rundll32 DNSQuery](/endpoint/rundll32_dnsquery/) | [System Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#system-binary-proxy-execution), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Rundll32 Process Creating Exe Dll Files](/endpoint/rundll32_process_creating_exe_dll_files/) | [System Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#system-binary-proxy-execution), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Rundll32 Shimcache Flush](/endpoint/rundll32_shimcache_flush/) | [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network](/endpoint/rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network](/endpoint/rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network/) | [System Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#system-binary-proxy-execution), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Ryuk Test Files Detected](/endpoint/ryuk_test_files_detected/) | [Data Encrypted for Impact](/tags/#data-encrypted-for-impact) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Ryuk Wake on LAN Command](/endpoint/ryuk_wake_on_lan_command/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [Windows Command Shell](/tags/#windows-command-shell) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [SAM Database File Access Attempt](/endpoint/sam_database_file_access_attempt/) | [Security Account Manager](/tags/#security-account-manager), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping) | [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
@@ -665,7 +666,7 @@ sidebar:
| [SchCache Change By App Connect And Create ADSI Object](/endpoint/schcache_change_by_app_connect_and_create_adsi_object/) | [Domain Account](/tags/#domain-account), [Account Discovery](/tags/#account-discovery) | [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Schedule Task with HTTP Command Arguments](/endpoint/schedule_task_with_http_command_arguments/) | [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger](/endpoint/schedule_task_with_rundll32_command_trigger/) | [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Scheduled Task Creation on Remote Endpoint using At](/endpoint/scheduled_task_creation_on_remote_endpoint_using_at/) | [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job), [At (Windows)](/tags/#at-(windows)) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Scheduled Task Creation on Remote Endpoint using At](/endpoint/scheduled_task_creation_on_remote_endpoint_using_at/) | [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job), [At](/tags/#at) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD](/endpoint/scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd/) | [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Scheduled Task Initiation on Remote Endpoint](/endpoint/scheduled_task_initiation_on_remote_endpoint/) | [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job), [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware](/deprecated/scheduled_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware/) | [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
@@ -691,10 +692,20 @@ sidebar:
| [Single Letter Process On Endpoint](/endpoint/single_letter_process_on_endpoint/) | [User Execution](/tags/#user-execution), [Malicious File](/tags/#malicious-file) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Spectre and Meltdown Vulnerable Systems](/deprecated/spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems/) | None | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Spike in File Writes](/endpoint/spike_in_file_writes/) | None | [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Splunk Command and Scripting Interpreter Delete Usage](/application/splunk_command_and_scripting_interpreter_delete_usage/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter) | [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Splunk Command and Scripting Interpreter Risky Commands](/application/splunk_command_and_scripting_interpreter_risky_commands/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter) | [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Splunk Command and Scripting Interpreter Risky SPL MLTK](/application/splunk_command_and_scripting_interpreter_risky_spl_mltk/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter) | [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Splunk Digital Certificates Infrastructure Version](/application/splunk_digital_certificates_infrastructure_version/) | [Digital Certificates](/tags/#digital-certificates) | [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Splunk Digital Certificates Lack of Encryption](/application/splunk_digital_certificates_lack_of_encryption/) | [Digital Certificates](/tags/#digital-certificates) | [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Splunk DoS via Malformed S2S Request](/application/splunk_dos_via_malformed_s2s_request/) | [Network Denial of Service](/tags/#network-denial-of-service) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure](/deprecated/splunk_enterprise_information_disclosure/) | None | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Splunk Identified SSL TLS Certificates](/network/splunk_identified_ssl_tls_certificates/) | [Network Sniffing](/tags/#network-sniffing) | [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Splunk Process Injection Forwarder Bundle Downloads](/application/splunk_process_injection_forwarder_bundle_downloads/) | [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection) | [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Splunk Protocol Impersonation Weak Encryption Configuration](/application/splunk_protocol_impersonation_weak_encryption_configuration/) | [Protocol Impersonation](/tags/#protocol-impersonation) | [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Splunk User Enumeration Attempt](/application/splunk_user_enumeration_attempt/) | [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Splunk XSS in Monitoring Console](/application/splunk_xss_in_monitoring_console/) | [Drive-by Compromise](/tags/#drive-by-compromise) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Splunk protocol impersonation weak encryption selfsigned](/application/splunk_protocol_impersonation_weak_encryption_selfsigned/) | [Digital Certificates](/tags/#digital-certificates) | [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Splunk protocol impersonation weak encryption simplerequest](/application/splunk_protocol_impersonation_weak_encryption_simplerequest/) | [Digital Certificates](/tags/#digital-certificates) | [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Spoolsv Spawning Rundll32](/endpoint/spoolsv_spawning_rundll32/) | [Print Processors](/tags/#print-processors), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Spoolsv Suspicious Loaded Modules](/endpoint/spoolsv_suspicious_loaded_modules/) | [Print Processors](/tags/#print-processors), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Spoolsv Suspicious Process Access](/endpoint/spoolsv_suspicious_process_access/) | [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](/tags/#exploitation-for-privilege-escalation) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
@@ -715,7 +726,7 @@ sidebar:
| [Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior](/endpoint/suspicious_event_log_service_behavior/) | [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host), [Clear Windows Event Logs](/tags/#clear-windows-event-logs) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Suspicious File Write](/deprecated/suspicious_file_write/) | None | [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Suspicious GPUpdate no Command Line Arguments](/endpoint/suspicious_gpupdate_no_command_line_arguments/) | [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Suspicious IcedID Rundll32 Cmdline](/endpoint/suspicious_icedid_rundll32_cmdline/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Suspicious IcedID Rundll32 Cmdline](/endpoint/suspicious_icedid_rundll32_cmdline/) | [System Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#system-binary-proxy-execution), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Suspicious Image Creation In Appdata Folder](/endpoint/suspicious_image_creation_in_appdata_folder/) | [Screen Capture](/tags/#screen-capture) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Suspicious Java Classes](/application/suspicious_java_classes/) | None | [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Suspicious Kerberos Service Ticket Request](/endpoint/suspicious_kerberos_service_ticket_request/) | [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts), [Domain Accounts](/tags/#domain-accounts) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
@@ -729,12 +740,12 @@ sidebar:
| [Suspicious Process File Path](/endpoint/suspicious_process_file_path/) | [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Suspicious Process With Discord DNS Query](/endpoint/suspicious_process_with_discord_dns_query/) | [Visual Basic](/tags/#visual-basic), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter) | [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Suspicious Reg exe Process](/endpoint/suspicious_reg_exe_process/) | [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Suspicious Regsvr32 Register Suspicious Path](/endpoint/suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Regsvr32](/tags/#regsvr32) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Suspicious Rundll32 PluginInit](/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_plugininit/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Suspicious Rundll32 Rename](/deprecated/suspicious_rundll32_rename/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities) | [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Suspicious Rundll32 StartW](/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_startw/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Suspicious Rundll32 dllregisterserver](/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments](/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_no_command_line_arguments/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Suspicious Regsvr32 Register Suspicious Path](/endpoint/suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path/) | [System Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#system-binary-proxy-execution), [Regsvr32](/tags/#regsvr32) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Suspicious Rundll32 PluginInit](/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_plugininit/) | [System Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#system-binary-proxy-execution), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Suspicious Rundll32 Rename](/deprecated/suspicious_rundll32_rename/) | [System Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#system-binary-proxy-execution), [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities) | [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Suspicious Rundll32 StartW](/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_startw/) | [System Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#system-binary-proxy-execution), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Suspicious Rundll32 dllregisterserver](/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver/) | [System Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#system-binary-proxy-execution), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments](/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_no_command_line_arguments/) | [System Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#system-binary-proxy-execution), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Suspicious SQLite3 LSQuarantine Behavior](/endpoint/suspicious_sqlite3_lsquarantine_behavior/) | [Data Staged](/tags/#data-staged) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory](/endpoint/suspicious_scheduled_task_from_public_directory/) | [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job) | [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Suspicious SearchProtocolHost no Command Line Arguments](/endpoint/suspicious_searchprotocolhost_no_command_line_arguments/) | [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
@@ -743,8 +754,8 @@ sidebar:
| [Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename](/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](/tags/#trusted-developer-utilities-proxy-execution), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities) | [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler usage](/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage/) | [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](/tags/#trusted-developer-utilities-proxy-execution) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Suspicious msbuild path](/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_path/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](/tags/#trusted-developer-utilities-proxy-execution), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities), [MSBuild](/tags/#msbuild) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Suspicious mshta child process](/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_child_process/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Mshta](/tags/#mshta) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Suspicious mshta spawn](/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_spawn/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Mshta](/tags/#mshta) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Suspicious mshta child process](/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_child_process/) | [System Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#system-binary-proxy-execution), [Mshta](/tags/#mshta) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Suspicious mshta spawn](/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_spawn/) | [System Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#system-binary-proxy-execution), [Mshta](/tags/#mshta) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Suspicious wevtutil Usage](/endpoint/suspicious_wevtutil_usage/) | [Clear Windows Event Logs](/tags/#clear-windows-event-logs), [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Suspicious writes to System Volume Information](/deprecated/suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading) | [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin](/endpoint/suspicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
@@ -758,11 +769,11 @@ sidebar:
| [Time Provider Persistence Registry](/endpoint/time_provider_persistence_registry/) | [Time Providers](/tags/#time-providers), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Trickbot Named Pipe](/endpoint/trickbot_named_pipe/) | [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [UAC Bypass MMC Load Unsigned Dll](/endpoint/uac_bypass_mmc_load_unsigned_dll/) | [Bypass User Account Control](/tags/#bypass-user-account-control), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [UAC Bypass With Colorui COM Object](/endpoint/uac_bypass_with_colorui_com_object/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [CMSTP](/tags/#cmstp) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [UAC Bypass With Colorui COM Object](/endpoint/uac_bypass_with_colorui_com_object/) | [System Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#system-binary-proxy-execution), [CMSTP](/tags/#cmstp) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [USN Journal Deletion](/endpoint/usn_journal_deletion/) | [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Uncommon Processes On Endpoint](/deprecated/uncommon_processes_on_endpoint/) | [Malicious File](/tags/#malicious-file) | [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Unified Messaging Service Spawning a Process](/endpoint/unified_messaging_service_spawning_a_process/) | [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Uninstall App Using MsiExec](/endpoint/uninstall_app_using_msiexec/) | [Msiexec](/tags/#msiexec), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Uninstall App Using MsiExec](/endpoint/uninstall_app_using_msiexec/) | [Msiexec](/tags/#msiexec), [System Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#system-binary-proxy-execution) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Unknown Process Using The Kerberos Protocol](/endpoint/unknown_process_using_the_kerberos_protocol/) | [Use Alternate Authentication Material](/tags/#use-alternate-authentication-material) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Unload Sysmon Filter Driver](/endpoint/unload_sysmon_filter_driver/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Unloading AMSI via Reflection](/endpoint/unloading_amsi_via_reflection/) | [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
@@ -779,7 +790,7 @@ sidebar:
| [VMware Server Side Template Injection Hunt](/web/vmware_server_side_template_injection_hunt/) | [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application) | [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [VMware Workspace ONE Freemarker Server-side Template Injection](/web/vmware_workspace_one_freemarker_server-side_template_injection/) | [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application) | [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Vbscript Execution Using Wscript App](/endpoint/vbscript_execution_using_wscript_app/) | [Visual Basic](/tags/#visual-basic), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Verclsid CLSID Execution](/endpoint/verclsid_clsid_execution/) | [Verclsid](/tags/#verclsid), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution) | [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Verclsid CLSID Execution](/endpoint/verclsid_clsid_execution/) | [Verclsid](/tags/#verclsid), [System Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#system-binary-proxy-execution) | [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [W3WP Spawning Shell](/endpoint/w3wp_spawning_shell/) | [Server Software Component](/tags/#server-software-component), [Web Shell](/tags/#web-shell) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [WBAdmin Delete System Backups](/endpoint/wbadmin_delete_system_backups/) | [Inhibit System Recovery](/tags/#inhibit-system-recovery) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [WMI Permanent Event Subscription](/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription/) | [Windows Management Instrumentation](/tags/#windows-management-instrumentation) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
@@ -788,7 +799,7 @@ sidebar:
| [WMI Temporary Event Subscription](/endpoint/wmi_temporary_event_subscription/) | [Windows Management Instrumentation](/tags/#windows-management-instrumentation) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [WMIC XSL Execution via URL](/endpoint/wmic_xsl_execution_via_url/) | [XSL Script Processing](/tags/#xsl-script-processing) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [WSReset UAC Bypass](/endpoint/wsreset_uac_bypass/) | [Bypass User Account Control](/tags/#bypass-user-account-control), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Wbemprox COM Object Execution](/endpoint/wbemprox_com_object_execution/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [CMSTP](/tags/#cmstp) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Wbemprox COM Object Execution](/endpoint/wbemprox_com_object_execution/) | [System Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#system-binary-proxy-execution), [CMSTP](/tags/#cmstp) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Web Fraud - Account Harvesting](/deprecated/web_fraud_-_account_harvesting/) | [Create Account](/tags/#create-account) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Web Fraud - Anomalous User Clickspeed](/deprecated/web_fraud_-_anomalous_user_clickspeed/) | [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts) | [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Web Fraud - Password Sharing Across Accounts](/deprecated/web_fraud_-_password_sharing_across_accounts/) | None | [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
@@ -805,6 +816,8 @@ sidebar:
| [WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started](/endpoint/winevent_windows_task_scheduler_event_action_started/) | [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task) | [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [WinRM Spawning a Process](/endpoint/winrm_spawning_a_process/) | [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Windows AdFind Exe](/endpoint/windows_adfind_exe/) | [Remote System Discovery](/tags/#remote-system-discovery) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Windows Command and Scripting Interpreter Hunting Path Traversal](/endpoint/windows_command_and_scripting_interpreter_hunting_path_traversal/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter) | [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Windows Command and Scripting Interpreter Path Traversal Exec](/endpoint/windows_command_and_scripting_interpreter_path_traversal_exec/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Windows Computer Account Created by Computer Account](/endpoint/windows_computer_account_created_by_computer_account/) | [Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets](/tags/#steal-or-forge-kerberos-tickets) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Windows Computer Account Requesting Kerberos Ticket](/endpoint/windows_computer_account_requesting_kerberos_ticket/) | [Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets](/tags/#steal-or-forge-kerberos-tickets) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Windows Computer Account With SPN](/endpoint/windows_computer_account_with_spn/) | [Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets](/tags/#steal-or-forge-kerberos-tickets) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
@@ -823,13 +836,14 @@ sidebar:
| [Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry](/endpoint/windows_disableantispyware_registry/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Windows Disabled Users Failing To Authenticate Kerberos](/endpoint/windows_disabled_users_failing_to_authenticate_kerberos/) | [Password Spraying](/tags/#password-spraying), [Brute Force](/tags/#brute-force) | [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Windows DiskCryptor Usage](/endpoint/windows_diskcryptor_usage/) | [Data Encrypted for Impact](/tags/#data-encrypted-for-impact) | [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Windows Diskshadow Proxy Execution](/endpoint/windows_diskshadow_proxy_execution/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path](/endpoint/windows_dotnet_binary_in_non_standard_path/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [InstallUtil](/tags/#installutil) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Windows Diskshadow Proxy Execution](/endpoint/windows_diskshadow_proxy_execution/) | [System Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#system-binary-proxy-execution) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path](/endpoint/windows_dotnet_binary_in_non_standard_path/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities), [System Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#system-binary-proxy-execution), [InstallUtil](/tags/#installutil) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Windows Driver Load Non-Standard Path](/endpoint/windows_driver_load_non-standard_path/) | [Rootkit](/tags/#rootkit) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Windows Drivers Loaded by Signature](/endpoint/windows_drivers_loaded_by_signature/) | [Rootkit](/tags/#rootkit), [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](/tags/#exploitation-for-privilege-escalation) | [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Windows Event For Service Disabled](/endpoint/windows_event_for_service_disabled/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Windows Event Log Cleared](/endpoint/windows_event_log_cleared/) | [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host), [Clear Windows Event Logs](/tags/#clear-windows-event-logs) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Windows Excessive Disabled Services Event](/endpoint/windows_excessive_disabled_services_event/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Windows Execute Arbitrary Commands with MSDT](/endpoint/windows_execute_arbitrary_commands_with_msdt/) | [System Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#system-binary-proxy-execution) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Windows File Without Extension In Critical Folder](/endpoint/windows_file_without_extension_in_critical_folder/) | [Data Destruction](/tags/#data-destruction) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Windows Get-AdComputer Unconstrained Delegation Discovery](/endpoint/windows_get-adcomputer_unconstrained_delegation_discovery/) | [Remote System Discovery](/tags/#remote-system-discovery) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Windows Hidden Schedule Task Settings](/endpoint/windows_hidden_schedule_task_settings/) | [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
@@ -839,12 +853,12 @@ sidebar:
| [Windows ISO LNK File Creation](/endpoint/windows_iso_lnk_file_creation/) | [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment), [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Malicious Link](/tags/#malicious-link), [User Execution](/tags/#user-execution) | [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Windows Indirect Command Execution Via forfiles](/endpoint/windows_indirect_command_execution_via_forfiles/) | [Indirect Command Execution](/tags/#indirect-command-execution) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Windows Indirect Command Execution Via pcalua](/endpoint/windows_indirect_command_execution_via_pcalua/) | [Indirect Command Execution](/tags/#indirect-command-execution) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Windows InstallUtil Credential Theft](/endpoint/windows_installutil_credential_theft/) | [InstallUtil](/tags/#installutil), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Windows InstallUtil Remote Network Connection](/endpoint/windows_installutil_remote_network_connection/) | [InstallUtil](/tags/#installutil), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Windows InstallUtil URL in Command Line](/endpoint/windows_installutil_url_in_command_line/) | [InstallUtil](/tags/#installutil), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option](/endpoint/windows_installutil_uninstall_option/) | [InstallUtil](/tags/#installutil), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option with Network](/endpoint/windows_installutil_uninstall_option_with_network/) | [InstallUtil](/tags/#installutil), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path](/endpoint/windows_installutil_in_non_standard_path/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [InstallUtil](/tags/#installutil) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Windows InstallUtil Credential Theft](/endpoint/windows_installutil_credential_theft/) | [InstallUtil](/tags/#installutil), [System Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#system-binary-proxy-execution) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Windows InstallUtil Remote Network Connection](/endpoint/windows_installutil_remote_network_connection/) | [InstallUtil](/tags/#installutil), [System Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#system-binary-proxy-execution) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Windows InstallUtil URL in Command Line](/endpoint/windows_installutil_url_in_command_line/) | [InstallUtil](/tags/#installutil), [System Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#system-binary-proxy-execution) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option](/endpoint/windows_installutil_uninstall_option/) | [InstallUtil](/tags/#installutil), [System Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#system-binary-proxy-execution) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option with Network](/endpoint/windows_installutil_uninstall_option_with_network/) | [InstallUtil](/tags/#installutil), [System Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#system-binary-proxy-execution) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path](/endpoint/windows_installutil_in_non_standard_path/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities), [System Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#system-binary-proxy-execution), [InstallUtil](/tags/#installutil) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Windows Invalid Users Failed Authentication via Kerberos](/endpoint/windows_invalid_users_failed_authentication_via_kerberos/) | [Password Spraying](/tags/#password-spraying), [Brute Force](/tags/#brute-force) | [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Windows Java Spawning Shells](/endpoint/windows_java_spawning_shells/) | [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Windows Kerberos Local Successful Logon](/endpoint/windows_kerberos_local_successful_logon/) | [Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets](/tags/#steal-or-forge-kerberos-tickets) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
@@ -854,13 +868,14 @@ sidebar:
| [Windows NirSoft AdvancedRun](/endpoint/windows_nirsoft_advancedrun/) | [Tool](/tags/#tool) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Windows NirSoft Utilities](/endpoint/windows_nirsoft_utilities/) | [Tool](/tags/#tool) | [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Windows Non-System Account Targeting Lsass](/endpoint/windows_non-system_account_targeting_lsass/) | [LSASS Memory](/tags/#lsass-memory), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Windows Office Product Spawning MSDT](/endpoint/windows_office_product_spawning_msdt/) | [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Windows Possible Credential Dumping](/endpoint/windows_possible_credential_dumping/) | [LSASS Memory](/tags/#lsass-memory), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Windows PowerView Constrained Delegation Discovery](/endpoint/windows_powerview_constrained_delegation_discovery/) | [Remote System Discovery](/tags/#remote-system-discovery) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Windows PowerView Unconstrained Delegation Discovery](/endpoint/windows_powerview_unconstrained_delegation_discovery/) | [Remote System Discovery](/tags/#remote-system-discovery) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Windows Process With NamedPipe CommandLine](/endpoint/windows_process_with_namedpipe_commandline/) | [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection) | [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Windows Processes Killed By Industroyer2 Malware](/endpoint/windows_processes_killed_by_industroyer2_malware/) | [Service Stop](/tags/#service-stop) | [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Windows Raccine Scheduled Task Deletion](/endpoint/windows_raccine_scheduled_task_deletion/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Windows Rasautou DLL Execution](/endpoint/windows_rasautou_dll_execution/) | [Dynamic-link Library Injection](/tags/#dynamic-link-library-injection), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Windows Rasautou DLL Execution](/endpoint/windows_rasautou_dll_execution/) | [Dynamic-link Library Injection](/tags/#dynamic-link-library-injection), [System Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#system-binary-proxy-execution), [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Windows Raw Access To Disk Volume Partition](/endpoint/windows_raw_access_to_disk_volume_partition/) | [Disk Structure Wipe](/tags/#disk-structure-wipe), [Disk Wipe](/tags/#disk-wipe) | [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive](/endpoint/windows_raw_access_to_master_boot_record_drive/) | [Disk Structure Wipe](/tags/#disk-structure-wipe), [Disk Wipe](/tags/#disk-wipe) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
| [Windows Registry Certificate Added](/endpoint/windows_registry_certificate_added/) | [Install Root Certificate](/tags/#install-root-certificate), [Subvert Trust Controls](/tags/#subvert-trust-controls) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
docs/_pages/splunk_audit.md
+9
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@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
---
title: Splunk_Audit
layout: tag
author_profile: false
taxonomy: Splunk_Audit
permalink: /detections/splunk_audit/
sidebar:
nav: "detections"
---
docs/_pages/stories.md
+50 -48
View File
@@ -14,42 +14,43 @@ sidebar:
| [AWS Cryptomining](aws_cryptomining) | [Cloud Accounts](/tags/#cloud-accounts), [Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions](/tags/#unused/unsupported-cloud-regions) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) |
| [AWS IAM Privilege Escalation](aws_iam_privilege_escalation) | [Cloud Accounts](/tags/#cloud-accounts), [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts), [Cloud Account](/tags/#cloud-account), [Create Account](/tags/#create-account), [Cloud Infrastructure Discovery](/tags/#cloud-infrastructure-discovery), [Brute Force](/tags/#brute-force), [Account Manipulation](/tags/#account-manipulation), [Cloud Groups](/tags/#cloud-groups), [Permission Groups Discovery](/tags/#permission-groups-discovery) | [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access), [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Discovery](/tags/#discovery), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) |
| [AWS Network ACL Activity](aws_network_acl_activity) | [Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall](/tags/#disable-or-modify-cloud-firewall), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) |
| [AWS Security Hub Alerts]() | None | None |
| [AWS Security Hub Alerts](aws_security_hub_alerts) | None | None |
| [AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities](aws_suspicious_provisioning_activities) | [Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions](/tags/#unused/unsupported-cloud-regions) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) |
| [AWS User Monitoring](aws_user_monitoring) | [Cloud Service Discovery](/tags/#cloud-service-discovery), [Cloud Accounts](/tags/#cloud-accounts) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Discovery](/tags/#discovery), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) |
| [AcidRain](acidrain) | [Data Destruction](/tags/#data-destruction), [File Deletion](/tags/#file-deletion), [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Impact](/tags/#impact) |
| [Active Directory Discovery](active_directory_discovery) | [Domain Account](/tags/#domain-account), [Account Discovery](/tags/#account-discovery), [Remote System Discovery](/tags/#remote-system-discovery), [Permission Groups Discovery](/tags/#permission-groups-discovery), [Domain Groups](/tags/#domain-groups), [Domain Trust Discovery](/tags/#domain-trust-discovery), [Password Policy Discovery](/tags/#password-policy-discovery), [Local Groups](/tags/#local-groups), [System Owner/User Discovery](/tags/#system-owner/user-discovery), [Local Account](/tags/#local-account), [System Network Connections Discovery](/tags/#system-network-connections-discovery), [System Network Configuration Discovery](/tags/#system-network-configuration-discovery), [Internet Connection Discovery](/tags/#internet-connection-discovery), [Kerberoasting](/tags/#kerberoasting), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job) | [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access), [Discovery](/tags/#discovery), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) |
| [Active Directory Kerberos Attacks](active_directory_kerberos_attacks) | [Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets](/tags/#steal-or-forge-kerberos-tickets), [AS-REP Roasting](/tags/#as-rep-roasting), [Kerberoasting](/tags/#kerberoasting), [Golden Ticket](/tags/#golden-ticket), [Use Alternate Authentication Material](/tags/#use-alternate-authentication-material), [Gather Victim Identity Information](/tags/#gather-victim-identity-information), [Email Addresses](/tags/#email-addresses), [Pass the Ticket](/tags/#pass-the-ticket), [Password Spraying](/tags/#password-spraying), [Brute Force](/tags/#brute-force), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping), [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts), [Domain Accounts](/tags/#domain-accounts), [Remote System Discovery](/tags/#remote-system-discovery) | [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access), [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Discovery](/tags/#discovery), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access), [Lateral Movement](/tags/#lateral-movement), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation), [Reconnaissance](/tags/#reconnaissance) |
| [Active Directory Lateral Movement](active_directory_lateral_movement) | [Use Alternate Authentication Material](/tags/#use-alternate-authentication-material), [Pass the Hash](/tags/#pass-the-hash), [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](/tags/#smb/windows-admin-shares), [System Services](/tags/#system-services), [Service Execution](/tags/#service-execution), [Distributed Component Object Model](/tags/#distributed-component-object-model), [Windows Management Instrumentation](/tags/#windows-management-instrumentation), [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service), [Windows Remote Management](/tags/#windows-remote-management), [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job), [At (Windows)](/tags/#at-(windows)), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process), [Services Registry Permissions Weakness](/tags/#services-registry-permissions-weakness), [Remote Desktop Protocol](/tags/#remote-desktop-protocol), [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access), [Lateral Movement](/tags/#lateral-movement), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) |
| [Active Directory Lateral Movement](active_directory_lateral_movement) | [Use Alternate Authentication Material](/tags/#use-alternate-authentication-material), [Pass the Hash](/tags/#pass-the-hash), [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](/tags/#smb/windows-admin-shares), [System Services](/tags/#system-services), [Service Execution](/tags/#service-execution), [Distributed Component Object Model](/tags/#distributed-component-object-model), [Windows Management Instrumentation](/tags/#windows-management-instrumentation), [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service), [Windows Remote Management](/tags/#windows-remote-management), [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job), [At](/tags/#at), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process), [Services Registry Permissions Weakness](/tags/#services-registry-permissions-weakness), [Remote Desktop Protocol](/tags/#remote-desktop-protocol), [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access), [Lateral Movement](/tags/#lateral-movement), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) |
| [Active Directory Password Spraying](active_directory_password_spraying) | [Password Spraying](/tags/#password-spraying), [Brute Force](/tags/#brute-force) | [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access) |
| [Apache Struts Vulnerability](apache_struts_vulnerability) | [System Information Discovery](/tags/#system-information-discovery) | [Discovery](/tags/#discovery) |
| [Asset Tracking]() | None | None |
| [Asset Tracking](asset_tracking) | None | None |
| [Atlassian Confluence Server and Data Center CVE-2022-26134](atlassian_confluence_server_and_data_center_cve-2022-26134) | [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application), [Server Software Component](/tags/#server-software-component) | [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence) |
| [BITS Jobs](bits_jobs) | [BITS Jobs](/tags/#bits-jobs), [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer) | [Command And Control](/tags/#command-and-control), [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence) |
| [Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156](baron_samedit_cve-2021-3156) | [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](/tags/#exploitation-for-privilege-escalation) | [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) |
| [BlackMatter Ransomware](blackmatter_ransomware) | [Credentials in Registry](/tags/#credentials-in-registry), [Unsecured Credentials](/tags/#unsecured-credentials), [Inhibit System Recovery](/tags/#inhibit-system-recovery), [Defacement](/tags/#defacement), [Data Encrypted for Impact](/tags/#data-encrypted-for-impact) | [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access), [Impact](/tags/#impact) |
| [Brand Monitoring]() | None | None |
| [Brand Monitoring](brand_monitoring) | None | None |
| [Caddy Wiper](caddy_wiper) | [Disk Structure Wipe](/tags/#disk-structure-wipe), [Disk Wipe](/tags/#disk-wipe) | [Impact](/tags/#impact) |
| [Clop Ransomware](clop_ransomware) | [User Execution](/tags/#user-execution), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process), [Data Destruction](/tags/#data-destruction), [Inhibit System Recovery](/tags/#inhibit-system-recovery), [Data Encrypted for Impact](/tags/#data-encrypted-for-impact), [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host), [Clear Windows Event Logs](/tags/#clear-windows-event-logs), [System Services](/tags/#system-services), [Service Execution](/tags/#service-execution) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Impact](/tags/#impact), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) |
| [Cloud Cryptomining](cloud_cryptomining) | [Cloud Accounts](/tags/#cloud-accounts), [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts), [Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions](/tags/#unused/unsupported-cloud-regions) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) |
| [Cloud Federated Credential Abuse](cloud_federated_credential_abuse) | [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts), [Cloud Account](/tags/#cloud-account), [Create Account](/tags/#create-account), [Modify Authentication Process](/tags/#modify-authentication-process), [LSASS Memory](/tags/#lsass-memory), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping), [Image File Execution Options Injection](/tags/#image-file-execution-options-injection), [Event Triggered Execution](/tags/#event-triggered-execution) | [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access), [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) |
| [Cobalt Strike](cobalt_strike) | [Archive via Utility](/tags/#archive-via-utility), [Archive Collected Data](/tags/#archive-collected-data), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [Windows Command Shell](/tags/#windows-command-shell), [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process), [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Regsvr32](/tags/#regsvr32), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism), [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](/tags/#trusted-developer-utilities-proxy-execution), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities), [MSBuild](/tags/#msbuild) | [Collection](/tags/#collection), [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) |
| [ColdRoot MacOS RAT]() | None | None |
| [Cobalt Strike](cobalt_strike) | [Archive via Utility](/tags/#archive-via-utility), [Archive Collected Data](/tags/#archive-collected-data), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [Windows Command Shell](/tags/#windows-command-shell), [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process), [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection), [System Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#system-binary-proxy-execution), [Regsvr32](/tags/#regsvr32), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism), [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](/tags/#trusted-developer-utilities-proxy-execution), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities), [MSBuild](/tags/#msbuild) | [Collection](/tags/#collection), [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) |
| [ColdRoot MacOS RAT](coldroot_macos_rat) | None | None |
| [Collection and Staging](collection_and_staging) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Archive via Utility](/tags/#archive-via-utility), [Archive Collected Data](/tags/#archive-collected-data), [Email Collection](/tags/#email-collection), [Local Email Collection](/tags/#local-email-collection), [Remote Email Collection](/tags/#remote-email-collection) | [Collection](/tags/#collection), [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) |
| [Command and Control](command_and_control) | [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-unencrypted/obfuscated-non-c2-protocol), [DNS](/tags/#dns), [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol), [Non-Application Layer Protocol](/tags/#non-application-layer-protocol), [Application Layer Protocol](/tags/#application-layer-protocol), [Web Protocols](/tags/#web-protocols), [Drive-by Compromise](/tags/#drive-by-compromise) | [Command And Control](/tags/#command-and-control), [Exfiltration](/tags/#exfiltration), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access) |
| [Command and Control](command_and_control) | [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-unencrypted-non-c2-protocol), [DNS](/tags/#dns), [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol), [Non-Application Layer Protocol](/tags/#non-application-layer-protocol), [Application Layer Protocol](/tags/#application-layer-protocol), [Web Protocols](/tags/#web-protocols), [Drive-by Compromise](/tags/#drive-by-compromise) | [Command And Control](/tags/#command-and-control), [Exfiltration](/tags/#exfiltration), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access) |
| [Common Phishing Frameworks](common_phishing_frameworks) | [Spearphishing via Service](/tags/#spearphishing-via-service) | [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access) |
| [Container Implantation Monitoring and Investigation](container_implantation_monitoring_and_investigation) | [Implant Internal Image](/tags/#implant-internal-image) | [Persistence](/tags/#persistence) |
| [Credential Dumping](credential_dumping) | [LSASS Memory](/tags/#lsass-memory), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping), [Security Account Manager](/tags/#security-account-manager), [NTDS](/tags/#ntds), [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell) | [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access), [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Execution](/tags/#execution) |
| [CyclopsBLink](cyclopsblink) | [Disable or Modify System Firewall](/tags/#disable-or-modify-system-firewall), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses), [Masquerade Task or Service](/tags/#masquerade-task-or-service), [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) |
| [DHS Report TA18-074A](dhs_report_ta18-074a) | [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell), [Windows Command Shell](/tags/#windows-command-shell), [Local Account](/tags/#local-account), [Create Account](/tags/#create-account), [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](/tags/#smb/windows-admin-shares), [System Services](/tags/#system-services), [Service Execution](/tags/#service-execution), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [Disable or Modify System Firewall](/tags/#disable-or-modify-system-firewall), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses), [Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder](/tags/#registry-run-keys-/-startup-folder), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution), [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process), [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job), [User Execution](/tags/#user-execution), [Malicious File](/tags/#malicious-file), [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry), [File Transfer Protocols](/tags/#file-transfer-protocols), [Application Layer Protocol](/tags/#application-layer-protocol) | [Command And Control](/tags/#command-and-control), [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Lateral Movement](/tags/#lateral-movement), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) |
| [DNS Amplification Attacks](dns_amplification_attacks) | [Network Denial of Service](/tags/#network-denial-of-service), [Reflection Amplification](/tags/#reflection-amplification) | [Impact](/tags/#impact) |
| [DNS Hijacking](dns_hijacking) | [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-unencrypted/obfuscated-non-c2-protocol), [DNS](/tags/#dns), [Drive-by Compromise](/tags/#drive-by-compromise) | [Command And Control](/tags/#command-and-control), [Exfiltration](/tags/#exfiltration), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access) |
| [DarkSide Ransomware](darkside_ransomware) | [Security Account Manager](/tags/#security-account-manager), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping), [BITS Jobs](/tags/#bits-jobs), [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [CMSTP](/tags/#cmstp), [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection), [Inhibit System Recovery](/tags/#inhibit-system-recovery), [LSASS Memory](/tags/#lsass-memory), [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](/tags/#smb/windows-admin-shares), [Automated Exfiltration](/tags/#automated-exfiltration), [System Services](/tags/#system-services), [Service Execution](/tags/#service-execution), [Data Encrypted for Impact](/tags/#data-encrypted-for-impact), [Bypass User Account Control](/tags/#bypass-user-account-control), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism) | [Command And Control](/tags/#command-and-control), [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access), [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Exfiltration](/tags/#exfiltration), [Impact](/tags/#impact), [Lateral Movement](/tags/#lateral-movement), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) |
| [Data Destruction](data_destruction) | [Windows Command Shell](/tags/#windows-command-shell), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](/tags/#smb/windows-admin-shares), [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Data Destruction](/tags/#data-destruction), [File Deletion](/tags/#file-deletion), [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Regsvr32](/tags/#regsvr32), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process), [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry), [Disk Structure Wipe](/tags/#disk-structure-wipe), [Disk Wipe](/tags/#disk-wipe) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Impact](/tags/#impact), [Lateral Movement](/tags/#lateral-movement), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) |
| [Data Exfiltration](data_exfiltration) | [Transfer Data to Cloud Account](/tags/#transfer-data-to-cloud-account), [Email Collection](/tags/#email-collection), [Email Forwarding Rule](/tags/#email-forwarding-rule), [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol), [Local Email Collection](/tags/#local-email-collection), [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Exfiltration Over C2 Channel](/tags/#exfiltration-over-c2-channel), [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-unencrypted/obfuscated-non-c2-protocol) | [Collection](/tags/#collection), [Exfiltration](/tags/#exfiltration), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access) |
| [Data Protection](data_protection) | [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-unencrypted/obfuscated-non-c2-protocol), [Drive-by Compromise](/tags/#drive-by-compromise) | [Exfiltration](/tags/#exfiltration), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access) |
| [DNS Hijacking](dns_hijacking) | [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-unencrypted-non-c2-protocol), [DNS](/tags/#dns), [Drive-by Compromise](/tags/#drive-by-compromise) | [Command And Control](/tags/#command-and-control), [Exfiltration](/tags/#exfiltration), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access) |
| [DarkSide Ransomware](darkside_ransomware) | [Security Account Manager](/tags/#security-account-manager), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping), [BITS Jobs](/tags/#bits-jobs), [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer), [System Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#system-binary-proxy-execution), [CMSTP](/tags/#cmstp), [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection), [Inhibit System Recovery](/tags/#inhibit-system-recovery), [LSASS Memory](/tags/#lsass-memory), [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](/tags/#smb/windows-admin-shares), [Automated Exfiltration](/tags/#automated-exfiltration), [System Services](/tags/#system-services), [Service Execution](/tags/#service-execution), [Data Encrypted for Impact](/tags/#data-encrypted-for-impact), [Bypass User Account Control](/tags/#bypass-user-account-control), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism) | [Command And Control](/tags/#command-and-control), [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access), [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Exfiltration](/tags/#exfiltration), [Impact](/tags/#impact), [Lateral Movement](/tags/#lateral-movement), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) |
| [Data Destruction](data_destruction) | [Windows Command Shell](/tags/#windows-command-shell), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](/tags/#smb/windows-admin-shares), [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Data Destruction](/tags/#data-destruction), [File Deletion](/tags/#file-deletion), [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host), [System Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#system-binary-proxy-execution), [Regsvr32](/tags/#regsvr32), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process), [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry), [Disk Structure Wipe](/tags/#disk-structure-wipe), [Disk Wipe](/tags/#disk-wipe) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Impact](/tags/#impact), [Lateral Movement](/tags/#lateral-movement), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) |
| [Data Exfiltration](data_exfiltration) | [Transfer Data to Cloud Account](/tags/#transfer-data-to-cloud-account), [Email Collection](/tags/#email-collection), [Email Forwarding Rule](/tags/#email-forwarding-rule), [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol), [Local Email Collection](/tags/#local-email-collection), [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Exfiltration Over C2 Channel](/tags/#exfiltration-over-c2-channel), [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-unencrypted-non-c2-protocol) | [Collection](/tags/#collection), [Exfiltration](/tags/#exfiltration), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access) |
| [Data Protection](data_protection) | [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-unencrypted-non-c2-protocol), [Drive-by Compromise](/tags/#drive-by-compromise) | [Exfiltration](/tags/#exfiltration), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access) |
| [Deobfuscate-Decode Files or Information](deobfuscate-decode_files_or_information) | [Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information](/tags/#deobfuscate/decode-files-or-information) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) |
| [Detect Zerologon Attack](detect_zerologon_attack) | [LSASS Memory](/tags/#lsass-memory), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping), [Exploitation of Remote Services](/tags/#exploitation-of-remote-services), [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application) | [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access), [Lateral Movement](/tags/#lateral-movement) |
| [Dev Sec Ops](dev_sec_ops) | [Malicious Image](/tags/#malicious-image), [User Execution](/tags/#user-execution), [Compromise Client Software Binary](/tags/#compromise-client-software-binary), [Compromise Software Supply Chain](/tags/#compromise-software-supply-chain), [Supply Chain Compromise](/tags/#supply-chain-compromise), [Trusted Relationship](/tags/#trusted-relationship), [Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools](/tags/#compromise-software-dependencies-and-development-tools), [Exfiltration to Cloud Storage](/tags/#exfiltration-to-cloud-storage), [Exfiltration Over Web Service](/tags/#exfiltration-over-web-service), [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment), [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-unencrypted/obfuscated-non-c2-protocol), [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol), [Exploitation for Credential Access](/tags/#exploitation-for-credential-access), [Cloud Service Discovery](/tags/#cloud-service-discovery) | [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access), [Discovery](/tags/#discovery), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Exfiltration](/tags/#exfiltration), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence) |
| [Dev Sec Ops](dev_sec_ops) | [Malicious Image](/tags/#malicious-image), [User Execution](/tags/#user-execution), [Compromise Client Software Binary](/tags/#compromise-client-software-binary), [Compromise Software Supply Chain](/tags/#compromise-software-supply-chain), [Supply Chain Compromise](/tags/#supply-chain-compromise), [Trusted Relationship](/tags/#trusted-relationship), [Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools](/tags/#compromise-software-dependencies-and-development-tools), [Exfiltration to Cloud Storage](/tags/#exfiltration-to-cloud-storage), [Exfiltration Over Web Service](/tags/#exfiltration-over-web-service), [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment), [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-unencrypted-non-c2-protocol), [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol), [Exploitation for Credential Access](/tags/#exploitation-for-credential-access), [Cloud Service Discovery](/tags/#cloud-service-discovery) | [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access), [Discovery](/tags/#discovery), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Exfiltration](/tags/#exfiltration), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence) |
| [Disabling Security Tools](disabling_security_tools) | [Install Root Certificate](/tags/#install-root-certificate), [Subvert Trust Controls](/tags/#subvert-trust-controls), [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses), [Disable or Modify System Firewall](/tags/#disable-or-modify-system-firewall), [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process), [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) |
| [Domain Trust Discovery](domain_trust_discovery) | [Domain Trust Discovery](/tags/#domain-trust-discovery), [Remote System Discovery](/tags/#remote-system-discovery) | [Discovery](/tags/#discovery) |
| [Double Zero Destructor](double_zero_destructor) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process), [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry), [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) |
@@ -60,87 +61,88 @@ sidebar:
| [FIN7](fin7) | [System Owner/User Discovery](/tags/#system-owner/user-discovery), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [JavaScript](/tags/#javascript), [Credentials from Password Stores](/tags/#credentials-from-password-stores), [Credentials from Web Browsers](/tags/#credentials-from-web-browsers), [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment), [Visual Basic](/tags/#visual-basic), [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process), [Parent PID Spoofing](/tags/#parent-pid-spoofing), [Access Token Manipulation](/tags/#access-token-manipulation), [XSL Script Processing](/tags/#xsl-script-processing) | [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access), [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Discovery](/tags/#discovery), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) |
| [GCP Cross Account Activity](gcp_cross_account_activity) | [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) |
| [HAFNIUM Group](hafnium_group) | [LSASS Memory](/tags/#lsass-memory), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell), [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer), [Server Software Component](/tags/#server-software-component), [Web Shell](/tags/#web-shell), [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application), [Local Account](/tags/#local-account), [Create Account](/tags/#create-account), [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](/tags/#smb/windows-admin-shares), [System Services](/tags/#system-services), [Service Execution](/tags/#service-execution), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping), [NTDS](/tags/#ntds), [Email Collection](/tags/#email-collection), [Remote Email Collection](/tags/#remote-email-collection) | [Collection](/tags/#collection), [Command And Control](/tags/#command-and-control), [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access), [Lateral Movement](/tags/#lateral-movement), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence) |
| [Hermetic Wiper](hermetic_wiper) | [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell), [Malicious File](/tags/#malicious-file), [Active Setup](/tags/#active-setup), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer), [Change Default File Association](/tags/#change-default-file-association), [Event Triggered Execution](/tags/#event-triggered-execution), [Windows Command Shell](/tags/#windows-command-shell), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping), [Indicator Blocking](/tags/#indicator-blocking), [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](/tags/#trusted-developer-utilities-proxy-execution), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses), [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](/tags/#smb/windows-admin-shares), [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets](/tags/#steal-or-forge-kerberos-tickets), [Kerberoasting](/tags/#kerberoasting), [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application), [Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts](/tags/#boot-or-logon-initialization-scripts), [Logon Script (Windows)](/tags/#logon-script-(windows)), [Obfuscated Files or Information](/tags/#obfuscated-files-or-information), [DLL Side-Loading](/tags/#dll-side-loading), [Hijack Execution Flow](/tags/#hijack-execution-flow), [Accessibility Features](/tags/#accessibility-features), [Distributed Component Object Model](/tags/#distributed-component-object-model), [Windows Remote Management](/tags/#windows-remote-management), [Windows Management Instrumentation](/tags/#windows-management-instrumentation), [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task), [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service), [Indicator Removal from Tools](/tags/#indicator-removal-from-tools), [Component Object Model Hijacking](/tags/#component-object-model-hijacking), [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection), [Gather Victim Host Information](/tags/#gather-victim-host-information), [Image File Execution Options Injection](/tags/#image-file-execution-options-injection), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Regsvr32](/tags/#regsvr32), [Access Token Manipulation](/tags/#access-token-manipulation), [Token Impersonation/Theft](/tags/#token-impersonation/theft), [Screensaver](/tags/#screensaver), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process), [Time Providers](/tags/#time-providers), [Server Software Component](/tags/#server-software-component), [Web Shell](/tags/#web-shell), [Data Destruction](/tags/#data-destruction), [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry), [Disk Structure Wipe](/tags/#disk-structure-wipe), [Disk Wipe](/tags/#disk-wipe), [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment), [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](/tags/#exploitation-for-privilege-escalation), [Print Processors](/tags/#print-processors) | [Command And Control](/tags/#command-and-control), [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access), [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Impact](/tags/#impact), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access), [Lateral Movement](/tags/#lateral-movement), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation), [Reconnaissance](/tags/#reconnaissance) |
| [Hidden Cobra Malware](hidden_cobra_malware) | [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell), [Windows Command Shell](/tags/#windows-command-shell), [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host), [Network Share Connection Removal](/tags/#network-share-connection-removal), [Remote Desktop Protocol](/tags/#remote-desktop-protocol), [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [File Transfer Protocols](/tags/#file-transfer-protocols), [Application Layer Protocol](/tags/#application-layer-protocol), [DNS](/tags/#dns), [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](/tags/#smb/windows-admin-shares), [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-unencrypted/obfuscated-non-c2-protocol), [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol) | [Command And Control](/tags/#command-and-control), [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Exfiltration](/tags/#exfiltration), [Lateral Movement](/tags/#lateral-movement) |
| [Host Redirection](host_redirection) | [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-unencrypted/obfuscated-non-c2-protocol), [DNS](/tags/#dns) | [Command And Control](/tags/#command-and-control), [Exfiltration](/tags/#exfiltration) |
| [IcedID](icedid) | [Domain Account](/tags/#domain-account), [Account Discovery](/tags/#account-discovery), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [Windows Command Shell](/tags/#windows-command-shell), [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection), [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses), [User Execution](/tags/#user-execution), [Malicious File](/tags/#malicious-file), [Bypass User Account Control](/tags/#bypass-user-account-control), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism), [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry), [Archive via Utility](/tags/#archive-via-utility), [Archive Collected Data](/tags/#archive-collected-data), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Mshta](/tags/#mshta), [Domain Trust Discovery](/tags/#domain-trust-discovery), [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment), [Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder](/tags/#registry-run-keys-/-startup-folder), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution), [Regsvr32](/tags/#regsvr32), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job), [Data from Local System](/tags/#data-from-local-system), [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task) | [Collection](/tags/#collection), [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Discovery](/tags/#discovery), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) |
| [Hermetic Wiper](hermetic_wiper) | [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell), [Malicious File](/tags/#malicious-file), [Active Setup](/tags/#active-setup), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer), [Change Default File Association](/tags/#change-default-file-association), [Event Triggered Execution](/tags/#event-triggered-execution), [Windows Command Shell](/tags/#windows-command-shell), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping), [Indicator Blocking](/tags/#indicator-blocking), [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](/tags/#trusted-developer-utilities-proxy-execution), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses), [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](/tags/#smb/windows-admin-shares), [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets](/tags/#steal-or-forge-kerberos-tickets), [Kerberoasting](/tags/#kerberoasting), [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application), [Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts](/tags/#boot-or-logon-initialization-scripts), [Logon Script (Windows)](/tags/#logon-script-(windows)), [Obfuscated Files or Information](/tags/#obfuscated-files-or-information), [DLL Side-Loading](/tags/#dll-side-loading), [Hijack Execution Flow](/tags/#hijack-execution-flow), [Accessibility Features](/tags/#accessibility-features), [Distributed Component Object Model](/tags/#distributed-component-object-model), [Windows Remote Management](/tags/#windows-remote-management), [Windows Management Instrumentation](/tags/#windows-management-instrumentation), [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task), [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service), [Indicator Removal from Tools](/tags/#indicator-removal-from-tools), [Component Object Model Hijacking](/tags/#component-object-model-hijacking), [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection), [Gather Victim Host Information](/tags/#gather-victim-host-information), [Image File Execution Options Injection](/tags/#image-file-execution-options-injection), [System Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#system-binary-proxy-execution), [Regsvr32](/tags/#regsvr32), [Access Token Manipulation](/tags/#access-token-manipulation), [Token Impersonation/Theft](/tags/#token-impersonation/theft), [Screensaver](/tags/#screensaver), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process), [Time Providers](/tags/#time-providers), [Server Software Component](/tags/#server-software-component), [Web Shell](/tags/#web-shell), [Data Destruction](/tags/#data-destruction), [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry), [Disk Structure Wipe](/tags/#disk-structure-wipe), [Disk Wipe](/tags/#disk-wipe), [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment), [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](/tags/#exploitation-for-privilege-escalation), [Print Processors](/tags/#print-processors) | [Command And Control](/tags/#command-and-control), [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access), [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Impact](/tags/#impact), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access), [Lateral Movement](/tags/#lateral-movement), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation), [Reconnaissance](/tags/#reconnaissance) |
| [Hidden Cobra Malware](hidden_cobra_malware) | [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell), [Windows Command Shell](/tags/#windows-command-shell), [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host), [Network Share Connection Removal](/tags/#network-share-connection-removal), [Remote Desktop Protocol](/tags/#remote-desktop-protocol), [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [File Transfer Protocols](/tags/#file-transfer-protocols), [Application Layer Protocol](/tags/#application-layer-protocol), [DNS](/tags/#dns), [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](/tags/#smb/windows-admin-shares), [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-unencrypted-non-c2-protocol), [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol) | [Command And Control](/tags/#command-and-control), [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Exfiltration](/tags/#exfiltration), [Lateral Movement](/tags/#lateral-movement) |
| [Host Redirection](host_redirection) | [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-unencrypted-non-c2-protocol), [DNS](/tags/#dns) | [Command And Control](/tags/#command-and-control), [Exfiltration](/tags/#exfiltration) |
| [IcedID](icedid) | [Domain Account](/tags/#domain-account), [Account Discovery](/tags/#account-discovery), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [Windows Command Shell](/tags/#windows-command-shell), [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection), [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses), [User Execution](/tags/#user-execution), [Malicious File](/tags/#malicious-file), [Bypass User Account Control](/tags/#bypass-user-account-control), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism), [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry), [Archive via Utility](/tags/#archive-via-utility), [Archive Collected Data](/tags/#archive-collected-data), [System Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#system-binary-proxy-execution), [Mshta](/tags/#mshta), [Domain Trust Discovery](/tags/#domain-trust-discovery), [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment), [Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder](/tags/#registry-run-keys-/-startup-folder), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution), [Regsvr32](/tags/#regsvr32), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job), [Data from Local System](/tags/#data-from-local-system), [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task) | [Collection](/tags/#collection), [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Discovery](/tags/#discovery), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) |
| [Industroyer2](industroyer2) | [Domain Account](/tags/#domain-account), [Account Discovery](/tags/#account-discovery), [Security Account Manager](/tags/#security-account-manager), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping), [LSASS Memory](/tags/#lsass-memory), [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](/tags/#smb/windows-admin-shares), [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Distributed Component Object Model](/tags/#distributed-component-object-model), [Windows Management Instrumentation](/tags/#windows-management-instrumentation), [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service), [Cron](/tags/#cron), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job), [Data Destruction](/tags/#data-destruction), [Service Stop](/tags/#service-stop), [File Deletion](/tags/#file-deletion), [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host), [System Network Configuration Discovery](/tags/#system-network-configuration-discovery), [Gather Victim Host Information](/tags/#gather-victim-host-information), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process), [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task), [Disable or Modify System Firewall](/tags/#disable-or-modify-system-firewall), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access), [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Discovery](/tags/#discovery), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Impact](/tags/#impact), [Lateral Movement](/tags/#lateral-movement), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation), [Reconnaissance](/tags/#reconnaissance) |
| [Information Sabotage](information_sabotage) | [Transfer Data to Cloud Account](/tags/#transfer-data-to-cloud-account) | [Exfiltration](/tags/#exfiltration) |
| [Ingress Tool Transfer](ingress_tool_transfer) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell), [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer), [BITS Jobs](/tags/#bits-jobs) | [Command And Control](/tags/#command-and-control), [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence) |
| [Insider Threat](insider_threat) | [Exfiltration to Cloud Storage](/tags/#exfiltration-to-cloud-storage), [Exfiltration Over Web Service](/tags/#exfiltration-over-web-service), [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-unencrypted/obfuscated-non-c2-protocol), [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol), [Transfer Data to Cloud Account](/tags/#transfer-data-to-cloud-account), [Password Spraying](/tags/#password-spraying), [Brute Force](/tags/#brute-force) | [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access), [Exfiltration](/tags/#exfiltration) |
| [Insider Threat](insider_threat) | [Exfiltration to Cloud Storage](/tags/#exfiltration-to-cloud-storage), [Exfiltration Over Web Service](/tags/#exfiltration-over-web-service), [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-unencrypted-non-c2-protocol), [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol), [Transfer Data to Cloud Account](/tags/#transfer-data-to-cloud-account), [Password Spraying](/tags/#password-spraying), [Brute Force](/tags/#brute-force) | [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access), [Exfiltration](/tags/#exfiltration) |
| [JBoss Vulnerability](jboss_vulnerability) | [System Information Discovery](/tags/#system-information-discovery) | [Discovery](/tags/#discovery) |
| [Kubernetes Scanning Activity](kubernetes_scanning_activity) | [Cloud Service Discovery](/tags/#cloud-service-discovery) | [Discovery](/tags/#discovery) |
| [Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity]() | None | None |
| [Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity]() | None | None |
| [Linux Persistence Techniques](linux_persistence_techniques) | [Cron](/tags/#cron), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job), [Local Account](/tags/#local-account), [Create Account](/tags/#create-account), [At (Linux)](/tags/#at-(linux)), [Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification](/tags/#linux-and-mac-file-and-directory-permissions-modification), [File and Directory Permissions Modification](/tags/#file-and-directory-permissions-modification), [Setuid and Setgid](/tags/#setuid-and-setgid), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism), [Sudo and Sudo Caching](/tags/#sudo-and-sudo-caching), [Kernel Modules and Extensions](/tags/#kernel-modules-and-extensions), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution), [RC Scripts](/tags/#rc-scripts), [Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts](/tags/#boot-or-logon-initialization-scripts), [Unix Shell Configuration Modification](/tags/#unix-shell-configuration-modification), [Event Triggered Execution](/tags/#event-triggered-execution), [SSH Authorized Keys](/tags/#ssh-authorized-keys), [Account Manipulation](/tags/#account-manipulation), [/etc/passwd and /etc/shadow](/tags/#/etc/passwd-and-/etc/shadow), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping), [Dynamic Linker Hijacking](/tags/#dynamic-linker-hijacking), [Hijack Execution Flow](/tags/#hijack-execution-flow), [Systemd Timers](/tags/#systemd-timers), [Data Destruction](/tags/#data-destruction) | [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access), [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Impact](/tags/#impact), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) |
| [Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity](kubernetes_sensitive_object_access_activity) | None | None |
| [Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity](kubernetes_sensitive_role_activity) | None | None |
| [Linux Persistence Techniques](linux_persistence_techniques) | [Cron](/tags/#cron), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job), [Local Account](/tags/#local-account), [Create Account](/tags/#create-account), [At](/tags/#at), [Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification](/tags/#linux-and-mac-file-and-directory-permissions-modification), [File and Directory Permissions Modification](/tags/#file-and-directory-permissions-modification), [Setuid and Setgid](/tags/#setuid-and-setgid), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism), [Sudo and Sudo Caching](/tags/#sudo-and-sudo-caching), [Kernel Modules and Extensions](/tags/#kernel-modules-and-extensions), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution), [RC Scripts](/tags/#rc-scripts), [Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts](/tags/#boot-or-logon-initialization-scripts), [Unix Shell Configuration Modification](/tags/#unix-shell-configuration-modification), [Event Triggered Execution](/tags/#event-triggered-execution), [SSH Authorized Keys](/tags/#ssh-authorized-keys), [Account Manipulation](/tags/#account-manipulation), [/etc/passwd and /etc/shadow](/tags/#/etc/passwd-and-/etc/shadow), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping), [Dynamic Linker Hijacking](/tags/#dynamic-linker-hijacking), [Hijack Execution Flow](/tags/#hijack-execution-flow), [Systemd Timers](/tags/#systemd-timers), [Data Destruction](/tags/#data-destruction) | [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access), [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Impact](/tags/#impact), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) |
| [Linux Post-Exploitation](linux_post-exploitation) | [Unix Shell](/tags/#unix-shell) | [Execution](/tags/#execution) |
| [Linux Privilege Escalation](linux_privilege_escalation) | [Cron](/tags/#cron), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job), [Local Account](/tags/#local-account), [Create Account](/tags/#create-account), [At (Linux)](/tags/#at-(linux)), [Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification](/tags/#linux-and-mac-file-and-directory-permissions-modification), [File and Directory Permissions Modification](/tags/#file-and-directory-permissions-modification), [Setuid and Setgid](/tags/#setuid-and-setgid), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism), [Sudo and Sudo Caching](/tags/#sudo-and-sudo-caching), [Kernel Modules and Extensions](/tags/#kernel-modules-and-extensions), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution), [RC Scripts](/tags/#rc-scripts), [Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts](/tags/#boot-or-logon-initialization-scripts), [Unix Shell Configuration Modification](/tags/#unix-shell-configuration-modification), [Event Triggered Execution](/tags/#event-triggered-execution), [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](/tags/#exploitation-for-privilege-escalation), [SSH Authorized Keys](/tags/#ssh-authorized-keys), [Account Manipulation](/tags/#account-manipulation), [/etc/passwd and /etc/shadow](/tags/#/etc/passwd-and-/etc/shadow), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping), [Dynamic Linker Hijacking](/tags/#dynamic-linker-hijacking), [Hijack Execution Flow](/tags/#hijack-execution-flow), [Systemd Timers](/tags/#systemd-timers), [Data Destruction](/tags/#data-destruction) | [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access), [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Impact](/tags/#impact), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) |
| [Living Off The Land](living_off_the_land) | [BITS Jobs](/tags/#bits-jobs), [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer), [Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information](/tags/#deobfuscate/decode-files-or-information), [Windows Command Shell](/tags/#windows-command-shell), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Control Panel](/tags/#control-panel), [NTDS](/tags/#ntds), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping), [Compiled HTML File](/tags/#compiled-html-file), [Mshta](/tags/#mshta), [Regsvcs/Regasm](/tags/#regsvcs/regasm), [Regsvr32](/tags/#regsvr32), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32), [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses), [LSASS Memory](/tags/#lsass-memory), [Security Account Manager](/tags/#security-account-manager), [Bypass User Account Control](/tags/#bypass-user-account-control), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism), [Unix Shell](/tags/#unix-shell), [Plist Modification](/tags/#plist-modification), [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [Distributed Component Object Model](/tags/#distributed-component-object-model), [Services Registry Permissions Weakness](/tags/#services-registry-permissions-weakness), [Hijack Execution Flow](/tags/#hijack-execution-flow), [Windows Management Instrumentation](/tags/#windows-management-instrumentation), [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection), [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job), [At (Windows)](/tags/#at-(windows)), [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process), [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service), [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](/tags/#trusted-developer-utilities-proxy-execution), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities), [MSBuild](/tags/#msbuild), [Indirect Command Execution](/tags/#indirect-command-execution), [InstallUtil](/tags/#installutil) | [Command And Control](/tags/#command-and-control), [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access), [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Lateral Movement](/tags/#lateral-movement), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) |
| [Linux Privilege Escalation](linux_privilege_escalation) | [Cron](/tags/#cron), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job), [Local Account](/tags/#local-account), [Create Account](/tags/#create-account), [At](/tags/#at), [Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification](/tags/#linux-and-mac-file-and-directory-permissions-modification), [File and Directory Permissions Modification](/tags/#file-and-directory-permissions-modification), [Setuid and Setgid](/tags/#setuid-and-setgid), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism), [Sudo and Sudo Caching](/tags/#sudo-and-sudo-caching), [Kernel Modules and Extensions](/tags/#kernel-modules-and-extensions), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution), [RC Scripts](/tags/#rc-scripts), [Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts](/tags/#boot-or-logon-initialization-scripts), [Unix Shell Configuration Modification](/tags/#unix-shell-configuration-modification), [Event Triggered Execution](/tags/#event-triggered-execution), [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](/tags/#exploitation-for-privilege-escalation), [SSH Authorized Keys](/tags/#ssh-authorized-keys), [Account Manipulation](/tags/#account-manipulation), [/etc/passwd and /etc/shadow](/tags/#/etc/passwd-and-/etc/shadow), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping), [Dynamic Linker Hijacking](/tags/#dynamic-linker-hijacking), [Hijack Execution Flow](/tags/#hijack-execution-flow), [Systemd Timers](/tags/#systemd-timers), [Data Destruction](/tags/#data-destruction) | [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access), [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Impact](/tags/#impact), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) |
| [Living Off The Land](living_off_the_land) | [BITS Jobs](/tags/#bits-jobs), [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer), [Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information](/tags/#deobfuscate/decode-files-or-information), [Windows Command Shell](/tags/#windows-command-shell), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [System Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#system-binary-proxy-execution), [Control Panel](/tags/#control-panel), [NTDS](/tags/#ntds), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping), [Compiled HTML File](/tags/#compiled-html-file), [Mshta](/tags/#mshta), [Regsvcs/Regasm](/tags/#regsvcs/regasm), [Regsvr32](/tags/#regsvr32), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32), [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses), [LSASS Memory](/tags/#lsass-memory), [Security Account Manager](/tags/#security-account-manager), [Bypass User Account Control](/tags/#bypass-user-account-control), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism), [Unix Shell](/tags/#unix-shell), [Plist File Modification](/tags/#plist-file-modification), [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [Distributed Component Object Model](/tags/#distributed-component-object-model), [Services Registry Permissions Weakness](/tags/#services-registry-permissions-weakness), [Hijack Execution Flow](/tags/#hijack-execution-flow), [Windows Management Instrumentation](/tags/#windows-management-instrumentation), [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection), [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job), [At](/tags/#at), [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process), [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service), [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](/tags/#trusted-developer-utilities-proxy-execution), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities), [MSBuild](/tags/#msbuild), [Indirect Command Execution](/tags/#indirect-command-execution), [InstallUtil](/tags/#installutil) | [Command And Control](/tags/#command-and-control), [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access), [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Lateral Movement](/tags/#lateral-movement), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) |
| [Local Privilege Escalation With KrbRelayUp](local_privilege_escalation_with_krbrelayup) | [Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets](/tags/#steal-or-forge-kerberos-tickets), [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service) | [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) |
| [Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228](log4shell_cve-2021-44228) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell), [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer), [Windows Command Shell](/tags/#windows-command-shell), [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application) | [Command And Control](/tags/#command-and-control), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access) |
| [Malicious PowerShell](malicious_powershell) | [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping), [Obfuscated Files or Information](/tags/#obfuscated-files-or-information), [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [Distributed Component Object Model](/tags/#distributed-component-object-model), [Windows Remote Management](/tags/#windows-remote-management), [Windows Management Instrumentation](/tags/#windows-management-instrumentation), [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task), [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service), [Indicator Removal from Tools](/tags/#indicator-removal-from-tools), [Component Object Model Hijacking](/tags/#component-object-model-hijacking), [Event Triggered Execution](/tags/#event-triggered-execution), [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection), [Gather Victim Host Information](/tags/#gather-victim-host-information), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | [Command And Control](/tags/#command-and-control), [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access), [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Lateral Movement](/tags/#lateral-movement), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation), [Reconnaissance](/tags/#reconnaissance) |
| [Masquerading - Rename System Utilities](masquerading_-_rename_system_utilities) | [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32), [Data Destruction](/tags/#data-destruction), [File Deletion](/tags/#file-deletion), [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host), [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](/tags/#trusted-developer-utilities-proxy-execution), [MSBuild](/tags/#msbuild), [InstallUtil](/tags/#installutil) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Impact](/tags/#impact) |
| [Masquerading - Rename System Utilities](masquerading_-_rename_system_utilities) | [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities), [System Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#system-binary-proxy-execution), [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32), [Data Destruction](/tags/#data-destruction), [File Deletion](/tags/#file-deletion), [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host), [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](/tags/#trusted-developer-utilities-proxy-execution), [MSBuild](/tags/#msbuild), [InstallUtil](/tags/#installutil) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Impact](/tags/#impact) |
| [Meterpreter](meterpreter) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter) | [Execution](/tags/#execution) |
| [Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444](microsoft_mshtml_remote_code_execution_cve-2021-40444) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Control Panel](/tags/#control-panel), [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access) |
| [Monitor Backup Solution]() | None | None |
| [Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444](microsoft_mshtml_remote_code_execution_cve-2021-40444) | [System Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#system-binary-proxy-execution), [Control Panel](/tags/#control-panel), [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access) |
| [Microsoft Support Diagnostic Tool Vulnerability CVE-2022-30190](microsoft_support_diagnostic_tool_vulnerability_cve-2022-30190) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [System Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#system-binary-proxy-execution), [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access) |
| [Monitor Backup Solution](monitor_backup_solution) | None | None |
| [Monitor for Unauthorized Software](monitor_for_unauthorized_software) | [Match Legitimate Name or Location](/tags/#match-legitimate-name-or-location), [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping), [Active Scanning](/tags/#active-scanning) | [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access), [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Reconnaissance](/tags/#reconnaissance) |
| [Monitor for Updates]() | None | None |
| [NOBELIUM Group](nobelium_group) | [Archive via Utility](/tags/#archive-via-utility), [Archive Collected Data](/tags/#archive-collected-data), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [Windows Command Shell](/tags/#windows-command-shell), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Mshta](/tags/#mshta), [Obfuscated Files or Information](/tags/#obfuscated-files-or-information), [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process), [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job), [Remote System Discovery](/tags/#remote-system-discovery), [System Services](/tags/#system-services), [Service Execution](/tags/#service-execution), [Exploitation for Client Execution](/tags/#exploitation-for-client-execution), [File Transfer Protocols](/tags/#file-transfer-protocols), [Application Layer Protocol](/tags/#application-layer-protocol), [Web Protocols](/tags/#web-protocols), [Web Shell](/tags/#web-shell) | [Collection](/tags/#collection), [Command And Control](/tags/#command-and-control), [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Discovery](/tags/#discovery), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) |
| [Monitor for Updates](monitor_for_updates) | None | None |
| [NOBELIUM Group](nobelium_group) | [Archive via Utility](/tags/#archive-via-utility), [Archive Collected Data](/tags/#archive-collected-data), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [Windows Command Shell](/tags/#windows-command-shell), [System Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#system-binary-proxy-execution), [Mshta](/tags/#mshta), [Obfuscated Files or Information](/tags/#obfuscated-files-or-information), [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process), [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job), [Remote System Discovery](/tags/#remote-system-discovery), [System Services](/tags/#system-services), [Service Execution](/tags/#service-execution), [Exploitation for Client Execution](/tags/#exploitation-for-client-execution), [File Transfer Protocols](/tags/#file-transfer-protocols), [Application Layer Protocol](/tags/#application-layer-protocol), [Web Protocols](/tags/#web-protocols), [Web Shell](/tags/#web-shell) | [Collection](/tags/#collection), [Command And Control](/tags/#command-and-control), [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Discovery](/tags/#discovery), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) |
| [Netsh Abuse](netsh_abuse) | [Disable or Modify System Firewall](/tags/#disable-or-modify-system-firewall), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) |
| [Network Discovery](network_discovery) | [System Network Configuration Discovery](/tags/#system-network-configuration-discovery) | [Discovery](/tags/#discovery) |
| [Office 365 Detections](office_365_detections) | [Cloud Account](/tags/#cloud-account), [Create Account](/tags/#create-account), [Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall](/tags/#disable-or-modify-cloud-firewall), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses), [Modify Authentication Process](/tags/#modify-authentication-process), [Brute Force](/tags/#brute-force), [Email Collection](/tags/#email-collection), [Email Forwarding Rule](/tags/#email-forwarding-rule), [Remote Email Collection](/tags/#remote-email-collection), [Password Guessing](/tags/#password-guessing) | [Collection](/tags/#collection), [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access), [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence) |
| [Orangeworm Attack Group](orangeworm_attack_group) | [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell), [Windows Command Shell](/tags/#windows-command-shell), [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process), [System Services](/tags/#system-services), [Service Execution](/tags/#service-execution) | [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) |
| [PetitPotam NTLM Relay on Active Directory Certificate Services](petitpotam_ntlm_relay_on_active_directory_certificate_services) | [Forced Authentication](/tags/#forced-authentication), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping) | [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access) |
| [Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns](possible_backdoor_activity_associated_with_mudcarp_espionage_campaigns) | [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell), [Windows Command Shell](/tags/#windows-command-shell), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder](/tags/#registry-run-keys-/-startup-folder), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution) | [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) |
| [PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527](printnightmare_cve-2021-34527) | [Print Processors](/tags/#print-processors), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32), [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](/tags/#exploitation-for-privilege-escalation) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) |
| [Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch](prohibited_traffic_allowed_or_protocol_mismatch) | [Remote Desktop Protocol](/tags/#remote-desktop-protocol), [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol), [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-unencrypted/obfuscated-non-c2-protocol), [Application Layer Protocol](/tags/#application-layer-protocol), [Web Protocols](/tags/#web-protocols), [Drive-by Compromise](/tags/#drive-by-compromise) | [Command And Control](/tags/#command-and-control), [Exfiltration](/tags/#exfiltration), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access), [Lateral Movement](/tags/#lateral-movement) |
| [PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527](printnightmare_cve-2021-34527) | [Print Processors](/tags/#print-processors), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution), [System Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#system-binary-proxy-execution), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32), [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](/tags/#exploitation-for-privilege-escalation) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) |
| [Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch](prohibited_traffic_allowed_or_protocol_mismatch) | [Remote Desktop Protocol](/tags/#remote-desktop-protocol), [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol), [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-unencrypted-non-c2-protocol), [Application Layer Protocol](/tags/#application-layer-protocol), [Web Protocols](/tags/#web-protocols), [Drive-by Compromise](/tags/#drive-by-compromise) | [Command And Control](/tags/#command-and-control), [Exfiltration](/tags/#exfiltration), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access), [Lateral Movement](/tags/#lateral-movement) |
| [ProxyShell](proxyshell) | [Server Software Component](/tags/#server-software-component), [Web Shell](/tags/#web-shell), [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell) | [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence) |
| [Ransomware](ransomware) | [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task), [Archive via Utility](/tags/#archive-via-utility), [Archive Collected Data](/tags/#archive-collected-data), [Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall](/tags/#disable-or-modify-cloud-firewall), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism), [Inhibit System Recovery](/tags/#inhibit-system-recovery), [File Deletion](/tags/#file-deletion), [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [CMSTP](/tags/#cmstp), [Data Destruction](/tags/#data-destruction), [User Execution](/tags/#user-execution), [Automated Exfiltration](/tags/#automated-exfiltration), [Domain Account](/tags/#domain-account), [Local Groups](/tags/#local-groups), [Domain Trust Discovery](/tags/#domain-trust-discovery), [Local Account](/tags/#local-account), [Account Discovery](/tags/#account-discovery), [Domain Groups](/tags/#domain-groups), [Permission Groups Discovery](/tags/#permission-groups-discovery), [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Clear Windows Event Logs](/tags/#clear-windows-event-logs), [Service Stop](/tags/#service-stop), [Account Access Removal](/tags/#account-access-removal), [System Services](/tags/#system-services), [Service Execution](/tags/#service-execution), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [Visual Basic](/tags/#visual-basic), [File and Directory Permissions Modification](/tags/#file-and-directory-permissions-modification), [Defacement](/tags/#defacement), [DLL Side-Loading](/tags/#dll-side-loading), [Hijack Execution Flow](/tags/#hijack-execution-flow), [Obfuscated Files or Information](/tags/#obfuscated-files-or-information), [Indicator Removal from Tools](/tags/#indicator-removal-from-tools), [Component Object Model Hijacking](/tags/#component-object-model-hijacking), [Event Triggered Execution](/tags/#event-triggered-execution), [Gather Victim Host Information](/tags/#gather-victim-host-information), [Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder](/tags/#registry-run-keys-/-startup-folder), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution), [Windows Management Instrumentation](/tags/#windows-management-instrumentation), [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job), [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities), [Msiexec](/tags/#msiexec), [Data Encrypted for Impact](/tags/#data-encrypted-for-impact), [InstallUtil](/tags/#installutil), [Tool](/tags/#tool), [Server Software Component](/tags/#server-software-component), [Web Shell](/tags/#web-shell), [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application), [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol), [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](/tags/#smb/windows-admin-shares), [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [Application Layer Protocol](/tags/#application-layer-protocol), [Web Protocols](/tags/#web-protocols) | [Collection](/tags/#collection), [Command And Control](/tags/#command-and-control), [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Discovery](/tags/#discovery), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Exfiltration](/tags/#exfiltration), [Impact](/tags/#impact), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access), [Lateral Movement](/tags/#lateral-movement), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation), [Reconnaissance](/tags/#reconnaissance), [Resource Development](/tags/#resource-development) |
| [Ransomware](ransomware) | [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task), [Archive via Utility](/tags/#archive-via-utility), [Archive Collected Data](/tags/#archive-collected-data), [Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall](/tags/#disable-or-modify-cloud-firewall), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism), [Inhibit System Recovery](/tags/#inhibit-system-recovery), [File Deletion](/tags/#file-deletion), [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host), [System Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#system-binary-proxy-execution), [CMSTP](/tags/#cmstp), [Data Destruction](/tags/#data-destruction), [User Execution](/tags/#user-execution), [Automated Exfiltration](/tags/#automated-exfiltration), [Domain Account](/tags/#domain-account), [Local Groups](/tags/#local-groups), [Domain Trust Discovery](/tags/#domain-trust-discovery), [Local Account](/tags/#local-account), [Account Discovery](/tags/#account-discovery), [Domain Groups](/tags/#domain-groups), [Permission Groups Discovery](/tags/#permission-groups-discovery), [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Clear Windows Event Logs](/tags/#clear-windows-event-logs), [Service Stop](/tags/#service-stop), [Account Access Removal](/tags/#account-access-removal), [System Services](/tags/#system-services), [Service Execution](/tags/#service-execution), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [Visual Basic](/tags/#visual-basic), [File and Directory Permissions Modification](/tags/#file-and-directory-permissions-modification), [Defacement](/tags/#defacement), [DLL Side-Loading](/tags/#dll-side-loading), [Hijack Execution Flow](/tags/#hijack-execution-flow), [Obfuscated Files or Information](/tags/#obfuscated-files-or-information), [Indicator Removal from Tools](/tags/#indicator-removal-from-tools), [Component Object Model Hijacking](/tags/#component-object-model-hijacking), [Event Triggered Execution](/tags/#event-triggered-execution), [Gather Victim Host Information](/tags/#gather-victim-host-information), [Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder](/tags/#registry-run-keys-/-startup-folder), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution), [Windows Management Instrumentation](/tags/#windows-management-instrumentation), [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job), [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities), [Msiexec](/tags/#msiexec), [Data Encrypted for Impact](/tags/#data-encrypted-for-impact), [InstallUtil](/tags/#installutil), [Tool](/tags/#tool), [Server Software Component](/tags/#server-software-component), [Web Shell](/tags/#web-shell), [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application), [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol), [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](/tags/#smb/windows-admin-shares), [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [Application Layer Protocol](/tags/#application-layer-protocol), [Web Protocols](/tags/#web-protocols) | [Collection](/tags/#collection), [Command And Control](/tags/#command-and-control), [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Discovery](/tags/#discovery), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Exfiltration](/tags/#exfiltration), [Impact](/tags/#impact), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access), [Lateral Movement](/tags/#lateral-movement), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation), [Reconnaissance](/tags/#reconnaissance), [Resource Development](/tags/#resource-development) |
| [Ransomware Cloud](ransomware_cloud) | [Data Encrypted for Impact](/tags/#data-encrypted-for-impact) | [Impact](/tags/#impact) |
| [Remcos](remcos) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses), [Bypass User Account Control](/tags/#bypass-user-account-control), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism), [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [JavaScript](/tags/#javascript), [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection), [Dynamic-link Library Injection](/tags/#dynamic-link-library-injection), [Regsvr32](/tags/#regsvr32), [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry), [Credentials from Password Stores](/tags/#credentials-from-password-stores), [Credentials from Web Browsers](/tags/#credentials-from-web-browsers), [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host), [Component Object Model](/tags/#component-object-model), [Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder](/tags/#registry-run-keys-/-startup-folder), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Screen Capture](/tags/#screen-capture), [Visual Basic](/tags/#visual-basic), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process), [Gather Victim Host Information](/tags/#gather-victim-host-information), [Parent PID Spoofing](/tags/#parent-pid-spoofing), [Access Token Manipulation](/tags/#access-token-manipulation) | [Collection](/tags/#collection), [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access), [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation), [Reconnaissance](/tags/#reconnaissance) |
| [Revil Ransomware](revil_ransomware) | [Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall](/tags/#disable-or-modify-cloud-firewall), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses), [Inhibit System Recovery](/tags/#inhibit-system-recovery), [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Defacement](/tags/#defacement), [DLL Side-Loading](/tags/#dll-side-loading), [Hijack Execution Flow](/tags/#hijack-execution-flow), [User Execution](/tags/#user-execution), [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [CMSTP](/tags/#cmstp) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Impact](/tags/#impact), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) |
| [Remcos](remcos) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses), [Bypass User Account Control](/tags/#bypass-user-account-control), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism), [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [JavaScript](/tags/#javascript), [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection), [Dynamic-link Library Injection](/tags/#dynamic-link-library-injection), [Regsvr32](/tags/#regsvr32), [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry), [Credentials from Password Stores](/tags/#credentials-from-password-stores), [Credentials from Web Browsers](/tags/#credentials-from-web-browsers), [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host), [Component Object Model](/tags/#component-object-model), [Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder](/tags/#registry-run-keys-/-startup-folder), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution), [System Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#system-binary-proxy-execution), [Screen Capture](/tags/#screen-capture), [Visual Basic](/tags/#visual-basic), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process), [Gather Victim Host Information](/tags/#gather-victim-host-information), [Parent PID Spoofing](/tags/#parent-pid-spoofing), [Access Token Manipulation](/tags/#access-token-manipulation) | [Collection](/tags/#collection), [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access), [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation), [Reconnaissance](/tags/#reconnaissance) |
| [Revil Ransomware](revil_ransomware) | [Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall](/tags/#disable-or-modify-cloud-firewall), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses), [Inhibit System Recovery](/tags/#inhibit-system-recovery), [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Defacement](/tags/#defacement), [DLL Side-Loading](/tags/#dll-side-loading), [Hijack Execution Flow](/tags/#hijack-execution-flow), [User Execution](/tags/#user-execution), [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry), [System Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#system-binary-proxy-execution), [CMSTP](/tags/#cmstp) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Impact](/tags/#impact), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) |
| [Router and Infrastructure Security](router_and_infrastructure_security) | [Hardware Additions](/tags/#hardware-additions), [Network Denial of Service](/tags/#network-denial-of-service), [Adversary-in-the-Middle](/tags/#adversary-in-the-middle), [ARP Cache Poisoning](/tags/#arp-cache-poisoning), [TFTP Boot](/tags/#tftp-boot), [Pre-OS Boot](/tags/#pre-os-boot), [Automated Exfiltration](/tags/#automated-exfiltration), [Traffic Duplication](/tags/#traffic-duplication) | [Collection](/tags/#collection), [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access), [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Exfiltration](/tags/#exfiltration), [Impact](/tags/#impact), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence) |
| [Ryuk Ransomware](ryuk_ransomware) | [Windows Command Shell](/tags/#windows-command-shell), [Inhibit System Recovery](/tags/#inhibit-system-recovery), [Data Destruction](/tags/#data-destruction), [Domain Trust Discovery](/tags/#domain-trust-discovery), [Data Encrypted for Impact](/tags/#data-encrypted-for-impact), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job), [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses), [Service Stop](/tags/#service-stop), [Remote Desktop Protocol](/tags/#remote-desktop-protocol), [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Discovery](/tags/#discovery), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Impact](/tags/#impact), [Lateral Movement](/tags/#lateral-movement), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) |
| [SQL Injection](sql_injection) | [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application) | [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access) |
| [SamSam Ransomware](samsam_ransomware) | [Match Legitimate Name or Location](/tags/#match-legitimate-name-or-location), [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping), [Active Scanning](/tags/#active-scanning), [User Execution](/tags/#user-execution), [Malicious File](/tags/#malicious-file), [Data Destruction](/tags/#data-destruction), [Inhibit System Recovery](/tags/#inhibit-system-recovery), [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](/tags/#smb/windows-admin-shares), [System Services](/tags/#system-services), [Service Execution](/tags/#service-execution), [Data Encrypted for Impact](/tags/#data-encrypted-for-impact), [Remote Desktop Protocol](/tags/#remote-desktop-protocol), [System Information Discovery](/tags/#system-information-discovery) | [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access), [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Discovery](/tags/#discovery), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Impact](/tags/#impact), [Lateral Movement](/tags/#lateral-movement), [Reconnaissance](/tags/#reconnaissance) |
| [Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil](signed_binary_proxy_execution_installutil) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [InstallUtil](/tags/#installutil) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) |
| [Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil](signed_binary_proxy_execution_installutil) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities), [System Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#system-binary-proxy-execution), [InstallUtil](/tags/#installutil) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) |
| [Silver Sparrow](silver_sparrow) | [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer), [Launch Agent](/tags/#launch-agent), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process), [Data Staged](/tags/#data-staged) | [Collection](/tags/#collection), [Command And Control](/tags/#command-and-control), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) |
| [Spearphishing Attachments](spearphishing_attachments) | [Security Account Manager](/tags/#security-account-manager), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping), [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment), [Spearphishing Link](/tags/#spearphishing-link), [Malicious Link](/tags/#malicious-link), [User Execution](/tags/#user-execution) | [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access) |
| [Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities]() | None | None |
| [Splunk Vulnerabilities](splunk_vulnerabilities) | [File and Directory Discovery](/tags/#file-and-directory-discovery), [Network Denial of Service](/tags/#network-denial-of-service), [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts), [Drive-by Compromise](/tags/#drive-by-compromise) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Discovery](/tags/#discovery), [Impact](/tags/#impact), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) |
| [Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities](spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerabilities) | None | None |
| [Splunk Vulnerabilities](splunk_vulnerabilities) | [File and Directory Discovery](/tags/#file-and-directory-discovery), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [Digital Certificates](/tags/#digital-certificates), [Network Denial of Service](/tags/#network-denial-of-service), [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection), [Protocol Impersonation](/tags/#protocol-impersonation), [Digital Certificates](/tags/#digital-certificates), [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts), [Drive-by Compromise](/tags/#drive-by-compromise), [Network Sniffing](/tags/#network-sniffing) | [Command And Control](/tags/#command-and-control), [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access), [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Discovery](/tags/#discovery), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Impact](/tags/#impact), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation), [Resource Development](/tags/#resource-development) |
| [Spring4Shell CVE-2022-22965](spring4shell_cve-2022-22965) | [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application), [Web Shell](/tags/#web-shell), [Server Software Component](/tags/#server-software-component) | [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence) |
| [Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities](suspicious_aws_ec2_activities) | [Cloud Accounts](/tags/#cloud-accounts), [Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions](/tags/#unused/unsupported-cloud-regions) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) |
| [Suspicious AWS Login Activities](suspicious_aws_login_activities) | [Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions](/tags/#unused/unsupported-cloud-regions), [Cloud Accounts](/tags/#cloud-accounts) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) |
| [Suspicious AWS S3 Activities](suspicious_aws_s3_activities) | [Data from Cloud Storage Object](/tags/#data-from-cloud-storage-object) | [Collection](/tags/#collection) |
| [Suspicious AWS Traffic]() | None | None |
| [Suspicious AWS Traffic](suspicious_aws_traffic) | None | None |
| [Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities](suspicious_cloud_authentication_activities) | [Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions](/tags/#unused/unsupported-cloud-regions) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) |
| [Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities](suspicious_cloud_instance_activities) | [Cloud Accounts](/tags/#cloud-accounts), [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts), [Transfer Data to Cloud Account](/tags/#transfer-data-to-cloud-account) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Exfiltration](/tags/#exfiltration), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) |
| [Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities](suspicious_cloud_provisioning_activities) | [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) |
| [Suspicious Cloud User Activities](suspicious_cloud_user_activities) | [Cloud Accounts](/tags/#cloud-accounts), [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts), [Cloud Infrastructure Discovery](/tags/#cloud-infrastructure-discovery), [User Execution](/tags/#user-execution) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Discovery](/tags/#discovery), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) |
| [Suspicious Command-Line Executions](suspicious_command-line_executions) | [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell), [Windows Command Shell](/tags/#windows-command-shell), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Execution](/tags/#execution) |
| [Suspicious Compiled HTML Activity](suspicious_compiled_html_activity) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Compiled HTML File](/tags/#compiled-html-file) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) |
| [Suspicious DNS Traffic](suspicious_dns_traffic) | [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-unencrypted/obfuscated-non-c2-protocol), [DNS](/tags/#dns), [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol), [Application Layer Protocol](/tags/#application-layer-protocol), [Drive-by Compromise](/tags/#drive-by-compromise) | [Command And Control](/tags/#command-and-control), [Exfiltration](/tags/#exfiltration), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access) |
| [Suspicious Compiled HTML Activity](suspicious_compiled_html_activity) | [System Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#system-binary-proxy-execution), [Compiled HTML File](/tags/#compiled-html-file) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) |
| [Suspicious DNS Traffic](suspicious_dns_traffic) | [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-unencrypted-non-c2-protocol), [DNS](/tags/#dns), [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol), [Application Layer Protocol](/tags/#application-layer-protocol), [Drive-by Compromise](/tags/#drive-by-compromise) | [Command And Control](/tags/#command-and-control), [Exfiltration](/tags/#exfiltration), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access) |
| [Suspicious Emails](suspicious_emails) | [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment) | [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access) |
| [Suspicious GCP Storage Activities](suspicious_gcp_storage_activities) | [Data from Cloud Storage Object](/tags/#data-from-cloud-storage-object) | [Collection](/tags/#collection) |
| [Suspicious MSHTA Activity](suspicious_mshta_activity) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Mshta](/tags/#mshta), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [Windows Command Shell](/tags/#windows-command-shell), [Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder](/tags/#registry-run-keys-/-startup-folder), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) |
| [Suspicious MSHTA Activity](suspicious_mshta_activity) | [System Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#system-binary-proxy-execution), [Mshta](/tags/#mshta), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [Windows Command Shell](/tags/#windows-command-shell), [Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder](/tags/#registry-run-keys-/-startup-folder), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) |
| [Suspicious Okta Activity](suspicious_okta_activity) | [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts), [Default Accounts](/tags/#default-accounts) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) |
| [Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity](suspicious_regsvcs_regasm_activity) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Regsvcs/Regasm](/tags/#regsvcs/regasm) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) |
| [Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity](suspicious_regsvr32_activity) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Regsvr32](/tags/#regsvr32), [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) |
| [Suspicious Rundll32 Activity](suspicious_rundll32_activity) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities), [LSASS Memory](/tags/#lsass-memory), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping) | [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access), [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) |
| [Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity](suspicious_regsvcs_regasm_activity) | [System Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#system-binary-proxy-execution), [Regsvcs/Regasm](/tags/#regsvcs/regasm) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) |
| [Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity](suspicious_regsvr32_activity) | [System Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#system-binary-proxy-execution), [Regsvr32](/tags/#regsvr32), [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) |
| [Suspicious Rundll32 Activity](suspicious_rundll32_activity) | [System Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#system-binary-proxy-execution), [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities), [LSASS Memory](/tags/#lsass-memory), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping) | [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access), [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) |
| [Suspicious WMI Use](suspicious_wmi_use) | [Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription](/tags/#windows-management-instrumentation-event-subscription), [Event Triggered Execution](/tags/#event-triggered-execution), [Windows Management Instrumentation](/tags/#windows-management-instrumentation), [XSL Script Processing](/tags/#xsl-script-processing) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) |
| [Suspicious Windows Registry Activities](suspicious_windows_registry_activities) | [Hidden Files and Directories](/tags/#hidden-files-and-directories), [Change Default File Association](/tags/#change-default-file-association), [Bypass User Account Control](/tags/#bypass-user-account-control), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism), [Port Monitors](/tags/#port-monitors), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution), [Application Shimming](/tags/#application-shimming), [Event Triggered Execution](/tags/#event-triggered-execution), [Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder](/tags/#registry-run-keys-/-startup-folder), [Image File Execution Options Injection](/tags/#image-file-execution-options-injection), [Services Registry Permissions Weakness](/tags/#services-registry-permissions-weakness) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) |
| [Suspicious Zoom Child Processes](suspicious_zoom_child_processes) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [Windows Command Shell](/tags/#windows-command-shell), [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](/tags/#exploitation-for-privilege-escalation) | [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) |
| [Trickbot](trickbot) | [Domain Account](/tags/#domain-account), [Account Discovery](/tags/#account-discovery), [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses), [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection), [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](/tags/#smb/windows-admin-shares), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Mshta](/tags/#mshta), [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32), [Gather Victim Network Information](/tags/#gather-victim-network-information), [IP Addresses](/tags/#ip-addresses), [Obfuscated Files or Information](/tags/#obfuscated-files-or-information), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Discovery](/tags/#discovery), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access), [Lateral Movement](/tags/#lateral-movement), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation), [Reconnaissance](/tags/#reconnaissance) |
| [Trickbot](trickbot) | [Domain Account](/tags/#domain-account), [Account Discovery](/tags/#account-discovery), [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses), [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection), [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](/tags/#smb/windows-admin-shares), [System Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#system-binary-proxy-execution), [Mshta](/tags/#mshta), [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32), [Gather Victim Network Information](/tags/#gather-victim-network-information), [IP Addresses](/tags/#ip-addresses), [Obfuscated Files or Information](/tags/#obfuscated-files-or-information), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Discovery](/tags/#discovery), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access), [Lateral Movement](/tags/#lateral-movement), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation), [Reconnaissance](/tags/#reconnaissance) |
| [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](/tags/#trusted-developer-utilities-proxy-execution), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) |
| [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild](trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution_msbuild) | [MSBuild](/tags/#msbuild), [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](/tags/#trusted-developer-utilities-proxy-execution), [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) |
| [Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications](unusual_aws_ec2_modifications) | [Cloud Accounts](/tags/#cloud-accounts) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) |
| [Unusual Processes](unusual_processes) | [Malicious File](/tags/#malicious-file), [Match Legitimate Name or Location](/tags/#match-legitimate-name-or-location), [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping), [Active Scanning](/tags/#active-scanning), [System Network Configuration Discovery](/tags/#system-network-configuration-discovery), [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities), [Verclsid](/tags/#verclsid), [InstallUtil](/tags/#installutil), [Tool](/tags/#tool), [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process), [Parent PID Spoofing](/tags/#parent-pid-spoofing), [Access Token Manipulation](/tags/#access-token-manipulation), [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application) | [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access), [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Discovery](/tags/#discovery), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation), [Reconnaissance](/tags/#reconnaissance), [Resource Development](/tags/#resource-development) |
| [Use of Cleartext Protocols]() | None | None |
| [Unusual Processes](unusual_processes) | [Malicious File](/tags/#malicious-file), [Match Legitimate Name or Location](/tags/#match-legitimate-name-or-location), [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping), [Active Scanning](/tags/#active-scanning), [System Network Configuration Discovery](/tags/#system-network-configuration-discovery), [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry), [System Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#system-binary-proxy-execution), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities), [Verclsid](/tags/#verclsid), [InstallUtil](/tags/#installutil), [Tool](/tags/#tool), [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process), [Parent PID Spoofing](/tags/#parent-pid-spoofing), [Access Token Manipulation](/tags/#access-token-manipulation), [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application) | [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access), [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Discovery](/tags/#discovery), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation), [Reconnaissance](/tags/#reconnaissance), [Resource Development](/tags/#resource-development) |
| [Use of Cleartext Protocols](use_of_cleartext_protocols) | None | None |
| [VMware Server Side Injection and Privilege Escalation](vmware_server_side_injection_and_privilege_escalation) | [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application) | [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access) |
| [Web Fraud Detection](web_fraud_detection) | [Create Account](/tags/#create-account), [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) |
| [WhisperGate](whispergate) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses), [Windows Command Shell](/tags/#windows-command-shell), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [Data Destruction](/tags/#data-destruction), [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](/tags/#smb/windows-admin-shares), [Distributed Component Object Model](/tags/#distributed-component-object-model), [Windows Management Instrumentation](/tags/#windows-management-instrumentation), [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service), [Obfuscated Files or Information](/tags/#obfuscated-files-or-information), [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](/tags/#virtualization/sandbox-evasion), [Time Based Evasion](/tags/#time-based-evasion), [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host), [Visual Basic](/tags/#visual-basic), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [InstallUtil](/tags/#installutil), [Tool](/tags/#tool), [Disk Structure Wipe](/tags/#disk-structure-wipe), [Disk Wipe](/tags/#disk-wipe), [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection), [Parent PID Spoofing](/tags/#parent-pid-spoofing), [Access Token Manipulation](/tags/#access-token-manipulation) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Discovery](/tags/#discovery), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Impact](/tags/#impact), [Lateral Movement](/tags/#lateral-movement), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation), [Resource Development](/tags/#resource-development) |
| [WhisperGate](whispergate) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses), [Windows Command Shell](/tags/#windows-command-shell), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [Data Destruction](/tags/#data-destruction), [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](/tags/#smb/windows-admin-shares), [Distributed Component Object Model](/tags/#distributed-component-object-model), [Windows Management Instrumentation](/tags/#windows-management-instrumentation), [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service), [Obfuscated Files or Information](/tags/#obfuscated-files-or-information), [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](/tags/#virtualization/sandbox-evasion), [Time Based Evasion](/tags/#time-based-evasion), [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host), [Visual Basic](/tags/#visual-basic), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities), [System Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#system-binary-proxy-execution), [InstallUtil](/tags/#installutil), [Tool](/tags/#tool), [Disk Structure Wipe](/tags/#disk-structure-wipe), [Disk Wipe](/tags/#disk-wipe), [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection), [Parent PID Spoofing](/tags/#parent-pid-spoofing), [Access Token Manipulation](/tags/#access-token-manipulation) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Discovery](/tags/#discovery), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Impact](/tags/#impact), [Lateral Movement](/tags/#lateral-movement), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation), [Resource Development](/tags/#resource-development) |
| [Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350](windows_dns_sigred_cve-2020-1350) | [Exploitation for Client Execution](/tags/#exploitation-for-client-execution) | [Execution](/tags/#execution) |
| [Windows Defense Evasion Tactics](windows_defense_evasion_tactics) | [Hidden Files and Directories](/tags/#hidden-files-and-directories), [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses), [Compile After Delivery](/tags/#compile-after-delivery), [Obfuscated Files or Information](/tags/#obfuscated-files-or-information), [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry), [Hide Artifacts](/tags/#hide-artifacts), [Bypass User Account Control](/tags/#bypass-user-account-control), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism), [Inhibit System Recovery](/tags/#inhibit-system-recovery), [Disable or Modify System Firewall](/tags/#disable-or-modify-system-firewall), [File and Directory Permissions Modification](/tags/#file-and-directory-permissions-modification), [Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification](/tags/#windows-file-and-directory-permissions-modification), [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection), [Dynamic-link Library Injection](/tags/#dynamic-link-library-injection), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Impact](/tags/#impact), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) |
| [Windows Defense Evasion Tactics](windows_defense_evasion_tactics) | [Hidden Files and Directories](/tags/#hidden-files-and-directories), [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses), [Compile After Delivery](/tags/#compile-after-delivery), [Obfuscated Files or Information](/tags/#obfuscated-files-or-information), [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry), [Hide Artifacts](/tags/#hide-artifacts), [Bypass User Account Control](/tags/#bypass-user-account-control), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism), [Inhibit System Recovery](/tags/#inhibit-system-recovery), [Disable or Modify System Firewall](/tags/#disable-or-modify-system-firewall), [File and Directory Permissions Modification](/tags/#file-and-directory-permissions-modification), [Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification](/tags/#windows-file-and-directory-permissions-modification), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection), [Dynamic-link Library Injection](/tags/#dynamic-link-library-injection), [System Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#system-binary-proxy-execution) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Impact](/tags/#impact), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) |
| [Windows Discovery Techniques](windows_discovery_techniques) | [Permission Groups Discovery](/tags/#permission-groups-discovery), [Local Groups](/tags/#local-groups) | [Discovery](/tags/#discovery) |
| [Windows Drivers](windows_drivers) | [Rootkit](/tags/#rootkit), [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](/tags/#exploitation-for-privilege-escalation), [Install Root Certificate](/tags/#install-root-certificate), [Subvert Trust Controls](/tags/#subvert-trust-controls), [Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder](/tags/#registry-run-keys-/-startup-folder), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution), [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) |
| [Windows File Extension and Association Abuse](windows_file_extension_and_association_abuse) | [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities), [Change Default File Association](/tags/#change-default-file-association), [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) |
docs/_posts/2017-01-07-spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems.md
+6 -2
View File
@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ The search is used to detect systems that are still vulnerable to the Spectre an
</div>
</details>
#### Search
#### Search
```
@@ -109,7 +109,8 @@ The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
Note that **spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
> :information_source:
> **spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
#### Required field
* _time
@@ -134,6 +135,9 @@ It is possible that your vulnerability scanner is not detecting that the patches
| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd |
> :information_source:
> The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.
#### Reference
docs/_posts/2017-09-12-detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers.md
+7 -3
View File
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ tags:
- Authentication
---
### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object
### :warning: WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL analytic
We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported.
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ The search queries the authentication logs for assets that are categorized as ro
</div>
</details>
#### Search
#### Search
```
@@ -107,7 +107,8 @@ The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
Note that **detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
> :information_source:
> **detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
#### Required field
* _time
@@ -135,6 +136,9 @@ Legitimate router connections may appear as new connections
| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd |
> :information_source:
> The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.
#### Reference
docs/_posts/2017-09-12-extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups.md
+6 -2
View File
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ This search returns a list of hosts that have not successfully completed a backu
</div>
</details>
#### Search
#### Search
```
`netbackup` MESSAGE="Disk/Partition backup completed successfully."
@@ -102,7 +102,8 @@ The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [netbackup](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/netbackup.yml)
Note that **extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
> :information_source:
> **extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
#### Required field
* _time
@@ -129,6 +130,9 @@ None identified
| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd |
> :information_source:
> The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.
#### Reference
docs/_posts/2017-09-12-identify_new_user_accounts.md
+6 -2
View File
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ This detection search will help profile user accounts in your environment by ide
</div>
</details>
#### Search
#### Search
```
@@ -112,7 +112,8 @@ This detection search will help profile user accounts in your environment by ide
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
Note that **identify_new_user_accounts_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
> :information_source:
> **identify_new_user_accounts_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
#### Required field
* _time
@@ -137,6 +138,9 @@ If the Identity_Management data model is not updated regularly, this search coul
| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd |
> :information_source:
> The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.
#### Reference
docs/_posts/2017-09-12-unsuccessful_netbackup_backups.md
+6 -2
View File
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ This search gives you the hosts where a backup was attempted and then failed.
</div>
</details>
#### Search
#### Search
```
`netbackup`
@@ -101,7 +101,8 @@ The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [netbackup](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/netbackup.yml)
Note that **unsuccessful_netbackup_backups_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
> :information_source:
> **unsuccessful_netbackup_backups_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
#### Required field
* _time
@@ -126,6 +127,9 @@ None identified
| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd |
> :information_source:
> The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.
#### Reference
docs/_posts/2017-09-13-detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address.md
+7 -3
View File
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ tags:
- Network_Sessions
---
### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object
### :warning: WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL analytic
We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported.
@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ By populating the organization's assets within the assets_by_str.csv, we will be
</div>
</details>
#### Search
#### Search
```
@@ -109,7 +109,8 @@ By populating the organization's assets within the assets_by_str.csv, we will be
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
Note that **detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
> :information_source:
> **detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
#### Required field
* _time
@@ -137,6 +138,9 @@ This search might be prone to high false positives. Please consider this when co
| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd |
> :information_source:
> The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.
#### Reference
docs/_posts/2017-09-15-no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame.md
+7 -3
View File
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ tags:
- Updates
---
### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object
### :warning: WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL analytic
We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported.
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ This search looks for Windows endpoints that have not generated an event indicat
</div>
</details>
#### Search
#### Search
```
@@ -109,7 +109,8 @@ The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
Note that **no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
> :information_source:
> **no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
#### Required field
* _time
@@ -137,6 +138,9 @@ None identified
| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd |
> :information_source:
> The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.
#### Reference
docs/_posts/2017-09-19-email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces.md
+7 -3
View File
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ tags:
- Email
---
### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object
### :warning: WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL analytic
We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported.
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ Attackers often use spaces as a means to obfuscate an attachment's file extensio
</div>
</details>
#### Search
#### Search
```
@@ -106,7 +106,8 @@ The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
Note that **email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
> :information_source:
> **email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
#### Required field
* _time
@@ -140,6 +141,9 @@ None at this time
| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd |
> :information_source:
> The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.
#### Reference
docs/_posts/2017-09-19-open_redirect_in_splunk_web.md
+6 -2
View File
@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ This search allows you to look for evidence of exploitation for CVE-2016-4859, t
</div>
</details>
#### Search
#### Search
```
index=_internal sourcetype=splunk_web_access return_to="/%09/*"
@@ -106,7 +106,8 @@ index=_internal sourcetype=splunk_web_access return_to="/%09/*"
#### Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
Note that **open_redirect_in_splunk_web_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
> :information_source:
> **open_redirect_in_splunk_web_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
#### Required field
* _time
@@ -131,6 +132,9 @@ None identified
| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd |
> :information_source:
> The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.
#### Reference
docs/_posts/2017-09-20-large_volume_of_dns_any_queries.md
+7 -3
View File
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ tags:
- Network_Resolution
---
### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object
### :warning: WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL analytic
We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported.
@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ The search is used to identify attempts to use your DNS Infrastructure for DDoS
</div>
</details>
#### Search
#### Search
```
@@ -117,7 +117,8 @@ The search is used to identify attempts to use your DNS Infrastructure for DDoS
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
Note that **large_volume_of_dns_any_queries_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
> :information_source:
> **large_volume_of_dns_any_queries_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
#### Required field
* _time
@@ -145,6 +146,9 @@ Legitimate ANY requests may trigger this search, however it is unusual to see a
| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd |
> :information_source:
> The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.
#### Reference
docs/_posts/2017-09-23-detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers.md
+7 -3
View File
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ tags:
- Web
---
### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object
### :warning: WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL analytic
We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported.
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ This search looks for specific GET or HEAD requests to web servers that are indi
</div>
</details>
#### Search
#### Search
```
@@ -107,7 +107,8 @@ The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
Note that **detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
> :information_source:
> **detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
#### Required field
* _time
@@ -137,6 +138,9 @@ It's possible for legitimate HTTP requests to be made to URLs containing the sus
| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd |
> :information_source:
> The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.
#### Reference
docs/_posts/2017-09-23-detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers.md
+7 -3
View File
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ tags:
- Web
---
### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object
### :warning: WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL analytic
We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported.
@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ This search is used to detect malicious HTTP requests crafted to exploit jmx-con
</div>
</details>
#### Search
#### Search
```
@@ -112,7 +112,8 @@ The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
Note that **detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
> :information_source:
> **detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
#### Required field
* _time
@@ -143,6 +144,9 @@ No known false positives for this detection.
| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd |
> :information_source:
> The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.
#### Reference
docs/_posts/2017-09-23-monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse.md
+7 -3
View File
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ This search looks for DNS requests for faux domains similar to the domains that
</div>
</details>
#### Search
#### Search
```
@@ -96,10 +96,11 @@ This search looks for DNS requests for faux domains similar to the domains that
#### Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
* [brand_abuse_dns](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/brand_abuse_dns.yml)
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
Note that **monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
> :information_source:
> **monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
#### Required field
* _time
@@ -124,6 +125,9 @@ None at this time
| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd |
> :information_source:
> The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.
#### Reference
docs/_posts/2017-09-23-monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse.md
+8 -4
View File
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ tags:
- Web
---
### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object
### :warning: WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL analytic
We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported.
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ This search looks for Web requests to faux domains similar to the one that you w
</div>
</details>
#### Search
#### Search
```
@@ -101,10 +101,11 @@ This search looks for Web requests to faux domains similar to the one that you w
#### Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [brand_abuse_web](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/brand_abuse_web.yml)
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
* [brand_abuse_web](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/brand_abuse_web.yml)
Note that **monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
> :information_source:
> **monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
#### Required field
* _time
@@ -131,6 +132,9 @@ None at this time
| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd |
> :information_source:
> The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.
#### Reference
docs/_posts/2017-10-13-unusually_long_content-type_length.md
+7 -3
View File
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ tags:
- Splunk Cloud
---
### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object
### :warning: WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL analytic
We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported.
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ This search looks for unusually long strings in the Content-Type http header tha
</div>
</details>
#### Search
#### Search
```
`stream_http`
@@ -109,7 +109,8 @@ This search looks for unusually long strings in the Content-Type http header tha
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [stream_http](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/stream_http.yml)
Note that **unusually_long_content-type_length_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
> :information_source:
> **unusually_long_content-type_length_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
#### Required field
* _time
@@ -139,6 +140,9 @@ Very few legitimate Content-Type fields will have a length greater than 100 char
| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd |
> :information_source:
> The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.
#### Reference
docs/_posts/2017-11-27-detect_usb_device_insertion.md
+6 -2
View File
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ The search is used to detect hosts that generate Windows Event ID 4663 for succe
</div>
</details>
#### Search
#### Search
```
@@ -103,7 +103,8 @@ The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
Note that **detect_usb_device_insertion_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
> :information_source:
> **detect_usb_device_insertion_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
#### Required field
* _time
@@ -132,6 +133,9 @@ Legitimate USB activity will also be detected. Please verify and investigate as
| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd |
> :information_source:
> The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.
#### Reference
docs/_posts/2018-01-05-monitor_email_for_brand_abuse.md
+7 -3
View File
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ tags:
- Email
---
### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object
### :warning: WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL analytic
We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported.
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ This search looks for emails claiming to be sent from a domain similar to one th
</div>
</details>
#### Search
#### Search
```
@@ -108,7 +108,8 @@ The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
Note that **monitor_email_for_brand_abuse_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
> :information_source:
> **monitor_email_for_brand_abuse_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
#### Lookups
The SPL above uses the following Lookups:
@@ -142,6 +143,9 @@ None at this time
| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd |
> :information_source:
> The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.
#### Reference
docs/_posts/2018-02-23-ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region.md
+6 -2
View File
@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where an instance is started in a pa
</div>
</details>
#### Search
#### Search
```
`cloudtrail` earliest=-1h StartInstances
@@ -113,7 +113,8 @@ The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml)
Note that **ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
> :information_source:
> **ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
#### Required field
* _time
@@ -140,6 +141,9 @@ It's possible that a user has unknowingly started an instance in a new region. P
| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd |
> :information_source:
> The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.
#### Reference
docs/_posts/2018-03-12-ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_ami.md
+6 -2
View File
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ This search looks for EC2 instances being created with previously unseen AMIs.
</div>
</details>
#### Search
#### Search
```
`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances [search `cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success
@@ -109,7 +109,8 @@ The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml)
Note that **ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_ami_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
> :information_source:
> **ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_ami_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
#### Required field
* _time
@@ -137,6 +138,9 @@ After a new AMI is created, the first systems created with that AMI will cause t
| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd |
> :information_source:
> The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.
#### Reference
docs/_posts/2018-03-16-aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.md
+6 -2
View File
@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen cities.
</div>
</details>
#### Search
#### Search
```
`cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*)
@@ -118,7 +118,8 @@ This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen cities.
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml)
Note that **aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
> :information_source:
> **aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
#### Required field
* _time
@@ -146,6 +147,9 @@ This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define "false positive" slightly dif
| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd |
> :information_source:
> The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.
#### Reference
docs/_posts/2018-03-16-aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.md
+6 -2
View File
@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen countri
</div>
</details>
#### Search
#### Search
```
`cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*)
@@ -118,7 +118,8 @@ This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen countri
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml)
Note that **aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
> :information_source:
> **aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
#### Required field
* _time
@@ -146,6 +147,9 @@ This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define "false positive" slightly dif
| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd |
> :information_source:
> The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.
#### Reference
docs/_posts/2018-03-16-aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.md
+6 -2
View File
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen IP addr
</div>
</details>
#### Search
#### Search
```
`cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) [search `cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*)
@@ -108,7 +108,8 @@ This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen IP addr
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml)
Note that **aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
> :information_source:
> **aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
#### Required field
* _time
@@ -136,6 +137,9 @@ This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define "false positive" slightly dif
| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd |
> :information_source:
> The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.
#### Reference
docs/_posts/2018-03-16-aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.md
+6 -2
View File
@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen regions
</div>
</details>
#### Search
#### Search
```
`cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*)
@@ -118,7 +118,8 @@ This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen regions
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml)
Note that **aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
> :information_source:
> **aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
#### Required field
* _time
@@ -146,6 +147,9 @@ This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define "false positive" slightly dif
| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd |
> :information_source:
> The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.
#### Reference
docs/_posts/2018-04-16-detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles.md
+6 -2
View File
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ This search detects new API calls that have either never been seen before or tha
</div>
</details>
#### Search
#### Search
```
`cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall errorCode=success userIdentity.type=AssumedRole [search `cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall errorCode=success userIdentity.type=AssumedRole
@@ -120,7 +120,8 @@ The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml)
Note that **detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
> :information_source:
> **detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
#### Lookups
The SPL above uses the following Lookups:
@@ -155,6 +156,9 @@ It is possible that there are legitimate user roles making new or infrequently u
| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd |
> :information_source:
> The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.
#### Reference
docs/_posts/2018-04-18-detect_spike_in_security_group_activity.md
+7 -3
View File
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ This search will detect users creating spikes in API activity related to securit
</div>
</details>
#### Search
#### Search
```
`cloudtrail` `security_group_api_calls` [search `cloudtrail` `security_group_api_calls`
@@ -124,10 +124,11 @@ This search will detect users creating spikes in API activity related to securit
#### Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml)
* [security_group_api_calls](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_group_api_calls.yml)
* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml)
Note that **detect_spike_in_security_group_activity_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
> :information_source:
> **detect_spike_in_security_group_activity_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
#### Lookups
The SPL above uses the following Lookups:
@@ -159,6 +160,9 @@ Based on the values of`dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold`, the false p
| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd |
> :information_source:
> The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.
#### Reference
docs/_posts/2018-05-07-detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws.md
+7 -3
View File
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ tags:
- Splunk Cloud
---
### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object
### :warning: WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL analytic
We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported.
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ This search will detect spike in blocked outbound network connections originatin
</div>
</details>
#### Search
#### Search
```
`cloudwatchlogs_vpcflow` action=blocked (src_ip=10.0.0.0/8 OR src_ip=172.16.0.0/12 OR src_ip=192.168.0.0/16) ( dest_ip!=10.0.0.0/8 AND dest_ip!=172.16.0.0/12 AND dest_ip!=192.168.0.0/16) [search `cloudwatchlogs_vpcflow` action=blocked (src_ip=10.0.0.0/8 OR src_ip=172.16.0.0/12 OR src_ip=192.168.0.0/16) ( dest_ip!=10.0.0.0/8 AND dest_ip!=172.16.0.0/12 AND dest_ip!=192.168.0.0/16)
@@ -115,7 +115,8 @@ This search will detect spike in blocked outbound network connections originatin
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [cloudwatchlogs_vpcflow](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudwatchlogs_vpcflow.yml)
Note that **detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
> :information_source:
> **detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
#### Lookups
The SPL above uses the following Lookups:
@@ -151,6 +152,9 @@ The false-positive rate may vary based on the values of`dataPointThreshold` and
| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd |
> :information_source:
> The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.
#### Reference
docs/_posts/2018-05-17-detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa.md
+6 -2
View File
@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user logged into the AWS acc
</div>
</details>
#### Search
#### Search
```
`cloudtrail` userIdentity.sessionContext.attributes.mfaAuthenticated=false
@@ -104,7 +104,8 @@ The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml)
Note that **detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
> :information_source:
> **detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
#### Lookups
The SPL above uses the following Lookups:
@@ -145,6 +146,9 @@ Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure do not have multi
| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd |
> :information_source:
> The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.
#### Reference
docs/_posts/2018-05-21-detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity.md
+6 -2
View File
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ This search will detect users creating spikes in API activity related to network
</div>
</details>
#### Search
#### Search
```
`cloudtrail` `network_acl_events` [search `cloudtrail` `network_acl_events`
@@ -125,7 +125,8 @@ The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [network_acl_events](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/network_acl_events.yml)
* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml)
Note that **detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
> :information_source:
> **detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
#### Lookups
The SPL above uses the following Lookups:
@@ -157,6 +158,9 @@ The false-positive rate may vary based on the values of`dataPointThreshold` and
| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd |
> :information_source:
> The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.
#### Reference
docs/_posts/2018-06-01-detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets.md
+7 -3
View File
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ tags:
- Network_Traffic
---
### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object
### :warning: WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL analytic
We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported.
@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ This search looks for outbound ICMP packets with a packet size larger than 1,000
</div>
</details>
#### Search
#### Search
```
@@ -113,7 +113,8 @@ The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
Note that **detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
> :information_source:
> **detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
#### Required field
* _time
@@ -145,6 +146,9 @@ ICMP packets are used in a variety of ways to help troubleshoot networking issue
| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd |
> :information_source:
> The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.
#### Reference
docs/_posts/2018-06-14-splunk_enterprise_information_disclosure.md
+6 -2
View File
@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ This search allows you to look for evidence of exploitation for CVE-2018-11409,
</div>
</details>
#### Search
#### Search
```
index=_internal sourcetype=splunkd_ui_access server-info
@@ -112,7 +112,8 @@ index=_internal sourcetype=splunkd_ui_access server-info
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
Note that **splunk_enterprise_information_disclosure_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
> :information_source:
> **splunk_enterprise_information_disclosure_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
#### Required field
* _time
@@ -137,6 +138,9 @@ Retrieving server information may be a legitimate API request. Verify that the a
| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd |
> :information_source:
> The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.
#### Reference
docs/_posts/2018-06-28-detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip.md
+7 -3
View File
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ tags:
- Splunk Cloud
---
### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object
### :warning: WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL analytic
We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported.
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ This search looks at S3 bucket-access logs and detects new or previously unseen
</div>
</details>
#### Search
#### Search
```
`aws_s3_accesslogs` http_status=200 [search `aws_s3_accesslogs` http_status=200
@@ -121,7 +121,8 @@ The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [aws_s3_accesslogs](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/aws_s3_accesslogs.yml)
Note that **detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
> :information_source:
> **detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
#### Required field
* _time
@@ -149,6 +150,9 @@ S3 buckets can be accessed from any IP, as long as it can make a successful conn
| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd |
> :information_source:
> The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.
#### Reference
docs/_posts/2018-10-08-web_fraud_-_account_harvesting.md
+6 -2
View File
@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ This search is used to identify the creation of multiple user accounts using the
</div>
</details>
#### Search
#### Search
```
`stream_http` http_content_type=text* uri="/magento2/customer/account/loginPost/"
@@ -111,7 +111,8 @@ This search is used to identify the creation of multiple user accounts using the
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [stream_http](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/stream_http.yml)
Note that **web_fraud_-_account_harvesting_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
> :information_source:
> **web_fraud_-_account_harvesting_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
#### Required field
* _time
@@ -139,6 +140,9 @@ As is common with many fraud-related searches, we are usually looking to attribu
| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd |
> :information_source:
> The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.
#### Reference
* [https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/2734/](https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/2734/)
docs/_posts/2018-10-08-web_fraud_-_anomalous_user_clickspeed.md
+6 -2
View File
@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ This search is used to examine web sessions to identify those where the clicks a
</div>
</details>
#### Search
#### Search
```
`stream_http` http_content_type=text*
@@ -112,7 +112,8 @@ This search is used to examine web sessions to identify those where the clicks a
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [stream_http](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/stream_http.yml)
Note that **web_fraud_-_anomalous_user_clickspeed_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
> :information_source:
> **web_fraud_-_anomalous_user_clickspeed_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
#### Required field
* _time
@@ -139,6 +140,9 @@ As is common with many fraud-related searches, we are usually looking to attribu
| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd |
> :information_source:
> The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.
#### Reference
* [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Session_ID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Session_ID)
docs/_posts/2018-10-08-web_fraud_-_password_sharing_across_accounts.md
+6 -2
View File
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ This search is used to identify user accounts that share a common password.
</div>
</details>
#### Search
#### Search
```
`stream_http` http_content_type=text* uri=/magento2/customer/account/loginPost*
@@ -101,7 +101,8 @@ This search is used to identify user accounts that share a common password.
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [stream_http](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/stream_http.yml)
Note that **web_fraud_-_password_sharing_across_accounts_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
> :information_source:
> **web_fraud_-_password_sharing_across_accounts_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
#### Required field
* _time
@@ -128,6 +129,9 @@ As is common with many fraud-related searches, we are usually looking to attribu
| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd |
> :information_source:
> The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.
#### Reference
* [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Session_ID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Session_ID)
docs/_posts/2018-10-12-cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image.md
+6 -2
View File
@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ This search looks for cloud compute instances being created with previously unse
</div>
</details>
#### Search
#### Search
```
@@ -107,7 +107,8 @@ This search looks for cloud compute instances being created with previously unse
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
Note that **cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
> :information_source:
> **cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
#### Lookups
The SPL above uses the following Lookups:
@@ -141,6 +142,9 @@ After a new image is created, the first systems created with that image will cau
| 36.0 | 60 | 60 | User $user$ is creating an instance $dest$ with an image that has not been previously seen. |
> :information_source:
> The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.
#### Reference
docs/_posts/2018-10-23-wmi_permanent_event_subscription.md
+7 -3
View File
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ tags:
- Splunk Cloud
---
### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object
### :warning: WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL analytic
We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported.
@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ This search looks for the creation of WMI permanent event subscriptions.
</div>
</details>
#### Search
#### Search
```
`wmi` EventCode=5861 Binding
@@ -117,7 +117,8 @@ The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [wmi](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wmi.yml)
Note that **wmi_permanent_event_subscription_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
> :information_source:
> **wmi_permanent_event_subscription_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
#### Required field
* _time
@@ -146,6 +147,9 @@ Although unlikely, administrators may use event subscriptions for legitimate pur
| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd |
> :information_source:
> The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.
#### Reference
docs/_posts/2018-10-23-wmi_temporary_event_subscription.md
+7 -3
View File
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ tags:
- Splunk Cloud
---
### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object
### :warning: WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL analytic
We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported.
@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ This search looks for the creation of WMI temporary event subscriptions.
</div>
</details>
#### Search
#### Search
```
`wmi` EventCode=5860 Temporary
@@ -116,7 +116,8 @@ The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [wmi](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wmi.yml)
Note that **wmi_temporary_event_subscription_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
> :information_source:
> **wmi_temporary_event_subscription_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
#### Required field
* _time
@@ -144,6 +145,9 @@ Some software may create WMI temporary event subscriptions for various purposes.
| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd |
> :information_source:
> The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.
#### Reference
docs/_posts/2018-11-02-windows_hosts_file_modification.md
+6 -2
View File
@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ The search looks for modifications to the hosts file on all Windows endpoints ac
</div>
</details>
#### Search
#### Search
```
@@ -107,7 +107,8 @@ The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
Note that **windows_hosts_file_modification_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
> :information_source:
> **windows_hosts_file_modification_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
#### Required field
* _time
@@ -132,6 +133,9 @@ There may be legitimate reasons for system administrators to add entries to this
| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd |
> :information_source:
> The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.
#### Reference
docs/_posts/2018-11-27-detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion.md
+7 -3
View File
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ tags:
- Splunk Cloud
---
### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object
### :warning: WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL analytic
We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported.
@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ This search detects users creating spikes in API activity related to deletion of
</div>
</details>
#### Search
#### Search
```
`cloudtrail` eventName=DeleteBucket [search `cloudtrail` eventName=DeleteBucket
@@ -126,7 +126,8 @@ This search detects users creating spikes in API activity related to deletion of
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml)
Note that **detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
> :information_source:
> **detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
#### Lookups
The SPL above uses the following Lookups:
@@ -159,6 +160,9 @@ Based on the values of`dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold`, the false p
| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd |
> :information_source:
> The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.
#### Reference
docs/_posts/2018-12-03-remote_wmi_command_attempt.md
+7 -3
View File
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ The following analytic identifies usage of `wmic.exe` spawning a local or remote
</div>
</details>
#### Search
#### Search
```
@@ -110,11 +110,12 @@ The following analytic identifies usage of `wmic.exe` spawning a local or remote
#### Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [process_wmic](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_wmic.yml)
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
* [process_wmic](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_wmic.yml)
Note that **remote_wmi_command_attempt_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
> :information_source:
> **remote_wmi_command_attempt_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
#### Required field
* _time
@@ -147,6 +148,9 @@ Administrators may use this legitimately to gather info from remote systems. Fil
| 36.0 | 60 | 60 | A wmic.exe process $process$ contain node commandline $process$ in host $dest$ |
> :information_source:
> The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.
#### Reference
* [https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1047/T1047.yaml](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1047/T1047.yaml)
docs/_posts/2018-12-03-usn_journal_deletion.md
+6 -2
View File
@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ The fsutil.exe application is a legitimate Windows utility used to perform tasks
</div>
</details>
#### Search
#### Search
```
@@ -116,7 +116,8 @@ The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
Note that **usn_journal_deletion_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
> :information_source:
> **usn_journal_deletion_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
#### Required field
* _time
@@ -148,6 +149,9 @@ None identified
| 45.0 | 50 | 90 | Possible USN journal deletion on $dest$ |
> :information_source:
> The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.
#### Reference
docs/_posts/2018-12-06-suspicious_java_classes.md
+7 -3
View File
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ tags:
- Splunk Cloud
---
### WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object
### :warning: WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL analytic
We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is **NOT** supported.
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ This search looks for suspicious Java classes that are often used to exploit rem
</div>
</details>
#### Search
#### Search
```
`stream_http` http_method=POST http_content_length>1
@@ -105,7 +105,8 @@ The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [stream_http](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/stream_http.yml)
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
Note that **suspicious_java_classes_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
> :information_source:
> **suspicious_java_classes_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
#### Required field
* _time
@@ -138,6 +139,9 @@ There are no known false positives.
| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd |
> :information_source:
> The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.
#### Reference
docs/_posts/2018-12-14-file_with_samsam_extension.md
+6 -2
View File
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ The search looks for file writes with extensions consistent with a SamSam ransom
</div>
</details>
#### Search
#### Search
```
@@ -104,7 +104,8 @@ The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
Note that **file_with_samsam_extension_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
> :information_source:
> **file_with_samsam_extension_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
#### Required field
* _time
@@ -133,6 +134,9 @@ Because these extensions are not typically used in normal operations, you should
| 90.0 | 100 | 90 | File writes $file_name$ with extensions consistent with a SamSam ransomware attack seen on $dest$ |
> :information_source:
> The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.
#### Reference

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