Merge pull request #2040 from splunk/Haageth

To Haags or Not to Haags

detections/endpoint/ssa___windows_mshta_child_process.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+name: Windows MSHTA Child Process
+id: f63f7e9c-9526-11ec-9fc7-acde48001122
+version: 1
+date: '2022-02-23'
+author: Michael Haag, Splunk
+type: TTP
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint_Processes
+description: The following analytic identifies child processes spawning from  "mshta.exe".
+  The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments
+  were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, parent process
+  "mshta.exe" and its child process.
+search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event,
+  "_time"), "string", null)), cmd_line=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"),
+  "string", null)), process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_name"),
+  "string", null)), process_path=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_path"), "string",
+  null), parent_process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, "parent_process_name"), "string",
+  null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, "event_id"), "string", null) | where
+  cmd_line IS NOT NULL AND process_name IS NOT NULL AND parent_process_name IS NOT NULL | where parent_process_name="mshta.exe" AND process_name="powershell.exe" OR process_name="cmd.exe" OR 
+  process_name="scrcons.exe" OR process_name="colorcpl.exe" OR process_name="msbuild.exe" OR process_name="microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe"
+  OR process_name="searchprotocolhost.exe" OR process_name="cscript.exe"  OR process_name="wscript.exe"
+  | eval start_time=timestamp, end_time=timestamp, entities=mvappend(ucast(map_get(input_event,
+  "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"),
+  "string", null)), body=create_map(["event_id", event_id, "cmd_line", cmd_line, "process_name",
+  process_name, "parent_process_name", parent_process_name, "process_path", process_path])
+  | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting
+  logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your
+  endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the
+  Sysmon TA.
+known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit
+  this behavior, triggering a false positive.
+references:
+- https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses
+- https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/
+tags:
+  analytic_story:
+  - Suspicious MSHTA Activity
+  - Living Off The Land
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Exploitation
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1218.005
+  - T1218
+  product:
+  - Splunk Behavioral Analytics
+  required_fields:
+  - _time
+  - dest_device_id
+  - process_name
+  - parent_process_name
+  - process_path
+  - dest_user_id
+  - process
+  - cmd_line
+  security_domain: endpoint
+  impact: 80
+  confidence: 100
+  # (impact * confidence)/100
+  risk_score: 80
+  context:
+  - Source:Endpoint
+  - Stage:Defense Evasion
+  message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified
+    on endpoint $dest_device_id$ by user $dest_user_id$ attempting to access a remote destination to
+    download an additional payload.
+  nist:
+  - PR.PT
+  - DE.CM
+  cis20:
+  - CIS 8
+  observable:
+  - name: dest_user_id
+    type: User
+    role:
+    - Victim
+  - name: dest_device_id
+    type: Hostname
+    role:
+    - Victim
+  - name: parent_process_name
+    type: Parent Process
+    role:
+    - Parent Process
+  - name: process_name
+    type: Process
+    role:
+    - Child Process

detections/endpoint/ssa___windows_mshta_command_line_url.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
+name: Windows MSHTA Command-Line URL
+id: 9b35c538-94ef-11ec-9439-acde48001122
+version: 1
+date: '2022-02-23'
+author: Michael Haag, Splunk
+type: TTP
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint_Processes
+description: This analytic identifies when Microsoft HTML Application Host (mshta.exe)
+  utility is used to make remote http connections. Adversaries may use mshta.exe to
+  proxy the download and execution of remote .hta files. The analytic identifies command
+  line arguments of http and https being used. This technique is commonly used by
+  malicious software to bypass preventative controls. The search will return the first
+  time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions,
+  as well as the target system, the user, process "rundll32.exe" and its parent process.
+search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event,
+  "_time"), "string", null)), cmd_line=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"),
+  "string", null)), process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_name"),
+  "string", null)), process_path=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_path"), "string",
+  null), parent_process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, "parent_process_name"), "string",
+  null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, "event_id"), "string", null) | where
+  cmd_line IS NOT NULL AND process_name IS NOT NULL | where process_name="mshta.exe" AND (like (cmd_line, "%http://%") OR like (cmd_line, "%https://%"))
+  | eval start_time=timestamp, end_time=timestamp, entities=mvappend(ucast(map_get(input_event,
+  "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"),
+  "string", null)), body=create_map(["event_id", event_id, "cmd_line", cmd_line, "process_name",
+  process_name, "parent_process_name", parent_process_name, "process_path", process_path])
+  | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
+  on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
+  your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition,
+  confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the
+  endpoint product.
+known_false_positives: It is possible legitimate applications may perform this behavior
+  and will need to be filtered.
+references:
+  - https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses
+  - https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/
+  - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/search/-search-3x-wds-extidx-prot-implementing
+tags:
+  analytic_story:
+  - Suspicious MSHTA Activity
+  - Living Off The Land
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Exploitation
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1218.005
+  - T1218
+  product:
+  - Splunk Behavioral Analytics
+  required_fields:
+  - _time
+  - dest_device_id
+  - process_name
+  - parent_process_name
+  - process_path
+  - dest_user_id
+  - process
+  - cmd_line
+  security_domain: endpoint
+  impact: 80
+  confidence: 100
+  # (impact * confidence)/100
+  risk_score: 80
+  context:
+  - Source:Endpoint
+  - Stage:Defense Evasion
+  message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified
+    on endpoint $dest_device_id$ by user $dest_user_id$ attempting to access a remote destination to
+    download an additional payload.
+  nist:
+  - PR.PT
+  - DE.CM
+  cis20:
+  - CIS 8
+  observable:
+  - name: dest_user_id
+    type: User
+    role:
+    - Victim
+  - name: dest_device_id
+    type: Hostname
+    role:
+    - Victim
+  - name: parent_process_name
+    type: Parent Process
+    role:
+    - Parent Process
+  - name: process_name
+    type: Process
+    role:
+    - Child Process

detections/endpoint/ssa___windows_mshta_inline_hta_execution.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+name: Windows MSHTA Inline HTA Execution
+id: 24962154-9524-11ec-9333-acde48001122
+version: 1
+date: '2022-02-23'
+author: Michael Haag, Splunk
+type: TTP
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint_Processes
+description: The following analytic identifies "mshta.exe" execution with inline protocol
+  handlers. "JavaScript", "VBScript", and "About" are the only supported options when
+  invoking HTA content directly on the command-line. The search will return the first
+  time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions,
+  as well as the target system, the user, process "mshta.exe" and its parent process.
+search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event,
+  "_time"), "string", null)), cmd_line=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"),
+  "string", null)), process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_name"),
+  "string", null)), process_path=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_path"), "string",
+  null), parent_process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, "parent_process_name"), "string",
+  null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, "event_id"), "string", null) | where
+  cmd_line IS NOT NULL AND process_name IS NOT NULL | where process_name="mshta.exe" AND (like (cmd_line, "%vbscript%") OR like (cmd_line, "%javascript%") OR like (cmd_line, "%about%"))
+  | eval start_time=timestamp, end_time=timestamp, entities=mvappend(ucast(map_get(input_event,
+  "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"),
+  "string", null)), body=create_map(["event_id", event_id, "cmd_line", cmd_line, "process_name",
+  process_name, "parent_process_name", parent_process_name, "process_path", process_path])
+  | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
+  on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
+  your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition,
+  confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the
+  endpoint product.
+known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit
+  this behavior, triggering a false positive.
+references:
+- https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses
+- https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/
+- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/search/-search-3x-wds-extidx-prot-implementing
+tags:
+  analytic_story:
+  - Suspicious MSHTA Activity
+  - Living Off The Land
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Exploitation
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1218.005
+  - T1218
+  product:
+  - Splunk Behavioral Analytics
+  required_fields:
+  - _time
+  - dest_device_id
+  - process_name
+  - parent_process_name
+  - process_path
+  - dest_user_id
+  - process
+  - cmd_line
+  security_domain: endpoint
+  impact: 80
+  confidence: 100
+  # (impact * confidence)/100
+  risk_score: 80
+  context:
+  - Source:Endpoint
+  - Stage:Defense Evasion
+  message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified
+    on endpoint $dest_device_id$ by user $dest_user_id$ executing with inline HTA, indicative of defense
+    evasion.
+  nist:
+  - PR.PT
+  - DE.CM
+  cis20:
+  - CIS 8
+  observable:
+  - name: dest_user_id
+    type: User
+    role:
+    - Victim
+  - name: dest_device_id
+    type: Hostname
+    role:
+    - Victim
+  - name: parent_process_name
+    type: Parent Process
+    role:
+    - Parent Process
+  - name: process_name
+    type: Process
+    role:
+    - Child Process

detections/endpoint/ssa___windows_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+name: Windows Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution
+id: 0caa1dd6-94f5-11ec-9786-acde48001122
+version: 1
+date: '2022-02-23'
+author: Michael Haag, Splunk
+type: TTP
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint_Processes
+description: The following analytic identifies "rundll32.exe" execution with inline
+  protocol handlers. "JavaScript", "VBScript", and "About" are the only supported
+  options when invoking HTA content directly on the command-line. This type of behavior
+  is commonly observed with fileless malware or application whitelisting bypass techniques.
+  The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments
+  were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, process
+  "rundll32.exe" and its parent process.
+search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event,
+  "_time"), "string", null)), cmd_line=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"),
+  "string", null)), process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_name"),
+  "string", null)), process_path=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_path"), "string",
+  null), parent_process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, "parent_process_name"), "string",
+  null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, "event_id"), "string", null) | where
+  cmd_line IS NOT NULL AND process_name IS NOT NULL | where process_name="rundll32.exe" AND (like (cmd_line, "%vbscript%") OR like (cmd_line, "%javascript%") OR like (cmd_line, "%about%"))
+  | eval start_time=timestamp, end_time=timestamp, entities=mvappend(ucast(map_get(input_event,
+  "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"),
+  "string", null)), body=create_map(["event_id", event_id, "cmd_line", cmd_line, "process_name",
+  process_name, "parent_process_name", parent_process_name, "process_path", process_path])
+  | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
+  on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
+  your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition,
+  confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the
+  endpoint product.
+known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit
+  this behavior, triggering a false positive.
+references:
+- https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses
+- https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/
+- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/search/-search-3x-wds-extidx-prot-implementing
+tags:
+  analytic_story:
+  - Suspicious MSHTA Activity
+  - NOBELIUM Group
+  - Living Off The Land
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
+  cis20:
+  - CIS 8
+  confidence: 80
+  context:
+  - Source:Endpoint
+  - Stage:Initial Access
+  - Stage:Execution
+  - Stage:Defense Evasion
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log
+  impact: 70
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Exploitation
+  message: Suspicious $process_name$ inline HTA execution on $dest_device_id$.
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1218
+  - T1218.005
+  nist:
+  - PR.PT
+  - DE.CM
+  observable:
+  - name: dest_user_id
+    type: User
+    role:
+    - Victim
+  - name: dest_device_id
+    type: Hostname
+    role:
+    - Victim
+  - name: parent_process_name
+    type: Parent Process
+    role:
+    - Parent Process
+  - name: process_name
+    type: Process
+    role:
+    - Child Process
+  product:
+  - Splunk Behavioral Analytics
+  required_fields:
+  - _time
+  - dest_device_id
+  - process_name
+  - parent_process_name
+  - process_path
+  - dest_user_id
+  - process
+  - cmd_line
+  risk_score: 56
+  security_domain: endpoint
+  supported_tas:
+  - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon

dist/ssa/srs/ssa___windows_mshta_child_process.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+author: Michael Haag, Splunk
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint_Processes
+date: '2022-02-23'
+description: The following analytic identifies child processes spawning from  "mshta.exe".
+  The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments
+  were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, parent process
+  "mshta.exe" and its child process.
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting
+  logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your
+  endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the
+  Sysmon TA.
+id: f63f7e9c-9526-11ec-9fc7-acde48001122
+known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit
+  this behavior, triggering a false positive.
+name: Windows MSHTA Child Process
+product:
+- Splunk Behavioral Analytics
+references:
+- https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses
+- https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/
+risk_message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified
+  on endpoint $dest_device_id$ by user $dest_user_id$ attempting to access a remote
+  destination to download an additional payload.
+search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event,
+  "_time"), "string", null)), cmd_line=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"),
+  "string", null)), process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_name"),
+  "string", null)), process_path=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_path"), "string",
+  null), parent_process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, "parent_process_name"), "string",
+  null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, "event_id"), "string", null) | where
+  cmd_line IS NOT NULL AND process_name IS NOT NULL AND parent_process_name IS NOT
+  NULL | where parent_process_name="mshta.exe" AND process_name="powershell.exe" OR
+  process_name="cmd.exe" OR process_name="scrcons.exe" OR process_name="colorcpl.exe"
+  OR process_name="msbuild.exe" OR process_name="microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe"
+  OR process_name="searchprotocolhost.exe" OR process_name="cscript.exe"  OR process_name="wscript.exe"
+  | eval start_time=timestamp, end_time=timestamp, entities=mvappend(ucast(map_get(input_event,
+  "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"),
+  "string", null)), body=create_map(["event_id", event_id, "cmd_line", cmd_line, "process_name",
+  process_name, "parent_process_name", parent_process_name, "process_path", process_path])
+  | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
+tags:
+  analytic_story:
+  - Suspicious MSHTA Activity
+  - Living Off The Land
+  cis20:
+  - CIS 8
+  confidence: 100
+  context:
+  - Source:Endpoint
+  - Stage:Defense Evasion
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log
+  impact: 80
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Exploitation
+  message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified
+    on endpoint $dest_device_id$ by user $dest_user_id$ attempting to access a remote
+    destination to download an additional payload.
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1218.005
+  - T1218
+  nist:
+  - PR.PT
+  - DE.CM
+  observable:
+  - name: dest_user_id
+    role:
+    - Victim
+    type: User
+  - name: dest_device_id
+    role:
+    - Victim
+    type: Hostname
+  - name: parent_process_name
+    role:
+    - Parent Process
+    type: Parent Process
+  - name: process_name
+    role:
+    - Child Process
+    type: Process
+  product:
+  - Splunk Behavioral Analytics
+  required_fields:
+  - _time
+  - dest_device_id
+  - process_name
+  - parent_process_name
+  - process_path
+  - dest_user_id
+  - process
+  - cmd_line
+  risk_score: 80
+  risk_severity: high
+  security_domain: endpoint
+test:
+  name: Windows MSHTA Child Process Unit Test
+  tests:
+  - attack_data:
+    - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log
+      file_name: windows-security.log
+      source: WinEventLog:Security
+    file: endpoint/ssa___windows_mshta_child_process.yml
+    name: Windows MSHTA Child Process
+    pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)'
+type: TTP
+version: 1

dist/ssa/srs/ssa___windows_mshta_command-line_url.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+author: Michael Haag, Splunk
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint_Processes
+date: '2022-02-23'
+description: This analytic identifies when Microsoft HTML Application Host (mshta.exe)
+  utility is used to make remote http connections. Adversaries may use mshta.exe to
+  proxy the download and execution of remote .hta files. The analytic identifies command
+  line arguments of http and https being used. This technique is commonly used by
+  malicious software to bypass preventative controls. The search will return the first
+  time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions,
+  as well as the target system, the user, process "rundll32.exe" and its parent process.
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
+  on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
+  your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition,
+  confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the
+  endpoint product.
+id: 9b35c538-94ef-11ec-9439-acde48001122
+known_false_positives: It is possible legitimate applications may perform this behavior
+  and will need to be filtered.
+name: Windows MSHTA Command-Line URL
+product:
+- Splunk Behavioral Analytics
+references:
+- https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses
+- https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/
+- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/search/-search-3x-wds-extidx-prot-implementing
+risk_message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified
+  on endpoint $dest_device_id$ by user $dest_user_id$ attempting to access a remote
+  destination to download an additional payload.
+search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event,
+  "_time"), "string", null)), cmd_line=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"),
+  "string", null)), process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_name"),
+  "string", null)), process_path=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_path"), "string",
+  null), parent_process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, "parent_process_name"), "string",
+  null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, "event_id"), "string", null) | where
+  cmd_line IS NOT NULL AND process_name IS NOT NULL | where process_name="mshta.exe"
+  AND (like (cmd_line, "%http://%") OR like (cmd_line, "%https://%")) | eval start_time=timestamp,
+  end_time=timestamp, entities=mvappend(ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"),
+  "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)),
+  body=create_map(["event_id", event_id, "cmd_line", cmd_line, "process_name", process_name,
+  "parent_process_name", parent_process_name, "process_path", process_path]) | into
+  write_ssa_detected_events();'
+tags:
+  analytic_story:
+  - Suspicious MSHTA Activity
+  - Living Off The Land
+  cis20:
+  - CIS 8
+  confidence: 100
+  context:
+  - Source:Endpoint
+  - Stage:Defense Evasion
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log
+  impact: 80
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Exploitation
+  message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified
+    on endpoint $dest_device_id$ by user $dest_user_id$ attempting to access a remote
+    destination to download an additional payload.
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1218.005
+  - T1218
+  nist:
+  - PR.PT
+  - DE.CM
+  observable:
+  - name: dest_user_id
+    role:
+    - Victim
+    type: User
+  - name: dest_device_id
+    role:
+    - Victim
+    type: Hostname
+  - name: parent_process_name
+    role:
+    - Parent Process
+    type: Parent Process
+  - name: process_name
+    role:
+    - Child Process
+    type: Process
+  product:
+  - Splunk Behavioral Analytics
+  required_fields:
+  - _time
+  - dest_device_id
+  - process_name
+  - parent_process_name
+  - process_path
+  - dest_user_id
+  - process
+  - cmd_line
+  risk_score: 80
+  risk_severity: high
+  security_domain: endpoint
+test:
+  name: Windows MSHTA Command-Line URL Unit Test
+  tests:
+  - attack_data:
+    - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log
+      file_name: windows-security.log
+      source: WinEventLog:Security
+    file: endpoint/ssa___windows_mshta_command_line_url.yml
+    name: Windows MSHTA Command-Line URL
+    pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)'
+type: TTP
+version: 1

dist/ssa/srs/ssa___windows_mshta_inline_hta_execution.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+author: Michael Haag, Splunk
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint_Processes
+date: '2022-02-23'
+description: The following analytic identifies "mshta.exe" execution with inline protocol
+  handlers. "JavaScript", "VBScript", and "About" are the only supported options when
+  invoking HTA content directly on the command-line. The search will return the first
+  time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions,
+  as well as the target system, the user, process "mshta.exe" and its parent process.
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
+  on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
+  your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition,
+  confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the
+  endpoint product.
+id: 24962154-9524-11ec-9333-acde48001122
+known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit
+  this behavior, triggering a false positive.
+name: Windows MSHTA Inline HTA Execution
+product:
+- Splunk Behavioral Analytics
+references:
+- https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses
+- https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/
+- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/search/-search-3x-wds-extidx-prot-implementing
+risk_message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified
+  on endpoint $dest_device_id$ by user $dest_user_id$ executing with inline HTA, indicative
+  of defense evasion.
+search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event,
+  "_time"), "string", null)), cmd_line=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"),
+  "string", null)), process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_name"),
+  "string", null)), process_path=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_path"), "string",
+  null), parent_process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, "parent_process_name"), "string",
+  null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, "event_id"), "string", null) | where
+  cmd_line IS NOT NULL AND process_name IS NOT NULL | where process_name="mshta.exe"
+  AND (like (cmd_line, "%vbscript%") OR like (cmd_line, "%javascript%") OR like (cmd_line,
+  "%about%")) | eval start_time=timestamp, end_time=timestamp, entities=mvappend(ucast(map_get(input_event,
+  "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"),
+  "string", null)), body=create_map(["event_id", event_id, "cmd_line", cmd_line, "process_name",
+  process_name, "parent_process_name", parent_process_name, "process_path", process_path])
+  | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
+tags:
+  analytic_story:
+  - Suspicious MSHTA Activity
+  - Living Off The Land
+  cis20:
+  - CIS 8
+  confidence: 100
+  context:
+  - Source:Endpoint
+  - Stage:Defense Evasion
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log
+  impact: 80
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Exploitation
+  message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified
+    on endpoint $dest_device_id$ by user $dest_user_id$ executing with inline HTA,
+    indicative of defense evasion.
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1218.005
+  - T1218
+  nist:
+  - PR.PT
+  - DE.CM
+  observable:
+  - name: dest_user_id
+    role:
+    - Victim
+    type: User
+  - name: dest_device_id
+    role:
+    - Victim
+    type: Hostname
+  - name: parent_process_name
+    role:
+    - Parent Process
+    type: Parent Process
+  - name: process_name
+    role:
+    - Child Process
+    type: Process
+  product:
+  - Splunk Behavioral Analytics
+  required_fields:
+  - _time
+  - dest_device_id
+  - process_name
+  - parent_process_name
+  - process_path
+  - dest_user_id
+  - process
+  - cmd_line
+  risk_score: 80
+  risk_severity: high
+  security_domain: endpoint
+test:
+  name: Windows MSHTA Inline HTA Execution Unit Test
+  tests:
+  - attack_data:
+    - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log
+      file_name: windows-security.log
+      source: WinEventLog:Security
+    file: endpoint/ssa___windows_mshta_inline_hta_execution.yml
+    name: Windows MSHTA Inline HTA Execution
+    pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)'
+type: TTP
+version: 1

dist/ssa/srs/ssa___windows_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+author: Michael Haag, Splunk
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint_Processes
+date: '2022-02-23'
+description: The following analytic identifies "rundll32.exe" execution with inline
+  protocol handlers. "JavaScript", "VBScript", and "About" are the only supported
+  options when invoking HTA content directly on the command-line. This type of behavior
+  is commonly observed with fileless malware or application whitelisting bypass techniques.
+  The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments
+  were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, process
+  "rundll32.exe" and its parent process.
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
+  on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
+  your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition,
+  confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the
+  endpoint product.
+id: 0caa1dd6-94f5-11ec-9786-acde48001122
+known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit
+  this behavior, triggering a false positive.
+name: Windows Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution
+product:
+- Splunk Behavioral Analytics
+references:
+- https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses
+- https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/
+- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/search/-search-3x-wds-extidx-prot-implementing
+risk_message: Suspicious $process_name$ inline HTA execution on $dest_device_id$.
+search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event,
+  "_time"), "string", null)), cmd_line=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"),
+  "string", null)), process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_name"),
+  "string", null)), process_path=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_path"), "string",
+  null), parent_process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, "parent_process_name"), "string",
+  null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, "event_id"), "string", null) | where
+  cmd_line IS NOT NULL AND process_name IS NOT NULL | where process_name="rundll32.exe"
+  AND (like (cmd_line, "%vbscript%") OR like (cmd_line, "%javascript%") OR like (cmd_line,
+  "%about%")) | eval start_time=timestamp, end_time=timestamp, entities=mvappend(ucast(map_get(input_event,
+  "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"),
+  "string", null)), body=create_map(["event_id", event_id, "cmd_line", cmd_line, "process_name",
+  process_name, "parent_process_name", parent_process_name, "process_path", process_path])
+  | into write_ssa_detected_events();'
+tags:
+  analytic_story:
+  - Suspicious MSHTA Activity
+  - NOBELIUM Group
+  - Living Off The Land
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
+  cis20:
+  - CIS 8
+  confidence: 80
+  context:
+  - Source:Endpoint
+  - Stage:Initial Access
+  - Stage:Execution
+  - Stage:Defense Evasion
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log
+  impact: 70
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Exploitation
+  message: Suspicious $process_name$ inline HTA execution on $dest_device_id$.
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1218
+  - T1218.005
+  nist:
+  - PR.PT
+  - DE.CM
+  observable:
+  - name: dest_user_id
+    role:
+    - Victim
+    type: User
+  - name: dest_device_id
+    role:
+    - Victim
+    type: Hostname
+  - name: parent_process_name
+    role:
+    - Parent Process
+    type: Parent Process
+  - name: process_name
+    role:
+    - Child Process
+    type: Process
+  product:
+  - Splunk Behavioral Analytics
+  required_fields:
+  - _time
+  - dest_device_id
+  - process_name
+  - parent_process_name
+  - process_path
+  - dest_user_id
+  - process
+  - cmd_line
+  risk_score: 56
+  risk_severity: medium
+  security_domain: endpoint
+  supported_tas:
+  - Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon
+test:
+  name: Windows Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution Unit Test
+  tests:
+  - attack_data:
+    - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log
+      file_name: windows-security.log
+      source: WinEventLog:Security
+    file: endpoint/ssa___windows_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.yml
+    name: Windows Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution
+    pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)'
+type: TTP
+version: 1

tests/endpoint/ssa___windows_mshta_child_process.test.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+name: Windows MSHTA Child Process Unit Test
+tests:
+- name: Windows MSHTA Child Process
+  file: endpoint/ssa___windows_mshta_child_process.yml
+  pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)'
+  attack_data:
+  - file_name: windows-security.log
+    data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log
+    source: WinEventLog:Security

tests/endpoint/ssa___windows_mshta_command_line_url.test.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+name: Windows MSHTA Command-Line URL Unit Test
+tests:
+- name: Windows MSHTA Command-Line URL
+  file: endpoint/ssa___windows_mshta_command_line_url.yml
+  pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)'
+  attack_data:
+  - file_name: windows-security.log
+    data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log
+    source: WinEventLog:Security

tests/endpoint/ssa___windows_mshta_inline_hta_execution.test.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+name: Windows MSHTA Inline HTA Execution Unit Test
+tests:
+- name: Windows MSHTA Inline HTA Execution
+  file: endpoint/ssa___windows_mshta_inline_hta_execution.yml
+  pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)'
+  attack_data:
+  - file_name: windows-security.log
+    data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log
+    source: WinEventLog:Security

tests/endpoint/ssa___windows_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.test.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+name: Windows Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution Unit Test
+tests:
+- name: Windows Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution
+  file: endpoint/ssa___windows_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.yml
+  pass_condition: '@count_gt(0)'
+  attack_data:
+  - file_name: windows-security.log
+    data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log
+    source: WinEventLog:Security