update detections

This commit is contained in:
mvelazco
2021-11-23 16:00:04 -05:00
parent 4c696f9ad8
commit 5211a97f11
6 changed files with 80 additions and 8 deletions
@@ -12,7 +12,20 @@ description: The following analytic identifies `mmc.exe` spawning a LOLBAS execu
The LOLBAS project documents Windows native binaries that can be abused by threat actors to
perform tasks like executing malicious code. Looking for child processes of mmc.exe
that are part of the LOLBAS project can help defenders identify lateral movement activity.
search: '| UPDATE_SPL | `mmc_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter`'
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=mmc.exe)
(Processes.process_name IN ("Regsvcs.exe", "Ftp.exe", "OfflineScannerShell.exe", "Rasautou.exe", "Schtasks.exe",
"Xwizard.exe", "Dllhost.exe", "Pnputil.exe", "Atbroker.exe", "Pcwrun.exe", "Ttdinject.exe","Mshta.exe", "Bitsadmin.exe",
"Certoc.exe", "Ieexec.exe", "Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe", "Runscripthelper.exe", "Forfiles.exe", "Msbuild.exe",
"Register-cimprovider.exe", "Tttracer.exe", "Ie4uinit.exe", "Bash.exe", "Hh.exe", "SettingSyncHost.exe", "Cmstp.exe",
"Mmc.exe", "Stordiag.exe", "Scriptrunner.exe", "Odbcconf.exe", "Extexport.exe", "Msdt.exe", "WorkFolders.exe",
"Diskshadow.exe", "Mavinject.exe", "Regasm.exe", "Gpscript.exe", "Rundll32.exe", "Regsvr32.exe", "Msiexec.exe",
"Wuauclt.exe", "Presentationhost.exe", "Wmic.exe", "Runonce.exe", "Syncappvpublishingserver.exe", "Verclsid.exe",
"Infdefaultinstall.exe", "Explorer.exe", "Installutil.exe", "Netsh.exe", "Wab.exe", "Dnscmd.exe", "At.exe",
"Pcalua.exe", "Msconfig.exe"))
by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name
Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `mmc_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter`'
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting
logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your
endpoints.
@@ -12,13 +12,26 @@ description: The following analytic identifies `services.exe` spawning a LOLBAS
The LOLBAS project documents Windows native binaries that can be abused by threat actors to
perform tasks like executing malicious code. Looking for child processes of services.exe
that are part of the LOLBAS project can help defenders identify lateral movement activity.
search: '| UPDATE_SPL | `services_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter`'
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=services.exe)
(Processes.process_name IN ("Regsvcs.exe", "Ftp.exe", "OfflineScannerShell.exe", "Rasautou.exe", "Schtasks.exe",
"Xwizard.exe", "Dllhost.exe", "Pnputil.exe", "Atbroker.exe", "Pcwrun.exe", "Ttdinject.exe","Mshta.exe", "Bitsadmin.exe",
"Certoc.exe", "Ieexec.exe", "Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe", "Runscripthelper.exe", "Forfiles.exe", "Msbuild.exe",
"Register-cimprovider.exe", "Tttracer.exe", "Ie4uinit.exe", "Bash.exe", "Hh.exe", "SettingSyncHost.exe", "Cmstp.exe",
"Mmc.exe", "Stordiag.exe", "Scriptrunner.exe", "Odbcconf.exe", "Extexport.exe", "Msdt.exe", "WorkFolders.exe",
"Diskshadow.exe", "Mavinject.exe", "Regasm.exe", "Gpscript.exe", "Rundll32.exe", "Regsvr32.exe", "Msiexec.exe",
"Wuauclt.exe", "Presentationhost.exe", "Wmic.exe", "Runonce.exe", "Syncappvpublishingserver.exe", "Verclsid.exe",
"Infdefaultinstall.exe", "Explorer.exe", "Installutil.exe", "Netsh.exe", "Wab.exe", "Dnscmd.exe", "At.exe",
"Pcalua.exe", "Msconfig.exe"))
by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name
Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `services_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter`'
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting
logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your
endpoints.
known_false_positives: Legitimate applications may trigger this behavior, filter as needed.
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/tree/master/atomics/T1543.003
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003/
- https://pentestlab.blog/2020/07/21/lateral-movement-services/
- https://lolbas-project.github.io/
tags:
@@ -12,12 +12,27 @@ description: The following analytic identifies `svchost.exe` spawning a LOLBAS e
The LOLBAS project documents Windows native binaries that can be abused by threat actors to
perform tasks like executing malicious code. Looking for child processes of svchost.exe
that are part of the LOLBAS project can help defenders identify lateral movement activity.
search: '| UPDATE_SPL | `svchost_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter`'
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=svchost.exe)
(Processes.process_name IN ("Regsvcs.exe", "Ftp.exe", "OfflineScannerShell.exe", "Rasautou.exe", "Schtasks.exe",
"Xwizard.exe", "Dllhost.exe", "Pnputil.exe", "Atbroker.exe", "Pcwrun.exe", "Ttdinject.exe","Mshta.exe", "Bitsadmin.exe",
"Certoc.exe", "Ieexec.exe", "Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe", "Runscripthelper.exe", "Forfiles.exe", "Msbuild.exe",
"Register-cimprovider.exe", "Tttracer.exe", "Ie4uinit.exe", "Bash.exe", "Hh.exe", "SettingSyncHost.exe", "Cmstp.exe",
"Mmc.exe", "Stordiag.exe", "Scriptrunner.exe", "Odbcconf.exe", "Extexport.exe", "Msdt.exe", "WorkFolders.exe",
"Diskshadow.exe", "Mavinject.exe", "Regasm.exe", "Gpscript.exe", "Rundll32.exe", "Regsvr32.exe", "Msiexec.exe",
"Wuauclt.exe", "Presentationhost.exe", "Wmic.exe", "Runonce.exe", "Syncappvpublishingserver.exe", "Verclsid.exe",
"Infdefaultinstall.exe", "Explorer.exe", "Installutil.exe", "Netsh.exe", "Wab.exe", "Dnscmd.exe", "At.exe",
"Pcalua.exe", "Msconfig.exe"))
by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name
Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `svchost_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter`'
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting
logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your
endpoints.
known_false_positives: Legitimate applications may trigger this behavior, filter as needed.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005/
- https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/persistence/t1053-schtask
- https://lolbas-project.github.io/
tags:
analytic_story:
@@ -12,12 +12,27 @@ description: The following analytic identifies `wmiprsve.exe` spawning a LOLBAS
The LOLBAS project documents Windows native binaries that can be abused by threat actors to
perform tasks like executing malicious code. Looking for child processes of wmiprvse.exe
that are part of the LOLBAS project can help defenders identify lateral movement activity.
search: '| UPDATE_SPL | `wmiprsve_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter`'
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=wmiprvse.exe)
(Processes.process_name IN ("Regsvcs.exe", "Ftp.exe", "OfflineScannerShell.exe", "Rasautou.exe", "Schtasks.exe",
"Xwizard.exe", "Dllhost.exe", "Pnputil.exe", "Atbroker.exe", "Pcwrun.exe", "Ttdinject.exe","Mshta.exe", "Bitsadmin.exe",
"Certoc.exe", "Ieexec.exe", "Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe", "Runscripthelper.exe", "Forfiles.exe", "Msbuild.exe",
"Register-cimprovider.exe", "Tttracer.exe", "Ie4uinit.exe", "Bash.exe", "Hh.exe", "SettingSyncHost.exe", "Cmstp.exe",
"Mmc.exe", "Stordiag.exe", "Scriptrunner.exe", "Odbcconf.exe", "Extexport.exe", "Msdt.exe", "WorkFolders.exe",
"Diskshadow.exe", "Mavinject.exe", "Regasm.exe", "Gpscript.exe", "Rundll32.exe", "Regsvr32.exe", "Msiexec.exe",
"Wuauclt.exe", "Presentationhost.exe", "Wmic.exe", "Runonce.exe", "Syncappvpublishingserver.exe", "Verclsid.exe",
"Infdefaultinstall.exe", "Explorer.exe", "Installutil.exe", "Netsh.exe", "Wab.exe", "Dnscmd.exe", "At.exe",
"Pcalua.exe", "Msconfig.exe"))
by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name
Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wmiprsve_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter`'
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting
logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your
endpoints.
known_false_positives: Legitimate applications may trigger this behavior, filter as needed.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047/
- https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/lateral-movement/t1047-wmi-for-lateral-movement
- https://lolbas-project.github.io/
tags:
analytic_story:
@@ -12,13 +12,28 @@ description: The following analytic identifies `Wsmprovhost.exe` spawning a LOLB
The LOLBAS project documents Windows native binaries that can be abused by threat actors to
perform tasks like executing malicious code. Looking for child processes of Wsmprovhost.exe
that are part of the LOLBAS project can help defenders identify lateral movement activity.
search: '| UPDATE_SPL | `wsmprovhost_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter`'
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=wsmprovhost.exe)
(Processes.process_name IN ("Regsvcs.exe", "Ftp.exe", "OfflineScannerShell.exe", "Rasautou.exe", "Schtasks.exe",
"Xwizard.exe", "Dllhost.exe", "Pnputil.exe", "Atbroker.exe", "Pcwrun.exe", "Ttdinject.exe","Mshta.exe", "Bitsadmin.exe",
"Certoc.exe", "Ieexec.exe", "Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe", "Runscripthelper.exe", "Forfiles.exe", "Msbuild.exe",
"Register-cimprovider.exe", "Tttracer.exe", "Ie4uinit.exe", "Bash.exe", "Hh.exe", "SettingSyncHost.exe", "Cmstp.exe",
"Mmc.exe", "Stordiag.exe", "Scriptrunner.exe", "Odbcconf.exe", "Extexport.exe", "Msdt.exe", "WorkFolders.exe",
"Diskshadow.exe", "Mavinject.exe", "Regasm.exe", "Gpscript.exe", "Rundll32.exe", "Regsvr32.exe", "Msiexec.exe",
"Wuauclt.exe", "Presentationhost.exe", "Wmic.exe", "Runonce.exe", "Syncappvpublishingserver.exe", "Verclsid.exe",
"Infdefaultinstall.exe", "Explorer.exe", "Installutil.exe", "Netsh.exe", "Wab.exe", "Dnscmd.exe", "At.exe",
"Pcalua.exe", "Msconfig.exe"))
by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name
Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `wsmprovhost_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter`'
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting
logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your
endpoints.
known_false_positives: Legitimate applications may trigger this behavior, filter as needed.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006/
- https://lolbas-project.github.io/
- https://pentestlab.blog/2018/05/15/lateral-movement-winrm/
tags:
analytic_story:
- Lateral Movement
+3 -2
View File
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
name: Lateral Movement
id: 399d65dc-1f08-499b-a259-aad9051f38ad
version: 2
date: '2020-02-04'
author: David Dorsey, Splunk
date: '2021-11-23'
author: David Dorsey, Mauricio Velazco Splunk
description: Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures around how
attackers move laterally within the enterprise. Because lateral movement can expose
the adversary to detection, it should be an important focus for security analysts.
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ narrative: "Once attackers gain a foothold within an enterprise, they will seek
\ for all processes to ensure that the attackers did not install unauthorized software."
references:
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/executive-perspective/2015/08/malware_lateral_move.html
- https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hVTkkkM9XDg
tags:
analytic_story: Lateral Movement
category: