Branch was auto-updated.

2026-06-08 17:32:49 +00:00 · 2022-07-07 07:56:49 -07:00
parent ea3eac483b 61a698f574
commit 57e6b92dc6
682 changed files with 2817 additions and 1186 deletions
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
    "id": {
      "group": null, 
      "name": "DA-ESS-ContentUpdate", 
-      "version": "3.43.1"
+      "version": "3.44.0"
    }, 
    "author": [
      {
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
-# On Date: 2022-06-22T17:37:56 UTC
+# On Date: 2022-06-29T20:42:24 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Security Research
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
@@ -7625,6 +7625,56 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exp
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = []

+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows MSIExec DLLRegisterServer - Rule]
+type = detection
+asset_type = Endpoint
+confidence = medium
+explanation = The following analytic identifies the usage of msiexec.exe using the /y switch parameter, which grants the ability for msiexec to load DLLRegisterServer. Upon triage, review parent process and capture any artifacts for further review.
+how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.
+annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.007"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
+known_false_positives = This analytic will need to be tuned for your environment based on legitimate usage of msiexec.exe. Filter as needed.
+providing_technologies = []
+
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows MSIExec Remote Download - Rule]
+type = detection
+asset_type = Endpoint
+confidence = medium
+explanation = The following analytic identifies msiexec.exe with http in the command-line. This procedure will utilize msiexec.exe to download a remote file and load it. During triage, review parallel processes and capture any artifacts on disk for review.
+how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.
+annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.007"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
+known_false_positives = False positives may be present, filter by destination or parent process as needed.
+providing_technologies = []
+
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows MSIExec Spawn Discovery Command - Rule]
+type = detection
+asset_type = Endpoint
+confidence = medium
+explanation = The following analytic identifies MSIExec spawning multiple discovery commands, including spawning Cmd.exe or PowerShell.exe. Typically, child processes are not common from MSIExec other than MSIExec spawning itself.
+how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.
+annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.007"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
+known_false_positives = False positives will be present with MSIExec spawning Cmd or PowerShell. Filtering will be needed. In addition, add other known discovery processes to enhance query.
+providing_technologies = []
+
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows MSIExec Unregister DLLRegisterServer - Rule]
+type = detection
+asset_type = Endpoint
+confidence = medium
+explanation = The following analytic identifies the usage of msiexec.exe using the /z switch parameter, which grants the ability for msiexec to unload DLLRegisterServer. Upon triage, review parent process and capture any artifacts for further review.
+how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.
+annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.007"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
+known_false_positives = This analytic will need to be tuned for your environment based on legitimate usage of msiexec.exe. Filter as needed.
+providing_technologies = []
+
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows MSIExec With Network Connections - Rule]
+type = detection
+asset_type = Endpoint
+confidence = medium
+explanation = The following analytic identifies MSIExec with any network connection over port 443 or 80. Typically, MSIExec does not perform network communication to the internet.
+how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. Add parent process as a filter, filter known good processes. This may be voluminous due to the join on process_id. All_Traffic does not have process_guid, yet.
+annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.007"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
+known_false_positives = False positives will be present and filtering is required.
+providing_technologies = []
+
 [savedsearch://ESCU - Windows NirSoft AdvancedRun - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
@@ -7689,6 +7739,26 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Rec
 known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may leverage PowerView for system management or troubleshooting.
 providing_technologies = []

+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows PowerView Kerberos Service Ticket Request - Rule]
+type = detection
+asset_type = endpoint
+confidence = medium
+explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainSPNTicket` commandlets with specific parameters. This commandlet is a part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration and discovery on Windows Active Directory networks. As the name suggests, this commandlet is used to request the kerberos ticket for a specified service principal name (SPN). Once the ticket is received, it may be cracked using password cracking tools like hashcat to extract the password of the SPN account. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage PowerView and these commandlets to identify accounts that can be attacked with the Kerberoasting technique.
+how_to_implement = The following analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging.
+annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1558", "T1558.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
+known_false_positives = False positive may include Administrators using PowerView for troubleshooting and management.
+providing_technologies = []
+
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows PowerView SPN Discovery - Rule]
+type = detection
+asset_type = endpoint
+confidence = medium
+explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainUser` or `Get-NetUSer` commandlets with specific parameters. These commandlets are part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration and discovery on Windows Active Directory networks. As the names suggest, these commandlets are used to identify domain users in a network and combining them with the `-SPN` parameter allows adversaries to discover domain accounts associated with a Service Principal Name (SPN). Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage PowerView and these commandlets to identify accounts that can be attacked with the Kerberoasting technique.
+how_to_implement = The following analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging.
+annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1558", "T1558.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
+known_false_positives = False positive may include Administrators using PowerView for troubleshooting and management.
+providing_technologies = []
+
 [savedsearch://ESCU - Windows PowerView Unconstrained Delegation Discovery - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
@@ -9384,7 +9454,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kerberos_(protocol)", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-kile/2a32282e-dd48-4ad9-a542-609804b02cc9", "https://m0chan.github.io/2019/07/31/How-To-Attack-Kerberos-101.html", "https://stealthbits.com/blog/cracking-active-directory-passwords-with-as-rep-roasting/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/004/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Mauricio Velazco"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With Get-ADUser - Rule", "ESCU - Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With PowerView - Rule", "ESCU - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule", "ESCU - Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled in UserAccountControl - Rule", "ESCU - Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Kerberos Service Ticket Request Using RC4 Encryption - Rule", "ESCU - Kerberos TGT Request Using RC4 Encryption - Rule", "ESCU - Kerberos User Enumeration - Rule", "ESCU - Mimikatz PassTheTicket CommandLine Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos - Rule", "ESCU - PetitPotam Suspicious Kerberos TGT Request - Rule", "ESCU - Rubeus Command Line Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Rubeus Kerberos Ticket Exports Through Winlogon Access - Rule", "ESCU - ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with SetSPN - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Kerberos Service Ticket Request - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Ticket Granting Ticket Request - Rule", "ESCU - Unknown Process Using The Kerberos Protocol - Rule", "ESCU - Unusual Number of Kerberos Service Tickets Requested - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Computer Account Created by Computer Account - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Computer Account Requesting Kerberos Ticket - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Computer Account With SPN - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disabled Users Failing To Authenticate Kerberos - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Get-AdComputer Unconstrained Delegation Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Invalid Users Failed Authentication via Kerberos - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Kerberos Local Successful Logon - Rule", "ESCU - Windows PowerView Constrained Delegation Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Windows PowerView Unconstrained Delegation Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Unusual Number of Computer Service Tickets Requested - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With Get-ADUser - Rule", "ESCU - Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With PowerView - Rule", "ESCU - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule", "ESCU - Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled in UserAccountControl - Rule", "ESCU - Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Kerberos Service Ticket Request Using RC4 Encryption - Rule", "ESCU - Kerberos TGT Request Using RC4 Encryption - Rule", "ESCU - Kerberos User Enumeration - Rule", "ESCU - Mimikatz PassTheTicket CommandLine Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos - Rule", "ESCU - PetitPotam Suspicious Kerberos TGT Request - Rule", "ESCU - Rubeus Command Line Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Rubeus Kerberos Ticket Exports Through Winlogon Access - Rule", "ESCU - ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with SetSPN - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Kerberos Service Ticket Request - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Ticket Granting Ticket Request - Rule", "ESCU - Unknown Process Using The Kerberos Protocol - Rule", "ESCU - Unusual Number of Kerberos Service Tickets Requested - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Computer Account Created by Computer Account - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Computer Account Requesting Kerberos Ticket - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Computer Account With SPN - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disabled Users Failing To Authenticate Kerberos - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Get-AdComputer Unconstrained Delegation Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Invalid Users Failed Authentication via Kerberos - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Kerberos Local Successful Logon - Rule", "ESCU - Windows PowerView Constrained Delegation Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Windows PowerView Kerberos Service Ticket Request - Rule", "ESCU - Windows PowerView SPN Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Windows PowerView Unconstrained Delegation Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Unusual Number of Computer Service Tickets Requested - Rule"]
 description = Monitor for activities and techniques associated with Kerberos based attacks within with Active Directory environments.
 narrative = Kerberos, initially named after Cerberus, the three-headed dog in Greek mythology, is a network authentication protocol that allows computers and users to prove their identity through a trusted third-party. This trusted third-party issues Kerberos tickets using symmetric encryption to allow users access to services and network resources based on their privilege level. Kerberos is the default authentication protocol used on Windows Active Directory networks since the introduction of Windows Server 2003. With Kerberos being the backbone of Windows authentication, it is commonly abused by adversaries across the different phases of a breach including initial access, privilege escalation, defense evasion, credential access, lateral movement, etc.\ This Analytic Story groups detection use cases in which the Kerberos protocol is abused. Defenders can leverage these analytics to detect and hunt for adversaries engaging in Kerberos based attacks.

@@ -10073,7 +10143,7 @@ narrative = Hermetic Wiper is destructive malware operation found by Sentinel On
 category = Malware
 last_updated = 2020-01-22
 version = 2
-references = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/HIDDEN-COBRA-North-Korean-Malicious-Cyber-Activity", "https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Destructive-Malware-Report.pdf"]
+references = ["https://web.archive.org/web/20191220004307/https://www.us-cert.gov/HIDDEN-COBRA-North-Korean-Malicious-Cyber-Activity", "https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Destructive-Malware-Report.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
 searches = ["ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious File Write - Rule", "ESCU - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Outbound Emails to Hidden Cobra Threat Actors - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task"]
@@ -10328,7 +10398,7 @@ Microsoft releases updates for Windows systems on a monthly cadence. They should
 category = Abuse
 last_updated = 2017-01-05
 version = 1
-references = ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/tn-archive/bb490939(v=technet.10)", "https://htmlpreview.github.io/?https://github.com/MatthewDemaske/blogbackup/blob/master/netshell.html", "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html"]
+references = ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/tn-archive/bb490939(v=technet.10)", "https://htmlpreview.github.io/?https://github.com/MatthewDemaske/blogbackup/blob/master/netshell.html", "https://blogs.jpcert.or.jp/en/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
 searches = ["ESCU - Processes created by netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
@@ -10474,7 +10544,7 @@ narrative = During Pwn2Own April 2021, a security researcher demonstrated an att
 category = Malware
 last_updated = 2020-02-04
 version = 1
-references = ["https://www.carbonblack.com/2017/06/28/carbon-black-threat-research-technical-analysis-petya-notpetya-ransomware/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2017/06/27/closing-the-detection-to-mitigation-gap-or-to-petya-or-notpetya-whocares-.html"]
+references = ["https://web.archive.org/web/20190826231258/https://www.carbonblack.com/2017/06/28/carbon-black-threat-research-technical-analysis-petya-notpetya-ransomware/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2017/06/27/closing-the-detection-to-mitigation-gap-or-to-petya-or-notpetya-whocares-.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
 searches = ["ESCU - Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware - Rule", "ESCU - 7zip CommandLine To SMB Share Path - Rule", "ESCU - Allow File And Printing Sharing In Firewall - Rule", "ESCU - Allow Network Discovery In Firewall - Rule", "ESCU - Allow Operation with Consent Admin - Rule", "ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Clear Unallocated Sector Using Cipher App - Rule", "ESCU - CMLUA Or CMSTPLUA UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Conti Common Exec parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Detect RClone Command-Line Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Renamed RClone - Rule", "ESCU - Detect SharpHound Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Detect SharpHound File Modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Detect SharpHound Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Disable AMSI Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disable ETW Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Logs Using WevtUtil - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Service Stop Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Net App - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage Of SC Service Utility - Rule", "ESCU - Execute Javascript With Jscript COM CLSID - Rule", "ESCU - Fsutil Zeroing File - Rule", "ESCU - ICACLS Grant Command - Rule", "ESCU - Known Services Killed by Ransomware - Rule", "ESCU - Modification Of Wallpaper - Rule", "ESCU - Msmpeng Application DLL Side Loading - Rule", "ESCU - Permission Modification using Takeown App - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Disable Security Monitoring - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Execute COM Object - Rule", "ESCU - Prevent Automatic Repair Mode using Bcdedit - Rule", "ESCU - Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Recursive Delete of Directory In Batch CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Revil Common Exec Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Revil Registry Entry - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 LockWorkStation - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - UAC Bypass With Colorui COM Object - Rule", "ESCU - Uninstall App Using MsiExec - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Wbemprox COM Object Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Change Password Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Lock Workstation Feature Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable LogOff Button Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Memory Crash Dump - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Shutdown Button Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Windows Group Policy Features Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DiskCryptor Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Hide Notification Features Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows NirSoft AdvancedRun - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Raccine Scheduled Task Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Registry Modification for Safe Mode Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ESCU - MS Exchange Mailbox Replication service writing Active Server Pages - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task"]
@@ -10578,7 +10648,7 @@ narrative = Remcos or Remote Control and Surveillance, marketed as a legitimate
 category = Best Practices
 last_updated = 2017-09-12
 version = 1
-references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/executive-perspective/2015/09/the_new_route_toper.html", "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/about/security-center/event-response/synful-knock.html"]
+references = ["https://web.archive.org/web/20210420020040/https://www.fireeye.com/blog/executive-perspective/2015/09/the_new_route_toper.html", "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/about/security-center/event-response/synful-knock.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
 searches = ["ESCU - Detect New Login Attempts to Routers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect ARP Poisoning - Rule", "ESCU - Detect IPv6 Network Infrastructure Threats - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Port Security Violation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rogue DHCP Server - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Software Download To Network Device - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Traffic Mirroring - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
@@ -10810,7 +10880,7 @@ Once a phishing message has been detected, the next steps are to answer the foll
 category = Cloud Security
 last_updated = 2020-08-05
 version = 1
-references = ["https://cloud.google.com/blog/product/gcp/4-steps-for-hardening-your-cloud-storage-buckets-taking-charge-of-your-security", "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/gcp/google-cloud-platform-gcp-bucket-enumeration/"]
+references = ["https://cloud.google.com/blog/products/gcp/4-steps-for-hardening-your-cloud-storage-buckets-taking-charge-of-your-security", "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/gcp/google-cloud-platform-gcp-bucket-enumeration/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Shannon Davis"}]
 spec_version = 3
 searches = ["ESCU - Detect GCP Storage access from a new IP - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Open GCP Storage Buckets - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
@@ -10903,7 +10973,7 @@ narrative = Attackers are developing increasingly sophisticated techniques for h
 category = Adversary Tactics
 last_updated = 2018-10-23
 version = 2
-references = ["https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Graeber-Abusing-Windows-Management-Instrumentation-WMI-To-Build-A-Persistent%20Asynchronous-And-Fileless-Backdoor-wp.pdf", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/wmimplant_a_wmi_ba.html"]
+references = ["https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Graeber-Abusing-Windows-Management-Instrumentation-WMI-To-Build-A-Persistent%20Asynchronous-And-Fileless-Backdoor-wp.pdf", "https://web.archive.org/web/20210921091529/https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/wmimplant_a_wmi_ba.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
 searches = ["ESCU - Detect WMI Event Subscription Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Process Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - Script Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Windows WMI Process Call Create - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon - Rule", "ESCU - WMIC XSL Execution via URL - Rule", "ESCU - XSL Script Execution With WMIC - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Temporary Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task"]
@@ -10973,7 +11043,7 @@ The objective of this step is to confirm the executed script code is benign or m
 category = Malware
 last_updated = 2020-02-04
 version = 2
-references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/08/monitoring-windows-console-activity-part-two.html", "https://www.splunk.com/pdfs/technical-briefs/advanced-threat-detection-and-response-tech-brief.pdf", "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/logging/detecting-security-incidents-windows-workstation-event-logs-34262"]
+references = ["https://web.archive.org/web/20210921093439/https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/08/monitoring-windows-console-activity-part-two.html", "https://www.splunk.com/pdfs/technical-briefs/advanced-threat-detection-and-response-tech-brief.pdf", "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/logging/detecting-security-incidents-windows-workstation-event-logs-34262"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
 searches = ["ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Attacker Tools On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 Shimcache Flush - Rule", "ESCU - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Copy on System32 - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Verclsid CLSID Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows NirSoft AdvancedRun - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Remote Assistance Spawning Process - Rule", "ESCU - Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - WinRM Spawning a Process - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
@@ -10997,7 +11067,7 @@ narrative = Various legacy protocols operate by default in the clear, without th
 category = Adversary Tactics
 last_updated = 2022-05-19
 version = 1
-references = ["https://attackerkb.com/topics/BDXyTqY1ld/cve-2022-22954/rapid7-analysis", "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/sites/default/files/publications/CISA_CSA_Threat_Actors_Chaining_VMware_Unpatched_Vulnerabilities_for_Full_System_Control.pdf"]
+references = ["https://attackerkb.com/topics/BDXyTqY1ld/cve-2022-22954/rapid7-analysis", "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-138b"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
 searches = ["ESCU - VMware Server Side Template Injection Hunt - Rule", "ESCU - VMware Workspace ONE Freemarker Server-side Template Injection - Rule"]
@@ -11130,6 +11200,17 @@ searches = ["ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule",
 description = Windows services are often used by attackers for persistence and the ability to load drivers or otherwise interact with the Windows kernel. This Analytic Story helps you monitor your environment for indications that Windows services are being modified or created in a suspicious manner.
 narrative = The Windows operating system uses a services architecture to allow for running code in the background, similar to a UNIX daemon. Attackers will often leverage Windows services for persistence, hiding in plain sight, seeking the ability to run privileged code that can interact with the kernel. In many cases, attackers will create a new service to host their malicious code. Attackers have also been observed modifying unnecessary or unused services to point to their own code, as opposed to what was intended. In these cases, attackers often use tools to create or modify services in ways that are not typical for most environments, providing opportunities for detection.

+[analytic_story://Windows System Binary Proxy Execution MSIExec]
+category = Adversary Tactics
+last_updated = 2022-06-16
+version = 1
+references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/007/"]
+maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
+spec_version = 3
+searches = ["ESCU - Windows MSIExec DLLRegisterServer - Rule", "ESCU - Windows MSIExec Remote Download - Rule", "ESCU - Windows MSIExec Spawn Discovery Command - Rule", "ESCU - Windows MSIExec Unregister DLLRegisterServer - Rule", "ESCU - Windows MSIExec With Network Connections - Rule"]
+description = Adversaries may abuse msiexec.exe to proxy execution of malicious payloads. Msiexec.exe is the command-line utility for the Windows Installer and is thus commonly associated with executing installation packages (.msi).
+narrative = Adversaries may abuse msiexec.exe to launch local or network accessible MSI files. Msiexec.exe can also execute DLLs. Since it may be signed and native on Windows systems, msiexec.exe can be used to bypass application control solutions that do not account for its potential abuse. Msiexec.exe execution may also be elevated to SYSTEM privileges if the AlwaysInstallElevated policy is enabled.
+
 [analytic_story://XMRig]
 category = Malware
 last_updated = 2021-05-07
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 is_configured = false
 state = enabled
 state_change_requires_restart = false
-build = 8439
+build = 8568

 [triggers]
 reload.analytic_stories = simple
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ reload.es_investigations = simple

 [launcher]
 author = Splunk
-version = 3.43.1
+version = 3.44.0
 description = Explore the Analytic Stories included with ES Content Updates.

 [ui]
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
-# On Date: 2022-06-22T17:37:56 UTC
+# On Date: 2022-06-29T20:42:24 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Security Research
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
 [content-version]
-version = 3.43.1
+version = 3.44.0
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
-# On Date: 2022-06-22T17:37:56 UTC
+# On Date: 2022-06-29T20:42:24 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Security Research
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
-# On Date: 2022-06-22T17:37:56 UTC
+# On Date: 2022-06-29T20:42:24 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Security Research
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
@@ -2981,6 +2981,26 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
 definition = search *
 description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.

+[windows_msiexec_dllregisterserver_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
+[windows_msiexec_remote_download_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
+[windows_msiexec_spawn_discovery_command_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
+[windows_msiexec_unregister_dllregisterserver_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
+[windows_msiexec_with_network_connections_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
 [windows_nirsoft_advancedrun_filter]
 definition = search *
 description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
@@ -3005,6 +3025,14 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
 definition = search *
 description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.

+[windows_powerview_kerberos_service_ticket_request_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
+[windows_powerview_spn_discovery_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
 [windows_powerview_unconstrained_delegation_discovery_filter]
 definition = search *
 description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
@@ -4002,6 +4030,10 @@ description = Matches the process with its original file name, data for this mac
 definition = (Processes.process_name=mshta.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=MSHTA.EXE)
 description = Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/

+[process_msiexec]
+definition = (Processes.process_name=msiexec.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=msiexec.exe)
+description = Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/
+
 [process_net]
 definition = (Processes.process_name="net.exe" OR Processes.original_file_name="net.exe" OR Processes.process_name="net1.exe" OR Processes.original_file_name="net1.exe")
 description = Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
-# On Date: 2022-06-22T17:37:56 UTC
+# On Date: 2022-06-29T20:42:24 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Security Research
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
@@ -11324,7 +11324,7 @@ action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the usage of `rclone.exe`, renamed, being used to exfiltrate data to a remote destination. RClone has been used by multiple ransomware groups to exfiltrate data. In many instances, it will be downloaded from the legitimate site and executed accordingly. During triage, isolate the endpoint and begin to review parallel processes for additional behavior. At this stage, the adversary may have staged data to be exfiltrated.
 action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1020"]}
-action.escu.data_models = []
+action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies the usage of `rclone.exe`, renamed, being used to exfiltrate data to a remote destination. RClone has been used by multiple ransomware groups to exfiltrate data. In many instances, it will be downloaded from the legitimate site and executed accordingly. During triage, isolate the endpoint and begin to review parallel processes for additional behavior. At this stage, the adversary may have staged data to be exfiltrated.
 action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.
 action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives should be limited as this analytic identifies renamed instances of `rclone.exe`. Filter as needed if there is a legitimate business use case.
@@ -13029,7 +13029,7 @@ action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The search looks for modifications to registry keys that control the enforcement of Windows User Account Control (UAC).
 action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.002", "T1548"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]}
-action.escu.data_models = []
+action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 action.escu.eli5 = The search looks for modifications to registry keys that control the enforcement of Windows User Account Control (UAC).
 action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or via other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report registry modifications.
 action.escu.known_false_positives = This registry key may be modified via administrators to implement a change in system policy. This type of change should be a very rare occurrence.
@@ -20773,7 +20773,7 @@ action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search looks for registry activity associated with modifications to the registry key `HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Print\Monitors`. In this scenario, an attacker can load an arbitrary .dll into the print-monitor registry by giving the full path name to the after.dll. The system will execute the .dll with elevated (SYSTEM) permissions and will persist after reboot.
 action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 5"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.010", "T1547"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"]}
-action.escu.data_models = []
+action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for registry activity associated with modifications to the registry key `HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Print\Monitors`. In this scenario, an attacker can load an arbitrary .dll into the print-monitor registry by giving the full path name to the after.dll. The system will execute the .dll with elevated (SYSTEM) permissions and will persist after reboot.
 action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or via other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report registry modifications.
 action.escu.known_false_positives = You will encounter noise from legitimate print-monitor registry entries.
@@ -22477,12 +22477,12 @@ action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = A required step while exploiting the CVE-2021-44228-Log4j vulnerability is that the victim server will perform outbound connections to attacker-controlled infrastructure. This is required as part of the JNDI lookup as well as for retrieving the second stage .class payload. The following analytic identifies the Java process reaching out to default ports used by the LDAP and RMI protocols. This behavior could represent successfull exploitation. Note that adversaries can easily decide to use arbitrary ports for these protocols and potentially bypass this detection.
 action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"]}
-action.escu.data_models = []
+action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"]
 action.escu.eli5 = A required step while exploiting the CVE-2021-44228-Log4j vulnerability is that the victim server will perform outbound connections to attacker-controlled infrastructure. This is required as part of the JNDI lookup as well as for retrieving the second stage .class payload. The following analytic identifies the Java process reaching out to default ports used by the LDAP and RMI protocols. This behavior could represent successfull exploitation. Note that adversaries can easily decide to use arbitrary ports for these protocols and potentially bypass this detection.
 action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
 action.escu.known_false_positives = Legitimate Java applications may use perform outbound connections to these ports. Filter as needed
-action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-13
-action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-13
+action.escu.creation_date = 2022-06-28
+action.escu.modification_date = 2022-06-28
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
@@ -22516,7 +22516,7 @@ relation = greater than
 quantity = 0
 realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
-search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="java.exe" OR Processes.process_name=javaw.exe OR Processes.process_name=javaw.exe) by _time Processes.process_guid Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name |  `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | join  process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Ports where (Ports.dest_port= 389 OR Ports.dest_port= 636 OR Ports.dest_port = 1389 OR Ports.dest_port = 1099 ) by Ports.process_guid Ports.dest Ports.dest_port| `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` |  rename  dest as connection_to_CNC] | table _time dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process connection_to_CNC dest_port | `outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports_filter`
+search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="java.exe" OR Processes.process_name=javaw.exe OR Processes.process_name=javaw.exe) by _time Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | join process_id [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where (All_Traffic.dest_port= 389 OR All_Traffic.dest_port= 636 OR All_Traffic.dest_port = 1389 OR All_Traffic.dest_port = 1099 ) by All_Traffic.process_id All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | rename dest as connection_to_CNC] | table _time dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process connection_to_CNC dest_port| `outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports_filter`

 [ESCU - Overwriting Accessibility Binaries - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
@@ -24447,7 +24447,7 @@ action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search looks for registry activity associated with application compatibility shims, which can be leveraged by attackers for various nefarious purposes.
 action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.011", "T1546"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]}
-action.escu.data_models = []
+action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for registry activity associated with application compatibility shims, which can be leveraged by attackers for various nefarious purposes.
 action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must populate the Change_Analysis data model. This is typically populated via endpoint detection and response product, such as Carbon Black or other endpoint data sources such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.
 action.escu.known_false_positives = There are many legitimate applications that leverage shim databases for compatibility purposes for legacy applications
@@ -24539,7 +24539,7 @@ action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search looks for modifications to registry keys that can be used to elevate privileges. The registry keys under "Image File Execution Options" are used to intercept calls to an executable and can be used to attach malicious binaries to benign system binaries.
 action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.012", "T1546"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]}
-action.escu.data_models = []
+action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for modifications to registry keys that can be used to elevate privileges. The registry keys under "Image File Execution Options" are used to intercept calls to an executable and can be used to attach malicious binaries to benign system binaries.
 action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.
 action.escu.known_false_positives = There are many legitimate applications that must execute upon system startup and will use these registry keys to accomplish that task.
@@ -26061,7 +26061,7 @@ action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The search looks for files that contain the key word *Ryuk* under any folder in the C drive, which is consistent with Ryuk propagation.
 action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1486"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]}
-action.escu.data_models = []
+action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 action.escu.eli5 = The search looks for files that contain the key word *Ryuk* under any folder in the C drive, which is consistent with Ryuk propagation.
 action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint Filesystem data-model object. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data.
 action.escu.known_false_positives = If there are files with this keywoord as file names it might trigger false possitives, please make use of our filters to tune out potential FPs.
@@ -27232,7 +27232,7 @@ action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search looks for shim database files being written to default directories. The sdbinst.exe application is used to install shim database files (.sdb). According to Microsoft, a shim is a small library that transparently intercepts an API, changes the parameters passed, handles the operation itself, or redirects the operation elsewhere.
 action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.011", "T1546"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
-action.escu.data_models = []
+action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for shim database files being written to default directories. The sdbinst.exe application is used to install shim database files (.sdb). According to Microsoft, a shim is a small library that transparently intercepts an API, changes the parameters passed, handles the operation itself, or redirects the operation elsewhere.
 action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data.
 action.escu.known_false_positives = Because legitimate shim files are created and used all the time, this event, in itself, is not suspicious. However, if there are other correlating events, it may warrant further investigation.
@@ -29275,7 +29275,7 @@ action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search detects writes to the recycle bin by a process other than explorer.exe.
 action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
-action.escu.data_models = []
+action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 action.escu.eli5 = This search detects writes to the recycle bin by a process other than explorer.exe.
 action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on filesystem and process logs responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Filesystem` nodes.
 action.escu.known_false_positives = Because the Recycle Bin is a hidden folder in modern versions of Windows, it would be unusual for a process other than explorer.exe to write to it. Incidents should be investigated as appropriate.
@@ -31007,7 +31007,7 @@ action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic is to detect deletion of registry with suspicious process file path. This technique was seen in Double Zero wiper malware where it will delete all the subkey in HKLM, HKCU and HKU registry hive as part of its destructive payload to the targeted hosts. This anomaly detections can catch possible malware or advesaries deleting registry as part of defense evasion or even payload impact but can also catch for third party application updates or installation. In this scenario false positive filter is needed.
 action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
-action.escu.data_models = []
+action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 action.escu.eli5 = This analytic is to detect deletion of registry with suspicious process file path. This technique was seen in Double Zero wiper malware where it will delete all the subkey in HKLM, HKCU and HKU registry hive as part of its destructive payload to the targeted hosts. This anomaly detections can catch possible malware or advesaries deleting registry as part of defense evasion or even payload impact but can also catch for third party application updates or installation. In this scenario false positive filter is needed.
 action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the registry value name, registry path, and registry value data from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.
 action.escu.known_false_positives = This detection can catch for third party application updates or installation. In this scenario false positive filter is needed.
@@ -32923,6 +32923,236 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path = "*\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\Advanced*" AND Registry.registry_value_name  IN("ShowCompColor", "ShowInfoTip") by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `windows_modify_show_compress_color_and_info_tip_registry_filter`

+[ESCU - Windows MSIExec DLLRegisterServer - Rule]
+action.escu = 0
+action.escu.enabled = 1
+description = The following analytic identifies the usage of msiexec.exe using the /y switch parameter, which grants the ability for msiexec to load DLLRegisterServer. Upon triage, review parent process and capture any artifacts for further review.
+action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.007"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
+action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"]
+action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies the usage of msiexec.exe using the /y switch parameter, which grants the ability for msiexec to load DLLRegisterServer. Upon triage, review parent process and capture any artifacts for further review.
+action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.
+action.escu.known_false_positives = This analytic will need to be tuned for your environment based on legitimate usage of msiexec.exe. Filter as needed.
+action.escu.creation_date = 2022-06-14
+action.escu.modification_date = 2022-06-14
+action.escu.confidence = high
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows MSIExec DLLRegisterServer - Rule
+action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
+action.escu.providing_technologies = []
+action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows System Binary Proxy Execution MSIExec"]
+action.risk = 1
+action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to register a file.
+action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 35}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 35}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process name"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}]
+action.risk.param._risk_score = 0
+action.risk.param.verbose = 0
+cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
+dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
+dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
+action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows MSIExec DLLRegisterServer - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows System Binary Proxy Execution MSIExec"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.007"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process Name"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]}
+schedule_window = auto
+action.notable = 1
+action.notable.param.nes_fields = user,dest
+action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies the usage of msiexec.exe using the /y switch parameter, which grants the ability for msiexec to load DLLRegisterServer. Upon triage, review parent process and capture any artifacts for further review.
+action.notable.param.rule_title = Windows MSIExec DLLRegisterServer
+action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint
+action.notable.param.severity = high
+alert.digest_mode = 1
+disabled = true
+enableSched = 1
+allow_skew = 100%
+counttype = number of events
+relation = greater than
+quantity = 0
+realtime_schedule = 0
+is_visible = false
+search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_msiexec` Processes.process IN ("*/y*", "*-y*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_msiexec_dllregisterserver_filter`
+
+[ESCU - Windows MSIExec Remote Download - Rule]
+action.escu = 0
+action.escu.enabled = 1
+description = The following analytic identifies msiexec.exe with http in the command-line. This procedure will utilize msiexec.exe to download a remote file and load it. During triage, review parallel processes and capture any artifacts on disk for review.
+action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.007"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
+action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"]
+action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies msiexec.exe with http in the command-line. This procedure will utilize msiexec.exe to download a remote file and load it. During triage, review parallel processes and capture any artifacts on disk for review.
+action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.
+action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present, filter by destination or parent process as needed.
+action.escu.creation_date = 2022-06-16
+action.escu.modification_date = 2022-06-16
+action.escu.confidence = high
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows MSIExec Remote Download - Rule
+action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
+action.escu.providing_technologies = []
+action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows System Binary Proxy Execution MSIExec"]
+action.risk = 1
+action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to download a remote file.
+action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 35}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 35}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process name"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}]
+action.risk.param._risk_score = 0
+action.risk.param.verbose = 0
+cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
+dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
+dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
+action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows MSIExec Remote Download - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows System Binary Proxy Execution MSIExec"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.007"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process Name"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]}
+schedule_window = auto
+action.notable = 1
+action.notable.param.nes_fields = user,dest
+action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies msiexec.exe with http in the command-line. This procedure will utilize msiexec.exe to download a remote file and load it. During triage, review parallel processes and capture any artifacts on disk for review.
+action.notable.param.rule_title = Windows MSIExec Remote Download
+action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint
+action.notable.param.severity = high
+alert.digest_mode = 1
+disabled = true
+enableSched = 1
+allow_skew = 100%
+counttype = number of events
+relation = greater than
+quantity = 0
+realtime_schedule = 0
+is_visible = false
+search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_msiexec` Processes.process IN ("*http://*", "*https://*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_msiexec_remote_download_filter`
+
+[ESCU - Windows MSIExec Spawn Discovery Command - Rule]
+action.escu = 0
+action.escu.enabled = 1
+description = The following analytic identifies MSIExec spawning multiple discovery commands, including spawning Cmd.exe or PowerShell.exe. Typically, child processes are not common from MSIExec other than MSIExec spawning itself.
+action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.007"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
+action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"]
+action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies MSIExec spawning multiple discovery commands, including spawning Cmd.exe or PowerShell.exe. Typically, child processes are not common from MSIExec other than MSIExec spawning itself.
+action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.
+action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives will be present with MSIExec spawning Cmd or PowerShell. Filtering will be needed. In addition, add other known discovery processes to enhance query.
+action.escu.creation_date = 2022-06-13
+action.escu.modification_date = 2022-06-13
+action.escu.confidence = high
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows MSIExec Spawn Discovery Command - Rule
+action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
+action.escu.providing_technologies = []
+action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows System Binary Proxy Execution MSIExec"]
+action.risk = 1
+action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ running different discovery commands.
+action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 35}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 35}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process name"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}]
+action.risk.param._risk_score = 0
+action.risk.param.verbose = 0
+cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
+dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
+dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
+action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows MSIExec Spawn Discovery Command - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows System Binary Proxy Execution MSIExec"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.007"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process Name"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]}
+schedule_window = auto
+action.notable = 1
+action.notable.param.nes_fields = user,dest
+action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies MSIExec spawning multiple discovery commands, including spawning Cmd.exe or PowerShell.exe. Typically, child processes are not common from MSIExec other than MSIExec spawning itself.
+action.notable.param.rule_title = Windows MSIExec Spawn Discovery Command
+action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint
+action.notable.param.severity = high
+alert.digest_mode = 1
+disabled = true
+enableSched = 1
+allow_skew = 100%
+counttype = number of events
+relation = greater than
+quantity = 0
+realtime_schedule = 0
+is_visible = false
+search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=msiexec.exe Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe","cmd.exe", "nltest.exe","ipconfig.exe","systeminfo.exe") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_msiexec_spawn_discovery_command_filter`
+
+[ESCU - Windows MSIExec Unregister DLLRegisterServer - Rule]
+action.escu = 0
+action.escu.enabled = 1
+description = The following analytic identifies the usage of msiexec.exe using the /z switch parameter, which grants the ability for msiexec to unload DLLRegisterServer. Upon triage, review parent process and capture any artifacts for further review.
+action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.007"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
+action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"]
+action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies the usage of msiexec.exe using the /z switch parameter, which grants the ability for msiexec to unload DLLRegisterServer. Upon triage, review parent process and capture any artifacts for further review.
+action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.
+action.escu.known_false_positives = This analytic will need to be tuned for your environment based on legitimate usage of msiexec.exe. Filter as needed.
+action.escu.creation_date = 2022-06-14
+action.escu.modification_date = 2022-06-14
+action.escu.confidence = high
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows MSIExec Unregister DLLRegisterServer - Rule
+action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
+action.escu.providing_technologies = []
+action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows System Binary Proxy Execution MSIExec"]
+action.risk = 1
+action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to unregister a file.
+action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 35}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 35}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process name"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}]
+action.risk.param._risk_score = 0
+action.risk.param.verbose = 0
+cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
+dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
+dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
+action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows MSIExec Unregister DLLRegisterServer - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows System Binary Proxy Execution MSIExec"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.007"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process Name"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]}
+schedule_window = auto
+action.notable = 1
+action.notable.param.nes_fields = user,dest
+action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies the usage of msiexec.exe using the /z switch parameter, which grants the ability for msiexec to unload DLLRegisterServer. Upon triage, review parent process and capture any artifacts for further review.
+action.notable.param.rule_title = Windows MSIExec Unregister DLLRegisterServer
+action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint
+action.notable.param.severity = high
+alert.digest_mode = 1
+disabled = true
+enableSched = 1
+allow_skew = 100%
+counttype = number of events
+relation = greater than
+quantity = 0
+realtime_schedule = 0
+is_visible = false
+search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_msiexec` Processes.process IN ("*/z*", "*-z*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_msiexec_unregister_dllregisterserver_filter`
+
+[ESCU - Windows MSIExec With Network Connections - Rule]
+action.escu = 0
+action.escu.enabled = 1
+description = The following analytic identifies MSIExec with any network connection over port 443 or 80. Typically, MSIExec does not perform network communication to the internet.
+action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.007"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
+action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"]
+action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies MSIExec with any network connection over port 443 or 80. Typically, MSIExec does not perform network communication to the internet.
+action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. Add parent process as a filter, filter known good processes. This may be voluminous due to the join on process_id. All_Traffic does not have process_guid, yet.
+action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives will be present and filtering is required.
+action.escu.creation_date = 2022-06-16
+action.escu.modification_date = 2022-06-16
+action.escu.confidence = high
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows MSIExec With Network Connections - Rule
+action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
+action.escu.providing_technologies = []
+action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows System Binary Proxy Execution MSIExec"]
+action.risk = 1
+action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ contacting a remote destination.
+action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 35}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 35}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process name"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}]
+action.risk.param._risk_score = 0
+action.risk.param.verbose = 0
+cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
+dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
+dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
+action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows MSIExec With Network Connections - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows System Binary Proxy Execution MSIExec"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.007"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process Name"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]}
+schedule_window = auto
+action.notable = 1
+action.notable.param.nes_fields = user,dest
+action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies MSIExec with any network connection over port 443 or 80. Typically, MSIExec does not perform network communication to the internet.
+action.notable.param.rule_title = Windows MSIExec With Network Connections
+action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint
+action.notable.param.severity = high
+alert.digest_mode = 1
+disabled = true
+enableSched = 1
+allow_skew = 100%
+counttype = number of events
+relation = greater than
+quantity = 0
+realtime_schedule = 0
+is_visible = false
+search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_msiexec` by _time Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | join  process_id [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port IN ("80","443") by All_Traffic.process_id All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port All_Traffic.dest_ip | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` ] | table _time dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process process_id dest_port dest_ip | `windows_msiexec_with_network_connections_filter`
+
 [ESCU - Windows NirSoft AdvancedRun - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
@@ -33205,6 +33435,98 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = "*Get-DomainComputer*" OR Message = "*Get-NetComputer*") AND (Message = "*-TrustedToAuth*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_powerview_constrained_delegation_discovery_filter`

+[ESCU - Windows PowerView Kerberos Service Ticket Request - Rule]
+action.escu = 0
+action.escu.enabled = 1
+description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainSPNTicket` commandlets with specific parameters. This commandlet is a part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration and discovery on Windows Active Directory networks. As the name suggests, this commandlet is used to request the kerberos ticket for a specified service principal name (SPN). Once the ticket is received, it may be cracked using password cracking tools like hashcat to extract the password of the SPN account. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage PowerView and these commandlets to identify accounts that can be attacked with the Kerberoasting technique.
+action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1558", "T1558.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
+action.escu.data_models = []
+action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainSPNTicket` commandlets with specific parameters. This commandlet is a part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration and discovery on Windows Active Directory networks. As the name suggests, this commandlet is used to request the kerberos ticket for a specified service principal name (SPN). Once the ticket is received, it may be cracked using password cracking tools like hashcat to extract the password of the SPN account. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage PowerView and these commandlets to identify accounts that can be attacked with the Kerberoasting technique.
+action.escu.how_to_implement = The following analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging.
+action.escu.known_false_positives = False positive may include Administrators using PowerView for troubleshooting and management.
+action.escu.creation_date = 2022-06-22
+action.escu.modification_date = 2022-06-22
+action.escu.confidence = high
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows PowerView Kerberos Service Ticket Request - Rule
+action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
+action.escu.providing_technologies = []
+action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"]
+action.risk = 1
+action.risk.param._risk_message = PowerView commandlets used for requesting SPN service ticket executed on $Computer_Name$
+action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "Client_Address", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 27}]
+action.risk.param._risk_score = 0
+action.risk.param.verbose = 0
+cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
+dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
+dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
+action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows PowerView Kerberos Service Ticket Request - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1558", "T1558.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "Client_Address", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]}
+schedule_window = auto
+action.notable = 1
+action.notable.param.nes_fields = user,dest
+action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainSPNTicket` commandlets with specific parameters. This commandlet is a part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration and discovery on Windows Active Directory networks. As the name suggests, this commandlet is used to request the kerberos ticket for a specified service principal name (SPN). Once the ticket is received, it may be cracked using password cracking tools like hashcat to extract the password of the SPN account. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage PowerView and these commandlets to identify accounts that can be attacked with the Kerberoasting technique.
+action.notable.param.rule_title = Windows PowerView Kerberos Service Ticket Request
+action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint
+action.notable.param.severity = high
+alert.digest_mode = 1
+disabled = true
+enableSched = 1
+allow_skew = 100%
+counttype = number of events
+relation = greater than
+quantity = 0
+realtime_schedule = 0
+is_visible = false
+search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 Message=*Get-DomainSPNTicket* | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_powerview_kerberos_service_ticket_request_filter`
+
+[ESCU - Windows PowerView SPN Discovery - Rule]
+action.escu = 0
+action.escu.enabled = 1
+description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainUser` or `Get-NetUSer` commandlets with specific parameters. These commandlets are part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration and discovery on Windows Active Directory networks. As the names suggest, these commandlets are used to identify domain users in a network and combining them with the `-SPN` parameter allows adversaries to discover domain accounts associated with a Service Principal Name (SPN). Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage PowerView and these commandlets to identify accounts that can be attacked with the Kerberoasting technique.
+action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1558", "T1558.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
+action.escu.data_models = []
+action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainUser` or `Get-NetUSer` commandlets with specific parameters. These commandlets are part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration and discovery on Windows Active Directory networks. As the names suggest, these commandlets are used to identify domain users in a network and combining them with the `-SPN` parameter allows adversaries to discover domain accounts associated with a Service Principal Name (SPN). Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage PowerView and these commandlets to identify accounts that can be attacked with the Kerberoasting technique.
+action.escu.how_to_implement = The following analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging.
+action.escu.known_false_positives = False positive may include Administrators using PowerView for troubleshooting and management.
+action.escu.creation_date = 2022-06-22
+action.escu.modification_date = 2022-06-22
+action.escu.confidence = high
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows PowerView SPN Discovery - Rule
+action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
+action.escu.providing_technologies = []
+action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"]
+action.risk = 1
+action.risk.param._risk_message = PowerView commandlets used for SPN discovery executed on $Computer_Name$
+action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "Client_Address", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 27}]
+action.risk.param._risk_score = 0
+action.risk.param.verbose = 0
+cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
+dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
+dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
+action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows PowerView SPN Discovery - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1558", "T1558.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "Client_Address", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]}
+schedule_window = auto
+action.notable = 1
+action.notable.param.nes_fields = user,dest
+action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainUser` or `Get-NetUSer` commandlets with specific parameters. These commandlets are part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration and discovery on Windows Active Directory networks. As the names suggest, these commandlets are used to identify domain users in a network and combining them with the `-SPN` parameter allows adversaries to discover domain accounts associated with a Service Principal Name (SPN). Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage PowerView and these commandlets to identify accounts that can be attacked with the Kerberoasting technique.
+action.notable.param.rule_title = Windows PowerView SPN Discovery
+action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint
+action.notable.param.severity = high
+alert.digest_mode = 1
+disabled = true
+enableSched = 1
+allow_skew = 100%
+counttype = number of events
+relation = greater than
+quantity = 0
+realtime_schedule = 0
+is_visible = false
+search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 (ScriptBlockText =*Get-NetUser* OR ScriptBlockText=*Get-DomainUser*) ScriptBlockText= *-SPN* | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `windows_powerview_spn_discovery_filter`
+
 [ESCU - Windows PowerView Unconstrained Delegation Discovery - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
@@ -33784,7 +34106,7 @@ action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The search looks for a Windows Security Account Manager (SAM) was stopped via command-line. This is consistent with Ryuk infections across a fleet of endpoints.
 action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1489"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]}
-action.escu.data_models = []
+action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 action.escu.eli5 = The search looks for a Windows Security Account Manager (SAM) was stopped via command-line. This is consistent with Ryuk infections across a fleet of endpoints.
 action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records the process-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint Processes data-model object. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data.
 action.escu.known_false_positives = SAM is a critical windows service, stopping it would cause major issues on an endpoint this makes false positive rare. AlthoughNo false positives have been identified.
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
-# On Date: 2022-06-22T17:37:56 UTC
+# On Date: 2022-06-29T20:42:24 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Security Research
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
-# On Date: 2022-06-22T17:37:56 UTC
+# On Date: 2022-06-29T20:42:24 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Security Research
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
@@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ T1584.002,DNS Server,Resource Development,no
 T1584.001,Domains,Resource Development,Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|Transparent Tribe|Magic Hound|APT29|APT1
 T1583.006,Web Services,Resource Development,APT28|Confucius|LazyScripter|Kimsuky|Magic Hound|IndigoZebra|ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|HAFNIUM|Lazarus Group|Turla|APT32|APT17|APT29
 T1583.005,Botnet,Resource Development,no
-T1583.004,Server,Resource Development,Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|GALLIUM|Sandworm Team
+T1583.004,Server,Resource Development,Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|Gelsemium|GALLIUM|Sandworm Team
 T1583.003,Virtual Private Server,Resource Development,Axiom|Dragonfly|HAFNIUM|TEMP.Veles
 T1583.002,DNS Server,Resource Development,Axiom
 T1584,Compromise Infrastructure,Resource Development,no
@@ -174,9 +174,9 @@ T1546.015,Component Object Model Hijacking,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,APT2
 T1071.004,DNS,Command And Control,LazyScripter|Chimera|APT39|Tropic Trooper|OilRig|Ke3chang|Cobalt Group|APT18|APT41|FIN7
 T1071.003,Mail Protocols,Command And Control,Turla|Kimsuky|APT32|SilverTerrier|APT28
 T1071.002,File Transfer Protocols,Command And Control,Kimsuky|APT41|SilverTerrier|Honeybee
-T1071.001,Web Protocols,Command And Control,Kimsuky|Confucius|TeamTNT|FIN8|APT29|Mustang Panda|Windshift|TA551|Higaisa|HAFNIUM|Sidewinder|Chimera|Sandworm Team|TA505|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Inception|APT41|SilverTerrier|APT28|WIRTE|APT33|FIN4|Night Dragon|APT18|APT38|Dark Caracal|Cobalt Group|Orangeworm|Rancor|Threat Group-3390|Turla|APT19|APT37|Ke3chang|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|OilRig|APT32|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon
+T1071.001,Web Protocols,Command And Control,Kimsuky|Confucius|TeamTNT|FIN8|APT29|Mustang Panda|Windshift|TA551|Higaisa|HAFNIUM|Sidewinder|Chimera|Sandworm Team|TA505|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Inception|APT41|SilverTerrier|APT28|WIRTE|APT33|FIN4|Night Dragon|APT18|APT38|Rancor|Ke3chang|Orangeworm|APT37|APT19|Cobalt Group|Threat Group-3390|Dark Caracal|Turla|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|APT32|OilRig|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon
 T1572,Protocol Tunneling,Command And Control,Leviathan|CostaRicto|Chimera|Fox Kitten|OilRig|Cobalt Group|FIN6
-T1048.003,Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol,Exfiltration,Wizard Spider|FIN6|APT32|APT33|Thrip|FIN8|OilRig|Lazarus Group
+T1048.003,Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol,Exfiltration,Wizard Spider|FIN6|APT32|APT33|Thrip|FIN8|OilRig|Lazarus Group
 T1048.002,Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol,Exfiltration,APT28|APT29
 T1048.001,Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol,Exfiltration,no
 T1001.003,Protocol Impersonation,Command And Control,Higaisa|Lazarus Group
@@ -189,18 +189,18 @@ T1090.003,Multi-hop Proxy,Command And Control,Leviathan|CostaRicto|APT28|Operati
 T1090.002,External Proxy,Command And Control,Tonto Team|APT39|Silence|GALLIUM|MuddyWater|APT3|FIN5|Lazarus Group|menuPass|APT28
 T1090.001,Internal Proxy,Command And Control,Lazarus Group|Turla|APT29|Higaisa|Operation Wocao|APT39|Strider
 T1102.003,One-Way Communication,Command And Control,Leviathan
-T1102.002,Bidirectional Communication,Command And Control,Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|APT28|APT29|Sandworm Team|APT39|APT12|FIN7|Turla|APT37|Magic Hound|Carbanak
+T1102.002,Bidirectional Communication,Command And Control,Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|APT28|APT29|Sandworm Team|APT39|APT12|Turla|FIN7|APT37|Magic Hound|Carbanak
 T1102.001,Dead Drop Resolver,Command And Control,Rocke|APT41|BRONZE BUTLER|RTM|Patchwork
 T1571,Non-Standard Port,Command And Control,WIRTE|Sandworm Team|Rocke|DarkVishnya|Silence|APT-C-36|Magic Hound|APT33|APT32|TEMP.Veles|Lazarus Group|FIN7
 T1074.002,Remote Data Staging,Collection,Leviathan|APT28|APT29|Chimera|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|FIN6|Night Dragon|FIN8
-T1074.001,Local Data Staging,Collection,Dragonfly|Indrik Spider|BackdoorDiplomacy|Mustang Panda|Sidewinder|Chimera|Kimsuky|APT39|Operation Wocao|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|Honeybee|Patchwork|Leviathan|APT3|FIN5|menuPass|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28
+T1074.001,Local Data Staging,Collection,Dragonfly|Indrik Spider|BackdoorDiplomacy|Mustang Panda|Sidewinder|Chimera|Kimsuky|APT39|Operation Wocao|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|Patchwork|Honeybee|Dragonfly 2.0|Leviathan|APT3|FIN5|menuPass|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28
 T1078.004,Cloud Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,Ke3chang|APT29|APT28|APT33
 T1564.004,NTFS File Attributes,Defense Evasion,APT32
 T1564.003,Hidden Window,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|Kimsuky|Nomadic Octopus|Higaisa|Gorgon Group|Deep Panda|DarkHydrus|CopyKittens|APT19|APT32|APT28|APT3|Magic Hound
 T1078.003,Local Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,APT29|Kimsuky|HAFNIUM|Turla|Operation Wocao|PROMETHIUM|Tropic Trooper|FIN10|APT32
 T1078.002,Domain Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,Naikon|Indrik Spider|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|APT29|TA505|APT3|Threat Group-1314
 T1078.001,Default Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,no
-T1564.002,Hidden Users,Defense Evasion,Kimsuky|Dragonfly
+T1564.002,Hidden Users,Defense Evasion,Kimsuky|Dragonfly|Dragonfly 2.0
 T1574.006,Dynamic Linker Hijacking,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,APT41|Rocke
 T1574.002,DLL Side-Loading,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,Lazarus Group|Mustang Panda|Higaisa|BlackTech|Sidewinder|Chimera|BRONZE BUTLER|Naikon|APT41|GALLIUM|Tropic Trooper|APT19|Patchwork|APT32|APT3|menuPass|Threat Group-3390
 T1574.001,DLL Search Order Hijacking,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,Aquatic Panda|BackdoorDiplomacy|Tonto Team|Evilnum|APT41|Whitefly|RTM|Threat Group-3390|menuPass
@@ -214,10 +214,10 @@ T1574,Hijack Execution Flow,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
 T1069.001,Local Groups,Discovery,Tonto Team|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Turla|OilRig|admin@338
 T1570,Lateral Tool Transfer,Lateral Movement,Sandworm Team|Chimera|GALLIUM|Operation Wocao|APT32|Wizard Spider|Turla|FIN10
 T1568.003,DNS Calculation,Command And Control,APT12
-T1204.002,Malicious File,Execution,LazyScripter|WIRTE|Confucius|Dragonfly|Threat Group-3390|Nomadic Octopus|Indrik Spider|APT38|Andariel|Ferocious Kitten|IndigoZebra|Transparent Tribe|Tonto Team|Magic Hound|Ajax Security Team|Mustang Panda|TA551|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Kimsuky|FIN6|PROMETHIUM|APT30|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|RTM|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|Machete|admin@338|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|MuddyWater|Rancor|Gorgon Group|OilRig|FIN7|APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|Cobalt Group|APT19|DarkHydrus|Dark Caracal|PLATINUM|menuPass|Leviathan|APT28|APT29|TA459|APT37|Elderwood|FIN8
-T1204.001,Malicious Link,Execution,LazyScripter|Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|Confucius|FIN7|Transparent Tribe|APT3|Magic Hound|APT28|APT29|Mustang Panda|Sidewinder|ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|Evilnum|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|Patchwork|Windshift|APT32|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|TA505|OilRig|Machete|Leviathan|FIN8|FIN4|Elderwood|Cobalt Group|APT39|Night Dragon|APT33|Turla
+T1204.002,Malicious File,Execution,LazyScripter|WIRTE|Confucius|Dragonfly|Threat Group-3390|Nomadic Octopus|Indrik Spider|APT38|Andariel|Ferocious Kitten|IndigoZebra|Transparent Tribe|Tonto Team|Magic Hound|Ajax Security Team|Mustang Panda|TA551|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Kimsuky|FIN6|PROMETHIUM|APT30|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|RTM|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|Machete|admin@338|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN7|BRONZE BUTLER|Gorgon Group|OilRig|Dark Caracal|Cobalt Group|DarkHydrus|Rancor|Patchwork|APT32|APT19|MuddyWater|Lazarus Group|menuPass|APT37|Leviathan|TA459|APT29|APT28|FIN8|PLATINUM|Elderwood
+T1204.001,Malicious Link,Execution,LazyScripter|Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|Confucius|FIN7|Transparent Tribe|APT3|Magic Hound|APT28|APT29|Mustang Panda|Sidewinder|ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|Evilnum|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|Patchwork|Windshift|APT32|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|TA505|OilRig|Machete|Leviathan|FIN8|FIN4|Elderwood|Dragonfly 2.0|Cobalt Group|APT39|Night Dragon|Turla|APT33
 T1195.003,Compromise Hardware Supply Chain,Initial Access,no
-T1195.002,Compromise Software Supply Chain,Initial Access,Threat Group-3390|APT29|Cobalt Group|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Dragonfly|Sandworm Team|APT41
+T1195.002,Compromise Software Supply Chain,Initial Access,Gelsemium|Threat Group-3390|APT29|Cobalt Group|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Dragonfly|Sandworm Team|APT41
 T1195.001,Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools,Initial Access,no
 T1568.001,Fast Flux DNS,Command And Control,menuPass|TA505
 T1052.001,Exfiltration over USB,Exfiltration,Mustang Panda|Tropic Trooper
@@ -225,16 +225,16 @@ T1569.002,Service Execution,Execution,APT38|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spide
 T1569.001,Launchctl,Execution,no
 T1569,System Services,Execution,no
 T1568.002,Domain Generation Algorithms,Command And Control,TA551|APT41
-T1568,Dynamic Resolution,Command And Control,Gamaredon Group|Transparent Tribe|APT29
+T1568,Dynamic Resolution,Command And Control,Gamaredon Group|Gelsemium|Transparent Tribe|APT29
 T1011.001,Exfiltration Over Bluetooth,Exfiltration,no
 T1567.002,Exfiltration to Cloud Storage,Exfiltration,Kimsuky|Threat Group-3390|Confucius|Lazarus Group|FIN7|ZIRCONIUM|HAFNIUM|Chimera|Leviathan|Turla
 T1567.001,Exfiltration to Code Repository,Exfiltration,no
-T1059.006,Python,Execution,Dragonfly|Tonto Team|APT37|ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|Turla|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|APT29|Rocke|BRONZE BUTLER|APT39|Machete
-T1059.005,Visual Basic,Execution,Confucius|Lazarus Group|LazyScripter|OilRig|APT38|Transparent Tribe|APT29|Mustang Panda|Windshift|Higaisa|Sidewinder|APT39|Machete|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|APT33|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|Rancor|Patchwork|MuddyWater|Honeybee|FIN7|APT37|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|Turla|TA505|Silence|WIRTE|FIN4|Gorgon Group|Cobalt Group|Leviathan|TA459|Magic Hound
+T1059.006,Python,Execution,Dragonfly|Tonto Team|APT37|ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|Turla|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|APT29|Rocke|BRONZE BUTLER|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|Machete
+T1059.005,Visual Basic,Execution,Confucius|Lazarus Group|LazyScripter|OilRig|APT38|Transparent Tribe|APT29|Mustang Panda|Windshift|Higaisa|Sidewinder|APT39|Machete|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|APT33|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|Rancor|Patchwork|MuddyWater|Honeybee|FIN7|APT37|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|Turla|TA505|Silence|WIRTE|FIN4|Cobalt Group|Gorgon Group|Leviathan|TA459|Magic Hound
 T1059.004,Unix Shell,Execution,TeamTNT|Rocke|APT41
-T1059.003,Windows Command Shell,Execution,Kimsuky|Aquatic Panda|Dragonfly|LazyScripter|Sandworm Team|Nomadic Octopus|TeamTNT|APT29|Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|TA551|Higaisa|Indrik Spider|Chimera|Fox Kitten|Machete|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|FIN6|TA505|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|OilRig|Lazarus Group|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|FIN7|APT41|GALLIUM|Turla|Silence|APT32|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Dark Caracal|Ke3chang|Gorgon Group|Rancor|FIN8|APT28|APT37|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|Sowbug|menuPass|FIN10|Threat Group-3390|Gamaredon Group|Suckfly|Patchwork|Threat Group-1314|APT3|admin@338|APT1
+T1059.003,Windows Command Shell,Execution,Kimsuky|Aquatic Panda|Dragonfly|LazyScripter|Sandworm Team|Nomadic Octopus|TeamTNT|APT29|Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|TA551|Higaisa|Indrik Spider|Chimera|Fox Kitten|Machete|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|FIN6|TA505|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|OilRig|Lazarus Group|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|FIN7|APT41|GALLIUM|Turla|Silence|APT32|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Gorgon Group|Dark Caracal|Ke3chang|Dragonfly 2.0|Rancor|FIN8|APT28|APT37|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|Sowbug|menuPass|FIN10|Threat Group-3390|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Suckfly|Threat Group-1314|APT3|admin@338|APT1
 T1059.002,AppleScript,Execution,no
-T1059.001,PowerShell,Execution,Gamaredon Group|Lazarus Group|Aquatic Panda|Confucius|Dragonfly|LazyScripter|Nomadic Octopus|TeamTNT|APT38|Tonto Team|Mustang Panda|Indrik Spider|HAFNIUM|Sidewinder|Fox Kitten|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|APT39|DarkVishnya|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Inception|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|GALLIUM|TA505|WIRTE|TEMP.Veles|APT33|Gallmaker|APT19|DarkHydrus|APT28|Turla|Gorgon Group|Thrip|Cobalt Group|Leviathan|MuddyWater|FIN8|TA459|CopyKittens|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|Threat Group-3390|FIN10|APT32|FIN7|menuPass|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Poseidon Group|APT3|APT29|Deep Panda
+T1059.001,PowerShell,Execution,Gamaredon Group|Lazarus Group|Aquatic Panda|Confucius|Dragonfly|LazyScripter|Nomadic Octopus|TeamTNT|APT38|Tonto Team|Mustang Panda|Indrik Spider|HAFNIUM|Sidewinder|Fox Kitten|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|APT39|DarkVishnya|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Inception|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|GALLIUM|TA505|WIRTE|TEMP.Veles|APT33|Gallmaker|Turla|Thrip|Cobalt Group|APT28|DarkHydrus|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|Gorgon Group|TA459|Leviathan|MuddyWater|FIN8|CopyKittens|OilRig|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN7|APT32|menuPass|FIN10|Threat Group-3390|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Poseidon Group|APT3|APT29|Deep Panda
 T1567,Exfiltration Over Web Service,Exfiltration,APT28
 T1497.003,Time Based Evasion,Defense Evasion|Discovery,no
 T1497.002,User Activity Based Checks,Defense Evasion|Discovery,Darkhotel|FIN7
@@ -242,40 +242,40 @@ T1497.001,System Checks,Defense Evasion|Discovery,Lazarus Group|OilRig|Darkhotel
 T1498.002,Reflection Amplification,Impact,no
 T1498.001,Direct Network Flood,Impact,no
 T1566.003,Spearphishing via Service,Initial Access,Lazarus Group|APT29|Ajax Security Team|Magic Hound|Windshift|FIN6|OilRig|Dark Caracal
-T1566.002,Spearphishing Link,Initial Access,Lazarus Group|Confucius|LazyScripter|Transparent Tribe|FIN7|APT3|Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|Sidewinder|Evilnum|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|APT1|Windshift|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|Machete|Kimsuky|TA505|APT39|FIN4|APT32|Night Dragon|Cobalt Group|APT28|Turla|OilRig|APT33|Patchwork|Magic Hound|APT29|FIN8|Elderwood|Leviathan
-T1566.001,Spearphishing Attachment,Initial Access,WIRTE|Confucius|Dragonfly|LazyScripter|Threat Group-3390|APT38|Andariel|Ferocious Kitten|IndigoZebra|Transparent Tribe|Nomadic Octopus|Tonto Team|Ajax Security Team|Mustang Panda|TA551|Higaisa|Sidewinder|APT1|FIN6|APT30|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Mofang|Wizard Spider|RTM|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|APT41|Machete|admin@338|Kimsuky|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|Tropic Trooper|APT19|Gorgon Group|Cobalt Group|FIN7|Rancor|APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|OilRig|Lazarus Group|DarkHydrus|Patchwork|APT28|Leviathan|menuPass|APT29|FIN8|PLATINUM|Elderwood|APT37|TA459|MuddyWater
-T1566,Phishing,Initial Access,Axiom|GOLD SOUTHFIELD
+T1566.002,Spearphishing Link,Initial Access,Lazarus Group|Confucius|LazyScripter|Transparent Tribe|FIN7|APT3|Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|Sidewinder|Evilnum|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|APT1|Windshift|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|Machete|Kimsuky|TA505|APT39|FIN4|APT32|Night Dragon|APT28|Cobalt Group|Turla|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|Elderwood|APT33|APT29|Leviathan|FIN8|Patchwork|Magic Hound
+T1566.001,Spearphishing Attachment,Initial Access,WIRTE|Confucius|Dragonfly|LazyScripter|Threat Group-3390|APT38|Andariel|Ferocious Kitten|IndigoZebra|Transparent Tribe|Nomadic Octopus|Tonto Team|Ajax Security Team|Mustang Panda|TA551|Higaisa|Sidewinder|APT1|FIN6|APT30|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Mofang|Wizard Spider|RTM|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|APT41|Machete|admin@338|Kimsuky|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|Tropic Trooper|DarkHydrus|Lazarus Group|Gorgon Group|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|APT19|APT32|Cobalt Group|Rancor|FIN7|Dragonfly 2.0|MuddyWater|APT28|TA459|APT29|APT37|Leviathan|FIN8|Patchwork|menuPass|Elderwood|PLATINUM
+T1566,Phishing,Initial Access,Axiom|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Dragonfly
 T1565.003,Runtime Data Manipulation,Impact,APT38
 T1565.002,Transmitted Data Manipulation,Impact,APT38
 T1565.001,Stored Data Manipulation,Impact,APT38
 T1565,Data Manipulation,Impact,no
-T1564.001,Hidden Files and Directories,Defense Evasion,Transparent Tribe|Mustang Panda|Rocke|APT32|Tropic Trooper|Lazarus Group|APT28
+T1564.001,Hidden Files and Directories,Defense Evasion,Transparent Tribe|Mustang Panda|Rocke|APT32|Tropic Trooper|APT28|Lazarus Group
 T1564,Hide Artifacts,Defense Evasion,no
 T1563.002,RDP Hijacking,Lateral Movement,Axiom
 T1563.001,SSH Hijacking,Lateral Movement,no
 T1563,Remote Service Session Hijacking,Lateral Movement,no
 T1518.001,Security Software Discovery,Discovery,Kimsuky|Aquatic Panda|TeamTNT|APT38|Windshift|Sidewinder|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Turla|Rocke|Frankenstein|The White Company|Cobalt Group|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|Tropic Trooper|FIN8|Patchwork|Naikon
 T1069.003,Cloud Groups,Discovery,no
-T1069.002,Domain Groups,Discovery,APT29|Dragonfly|Turla|Inception|OilRig|Ke3chang
+T1069.002,Domain Groups,Discovery,APT29|Dragonfly|Turla|Inception|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|Ke3chang
 T1087.004,Cloud Account,Discovery,APT29
 T1087.003,Email Account,Discovery,Sandworm Team|TA505
-T1087.002,Domain Account,Discovery,APT29|Lazarus Group|Dragonfly|MuddyWater|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Chimera|Turla|Sandworm Team|BRONZE BUTLER|OilRig|menuPass|FIN6|Poseidon Group|Ke3chang
+T1087.002,Domain Account,Discovery,APT29|Lazarus Group|Dragonfly|MuddyWater|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Chimera|Turla|Sandworm Team|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN6|Poseidon Group|Ke3chang
 T1087.001,Local Account,Discovery,Chimera|Fox Kitten|Turla|Poseidon Group|OilRig|Ke3chang|APT32|APT1|Threat Group-3390|APT3|admin@338
 T1553.004,Install Root Certificate,Defense Evasion,no
-T1562.004,Disable or Modify System Firewall,Defense Evasion,Dragonfly|TeamTNT|APT38|APT29|Operation Wocao|Rocke|Lazarus Group|Kimsuky|Carbanak
+T1562.004,Disable or Modify System Firewall,Defense Evasion,Dragonfly|TeamTNT|APT38|APT29|Operation Wocao|Rocke|Lazarus Group|Kimsuky|Dragonfly 2.0|Carbanak
 T1562.003,Impair Command History Logging,Defense Evasion,APT38
 T1562.002,Disable Windows Event Logging,Defense Evasion,Sandworm Team|APT29|Threat Group-3390
 T1562.001,Disable or Modify Tools,Defense Evasion,Aquatic Panda|TeamTNT|Indrik Spider|APT29|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|FIN6|Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Rocke|Kimsuky|Turla|Night Dragon|Gorgon Group|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda
 T1562,Impair Defenses,Defense Evasion,no
-T1003.004,LSA Secrets,Credential Access,Dragonfly|OilRig|MuddyWater|menuPass|Leafminer|Ke3chang|APT33|Threat Group-3390
+T1003.004,LSA Secrets,Credential Access,Dragonfly|OilRig|MuddyWater|menuPass|Leafminer|Ke3chang|Dragonfly 2.0|APT33|Threat Group-3390
 T1003.005,Cached Domain Credentials,Credential Access,OilRig|MuddyWater|Leafminer|APT33
 T1561.002,Disk Structure Wipe,Impact,Sandworm Team|Lazarus Group|APT38|APT37
 T1561.001,Disk Content Wipe,Impact,Lazarus Group
 T1561,Disk Wipe,Impact,no
 T1560.003,Archive via Custom Method,Collection,Mustang Panda|Lazarus Group|Kimsuky|CopyKittens|FIN6
 T1560.002,Archive via Library,Collection,Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390
-T1560.001,Archive via Utility,Collection,Kimsuky|Aquatic Panda|APT28|APT29|Mustang Panda|HAFNIUM|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Chimera|APT41|GALLIUM|Turla|Gallmaker|APT33|APT39|MuddyWater|Magic Hound|FIN8|Sowbug|CopyKittens|APT3|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|APT1|Ke3chang
-T1560,Archive Collected Data,Collection,Axiom|Dragonfly|Leviathan|menuPass|APT32|APT28|Patchwork|Honeybee|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Ke3chang
+T1560.001,Archive via Utility,Collection,Kimsuky|Aquatic Panda|APT28|APT29|Mustang Panda|HAFNIUM|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Chimera|APT41|GALLIUM|Turla|Gallmaker|APT33|APT39|MuddyWater|Magic Hound|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|CopyKittens|Sowbug|APT3|menuPass|APT1|Ke3chang
+T1560,Archive Collected Data,Collection,Axiom|Dragonfly|Leviathan|menuPass|APT32|Honeybee|Patchwork|APT28|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Ke3chang
 T1499.004,Application or System Exploitation,Impact,no
 T1499.003,Application Exhaustion Flood,Impact,no
 T1499.002,Service Exhaustion Flood,Impact,no
@@ -283,7 +283,7 @@ T1499.001,OS Exhaustion Flood,Impact,no
 T1491.002,External Defacement,Impact,Sandworm Team
 T1491.001,Internal Defacement,Impact,Gamaredon Group|Lazarus Group
 T1114.003,Email Forwarding Rule,Collection,Silent Librarian|Kimsuky
-T1114.002,Remote Email Collection,Collection,Kimsuky|Dragonfly|APT29|HAFNIUM|Chimera|APT1|FIN4|Leafminer|Ke3chang|APT28
+T1114.002,Remote Email Collection,Collection,Kimsuky|Dragonfly|APT29|HAFNIUM|Chimera|APT1|FIN4|Ke3chang|Leafminer|Dragonfly 2.0|APT28
 T1114.001,Local Email Collection,Collection,Chimera|Magic Hound|APT1
 T1134.005,SID-History Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
 T1134.004,Parent PID Spoofing,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
@@ -295,7 +295,7 @@ T1213.001,Confluence,Collection,no
 T1555.003,Credentials from Web Browsers,Credential Access,APT29|Ajax Security Team|ZIRCONIUM|FIN6|Sandworm Team|Inception|Stealth Falcon|OilRig|Leafminer|APT33|APT3|Kimsuky|TA505|MuddyWater|APT37|Patchwork|Molerats
 T1555.002,Securityd Memory,Credential Access,no
 T1555.001,Keychain,Credential Access,no
-T1559.002,Dynamic Data Exchange,Execution,Leviathan|Sidewinder|Sharpshooter|TA505|MuddyWater|Gallmaker|Cobalt Group|Patchwork|APT37|FIN7|APT28
+T1559.002,Dynamic Data Exchange,Execution,Leviathan|Sidewinder|Sharpshooter|TA505|MuddyWater|Gallmaker|Patchwork|Cobalt Group|APT37|FIN7|APT28
 T1559.001,Component Object Model,Execution,Gamaredon Group|MuddyWater
 T1559,Inter-Process Communication,Execution,no
 T1558.002,Silver Ticket,Credential Access,no
@@ -309,7 +309,7 @@ T1556,Modify Authentication Process,Credential Access|Defense Evasion|Persistenc
 T1056.004,Credential API Hooking,Collection|Credential Access,PLATINUM
 T1056.003,Web Portal Capture,Collection|Credential Access,no
 T1056.002,GUI Input Capture,Collection|Credential Access,FIN4
-T1056.001,Keylogging,Collection|Credential Access,Tonto Team|Ajax Security Team|Operation Wocao|APT32|Sandworm Team|APT39|APT41|Kimsuky|menuPass|FIN4|APT38|Ke3chang|OilRig|PLATINUM|Sowbug|Magic Hound|Group5|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT3|Darkhotel|APT28
+T1056.001,Keylogging,Collection|Credential Access,Tonto Team|Ajax Security Team|Operation Wocao|APT32|Sandworm Team|APT39|APT41|Kimsuky|menuPass|FIN4|APT38|OilRig|Ke3chang|PLATINUM|Sowbug|Magic Hound|Group5|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT3|Darkhotel|APT28
 T1555,Credentials from Password Stores,Credential Access,APT29|Evilnum|FIN6|APT39|OilRig|MuddyWater|Leafminer|APT33|Stealth Falcon
 T1552.005,Cloud Instance Metadata API,Credential Access,TeamTNT
 T1003.008,/etc/passwd and /etc/shadow,Credential Access,no
@@ -317,19 +317,19 @@ T1003.007,Proc Filesystem,Credential Access,no
 T1003.006,DCSync,Credential Access,APT29|Operation Wocao
 T1558.003,Kerberoasting,Credential Access,FIN7|APT29|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider
 T1552.006,Group Policy Preferences,Credential Access,APT33
-T1003.003,NTDS,Credential Access,Ke3chang|Dragonfly|APT28|Mustang Panda|HAFNIUM|Fox Kitten|menuPass|Wizard Spider|Chimera|FIN6
-T1003.002,Security Account Manager,Credential Access,Dragonfly|Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390|Ke3chang|GALLIUM|Night Dragon|menuPass
-T1003.001,LSASS Memory,Credential Access,Aquatic Panda|Indrik Spider|HAFNIUM|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Blue Mockingbird|Silence|Threat Group-3390|Leviathan|APT41|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|APT32|Leafminer|Magic Hound|FIN8|MuddyWater|PLATINUM|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN6|APT3|APT28|APT1|Ke3chang|Cleaver
+T1003.003,NTDS,Credential Access,Ke3chang|Dragonfly|APT28|Mustang Panda|HAFNIUM|Fox Kitten|menuPass|Wizard Spider|Chimera|FIN6|Dragonfly 2.0
+T1003.002,Security Account Manager,Credential Access,Dragonfly|Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390|Ke3chang|GALLIUM|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|menuPass
+T1003.001,LSASS Memory,Credential Access,Aquatic Panda|Indrik Spider|HAFNIUM|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Blue Mockingbird|Silence|Threat Group-3390|Leviathan|APT41|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|APT32|Leafminer|Magic Hound|FIN8|PLATINUM|MuddyWater|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN6|APT3|APT28|APT1|Ke3chang|Cleaver
 T1110.004,Credential Stuffing,Credential Access,Chimera
 T1110.003,Password Spraying,Credential Access,Sandworm Team|APT29|Silent Librarian|Chimera|APT28|APT33|Leafminer|Lazarus Group
-T1110.002,Password Cracking,Credential Access,Dragonfly|FIN6|APT41|APT3
+T1110.002,Password Cracking,Credential Access,Dragonfly|FIN6|APT41|Dragonfly 2.0|APT3
 T1110.001,Password Guessing,Credential Access,APT28
 T1021.006,Windows Remote Management,Lateral Movement,APT29|Chimera|Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390
 T1021.005,VNC,Lateral Movement,Gamaredon Group|FIN7|Fox Kitten|GCMAN
 T1021.004,SSH,Lateral Movement,BlackTech|Lazarus Group|TeamTNT|FIN7|Fox Kitten|Rocke|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|OilRig|menuPass|GCMAN
 T1021.003,Distributed Component Object Model,Lateral Movement,no
 T1021.002,SMB/Windows Admin Shares,Lateral Movement,APT29|Sandworm Team|APT28|Fox Kitten|APT41|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|APT39|APT32|Orangeworm|FIN8|APT3|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-1314|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang
-T1021.001,Remote Desktop Protocol,Lateral Movement,APT29|Dragonfly|Kimsuky|FIN7|Fox Kitten|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Cobalt Group|FIN8|OilRig|APT3|menuPass|FIN10|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|APT1|Axiom
+T1021.001,Remote Desktop Protocol,Lateral Movement,APT29|Dragonfly|Kimsuky|FIN7|Fox Kitten|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|APT3|OilRig|FIN10|menuPass|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|APT1|Axiom
 T1554,Compromise Client Software Binary,Persistence,no
 T1036.006,Space after Filename,Defense Evasion,no
 T1036.005,Match Legitimate Name or Location,Defense Evasion,Ke3chang|Kimsuky|Gamaredon Group|WIRTE|APT28|Ferocious Kitten|FIN7|BackdoorDiplomacy|Transparent Tribe|Naikon|APT29|Mustang Panda|Sidewinder|Darkhotel|Lazarus Group|Indrik Spider|Fox Kitten|Machete|Chimera|PROMETHIUM|Rocke|Sandworm Team|APT39|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Silence|APT41|menuPass|TEMP.Veles|MuddyWater|Sowbug|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|Patchwork|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Carbanak|APT1
@@ -338,12 +338,12 @@ T1036.003,Rename System Utilities,Defense Evasion,Lazarus Group|menuPass|APT32|G
 T1036.002,Right-to-Left Override,Defense Evasion,Ferocious Kitten|BRONZE BUTLER|BlackTech|Ke3chang|Scarlet Mimic
 T1036.001,Invalid Code Signature,Defense Evasion,Windshift|APT37
 T1553.003,SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking,Defense Evasion,no
-T1553.002,Code Signing,Defense Evasion,Lazarus Group|menuPass|APT29|GALLIUM|Wizard Spider|Kimsuky|PROMETHIUM|Patchwork|Silence|APT41|FIN6|TA505|Honeybee|FIN7|Leviathan|CopyKittens|Winnti Group|Suckfly|Molerats|Darkhotel
+T1553.002,Code Signing,Defense Evasion,Lazarus Group|menuPass|APT29|GALLIUM|Wizard Spider|Kimsuky|PROMETHIUM|Patchwork|Silence|APT41|FIN6|TA505|FIN7|Honeybee|Leviathan|CopyKittens|Winnti Group|Suckfly|Molerats|Darkhotel
 T1553.001,Gatekeeper Bypass,Defense Evasion,no
 T1553,Subvert Trust Controls,Defense Evasion,Axiom
 T1027.003,Steganography,Defense Evasion,Andariel|Leviathan|TA551|BRONZE BUTLER|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|APT37
 T1027.002,Software Packing,Defense Evasion,Threat Group-3390|Lazarus Group|Sandworm Team|Kimsuky|TeamTNT|ZIRCONIUM|TA505|Rocke|GALLIUM|The White Company|APT39|APT38|Dark Caracal|Elderwood|APT3|Patchwork|APT29|Night Dragon
-T1027.001,Binary Padding,Defense Evasion,APT29|Mustang Panda|Higaisa|Gamaredon Group|APT32|Patchwork|Leviathan|BRONZE BUTLER|Moafee
+T1027.001,Binary Padding,Defense Evasion,APT29|Mustang Panda|Higaisa|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|APT32|Leviathan|BRONZE BUTLER|Moafee
 T1222.002,Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification,Defense Evasion,TeamTNT|Rocke|APT32
 T1222.001,Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification,Defense Evasion,Wizard Spider
 T1552.004,Private Keys,Credential Access,TeamTNT|APT29|Operation Wocao|Rocke
@@ -354,7 +354,7 @@ T1552,Unsecured Credentials,Credential Access,no
 T1216.001,PubPrn,Defense Evasion,APT32
 T1070.006,Timestomp,Defense Evasion,APT38|APT29|Chimera|Kimsuky|Rocke|TEMP.Veles|APT32|Lazarus Group|APT28
 T1070.005,Network Share Connection Removal,Defense Evasion,Threat Group-3390
-T1070.004,File Deletion,Defense Evasion,Aquatic Panda|Dragonfly|TeamTNT|APT39|Mustang Panda|Chimera|Evilnum|Operation Wocao|FIN6|Sandworm Team|Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Wizard Spider|APT41|Kimsuky|Silence|The White Company|TEMP.Veles|APT32|APT38|Patchwork|Honeybee|menuPass|Cobalt Group|FIN8|Magic Hound|FIN5|BRONZE BUTLER|APT3|OilRig|APT28|Threat Group-3390|FIN10|Group5|Lazarus Group|APT18|APT29
+T1070.004,File Deletion,Defense Evasion,Aquatic Panda|Dragonfly|TeamTNT|APT39|Mustang Panda|Chimera|Evilnum|Operation Wocao|FIN6|Sandworm Team|Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Wizard Spider|APT41|Kimsuky|Silence|The White Company|TEMP.Veles|APT32|APT38|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Honeybee|Patchwork|menuPass|FIN8|OilRig|FIN5|BRONZE BUTLER|APT3|Magic Hound|Threat Group-3390|APT28|FIN10|Group5|Lazarus Group|APT18|APT29
 T1070.003,Clear Command History,Defense Evasion,Lazarus Group|TeamTNT|menuPass|APT41
 T1550.004,Web Session Cookie,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,APT29
 T1550.001,Application Access Token,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,APT29|APT28
@@ -363,16 +363,17 @@ T1550.002,Pass the Hash,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,Chimera|Kimsuky|GALLIUM
 T1550,Use Alternate Authentication Material,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,APT29
 T1548.004,Elevated Execution with Prompt,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
 T1548.003,Sudo and Sudo Caching,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
-T1548.002,Bypass User Account Control,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,Evilnum|APT37|MuddyWater|Threat Group-3390|Cobalt Group|Honeybee|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork|APT29
+T1548.002,Bypass User Account Control,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,Evilnum|APT37|MuddyWater|Threat Group-3390|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork|APT29
 T1548.001,Setuid and Setgid,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
 T1548,Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
 T1136.003,Cloud Account,Persistence,APT29
 T1070.002,Clear Linux or Mac System Logs,Defense Evasion,TeamTNT|Rocke
-T1070.001,Clear Windows Event Logs,Defense Evasion,Dragonfly|Indrik Spider|Chimera|Operation Wocao|APT41|APT38|APT32|FIN8|FIN5|APT28
+T1070.001,Clear Windows Event Logs,Defense Evasion,Dragonfly|Indrik Spider|Chimera|Operation Wocao|APT41|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|APT32|FIN8|FIN5|APT28
 T1136.002,Domain Account,Persistence,Sandworm Team|HAFNIUM|GALLIUM
-T1136.001,Local Account,Persistence,Kimsuky|Dragonfly|TeamTNT|Fox Kitten|APT39|APT41|Leafminer|APT3
+T1136.001,Local Account,Persistence,Kimsuky|Dragonfly|TeamTNT|Fox Kitten|APT39|APT41|Leafminer|Dragonfly 2.0|APT3
+T1547.011,Plist Modification,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
 T1547.010,Port Monitors,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
-T1547.009,Shortcut Modification,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Dragonfly|APT39|Darkhotel|APT29|Gorgon Group|Lazarus Group|Leviathan
+T1547.009,Shortcut Modification,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Dragonfly|APT39|Darkhotel|APT29|Gorgon Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Lazarus Group|Leviathan
 T1547.008,LSASS Driver,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
 T1547.007,Re-opened Applications,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
 T1547.006,Kernel Modules and Extensions,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
@@ -396,27 +397,27 @@ T1546.004,Unix Shell Configuration Modification,Privilege Escalation|Persistence
 T1546.003,Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,FIN8|Mustang Panda|APT33|Blue Mockingbird|Turla|Leviathan|APT29
 T1546.002,Screensaver,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
 T1546.001,Change Default File Association,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,Kimsuky
-T1547.001,Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Confucius|Dragonfly|LazyScripter|TeamTNT|Naikon|Windshift|Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Sidewinder|APT28|Wizard Spider|PROMETHIUM|Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Silence|RTM|Inception|APT41|Kimsuky|APT33|APT39|APT32|APT18|Dark Caracal|Gorgon Group|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|Threat Group-3390|Turla|Ke3chang|APT19|MuddyWater|APT37|Leviathan|Magic Hound|APT3|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN7|FIN10|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT29|Darkhotel
+T1547.001,Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Confucius|Dragonfly|LazyScripter|TeamTNT|Naikon|Windshift|Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Sidewinder|APT28|Wizard Spider|PROMETHIUM|Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Silence|RTM|Inception|APT41|Kimsuky|APT33|APT39|APT32|APT18|Dark Caracal|Threat Group-3390|Honeybee|Turla|Cobalt Group|Ke3chang|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|Gorgon Group|MuddyWater|APT37|Leviathan|BRONZE BUTLER|APT3|Magic Hound|FIN10|FIN7|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT29|Darkhotel
 T1218.002,Control Panel,Defense Evasion,no
 T1218.010,Regsvr32,Defense Evasion,Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|TA551|Blue Mockingbird|Inception|WIRTE|Cobalt Group|APT19|Leviathan|APT32|Deep Panda
 T1218.009,Regsvcs/Regasm,Defense Evasion,no
 T1218.005,Mshta,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|Confucius|Lazarus Group|APT29|LazyScripter|Mustang Panda|TA551|Sidewinder|Inception|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|FIN7
 T1218.004,InstallUtil,Defense Evasion,Mustang Panda|menuPass
-T1218.001,Compiled HTML File,Defense Evasion,APT38|APT41|Silence|OilRig|Dark Caracal
+T1218.001,Compiled HTML File,Defense Evasion,APT38|APT41|Silence|Dark Caracal|OilRig|Lazarus Group
 T1218.003,CMSTP,Defense Evasion,Cobalt Group|MuddyWater
 T1218.011,Rundll32,Defense Evasion,Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|LazyScripter|APT38|HAFNIUM|TA551|APT41|Gamaredon Group|APT32|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|TA505|MuddyWater|APT29|APT19|CopyKittens|APT3|Carbanak|APT28
 T1547,Boot or Logon Autostart Execution,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
 T1546,Event Triggered Execution,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
-T1098.003,Additional Cloud Roles,Persistence,APT29
-T1098.002,Additional Email Delegate Permissions,Persistence,APT28|APT29|Magic Hound
+T1098.003,Add Office 365 Global Administrator Role,Persistence,APT29
+T1098.002,Exchange Email Delegate Permissions,Persistence,APT28|APT29|Magic Hound
 T1098.001,Additional Cloud Credentials,Persistence,APT29
 T1543.004,Launch Daemon,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
-T1543.003,Windows Service,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,TeamTNT|APT38|PROMETHIUM|Blue Mockingbird|DarkVishnya|Wizard Spider|APT32|APT41|Kimsuky|Tropic Trooper|Threat Group-3390|Ke3chang|Cobalt Group|Honeybee|APT19|FIN7|APT3|Lazarus Group|Carbanak
+T1543.003,Windows Service,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,TeamTNT|APT38|PROMETHIUM|Blue Mockingbird|DarkVishnya|Wizard Spider|APT32|APT41|Kimsuky|Tropic Trooper|Cobalt Group|Ke3chang|FIN7|APT19|Threat Group-3390|Honeybee|APT3|Lazarus Group|Carbanak
 T1543.002,Systemd Service,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,TeamTNT|Rocke
 T1543.001,Launch Agent,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
 T1037.005,Startup Items,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
 T1037.004,RC Scripts,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
-T1055.012,Process Hollowing,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Kimsuky|Threat Group-3390|Gorgon Group|menuPass|Patchwork
+T1055.012,Process Hollowing,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Kimsuky|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Gorgon Group|Patchwork
 T1055.013,Process Doppelgänging,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Leafminer
 T1055.011,Extra Window Memory Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
 T1055.014,VDSO Hijacking,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
@@ -429,17 +430,18 @@ T1055.002,Portable Executable Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Roc
 T1055.001,Dynamic-link Library Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,BackdoorDiplomacy|Leviathan|Wizard Spider|TA505|Turla|Tropic Trooper|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda
 T1037.003,Network Logon Script,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
 T1543,Create or Modify System Process,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
-T1037.002,Login Hook,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
+T1037.002,Logon Script (Mac),Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
 T1037.001,Logon Script (Windows),Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Cobalt Group|APT28
 T1542.003,Bootkit,Persistence|Defense Evasion,APT41|Lazarus Group|APT28
 T1542.002,Component Firmware,Persistence|Defense Evasion,Equation
 T1542.001,System Firmware,Persistence|Defense Evasion,no
-T1505.003,Web Shell,Persistence,Dragonfly|BackdoorDiplomacy|APT38|APT29|APT28|Tonto Team|Sandworm Team|HAFNIUM|Volatile Cedar|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|Tropic Trooper|GALLIUM|Threat Group-3390|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|OilRig|APT32|Deep Panda
+T1505.003,Web Shell,Persistence,Dragonfly|BackdoorDiplomacy|APT38|APT29|APT28|Tonto Team|Sandworm Team|HAFNIUM|Volatile Cedar|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|Tropic Trooper|GALLIUM|Threat Group-3390|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|APT32|OilRig|Deep Panda
 T1505.002,Transport Agent,Persistence,no
 T1505.001,SQL Stored Procedures,Persistence,Sandworm Team
 T1053.003,Cron,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,APT38|Rocke
-T1053.005,Scheduled Task,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|Confucius|Dragonfly|APT37|APT38|Naikon|CostaRicto|Mustang Panda|Higaisa|Fox Kitten|Molerats|Machete|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT-C-36|BRONZE BUTLER|APT41|GALLIUM|Silence|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|OilRig|Rancor|Cobalt Group|Patchwork|FIN8|FIN10|menuPass|APT32|FIN7|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|APT3|APT29
-T1053.002,At,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,BRONZE BUTLER|Threat Group-3390|APT18
+T1053.001,At (Linux),Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
+T1053.005,Scheduled Task,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|Confucius|Dragonfly|APT37|APT38|Naikon|CostaRicto|Mustang Panda|Higaisa|Fox Kitten|Molerats|Machete|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT-C-36|BRONZE BUTLER|APT41|GALLIUM|Silence|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|Rancor|OilRig|Patchwork|Dragonfly 2.0|Cobalt Group|FIN8|menuPass|FIN10|FIN7|APT32|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|APT3|APT29
+T1053.002,At (Windows),Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,BRONZE BUTLER|Threat Group-3390|APT18
 T1542,Pre-OS Boot,Defense Evasion|Persistence,no
 T1137.001,Office Template Macros,Persistence,MuddyWater
 T1137.004,Outlook Home Page,Persistence,OilRig
@@ -475,38 +477,38 @@ T1485,Data Destruction,Impact,Gamaredon Group|Sandworm Team|Lazarus Group|APT38
 T1484,Domain Policy Modification,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
 T1482,Domain Trust Discovery,Discovery,FIN8|APT29|Chimera
 T1480,Execution Guardrails,Defense Evasion,no
-T1221,Template Injection,Defense Evasion,Lazarus Group|Confucius|Dragonfly|Gamaredon Group|Frankenstein|Inception|APT28|Tropic Trooper|DarkHydrus
-T1220,XSL Script Processing,Defense Evasion,Lazarus Group|Higaisa|Cobalt Group
+T1221,Template Injection,Defense Evasion,Lazarus Group|Confucius|Dragonfly|Gamaredon Group|Frankenstein|Inception|APT28|Tropic Trooper|DarkHydrus|Dragonfly 2.0
 T1222,File and Directory Permissions Modification,Defense Evasion,no
-T1202,Indirect Command Execution,Defense Evasion,Lazarus Group
-T1195,Supply Chain Compromise,Initial Access,no
-T1219,Remote Access Software,Command And Control,TeamTNT|Mustang Panda|MuddyWater|Evilnum|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Sandworm Team|DarkVishnya|RTM|Kimsuky|Night Dragon|Cobalt Group|Thrip|Carbanak
-T1213,Data from Information Repositories,Collection,APT29|APT28|Fox Kitten|FIN6|Turla
-T1200,Hardware Additions,Initial Access,DarkVishnya
-T1216,System Script Proxy Execution,Defense Evasion,no
-T1190,Exploit Public-Facing Application,Initial Access,Threat Group-3390|Ke3chang|Kimsuky|Magic Hound|Dragonfly|BackdoorDiplomacy|menuPass|HAFNIUM|Volatile Cedar|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|APT28|APT29|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Blue Mockingbird|Rocke|APT39|BlackTech|APT41|GALLIUM|Night Dragon|Axiom
-T1201,Password Policy Discovery,Discovery,Chimera|Turla|OilRig
-T1218,System Binary Proxy Execution,Defense Evasion,Lazarus Group
-T1207,Rogue Domain Controller,Defense Evasion,no
-T1199,Trusted Relationship,Initial Access,Threat Group-3390|APT29|Sandworm Team|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|APT28|menuPass
-T1205,Traffic Signaling,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Command And Control,no
+T1220,XSL Script Processing,Defense Evasion,Lazarus Group|Higaisa|Cobalt Group
 T1217,Browser Bookmark Discovery,Discovery,APT38|Chimera|Fox Kitten
-T1204,User Execution,Execution,no
-T1210,Exploitation of Remote Services,Lateral Movement,Dragonfly|Tonto Team|FIN7|Fox Kitten|menuPass|Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390|APT28
-T1189,Drive-by Compromise,Initial Access,Magic Hound|APT28|Axiom|Transparent Tribe|Andariel|Leviathan|Machete|Windigo|Dragonfly|PROMETHIUM|Turla|Windshift|RTM|Darkhotel|APT38|BRONZE BUTLER|Dark Caracal|Leafminer|APT32|APT19|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|Patchwork|Elderwood|APT37|PLATINUM
-T1211,Exploitation for Defense Evasion,Defense Evasion,APT28
 T1212,Exploitation for Credential Access,Credential Access,no
-T1203,Exploitation for Client Execution,Execution,Axiom|Confucius|Dragonfly|Andariel|Transparent Tribe|APT3|Tonto Team|Mustang Panda|Darkhotel|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Sandworm Team|MuddyWater|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT41|admin@338|Threat Group-3390|APT12|The White Company|APT33|APT32|APT28|Tropic Trooper|Lazarus Group|Cobalt Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Elderwood|APT37|Leviathan|Patchwork|TA459|APT29
+T1189,Drive-by Compromise,Initial Access,Magic Hound|APT28|Axiom|Transparent Tribe|Andariel|Leviathan|Machete|Windigo|Dragonfly|PROMETHIUM|Turla|Windshift|RTM|Darkhotel|APT38|APT19|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|Dark Caracal|Dragonfly 2.0|Leafminer|Patchwork|APT37|Elderwood|PLATINUM
+T1211,Exploitation for Defense Evasion,Defense Evasion,APT28
 T1197,BITS Jobs,Defense Evasion|Persistence,APT39|Patchwork|APT41|Leviathan
+T1203,Exploitation for Client Execution,Execution,Axiom|Confucius|Dragonfly|Andariel|Transparent Tribe|APT3|Tonto Team|Mustang Panda|Darkhotel|Higaisa|HAFNIUM|Sidewinder|Sandworm Team|MuddyWater|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT41|admin@338|Threat Group-3390|APT12|The White Company|APT33|APT32|APT28|Tropic Trooper|BRONZE BUTLER|Cobalt Group|Lazarus Group|Patchwork|Elderwood|APT29|TA459|APT37|Leviathan
+T1201,Password Policy Discovery,Discovery,Chimera|Turla|OilRig
+T1195,Supply Chain Compromise,Initial Access,no
+T1199,Trusted Relationship,Initial Access,Threat Group-3390|APT29|Sandworm Team|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|APT28|menuPass
+T1218,Signed Binary Proxy Execution,Defense Evasion,Lazarus Group
+T1204,User Execution,Execution,no
+T1213,Data from Information Repositories,Collection,APT29|APT28|Fox Kitten|FIN6|Turla
+T1190,Exploit Public-Facing Application,Initial Access,Threat Group-3390|Ke3chang|Kimsuky|Magic Hound|Dragonfly|BackdoorDiplomacy|menuPass|Volatile Cedar|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|APT28|APT29|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Blue Mockingbird|Rocke|APT39|BlackTech|APT41|GALLIUM|Night Dragon|Axiom
+T1210,Exploitation of Remote Services,Lateral Movement,Dragonfly|Tonto Team|FIN7|Fox Kitten|menuPass|Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390|APT28
+T1200,Hardware Additions,Initial Access,DarkVishnya
+T1202,Indirect Command Execution,Defense Evasion,Lazarus Group
+T1219,Remote Access Software,Command And Control,TeamTNT|Mustang Panda|MuddyWater|Evilnum|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Sandworm Team|DarkVishnya|RTM|Kimsuky|Night Dragon|Cobalt Group|Thrip|Carbanak
+T1207,Rogue Domain Controller,Defense Evasion,no
+T1216,Signed Script Proxy Execution,Defense Evasion,no
+T1205,Traffic Signaling,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Command And Control,no
 T1176,Browser Extensions,Persistence,Kimsuky
+T1187,Forced Authentication,Credential Access,Dragonfly|DarkHydrus|Dragonfly 2.0
 T1185,Browser Session Hijacking,Collection,no
-T1187,Forced Authentication,Credential Access,Dragonfly|DarkHydrus
-T1140,Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information,Defense Evasion,Lazarus Group|Ke3chang|Kimsuky|APT39|APT29|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Molerats|Frankenstein|Turla|WIRTE|Darkhotel|Tropic Trooper|menuPass|Gorgon Group|Threat Group-3390|APT19|Honeybee|Leviathan|MuddyWater|APT28|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER
-T1137,Office Application Startup,Persistence,Gamaredon Group|APT32
+T1140,Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information,Defense Evasion,Lazarus Group|Ke3chang|Kimsuky|APT39|APT29|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Molerats|Frankenstein|Turla|WIRTE|Darkhotel|Tropic Trooper|Honeybee|Gorgon Group|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|APT19|Leviathan|MuddyWater|APT28|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER
 T1134,Access Token Manipulation,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,FIN6|Blue Mockingbird
 T1136,Create Account,Persistence,Sandworm Team|Indrik Spider
-T1135,Network Share Discovery,Discovery,Dragonfly|Tonto Team|APT38|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|APT32|APT39|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT1|Sowbug
-T1133,External Remote Services,Persistence|Initial Access,Dragonfly|TeamTNT|Leviathan|APT28|APT29|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Kimsuky|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Chimera|Sandworm Team|APT41|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|Night Dragon|Ke3chang|OilRig|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|APT18
+T1135,Network Share Discovery,Discovery,Dragonfly|Tonto Team|APT38|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|APT32|APT39|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT1|Dragonfly 2.0|Sowbug
+T1137,Office Application Startup,Persistence,Gamaredon Group|APT32
+T1133,External Remote Services,Persistence|Initial Access,Dragonfly|TeamTNT|Leviathan|APT28|APT29|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Kimsuky|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Chimera|Sandworm Team|APT41|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|Night Dragon|Ke3chang|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|APT18
 T1132,Data Encoding,Command And Control,no
 T1129,Shared Modules,Execution,no
 T1127,Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution,Defense Evasion,no
@@ -514,64 +516,64 @@ T1125,Video Capture,Collection,Silence|FIN7
 T1124,System Time Discovery,Discovery,Darkhotel|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Chimera|Operation Wocao|The White Company|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Turla
 T1123,Audio Capture,Collection,APT37
 T1120,Peripheral Device Discovery,Discovery,OilRig|BackdoorDiplomacy|Operation Wocao|Turla|APT37|Gamaredon Group|Equation|APT28
-T1119,Automated Collection,Collection,Ke3chang|Confucius|Mustang Panda|Sidewinder|Chimera|menuPass|Operation Wocao|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT1|Patchwork|APT28|FIN5|OilRig|Threat Group-3390|FIN6
+T1119,Automated Collection,Collection,Ke3chang|Confucius|Mustang Panda|Sidewinder|Chimera|menuPass|Operation Wocao|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT1|APT28|Patchwork|OilRig|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|FIN6
 T1115,Clipboard Data,Collection,Operation Wocao|APT39|APT38
 T1114,Email Collection,Collection,Magic Hound|Silent Librarian
-T1113,Screen Capture,Collection,Dragonfly|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Gamaredon Group|APT39|Silence|MuddyWater|FIN7|OilRig|Dark Caracal|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|Group5|APT28
-T1112,Modify Registry,Defense Evasion,Dragonfly|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|Turla|APT32|APT38|APT19|Threat Group-3390|Patchwork|Honeybee|Gorgon Group|FIN8
-T1111,Multi-Factor Authentication Interception,Credential Access,Kimsuky|Chimera|Operation Wocao
+T1113,Screen Capture,Collection,Dragonfly|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Gamaredon Group|APT39|Silence|MuddyWater|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|Dark Caracal|FIN7|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|Group5|APT28
+T1112,Modify Registry,Defense Evasion,Dragonfly|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|Turla|APT32|APT38|Patchwork|Gorgon Group|Threat Group-3390|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|Honeybee|FIN8
+T1111,Two-Factor Authentication Interception,Credential Access,Kimsuky|Chimera|Operation Wocao
 T1110,Brute Force,Credential Access,Lazarus Group|Dragonfly|APT38|APT28|Fox Kitten|DarkVishnya|APT39|OilRig|FIN5|Turla
 T1106,Native API,Execution,BlackTech|Lazarus Group|APT38|Higaisa|menuPass|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Turla|Silence|APT37|Gorgon Group
-T1105,Ingress Tool Transfer,Command And Control,LazyScripter|Ke3chang|Aquatic Panda|Winnti Group|Confucius|Dragonfly|TeamTNT|Nomadic Octopus|IndigoZebra|Andariel|BackdoorDiplomacy|Tonto Team|HAFNIUM|APT29|Ajax Security Team|Mustang Panda|Windshift|Darkhotel|ZIRCONIUM|TA551|Volatile Cedar|Indrik Spider|Evilnum|Sidewinder|Fox Kitten|Kimsuky|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Silence|APT-C-36|APT41|GALLIUM|TA505|WIRTE|APT33|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Gorgon Group|Turla|Cobalt Group|Rancor|OilRig|Leviathan|Elderwood|APT37|PLATINUM|FIN8|APT32|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|APT3|menuPass|FIN7|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28
+T1105,Ingress Tool Transfer,Command And Control,LazyScripter|Ke3chang|Aquatic Panda|Winnti Group|Confucius|Dragonfly|TeamTNT|Nomadic Octopus|IndigoZebra|Andariel|BackdoorDiplomacy|Tonto Team|HAFNIUM|APT29|Ajax Security Team|Mustang Panda|Windshift|Darkhotel|ZIRCONIUM|TA551|Volatile Cedar|Indrik Spider|Evilnum|Sidewinder|Fox Kitten|Kimsuky|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Silence|APT-C-36|APT41|GALLIUM|TA505|WIRTE|APT33|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Rancor|Gorgon Group|OilRig|Turla|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|PLATINUM|APT37|Elderwood|Leviathan|APT32|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|APT3|menuPass|FIN7|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28
 T1104,Multi-Stage Channels,Command And Control,Lazarus Group|APT41|MuddyWater|APT3
 T1102,Web Service,Command And Control,Mustang Panda|LazyScripter|TeamTNT|FIN8|Fox Kitten|Turla|APT32|Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Inception|FIN6
-T1098,Account Manipulation,Persistence,Kimsuky|Dragonfly|Sandworm Team|APT3|Lazarus Group
+T1098,Account Manipulation,Persistence,Kimsuky|Dragonfly|Sandworm Team|APT3|Dragonfly 2.0|Lazarus Group
 T1095,Non-Application Layer Protocol,Command And Control,BackdoorDiplomacy|HAFNIUM|Operation Wocao|FIN6|APT29|PLATINUM|APT3
 T1092,Communication Through Removable Media,Command And Control,APT28
 T1091,Replication Through Removable Media,Lateral Movement|Initial Access,FIN7|Mustang Panda|Tropic Trooper|Darkhotel|APT28
 T1090,Proxy,Command And Control,Windigo|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|APT41|Turla
 T1087,Account Discovery,Discovery,APT29
-T1083,File and Directory Discovery,Discovery,Winnti Group|Confucius|Dragonfly|APT38|APT29|Mustang Panda|Darkhotel|Windigo|Sidewinder|Chimera|Fox Kitten|menuPass|APT39|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Inception|APT41|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|APT18|Dark Caracal|Leafminer|Honeybee|BRONZE BUTLER|Sowbug|Magic Hound|APT3|APT28|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
-T1082,System Information Discovery,Discovery,Aquatic Panda|Confucius|TeamTNT|APT38|APT29|Mustang Panda|Windshift|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Windigo|Sidewinder|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|APT19|APT32|Honeybee|APT37|APT3|OilRig|Sowbug|Magic Hound|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
+T1083,File and Directory Discovery,Discovery,Winnti Group|Confucius|Dragonfly|APT38|APT29|Mustang Panda|Darkhotel|Windigo|Sidewinder|Chimera|Fox Kitten|menuPass|APT39|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Inception|APT41|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|APT18|Leafminer|Honeybee|Dark Caracal|Dragonfly 2.0|APT3|Sowbug|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|APT28|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
+T1082,System Information Discovery,Discovery,Aquatic Panda|Confucius|TeamTNT|APT38|APT29|Mustang Panda|Windshift|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Windigo|Sidewinder|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|APT32|APT37|Honeybee|APT19|Magic Hound|Sowbug|OilRig|APT3|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
 T1080,Taint Shared Content,Lateral Movement,Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Darkhotel
-T1078,Valid Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,Ke3chang|Lazarus Group|Axiom|Dragonfly|FIN7|Leviathan|APT29|Silent Librarian|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|APT39|FIN4|Night Dragon|FIN8|APT33|OilRig|FIN5|FIN10|APT28|menuPass|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390|APT18|PittyTiger|Carbanak
+T1078,Valid Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,Ke3chang|Lazarus Group|Axiom|Dragonfly|FIN7|Leviathan|APT29|Silent Librarian|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|APT39|FIN4|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|APT33|FIN5|OilRig|APT28|menuPass|FIN10|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390|APT18|PittyTiger|Carbanak
 T1074,Data Staged,Collection,Wizard Spider
 T1072,Software Deployment Tools,Execution|Lateral Movement,Silence|APT32|Threat Group-1314
-T1071,Application Layer Protocol,Command And Control,Dragonfly|TeamTNT|Rocke|Magic Hound
+T1071,Application Layer Protocol,Command And Control,Dragonfly|TeamTNT|Rocke|Magic Hound|Dragonfly 2.0
 T1070,Indicator Removal on Host,Defense Evasion,Lazarus Group|APT29
 T1069,Permission Groups Discovery,Discovery,APT29|TA505|APT3
-T1068,Exploitation for Privilege Escalation,Privilege Escalation,APT29|Tonto Team|ZIRCONIUM|Turla|Whitefly|APT33|Cobalt Group|PLATINUM|FIN8|Threat Group-3390|APT32|FIN6|APT28
-T1059,Command and Scripting Interpreter,Execution,Dragonfly|APT37|Windigo|Fox Kitten|APT32|Whitefly|APT39|APT19|FIN7|OilRig|FIN5|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Ke3chang
-T1057,Process Discovery,Discovery,Gamaredon Group|Kimsuky|TeamTNT|Andariel|APT29|Mustang Panda|Windshift|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Rocke|Frankenstein|Inception|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|APT38|Tropic Trooper|APT37|Honeybee|Magic Hound|APT3|OilRig|APT28|Winnti Group|Stealth Falcon|Poseidon Group|Lazarus Group|Molerats|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang
+T1068,Exploitation for Privilege Escalation,Privilege Escalation,APT29|Tonto Team|ZIRCONIUM|Turla|Whitefly|APT33|Cobalt Group|PLATINUM|FIN8|APT32|Threat Group-3390|FIN6|APT28
+T1059,Command and Scripting Interpreter,Execution,Dragonfly|APT37|Windigo|Fox Kitten|APT32|Whitefly|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN7|APT19|OilRig|FIN5|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Ke3chang
+T1057,Process Discovery,Discovery,Gamaredon Group|Kimsuky|TeamTNT|Andariel|APT29|Mustang Panda|Windshift|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Rocke|Frankenstein|Inception|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|APT38|Tropic Trooper|APT37|Honeybee|OilRig|APT3|Magic Hound|APT28|Winnti Group|Stealth Falcon|Poseidon Group|Lazarus Group|Molerats|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang
 T1056,Input Capture,Collection|Credential Access,APT39
-T1055,Process Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Operation Wocao|APT32|Sharpshooter|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|Cobalt Group|APT37|Turla|Honeybee|PLATINUM
+T1055,Process Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Operation Wocao|APT32|Sharpshooter|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|Cobalt Group|Turla|APT37|Honeybee|PLATINUM
 T1053,Scheduled Task/Job,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
 T1052,Exfiltration Over Physical Medium,Exfiltration,no
-T1049,System Network Connections Discovery,Discovery,Lazarus Group|TeamTNT|Andariel|BackdoorDiplomacy|Mustang Panda|MuddyWater|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Tropic Trooper|APT41|APT38|GALLIUM|APT32|APT1|OilRig|APT3|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
+T1049,System Network Connections Discovery,Discovery,Lazarus Group|TeamTNT|Andariel|BackdoorDiplomacy|Mustang Panda|MuddyWater|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Tropic Trooper|APT41|APT38|GALLIUM|APT32|APT1|OilRig|APT3|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
 T1048,Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol,Exfiltration,no
-T1047,Windows Management Instrumentation,Execution,Gamaredon Group|Sandworm Team|FIN7|Indrik Spider|Naikon|Mustang Panda|Windshift|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT41|FIN6|GALLIUM|APT32|MuddyWater|OilRig|Threat Group-3390|Leviathan|FIN8|menuPass|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT29|Deep Panda
-T1046,Network Service Discovery,Discovery,BlackTech|Lazarus Group|TeamTNT|BackdoorDiplomacy|Naikon|CostaRicto|Chimera|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Rocke|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT39|APT32|Leafminer|Cobalt Group|OilRig|menuPass|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390
+T1047,Windows Management Instrumentation,Execution,Gamaredon Group|Sandworm Team|FIN7|Indrik Spider|Naikon|Mustang Panda|Windshift|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT41|FIN6|GALLIUM|APT32|MuddyWater|Threat Group-3390|OilRig|FIN8|Leviathan|menuPass|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT29|Deep Panda
+T1046,Network Service Scanning,Discovery,BlackTech|Lazarus Group|TeamTNT|BackdoorDiplomacy|Naikon|CostaRicto|Chimera|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Rocke|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT39|APT32|OilRig|Cobalt Group|Leafminer|menuPass|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390
 T1041,Exfiltration Over C2 Channel,Exfiltration,Confucius|Leviathan|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Chimera|APT39|Operation Wocao|Sandworm Team|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Kimsuky|GALLIUM|APT32|APT3|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Ke3chang
 T1040,Network Sniffing,Credential Access|Discovery,Kimsuky|Sandworm Team|DarkVishnya|APT33|APT28
 T1039,Data from Network Shared Drive,Collection,APT28|Chimera|Fox Kitten|Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Sowbug|menuPass
 T1037,Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Rocke
-T1036,Masquerading,Defense Evasion,Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|Dragonfly|LazyScripter|APT28|Nomadic Octopus|OilRig|APT29|ZIRCONIUM|TA551|Windshift|APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|PLATINUM
-T1033,System Owner/User Discovery,Discovery,Threat Group-3390|Ke3chang|Dragonfly|APT38|Windshift|ZIRCONIUM|Sidewinder|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT41|GALLIUM|Tropic Trooper|APT39|MuddyWater|APT32|APT37|APT19|OilRig|Magic Hound|FIN10|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3
+T1036,Masquerading,Defense Evasion,Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|Dragonfly|LazyScripter|APT28|Nomadic Octopus|OilRig|APT29|ZIRCONIUM|TA551|Windshift|APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|PLATINUM|Dragonfly 2.0
+T1033,System Owner/User Discovery,Discovery,Threat Group-3390|Ke3chang|Dragonfly|APT38|Windshift|ZIRCONIUM|Sidewinder|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT41|GALLIUM|Tropic Trooper|APT39|MuddyWater|APT37|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|APT32|Magic Hound|OilRig|FIN10|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3
 T1030,Data Transfer Size Limits,Exfiltration,APT28|Threat Group-3390
 T1029,Scheduled Transfer,Exfiltration,Higaisa
-T1027,Obfuscated Files or Information,Defense Evasion,Aquatic Panda|Ke3chang|LazyScripter|TeamTNT|BackdoorDiplomacy|Transparent Tribe|APT39|Mustang Panda|Windshift|TA551|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Fox Kitten|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|FIN6|Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|APT41|GALLIUM|Turla|TA505|Silence|APT33|Night Dragon|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|APT29|APT18|Tropic Trooper|APT37|Cobalt Group|Dark Caracal|menuPass|Leafminer|Honeybee|APT19|Threat Group-3390|Patchwork|Elderwood|MuddyWater|Leviathan|FIN7|BlackOasis|FIN8|OilRig|APT3|Magic Hound|APT32|Group5|Dust Storm|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT28
+T1027,Obfuscated Files or Information,Defense Evasion,Aquatic Panda|Ke3chang|LazyScripter|TeamTNT|BackdoorDiplomacy|Transparent Tribe|APT39|Mustang Panda|Windshift|TA551|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Fox Kitten|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|FIN6|Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|APT41|GALLIUM|Turla|TA505|Silence|APT33|Night Dragon|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|APT29|APT18|Tropic Trooper|Patchwork|menuPass|APT37|Threat Group-3390|Cobalt Group|Dark Caracal|Leafminer|Honeybee|APT19|BlackOasis|Leviathan|FIN8|MuddyWater|FIN7|Elderwood|OilRig|Magic Hound|APT3|APT32|Group5|Dust Storm|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT28
 T1025,Data from Removable Media,Collection,Turla|Gamaredon Group|APT28
 T1021,Remote Services,Lateral Movement,no
 T1020,Automated Exfiltration,Exfiltration,Ke3chang|Sidewinder|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Honeybee
-T1018,Remote System Discovery,Discovery,Dragonfly|Indrik Spider|Naikon|APT29|Chimera|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Sandworm Team|Rocke|Wizard Spider|Silence|GALLIUM|APT39|APT32|Leafminer|Ke3chang|Threat Group-3390|Deep Panda|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN5|APT3|menuPass|FIN6|Turla
-T1016,System Network Configuration Discovery,Discovery,Kimsuky|Dragonfly|TeamTNT|ZIRCONIUM|Mustang Panda|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Sandworm Team|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT41|GALLIUM|APT32|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|APT19|Magic Hound|OilRig|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3|Naikon|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
+T1018,Remote System Discovery,Discovery,Dragonfly|Indrik Spider|Naikon|APT29|Chimera|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Sandworm Team|Rocke|Wizard Spider|Silence|GALLIUM|APT39|APT32|Deep Panda|Ke3chang|Threat Group-3390|Dragonfly 2.0|Leafminer|FIN8|FIN5|APT3|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN6|Turla
+T1016,System Network Configuration Discovery,Discovery,Kimsuky|Dragonfly|TeamTNT|ZIRCONIUM|Mustang Panda|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Sandworm Team|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT41|GALLIUM|APT32|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|Magic Hound|OilRig|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3|Naikon|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
 T1014,Rootkit,Defense Evasion,TeamTNT|Rocke|APT41|APT28|Winnti Group
-T1012,Query Registry,Discovery,Kimsuky|Dragonfly|ZIRCONIUM|Chimera|Fox Kitten|APT39|Operation Wocao|APT32|Threat Group-3390|OilRig|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Turla
+T1012,Query Registry,Discovery,Kimsuky|Dragonfly|ZIRCONIUM|Chimera|Fox Kitten|APT39|Operation Wocao|APT32|Dragonfly 2.0|Threat Group-3390|OilRig|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Turla
 T1011,Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium,Exfiltration,no
 T1010,Application Window Discovery,Discovery,Lazarus Group
 T1008,Fallback Channels,Command And Control,FIN7|APT41|OilRig|Lazarus Group
 T1007,System Service Discovery,Discovery,Kimsuky|Aquatic Panda|Indrik Spider|Chimera|Operation Wocao|BRONZE BUTLER|APT1|OilRig|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
 T1006,Direct Volume Access,Defense Evasion,no
-T1005,Data from Local System,Collection,Axiom|Dragonfly|FIN7|APT41|APT38|Andariel|APT29|Windigo|Fox Kitten|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|FIN6|Gamaredon Group|APT39|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|GALLIUM|Turla|menuPass|Honeybee|Dark Caracal|APT37|APT28|BRONZE BUTLER|APT3|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|Threat Group-3390|APT1|Ke3chang
+T1005,Data from Local System,Collection,Axiom|Dragonfly|FIN7|APT41|APT38|Andariel|APT29|Windigo|Fox Kitten|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|FIN6|Gamaredon Group|APT39|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|GALLIUM|Turla|menuPass|Dark Caracal|Dragonfly 2.0|Honeybee|APT37|APT28|APT3|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|Threat Group-3390|APT1|Ke3chang
 T1003,OS Credential Dumping,Credential Access,Tonto Team|APT39|Frankenstein|APT32|APT28|Leviathan|Sowbug|Suckfly|Poseidon Group|Axiom
-T1001,Data Obfuscation,Command And Control,Operation Wocao
+T1001,Data Obfuscation,Command And Control,Operation Wocao|Axiom
@@ -1,80 +0,0 @@
-name: Potential Pass the Token or Hash Observed at the Destination Device
-id: 82e76b80-5cdb-4899-9b43-85dbe777b36d
-version: 3
-description: This detection identifies potential Pass the Token or Pass the Hash credential
-  stealing. We detect the main side effect of these attacks, which is a transition
-  from the dominant Kerberos logins to rare NTLM logins for a given user, as reported
-  by a detination device.
-search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | where "Authentication" IN(_datamodels)
-  | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
-  dest_user=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_primary_artifact"), "string",
-  null)), dest_user_id=   ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null),
-  dest_device_id=       ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null),
-  signature_id=   lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "signature_id"), "string", null)),
-  authentication_method=  lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "authentication_method"),
-  "string", null)), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, "event_id"), "string", null)
-
-  | where signature_id = "4624" AND (authentication_method="ntlmssp" OR authentication_method="kerberos")
-  AND dest_user_id != null AND dest_device_id != null
-
-  | eval isKerberos=if(authentication_method == "kerberos", 1, 0), isNtlm=if(authentication_method
-  == "ntlmssp", 1, 0), timeNTLM=if(isNtlm > 0, timestamp, null)
-
-  | stats sum(isKerberos) as totalKerberos, sum(isNtlm)     as totalNtlm, min(timestamp)  as
-  startTime, min(timeNTLM)   as startNTLMTime, max(timestamp)  as endTime, max(timeNTLM)   as
-  endNTLMTime by dest_user_id, dest_user, dest_device_id, span(timestamp, 86400s)
-
-  | where NOT dest_user="-" AND totalKerberos > 0 AND totalNtlm > 0 AND endTime -
-  startTime > 1800000 AND (totalKerberos > 10 * totalNtlm AND totalKerberos > 50)  AND
-  (endTime - startTime) > 3 * (endNTLMTime - startNTLMTime)
-
-  | eval start_time=ucast(startNTLMTime, "long", null), end_time=ucast(endNTLMTime,
-  "long", null), entities=mvappend(dest_user_id, dest_device_id), body=create_map(["event_id",
-  event_id, "total_kerberos", totalKerberos, "total_ntlm", totalNtlm, "analysis_start_time",
-  startTime, "analysis_end_time", endTime, "pth_start_time", startNTLMTime, "pth_end_time",
-  endNTLMTime])
-
-  | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from endpoint devices,
-  i.e., destinations of interest. Please make sure that event ID 4624 is being logged.
-known_false_positives: Environments in which NTLM is used extremely rarely and for
-  benign purposes (such as a rare use of SMB shares).
-references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/002/
- https://www.offensive-security.com/metasploit-unleashed/psexec-pass-hash/
-tags:
-  analytic_story:
-  - Active Directory Lateral Movement
-  cis20:
-  - CIS 16
-  - CIS 20
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Exploitation
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1550
-  - T1550.002
-  nist:
-  - PR.PT
-  - PR.AT
-  - PR.AC
-  - PR.IP
-  required_fields:
-  - _time
-  - signature_id
-  - dest_user
-  - dest_user_id
-  - dest_device_id
-  - authentication_method
-  risk_score: 72
-  security_domain: endpoint
-  risk_severity: medium
-test:
-  name: Potential Pass the Token or Hash Observed at the Destination Device Unit Test
-  tests:
-  - name: Potential Pass the Token or Hash Observed at the Destination Device
-    file: endpoint/ssa___potential_pass_the_token_or_hash_observed_at_the_destination_device.yml
-    pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)'
-    attack_data:
-    - file_name: ptt_pth_kerb_ntlm_anon_dest_dataset.log
-      data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1550.002/extracts_from_real_data/ptt_pth_kerb_ntlm_anon_dest_dataset.log
-      source: WinEventLog:Security
@@ -1,82 +0,0 @@
-name: Potential Pass the Token or Hash Observed by an Event Collecting Device
-id: 1058ba3e-a698-49bc-a1e5-7cedece4ea87
-version: 2
-description: This detection identifies potential Pass the Token or Pass the Hash credential
-  stealing. We detect the main side effect of these attacks, which is a transition
-  from the dominant Kerberos logins to rare NTLM logins for a given user, as reported
-  by an event-collecting device (i.e., a specific domain controller or an endpoint
-  destination).
-search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | where "Authentication" IN(_datamodels)
-
-  | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)),
-  dest_user=      lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_primary_artifact"),
-  "string", null)), dest_user_id=   ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string",
-  null), origin_device_id=       ucast(map_get(input_event, "origin_device_id"), "string",
-  null), signature_id=   lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "signature_id"), "string",
-  null)), authentication_method=  lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "authentication_method"),
-  "string", null)), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, "event_id"), "string", null)
-  | where signature_id = "4624" AND (authentication_method="ntlmssp" OR authentication_method="kerberos")
-  AND dest_user_id != null AND origin_device_id != null
-
-  | eval isKerberos=if(authentication_method == "kerberos", 1, 0), isNtlm=if(authentication_method
-  == "ntlmssp", 1, 0), timeNTLM=if(isNtlm > 0, timestamp, null)
-
-  | stats sum(isKerberos) as totalKerberos, sum(isNtlm)     as totalNtlm, min(timestamp)  as
-  startTime, min(timeNTLM)   as startNTLMTime, max(timestamp)  as endTime, max(timeNTLM)   as
-  endNTLMTime by dest_user_id, dest_user, origin_device_id, span(timestamp, 86400s)
-
-  | where NOT dest_user="-" AND totalKerberos > 0 AND totalNtlm > 0 AND endTime -
-  startTime > 1800000 AND (totalKerberos > 10 * totalNtlm AND totalKerberos > 50)  AND
-  (endTime - startTime) > 3 * (endNTLMTime - startNTLMTime)
-
-  | eval start_time=startNTLMTime, end_time=endNTLMTime, entities=mvappend(dest_user_id,
-  origin_device_id), body=create_map(["event_id", event_id, "total_kerberos", totalKerberos,
-  "total_ntlm", totalNtlm, "analysis_start_time", startTime, "analysis_end_time",
-  endTime, "detection_start_time", startNTLMTime, "detection_end_time", endNTLMTime])
-
-  | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows Security logs from devices of interest
-  - at least from domain controllers. Please make sure that event ID 4624 is being
-  logged.
-known_false_positives: Environments in which NTLM is used extremely rarely and for
-  benign purposes (such as a rare use of SMB shares).
-references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/002/
- https://www.offensive-security.com/metasploit-unleashed/psexec-pass-hash/
-tags:
-  analytic_story:
-  - Active Directory Lateral Movement
-  cis20:
-  - CIS 16
-  - CIS 20
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Exploitation
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1550
-  - T1550.002
-  nist:
-  - PR.PT
-  - PR.AT
-  - PR.AC
-  - PR.IP
-  required_fields:
-  - _time
-  - signature_id
-  - dest_user
-  - dest_user_id
-  - origin_device_id
-  - authentication_method
-  risk_score: 64
-  security_domain: endpoint
-  risk_severity: medium
-test:
-  name: Potential Pass the Token or Hash Observed by an Event Collecting Device Unit
-    Test
-  tests:
-  - name: Potential Pass the Token or Hash Observed by an Event Collecting Device
-    file: endpoint/ssa___ptt_pth_kerb_ntlm_origin_device.yml
-    pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)'
-    attack_data:
-    - file_name: ptt_pth_kerb_ntlm_anon_DC_dataset.log
-      data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1550.002/extracts_from_real_data/ptt_pth_kerb_ntlm_anon_DC_dataset.log
-      source: WinEventLog:Security
@@ -1,78 +0,0 @@
-name: Unusual LOLBAS in short period of time
-id: 59c0dd70-169c-4900-9a1f-bfcf13302f93
-version: 2
-description: Attacker activity may compromise executing several LOLBAS applications
-  in conjunction to accomplish their objectives. We are looking for more than usual
-  LOLBAS applications over a window of time, by building profiles per machine.
-search: ' | from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval device=ucast(map_get(input_event,
-  "dest_device_id"), "string", null), process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event,
-  "process_name"), "string", null)), timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event,
-  "_time"), "string", null)) | where process_name=="regsvcs.exe" OR process_name=="ftp.exe"
-  OR process_name=="dfsvc.exe" OR process_name=="rasautou.exe" OR process_name=="schtasks.exe"
-  OR process_name=="xwizard.exe" OR process_name=="findstr.exe" OR process_name=="esentutl.exe"
-  OR process_name=="cscript.exe" OR process_name=="reg.exe" OR process_name=="csc.exe"
-  OR process_name=="atbroker.exe" OR process_name=="print.exe" OR process_name=="pcwrun.exe"
-  OR process_name=="vbc.exe" OR process_name=="rpcping.exe" OR process_name=="wsreset.exe"
-  OR process_name=="ilasm.exe" OR process_name=="certutil.exe" OR process_name=="replace.exe"
-  OR process_name=="mshta.exe" OR process_name=="bitsadmin.exe" OR process_name=="wscript.exe"
-  OR process_name=="ieexec.exe" OR process_name=="cmd.exe" OR process_name=="microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe"
-  OR process_name=="runscripthelper.exe" OR process_name=="makecab.exe" OR process_name=="forfiles.exe"
-  OR process_name=="desktopimgdownldr.exe" OR process_name=="control.exe" OR process_name=="msbuild.exe"
-  OR process_name=="register-cimprovider.exe" OR process_name=="tttracer.exe" OR process_name=="ie4uinit.exe"
-  OR process_name=="sc.exe" OR process_name=="bash.exe" OR process_name=="hh.exe"
-  OR process_name=="cmstp.exe" OR process_name=="mmc.exe" OR process_name=="jsc.exe"
-  OR process_name=="scriptrunner.exe" OR process_name=="odbcconf.exe" OR process_name=="extexport.exe"
-  OR process_name=="msdt.exe" OR process_name=="diskshadow.exe" OR process_name=="extrac32.exe"
-  OR process_name=="eventvwr.exe" OR process_name=="mavinject.exe" OR process_name=="regasm.exe"
-  OR process_name=="gpscript.exe" OR process_name=="rundll32.exe" OR process_name=="regsvr32.exe"
-  OR process_name=="regedit.exe" OR process_name=="msiexec.exe" OR process_name=="gfxdownloadwrapper.exe"
-  OR process_name=="presentationhost.exe" OR process_name=="regini.exe" OR process_name=="wmic.exe"
-  OR process_name=="runonce.exe" OR process_name=="syncappvpublishingserver.exe" OR
-  process_name=="verclsid.exe" OR process_name=="psr.exe" OR process_name=="infdefaultinstall.exe"
-  OR process_name=="explorer.exe" OR process_name=="expand.exe" OR process_name=="installutil.exe"
-  OR process_name=="netsh.exe" OR process_name=="wab.exe" OR process_name=="dnscmd.exe"
-  OR process_name=="at.exe" OR process_name=="pcalua.exe" OR process_name=="cmdkey.exe"
-  OR process_name=="msconfig.exe" | stats count(process_name) as lolbas_counter by
-  device,span(timestamp, 300s) | eval lolbas_counter=lolbas_counter*1.0 | rename window_end
-  as timestamp | adaptive_threshold algorithm="quantile" value="lolbas_counter" entity="device"
-  window=2419200000L | where label AND quantile>0.99 | eval start_time = window_start,
-  end_time = timestamp, entities = mvappend(device), body=create_map(["lolbas_counter",
-  lolbas_counter, "quantile", quantile, "device", device]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
-how_to_implement: Collect endpoint data such as sysmon or 4688 events.
-known_false_positives: 'Some administrative tasks may involve multiple use of LOLBAS
-  applications in a short period of time. This might trigger false positives at the
-  beginning when it hasn''t collected yet enough data to construct the baseline.
-
-  '
-references:
- https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/tree/master/yml/OSBinaries
-tags:
-  analytic_story:
-  - Unusual Processes
-  cis20:
-  - CIS 8
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Exploitation
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1059
-  - T1053
-  nist:
-  - PR.PT
-  - DE.CM
-  required_fields:
-  - dest_device_id
-  - _time
-  - process_name
-  risk_score: 25
-  security_domain: endpoint
-  risk_severity: low
-test:
-  name: Unusual LOLBAS in short period of time Unit Test
-  tests:
-  - name: Unusual LOLBAS in short period of time
-    file: endpoint/ssa___unusual_lolbas_in_short_period_of_time.yml
-    pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)'
-    attack_data:
-    - file_name: T1059.all.labeled.lolbas-test.json
-      data: https://ssa-test-dataset.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/T1059.all.labeled.lolbas-test.json
-      source: WinEventLog:Security
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ known_false_positives: False positives should be limited as this is restricted t
  the Rclone process name. Filter or tune the analytic as needed.
 references:
 - https://redcanary.com/blog/rclone-mega-extortion/
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html
+- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations
 - https://thedfirreport.com/2021/03/29/sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware/
 - https://thedfirreport.com/2021/11/29/continuing-the-bazar-ransomware-story/
 tags:
@@ -27,8 +27,8 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting
 known_false_positives: It is possible for some legitimate administrative utilities
  to use similar cmd_line parameters. Filter as needed.
 references:
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/fin7_spear_phishing.html
- https://www.varonis.com/blog/dns-tunneling/
+- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/fin7-spear-phishing-campaign-targets-personnel-involved-sec-filings
+- https://www.varonis.com/blog/dns-tunneling
 - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/
 tags:
  analytic_story:
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingestin
 known_false_positives: System administrators may resize the shadowstorage for valid
  purposes. Filter as needed.
 references:
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/10/fin11-email-campaigns-precursor-for-ransomware-data-theft.html
+- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/fin11-email-campaigns-precursor-for-ransomware-data-theft
 - https://blog.virustotal.com/2020/11/keep-your-friends-close-keep-ransomware.html
 tags:
  analytic_story:
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ known_false_positives: Limited false positives in most environments, however tun
 references:
 - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105/
 - https://www.avira.com/en/blog/certutil-abused-by-attackers-to-spread-threats
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/10/certutil-qualms-they-came-to-drop-fombs.html
+- https://web.archive.org/web/20210921110637/https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/10/certutil-qualms-they-came-to-drop-fombs.html
 tags:
  analytic_story:
  - Ingress Tool Transfer
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ known_false_positives: None known at this time.
 references:
 - https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2021/02/lazyscripter-from-empire-to-double-rat/
 - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1548.002/T1548.002.md
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002
+- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002/
 - https://enigma0x3.net/2016/08/15/fileless-uac-bypass-using-eventvwr-exe-and-registry-hijacking/
 tags:
  analytic_story:
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ references:
 - https://github.com/mandiant/DueDLLigence
 - https://github.com/MHaggis/notes/blob/master/utilities/Invoke-SPLDLLigence.ps1
 - https://gist.github.com/NickTyrer/c6043e4b302d5424f701f15baf136513
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/10/staying-hidden-on-the-endpoint-evading-detection-with-shellcode.html
+- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/staying-hidden-on-the-endpoint-evading-detection-with-shellcode
 tags:
  analytic_story:
  - Windows Defense Evasion Tactics
@@ -869,6 +869,11 @@ sidebar:
 | [Windows Kerberos Local Successful Logon](/endpoint/windows_kerberos_local_successful_logon/) | [Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets](/tags/#steal-or-forge-kerberos-tickets) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
 | [Windows KrbRelayUp Service Creation](/endpoint/windows_krbrelayup_service_creation/) | [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
 | [Windows Linked Policies In ADSI Discovery](/endpoint/windows_linked_policies_in_adsi_discovery/) | [Domain Account](/tags/#domain-account), [Account Discovery](/tags/#account-discovery) | [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
+| [Windows MSIExec DLLRegisterServer](/endpoint/windows_msiexec_dllregisterserver/) | [Msiexec](/tags/#msiexec) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
+| [Windows MSIExec Remote Download](/endpoint/windows_msiexec_remote_download/) | [Msiexec](/tags/#msiexec) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
+| [Windows MSIExec Spawn Discovery Command](/endpoint/windows_msiexec_spawn_discovery_command/) | [Msiexec](/tags/#msiexec) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
+| [Windows MSIExec Unregister DLLRegisterServer](/endpoint/windows_msiexec_unregister_dllregisterserver/) | [Msiexec](/tags/#msiexec) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
+| [Windows MSIExec With Network Connections](/endpoint/windows_msiexec_with_network_connections/) | [Msiexec](/tags/#msiexec) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
 | [Windows Modify Show Compress Color And Info Tip Registry](/endpoint/windows_modify_show_compress_color_and_info_tip_registry/) | [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
 | [Windows NirSoft AdvancedRun](/endpoint/windows_nirsoft_advancedrun/) | [Tool](/tags/#tool) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
 | [Windows NirSoft Utilities](/endpoint/windows_nirsoft_utilities/) | [Tool](/tags/#tool) | [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
@@ -876,6 +881,8 @@ sidebar:
 | [Windows Office Product Spawning MSDT](/endpoint/windows_office_product_spawning_msdt/) | [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
 | [Windows Possible Credential Dumping](/endpoint/windows_possible_credential_dumping/) | [LSASS Memory](/tags/#lsass-memory), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
 | [Windows PowerView Constrained Delegation Discovery](/endpoint/windows_powerview_constrained_delegation_discovery/) | [Remote System Discovery](/tags/#remote-system-discovery) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
+| [Windows PowerView Kerberos Service Ticket Request](/endpoint/windows_powerview_kerberos_service_ticket_request/) | [Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets](/tags/#steal-or-forge-kerberos-tickets), [Kerberoasting](/tags/#kerberoasting) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
+| [Windows PowerView SPN Discovery](/endpoint/windows_powerview_spn_discovery/) | [Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets](/tags/#steal-or-forge-kerberos-tickets), [Kerberoasting](/tags/#kerberoasting) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
 | [Windows PowerView Unconstrained Delegation Discovery](/endpoint/windows_powerview_unconstrained_delegation_discovery/) | [Remote System Discovery](/tags/#remote-system-discovery) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
 | [Windows Process With NamedPipe CommandLine](/endpoint/windows_process_with_namedpipe_commandline/) | [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection) | [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
 | [Windows Processes Killed By Industroyer2 Malware](/endpoint/windows_processes_killed_by_industroyer2_malware/) | [Service Stop](/tags/#service-stop) | [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
@@ -151,5 +151,6 @@ sidebar:
 | [Windows Privilege Escalation](windows_privilege_escalation) | [Malicious File](/tags/#malicious-file), [Active Setup](/tags/#active-setup), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution), [Change Default File Association](/tags/#change-default-file-association), [Event Triggered Execution](/tags/#event-triggered-execution), [Indicator Blocking](/tags/#indicator-blocking), [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](/tags/#trusted-developer-utilities-proxy-execution), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses), [Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets](/tags/#steal-or-forge-kerberos-tickets), [Kerberoasting](/tags/#kerberoasting), [Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts](/tags/#boot-or-logon-initialization-scripts), [Logon Script (Windows)](/tags/#logon-script-(windows)), [DLL Side-Loading](/tags/#dll-side-loading), [Hijack Execution Flow](/tags/#hijack-execution-flow), [Accessibility Features](/tags/#accessibility-features), [Image File Execution Options Injection](/tags/#image-file-execution-options-injection), [Access Token Manipulation](/tags/#access-token-manipulation), [Token Impersonation/Theft](/tags/#token-impersonation/theft), [Screensaver](/tags/#screensaver), [Time Providers](/tags/#time-providers), [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](/tags/#exploitation-for-privilege-escalation), [Print Processors](/tags/#print-processors) | [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access), [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) |
 | [Windows Registry Abuse](windows_registry_abuse) | [Remote Desktop Protocol](/tags/#remote-desktop-protocol), [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism), [Security Account Manager](/tags/#security-account-manager), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping), [Credentials in Registry](/tags/#credentials-in-registry), [Unsecured Credentials](/tags/#unsecured-credentials), [Change Default File Association](/tags/#change-default-file-association), [Event Triggered Execution](/tags/#event-triggered-execution), [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses), [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry), [Hidden Files and Directories](/tags/#hidden-files-and-directories), [Hide Artifacts](/tags/#hide-artifacts), [Bypass User Account Control](/tags/#bypass-user-account-control), [Inhibit System Recovery](/tags/#inhibit-system-recovery), [Indicator Blocking](/tags/#indicator-blocking), [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](/tags/#trusted-developer-utilities-proxy-execution), [Defacement](/tags/#defacement), [Port Monitors](/tags/#port-monitors), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution), [Application Shimming](/tags/#application-shimming), [Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder](/tags/#registry-run-keys-/-startup-folder), [Image File Execution Options Injection](/tags/#image-file-execution-options-injection), [Screensaver](/tags/#screensaver), [Time Providers](/tags/#time-providers), [Data Destruction](/tags/#data-destruction), [Install Root Certificate](/tags/#install-root-certificate), [Subvert Trust Controls](/tags/#subvert-trust-controls), [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task), [Services Registry Permissions Weakness](/tags/#services-registry-permissions-weakness) | [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access), [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Impact](/tags/#impact), [Lateral Movement](/tags/#lateral-movement), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) |
 | [Windows Service Abuse](windows_service_abuse) | [Services Registry Permissions Weakness](/tags/#services-registry-permissions-weakness), [Hijack Execution Flow](/tags/#hijack-execution-flow), [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process), [System Services](/tags/#system-services), [Service Execution](/tags/#service-execution) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) |
+| [Windows System Binary Proxy Execution MSIExec](windows_system_binary_proxy_execution_msiexec) | [Msiexec](/tags/#msiexec) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) |
 | [XMRig](xmrig) | [Match Legitimate Name or Location](/tags/#match-legitimate-name-or-location), [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping), [Active Scanning](/tags/#active-scanning), [Account Access Removal](/tags/#account-access-removal), [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses), [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer), [Account Discovery](/tags/#account-discovery), [Service Stop](/tags/#service-stop), [File and Directory Permissions Modification](/tags/#file-and-directory-permissions-modification), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job), [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process) | [Command And Control](/tags/#command-and-control), [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access), [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Discovery](/tags/#discovery), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Impact](/tags/#impact), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation), [Reconnaissance](/tags/#reconnaissance) |
 | [sAMAccountName Spoofing and Domain Controller Impersonation](samaccountname_spoofing_and_domain_controller_impersonation) | [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts), [Domain Accounts](/tags/#domain-accounts) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) |
@@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ The search is used to detect systems that are still vulnerable to the Spectre an

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -104,8 +104,8 @@ The search queries the authentication logs for assets that are categorized as ro

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ This search looks for Windows endpoints that have not generated an event indicat

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -103,8 +103,8 @@ Attackers often use spaces as a means to obfuscate an attachment's file extensio

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -104,8 +104,8 @@ This search looks for specific GET or HEAD requests to web servers that are indi

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -109,8 +109,8 @@ This search is used to detect malicious HTTP requests crafted to exploit jmx-con

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -96,8 +96,8 @@ This search looks for DNS requests for faux domains similar to the domains that
 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
 * [brand_abuse_dns](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/brand_abuse_dns.yml)
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -100,9 +100,9 @@ This search looks for Web requests to faux domains similar to the one that you w

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
-* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
 * [brand_abuse_web](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/brand_abuse_web.yml)
+* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -100,8 +100,8 @@ The search is used to detect hosts that generate Windows Event ID 4663 for succe

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **detect_usb_device_insertion_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -105,8 +105,8 @@ This search looks for emails claiming to be sent from a domain similar to one th

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **monitor_email_for_brand_abuse_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -110,8 +110,8 @@ This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where an instance is started in a pa

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ This search looks for EC2 instances being created with previously unseen AMIs.

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_ami_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -117,8 +117,8 @@ This search detects new API calls that have either never been seen before or tha

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -101,8 +101,8 @@ This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user logged into the AWS acc

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -110,8 +110,8 @@ This search looks for outbound ICMP packets with a packet size larger than 1,000

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -118,8 +118,8 @@ This search looks at S3 bucket-access logs and detects new or previously unseen

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [aws_s3_accesslogs](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/aws_s3_accesslogs.yml)
 * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
+* [aws_s3_accesslogs](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/aws_s3_accesslogs.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -104,8 +104,8 @@ The search looks for modifications to the hosts file on all Windows endpoints ac

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **windows_hosts_file_modification_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -110,9 +110,9 @@ The following analytic identifies usage of `wmic.exe` spawning a local or remote

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
-* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
 * [process_wmic](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_wmic.yml)
+* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **remote_wmi_command_attempt_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -113,8 +113,8 @@ The fsutil.exe application is a legitimate Windows utility used to perform tasks

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **usn_journal_deletion_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ This search looks for suspicious Java classes that are often used to exploit rem

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [stream_http](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/stream_http.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **suspicious_java_classes_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -101,8 +101,8 @@ The search looks for file writes with extensions consistent with a SamSam ransom

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **file_with_samsam_extension_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ The search looks for a file named "test.txt" written to the windows system direc

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **samsam_test_file_write_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -112,8 +112,8 @@ This search looks for PowerShell requesting privileges consistent with credentia

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [wineventlog_security](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_security.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ The search looks for command-line arguments used to hide a file or directory usi

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ This search looks for suspicious processes on all systems labeled as web servers

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -99,9 +99,9 @@ The search looks for files created with names that have been linked to malicious

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
-* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
 * [suspicious_writes](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/suspicious_writes.yml)
+* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **suspicious_file_write_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ Command lines that are extremely long may be indicative of malicious activity on

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **unusually_long_command_line_-_mltk_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -102,9 +102,9 @@ This search looks for applications on the endpoint that you have marked as prohi

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [prohibited_softwares](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/prohibited_softwares.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **prohibited_software_on_endpoint_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -112,8 +112,8 @@ Monitor for signs that Vssadmin or Wmic has been used to create a shadow copy.

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **creation_of_shadow_copy_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -123,8 +123,8 @@ This search allows you to identify DNS requests that are unusually large for the

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **dns_query_length_outliers_-_mltk_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ tags:
  - Splunk Enterprise
  - Splunk Enterprise Security
  - Splunk Cloud
+  - Endpoint
 ---


@@ -30,7 +31,7 @@ This search looks for registry activity associated with modifications to the reg

 - **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types)
 - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud
-
+- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint)
 - **Last Updated**: 2020-01-28
 - **Author**: Bhavin Patel, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
 - **ID**: f5f6af30-7ba7-4295-bfe9-07de87c01bbc
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ tags:
  - Splunk Enterprise
  - Splunk Enterprise Security
  - Splunk Cloud
+  - Endpoint
 ---


@@ -30,7 +31,7 @@ This search looks for registry activity associated with application compatibilit

 - **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types)
 - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud
-
+- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint)
 - **Last Updated**: 2020-01-28
 - **Author**: Bhavin Patel, Patrick Bareiss, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
 - **ID**: f5f6af30-7aa7-4295-bfe9-07fe87c01bbb
@@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ Limited to no false positives are expected.

 * [https://enigma0x3.net/2017/03/17/fileless-uac-bypass-using-sdclt-exe/](https://enigma0x3.net/2017/03/17/fileless-uac-bypass-using-sdclt-exe/)
 * [https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME](https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME)
-* [https://www.cyborgsecurity.com/cyborg_labs/threat-hunt-deep-dives-user-account-control-bypass-via-registry-modification/](https://www.cyborgsecurity.com/cyborg_labs/threat-hunt-deep-dives-user-account-control-bypass-via-registry-modification/)
+* [https://www.cyborgsecurity.com/cyborg-labs/threat-hunt-deep-dives-user-account-control-bypass-via-registry-modification/](https://www.cyborgsecurity.com/cyborg-labs/threat-hunt-deep-dives-user-account-control-bypass-via-registry-modification/)



@@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ This search looks for EC2 instances being created with previously unseen instanc

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_instance_type_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ This search looks for processes referencing the plist files that determine which

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **macos_-_re-opened_applications_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -113,9 +113,9 @@ Detect the usage of comsvcs.dll for dumping the lsass process.

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [process_rundll32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_rundll32.yml)
 * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [process_rundll32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_rundll32.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -98,8 +98,8 @@ This search monitors for remote modifications to registry keys.

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **remote_registry_key_modifications_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -116,8 +116,8 @@ This search looks for child processes of spoolsv.exe. This activity is associate

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -114,8 +114,8 @@ This search will return a table of rare processes, the names of the systems runn
 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
 * [filter_rare_process_allow_list](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/filter_rare_process_allow_list.yml)
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **detect_rare_executables_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -110,8 +110,8 @@ The following analytic identifies `WmiPrvSE.exe` spawning a process. This typica

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **process_execution_via_wmi_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -110,8 +110,8 @@ This search looks for scripts launched via WMI.

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **script_execution_via_wmi_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -103,8 +103,8 @@ This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via user agent, and

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **amazon_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -103,8 +103,8 @@ This search provides detection information on unauthenticated requests against K

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via user agent, and

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [google_gcp_pubsub_message](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/google_gcp_pubsub_message.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **gcp_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -113,9 +113,9 @@ This search looks for child processes spawned by zoom.exe or zoom.us that has no

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
+* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
 * [previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_window](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_window.yml)
 * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
-* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -123,8 +123,8 @@ The detection Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe is detecting t

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -114,8 +114,8 @@ This search detects accounts that were created and deleted in a short time perio

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **short_lived_windows_accounts_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -116,8 +116,8 @@ The following analytic utilizes Windows Security Event ID 1102 or System log eve
 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
 * [wineventlog_system](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_system.yml)
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [wineventlog_security](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_security.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **windows_event_log_cleared_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -117,8 +117,8 @@ This search looks for network traffic on TCP/3389, the default port used by remo

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **remote_desktop_network_traffic_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -113,8 +113,8 @@ This search looks for newly created accounts that have been elevated to local ad

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [wineventlog_security](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_security.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **detect_new_local_admin_account_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -118,8 +118,8 @@ This search looks for successful AWS CloudTrail activity by user accounts that a

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -123,14 +123,14 @@ This search looks for DNS requests for phishing domains that are leveraging Evil

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [evilginx_phishlets_google](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/evilginx_phishlets_google.yml)
 * [evilginx_phishlets_aws](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/evilginx_phishlets_aws.yml)
-* [evilginx_phishlets_outlook](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/evilginx_phishlets_outlook.yml)
-* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
-* [evilginx_phishlets_facebook](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/evilginx_phishlets_facebook.yml)
+* [evilginx_phishlets_google](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/evilginx_phishlets_google.yml)
 * [evilginx_phishlets_0365](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/evilginx_phishlets_0365.yml)
-* [evilginx_phishlets_github](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/evilginx_phishlets_github.yml)
 * [evilginx_phishlets_amazon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/evilginx_phishlets_amazon.yml)
+* [evilginx_phishlets_outlook](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/evilginx_phishlets_outlook.yml)
+* [evilginx_phishlets_facebook](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/evilginx_phishlets_facebook.yml)
+* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [evilginx_phishlets_github](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/evilginx_phishlets_github.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -119,8 +119,8 @@ This search detects user accounts that have been locked out a relatively high nu

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -115,8 +115,8 @@ This search is used to detect attempts to use DNS tunneling, by calculating the

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **detect_long_dns_txt_record_response_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -113,8 +113,8 @@ This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a u

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **detect_new_user_aws_console_login_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -114,8 +114,8 @@ This search looks for outbound SMB connections made by hosts within your network

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **detect_outbound_smb_traffic_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -126,8 +126,8 @@ This search looks for execution of process `outlook.exe` where the process is wr

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **detect_outlook_exe_writing_a_zip_file_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -112,8 +112,8 @@ This search looks for the execution of the cscript.exe or wscript.exe processes,

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -109,9 +109,9 @@ This search looks for web connections to dynamic DNS providers.

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
 * [dynamic_dns_web_traffic](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/dynamic_dns_web_traffic.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -110,8 +110,8 @@ This search looks for specific command-line arguments that may indicate the exec

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -117,8 +117,8 @@ This search looks for EC2 instances being created by users who have not created

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -111,8 +111,8 @@ The search looks at the change-analysis data model and detects email files creat

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -126,8 +126,8 @@ This search looks for command-line arguments that use a `/c` parameter to execut

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **first_time_seen_command_line_argument_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -111,8 +111,8 @@ Attackers leverage an existing Windows binary, attrib.exe, to mark specific as h

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -117,8 +117,8 @@ This search looks for PowerShell processes started with parameters used to bypas
 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
 * [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml)
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **malicious_powershell_process_-_execution_policy_bypass_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -114,8 +114,8 @@ Microsoft Windows contains accessibility features that can be launched with a ke

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **overwriting_accessibility_binaries_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -113,8 +113,8 @@ This search looks for network traffic defined by port and transport layer protoc

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **prohibited_network_traffic_allowed_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -115,8 +115,8 @@ This search looks for network traffic on common ports where a higher layer proto

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **protocol_or_port_mismatch_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -117,8 +117,8 @@ This search looks for the remote desktop process mstsc.exe running on systems up

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **remote_desktop_process_running_on_system_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -119,8 +119,8 @@ This search looks for arguments to sc.exe indicating the creation or modificatio

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -109,8 +109,8 @@ This search looks for flags passed to schtasks.exe on the command-line that indi

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **scheduled_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -113,8 +113,8 @@ This search looks for changes to registry values that control Windows file assoc

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **suspicious_changes_to_file_associations_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ This detection looks for emails that are suspicious because of their sender, dom

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **suspicious_email_-_uba_anomaly_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -117,9 +117,9 @@ This search looks for emails that have attachments with suspicious file extensio

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
 * [suspicious_email_attachments](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/suspicious_email_attachments.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **suspicious_email_attachment_extensions_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -114,8 +114,8 @@ This search looks for reg.exe being launched from a command prompt not started b

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **suspicious_reg_exe_process_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ It's possible for system administrators to write scripts that exhibit this behav

 #### Reference

-* [https://car.mitre.org/wiki/CAR-2013-03-001](https://car.mitre.org/wiki/CAR-2013-03-001)
+* [https://car.mitre.org/wiki/CAR-2013-03-001/](https://car.mitre.org/wiki/CAR-2013-03-001/)



@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ tags:
  - Splunk Enterprise
  - Splunk Enterprise Security
  - Splunk Cloud
+  - Endpoint
 ---


@@ -25,7 +26,7 @@ This search detects writes to the recycle bin by a process other than explorer.e

 - **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types)
 - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud
-
+- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint)
 - **Last Updated**: 2020-07-22
 - **Author**: Rico Valdez, Splunk
 - **ID**: b5541828-8ffd-4070-9d95-b3da4de924cb
@@ -114,8 +114,8 @@ This search looks for network traffic identified as The Onion Router (TOR), a be

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **tor_traffic_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -108,9 +108,9 @@ This search looks for applications on the endpoint that you have marked as uncom

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
 * [uncommon_processes](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/uncommon_processes.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **uncommon_processes_on_endpoint_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
--- a/Show More
+++ b/Show More