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Added detection testing service results inDetect SharpHound File Modifications

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2021-06-03 15:24:00 +00:00
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detections/endpoint/detect_sharphound_file_modifications.yml
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@@ -6,32 +6,43 @@ author: Michael Haag, Splunk
type: batch
datamodel:
- Endpoint
description: SharpHound is used as a reconnaissance collector, ingestor, for BloodHound. SharpHound will query the domain controller and begin gathering all the data related to the domain and trusts. For output, it will drop a .zip file upon completion following a typical pattern that is often not changed.
This analytic focuses on the default file name scheme. Note that this may be evaded with different parameters within SharpHound, but that depends on the operator. `-randomizefilenames` and `-encryptzip` are two examples. In addition, executing SharpHound via .exe or .ps1 without any command-line arguments will still perform activity and dump output to the default filename.
Example default filename `20210601181553_BloodHound.zip`.
SharpHound creates multiple temp files following the same pattern `20210601182121_computers.json`, `domains.json`, `gpos.json`, `ous.json` and `users.json`. Tuning may be required, or remove these json's entirely if it is too noisy.
During traige, review parallel processes for further suspicious behavior. Typically, the process executing the `.ps1` ingestor will be PowerShell.
description: SharpHound is used as a reconnaissance collector, ingestor, for BloodHound.
SharpHound will query the domain controller and begin gathering all the data related
to the domain and trusts. For output, it will drop a .zip file upon completion following
a typical pattern that is often not changed. This analytic focuses on the default
file name scheme. Note that this may be evaded with different parameters within
SharpHound, but that depends on the operator. `-randomizefilenames` and `-encryptzip`
are two examples. In addition, executing SharpHound via .exe or .ps1 without any
command-line arguments will still perform activity and dump output to the default
filename. Example default filename `20210601181553_BloodHound.zip`. SharpHound creates
multiple temp files following the same pattern `20210601182121_computers.json`,
`domains.json`, `gpos.json`, `ous.json` and `users.json`. Tuning may be required,
or remove these json's entirely if it is too noisy. During traige, review parallel
processes for further suspicious behavior. Typically, the process executing the
`.ps1` ingestor will be PowerShell.
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name IN ("*bloodhound.zip", "*_computers.json", "*_gpos.json", "*_domains.json", "*_users.json", "*_groups.json")
by Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.dest
| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `detect_sharphound_file_modifications_filter`'
as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name IN ("*bloodhound.zip",
"*_computers.json", "*_gpos.json", "*_domains.json", "*_users.json", "*_groups.json")
by Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path
Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_sharphound_file_modifications_filter`'
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
on file modifications that include the name of the process, and file, responsible for the changes from
your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Filesystem` node.
known_false_positives: False positives should be limited as the analytic is specific to a filename with extension .zip. Filter as needed.
on file modifications that include the name of the process, and file, responsible
for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Filesystem`
node.
known_false_positives: False positives should be limited as the analytic is specific
to a filename with extension .zip. Filter as needed.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0521/
- https://thedfirreport.com/?s=bloodhound
- https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound/tree/master/Collectors
- https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/SharpHound3
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1059.001/T1059.001.md#atomic-test-2---run-bloodhound-from-local-disk
- https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0521/
- https://thedfirreport.com/?s=bloodhound
- https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound/tree/master/Collectors
- https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/SharpHound3
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1059.001/T1059.001.md#atomic-test-2---run-bloodhound-from-local-disk
tags:
analytic_story:
- Discovery Techniques
dataset: []
dataset:
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/sharphound/windows-sysmon.log
kill_chain_phases:
- Reconnaissance
mitre_attack_id:
@@ -51,4 +62,5 @@ tags:
- file_name
- process_id
- file_create_time
security_domain: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
automated_detection_testing: passed