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@@ -27,10 +27,12 @@ references:
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- https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63
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- https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf
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- https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/
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- https://www.welivesecurity.com/2022/04/12/industroyer2-industroyer-reloaded/
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tags:
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analytic_story:
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- Hermetic Wiper
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- Malicious PowerShell
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- Industroyer2
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confidence: 80
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context:
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- Source:Endpoint
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@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
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name: Windows Hidden Schedule Task Settings
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id: 0b730470-5fe8-4b13-93a7-fe0ad014d0cc
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version: 1
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date: '2022-04-26'
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author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
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type: TTP
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datamodel:
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- Endpoint
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description: The following query utilizes Windows Security EventCode 4698,
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A scheduled task was created, to identify suspicious tasks registered on
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Windows either via schtasks.exe OR TaskService with a hidden settings
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that are unique entry of malware like industroyer2 or attack that uses
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lolbin to download other file or payload to the infected machine.
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search: '`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4698
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| xmlkv Message
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| search Hidden = true
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| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Task_Name, Command, Author, Hidden, dest
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| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
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| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
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| `windows_hidden_schedule_task_settings_filter`'
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how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting
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logs with the task schedule (Exa. Security Log EventCode 4698) endpoints. Tune and
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filter known instances of Task schedule used in your environment.
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known_false_positives: unknown
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references:
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- https://www.welivesecurity.com/2022/04/12/industroyer2-industroyer-reloaded/
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- https://cert.gov.ua/article/39518
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tags:
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analytic_story:
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- Industroyer2
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- Active Directory Discovery
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asset_type: Endpoint
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cis20:
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- CIS 3
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- CIS 5
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- CIS 16
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confidence: 80
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context:
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- Source:Endpoint
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- Stage:Execution
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dataset:
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- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053/hidden_schedule_task/security.log
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impact: 80
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kill_chain_phases:
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- Exploitation
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message: A schedule task with hidden setting enable in host $dest$
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mitre_attack_id:
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- T1053
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nist:
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- DE.CM
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observable:
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- name: dest
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type: Hostname
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role:
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- Victim
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product:
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- Splunk Enterprise
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- Splunk Enterprise Security
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- Splunk Cloud
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required_fields:
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- _time
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- dest
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- Task_Name
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- Command
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- Author
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- Enabled
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- Hidden
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- Arguments
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risk_score: 64
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security_domain: endpoint
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@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
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name: Windows Linked Policies In ADSI Discovery
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id: 510ea428-4731-4d2f-8829-a28293e427aa
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version: 1
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date: '2022-04-25'
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author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
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type: Anomaly
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datamodel:
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- Endpoint
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description: The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104)
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to identify the `[Adsisearcher]` type accelerator being used to query Active Directory
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for domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage `[Adsisearcher]` to enumerate
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domain organizational unit for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.
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search: '`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = "*[adsisearcher]*" ScriptBlockText = "*objectcategory=organizationalunit*" ScriptBlockText = "*findAll()*"
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| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer user_id
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| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
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| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
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| `windows_linked_policies_in_adsi_discovery_filter`'
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how_to_implement: The following Hunting analytic requires PowerShell operational logs
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to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or
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add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging.
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known_false_positives: Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.
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references:
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- https://www.welivesecurity.com/2022/04/12/industroyer2-industroyer-reloaded/
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- https://medium.com/@pentesttas/discover-hidden-gpo-s-on-active-directory-using-ps-adsi-a284b6814c81
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tags:
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analytic_story:
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- Industroyer2
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- Active Directory Discovery
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asset_type: Endpoint
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cis20:
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- CIS 3
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- CIS 5
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- CIS 16
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confidence: 50
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context:
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- Source:Endpoint
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- Stage:Discovery
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dataset:
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- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/adsi_discovery/windows-powershell-xml2.log
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impact: 50
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kill_chain_phases:
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- Reconnaissance
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message: powershell process having commandline $Message$ for user enumeration
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mitre_attack_id:
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- T1087.002
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- T1087
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nist:
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- DE.CM
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observable:
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- name: Computer
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type: Hostname
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role:
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- Victim
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product:
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- Splunk Enterprise
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- Splunk Enterprise Security
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- Splunk Cloud
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required_fields:
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- _time
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- EventCode
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- ScriptBlockText
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- Computer
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- user_id
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risk_score: 25
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security_domain: endpoint
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name: Windows Processes Killed By Industroyer2 Malware
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id: d8bea5ca-9d4a-4249-8b56-64a619109835
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version: 1
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date: '2022-04-22'
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author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
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type: Anomaly
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datamodel:
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- Endpoint
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description: The following analytic is to look for known processes killed by industroyer2 malware.
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This technique was seen in the industroyer2 malware attack that tries to kill several processes
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of windows host machines related to the energy facility network. This anomaly might be a good
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indicator to check which process kill these processes or why the process was killed.
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search: '`sysmon` EventCode=5 process_name IN ("PServiceControl.exe", "PService_PPD.exe")
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| stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by process_name process process_path process_guid process_id EventCode dest user_id
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| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
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| `windows_processes_killed_by_industroyer2_malware_filter`'
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how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting
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Windows Security Event Logs with 4698 EventCode enabled. The Windows TA is also
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required.
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known_false_positives: False positives are possible if legitimate applications are
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allowed to terminate this process during testing or updates. Filter as needed based on paths that
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are used legitimately.
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references:
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- https://www.welivesecurity.com/2022/04/12/industroyer2-industroyer-reloaded/
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tags:
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analytic_story:
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- Industroyer2
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asset_type: Endpoint
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cis20:
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- CIS 3
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- CIS 5
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- CIS 16
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confidence: 60
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context:
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- Source:Endpoint
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- Stage:Defense Evasion
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dataset:
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- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/industroyer2/sysmon.log
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impact: 60
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kill_chain_phases:
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- Exploitation
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message: process was terminated $process_name$ in $dest$
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mitre_attack_id:
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- T1489
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nist:
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- DE.CM
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observable:
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- name: dest
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type: Hostname
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role:
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- Victim
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product:
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- Splunk Enterprise
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- Splunk Enterprise Security
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- Splunk Cloud
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required_fields:
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- _time
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- Processes.dest
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- Processes.user
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- Processes.parent_process_name
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- Processes.parent_process
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- Processes.original_file_name
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- Processes.process_name
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- Processes.process
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- Processes.process_id
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- Processes.parent_process_path
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- Processes.process_path
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- Processes.parent_process_id
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- Processes.process_guid
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risk_score: 36
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security_domain: endpoint
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@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
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name: Windows Root Domain linked policies Discovery
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id: 80ffaede-1f12-49d5-a86e-b4b599b68b3c
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version: 1
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date: '2022-04-25'
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author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
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type: Anomaly
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datamodel:
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- Endpoint
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description: The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104)
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to identify the `[Adsisearcher]` type accelerator being used to query Active Directory
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for domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage `[Adsisearcher]` to enumerate
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root domain linked policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.
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search: '`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = "*[adsisearcher]*" ScriptBlockText = "*.SearchRooT*" ScriptBlockText = "*.gplink*"
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| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer user_id
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| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
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| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
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| `windows_root_domain_linked_policies_discovery_filter`'
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how_to_implement: The following Hunting analytic requires PowerShell operational logs
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to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or
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add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging.
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known_false_positives: Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.
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references:
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- https://www.welivesecurity.com/2022/04/12/industroyer2-industroyer-reloaded/
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- https://medium.com/@pentesttas/discover-hidden-gpo-s-on-active-directory-using-ps-adsi-a284b6814c81
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tags:
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analytic_story:
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- Industroyer2
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- Active Directory Discovery
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asset_type: Endpoint
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cis20:
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- CIS 3
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- CIS 5
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- CIS 16
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confidence: 50
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context:
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- Source:Endpoint
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- Stage:Discovery
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dataset:
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- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/adsi_discovery/windows-powershell-xml1.log
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impact: 50
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kill_chain_phases:
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- Reconnaissance
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message: powershell process having commandline $Message$ for user enumeration
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mitre_attack_id:
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- T1087.002
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- T1087
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nist:
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- DE.CM
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observable:
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- name: Computer
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type: Hostname
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role:
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- Victim
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product:
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- Splunk Enterprise
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- Splunk Enterprise Security
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- Splunk Cloud
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required_fields:
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- _time
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- EventCode
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- ScriptBlockText
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- Computer
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- user_id
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risk_score: 25
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security_domain: endpoint
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@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
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name: Windows Hidden Schedule Task Settings Unit Test
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tests:
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- name: Windows Hidden Schedule Task Settings
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file: endpoint/windows_hidden_schedule_task_settings.yml
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pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0'
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earliest_time: -24h
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latest_time: now
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attack_data:
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- file_name: security.log
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data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053/hidden_schedule_task/security.log
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source: WinEventLog:Security
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sourcetype: WinEventLog
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@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
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name: Windows Linked Policies In ADSI Discovery Unit Test
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tests:
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- name: Windows Linked Policies In ADSI Discovery
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file: endpoint/windows_linked_policies_in_adsi_discovery.yml
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pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0'
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earliest_time: -24h
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latest_time: now
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attack_data:
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- file_name: windows-powershell-xml2.log
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data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/adsi_discovery/windows-powershell-xml2.log
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source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational
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sourcetype: xmlwineventlog
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@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
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name: Windows Processes Killed By Industroyer2 Malware Unit Test
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tests:
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- name: Windows Processes Killed By Industroyer2 Malware
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file: endpoint/windows_processes_killed_by_industroyer2_malware.yml
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pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0'
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earliest_time: -24h
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latest_time: now
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attack_data:
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- file_name: sysmon.log
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data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/industroyer2/sysmon.log
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source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
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sourcetype: xmlwineventlog
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@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
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name: Windows Root Domain linked policies Discovery Unit Test
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tests:
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- name: Windows Root Domain linked policies Discovery
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file: endpoint/windows_root_domain_linked_policies_discovery.yml
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pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0'
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earliest_time: -24h
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latest_time: now
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attack_data:
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- file_name: windows-powershell-xml1.log
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data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/adsi_discovery/windows-powershell-xml1.log
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source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational
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sourcetype: xmlwineventlog
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