second pass at fixing whitespace and related update fields

This commit is contained in:
pyth0n1c
2024-09-24 16:53:25 -07:00
parent b43bb4fb4e
commit 5b75e85ef8
29 changed files with 87 additions and 87 deletions
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
name: Okta Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled
id: 7c0348ce-bdf9-45f6-8a57-c18b5976f00a
version: 2
date: '2024-05-13'
version: 3
date: '2024-09-24'
author: Mauricio Velazco, Splunk
data_source:
- Okta
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ description: The following analytic identifies an attempt to disable multi-facto
could enable attackers to bypass additional security layers, potentially leading
to unauthorized access to sensitive information and prolonged undetected presence
in the network.
search: ' | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count max(_time) as lastTime,
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count max(_time) as lastTime,
min(_time) as firstTime from datamodel=Change where sourcetype="OktaIM2:log" All_Changes.object_category=User
AND All_Changes.action=modified All_Changes.command=user.mfa.factor.deactivate by
All_Changes.user All_Changes.result All_Changes.command sourcetype All_Changes.src
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
name: Okta Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip
id: de365ffa-42f5-46b5-b43f-fa72290b8218
version: 2
date: '2024-05-28'
version: 3
date: '2024-09-24'
author: Michael Haag, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk
data_source:
- Okta
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ description: The following analytic identifies instances where more than 10 uniq
behavior suggests an external entity is attempting to compromise multiple user accounts,
potentially leading to unauthorized access to organizational resources and data
breaches.
search: ' | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count max(_time) as lastTime,
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count max(_time) as lastTime,
min(_time) as firstTime dc(Authentication.user) as unique_accounts values(Authentication.signature)
as signature values(Authentication.user) as user values(Authentication.app) as app
values(Authentication.authentication_method) as authentication_method from datamodel=Authentication
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
name: Okta New API Token Created
id: c3d22720-35d3-4da4-bd0a-740d37192bd4
version: 3
date: '2024-05-11'
version: 4
date: '2024-09-24'
author: Michael Haag, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ description: The following analytic detects the creation of a new API token with
environment.
data_source:
- Okta
search: ' | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count max(_time) as lastTime,
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count max(_time) as lastTime,
min(_time) as firstTime from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created AND
All_Changes.command=system.api_token.create by _time span=5m All_Changes.user All_Changes.result
All_Changes.command sourcetype All_Changes.src All_Changes.action All_Changes.object_category
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
name: Okta New Device Enrolled on Account
id: bb27cbce-d4de-432c-932f-2e206e9130fb
version: 3
date: '2024-05-24'
version: 4
date: '2024-09-24'
author: Michael Haag, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ description: The following analytic identifies when a new device is enrolled on
and mitigating unauthorized access attempts.
data_source:
- Okta
search: ' | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count max(_time) as lastTime,
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count max(_time) as lastTime,
min(_time) as firstTime from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created All_Changes.command=device.enrollment.create
by _time span=5m All_Changes.user All_Changes.result All_Changes.command sourcetype
All_Changes.src All_Changes.action All_Changes.object_category | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")`
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
name: Kubernetes Anomalous Inbound Outbound Network IO
id: 4f3b0c97-657e-4547-a89a-9a50c656e3cd
version: 2
date: '2024-05-13'
version: 3
date: '2024-09-24'
author: Matthew Moore, Splunk
status: experimental
type: Anomaly
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ how_to_implement: 'To implement this detection, follow these steps:
* Leave all other settings at their default values.
* Run the Search Baseline Of Kubernetes Container Network IO Ratio '
* Run the Search Baseline Of Kubernetes Container Network IO Ratio'
known_false_positives: unknown
references:
- https://github.com/signalfx/splunk-otel-collector-chart
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
name: Kubernetes Anomalous Inbound to Outbound Network IO Ratio
id: 9d8f6e3f-39df-46d8-a9d4-96173edc501f
version: 2
date: '2024-05-26'
version: 3
date: '2024-09-24'
author: Matthew Moore, Splunk
status: experimental
type: Anomaly
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ how_to_implement: 'To implement this detection, follow these steps:
* Leave all other settings at their default values.
* Run the Search Baseline Of Kubernetes Container Network IO Ratio '
* Run the Search Baseline Of Kubernetes Container Network IO Ratio'
known_false_positives: unknown
references:
- https://github.com/signalfx/splunk-otel-collector-chart
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
name: Kubernetes Previously Unseen Container Image Name
id: fea515a4-b1d8-4cd6-80d6-e0d71397b891
version: 2
date: '2024-05-27'
version: 3
date: '2024-09-24'
author: Matthew Moore, Splunk
status: experimental
type: Anomaly
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ how_to_implement: 'To implement this detection, follow these steps:
* Leave all other settings at their default values.
* Run the Search Baseline Of Kubernetes Container Network IO Ratio '
* Run the Search Baseline Of Kubernetes Container Network IO Ratio'
known_false_positives: unknown
references:
- https://github.com/signalfx/splunk-otel-collector-chart
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
name: Kubernetes Previously Unseen Process
id: c8119b2f-d7f7-40be-940a-1c582870e8e2
version: 2
date: '2024-05-13'
version: 3
date: '2024-09-24'
author: Matthew Moore, Splunk
status: experimental
type: Anomaly
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ how_to_implement: 'To implement this detection, follow these steps:
* Leave all other settings at their default values.
* Run the Search Baseline Of Kubernetes Container Network IO Ratio '
* Run the Search Baseline Of Kubernetes Container Network IO Ratio'
known_false_positives: unknown
references:
- https://github.com/signalfx/splunk-otel-collector-chart
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
name: Kubernetes Process Running From New Path
id: 454076fb-0e9e-4adf-b93a-da132621c5e6
version: 2
date: '2024-05-27'
version: 3
date: '2024-09-24'
author: Matthew Moore, Splunk
status: experimental
type: Anomaly
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ how_to_implement: 'To implement this detection, follow these steps:
* Leave all other settings at their default values.
* Run the Search Baseline Of Kubernetes Container Network IO Ratio '
* Run the Search Baseline Of Kubernetes Container Network IO Ratio'
known_false_positives: unknown
references:
- https://github.com/signalfx/splunk-otel-collector-chart
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
name: Kubernetes Process with Anomalous Resource Utilisation
id: 25ca9594-7a0d-4a95-a5e5-3228d7398ec8
version: 2
date: '2024-05-27'
version: 3
date: '2024-09-24'
author: Matthew Moore, Splunk
status: experimental
type: Anomaly
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ how_to_implement: 'To implement this detection, follow these steps:
* Leave all other settings at their default values.
* Run the Search Baseline Of Kubernetes Container Network IO Ratio '
* Run the Search Baseline Of Kubernetes Container Network IO Ratio'
known_false_positives: unknown
references:
- https://github.com/signalfx/splunk-otel-collector-chart
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
name: Kubernetes Process with Resource Ratio Anomalies
id: 0d42b295-0f1f-4183-b75e-377975f47c65
version: 2
date: '2024-05-30'
version: 3
date: '2024-09-24'
author: Matthew Moore, Splunk
status: experimental
type: Anomaly
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ how_to_implement: 'To implement this detection, follow these steps:
* Leave all other settings at their default values.
* Run the Search Baseline Of Kubernetes Container Network IO Ratio '
* Run the Search Baseline Of Kubernetes Container Network IO Ratio'
known_false_positives: unknown
references:
- https://github.com/signalfx/splunk-otel-collector-chart
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
name: Kubernetes Shell Running on Worker Node
id: efebf0c4-dcf4-496f-85a2-5ab7ad8fa876
version: 2
date: '2024-05-25'
version: 3
date: '2024-09-24'
author: Matthew Moore, Splunk
status: experimental
type: Anomaly
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ how_to_implement: 'To implement this detection, follow these steps:
* Leave all other settings at their default values.
* Run the Search Baseline Of Kubernetes Container Network IO Ratio '
* Run the Search Baseline Of Kubernetes Container Network IO Ratio'
known_false_positives: unknown
references:
- https://github.com/signalfx/splunk-otel-collector-chart/tree/main
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
name: Kubernetes Shell Running on Worker Node with CPU Activity
id: cc1448e3-cc7a-4518-bc9f-2fa48f61a22b
version: 2
date: '2024-05-11'
version: 3
date: '2024-09-24'
author: Matthew Moore, Splunk
status: experimental
type: Anomaly
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ how_to_implement: 'To implement this detection, follow these steps:
* Leave all other settings at their default values.
* Run the Search Baseline Of Kubernetes Container Network IO Ratio '
* Run the Search Baseline Of Kubernetes Container Network IO Ratio'
known_false_positives: unknown
references:
- https://github.com/signalfx/splunk-otel-collector-chart/tree/main
@@ -1,14 +1,14 @@
name: O365 Application Available To Other Tenants
id: 942548a3-0273-47a4-8dbd-e5202437395c
version: 1
date: '2024-04-11'
version: 2
date: '2024-09-24'
author: Steven Dick
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic identifies the configuration of Azure Active Directory Applications in a manner that allows authentication from external tenants or personal accounts. This configuration can lead to inappropriate or malicious access of any data or capabilities the application is allowed to access. This detection leverages the O365 Universal Audit Log data source.
data_source:
- Office 365 Universal Audit Log
search: >
search: >-
`o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory Operation IN ("Add application.","Update application.") ModifiedProperties{}.Name=AvailableToOtherTenants
| eval result = case(match(mvindex('ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue',mvfind('ModifiedProperties{}.Name',"AvailableToOtherTenants")),"false"),"removed",true(),"added"), object_name=mvindex('Target{}.ID', 3), signature=Operation, object_attrs = "AvailableToOtherTenants", user = case(match(mvindex('Actor{}.ID',-1),"User"),mvindex('Actor{}.ID',0),match(mvindex('Actor{}.ID',-1),"ServicePrincipal"),mvindex('Actor{}.ID',3),true(),mvindex('Actor{}.ID',0))
| search result = "added"
@@ -1,14 +1,14 @@
name: O365 Cross-Tenant Access Change
id: 7c0fa490-12b0-4d0b-b9f5-e101d1e0e06f
version: 1
date: '2024-04-11'
version: 2
date: '2024-09-24'
author: Steven Dick
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic identifies when cross-tenant access/synchronization policies are changed in an Azure tenant. Adversaries have been observed altering victim cross-tenant policies as a method of lateral movement or maintaining persistent access to compromised environments. These policies should be considered sensitive and monitored for changes and/or loose configuration.
data_source:
- Office 365 Universal Audit Log
search: >
search: >-
`o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory Operation IN ("Add a partner to cross-tenant access setting.","Delete partner specific cross-tenant access setting.")
| eval user = case(match(mvindex('Actor{}.ID',-1),"User"),mvindex('Actor{}.ID',0),match(mvindex('Actor{}.ID',-1),"ServicePrincipal"),mvindex('Actor{}.ID',3),true(),mvindex('Actor{}.ID',0))
| stats values(Workload) as category, values(ClientIP) as src, values(ModifiedProperties{}.Name) as object_name, values(ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue) as object_attrs, count, min(_time) as firstTime, max(_time) as lastTime by Id,user,Operation
+3 -3
View File
@@ -1,14 +1,14 @@
name: O365 DLP Rule Triggered
id: 63a8a537-36fd-4aac-a3ea-1a96afd2c871
version: 1
date: '2024-04-01'
version: 2
date: '2024-09-24'
author: Steven Dick
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: The following analytic detects when Microsoft Office 365 Data Loss Prevention (DLP) rules have been triggered. DLP rules can be configured for any number of security, regulatory, or business compliance reasons, as such this analytic will only be as accurate as the upstream DLP configuration. Detections from this analytic should be evaluated thoroughly to determine what, if any, security relevance the underlying DLP events contain.
data_source:
- O365 Universal Audit Log
search: >
search: >-
`o365_management_activity` Operation=DLPRuleMatch
| eval recipient = 'ExchangeMetaData.To{}', signature_id = 'ExchangeMetaData.UniqueID', signature = 'PolicyDetails{}.Rules{}.RuleName' , src_user = UserId, reason ='PolicyDetails{}.Rules{}.ConditionsMatched.SensitiveInformation{}.SensitiveInformationTypeName', result='PolicyDetails{}.Rules{}.Actions{}', file_name=case(NOT match('PolicyDetails{}.Rules{}.ConditionsMatched.SensitiveInformation{}.Location',"Message Body"),'PolicyDetails{}.Rules{}.ConditionsMatched.SensitiveInformation{}.Location')
| stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(signature) as signature values(file_name) as file_name values(ExchangeMetaData.Subject) AS subject values(Workload) as app values(result) as result by src_user,recipient,signature_id,reason
@@ -1,14 +1,14 @@
name: O365 External Guest User Invited
id: 8c6d52ec-d5f2-4b2f-8ba1-f32c047a71fa
version: 1
date: '2024-04-11'
version: 2
date: '2024-09-24'
author: Steven Dick
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic identifies the invitation of an external guest user within Azure AD. With Azure AD B2B collaboration, users and administrators can invite external users to collaborate with internal users. External guest account invitations should be monitored by security teams as they could potentially lead to unauthorized access. An example of this attack vector was described at BlackHat 2022 by security researcher Dirk-Jan during his tall `Backdooring and Hijacking Azure AD Accounts by Abusing External Identities`. This detection leverages the Universal Audit Log (UAL)/o365:management:activity sourcetype as a detection data source.
data_source:
- Office 365 Universal Audit Log
search: >
search: >-
`o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory AND Operation="Add user*" AND ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue="[*Guest*]" AND ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue="[*Invitation*]"
| eval user = (mvindex('ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue',5)), src_user = case(match(mvindex('Actor{}.ID',-1),"User"),mvindex('Actor{}.ID',0),match(mvindex('Actor{}.ID',-1),"ServicePrincipal"),mvindex('Actor{}.ID',3),true(),mvindex('Actor{}.ID',0))
| rex field=user "(?<user>[\\w\\.-]+@[\\w-]+\\.[\\w-]{2,4})"
@@ -1,14 +1,14 @@
name: O365 External Identity Policy Changed
id: 29af1725-7a72-4d2d-8a18-e697e79a62d3
version: 1
date: '2024-04-11'
version: 2
date: '2024-09-24'
author: Steven Dick
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic identifies when changes are made to the external guest policies within Azure AD. With Azure AD B2B collaboration, users and administrators can invite external users to collaborate with internal users. This detection also attempts to highlight what may have changed. External guest account invitations should be monitored by security teams as they could potentially lead to unauthorized access. An example of this attack vector was described at BlackHat 2022 by security researcher Dirk-Jan during his tall `Backdooring and Hijacking Azure AD Accounts by Abusing External Identities`.
data_source:
- Office 365 Universal Audit Log
search: >
search: >-
`o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory Operation="Update policy." Target{}.ID="B2BManagementPolicy"
| eval object_attrs = mvindex('ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue',0), object_attrs_old = mvindex('ModifiedProperties{}.OldValue',0), object_name = mvindex('Target{}.ID',3), signature=Operation, user = case(match(mvindex('Actor{}.ID',-1),"User"),mvindex('Actor{}.ID',0),match(mvindex('Actor{}.ID',-1),"ServicePrincipal"),mvindex('Actor{}.ID',3),true(),mvindex('Actor{}.ID',0))
| spath input=object_attrs_old output=B2BOld path={}
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
name: O365 SharePoint Allowed Domains Policy Changed
id: b0cc6fa8-39b1-49ac-a4fe-f2f2a668e06c
version: 1
date: '2024-04-01'
version: 2
date: '2024-09-24'
author: Steven Dick
status: production
type: TTP
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ search: >
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `o365_sharepoint_allowed_domains_policy_changed_filter`
how_to_implement: You must install the Splunk Microsoft Office 365 Add-on and ingest Office 365 management activity events.
how_to_implement: You must install the Splunk Microsoft Office 365 Add-on and ingest Office 365 management activity events.
known_false_positives: Business approved changes by known administrators.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sharepoint/external-sharing-overview
@@ -1,14 +1,14 @@
name: AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City
id: 344a1778-0b25-490c-adb1-de8beddf59cd
version: 2
date: '2024-08-16'
version: 3
date: '2024-09-24'
author: David Dorsey, Splunk
status: deprecated
type: Anomaly
description: 'This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen
cities. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with
"Run" or "Create." This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the
latest Change Datamodel. '
latest Change Datamodel.'
data_source: []
search: '`cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress
| search City=* [search `cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation
@@ -1,14 +1,14 @@
name: AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country
id: ceb8d3d8-06cb-49eb-beaf-829526e33ff0
version: 2
date: '2024-08-15'
version: 3
date: '2024-09-24'
author: David Dorsey, Splunk
status: deprecated
type: Anomaly
description: 'This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen
countries. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins
with "Run" or "Create." This search is deprecated and have been translated to use
the latest Change Datamodel. '
the latest Change Datamodel.'
data_source: []
search: '`cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress
| search Country=* [search `cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) |
@@ -1,14 +1,14 @@
name: AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address
id: 42e15012-ac14-4801-94f4-f1acbe64880b
version: 2
date: '2024-08-15'
version: 3
date: '2024-09-24'
author: David Dorsey, Splunk
status: deprecated
type: Anomaly
description: 'This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen
IP addresses. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins
with "Run" or "Create." This search is deprecated and have been translated to use
the latest Change Datamodel. '
the latest Change Datamodel.'
data_source: []
search: '`cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) [search `cloudtrail` (eventName=Run*
OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search Country=* | stats earliest(_time)
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
name: Kubernetes AWS detect sensitive role access
id: b6013a7b-85e0-4a45-b051-10b252d69569
version: 2
date: '2024-08-15'
version: 3
date: '2024-09-24'
author: Rod Soto, Splunk
status: deprecated
type: Hunting
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ search: '`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` objectRef.resource=clusterroles OR clusterrole
how_to_implement: You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This
search works with cloudwatch logs.
known_false_positives: 'Sensitive role resource access is necessary for cluster operation,
however source IP, namespace and user group may indicate possible malicious use. '
however source IP, namespace and user group may indicate possible malicious use.'
references: []
tags:
analytic_story:
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
name: Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive role access
id: f27349e5-1641-4f6a-9e68-30402be0ad4c
version: 2
date: '2024-08-15'
version: 3
date: '2024-09-24'
author: Rod Soto, Splunk
status: deprecated
type: Hunting
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ search: '`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log| se
how_to_implement: You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure
Kube-Audit data diagnostics
known_false_positives: 'Sensitive role resource access is necessary for cluster operation,
however source IP, namespace and user group may indicate possible malicious use. '
however source IP, namespace and user group may indicate possible malicious use.'
references: []
tags:
analytic_story:
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
name: LOLBAS With Network Traffic
id: 2820f032-19eb-497e-8642-25b04a880359
version: 2
date: '2024-05-11'
version: 3
date: '2024-09-24'
author: Steven Dick
status: production
type: TTP
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this detection you must ingest event
of this type this data type.
known_false_positives: 'Legitmate usage of internal automation or scripting, espically
powershell.exe internal to internal or logon scripts. It may be necessary to omit
internal IP ranges if extremely noisy. ie NOT dest_ip IN ("10.0.0.0/8","172.16.0.0/12","192.168.0.0/16","170.98.0.0/16","0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1") '
internal IP ranges if extremely noisy. ie NOT dest_ip IN ("10.0.0.0/8","172.16.0.0/12","192.168.0.0/16","170.98.0.0/16","0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1")'
references:
- https://lolbas-project.github.io/#
- https://www.sans.org/presentations/lolbin-detection-methods-seven-common-attacks-revealed/
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
name: Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques
id: cde75cf6-3c7a-4dd6-af01-27cdb4511fd4
version: 6
date: '2024-05-18'
version: 7
date: '2024-09-24'
author: David Dorsey, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ search: "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.proces
`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| eval num_obfuscation = (mvcount(split(process,\"\
`\"))-1) + (mvcount(split(process, \"^\"))-1) + (mvcount(split(process, \"'\"))-1)
| `malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques_filter` | search num_obfuscation
> 10 "
> 10"
how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection
and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related
telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search,
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
name: Windows DISM Install PowerShell Web Access
id: fa6142a7-c364-4d11-9954-895dd9efb2d4
version: 1
date: '2024-09-03'
version: 2
date: '2024-09-24'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
data_sources:
- Windows Event Log Security 4688
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ data_sources:
type: TTP
status: production
description: The following analytic detects the installation of PowerShell Web Access using the Deployment Image Servicing and Management (DISM) tool. It leverages Sysmon Event ID 1 to identify the execution of `dism.exe` with specific parameters related to enabling the WindowsPowerShellWebAccess feature. This activity is significant because enabling PowerShell Web Access can facilitate remote execution of PowerShell commands, potentially allowing an attacker to gain unauthorized access to systems and networks. If confirmed malicious, this action could lead to further exploitation and compromise of the affected system.
search: ' | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
where Processes.process_name=dism.exe
(Processes.process="*WindowsPowerShellWebAccess*" AND Processes.process="*/online*" AND Processes.process="*/enable-feature*")
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
name: Windows Rapid Authentication On Multiple Hosts
id: 62606c77-d53d-4182-9371-b02cdbbbcef7
version: 2
date: '2024-05-16'
version: 3
date: '2024-09-24'
author: Mauricio Velazco, Splunk
type: TTP
status: production
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ description: The following analytic detects a source computer authenticating to
movement or network share enumeration by an adversary. If confirmed malicious, this
could lead to unauthorized access to multiple systems, potentially compromising
sensitive data and escalating privileges within the network.
search: ' `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4624 LogonType=3 TargetUserName!="ANONYMOUS
search: '`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4624 LogonType=3 TargetUserName!="ANONYMOUS
LOGON" TargetUserName!="*$" | bucket span=5m _time | stats dc(Computer) AS unique_targets
values(Computer) as host_targets by _time, IpAddress, TargetUserName | where unique_targets
> 30 | `windows_rapid_authentication_on_multiple_hosts_filter`'
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
name: Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Zeek
id: c5c622e4-d073-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003
version: 3
date: '2024-08-19'
version: 4
date: '2024-09-24'
author: Shannon Davis, Splunk
status: experimental
type: TTP
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_
| append [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Traffic
where All_Traffic.bytes_in>65000 by All_Traffic.flow_id | rename All_Traffic.flow_id
as flow_id] | `detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_zeek_filter` | stats count by flow_id
| where count>1 | fields - count '
| where count>1 | fields - count'
how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Zeek DNS and Zeek Conn data into Splunk. Zeek
data should also be getting ingested in JSON format. We are detecting SIG and KEY
records via bro:dns:json and TCP payload over 65KB in size via bro:conn:json. The