Branch was auto-updated.

detections/endpoint/jscript_execution_using_cscript_app.yml

@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ references:
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - FIN7
+  - Remcos
   automated_detection_testing: passed
   confidence: 70
   context:

detections/endpoint/non_chrome_process_accessing_chrome_default_dir.yml

@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - FIN7
+  - Remcos
   automated_detection_testing: passed
   confidence: 70
   context:

detections/endpoint/non_firefox_process_access_firefox_profile_dir.yml

@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ references: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - FIN7
+  - Remcos
   automated_detection_testing: passed
   confidence: 70
   context:

detections/endpoint/possible_browser_pass_view_parameter.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+name: Possible Browser Pass View Parameter
+id: 8ba484e8-4b97-11ec-b19a-acde48001122
+version: 1
+date: '2021-11-22'
+author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
+type: Hunting
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
+description: This analytic will detect a suspicious process contains a commandline
+  parameter related to web browser credential dumper. This technique was used by Remcos
+  RAT malware where it use the techique of Nirsoft webbrowserpassview.exe application
+  to dump web browser credentials. Remcos use the "/stext" commandline to dump the
+  credential in text format. This Hunting query is good indicator to look further
+  for possible remcos infection within the network or possible compromised host. Since
+  the detections is only base on the parameter command and the possible path where
+  it will drop the text credential information, It may catch normal tools that having
+  same command and behavior.
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
+  as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process  IN ("*/stext
+  *", "*/shtml *", "*/LoadPasswordsIE*", "*/LoadPasswordsFirefox*", "*/LoadPasswordsChrome*",
+  "*/LoadPasswordsOpera*", "*/LoadPasswordsSafari*" , "*/UseOperaPasswordFile*", "*/OperaPasswordFile*","*/stab*",
+  "*/scomma*", "*/stabular*", "*/shtml*", "*/sverhtml*", "*/sxml*", "*/skeepass*"
+  ) AND Processes.process IN ("*\\temp\\*", "*\\users\\public\\*", "*\\programdata\\*")
+  by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process
+  Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id
+  Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
+  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `possible_browser_pass_view_parameter_filter`'
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting
+  logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your
+  endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the
+  Sysmon TA.
+known_false_positives: False positive is quite limited. Filter is needed
+references:
+- https://www.nirsoft.net/utils/web_browser_password.html
+- https://app.any.run/tasks/df0baf9f-8baf-4c32-a452-16562ecb19be/
+tags:
+  analytic_story:
+  - Remcos
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1555/web_browser_pass_view/sysmon.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Exploitation
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1555.003
+  - T1555
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  required_fields:
+  - _time
+  - Processes.dest
+  - Processes.user
+  - Processes.parent_process_name
+  - Processes.parent_process
+  - Processes.original_file_name
+  - Processes.process_name
+  - Processes.process
+  - Processes.process_id
+  - Processes.parent_process_path
+  - Processes.process_path
+  - Processes.parent_process_id
+  security_domain: endpoint
+  impact: 40
+  confidence: 40
+  risk_score: 16
+  context:
+  - Source:Endpoint
+  - Stage:Credential Access
+  message: suspicious process $process_name$ contains commandline $process$ on $dest$
+  observable:
+  - name: user
+    type: User
+    role:
+    - Victim
+  - name: dest
+    type: Hostname
+    role:
+    - Victim
+  automated_detection_testing: passed

detections/endpoint/regsvr32_silent_and_install_param_dll_loading.yml

@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ references:
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity
+  - Remcos
   automated_detection_testing: passed
   confidence: 60
   context:

detections/endpoint/regsvr32_with_known_silent_switch_cmdline.yml

@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ tags:
   analytic_story:
   - IcedID
   - Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity
+  - Remcos
   automated_detection_testing: passed
   confidence: 80
   context:

detections/endpoint/system_info_gathering_using_dxdiag_application.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+name: System Info Gathering Using Dxdiag Application
+id: f92d74f2-4921-11ec-b685-acde48001122
+version: 1
+date: '2021-11-19'
+author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
+type: Hunting
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
+description: This analytic is to detect a suspicious dxdiag.exe process commandline
+  can collect system info of the target host. This technique was seen in remcos, adversaries
+  and other malware to collect information as part of recon or collection phase of
+  attack. Even this behavior is rarely seen in a corporate network this commandline
+  can be used by network administrator to audit host machine specification. Better
+  to check what it did after it pipes out the result to a file for further processing.
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
+  as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_dxdiag` AND Processes.process
+  = "* /t *" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process
+  Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id
+  | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
+  | `system_info_gathering_using_dxdiag_application_filter`'
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
+  on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
+  your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Filesystem`
+  node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the
+  latest TA for the endpoint product.
+known_false_positives: this commandline can be used by network administrator to audit
+  host machine specification.filter is needed.
+references:
+- https://app.any.run/tasks/df0baf9f-8baf-4c32-a452-16562ecb19be/
+tags:
+  analytic_story:
+  - Remcos
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/t1592/host_info_dxdiag/sysmon.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Reconnaissance
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1592
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  required_fields:
+  - _time
+  - Processes.dest
+  - Processes.user
+  - Processes.parent_process_name
+  - Processes.parent_process
+  - Processes.original_file_name
+  - Processes.process_name
+  - Processes.process
+  - Processes.process_id
+  - Processes.parent_process_path
+  - Processes.process_path
+  - Processes.parent_process_id
+  security_domain: endpoint
+  impact: 50
+  confidence: 50
+  risk_score: 25
+  context:
+  - source:endpoint
+  - stage:Reconnaissance
+  message: dxdiag.exe process with commandline $process$ on $dest$
+  observable:
+  - name: dest
+    type: Hostname
+    role:
+    - Victim
+  - name: user
+    type: User
+    role:
+    - Victim
+  automated_detection_testing: passed

macros/process_dxdiag.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+definition: (Processes.process_name=dxdiag.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=dxdiag.exe)
+description: Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/
+name: process_dxdiag

tests/endpoint/possible_browser_pass_view_parameter.test.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+name: Possible Browser Pass View Parameter Unit Test
+tests:
+- name: Possible Browser Pass View Parameter
+  file: endpoint/possible_browser_pass_view_parameter.yml
+  pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0'
+  earliest_time: '-24h'
+  latest_time: 'now'
+  attack_data:
+  - file_name: sysmon.log
+    data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1555/web_browser_pass_view/sysmon.log
+    source:  XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
+    sourcetype: xmlwineventlog

tests/endpoint/system_info_gathering_using_dxdiag_application.test.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+name: System Info Gathering Using Dxdiag Application Unit Test
+tests:
+- name: System Info Gathering Using Dxdiag Application
+  file: endpoint/system_info_gathering_using_dxdiag_application.yml
+  pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0'
+  earliest_time: '-24h'
+  latest_time: 'now'
+  attack_data:
+  - file_name: sysmon.log
+    data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/t1592/host_info_dxdiag/sysmon.log
+    source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
+    sourcetype: xmlwineventlog