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Merge pull request #3290 from splunk/integration_fixes_5.0

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Integration fixes for 5.0 alpha2
This commit is contained in:
Bhavin Patel
2025-01-23 11:29:14 -08:00
committed by GitHub
parent bd168eee28 217666c5d1
commit 2ef9726eb2
10 changed files with 29 additions and 28 deletions
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detections/application/okta_mismatch_between_source_and_response_for_verify_push_request.yml
+2 -2
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@@ -60,9 +60,9 @@ references:
- https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/6553
rba:
message: A mismatch between source and response for verifying a push request has
occurred for $actor.alternateId$
occurred for $user$
risk_objects:
- field: actor.alternateId
- field: user
type: user
score: 64
threat_objects: []
detections/cloud/asl_aws_defense_evasion_stop_logging_cloudtrail.yml
+2 -1
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@@ -8,7 +8,8 @@ type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects `StopLogging` events within AWS CloudTrail logs, a critical action that adversaries may use to evade detection. By halting the logging of their malicious activities, attackers aim to operate undetected within a compromised AWS environment. This detection is achieved by monitoring for specific CloudTrail log entries that indicate the cessation of logging activities. Identifying such behavior is crucial for a Security Operations Center (SOC), as it signals an attempt to undermine the integrity of logging mechanisms, potentially allowing malicious activities to proceed without observation. The impact of this evasion tactic is significant, as it can severely hamper incident response and forensic investigations by obscuring the attacker's actions.
data_source:
- ASL AWS CloudTrail
search: '`amazon_security_lake` api.operation=StopLogging | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by api.operation actor.user.uid actor.user.account.uid http_request.user_agent src_endpoint.ip cloud.region | rename actor.user.uid as user, src_endpoint.ip as src_ip, cloud.region as region, http_request.user_agent as user_agent, actor.user.account_uid as aws_account_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `asl_aws_defense_evasion_stop_logging_cloudtrail_filter`'
search: '`amazon_security_lake` api.operation=StopLogging | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by api.operation actor.user.uid actor.user.account.uid http_request.user_agent src_endpoint.ip cloud.region | rename actor.user.uid as user, src_endpoint.ip as src_ip, cloud.region as region, http_request.user_agent as user_agent, actor.user.account.uid
as aws_account_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `asl_aws_defense_evasion_stop_logging_cloudtrail_filter`'
how_to_implement: The detection is based on Amazon Security Lake events from Amazon Web Services (AWS), which is a centralized data lake that provides security-related data from AWS services. To use this detection, you must ingest CloudTrail logs from Amazon Security Lake into Splunk. To run this search, ensure that you ingest events using the latest version of Splunk Add-on for Amazon Web Services (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1876) or the Federated Analytics App.
known_false_positives: While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has stopped cloudtrail logging. Please investigate this activity.
references:
detections/cloud/asl_aws_defense_evasion_update_cloudtrail.yml
+1 -1
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@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects `UpdateTrail` events within AWS CloudTrail logs, aiming to identify attempts by attackers to evade detection by altering logging configurations. By updating CloudTrail settings with incorrect parameters, such as changing multi-regional logging to a single region, attackers can impair the logging of their activities across other regions. This behavior is crucial for Security Operations Centers (SOCs) to identify, as it indicates an adversary's intent to operate undetected within a compromised AWS environment. The impact of such evasion tactics is significant, potentially allowing malicious activities to proceed without being logged, thereby hindering incident response and forensic investigations.
data_source:
- ASL AWS CloudTrail
search: '`amazon_security_lake` api.operation=UpdateTrail | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by api.operation actor.user.uid actor.user.account.uid http_request.user_agent src_endpoint.ip cloud.region | rename actor.user.uid as user, src_endpoint.ip as src_ip, cloud.region as region, http_request.user_agent as user_agent, actor.user.account_uid as aws_account_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `asl_aws_defense_evasion_update_cloudtrail_filter`'
search: '`amazon_security_lake` api.operation=UpdateTrail | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by api.operation actor.user.uid actor.user.account.uid http_request.user_agent src_endpoint.ip cloud.region | rename actor.user.uid as user, src_endpoint.ip as src_ip, cloud.region as region, http_request.user_agent as user_agent, actor.user.account.uid as aws_account_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `asl_aws_defense_evasion_update_cloudtrail_filter`'
how_to_implement: The detection is based on Amazon Security Lake events from Amazon Web Services (AWS), which is a centralized data lake that provides security-related data from AWS services. To use this detection, you must ingest CloudTrail logs from Amazon Security Lake into Splunk. To run this search, ensure that you ingest events using the latest version of Splunk Add-on for Amazon Web Services (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1876) or the Federated Analytics App.
known_false_positives: While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has updated cloudtrail logging. Please investigate this activity.
references:
detections/cloud/asl_aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports.yml
+3 -3
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@@ -16,8 +16,8 @@ search: '`amazon_security_lake` api.operation=CreateNetworkAclEntry OR api.opera
| spath input=api.request.data path=networkAclId output=networkAclId
| search ruleAction=allow AND egress=false AND aclProtocol=-1 AND cidrBlock=0.0.0.0/0
| fillnull
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by api.operation actor.user.uid actor.user.account.uid http_request.user_agent src_endpoint.ip cloud.region networkAclId
| rename actor.user.uid as user, src_endpoint.ip as src_ip, cloud.region as region, http_request.user_agent as user_agent, actor.user.account_uid as aws_account_id
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by api.operation actor.user.uid actor.user.account.uid http_request.user_agent src_endpoint.ip cloud.region networkAclId cidrBlock
| rename actor.user.uid as user, src_endpoint.ip as src_ip, cloud.region as region, http_request.user_agent as user_agent, actor.user.account.uid as aws_account_id
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `asl_aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports_filter`'
how_to_implement: The detection is based on Amazon Security Lake events from Amazon Web Services (AWS), which is a centralized data lake that provides security-related data from AWS services. To use this detection, you must ingest CloudTrail logs from Amazon Security Lake into Splunk. To run this search, ensure that you ingest events using the latest version of Splunk Add-on for Amazon Web Services (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1876) or the Federated Analytics App.
known_false_positives: It's possible that an admin has created this ACL with all ports open for some legitimate purpose however, this should be scoped and not allowed in production environment.
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ drilldown_searches:
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
rba:
message: User $user$ has created network ACLs with all the ports open to a specified CIDR $requestParameters.cidrBlock$
message: User $user$ has created network ACLs with all the ports opens to $cidrBlock$
risk_objects:
- field: user
type: user
detections/cloud/azure_ad_service_principal_enumeration.yml
+8 -8
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@@ -6,15 +6,15 @@ author: Dean Luxton
data_source:
- Azure Active Directory MicrosoftGraphActivityLogs
type: TTP
status: production
status: production
description: >-
This detection leverages azure graph activity logs to identify when graph APIs have been used to identify 10 or more service principals.
This type of behaviour is associated with tools such as Azure enumberation tools such as AzureHound or ROADtools.
search: >-
`azure_monitor_aad` category IN (MicrosoftGraphActivityLogs) TERM(servicePrincipals)
`azure_monitor_aad` category IN (MicrosoftGraphActivityLogs) TERM(servicePrincipals) | fillnull
| rex field="properties.requestUri" "https\:\/\/graph.microsoft.com\/beta\/servicePrincipals\/(?P<servicePrincipalb>.*?)\/"
| rex field="properties.requestUri" "https\:\/\/graph.microsoft.com\/v1.0\/servicePrincipals\/(?P<servicePrincipalv1>.*?)\/"
| eval spn=coalesce(servicePrincipalb,servicePrincipalv1) | stats min(_time) as _time dc(spn) as spn_count values(user) as user values(user_category) as user_category values(src_category) as src_category count by src tenantId properties.userAgent
| eval spn=coalesce(servicePrincipalb,servicePrincipalv1) | stats count min(_time) as _time dc(spn) as spn_count values(user_id) as user_id by src tenantId properties.userAgent
| rename properties.userAgent as user_agent
| where spn_count>9 | `azure_ad_service_principal_enumeration_filter`
how_to_implement: >-
@@ -27,16 +27,16 @@ references:
- https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3110
- https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/AddOns/released/MSCloudServices/Install
drilldown_searches:
- name: View the detection results for - "$user$"
search: '%original_detection_search% | search user = "$user$"'
- name: View the detection results for - "$user_id$"
search: '%original_detection_search% | search user_id = "$user_id$"'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
- name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$"
search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$") starthoursago=168 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
- name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user_id$"
search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user_id$") starthoursago=168 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
rba:
message: $spn_count$ Service Principals have been enumerated by $user$ from IP $src$
message: $spn_count$ Service Principals have been enumerated by $user_id$ from IP $src$
risk_objects:
- field: tenantId
type: other
detections/endpoint/kerberos_pre_authentication_flag_disabled_in_useraccountcontrol.yml
+2 -2
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@@ -16,8 +16,7 @@ description: The following analytic detects when the Kerberos Pre-Authentication
data_source:
- Windows Event Log Security 4738
search: >
`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4738 MSADChangedAttributes=\"*Don't Require Preauth'
- Enabled*\" |rename Account_Name as user | table EventCode, user, dest, Security_ID,
`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4738 MSADChangedAttributes="*\'Don\'t Require Preauth\' - Enabled*" |rename Account_Name as user | table EventCode, user, dest, Security_ID,
MSADChangedAttributes | `kerberos_pre_authentication_flag_disabled_in_useraccountcontrol_filter`
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting
Domain Controller events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `User Account
@@ -68,3 +67,4 @@ tests:
https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1558.004/powershell/windows-security.log
source: WinEventLog:Security
sourcetype: WinEventLog
detections/endpoint/windows_ad_short_lived_server_object.yml
+1 -1
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@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ drilldown_searches:
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
rba:
message: Potential DCShadow Attack Detected on $Computer$
message: A short-lived server object was created and deleted on $Computer$
risk_objects:
- field: Computer
type: system
detections/endpoint/windows_file_share_discovery_with_powerview.yml
+8 -8
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@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ description: The following analytic detects the execution of the Invoke-ShareFin
and sensitive data.
search: '`powershell` EventCode=4104 (ScriptBlockText=Invoke-ShareFinder*) | stats
count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Opcode Computer UserID EventCode
ScriptBlockText | rename UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |
ScriptBlockText | rename UserID as user | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |
`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_file_share_discovery_with_powerview_filter`'
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable
PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here
@@ -29,12 +29,12 @@ references:
- https://thedfirreport.com/2023/01/23/sharefinder-how-threat-actors-discover-file-shares/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1135/
drilldown_searches:
- name: View the detection results for - "$Computer$" and "$user$"
search: '%original_detection_search% | search Computer = "$Computer$" user = "$user$"'
- name: View the detection results for - "$dest$" and "$user$"
search: '%original_detection_search% | search dest = "$dest$" user = "$user$"'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
- name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$Computer$" and "$user$"
search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$Computer$",
- name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$" and "$user$"
search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$",
"$user$") starthoursago=168 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk
Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all)
@@ -43,12 +43,12 @@ drilldown_searches:
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
rba:
message: Invoke-ShareFinder commandlet was executed on $Computer$
message: Invoke-ShareFinder commandlet was executed on $dest$
risk_objects:
- field: Computer
- field: dest
type: system
score: 48
- field: User
- field: user
type: user
score: 48
threat_objects: []
detections/endpoint/windows_new_custom_security_descriptor_set_on_eventlog_channel.yml
+1 -1
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@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE Registry.registry_path= "*\\Services\\Eventlog\\*"
AND Registry.registry_value_name=CustomSD BY Registry.dest Registry.registry_value_data
Registry.action Registry.process_guid Registry.process_id Registry.registry_key_name
Registry.user Registry.registry_value_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where
Registry.user Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where
isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_new_custom_security_descriptor_set_on_eventlog_channel_filter`'
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data
detections/endpoint/windows_new_eventlog_channelaccess_registry_value_set.yml
+1 -1
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@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE Registry.registry_path IN ("*\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\WINEVT\\Channels\\*",
"*\Microsoft\Windows\EventLog\*") AND Registry.registry_value_name=ChannelAccess
BY Registry.dest Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.process_guid
Registry.process_id Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_value_name
Registry.process_id Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_path
| `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_new_eventlog_channelaccess_registry_value_set_filter`'
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data