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linux_auditd_detection
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name: Linux Auditd Edit Cron Table Parameter
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id: f4bb7321-7e64-4d1e-b1aa-21f8b019a91f
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version: 1
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date: '2024-08-09'
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author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
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status: production
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type: TTP
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description: The following analytic detects the suspicious editing of cron jobs in
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Linux using the crontab command-line parameter (-e). It identifies this activity
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by monitoring command-line executions involving 'crontab' and the edit parameter.
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This behavior is significant for a SOC as cron job manipulations can indicate unauthorized
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persistence attempts or scheduled malicious actions. If confirmed malicious, this
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activity could lead to system compromise, unauthorized access, or broader network
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compromise.
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data_source:
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- Linux Auditd Syscall
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search: '`linux_auditd` type=SYSCALL SYSCALL=rename (comm IN ("crontab") OR exe IN ("*/crontab"))
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success=yes AND NOT (UID IN("daemon")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
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as lastTime by comm exe SYSCALL UID ppid pid | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
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| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `linux_auditd_edit_cron_table_parameter_filter`'
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how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection
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and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related
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telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search,
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you must ingest logs that contain the process complete command-line executions.
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These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that
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are specific to the EDR product. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to
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normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
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known_false_positives: Administrator or network operator can use this application
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for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.
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references:
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- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003/
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tags:
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analytic_story:
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- Linux Privilege Escalation
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- Linux Persistence Techniques
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- Linux Living Off The Land
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- Scheduled Tasks
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asset_type: Endpoint
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confidence: 80
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impact: 80
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message: $comm$ was executed on host.
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mitre_attack_id:
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- T1053.003
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- T1053
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observable:
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- name: comm
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type: Other
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role:
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- Victim
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product:
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- Splunk Enterprise
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- Splunk Enterprise Security
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- Splunk Cloud
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required_fields:
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- _time
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- comm
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- exe
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- SYSCALL
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- UID
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- ppid
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- pid
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risk_score: 64
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security_domain: endpoint
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tests:
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- name: True Positive Test
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attack_data:
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- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.003/linux_auditd_crontab_edit/linux_auditd_crontab_edit.log
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source: /var/log/audit/audit.log
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sourcetype: linux:audit
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+69
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name: Linux Auditd Possible Append Cronjob Entry On Existing Cronjob File
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id: fea71cf0-fa10-4ef6-9202-9682b2e0c477
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version: 1
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date: '2024-08-09'
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author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
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status: production
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type: Hunting
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description: The following analytic detects potential tampering with cronjob files
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on a Linux system by identifying 'echo' commands that append code to existing cronjob
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files. It leverages logs from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing
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on process names, parent processes, and command-line executions. This activity is
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significant because adversaries often use it for persistence or privilege escalation.
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If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute unauthorized code
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automatically, leading to system compromises and unauthorized data access, thereby
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impacting business operations and data integrity.
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data_source:
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- Linux Auditd Path
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search: '`linux_auditd` type=PATH name IN("*/etc/cron*", "*/var/spool/cron/*", "*/etc/anacrontab*")
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| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by name nametype OGID |
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`security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `linux_auditd_possible_append_cronjob_entry_on_existing_cronjob_file_filter`'
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how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection
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and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related
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telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search,
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you must ingest logs that contain the process complete command-line executions.
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These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that
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are specific to the EDR product. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to
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normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
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known_false_positives: False positives may arise from legitimate actions by administrators
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or network operators who may use these commands for automation purposes. Therefore,
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it's recommended to adjust filter macros to eliminate such false positives.
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references:
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- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003/
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- https://blog.aquasec.com/threat-alert-kinsing-malware-container-vulnerability
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- https://www.intezer.com/blog/research/kaiji-new-chinese-linux-malware-turning-to-golang/
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tags:
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analytic_story:
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- Linux Privilege Escalation
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- Linux Persistence Techniques
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- Linux Living Off The Land
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- Scheduled Tasks
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asset_type: Endpoint
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confidence: 70
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impact: 70
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message: a $PATH$ has been accessed/modified on host.
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mitre_attack_id:
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- T1053.003
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- T1053
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observable:
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- name: name
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type: Other
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role:
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- Victim
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product:
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- Splunk Enterprise
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- Splunk Enterprise Security
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- Splunk Cloud
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required_fields:
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- _time
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- name
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- nametype
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- OGID
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risk_score: 49
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security_domain: endpoint
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tests:
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- name: True Positive Test
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attack_data:
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- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.003/linux_auditd_cron_file_audited/linux_auditd_cron_file_audited2.log
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source: /var/log/audit/audit.log
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sourcetype: linux:audit
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@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
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name: Linux Auditd Sudo Or Su Execution
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id: 817a5c89-5b92-4818-a22d-aa35e1361afe
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version: 1
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date: '2024-08-09'
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author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
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status: production
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type: Anomaly
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description: The following analytic detects the execution of the "sudo" or "su" command
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on a Linux operating system. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response
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(EDR) agents, focusing on process names and parent process names. This activity
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is significant because "sudo" and "su" commands are commonly used by adversaries
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to elevate privileges, potentially leading to unauthorized access or control over
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the system. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to execute
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commands with root privileges, leading to severe security breaches, data exfiltration,
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or further system compromise.
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data_source:
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- Linux Auditd Proctitle
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search: '`linux_auditd` `linux_auditd_normalized_proctitle_process` | where LIKE(process_exec,
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"%sudo %") OR LIKE(process_exec, "%su %") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime
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max(_time) as lastTime by process_exec proctitle normalized_proctitle_delimiter
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| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `linux_auditd_sudo_or_su_execution_filter`'
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how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection
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and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related
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telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search,
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you must ingest logs that contain the process complete command-line executions.
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These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that
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are specific to the EDR product. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to
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normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
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known_false_positives: Administrator or network operator can execute this command.
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Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.
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references:
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- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/003/
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tags:
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analytic_story:
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- Linux Privilege Escalation
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- Linux Persistence Techniques
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asset_type: Endpoint
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confidence: 50
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impact: 50
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message: $process_exec$ event occurred on host.
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mitre_attack_id:
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- T1548.003
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- T1548
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observable:
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- name: process_exec
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type: Other
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role:
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- Victim
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product:
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- Splunk Enterprise
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- Splunk Enterprise Security
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- Splunk Cloud
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required_fields:
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- _time
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- proctitle
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risk_score: 25
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security_domain: endpoint
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tests:
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- name: True Positive Test
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attack_data:
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- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.003/linux_auditd_sudo_su/linux_auditd_sudo_su.log
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source: /var/log/audit/audit.log
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sourcetype: linux:audit
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