mirror of
https://github.com/splunk/security_content
synced 2026-06-08 17:32:49 +00:00
updating docs and package bits [ci skip]
This commit is contained in:
+1056
-1056
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
+704
-2112
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
+704
-704
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
+1570
-1922
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
@@ -303,6 +303,49 @@ version = 1
|
||||
|
||||
==Adversary Tactics==
|
||||
|
||||
===Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156===
|
||||
|
||||
Uncover activity consistent with CVE-2021-3156. Discovered by the Qualys Research Team, this vulnerability has been found to affect sudo across multiple Linux distributions (Ubuntu 20.04 and prior, Debian 10 and prior, Fedora 33 and prior). As this vulnerability was committed to code in July 2011, there will be many distributions affected. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability allows any unprivileged user to gain root privileges on the vulnerable host.
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="toccolours mw-collapsible">
|
||||
<div class="mw-collapsible-content">
|
||||
|
||||
====Narrative====
|
||||
A non-privledged user is able to execute the sudoedit command to trigger a buffer overflow. After the successful buffer overflow, they are then able to gain root privileges on the affected host. The conditions needed to be run are a trailing "\" along with shell and edit flags. Monitoring the /var/log directory on Linux hosts using the Splunk Universal Forwarder will allow you to pick up this behavior when using the provided detection.
|
||||
|
||||
====Detections====
|
||||
* Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156
|
||||
* Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 Segfault
|
||||
* Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 via OSQuery
|
||||
|
||||
====Data Models====
|
||||
|
||||
====Tags====
|
||||
|
||||
=====ATT&CK=====
|
||||
* T1068
|
||||
|
||||
=====Kill Chain Phases=====
|
||||
* Exploitation
|
||||
|
||||
=====CIS=====
|
||||
* CIS 12
|
||||
* CIS 16
|
||||
* CIS 8
|
||||
|
||||
=====NIST=====
|
||||
* DE.CM
|
||||
|
||||
====References====
|
||||
* https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-research/2021/01/26/cve-2021-3156-heap-based-buffer-overflow-in-sudo-baron-samedit
|
||||
|
||||
date = 2021-01-27
|
||||
|
||||
version = 1
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
===Collection and Staging===
|
||||
|
||||
Monitor for and investigate activities--such as suspicious writes to the Windows Recycling Bin or email servers sending high amounts of traffic to specific hosts, for example--that may indicate that an adversary is harvesting and exfiltrating sensitive data.
|
||||
@@ -952,7 +995,7 @@ This Analytic Story focuses on detecting signs that a malicious payload has been
|
||||
|
||||
====Detections====
|
||||
* Detect Oulook exe writing a zip file
|
||||
* Suspicious LNK file launching a process
|
||||
* Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location
|
||||
|
||||
====Data Models====
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -292,6 +292,8 @@ Another search detects incidents wherein a single password is used across multip
|
||||
|
||||
## Adversary Tactics
|
||||
|
||||
* [Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156](#Baron-Samedit-CVE-2021-3156)
|
||||
|
||||
* [Collection and Staging](#Collection-and-Staging)
|
||||
|
||||
* [Command and Control](#Command-and-Control)
|
||||
@@ -352,6 +354,43 @@ Another search detects incidents wherein a single password is used across multip
|
||||
|
||||
* [Windows Privilege Escalation](#Windows-Privilege-Escalation)
|
||||
|
||||
### Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156
|
||||
* id = 817b0dfc-23ba-4bcc-96cc-2cb77e428fbe
|
||||
* date = 2021-01-27
|
||||
* version = 1
|
||||
|
||||
#### Description
|
||||
Uncover activity consistent with CVE-2021-3156. Discovered by the Qualys Research Team, this vulnerability has been found to affect sudo across multiple Linux distributions (Ubuntu 20.04 and prior, Debian 10 and prior, Fedora 33 and prior). As this vulnerability was committed to code in July 2011, there will be many distributions affected. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability allows any unprivileged user to gain root privileges on the vulnerable host.
|
||||
|
||||
#### Narrative
|
||||
A non-privledged user is able to execute the sudoedit command to trigger a buffer overflow. After the successful buffer overflow, they are then able to gain root privileges on the affected host. The conditions needed to be run are a trailing "\" along with shell and edit flags. Monitoring the /var/log directory on Linux hosts using the Splunk Universal Forwarder will allow you to pick up this behavior when using the provided detection.
|
||||
|
||||
#### Detections
|
||||
* Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156
|
||||
* Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 Segfault
|
||||
* Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 via OSQuery
|
||||
|
||||
#### Data Models
|
||||
|
||||
#### Mappings
|
||||
|
||||
##### ATT&CK
|
||||
* T1068
|
||||
|
||||
##### Kill Chain Phases
|
||||
* Exploitation
|
||||
|
||||
###### CIS
|
||||
* CIS 12
|
||||
* CIS 16
|
||||
* CIS 8
|
||||
|
||||
##### NIST
|
||||
* DE.CM
|
||||
|
||||
##### References
|
||||
* https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-research/2021/01/26/cve-2021-3156-heap-based-buffer-overflow-in-sudo-baron-samedit
|
||||
|
||||
### Collection and Staging
|
||||
* id = 8e03c61e-13c4-4dcd-bfbe-5ce5a8dc031a
|
||||
* date = 2020-02-03
|
||||
@@ -936,7 +975,7 @@ This Analytic Story focuses on detecting signs that a malicious payload has been
|
||||
|
||||
#### Detections
|
||||
* Detect Oulook exe writing a zip file
|
||||
* Suspicious LNK file launching a process
|
||||
* Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location
|
||||
|
||||
#### Data Models
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
|
||||
"id": {
|
||||
"group": null,
|
||||
"name": "DA-ESS-ContentUpdate",
|
||||
"version": "3.13.0"
|
||||
"version": "3.14.0"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"author": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
||||
#############
|
||||
# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
|
||||
# On Date: 2021-01-27T20:07:16 UTC
|
||||
# On Date: 2021-02-04T22:56:28 UTC
|
||||
# Author: Splunk Security Research
|
||||
# Contact: research@splunk.com
|
||||
#############
|
||||
@@ -16,8 +16,8 @@ version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-cloudtrail-now-tracks-cross-account-activity-to-its-origin/"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - aws detect attach to role policy - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect permanent key creation - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect role creation - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect sts assume role abuse - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect sts get session token abuse - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1550"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["batch - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity"]
|
||||
data_models = []
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
description = Track when a user assumes an IAM role in another AWS account to obtain cross-account access to services and resources in that account. Accessing new roles could be an indication of malicious activity.
|
||||
@@ -34,8 +34,8 @@ version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 12", "CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1535"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP", "ID.AM"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Instance Types", "ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Regions", "ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 AMIs", "ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["batch - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK", "batch - Previously Seen AWS Regions", "batch - Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User", "batch - Previously Seen EC2 AMIs", "batch - Previously Seen EC2 Instance Types"]
|
||||
data_models = []
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
description = Monitor your AWS EC2 instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or EC2 instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior.
|
||||
@@ -53,8 +53,8 @@ version = 2
|
||||
reference = ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonVPC/latest/UserGuide/VPC_Appendix_NACLs.html", "https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/how-to-help-prepare-for-ddos-attacks-by-reducing-your-attack-surface/"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 11", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.007"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "DE.DP", "PR.AC"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of blocked outbound traffic from AWS", "ESCU - Baseline of Network ACL Activity by ARN"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["batch - Baseline of blocked outbound traffic from AWS", "batch - Baseline of Network ACL Activity by ARN"]
|
||||
data_models = []
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
description = Monitor your AWS network infrastructure for bad configurations and malicious activity. Investigative searches help you probe deeper, when the facts warrant it.
|
||||
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://aws.amazon.com/security-hub/features/"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for User - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = []
|
||||
data_models = []
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
@@ -85,8 +85,8 @@ version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Country - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Region - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From City - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From City - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Region - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Country - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["batch - Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources"]
|
||||
data_models = []
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
description = Monitor your AWS provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your network.
|
||||
@@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://redlock.io/blog/cryptojacking-tesla"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect API activity from users without MFA - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS API Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Security Group Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new API calls from user roles - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "DE.DP", "ID.AM", "PR.AC"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of Security Group Activity by ARN", "ESCU - Create a list of approved AWS service accounts", "ESCU - Previously seen API call per user roles in CloudTrail", "ESCU - Baseline of API Calls per User ARN"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["batch - Previously seen API call per user roles in CloudTrail", "batch - Baseline of API Calls per User ARN", "batch - Create a list of approved AWS service accounts", "batch - Baseline of Security Group Activity by ARN"]
|
||||
data_models = []
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
description = Detect and investigate dormant user accounts for your AWS environment that have become active again. Because inactive and ad-hoc accounts are common attack targets, it's critical to enable governance within your environment.
|
||||
@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs/blob/v3.2/dev/rules/REQUEST-944-APPLICATION-ATTACK-JAVA.conf"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Java Classes - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Content-Type Length - Rule", "ESCU - Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 18", "CIS 3", "CIS 4", "CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Delivery", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1082"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.RA", "PR.IP", "PR.MA", "PR.PT", "RS.MI"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Web POSTs From src - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Suspicious Strings in HTTP Header - Response Task"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate Suspicious Strings in HTTP Header - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Web POSTs From src - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = []
|
||||
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
@@ -150,13 +150,29 @@ version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/inventory-of-authorized-and-unauthorized-devices/"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Delivery", "Reconnaissance"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get First Occurrence and Last Occurrence of a MAC Address - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Count of assets by category"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get First Occurrence and Last Occurrence of a MAC Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["batch - Count of assets by category"]
|
||||
data_models = ["Network_Sessions"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
description = Keep a careful inventory of every asset on your network to make it easier to detect rogue devices. Unauthorized/unmanaged devices could be an indication of malicious behavior that should be investigated further.
|
||||
narrative = This Analytic Story is designed to help you develop a better understanding of what authorized and unauthorized devices are part of your enterprise. This story can help you better categorize and classify assets, providing critical business context and awareness of their assets during an incident. Information derived from this Analytic Story can be used to better inform and support other analytic stories. For successful detection, you will need to leverage the Assets and Identity Framework from Enterprise Security to populate your known assets.
|
||||
|
||||
[Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156]
|
||||
category = Adversary Tactics
|
||||
creation_date = 2021-01-27
|
||||
modification_date = 2021-01-27
|
||||
id = 817b0dfc-23ba-4bcc-96cc-2cb77e428fbe
|
||||
version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-research/2021/01/26/cve-2021-3156-heap-based-buffer-overflow-in-sudo-baron-samedit"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 Segfault - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 via OSQuery - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 16", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = []
|
||||
support_searches = []
|
||||
data_models = []
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
description = Uncover activity consistent with CVE-2021-3156. Discovered by the Qualys Research Team, this vulnerability has been found to affect sudo across multiple Linux distributions (Ubuntu 20.04 and prior, Debian 10 and prior, Fedora 33 and prior). As this vulnerability was committed to code in July 2011, there will be many distributions affected. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability allows any unprivileged user to gain root privileges on the vulnerable host.
|
||||
narrative = A non-privledged user is able to execute the sudoedit command to trigger a buffer overflow. After the successful buffer overflow, they are then able to gain root privileges on the affected host. The conditions needed to be run are a trailing "\" along with shell and edit flags. Monitoring the /var/log directory on Linux hosts using the Splunk Universal Forwarder will allow you to pick up this behavior when using the provided detection.
|
||||
|
||||
[Brand Monitoring]
|
||||
category = Abuse
|
||||
creation_date = 2017-12-19
|
||||
@@ -166,8 +182,8 @@ version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://www.zerofox.com/blog/what-is-digital-risk-monitoring/", "https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/consumer/family-safety/what-is-typosquatting/", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2016/06/explained-typosquatting/"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Delivery"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - DNSTwist Domain Names"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["batch - DNSTwist Domain Names"]
|
||||
data_models = ["Email", "Network_Resolution", "Web"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
description = Detect and investigate activity that may indicate that an adversary is using faux domains to mislead users into interacting with malicious infrastructure. Monitor DNS, email, and web traffic for permutations of your brand name.
|
||||
@@ -184,8 +200,8 @@ version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 12", "CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1535"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP", "ID.AM"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Initial", "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Update", "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Destroyed", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Update"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["batch - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Destroyed", "batch - Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Initial", "batch - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Update", "batch - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Initial", "batch - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Update", "batch - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Initial", "batch - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Initial", "batch - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched", "batch - Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Update", "batch - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Update"]
|
||||
data_models = ["Change"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
description = Monitor your cloud compute instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or compute instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior.
|
||||
@@ -203,7 +219,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://www.intego.com/mac-security-blog/osxcoldroot-and-the-rat-invasion/", "https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x2A.html", "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/coldroot-rat-still-undetectable-despite-being-uploaded-on-github-two-years-ago/"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection - Rule", "ESCU - Processes Tapping Keyboard Events - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 4", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Installation"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "DE.DP", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip - Response Task"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = []
|
||||
data_models = []
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
@@ -221,7 +237,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Collection", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1074"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Email files written outside of the Outlook directory - Rule", "ESCU - Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts - Rule", "ESCU - Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious writes to System Volume Information - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036", "T1114.001", "T1114.002"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = []
|
||||
data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
@@ -239,8 +255,8 @@ version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Command_and_Control", "https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/feature/Command-and-control-servers-The-puppet-masters-that-govern-malware"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 11", "CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048", "T1048.003", "T1071.001", "T1071.004", "T1095", "T1189"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.AC", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of blocked outbound traffic from AWS", "ESCU - Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["batch - Baseline of blocked outbound traffic from AWS", "batch - Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK"]
|
||||
data_models = ["Network_Resolution", "Network_Traffic"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
description = Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures leveraged by attackers to establish and operate command and control channels. Implants installed by attackers on compromised endpoints use these channels to receive instructions and send data back to the malicious operators.
|
||||
@@ -289,7 +305,7 @@ version = 3
|
||||
reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1003", "https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for.html"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", "ESCU - Create Remote Thread into LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001", "T1003.002", "T1003.003", "T1059.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Previous Unseen User - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts - Response Task"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Previous Unseen User - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = []
|
||||
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
@@ -307,8 +323,8 @@ version = 2
|
||||
reference = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Create local admin accounts using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Single Letter Process On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 16", "CIS 2", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.002", "T1053.005", "T1059.001", "T1059.003", "T1071.002", "T1112", "T1136.001", "T1204.002", "T1543.003", "T1547.001", "T1562.004"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process File Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process File Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["batch - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", "batch - Previously seen command line arguments"]
|
||||
data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
description = Monitor for suspicious activities associated with DHS Technical Alert US-CERT TA18-074A. Some of the activities that adversaries used in these compromises included spearfishing attacks, malware, watering-hole domains, many and more.
|
||||
@@ -344,7 +360,7 @@ reference = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insight
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS record changed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003", "T1071.004", "T1189"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - DNS Hijack Enrichment - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Discover DNS records"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["batch - Discover DNS records"]
|
||||
data_models = ["Network_Resolution"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
description = Secure your environment against DNS hijacks with searches that help you detect and investigate unauthorized changes to DNS records.
|
||||
@@ -383,7 +399,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/data-protection/", "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/dns/splunk-detect-dns-tunneling-37022", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect USB device insertion - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003", "T1189"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.DS", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = []
|
||||
data_models = ["Change_Analysis", "Network_Resolution"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
@@ -415,8 +431,8 @@ version = 2
|
||||
reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1089", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2015/11/vonteera-adware-uses-certificates-to-disable-anti-malware/", "https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Tools-Report.pdf"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Unload Sysmon Filter Driver - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112", "T1543.003", "T1553.004", "T1562.001", "T1562.004"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["batch - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", "batch - Previously seen command line arguments"]
|
||||
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
description = Looks for activities and techniques associated with the disabling of security tools on a Windows system, such as suspicious `reg.exe` processes, processes launching netsh, and many others.
|
||||
@@ -431,7 +447,7 @@ version = 2
|
||||
reference = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/", "http://www.noip.com/blog/2014/07/11/dynamic-dns-can-use-2/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/08/04/detecting-dynamic-dns-domains-in-splunk.html"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1071.001", "T1189"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "DE.DP", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = []
|
||||
data_models = ["Network_Resolution", "Web"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
@@ -447,8 +463,8 @@ version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-201A", "https://www.first.org/resources/papers/conf2017/Advanced-Incident-Detection-and-Threat-Hunting-using-Sysmon-and-Splunk.pdf", "https://www.vkremez.com/2017/05/emotet-banking-trojan-malware-analysis.html"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of tools built by NirSoft - Rule", "ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 2", "CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Delivery", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.002", "T1059.003", "T1072", "T1547.001", "T1566.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["batch - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK"]
|
||||
data_models = ["Email", "Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
description = Detect rarely used executables, specific registry paths that may confer malware survivability and persistence, instances where cmd.exe is used to launch script interpreters, and other indicators that the Emotet financial malware has compromised your environment.
|
||||
@@ -499,8 +515,8 @@ version = 2
|
||||
reference = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/HIDDEN-COBRA-North-Korean-Malicious-Cyber-Activity", "https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Destructive-Malware-Report.pdf"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious File Write - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 16", "CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001", "T1021.002", "T1048.003", "T1059.001", "T1059.003", "T1070.005", "T1071.002", "T1071.004"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Outbound Emails to Hidden Cobra Threat Actors - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", "ESCU - Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Outbound Emails to Hidden Cobra Threat Actors - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["batch - Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK", "batch - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", "batch - Previously seen command line arguments"]
|
||||
data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Resolution", "Network_Traffic"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
description = Monitor for and investigate activities, including the creation or deletion of hidden shares and file writes, that may be evidence of infiltration by North Korean government-sponsored cybercriminals. Details of this activity were reported in DHS Report TA-18-149A.
|
||||
@@ -564,7 +580,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://github.com/splunk/cloud-datamodel-security-research"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1526"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = []
|
||||
data_models = []
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
@@ -612,7 +628,7 @@ version = 2
|
||||
reference = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/executive-perspective/2015/08/malware_lateral_move.html"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks - Rule", "ESCU - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001", "T1053.005", "T1550.002", "T1558.003"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = []
|
||||
data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
@@ -632,7 +648,7 @@ version = 4
|
||||
reference = ["https://blogs.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/malware-employs-powershell-to-infect-systems/", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Multiple Suspicious Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1027", "T1059.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = []
|
||||
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
@@ -657,8 +673,8 @@ version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/03/04/tracking-locky-ransomware-using-carbon-black/"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Extended Period Without Successful Netbackup Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Unsuccessful Netbackup backups - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - All backup logs for host - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Monitor Unsuccessful Backups", "ESCU - Monitor Successful Backups"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - All backup logs for host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["batch - Monitor Unsuccessful Backups", "batch - Monitor Successful Backups"]
|
||||
data_models = []
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
description = Address common concerns when monitoring your backup processes. These searches can help you reduce risks from ransomware, device theft, or denial of physical access to a host by backing up data on endpoints.
|
||||
@@ -673,7 +689,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 2"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Installation"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = []
|
||||
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
@@ -708,8 +724,8 @@ version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/tn-archive/bb490939(v=technet.10)", "https://htmlpreview.github.io/?https://github.com/MatthewDemaske/blogbackup/blob/master/netshell.html", "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Processes created by netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.004"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["batch - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", "batch - Previously seen command line arguments"]
|
||||
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
description = Detect activities and various techniques associated with the abuse of `netsh.exe`, which can disable local firewall settings or set up a remote connection to a host from an infected system.
|
||||
@@ -741,8 +757,8 @@ version = 2
|
||||
reference = ["https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/orangeworm-targets-healthcare-us-europe-asia", "https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/healthcare-targeted-by-hacker/"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 2", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001", "T1059.003", "T1543.003", "T1569.002"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments", "ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["batch - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial", "batch - Previously seen command line arguments", "batch - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update"]
|
||||
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
description = Detect activities and various techniques associated with the Orangeworm Attack Group, a group that frequently targets the healthcare industry.
|
||||
@@ -758,7 +774,7 @@ modification_date = 2019-04-29
|
||||
id = 57226b40-94f3-4ce5-b101-a75f67759c27
|
||||
version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/spear-phishing-campaign-targets-ukraine-government.html"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Oulook exe writing a zip file - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious LNK file launching a process - Rule"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Oulook exe writing a zip file - Rule", "ESCU - Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001", "T1566.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = []
|
||||
@@ -783,8 +799,8 @@ version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/scope-of-mudcarp-attacks-highlight-1/", "http://blog.amossys.fr/badflick-is-not-so-bad.html"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001", "T1059.003", "T1547.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["batch - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK", "batch - Previously seen command line arguments"]
|
||||
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
description = Monitor your environment for suspicious behaviors that resemble the techniques employed by the MUDCARP threat group.
|
||||
@@ -826,7 +842,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["http://www.novetta.com/2015/02/advanced-methods-to-detect-advanced-cyber-attacks-protocol-abuse/"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048", "T1048.003", "T1071.001", "T1189"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.DS", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = []
|
||||
data_models = ["Network_Resolution", "Network_Traffic"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
@@ -842,8 +858,8 @@ version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://www.carbonblack.com/2017/06/28/carbon-black-threat-research-technical-analysis-petya-notpetya-ransomware/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2017/06/27/closing-the-detection-to-mitigation-gap-or-to-petya-or-notpetya-whocares-.html"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 10", "CIS 12", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 6", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.002", "T1036.003", "T1047", "T1048", "T1053.005", "T1070", "T1070.001", "T1071.001", "T1485", "T1490", "T1547.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "DE.DP", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", "ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["batch - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK", "batch - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK"]
|
||||
data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to ransomware--spikes in SMB traffic, suspicious wevtutil usage, the presence of common ransomware extensions, and system processes run from unexpected locations, and many others.
|
||||
@@ -924,7 +940,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/an-in-depth-analysis-of-samsam-ransomware-and-boss-spider/", "https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2018/07/31/samsam-the-almost-6-million-ransomware/", "https://thehackernews.com/2018/07/samsam-ransomware-attacks.html"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Batch File Write to System32 - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - File with Samsam Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Samsam Test File Write - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 10", "CIS 12", "CIS 16", "CIS 18", "CIS 2", "CIS 3", "CIS 4", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Delivery", "Installation", "Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001", "T1021.002", "T1082", "T1204.002", "T1485", "T1486", "T1490"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "ID.RA", "PR.AC", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.MA", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = []
|
||||
data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic", "Web"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
@@ -946,7 +962,7 @@ reference = ["https://meltdownattack.com/"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Spectre and Meltdown Vulnerable Systems - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 4"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "ID.RA", "PR.IP", "RS.MI"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Systems Ready for Spectre-Meltdown Windows Patch"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["batch - Systems Ready for Spectre-Meltdown Windows Patch"]
|
||||
data_models = ["Vulnerabilities"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
description = Assess and mitigate your systems' vulnerability to Spectre and Meltdown exploitation with the searches in this Analytic Story.
|
||||
@@ -986,7 +1002,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-11409", "https://www.splunk.com/view/SP-CAAAP5E#VulnerabilityDescriptionsandRatings", "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44865/"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 18", "CIS 3", "CIS 4"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "ID.RA", "PR.AC", "PR.IP", "PR.PT", "RS.MI"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip - Response Task"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = []
|
||||
data_models = []
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
@@ -1006,7 +1022,7 @@ reference = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive-attac
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ESCU - Sunburst Correlation DLL and Network Event - Rule", "ESCU - Supernova Webshell - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AdFind Exe - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 18", "CIS 2", "CIS 3", "CIS 4", "CIS 5", "CIS 6", "CIS 7", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Exfiltration", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018", "T1027", "T1053.005", "T1059.003", "T1071.001", "T1071.002", "T1203", "T1505.003", "T1543.003", "T1569.002"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "ID.RA", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = []
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["batch - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial", "batch - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update"]
|
||||
data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic", "Web"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
description = Sunburst is a trojanized updates to SolarWinds Orion IT monitoring and management software. It was discovered by FireEye in December 2020. The actors behind this campaign gained access to numerous public and private organizations around the world.
|
||||
@@ -1021,8 +1037,8 @@ version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 12", "CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1535"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP", "ID.AM"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Regions", "ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User", "ESCU - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["batch - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK", "batch - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK", "batch - Previously Seen AWS Regions", "batch - Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User"]
|
||||
data_models = []
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS EC2 instances for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as EC2 instances that originate from unusual locations or those launched by previously unseen users (among others). Included investigative searches will help you probe more deeply, when the information warrants it.
|
||||
@@ -1038,7 +1054,7 @@ reference = ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integr
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new user AWS Console Login - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1535"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Update previously seen users in CloudTrail", "ESCU - Previously seen users in CloudTrail"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["batch - Update previously seen users in CloudTrail", "batch - Previously seen users in CloudTrail"]
|
||||
data_models = ["Authentication"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
description = Monitor your AWS authentication events using your CloudTrail logs. Searches within this Analytic Story will help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious logins.
|
||||
@@ -1053,8 +1069,8 @@ version = 2
|
||||
reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/security-data-protection/cloud/public-aws-s3-buckets-writable/"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Open S3 buckets - Rule", "ESCU - Detect S3 access from a new IP - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13", "CIS 14"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1530"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "DE.DP", "PR.AC", "PR.DS"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously seen S3 bucket access by remote IP", "ESCU - Baseline of S3 Bucket deletion activity by ARN"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["batch - Baseline of S3 Bucket deletion activity by ARN", "batch - Previously seen S3 bucket access by remote IP"]
|
||||
data_models = []
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS S3 buckets for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as detecting open S3 buckets and buckets being accessed from a new IP. The contextual and investigative searches will give you more information, when required.
|
||||
@@ -1071,8 +1087,8 @@ version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/hiding-cloudcobalt-strike-beacon-c2-using-amazon-apis/"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of blocked outbound traffic from AWS"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["batch - Baseline of blocked outbound traffic from AWS"]
|
||||
data_models = []
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
description = Leverage these searches to monitor your AWS network traffic for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as a spike in blocked outbound traffic in your virtual private cloud (VPC).
|
||||
@@ -1090,8 +1106,8 @@ version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-cloudtrail-now-tracks-cross-account-activity-to-its-origin/", "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integration.html"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by New User - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP", "PR.AC", "PR.DS"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Users In CloudTrail - Update"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["batch - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Update", "batch - Previously Seen Users In CloudTrail - Update", "batch - Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail - Initial", "batch - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Initial"]
|
||||
data_models = ["Authentication"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
description = Monitor your cloud authentication events. Searches within this Analytic Story leverage the recent cloud updates to the Authentication data model to help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious login activity.
|
||||
@@ -1108,7 +1124,7 @@ reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.p
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP", "ID.AM"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Destroyed", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Update", "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Initial"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["batch - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Destroyed", "batch - Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Update", "batch - Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Initial", "batch - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched"]
|
||||
data_models = ["Change"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
description = Monitor your cloud infrastructure provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your cloud environment.
|
||||
@@ -1124,7 +1140,7 @@ reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.p
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["batch - Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update", "batch - Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial"]
|
||||
data_models = ["Change"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
description = Monitor your cloud infrastructure provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your cloud environment.
|
||||
@@ -1141,7 +1157,7 @@ reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.p
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "DE.DP", "ID.AM", "PR.AC"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls Per User", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Update", "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Security Group API Calls Per User"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["batch - Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Initial", "batch - Baseline Of Cloud Security Group API Calls Per User", "batch - Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Update", "batch - Baseline Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls Per User"]
|
||||
data_models = ["Change"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
description = Detect and investigate suspicious activities by users and roles in your cloud environments.
|
||||
@@ -1157,8 +1173,8 @@ version = 2
|
||||
reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1059", "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/macro-malware", "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036.003", "T1059.001", "T1059.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["batch - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK", "batch - Previously seen command line arguments"]
|
||||
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
description = Leveraging the Windows command-line interface (CLI) is one of the most common attack techniques--one that is also detailed in the MITRE ATT&CK framework. Use this Analytic Story to help you identify unusual or suspicious use of the CLI on Windows systems.
|
||||
@@ -1173,8 +1189,8 @@ version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["http://blogs.splunk.com/2015/10/01/random-words-on-entropy-and-dns/", "http://www.darkreading.com/analytics/security-monitoring/got-malware-three-signs-revealed-in-dns-traffic/d/d-id/1139680", "https://live.paloaltonetworks.com/t5/Threat-Vulnerability-Articles/What-are-suspicious-DNS-queries/ta-p/71454"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003", "T1071.004", "T1189"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["batch - Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK"]
|
||||
data_models = ["Network_Resolution"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
description = Attackers often attempt to hide within or otherwise abuse the domain name system (DNS). You can thwart attempts to manipulate this omnipresent protocol by monitoring for these types of abuses.
|
||||
@@ -1189,8 +1205,8 @@ version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/06/26/phishing-hits-a-new-level-of-quality/"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 3", "CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.IP"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - DNSTwist Domain Names"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["batch - DNSTwist Domain Names"]
|
||||
data_models = ["Email", "UEBA"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
description = Email remains one of the primary means for attackers to gain an initial foothold within the modern enterprise. Detect and investigate suspicious emails in your environment with the help of the searches in this Analytic Story.
|
||||
@@ -1225,8 +1241,8 @@ version = 2
|
||||
reference = ["https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/", "https://redcanary.com/blog/windows-registry-attacks-threat-detection/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/005/", "https://medium.com/@mbromileyDFIR/malware-monday-aebb456356c5"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Detect mshta inline hta execution - Rule", "ESCU - Detect mshta renamed - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious mshta child process - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious mshta spawn - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.003", "T1218.005", "T1547.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["batch - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK", "batch - Previously seen command line arguments"]
|
||||
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe process to execute malicious code.
|
||||
@@ -1261,7 +1277,7 @@ version = 2
|
||||
reference = ["https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Graeber-Abusing-Windows-Management-Instrumentation-WMI-To-Build-A-Persistent%20Asynchronous-And-Fileless-Backdoor-wp.pdf", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/wmimplant_a_wmi_ba.html"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Process Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - Script Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Temporary Event Subscription - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047", "T1546.003"], "nist": ["PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = []
|
||||
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
@@ -1279,7 +1295,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://redcanary.com/blog/windows-registry-attacks-threat-detection/", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1112"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.001", "T1546.011", "T1546.012", "T1547.001", "T1547.010", "T1548.002", "T1564.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = []
|
||||
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
@@ -1298,7 +1314,7 @@ reference = ["https://blog.rapid7.com/2020/04/02/dispelling-zoom-bugbears-what-y
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Child Process of Zoom - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.003", "T1068"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process File Activity - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Initial"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["batch - Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Initial", "batch - Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Update"]
|
||||
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
description = Attackers are using Zoom as an vector to increase privileges on a sytems. This story detects new child processes of zoom and provides investigative actions for this detection.
|
||||
@@ -1350,8 +1366,8 @@ version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - EC2 Instance Modified With Previously Unseen User - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Modifications By User"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["batch - Previously Seen EC2 Modifications By User"]
|
||||
data_models = []
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
description = Identify unusual changes to your AWS EC2 instances that may indicate malicious activity. Modifications to your EC2 instances by previously unseen users is an example of an activity that may warrant further investigation.
|
||||
@@ -1367,8 +1383,8 @@ version = 2
|
||||
reference = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/08/monitoring-windows-console-activity-part-two.html", "https://www.splunk.com/pdfs/technical-briefs/advanced-threat-detection-and-response-tech-brief.pdf", "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/logging/detecting-security-incidents-windows-workstation-event-logs-34262"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 2", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1016", "T1036.003", "T1204.002", "T1218.011"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["batch - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK"]
|
||||
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
description = Quickly identify systems running new or unusual processes in your environment that could be indicators of suspicious activity. Processes run from unusual locations, those with conspicuously long command lines, and rare executables are all examples of activities that may warrant deeper investigation.
|
||||
@@ -1385,7 +1401,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://www.monkey.org/~dugsong/dsniff/"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Protocols passing authentication in cleartext - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 14", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Reconnaissance"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.AC", "PR.DS", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = []
|
||||
data_models = ["Network_Traffic"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
@@ -1401,7 +1417,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://www.fbi.gov/scams-and-safety/common-fraud-schemes/internet-fraud", "https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2017-internet-crime-report-released-050718"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Web Fraud - Account Harvesting - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Anomalous User Clickspeed - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Password Sharing Across Accounts - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16", "CIS 6"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1136"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "DE.DP"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Web Session Information via session id - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Web Session Information via session id - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = []
|
||||
data_models = []
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
@@ -1438,7 +1454,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Defense_Evasion"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112", "T1222.001", "T1548.002", "T1564.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = []
|
||||
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
@@ -1454,7 +1470,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2013/12/file-extensions-2/", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1042"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Execution of File with Multiple Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036.003", "T1546.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = []
|
||||
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
@@ -1474,7 +1490,7 @@ version = 2
|
||||
reference = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/", "https://zeltser.com/security-incident-log-review-checklist/", "http://journeyintoir.blogspot.com/2013/01/re-introducing-usnjrnl.html"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 10", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070", "T1070.001", "T1490"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "DE.DP", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = []
|
||||
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
@@ -1491,7 +1507,7 @@ version = 2
|
||||
reference = ["http://www.fuzzysecurity.com/tutorials/19.html", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2010/07/malware-persistence-windows-registry.html", "http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/common-malware-persistence-mechanisms/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/fin7-shim-databases-persistence.html", "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dq2Hv7J9fvk"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005", "T1222.001", "T1543.003", "T1546.011", "T1547.001", "T1547.010", "T1564.001", "T1574.009", "T1574.011"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = []
|
||||
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
@@ -1507,7 +1523,7 @@ version = 2
|
||||
reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Child Processes of Spoolsv exe - Rule", "ESCU - Overwriting Accessibility Binaries - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 2", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068", "T1204.002", "T1546.008", "T1546.012"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.AC", "PR.DS", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = []
|
||||
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
@@ -1523,8 +1539,8 @@ version = 3
|
||||
reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1050", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1031"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 2", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543.003", "T1569.002", "T1574.011"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["batch - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial", "batch - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update"]
|
||||
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
description = Windows services are often used by attackers for persistence and the ability to load drivers or otherwise interact with the Windows kernel. This Analytic Story helps you monitor your environment for indications that Windows services are being modified or created in a suspicious manner.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
||||
#############
|
||||
# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
|
||||
# On Date: 2021-01-27T20:07:16 UTC
|
||||
# On Date: 2021-02-04T22:56:28 UTC
|
||||
# Author: Splunk Security Research
|
||||
# Contact: research@splunk.com
|
||||
#############
|
||||
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-cloudtrail-now-tracks-cross-account-activity-to-its-origin/"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - aws detect sts assume role abuse - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect role creation - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect permanent key creation - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect sts get session token abuse - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect attach to role policy - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - aws detect permanent key creation - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect attach to role policy - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect role creation - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect sts assume role abuse - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect sts get session token abuse - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Track when a user assumes an IAM role in another AWS account to obtain cross-account access to services and resources in that account. Accessing new roles could be an indication of malicious activity.
|
||||
narrative = Amazon Web Services (AWS) admins manage access to AWS resources and services across the enterprise using AWS's Identity and Access Management (IAM) functionality. IAM provides the ability to create and manage AWS users, groups, and roles-each with their own unique set of privileges and defined access to specific resources (such as EC2 instances, the AWS Management Console, API, or the command-line interface). Unlike conventional (human) users, IAM roles are assumable by anyone in the organization. They provide users with dynamically created temporary security credentials that expire within a set time period.\
|
||||
Herein lies the rub. In between the time between when the temporary credentials are issued and when they expire is a period of opportunity, where a user could leverage the temporary credentials to wreak havoc-spin up or remove instances, create new users, elevate privileges, and other malicious activities-throughout the environment.\
|
||||
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Monitor your AWS EC2 instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or EC2 instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior.
|
||||
narrative = Cryptomining is an intentionally difficult, resource-intensive business. Its complexity was designed into the process to ensure that the number of blocks mined each day would remain steady. So, it's par for the course that ambitious, but unscrupulous, miners make amassing the computing power of large enterprises--a practice known as cryptojacking--a top priority. \
|
||||
Cryptojacking has attracted an increasing amount of media attention since its explosion in popularity in the fall of 2017. The attacks have moved from in-browser exploits and mobile phones to enterprise cloud services, such as Amazon Web Services (AWS). It's difficult to determine exactly how widespread the practice has become, since bad actors continually evolve their ability to escape detection, including employing unlisted endpoints, moderating their CPU usage, and hiding the mining pool's IP address behind a free CDN. \
|
||||
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ version = 2
|
||||
references = ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonVPC/latest/UserGuide/VPC_Appendix_NACLs.html", "https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/how-to-help-prepare-for-ddos-attacks-by-reducing-your-attack-surface/"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Monitor your AWS network infrastructure for bad configurations and malicious activity. Investigative searches help you probe deeper, when the facts warrant it.
|
||||
narrative = AWS CloudTrail is an AWS service that helps you enable governance, compliance, and operational/risk auditing of your AWS account. Actions taken by a user, role, or an AWS service are recorded as events in CloudTrail. It is crucial for a company to monitor events and actions taken in the AWS Management Console, AWS Command Line Interface, and AWS SDKs and APIs to ensure that your servers are not vulnerable to attacks. This analytic story contains detection searches that leverage CloudTrail logs from AWS to check for bad configurations and malicious activity in your AWS network access controls.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://aws.amazon.com/security-hub/features/"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for User - Rule", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for User - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance - Rule", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = This story is focused around detecting Security Hub alerts generated from AWS
|
||||
narrative = AWS Security Hub collects and consolidates findings from AWS security services enabled in your environment, such as intrusion detection findings from Amazon GuardDuty, vulnerability scans from Amazon Inspector, S3 bucket policy findings from Amazon Macie, publicly accessible and cross-account resources from IAM Access Analyzer, and resources lacking WAF coverage from AWS Firewall Manager.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Country - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Region - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From City - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From City - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Region - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Country - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Monitor your AWS provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your network.
|
||||
narrative = Because most enterprise AWS activities originate from familiar geographic locations, monitoring for activity from unknown or unusual regions is an important security measure. This indicator can be especially useful in environments where it is impossible to add specific IPs to an allow list because they vary. \
|
||||
This Analytic Story was designed to provide you with flexibility in the precision you employ in specifying legitimate geographic regions. It can be as specific as an IP address or a city, or as broad as a region (think state) or an entire country. By determining how precise you want your geographical locations to be and monitoring for new locations that haven't previously accessed your environment, you can detect adversaries as they begin to probe your environment. Since there are legitimate reasons for activities from unfamiliar locations, this is not a standalone indicator. Nevertheless, location can be a relevant piece of information that you may wish to investigate further.
|
||||
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://redlock.io/blog/cryptojacking-tesla"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS API Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect API activity from users without MFA - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new API calls from user roles - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Security Group Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new API calls from user roles - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Security Group Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect API activity from users without MFA - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS API Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Detect and investigate dormant user accounts for your AWS environment that have become active again. Because inactive and ad-hoc accounts are common attack targets, it's critical to enable governance within your environment.
|
||||
narrative = It seems obvious that it is critical to monitor and control the users who have access to your cloud infrastructure. Nevertheless, it's all too common for enterprises to lose track of ad-hoc accounts, leaving their servers vulnerable to attack. In fact, this was the very oversight that led to Tesla's cryptojacking attack in February, 2018.\
|
||||
In addition to compromising the security of your data, when bad actors leverage your compute resources, it can incur monumental costs, since you will be billed for any new EC2 instances and increased bandwidth usage. \
|
||||
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs/blob/v3.2/dev/rules/REQUEST-944-APPLICATION-ATTACK-JAVA.conf"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Unusually Long Content-Type Length - Rule", "ESCU - Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Java Classes - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Web POSTs From src - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Suspicious Strings in HTTP Header - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Java Classes - Rule", "ESCU - Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Content-Type Length - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Suspicious Strings in HTTP Header - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Web POSTs From src - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Detect and investigate activities--such as unusually long `Content-Type` length, suspicious java classes and web servers executing suspicious processes--consistent with attempts to exploit Apache Struts vulnerabilities.
|
||||
narrative = In March of 2017, a remote code-execution vulnerability in the Jakarta Multipart parser in Apache Struts, a widely used open-source framework for creating Java web applications, was disclosed and assigned to CVE-2017-5638. About two months later, hackers exploited the flaw to carry out the world's <a href=https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2017/09/07/nations-biggest-hacks-and-data-breaches-millions/644311001/> 5th largest data breach</a>. The target, credit giant Equifax, <a href=https://money.cnn.com/2017/09/16/technology/equifax-breach-security-hole/index.html>told investigators</a> that it had become aware of the vulnerability two months before the attack. \
|
||||
The exploit involved manipulating the `Content-Type HTTP` header to execute commands embedded in the header.\
|
||||
@@ -113,10 +113,21 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/inventory-of-authorized-and-unauthorized-devices/"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get First Occurrence and Last Occurrence of a MAC Address - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address - Rule", "ESCU - Get First Occurrence and Last Occurrence of a MAC Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Keep a careful inventory of every asset on your network to make it easier to detect rogue devices. Unauthorized/unmanaged devices could be an indication of malicious behavior that should be investigated further.
|
||||
narrative = This Analytic Story is designed to help you develop a better understanding of what authorized and unauthorized devices are part of your enterprise. This story can help you better categorize and classify assets, providing critical business context and awareness of their assets during an incident. Information derived from this Analytic Story can be used to better inform and support other analytic stories. For successful detection, you will need to leverage the Assets and Identity Framework from Enterprise Security to populate your known assets.
|
||||
|
||||
[analytic_story://Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156]
|
||||
category = Adversary Tactics
|
||||
last_updated = 2021-01-27
|
||||
version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-research/2021/01/26/cve-2021-3156-heap-based-buffer-overflow-in-sudo-baron-samedit"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Shannon Davis"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 Segfault - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 via OSQuery - Rule"]
|
||||
description = Uncover activity consistent with CVE-2021-3156. Discovered by the Qualys Research Team, this vulnerability has been found to affect sudo across multiple Linux distributions (Ubuntu 20.04 and prior, Debian 10 and prior, Fedora 33 and prior). As this vulnerability was committed to code in July 2011, there will be many distributions affected. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability allows any unprivileged user to gain root privileges on the vulnerable host.
|
||||
narrative = A non-privledged user is able to execute the sudoedit command to trigger a buffer overflow. After the successful buffer overflow, they are then able to gain root privileges on the affected host. The conditions needed to be run are a trailing "\" along with shell and edit flags. Monitoring the /var/log directory on Linux hosts using the Splunk Universal Forwarder will allow you to pick up this behavior when using the provided detection.
|
||||
|
||||
[analytic_story://Brand Monitoring]
|
||||
category = Abuse
|
||||
last_updated = 2017-12-19
|
||||
@@ -124,7 +135,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://www.zerofox.com/blog/what-is-digital-risk-monitoring/", "https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/consumer/family-safety/what-is-typosquatting/", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2016/06/explained-typosquatting/"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Detect and investigate activity that may indicate that an adversary is using faux domains to mislead users into interacting with malicious infrastructure. Monitor DNS, email, and web traffic for permutations of your brand name.
|
||||
narrative = While you can educate your users and customers about the risks and threats posed by typosquatting, phishing, and corporate espionage, human error is a persistent fact of life. Of course, your adversaries are all too aware of this reality and will happily leverage it for nefarious purposes whenever possible3phishing with lookalike addresses, embedding faux command-and-control domains in malware, and hosting malicious content on domains that closely mimic your corporate servers. This is where brand monitoring comes in.\
|
||||
You can use our adaptation of `DNSTwist`, together with the support searches in this Analytic Story, to generate permutations of specified brands and external domains. Splunk can monitor email, DNS requests, and web traffic for these permutations and provide you with early warnings and situational awareness--powerful elements of an effective defense.\
|
||||
@@ -137,7 +148,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image - Rule", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Monitor your cloud compute instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or compute instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior.
|
||||
narrative = Cryptomining is an intentionally difficult, resource-intensive business. Its complexity was designed into the process to ensure that the number of blocks mined each day would remain steady. So, it's par for the course that ambitious, but unscrupulous, miners make amassing the computing power of large enterprises--a practice known as cryptojacking--a top priority. \
|
||||
Cryptojacking has attracted an increasing amount of media attention since its explosion in popularity in the fall of 2017. The attacks have moved from in-browser exploits and mobile phones to enterprise cloud services, such as Amazon Web Services (AWS), Google Cloud Platform (GCP), and Azure. It's difficult to determine exactly how widespread the practice has become, since bad actors continually evolve their ability to escape detection, including employing unlisted endpoints, moderating their CPU usage, and hiding the mining pool's IP address behind a free CDN. \
|
||||
@@ -151,7 +162,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://www.intego.com/mac-security-blog/osxcoldroot-and-the-rat-invasion/", "https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x2A.html", "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/coldroot-rat-still-undetectable-despite-being-uploaded-on-github-two-years-ago/"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Jose Hernandez"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection - Rule", "ESCU - Processes Tapping Keyboard Events - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Processes Tapping Keyboard Events - Rule", "ESCU - Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that relate to the ColdRoot Remote Access Trojan that affects MacOS. An example of some of these activities are changing sensative binaries in the MacOS sub-system, detecting process names and executables associated with the RAT, detecting when a keyboard tab is installed on a MacOS machine and more.
|
||||
narrative = Conventional wisdom holds that Apple's MacOS operating system is significantly less vulnerable to attack than Windows machines. While that point is debatable, it is true that attacks against MacOS systems are much less common. However, this fact does not mean that Macs are impervious to breaches. To the contrary, research has shown that that Mac malware is increasing at an alarming rate. According to AV-test, in 2018, there were 86,865 new MacOS malware variants, up from 27,338 the year before—a 31% increase. In contrast, the independent research firm found that new Windows malware had increased from 65.17M to 76.86M during that same period, less than half the rate of growth. The bottom line is that while the numbers look a lot smaller than Windows, it's definitely time to take Mac security more seriously.\
|
||||
This Analytic Story addresses the ColdRoot remote access trojan (RAT), which was uploaded to Github in 2016, but was still escaping detection by the first quarter of 2018, when a new, more feature-rich variant was discovered masquerading as an Apple audio driver. Among other capabilities, the Pascal-based ColdRoot can heist passwords from users' keychains and remotely control infected machines without detection. In the initial report of his findings, Patrick Wardle, Chief Research Officer for Digita Security, explained that the new ColdRoot RAT could start and kill processes on the breached system, spawn new remote-desktop sessions, take screen captures and assemble them into a live stream of the victim's desktop, and more.\
|
||||
@@ -164,7 +175,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Collection", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1074"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts - Rule", "ESCU - Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin - Rule", "ESCU - Email files written outside of the Outlook directory - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious writes to System Volume Information - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Email files written outside of the Outlook directory - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious writes to System Volume Information - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin - Rule", "ESCU - Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server - Rule", "ESCU - Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Monitor for and investigate activities--such as suspicious writes to the Windows Recycling Bin or email servers sending high amounts of traffic to specific hosts, for example--that may indicate that an adversary is harvesting and exfiltrating sensitive data.
|
||||
narrative = A common adversary goal is to identify and exfiltrate data of value from a target organization. This data may include email conversations and addresses, confidential company information, links to network design/infrastructure, important dates, and so on.\
|
||||
Attacks are composed of three activities: identification, collection, and staging data for exfiltration. Identification typically involves scanning systems and observing user activity. Collection can involve the transfer of large amounts of data from various repositories. Staging/preparation includes moving data to a central location and compressing (and optionally encoding and/or encrypting) it. All of these activities provide opportunities for defenders to identify their presence. \
|
||||
@@ -177,7 +188,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Command_and_Control", "https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/feature/Command-and-control-servers-The-puppet-masters-that-govern-malware"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures leveraged by attackers to establish and operate command and control channels. Implants installed by attackers on compromised endpoints use these channels to receive instructions and send data back to the malicious operators.
|
||||
narrative = Threat actors typically architect and implement an infrastructure to use in various ways during the course of their attack campaigns. In some cases, they leverage this infrastructure for scanning and performing reconnaissance activities. In others, they may use this infrastructure to launch actual attacks. One of the most important functions of this infrastructure is to establish servers that will communicate with implants on compromised endpoints. These servers establish a command and control channel that is used to proxy data between the compromised endpoint and the attacker. These channels relay commands from the attacker to the compromised endpoint and the output of those commands back to the attacker.\
|
||||
Because this communication is so critical for an adversary, they often use techniques designed to hide the true nature of the communications. There are many different techniques used to establish and communicate over these channels. This Analytic Story provides searches that look for a variety of the techniques used for these channels, as well as indications that these channels are active, by examining logs associated with border control devices and network-access control lists.
|
||||
@@ -201,7 +212,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://github.com/splunk/cloud-datamodel-security-research"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - New container uploaded to AWS ECR - Rule", "ESCU - GCP GCR container uploaded - Rule"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - GCP GCR container uploaded - Rule", "ESCU - New container uploaded to AWS ECR - Rule"]
|
||||
description = Use the searches in this story to monitor your Kubernetes registry repositories for upload, and deployment of potentially vulnerable, backdoor, or implanted containers. These searches provide information on source users, destination path, container names and repository names. The searches provide context to address Mitre T1525 which refers to container implantation upload to a company's repository either in Amazon Elastic Container Registry, Google Container Registry and Azure Container Registry.
|
||||
narrative = Container Registrys provide a way for organizations to keep customized images of their development and infrastructure environment in private. However if these repositories are misconfigured or priviledge users credentials are compromise, attackers can potentially upload implanted containers which can be deployed across the organization. These searches allow operator to monitor who, when and what was uploaded to container registry.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -212,7 +223,7 @@ version = 3
|
||||
references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1003", "https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for.html"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Create Remote Thread into LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Previous Unseen User - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Create Remote Thread into LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Previous Unseen User - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Uncover activity consistent with credential dumping, a technique wherein attackers compromise systems and attempt to obtain and exfiltrate passwords. The threat actors use these pilfered credentials to further escalate privileges and spread throughout a target environment. The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify attempts to credential dumping.
|
||||
narrative = Credential dumping—gathering credentials from a target system, often hashed or encrypted—is a common attack technique. Even though the credentials may not be in plain text, an attacker can still exfiltrate the data and set to cracking it offline, on their own systems. The threat actors target a variety of sources to extract them, including the Security Accounts Manager (SAM), Local Security Authority (LSA), NTDS from Domain Controllers, or the Group Policy Preference (GPP) files.\
|
||||
Once attackers obtain valid credentials, they use them to move throughout a target network with ease, discovering new systems and identifying assets of interest. Credentials obtained in this manner typically include those of privileged users, which may provide access to more sensitive information and system operations.\
|
||||
@@ -225,7 +236,7 @@ version = 2
|
||||
references = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Single Letter Process On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Create local admin accounts using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process File Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Create local admin accounts using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Single Letter Process On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process File Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Monitor for suspicious activities associated with DHS Technical Alert US-CERT TA18-074A. Some of the activities that adversaries used in these compromises included spearfishing attacks, malware, watering-hole domains, many and more.
|
||||
narrative = The frequency of nation-state cyber attacks has increased significantly over the last decade. Employing numerous tactics and techniques, these attacks continue to escalate in complexity. \
|
||||
There is a wide range of motivations for these state-sponsored hacks, including stealing valuable corporate, military, or diplomatic dataѿall of which could confer advantages in various arenas. They may also target critical infrastructure. \
|
||||
@@ -251,7 +262,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/", "http://www.noip.com/blog/2014/07/11/dynamic-dns-can-use-2/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/08/04/detecting-dynamic-dns-domains-in-splunk.html"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - DNS record changed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - DNS Hijack Enrichment - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS record changed - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - DNS Hijack Enrichment - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Secure your environment against DNS hijacks with searches that help you detect and investigate unauthorized changes to DNS records.
|
||||
narrative = Dubbed the Achilles heel of the Internet (see https://www.f5.com/labs/articles/threat-intelligence/dns-is-still-the-achilles-heel-of-the-internet-25613), DNS plays a critical role in routing web traffic but is notoriously vulnerable to attack. One reason is its distributed nature. It relies on unstructured connections between millions of clients and servers over inherently insecure protocols.\
|
||||
The gravity and extent of the importance of securing DNS from attacks is undeniable. The fallout of compromised DNS can be disastrous. Not only can hackers bring down an entire business, they can intercept confidential information, emails, and login credentials, as well. \
|
||||
@@ -281,7 +292,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/data-protection/", "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/dns/splunk-detect-dns-tunneling-37022", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Detect USB device insertion - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Detect USB device insertion - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Fortify your data-protection arsenal--while continuing to ensure data confidentiality and integrity--with searches that monitor for and help you investigate possible signs of data exfiltration.
|
||||
narrative = Attackers can leverage a variety of resources to compromise or exfiltrate enterprise data. Common exfiltration techniques include remote-access channels via low-risk, high-payoff active-collections operations and close-access operations using insiders and removable media. While this Analytic Story is not a comprehensive listing of all the methods by which attackers can exfiltrate data, it provides a useful starting point.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -292,7 +303,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1003", "https://github.com/SecuraBV/CVE-2020-1472", "https://www.secura.com/blog/zero-logon", "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-1472"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Jose Hernandez, Stan Miskowicz, David Dorsey, Shannon Davis Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Computer Changed with Anonymous Account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Zerologon via Zeek - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Zerologon via Zeek - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Computer Changed with Anonymous Account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Uncover activity related to the execution of Zerologon CVE-2020-11472, a technique wherein attackers target a Microsoft Windows Domain Controller to reset its computer account password. The result from this attack is attackers can now provide themselves high privileges and take over Domain Controller. The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify attempts to reset Domain Controller Computer Account via exploit code remotely or via the use of tool Mimikatz as payload carrier.
|
||||
narrative = This attack is a privilege escalation technique, where attacker targets a Netlogon secure channel connection to a domain controller, using Netlogon Remote Protocol (MS-NRPC). This vulnerability exposes vulnerable Windows Domain Controllers to be targeted via unaunthenticated RPC calls which eventually reset Domain Contoller computer account ($) providing the attacker the opportunity to exfil domain controller credential secrets and assign themselve high privileges that can lead to domain controller and potentially complete network takeover. The detection searches in this Analytic Story use Windows Event viewer events and Sysmon events to detect attack execution, these searches monitor access to the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process which is an indicator of the use of Mimikatz tool which has bee updated to carry this attack payload.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -303,7 +314,7 @@ version = 2
|
||||
references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1089", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2015/11/vonteera-adware-uses-certificates-to-disable-anti-malware/", "https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Tools-Report.pdf"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Unload Sysmon Filter Driver - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Unload Sysmon Filter Driver - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Looks for activities and techniques associated with the disabling of security tools on a Windows system, such as suspicious `reg.exe` processes, processes launching netsh, and many others.
|
||||
narrative = Attackers employ a variety of tactics in order to avoid detection and operate without barriers. This often involves modifying the configuration of security tools to get around them or explicitly disabling them to prevent them from running. This Analytic Story includes searches that look for activity consistent with attackers attempting to disable various security mechanisms. Such activity may involve monitoring for suspicious registry activity, as this is where much of the configuration for Windows and various other programs reside, or explicitly attempting to shut down security-related services. Other times, attackers attempt various tricks to prevent specific programs from running, such as adding the certificates with which the security tools are signed to a block list (which would prevent them from running).
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -314,7 +325,7 @@ version = 2
|
||||
references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/", "http://www.noip.com/blog/2014/07/11/dynamic-dns-can-use-2/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/08/04/detecting-dynamic-dns-domains-in-splunk.html"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Detect and investigate hosts in your environment that may be communicating with dynamic domain providers. Attackers may leverage these services to help them avoid firewall blocks and deny lists.
|
||||
narrative = Dynamic DNS services (DDNS) are legitimate low-cost or free services that allow users to rapidly update domain resolutions to IP infrastructure. While their usage can be benign, malicious actors can abuse DDNS to host harmful payloads or interactive-command-and-control infrastructure. These attackers will manually update or automate domain resolution changes by routing dynamic domains to IP addresses that circumvent firewall blocks and deny lists and frustrate a network defender's analytic and investigative processes. These searches will look for DNS queries made from within your infrastructure to suspicious dynamic domains and then investigate more deeply, when appropriate. While this list of top-level dynamic domains is not exhaustive, it can be dynamically updated as new suspicious dynamic domains are identified.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -325,7 +336,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-201A", "https://www.first.org/resources/papers/conf2017/Advanced-Incident-Detection-and-Threat-Hunting-using-Sysmon-and-Splunk.pdf", "https://www.vkremez.com/2017/05/emotet-banking-trojan-malware-analysis.html"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Detection of tools built by NirSoft - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of tools built by NirSoft - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Detect rarely used executables, specific registry paths that may confer malware survivability and persistence, instances where cmd.exe is used to launch script interpreters, and other indicators that the Emotet financial malware has compromised your environment.
|
||||
narrative = The trojan downloader known as Emotet first surfaced in 2014, when it was discovered targeting the banking industry to steal credentials. However, according to a joint technical alert (TA) issued by three government agencies (https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-201A), Emotet has evolved far beyond those beginnings to become what a ThreatPost article called a threat-delivery service(see https://threatpost.com/emotet-malware-evolves-beyond-banking-to-threat-delivery-service/134342/). For example, in early 2018, Emotet was found to be using its loader function to spread the Quakbot and Ransomware variants. \
|
||||
According to the TA, the the malware continues to be among the most costly and destructive malware affecting the private and public sectors. Researchers have linked it to the threat group Mealybug, which has also been on the security communitys radar since 2014.\
|
||||
@@ -349,7 +360,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/understanding-service-accounts"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - GCP Detect gcploit framework - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Detect high risk permissions by resource and account - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Detect accounts with high risk roles by project - Rule", "ESCU - gcp detect oauth token abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - gcp detect oauth token abuse - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Detect high risk permissions by resource and account - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Detect gcploit framework - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Detect accounts with high risk roles by project - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Track when a user assumes an IAM role in another GCP account to obtain cross-account access to services and resources in that account. Accessing new roles could be an indication of malicious activity.
|
||||
narrative = Google Cloud Platform (GCP) admins manage access to GCP resources and services across the enterprise using GCP Identity and Access Management (IAM) functionality. IAM provides the ability to create and manage GCP users, groups, and roles-each with their own unique set of privileges and defined access to specific resources (such as Compute instances, the GCP Management Console, API, or the command-line interface). Unlike conventional (human) users, IAM roles are potentially assumable by anyone in the organization. They provide users with dynamically created temporary security credentials that expire within a set time period.\
|
||||
In between the time between when the temporary credentials are issued and when they expire is a period of opportunity, where a user could leverage the temporary credentials to wreak havoc-spin up or remove instances, create new users, elevate privileges, and other malicious activities-throughout the environment.\
|
||||
@@ -362,7 +373,7 @@ version = 2
|
||||
references = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/HIDDEN-COBRA-North-Korean-Malicious-Cyber-Activity", "https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Destructive-Malware-Report.pdf"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious File Write - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Outbound Emails to Hidden Cobra Threat Actors - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious File Write - Rule", "ESCU - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Outbound Emails to Hidden Cobra Threat Actors - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Monitor for and investigate activities, including the creation or deletion of hidden shares and file writes, that may be evidence of infiltration by North Korean government-sponsored cybercriminals. Details of this activity were reported in DHS Report TA-18-149A.
|
||||
narrative = North Korea's government-sponsored "cyber army" has been slowly building momentum and gaining sophistication over the last 15 years or so. As a result, the group's activity, which the US government refers to as "Hidden Cobra," has surreptitiously crept onto the collective radar as a preeminent global threat.\
|
||||
These state-sponsored actors are thought to be responsible for everything from a hack on a South Korean nuclear plant to an attack on Sony in anticipation of its release of the movie "The Interview" at the end of 2014. They're also notorious for cyberespionage. In recent years, the group seems to be focused on financial crimes, such as cryptojacking.\
|
||||
@@ -376,7 +387,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2016/09/hosts-file-hijacks/"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Windows hosts file modification - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Windows hosts file modification - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Detect evidence of tactics used to redirect traffic from a host to a destination other than the one intended--potentially one that is part of an adversary's attack infrastructure. An example is redirecting communications regarding patches and updates or misleading users into visiting a malicious website.
|
||||
narrative = Attackers will often attempt to manipulate client communications for nefarious purposes. In some cases, an attacker may endeavor to modify a local host file to redirect communications with resources (such as antivirus or system-update services) to prevent clients from receiving patches or updates. In other cases, an attacker might use this tactic to have the client connect to a site that looks like the intended site, but instead installs malware or collects information from the victim. Additionally, an attacker may redirect a victim in order to execute a MITM attack and observe communications.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -412,7 +423,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://github.com/splunk/cloud-datamodel-security-research"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = This story addresses detection against Kubernetes cluster fingerprint scan and attack by providing information on items such as source ip, user agent, cluster names.
|
||||
narrative = Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration platform contains sensitve information and management priviledges of production workloads, microservices and applications. These searches allow operator to detect suspicious unauthenticated requests from the internet to kubernetes cluster.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -423,7 +434,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/approaching-kubernetes-security-detecting-kubernetes-scan-with-splunk.html"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = This story addresses detection and response of accounts acccesing Kubernetes cluster sensitive objects such as configmaps or secrets providing information on items such as user user, group. object, namespace and authorization reason.
|
||||
narrative = Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration platform contains sensitive objects within its architecture, specifically configmaps and secrets, if accessed by an attacker can lead to further compromise. These searches allow operator to detect suspicious requests against Kubernetes sensitive objects.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -434,7 +445,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/approaching-kubernetes-security-detecting-kubernetes-scan-with-splunk.html"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect RBAC authorizations by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect most active service accounts by pod namespace - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect most active service accounts by pod namespace - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect RBAC authorizations by account - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = This story addresses detection and response around Sensitive Role usage within a Kubernetes clusters against cluster resources and namespaces.
|
||||
narrative = Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration platform contains sensitive roles within its architecture, specifically configmaps and secrets, if accessed by an attacker can lead to further compromise. These searches allow operator to detect suspicious requests against Kubernetes role activities
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -445,7 +456,7 @@ version = 2
|
||||
references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/executive-perspective/2015/08/malware_lateral_move.html"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ESCU - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ESCU - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures around how attackers move laterally within the enterprise. Because lateral movement can expose the adversary to detection, it should be an important focus for security analysts.
|
||||
narrative = Once attackers gain a foothold within an enterprise, they will seek to expand their accesses and leverage techniques that facilitate lateral movement. Attackers will often spend quite a bit of time and effort moving laterally. Because lateral movement renders an attacker the most vulnerable to detection, it's an excellent focus for detection and investigation.\
|
||||
Indications of lateral movement can include the abuse of system utilities (such as `psexec.exe`), unauthorized use of remote desktop services, `file/admin$` shares, WMI, PowerShell, pass-the-hash, or the abuse of scheduled tasks. Organizations must be extra vigilant in detecting lateral movement techniques and look for suspicious activity in and around high-value strategic network assets, such as Active Directory, which are often considered the primary target or "crown jewels" to a persistent threat actor.\
|
||||
@@ -460,7 +471,7 @@ version = 4
|
||||
references = ["https://blogs.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/malware-employs-powershell-to-infect-systems/", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Multiple Suspicious Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Multiple Suspicious Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Attackers are finding stealthy ways "live off the land," leveraging utilities and tools that come standard on the endpoint--such as PowerShell--to achieve their goals without downloading binary files. These searches can help you detect and investigate PowerShell command-line options that may be indicative of malicious intent.
|
||||
narrative = The searches in this Analytic Story monitor for parameters often used for malicious purposes. It is helpful to understand how often the notable events generated by this story occur, as well as the commonalities between some of these events. These factors may provide clues about whether this is a common occurrence of minimal concern or a rare event that may require more extensive investigation. Likewise, it is important to determine whether the issue is restricted to a single user/system or is broader in scope.\
|
||||
The following factors may assist you in determining whether the event is malicious: \
|
||||
@@ -480,7 +491,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/03/04/tracking-locky-ransomware-using-carbon-black/"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Extended Period Without Successful Netbackup Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Unsuccessful Netbackup backups - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - All backup logs for host - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Unsuccessful Netbackup backups - Rule", "ESCU - Extended Period Without Successful Netbackup Backups - Rule", "ESCU - All backup logs for host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Address common concerns when monitoring your backup processes. These searches can help you reduce risks from ransomware, device theft, or denial of physical access to a host by backing up data on endpoints.
|
||||
narrative = Having backups is a standard best practice that helps ensure continuity of business operations. Having mature backup processes can also help you reduce the risks of many security-related incidents and streamline your response processes. The detection searches in this Analytic Story will help you identify systems that have backup failures, as well as systems that have not been backed up for an extended period of time. The story will also return the notable event history and all of the backup logs for an endpoint.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -491,7 +502,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Identify and investigate prohibited/unauthorized software or processes that may be concealing malicious behavior within your environment.
|
||||
narrative = It is critical to identify unauthorized software and processes running on enterprise endpoints and determine whether they are likely to be malicious. This Analytic Story requires the user to populate the Interesting Processes table within Enterprise Security with prohibited processes. An included support search will augment this data, adding information on processes thought to be malicious. This search requires data from endpoint detection-and-response solutions, endpoint data sources (such as Sysmon), or Windows Event Logs--assuming that the Active Directory administrator has enabled process tracking within the System Event Audit Logs.\
|
||||
It is important to investigate any software identified as suspicious, in order to understand how it was installed or executed. Analyzing authentication logs or any historic notable events might elicit additional investigative leads of interest. For best results, schedule the search to run every two weeks.
|
||||
@@ -516,7 +527,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/tn-archive/bb490939(v=technet.10)", "https://htmlpreview.github.io/?https://github.com/MatthewDemaske/blogbackup/blob/master/netshell.html", "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Processes created by netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Processes created by netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Detect activities and various techniques associated with the abuse of `netsh.exe`, which can disable local firewall settings or set up a remote connection to a host from an infected system.
|
||||
narrative = It is a common practice for attackers of all types to leverage native Windows tools and functionality to execute commands for malicious reasons. One such tool on Windows OS is `netsh.exe`,a command-line scripting utility that allows you to--either locally or remotely--display or modify the network configuration of a computer that is currently running. `Netsh.exe` can be used to discover and disable local firewall settings. It can also be used to set up a remote connection to a host from an infected system.\
|
||||
To get started, run the detection search to identify parent processes of `netsh.exe`.
|
||||
@@ -528,7 +539,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://i.blackhat.com/USA-20/Thursday/us-20-Bienstock-My-Cloud-Is-APTs-Cloud-Investigating-And-Defending-Office-365.pdf"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Patrick Bareiss"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - O365 PST export alert - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious Rights Delegation - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding - Rule", "ESCU - High Number of Login Failures from a single source - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Excessive Authentication Failures Alert - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Disable MFA - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Bypass MFA via Trusted IP - Rule"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - O365 Bypass MFA via Trusted IP - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Disable MFA - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding - Rule", "ESCU - High Number of Login Failures from a single source - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Excessive Authentication Failures Alert - Rule", "ESCU - O365 PST export alert - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious Rights Delegation - Rule"]
|
||||
description = This story is focused around detecting Office 365 Attacks.
|
||||
narrative = More and more companies are using Microsofts Office 365 cloud offering. Therefore, we see more and more attacks against Office 365. This story provides various detections for Office 365 attacks.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -539,7 +550,7 @@ version = 2
|
||||
references = ["https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/orangeworm-targets-healthcare-us-europe-asia", "https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/healthcare-targeted-by-hacker/"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Detect activities and various techniques associated with the Orangeworm Attack Group, a group that frequently targets the healthcare industry.
|
||||
narrative = In May of 2018, the attack group Orangeworm was implicated for installing a custom backdoor called Trojan.Kwampirs within large international healthcare corporations in the United States, Europe, and Asia. This malware provides the attackers with remote access to the target system, decrypting and extracting a copy of its main DLL payload from its resource section. Before writing the payload to disk, it inserts a randomly generated string into the middle of the decrypted payload in an attempt to evade hash-based detections.\
|
||||
Awareness of the Orangeworm group first surfaced in January, 2015. It has conducted targeted attacks against related industries, as well, such as pharmaceuticals and healthcare IT solution providers.\
|
||||
@@ -553,7 +564,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/spear-phishing-campaign-targets-ukraine-government.html"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Splunk Research Team"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious LNK file launching a process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Oulook exe writing a zip file - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Oulook exe writing a zip file - Rule", "ESCU - Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Detect signs of malicious payloads that may indicate that your environment has been breached via a phishing attack.
|
||||
narrative = Despite its simplicity, phishing remains the most pervasive and dangerous cyberthreat. In fact, research shows that as many as [91% of all successful attacks](https://digitalguardian.com/blog/91-percent-cyber-attacks-start-phishing-email-heres-how-protect-against-phishing) are initiated via a phishing email. \
|
||||
As most people know, these emails use fraudulent domains, [email scraping](https://www.cyberscoop.com/emotet-trojan-phishing-scraping-templates-cofense-geodo/), familiar contact names inserted as senders, and other tactics to lure targets into clicking a malicious link, opening an attachment with a [nefarious payload](https://www.cyberscoop.com/emotet-trojan-phishing-scraping-templates-cofense-geodo/), or entering sensitive personal information that perpetrators may intercept. This attack technique requires a relatively low level of skill and allows adversaries to easily cast a wide net. Worse, because its success relies on the gullibility of humans, it's impossible to completely "automate" it out of your environment. However, you can use ES and ESCU to detect and investigate potentially malicious payloads injected into your environment subsequent to a phishing attack. \
|
||||
@@ -571,7 +582,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/scope-of-mudcarp-attacks-highlight-1/", "http://blog.amossys.fr/badflick-is-not-so-bad.html"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "iDefense", "email": "-", "name": "iDefense Cyber Espionage Team"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Monitor your environment for suspicious behaviors that resemble the techniques employed by the MUDCARP threat group.
|
||||
narrative = This story was created as a joint effort between iDefense and Splunk.\
|
||||
iDefense analysts have recently discovered a Windows executable file that, upon execution, spoofs a decryption tool and then drops a file that appears to be the custom-built javascript backdoor, "Orz," which is associated with the threat actors known as MUDCARP (as well as "temp.Periscope" and "Leviathan"). The file is executed using Wscript.\
|
||||
@@ -609,7 +620,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["http://www.novetta.com/2015/02/advanced-methods-to-detect-advanced-cyber-attacks-protocol-abuse/"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Detect instances of prohibited network traffic allowed in the environment, as well as protocols running on non-standard ports. Both of these types of behaviors typically violate policy and can be leveraged by attackers.
|
||||
narrative = A traditional security best practice is to control the ports, protocols, and services allowed within your environment. By limiting the services and protocols to those explicitly approved by policy, administrators can minimize the attack surface. The combined effect allows both network defenders and security controls to focus and not be mired in superfluous traffic or data types. Looking for deviations to policy can identify attacker activity that abuses services and protocols to run on alternate or non-standard ports in the attempt to avoid detection or frustrate forensic analysts.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -620,7 +631,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://www.carbonblack.com/2017/06/28/carbon-black-threat-research-technical-analysis-petya-notpetya-ransomware/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2017/06/27/closing-the-detection-to-mitigation-gap-or-to-petya-or-notpetya-whocares-.html"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to ransomware--spikes in SMB traffic, suspicious wevtutil usage, the presence of common ransomware extensions, and system processes run from unexpected locations, and many others.
|
||||
narrative = Ransomware is an ever-present risk to the enterprise, wherein an infected host encrypts business-critical data, holding it hostage until the victim pays the attacker a ransom. There are many types and varieties of ransomware that can affect an enterprise. Attackers can deploy ransomware to enterprises through spearphishing campaigns and driveby downloads, as well as through traditional remote service-based exploitation. In the case of the WannaCry campaign, there was self-propagating wormable functionality that was used to maximize infection. Fortunately, organizations can apply several techniques--such as those in this Analytic Story--to detect and or mitigate the effects of ransomware.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -631,7 +642,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/s3-ransomware-part-1-attack-vector/", "https://github.com/d1vious/git-wild-hunt", "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PgzNib37g0M"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - AWS Detect Users creating keys with encrypt policy without MFA - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Detect Users with KMS keys performing encryption S3 - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - AWS Detect Users with KMS keys performing encryption S3 - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Detect Users creating keys with encrypt policy without MFA - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to ransomware. These searches include cloud related objects that may be targeted by malicious actors via cloud providers own encryption features.
|
||||
narrative = Ransomware is an ever-present risk to the enterprise, wherein an infected host encrypts business-critical data, holding it hostage until the victim pays the attacker a ransom. There are many types and varieties of ransomware that can affect an enterprise.Cloud ransomware can be deployed by obtaining high privilege credentials from targeted users or resources.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -642,7 +653,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/executive-perspective/2015/09/the_new_route_toper.html", "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/about/security-center/event-response/synful-knock.html"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Rogue DHCP Server - Rule", "ESCU - Detect ARP Poisoning - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Software Download To Network Device - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Port Security Violation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Traffic Mirroring - Rule", "ESCU - Detect IPv6 Network Infrastructure Threats - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Login Attempts to Routers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Traffic Mirroring - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Login Attempts to Routers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Port Security Violation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Software Download To Network Device - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rogue DHCP Server - Rule", "ESCU - Detect IPv6 Network Infrastructure Threats - Rule", "ESCU - Detect ARP Poisoning - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Validate the security configuration of network infrastructure and verify that only authorized users and systems are accessing critical assets. Core routing and switching infrastructure are common strategic targets for attackers.
|
||||
narrative = Networking devices, such as routers and switches, are often overlooked as resources that attackers will leverage to subvert an enterprise. Advanced threats actors have shown a proclivity to target these critical assets as a means to siphon and redirect network traffic, flash backdoored operating systems, and implement cryptographic weakened algorithms to more easily decrypt network traffic.\
|
||||
This Analytic Story helps you gain a better understanding of how your network devices are interacting with your hosts. By compromising your network devices, attackers can obtain direct access to the company's internal infrastructure— effectively increasing the attack surface and accessing private services/data.
|
||||
@@ -654,7 +665,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/detecting-ryuk-using-splunk-attack-range.html", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/big-game-hunting-with-ryuk-another-lucrative-targeted-ransomware/", "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-302a"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Jose Hernandez"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", "ESCU - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Windows connhost exe started forcefully - Rule", "ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Ryuk Test Files Detected - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Security Account Manager Stopped - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Ryuk Test Files Detected - Rule", "ESCU - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows connhost exe started forcefully - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Security Account Manager Stopped - Rule", "ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the Ryuk ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with Ryuk, Stopping Security Access Manager, DisableAntiSpyware registry key modification, suspicious psexec use, and more.
|
||||
narrative = Cybersecurity Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) released Alert (AA20-302A) on October 28th called “Ransomware Activity Targeting the Healthcare and Public Health Sector.” This alert details TTPs associated with ongoing and possible imminent attacks against the Healthcare sector, and is a joint advisory in coordination with other U.S. Government agencies. The objective of these malicious campaigns is to infiltrate targets in named sectors and to drop ransomware payloads, which will likely cause disruption of service and increase risk of actual harm to the health and safety of patients at hospitals, even with the aggravant of an ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. This document specifically refers to several crimeware exploitation frameworks, emphasizing the use of Ryuk ransomware as payload. The Ryuk ransomware payload is not new. It has been well documented and identified in multiple variants. Payloads need a carrier, and for Ryuk it has often been exploitation frameworks such as Cobalt Strike, or popular crimeware frameworks such as Emotet or Trickbot.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -677,7 +688,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/an-in-depth-analysis-of-samsam-ransomware-and-boss-spider/", "https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2018/07/31/samsam-the-almost-6-million-ransomware/", "https://thehackernews.com/2018/07/samsam-ransomware-attacks.html"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Batch File Write to System32 - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - File with Samsam Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Samsam Test File Write - Rule", "ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - File with Samsam Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Batch File Write to System32 - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Samsam Test File Write - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the SamSam ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with SamSam, RDP brute force attacks, the presence of files with SamSam ransomware extensions, suspicious psexec use, and more.
|
||||
narrative = The first version of the SamSam ransomware (a.k.a. Samas or SamsamCrypt) was launched in 2015 by a group of Iranian threat actors. The malicious software has affected and continues to affect thousands of victims and has raised almost $6M in ransom.\
|
||||
Although categorized under the heading of ransomware, SamSam campaigns have some importance distinguishing characteristics. Most notable is the fact that conventional ransomware is a numbers game. Perpetrators use a "spray-and-pray" approach with phishing campaigns or other mechanisms, charging a small ransom (typically under $1,000). The goal is to find a large number of victims willing to pay these mini-ransoms, adding up to a lucrative payday. They use relatively simple methods for infecting systems.\
|
||||
@@ -724,7 +735,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-11409", "https://www.splunk.com/view/SP-CAAAP5E#VulnerabilityDescriptionsandRatings", "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44865/"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Reduce the risk of CVE-2018-11409, an information disclosure vulnerability within some older versions of Splunk Enterprise, with searches designed to help ensure that your Splunk system does not leak information to authenticated users.
|
||||
narrative = Although there have been no reports of it being exploited, Splunk Enterprise versions through 7.0.1 reportedly have a vulnerability that may expose information through a REST endpoint (read more here: https://www.splunk.com/view/SP-CAAAP5E#VulnerabilityDescriptionsandRatings). NIST has included it in its vulnerability database (read more here: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-11409). The REST endpoint that exposes system information is also necessary for the proper operation of Splunk clustering and instrumentation. Customers should upgrade to the latest version to reduce the risk of this vulnerability.\
|
||||
Splunk Enterprise exposes partial information about the host operating system, hardware, and Splunk license. Splunk Enterprise before 6.6.0 exposes this information without authentication. Splunk Enterprise 6.6.0 and later exposes this information only to authenticated Splunk users. Based on the information exposure, Splunk characterizes this issue as a low severity impact.\
|
||||
@@ -738,7 +749,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor.html", "https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Patrick Bareiss"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AdFind Exe - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Sunburst Correlation DLL and Network Event - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Supernova Webshell - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Sunburst Correlation DLL and Network Event - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AdFind Exe - Rule", "ESCU - Supernova Webshell - Rule"]
|
||||
description = Sunburst is a trojanized updates to SolarWinds Orion IT monitoring and management software. It was discovered by FireEye in December 2020. The actors behind this campaign gained access to numerous public and private organizations around the world.
|
||||
narrative = This Analytic Story supports you to detect Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) from the Sunburst malware. The threat actor behind sunburst compromised the SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll, is a SolarWinds digitally-signed component of the Orion software framework that contains a backdoor that communicates via HTTP to third party servers. The detections in this Analytic Story are focusing on the dll loading events, file create events and network events to detect This malware.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -749,7 +760,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - Rule", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS EC2 instances for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as EC2 instances that originate from unusual locations or those launched by previously unseen users (among others). Included investigative searches will help you probe more deeply, when the information warrants it.
|
||||
narrative = AWS CloudTrail is an AWS service that helps you enable governance, compliance, and risk auditing within your AWS account. Actions taken by a user, role, or an AWS service are recorded as events in CloudTrail. It is crucial for a company to monitor events and actions taken in the AWS Console, AWS command-line interface, and AWS SDKs and APIs to ensure that your EC2 instances are not vulnerable to attacks. This Analytic Story identifies suspicious activities in your AWS EC2 instances and helps you respond and investigate those activities.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -760,7 +771,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integration.html"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Detect new user AWS Console Login - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new user AWS Console Login - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Monitor your AWS authentication events using your CloudTrail logs. Searches within this Analytic Story will help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious logins.
|
||||
narrative = It is important to monitor and control who has access to your AWS infrastructure. Detecting suspicious logins to your AWS infrastructure will provide good starting points for investigations. Abusive behaviors caused by compromised credentials can lead to direct monetary costs, as you will be billed for any EC2 instances created by the attacker.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -771,7 +782,7 @@ version = 2
|
||||
references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/security-data-protection/cloud/public-aws-s3-buckets-writable/"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI - Rule", "ESCU - Detect S3 access from a new IP - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Open S3 buckets - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI - Rule", "ESCU - Detect S3 access from a new IP - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Open S3 buckets - Rule", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS S3 buckets for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as detecting open S3 buckets and buckets being accessed from a new IP. The contextual and investigative searches will give you more information, when required.
|
||||
narrative = As cloud computing has exploded, so has the number of creative attacks on virtual environments. And as the number-two cloud-service provider, Amazon Web Services (AWS) has certainly had its share.\
|
||||
Amazon's "shared responsibility" model dictates that the company has responsibility for the environment outside of the VM and the customer is responsible for the security inside of the S3 container. As such, it's important to stay vigilant for activities that may belie suspicious behavior inside of your environment.\
|
||||
@@ -784,7 +795,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/hiding-cloudcobalt-strike-beacon-c2-using-amazon-apis/"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Leverage these searches to monitor your AWS network traffic for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as a spike in blocked outbound traffic in your virtual private cloud (VPC).
|
||||
narrative = A virtual private cloud (VPC) is an on-demand managed cloud-computing service that isolates computing resources for each client. Inside the VPC container, the environment resembles a physical network. \
|
||||
Amazon's VPC service enables you to launch EC2 instances and leverage other Amazon resources. The traffic that flows in and out of this VPC can be controlled via network access-control rules and security groups. Amazon also has a feature called VPC Flow Logs that enables you to log IP traffic going to and from the network interfaces in your VPC. This data is stored using Amazon CloudWatch Logs.\
|
||||
@@ -798,7 +809,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-cloudtrail-now-tracks-cross-account-activity-to-its-origin/", "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integration.html"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by New User - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by New User - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Monitor your cloud authentication events. Searches within this Analytic Story leverage the recent cloud updates to the Authentication data model to help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious login activity.
|
||||
narrative = It is important to monitor and control who has access to your cloud infrastructure. Detecting suspicious logins will provide good starting points for investigations. Abusive behaviors caused by compromised credentials can lead to direct monetary costs, as you will be billed for any compute activity whether legitimate or otherwise.\
|
||||
This Analytic Story has data model versions of cloud searches leveraging Authentication data, including those looking for suspicious login activity, and cross-account activity for AWS.
|
||||
@@ -810,7 +821,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed - Rule", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed - Rule", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Monitor your cloud infrastructure provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your cloud environment.
|
||||
narrative = Monitoring your cloud infrastructure logs allows you enable governance, compliance, and risk auditing. It is crucial for a company to monitor events and actions taken in the their cloud environments to ensure that your instances are not vulnerable to attacks. This Analytic Story identifies suspicious activities in your cloud compute instances and helps you respond and investigate those activities.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -821,7 +832,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Monitor your cloud infrastructure provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your cloud environment.
|
||||
narrative = Because most enterprise cloud infrastructure activities originate from familiar geographic locations, monitoring for activity from unknown or unusual regions is an important security measure. This indicator can be especially useful in environments where it is impossible to add specific IPs to an allow list because they vary.\
|
||||
This Analytic Story was designed to provide you with flexibility in the precision you employ in specifying legitimate geographic regions. It can be as specific as an IP address or a city, or as broad as a region (think state) or an entire country. By determining how precise you want your geographical locations to be and monitoring for new locations that haven't previously accessed your environment, you can detect adversaries as they begin to probe your environment. Since there are legitimate reasons for activities from unfamiliar locations, this is not a standalone indicator. Nevertheless, location can be a relevant piece of information that you may wish to investigate further.
|
||||
@@ -833,7 +844,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://redlock.io/blog/cryptojacking-tesla"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Detect and investigate suspicious activities by users and roles in your cloud environments.
|
||||
narrative = It seems obvious that it is critical to monitor and control the users who have access to your cloud infrastructure. Nevertheless, it's all too common for enterprises to lose track of ad-hoc accounts, leaving their servers vulnerable to attack. In fact, this was the very oversight that led to Tesla's cryptojacking attack in February, 2018.\
|
||||
In addition to compromising the security of your data, when bad actors leverage your compute resources, it can incur monumental costs, since you will be billed for any new instances and increased bandwidth usage.
|
||||
@@ -845,7 +856,7 @@ version = 2
|
||||
references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1059", "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/macro-malware", "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Leveraging the Windows command-line interface (CLI) is one of the most common attack techniques--one that is also detailed in the MITRE ATT&CK framework. Use this Analytic Story to help you identify unusual or suspicious use of the CLI on Windows systems.
|
||||
narrative = The ability to execute arbitrary commands via the Windows CLI is a primary goal for the adversary. With access to the shell, an attacker can easily run scripts and interact with the target system. Often, attackers may only have limited access to the shell or may obtain access in unusual ways. In addition, malware may execute and interact with the CLI in ways that would be considered unusual and inconsistent with typical user activity. This provides defenders with opportunities to identify suspicious use and investigate, as appropriate. This Analytic Story contains various searches to help identify this suspicious activity, as well as others to aid you in deeper investigation.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -856,7 +867,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["http://blogs.splunk.com/2015/10/01/random-words-on-entropy-and-dns/", "http://www.darkreading.com/analytics/security-monitoring/got-malware-three-signs-revealed-in-dns-traffic/d/d-id/1139680", "https://live.paloaltonetworks.com/t5/Threat-Vulnerability-Articles/What-are-suspicious-DNS-queries/ta-p/71454"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Attackers often attempt to hide within or otherwise abuse the domain name system (DNS). You can thwart attempts to manipulate this omnipresent protocol by monitoring for these types of abuses.
|
||||
narrative = Although DNS is one of the fundamental underlying protocols that make the Internet work, it is often ignored (perhaps because of its complexity and effectiveness). However, attackers have discovered ways to abuse the protocol to meet their objectives. One potential abuse involves manipulating DNS to hijack traffic and redirect it to an IP address under the attacker's control. This could inadvertently send users intending to visit google.com, for example, to an unrelated malicious website. Another technique involves using the DNS protocol for command-and-control activities with the attacker's malicious code or to covertly exfiltrate data. The searches within this Analytic Story look for these types of abuses.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -867,7 +878,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/06/26/phishing-hits-a-new-level-of-quality/"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly - Rule", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Email remains one of the primary means for attackers to gain an initial foothold within the modern enterprise. Detect and investigate suspicious emails in your environment with the help of the searches in this Analytic Story.
|
||||
narrative = It is a common practice for attackers of all types to leverage targeted spearphishing campaigns and mass mailers to deliver weaponized email messages and attachments. Fortunately, there are a number of ways to monitor email data in Splunk to detect suspicious content.\
|
||||
Once a phishing message has been detected, the next steps are to answer the following questions: \
|
||||
@@ -893,7 +904,7 @@ version = 2
|
||||
references = ["https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/", "https://redcanary.com/blog/windows-registry-attacks-threat-detection/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/005/", "https://medium.com/@mbromileyDFIR/malware-monday-aebb456356c5"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect mshta renamed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect mshta inline hta execution - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious mshta child process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious mshta spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious mshta spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious mshta child process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect mshta renamed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect mshta inline hta execution - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe process to execute malicious code.
|
||||
narrative = One common adversary tactic is to bypass application white-listing solutions via the mshta.exe process, which loads Microsoft HTML applications (mshtml.dll) with the .hta suffix. In these cases, attackers use the trusted Windows utility to proxy execution of malicious files, whether an .hta application, javascript, or VBScript.\
|
||||
The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an attacker is leveraging mshta.exe to execute malicious code. \
|
||||
@@ -906,7 +917,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1078", "https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Credential_stuffing", "https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/answer/What-is-a-password-spraying-attack-and-how-does-it-work"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentails From The Same IP - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Account Lockout Events - Rule", "ESCU - Okta User Logins From Multiple Cities - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Failed SSO Attempts - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate User Activities In Okta - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by app - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Okta Account Lockout Events - Rule", "ESCU - Okta User Logins From Multiple Cities - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Failed SSO Attempts - Rule", "ESCU - Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentails From The Same IP - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate User Activities In Okta - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by app - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Monitor your Okta environment for suspicious activities. Due to the Covid outbreak, many users are migrating over to leverage cloud services more and more. Okta is a popular tool to manage multiple users and the web-based applications they need to stay productive. The searches in this story will help monitor your Okta environment for suspicious activities and associated user behaviors.
|
||||
narrative = Okta is the leading single sign on (SSO) provider, allowing users to authenticate once to Okta, and from there access a variety of web-based applications. These applications are assigned to users and allow administrators to centrally manage which users are allowed to access which applications. It also provides centralized logging to help understand how the applications are used and by whom. \
|
||||
While SSO is a major convenience for users, it also provides attackers with an opportunity. If the attacker can gain access to Okta, they can access a variety of applications. As such monitoring the environment is important. \
|
||||
@@ -919,7 +930,7 @@ version = 2
|
||||
references = ["https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Graeber-Abusing-Windows-Management-Instrumentation-WMI-To-Build-A-Persistent%20Asynchronous-And-Fileless-Backdoor-wp.pdf", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/wmimplant_a_wmi_ba.html"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Temporary Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - Process Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Script Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - Script Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon - Rule", "ESCU - Process Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Temporary Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Attackers are increasingly abusing Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI), a framework and associated utilities available on all modern Windows operating systems. Because WMI can be leveraged to manage both local and remote systems, it is important to identify the processes executed and the user context within which the activity occurred.
|
||||
narrative = WMI is a Microsoft infrastructure for management data and operations on Windows operating systems. It includes of a set of utilities that can be leveraged to manage both local and remote Windows systems. Attackers are increasingly turning to WMI abuse in their efforts to conduct nefarious tasks, such as reconnaissance, detection of antivirus and virtual machines, code execution, lateral movement, persistence, and data exfiltration. \
|
||||
The detection searches included in this Analytic Story are used to look for suspicious use of WMI commands that attackers may leverage to interact with remote systems. The searches specifically look for the use of WMI to run processes on remote systems.\
|
||||
@@ -932,7 +943,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://redcanary.com/blog/windows-registry-attacks-threat-detection/", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1112"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Monitor and detect registry changes initiated from remote locations, which can be a sign that an attacker has infiltrated your system.
|
||||
narrative = Attackers are developing increasingly sophisticated techniques for hijacking target servers, while evading detection. One such technique that has become progressively more common is registry modification.\
|
||||
The registry is a key component of the Windows operating system. It has a hierarchical database called "registry" that contains settings, options, and values for executables. Once the threat actor gains access to a machine, they can use reg.exe to modify their account to obtain administrator-level privileges, maintain persistence, and move laterally within the environment.\
|
||||
@@ -957,7 +968,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218/T1218.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler/"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler usage - Rule"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler usage - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule"]
|
||||
description = Monitor and detect behaviors used by attackers who leverage trusted developer utilities to execute malicious code.
|
||||
narrative = Adversaries may take advantage of trusted developer utilities to proxy execution of malicious payloads. There are many utilities used for software development related tasks that can be used to execute code in various forms to assist in development, debugging, and reverse engineering. These utilities may often be signed with legitimate certificates that allow them to execute on a system and proxy execution of malicious code through a trusted process that effectively bypasses application control solutions.\
|
||||
The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an adversary is leveraging microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe to execute malicious code.
|
||||
@@ -969,7 +980,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/001/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1127.001/T1127.001.md", "https://github.com/infosecn1nja/MaliciousMacroMSBuild", "https://github.com/xorrior/RandomPS-Scripts/blob/master/Invoke-ExecuteMSBuild.ps1", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/", "https://github.com/MHaggis/CBR-Queries/blob/master/msbuild.md"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious msbuild path - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Spawn - Rule"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious msbuild path - Rule"]
|
||||
description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the msbuild.exe process to execute malicious code.
|
||||
narrative = Adversaries may use MSBuild to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. MSBuild.exe (Microsoft Build Engine) is a software build platform used by Visual Studio and is native to Windows. It handles XML formatted project files that define requirements for loading and building various platforms and configurations. \
|
||||
The inline task capability of MSBuild that was introduced in .NET version 4 allows for C# code to be inserted into an XML project file. MSBuild will compile and execute the inline task. MSBuild.exe is a signed Microsoft binary, so when it is used this way it can execute arbitrary code and bypass application control defenses that are configured to allow MSBuild.exe execution. \
|
||||
@@ -983,7 +994,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - EC2 Instance Modified With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - EC2 Instance Modified With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Identify unusual changes to your AWS EC2 instances that may indicate malicious activity. Modifications to your EC2 instances by previously unseen users is an example of an activity that may warrant further investigation.
|
||||
narrative = A common attack technique is to infiltrate a cloud instance and make modifications. The adversary can then secure access to your infrastructure or hide their activities. So it's important to stay alert to changes that may indicate that your environment has been compromised. \
|
||||
Searches within this Analytic Story can help you detect the presence of a threat by monitoring for EC2 instances that have been created or changed--either by users that have never previously performed these activities or by known users who modify or create instances in a way that have not been done before. This story also provides investigative searches that help you go deeper once you detect suspicious behavior.
|
||||
@@ -995,7 +1006,7 @@ version = 2
|
||||
references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/08/monitoring-windows-console-activity-part-two.html", "https://www.splunk.com/pdfs/technical-briefs/advanced-threat-detection-and-response-tech-brief.pdf", "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/logging/detecting-security-incidents-windows-workstation-event-logs-34262"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Quickly identify systems running new or unusual processes in your environment that could be indicators of suspicious activity. Processes run from unusual locations, those with conspicuously long command lines, and rare executables are all examples of activities that may warrant deeper investigation.
|
||||
narrative = Being able to profile a host's processes within your environment can help you more quickly identify processes that seem out of place when compared to the rest of the population of hosts or asset types.\
|
||||
This Analytic Story lets you identify processes that are either a) not typically seen running or b) have some sort of suspicious command-line arguments associated with them. This Analytic Story will also help you identify the user running these processes and the associated process activity on the host.\
|
||||
@@ -1008,7 +1019,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://www.monkey.org/~dugsong/dsniff/"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Protocols passing authentication in cleartext - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Protocols passing authentication in cleartext - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Leverage searches that detect cleartext network protocols that may leak credentials or should otherwise be encrypted.
|
||||
narrative = Various legacy protocols operate by default in the clear, without the protections of encryption. This potentially leaks sensitive information that can be exploited by passively sniffing network traffic. Depending on the protocol, this information could be highly sensitive, or could allow for session hijacking. In addition, these protocols send authentication information, which would allow for the harvesting of usernames and passwords that could potentially be used to authenticate and compromise secondary systems.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1019,7 +1030,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://www.fbi.gov/scams-and-safety/common-fraud-schemes/internet-fraud", "https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2017-internet-crime-report-released-050718"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Jim Apger"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Web Fraud - Password Sharing Across Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Anomalous User Clickspeed - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Account Harvesting - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Web Session Information via session id - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Web Fraud - Anomalous User Clickspeed - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Password Sharing Across Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Account Harvesting - Rule", "ESCU - Get Web Session Information via session id - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Monitor your environment for activity consistent with common attack techniques bad actors use when attempting to compromise web servers or other web-related assets.
|
||||
narrative = The Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) defines Internet fraud as the use of Internet services or software with Internet access to defraud victims or to otherwise take advantage of them. According to the Bureau, Internet crime schemes are used to steal millions of dollars each year from victims and continue to plague the Internet through various methods. The agency includes phishing scams, data breaches, Denial of Service (DOS) attacks, email account compromise, malware, spoofing, and ransomware in this category.\
|
||||
These crimes are not the fraud itself, but rather the attack techniques commonly employed by fraudsters in their pursuit of data that enables them to commit malicious actssuch as obtaining and using stolen credit cards. They represent a serious problem that is steadily increasing and not likely to go away anytime soon.\
|
||||
@@ -1035,7 +1046,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://research.checkpoint.com/2020/resolving-your-way-into-domain-admin-exploiting-a-17-year-old-bug-in-windows-dns-servers/", "https://support.microsoft.com/en-au/help/4569509/windows-dns-server-remote-code-execution-vulnerability"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Shannon Davis"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Splunk Stream - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Zeek - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Zeek - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Splunk Stream - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Uncover activity consistent with CVE-2020-1350, or SIGRed. Discovered by Checkpoint researchers, this vulnerability affects Windows 2003 to 2019, and is triggered by a malicious DNS response (only affects DNS over TCP). An attacker can use the malicious payload to cause a buffer overflow on the vulnerable system, leading to compromise. The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify the large response payload for SIG and KEY DNS records which can be used for the exploit.
|
||||
narrative = When a client requests a DNS record for a particular domain, that request gets routed first through the client's locally configured DNS server, then to any DNS server(s) configured as forwarders, and then onto the target domain's own DNS server(s). If a attacker wanted to, they could host a malicious DNS server that responds to the initial request with a specially crafted large response (~65KB). This response would flow through to the client's local DNS server, which if not patched for CVE-2020-1350, would cause the buffer overflow. The detection searches in this Analytic Story use wire data to detect the malicious behavior. Searches for Splunk Stream and Zeek are included. The Splunk Stream search correlates across stream:dns and stream:tcp, while the Zeek search correlates across bro:dns:json and bro:conn:json. These correlations are required to pick up both the DNS record types (SIG and KEY) along with the payload size (>65KB).
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1046,7 +1057,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Defense_Evasion"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Detect tactics used by malware to evade defenses on Windows endpoints. A few of these include suspicious `reg.exe` processes, files hidden with `attrib.exe` and disabling user-account control, among many others
|
||||
narrative = Defense evasion is a tactic--identified in the MITRE ATT&CK framework--that adversaries employ in a variety of ways to bypass or defeat defensive security measures. There are many techniques enumerated by the MITRE ATT&CK framework that are applicable in this context. This Analytic Story includes searches designed to identify the use of such techniques on Windows platforms.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1057,7 +1068,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2013/12/file-extensions-2/", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1042"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule", "ESCU - Execution of File with Multiple Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule", "ESCU - Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Execution of File with Multiple Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Detect and investigate suspected abuse of file extensions and Windows file associations. Some of the malicious behaviors involved may include inserting spaces before file extensions or prepending the file extension with a different one, among other techniques.
|
||||
narrative = Attackers use a variety of techniques to entice users to run malicious code or to persist on an endpoint. One way to accomplish these goals is to leverage file extensions and the mechanism Windows uses to associate files with specific applications. \
|
||||
Since its earliest days, Windows has used extensions to identify file types. Users have become familiar with these extensions and their application associations. For example, if users see that a file ends in `.doc` or `.docx`, they will assume that it is a Microsoft Word document and expect that double-clicking will open it using `winword.exe`. The user will typically also presume that the `.docx` file is safe. \
|
||||
@@ -1072,7 +1083,7 @@ version = 2
|
||||
references = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/", "https://zeltser.com/security-incident-log-review-checklist/", "http://journeyintoir.blogspot.com/2013/01/re-introducing-usnjrnl.html"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Adversaries often try to cover their tracks by manipulating Windows logs. Use these searches to help you monitor for suspicious activity surrounding log files--an essential component of an effective defense.
|
||||
narrative = Because attackers often modify system logs to cover their tracks and/or to thwart the investigative process, log monitoring is an industry-recognized best practice. While there are legitimate reasons to manipulate system logs, it is still worthwhile to keep track of who manipulated the logs, when they manipulated them, and in what way they manipulated them (determining which accesses, tools, or utilities were employed). Even if no malicious activity is detected, the knowledge of an attempt to manipulate system logs may be indicative of a broader security risk that should be thoroughly investigated.\
|
||||
The Analytic Story gives users two different ways to detect manipulation of Windows Event Logs and one way to detect deletion of the Update Sequence Number (USN) Change Journal. The story helps determine the history of the host and the users who have accessed it. Finally, the story aides in investigation by retrieving all the information on the process that caused these events (if the process has been identified).
|
||||
@@ -1084,7 +1095,7 @@ version = 2
|
||||
references = ["http://www.fuzzysecurity.com/tutorials/19.html", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2010/07/malware-persistence-windows-registry.html", "http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/common-malware-persistence-mechanisms/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/fin7-shim-databases-persistence.html", "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dq2Hv7J9fvk"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Monitor for activities and techniques associated with maintaining persistence on a Windows system--a sign that an adversary may have compromised your environment.
|
||||
narrative = Maintaining persistence is one of the first steps taken by attackers after the initial compromise. Attackers leverage various custom and built-in tools to ensure survivability and persistent access within a compromised enterprise. This Analytic Story provides searches to help you identify various behaviors used by attackers to maintain persistent access to a Windows environment.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1095,7 +1106,7 @@ version = 2
|
||||
references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Child Processes of Spoolsv exe - Rule", "ESCU - Overwriting Accessibility Binaries - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Overwriting Accessibility Binaries - Rule", "ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Child Processes of Spoolsv exe - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Monitor for and investigate activities that may be associated with a Windows privilege-escalation attack, including unusual processes running on endpoints, modified registry keys, and more.
|
||||
narrative = Privilege escalation is a "land-and-expand" technique, wherein an adversary gains an initial foothold on a host and then exploits its weaknesses to increase his privileges. The motivation is simple: certain actions on a Windows machine--such as installing software--may require higher-level privileges than those the attacker initially acquired. By increasing his privilege level, the attacker can gain the control required to carry out his malicious ends. This Analytic Story provides searches to detect and investigate behaviors that attackers may use to elevate their privileges in your environment.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1106,7 +1117,7 @@ version = 3
|
||||
references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1050", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1031"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Windows services are often used by attackers for persistence and the ability to load drivers or otherwise interact with the Windows kernel. This Analytic Story helps you monitor your environment for indications that Windows services are being modified or created in a suspicious manner.
|
||||
narrative = The Windows operating system uses a services architecture to allow for running code in the background, similar to a UNIX daemon. Attackers will often leverage Windows services for persistence, hiding in plain sight, seeking the ability to run privileged code that can interact with the kernel. In many cases, attackers will create a new service to host their malicious code. Attackers have also been observed modifying unnecessary or unused services to point to their own code, as opposed to what was intended. In these cases, attackers often use tools to create or modify services in ways that are not typical for most environments, providing opportunities for detection.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1770,6 +1781,36 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Act
|
||||
known_false_positives = Legitimate logon activity by authorized NTLM systems may be detected by this search. Please investigate as appropriate.
|
||||
providing_technologies = []
|
||||
|
||||
[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 - Rule]
|
||||
type = detection
|
||||
asset_type = Endpoint
|
||||
confidence = medium
|
||||
explanation = This search detects the heap-based buffer overflow of sudoedit
|
||||
how_to_implement = Splunk Universal Forwarder running on Linux systems, capturing logs from the /var/log directory. The vulnerability is exposed when a non privledged user tries passing in a single \ character at the end of the command while using the shell and edit flags.
|
||||
annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
|
||||
known_false_positives = unknown
|
||||
providing_technologies = []
|
||||
|
||||
[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 Segfault - Rule]
|
||||
type = detection
|
||||
asset_type = Endpoint
|
||||
confidence = medium
|
||||
explanation = This search detects the heap-based buffer overflow of sudoedit
|
||||
how_to_implement = Splunk Universal Forwarder running on Linux systems (tested on Centos and Ubuntu), where segfaults are being logged. This also captures instances where the exploit has been compiled into a binary. The detection looks for greater than 5 instances of sudoedit combined with segfault over your search time period on a single host
|
||||
annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
|
||||
known_false_positives = If sudoedit is throwing segfaults for other reasons this will pick those up too.
|
||||
providing_technologies = []
|
||||
|
||||
[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 via OSQuery - Rule]
|
||||
type = detection
|
||||
asset_type = Endpoint
|
||||
confidence = medium
|
||||
explanation = This search detects the heap-based buffer overflow of sudoedit
|
||||
how_to_implement = OSQuery installed and configured to pick up process events (info at https://osquery.io) as well as using the Splunk OSQuery Add-on https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/4402. The vulnerability is exposed when a non privledged user tries passing in a single \ character at the end of the command while using the shell and edit flags.
|
||||
annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
|
||||
known_false_positives = unknown
|
||||
providing_technologies = []
|
||||
|
||||
[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Computer Changed with Anonymous Account - Rule]
|
||||
type = detection
|
||||
asset_type = Windows
|
||||
@@ -3104,6 +3145,16 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"
|
||||
known_false_positives = Microsoft may provide updates to these binaries. Verify that these changes do not correspond with your normal software update cycle.
|
||||
providing_technologies = []
|
||||
|
||||
[savedsearch://ESCU - Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location - Rule]
|
||||
type = detection
|
||||
asset_type = Endpoint
|
||||
confidence = medium
|
||||
explanation = This search looks for a process launching an `*.lnk` file under `C:\User*` or `*\Local\Temp\*`. This is common behavior used by various spear phishing tools.
|
||||
how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records filesystem and process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response products, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon.
|
||||
annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]}
|
||||
known_false_positives = This detection should yield little or no false positive results. It is uncommon for LNK files to be executed from temporary or user directories.
|
||||
providing_technologies = []
|
||||
|
||||
[savedsearch://ESCU - Process Execution via WMI - Rule]
|
||||
type = detection
|
||||
asset_type = Endpoint
|
||||
@@ -3559,16 +3610,6 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 7", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation
|
||||
known_false_positives = There are no known false positives.
|
||||
providing_technologies = []
|
||||
|
||||
[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious LNK file launching a process - Rule]
|
||||
type = detection
|
||||
asset_type = Endpoint
|
||||
confidence = medium
|
||||
explanation = This search looks for a ``*.lnk` file under `C:\User*` or `*\Local\Temp\*` executing a process. This is common behavior used by various spear phishing tools.
|
||||
how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records filesystem and process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response products, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon.
|
||||
annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]}
|
||||
known_false_positives = This detection should yield little or no false positive results. It is uncommon for LNK files to execute process from temporary or user directories.
|
||||
providing_technologies = []
|
||||
|
||||
[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule]
|
||||
type = detection
|
||||
asset_type = Endpoint
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
|
||||
is_configured = false
|
||||
state = enabled
|
||||
state_change_requires_restart = false
|
||||
build = 17283
|
||||
build = 18361
|
||||
|
||||
[triggers]
|
||||
reload.analytic_stories = simple
|
||||
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ reload.content-version = simple
|
||||
|
||||
[launcher]
|
||||
author = Splunk
|
||||
version = 3.13.0
|
||||
version = 3.14.0
|
||||
description = Explore the Analytic Stories included with ES Content Updates.
|
||||
|
||||
[ui]
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
||||
#############
|
||||
# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
|
||||
# On Date: 2021-01-27T20:07:16 UTC
|
||||
# On Date: 2021-02-04T22:56:28 UTC
|
||||
# Author: Splunk Security Research
|
||||
# Contact: research@splunk.com
|
||||
#############
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
|
||||
[content-version]
|
||||
version = 3.13.0
|
||||
version = 3.14.0
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -4,91 +4,98 @@ label = AWS Cross Account Activity
|
||||
description = Track when a user assumes an IAM role in another AWS account to obtain cross-account access to services and resources in that account. Accessing new roles could be an indication of malicious activity.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_accesskeyid___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_accesskeyid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_aws_cryptomining]
|
||||
label = AWS Cryptomining
|
||||
description = Monitor your AWS EC2 instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or EC2 instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_aws_network_acl_activity]
|
||||
label = AWS Network ACL Activity
|
||||
description = Monitor your AWS network infrastructure for bad configurations and malicious activity. Investigative searches help you probe deeper, when the facts warrant it.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_aws_security_hub_alerts]
|
||||
label = AWS Security Hub Alerts
|
||||
description = This story is focused around detecting Security Hub alerts generated from AWS
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_aws_suspicious_provisioning_activities]
|
||||
label = AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities
|
||||
description = Monitor your AWS provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your network.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_country___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_region___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_city___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_city___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_region___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_country___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_aws_user_monitoring]
|
||||
label = AWS User Monitoring
|
||||
description = Detect and investigate dormant user accounts for your AWS environment that have become active again. Because inactive and ad-hoc accounts are common attack targets, it's critical to enable governance within your environment.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_user_activities_by_user_field___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_user_activities_by_user_field___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_apache_struts_vulnerability]
|
||||
label = Apache Struts Vulnerability
|
||||
description = Detect and investigate activities--such as unusually long `Content-Type` length, suspicious java classes and web servers executing suspicious processes--consistent with attempts to exploit Apache Struts vulnerabilities.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_posts_from_src___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_suspicious_strings_in_http_header___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_suspicious_strings_in_http_header___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_posts_from_src___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_asset_tracking]
|
||||
label = Asset Tracking
|
||||
description = Keep a careful inventory of every asset on your network to make it easier to detect rogue devices. Unauthorized/unmanaged devices could be an indication of malicious behavior that should be investigated further.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_first_occurrence_and_last_occurrence_of_a_mac_address___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_first_occurrence_and_last_occurrence_of_a_mac_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156]
|
||||
label = Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156
|
||||
description = Uncover activity consistent with CVE-2021-3156. Discovered by the Qualys Research Team, this vulnerability has been found to affect sudo across multiple Linux distributions (Ubuntu 20.04 and prior, Debian 10 and prior, Fedora 33 and prior). As this vulnerability was committed to code in July 2011, there will be many distributions affected. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability allows any unprivileged user to gain root privileges on the vulnerable host.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_brand_monitoring]
|
||||
label = Brand Monitoring
|
||||
description = Detect and investigate activity that may indicate that an adversary is using faux domains to mislead users into interacting with malicious infrastructure. Monitor DNS, email, and web traffic for permutations of your brand name.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_emails_from_specific_sender___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_email_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_emails_from_specific_sender___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_email_info___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_cloud_cryptomining]
|
||||
label = Cloud Cryptomining
|
||||
description = Monitor your cloud compute instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or compute instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_coldroot_macos_rat]
|
||||
label = ColdRoot MacOS RAT
|
||||
description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that relate to the ColdRoot Remote Access Trojan that affects MacOS. An example of some of these activities are changing sensative binaries in the MacOS sub-system, detecting process names and executables associated with the RAT, detecting when a keyboard tab is installed on a MacOS machine and more.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_network_traffic_from_src_ip___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_network_traffic_from_src_ip___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_collection_and_staging]
|
||||
label = Collection and Staging
|
||||
description = Monitor for and investigate activities--such as suspicious writes to the Windows Recycling Bin or email servers sending high amounts of traffic to specific hosts, for example--that may indicate that an adversary is harvesting and exfiltrating sensitive data.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_command_and_control]
|
||||
label = Command and Control
|
||||
description = Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures leveraged by attackers to establish and operate command and control channels. Implants installed by attackers on compromised endpoints use these channels to receive instructions and send data back to the malicious operators.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_common_phishing_frameworks]
|
||||
label = Common Phishing Frameworks
|
||||
@@ -109,14 +116,14 @@ label = Credential Dumping
|
||||
description = Uncover activity consistent with credential dumping, a technique wherein attackers compromise systems and attempt to obtain and exfiltrate passwords. The threat actors use these pilfered credentials to further escalate privileges and spread throughout a target environment. The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify attempts to credential dumping.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_failed_logins_for_multiple_destinations___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_previous_unseen_user___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_hash_attempts___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_ticket_attempts___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_hash_attempts___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_previous_unseen_user___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_failed_logins_for_multiple_destinations___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_ticket_attempts___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_dhs_report_ta18_074a]
|
||||
label = DHS Report TA18-074A
|
||||
description = Monitor for suspicious activities associated with DHS Technical Alert US-CERT TA18-074A. Some of the activities that adversaries used in these compromises included spearfishing attacks, malware, watering-hole domains, many and more.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_file_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_file_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_dns_amplification_attacks]
|
||||
label = DNS Amplification Attacks
|
||||
@@ -144,7 +151,7 @@ label = Data Protection
|
||||
description = Fortify your data-protection arsenal--while continuing to ensure data confidentiality and integrity--with searches that monitor for and help you investigate possible signs of data exfiltration.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_detect_zerologon_attack]
|
||||
label = Detect Zerologon Attack
|
||||
@@ -158,21 +165,21 @@ label = Disabling Security Tools
|
||||
description = Looks for activities and techniques associated with the disabling of security tools on a Windows system, such as suspicious `reg.exe` processes, processes launching netsh, and many others.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_dynamic_dns]
|
||||
label = Dynamic DNS
|
||||
description = Detect and investigate hosts in your environment that may be communicating with dynamic domain providers. Attackers may leverage these services to help them avoid firewall blocks and deny lists.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_emotet_malware__dhs_report_ta18_201a_]
|
||||
label = Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A
|
||||
description = Detect rarely used executables, specific registry paths that may confer malware survivability and persistence, instances where cmd.exe is used to launch script interpreters, and other indicators that the Emotet financial malware has compromised your environment.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_f5_tmui_rce_cve_2020_5902]
|
||||
label = F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902
|
||||
@@ -193,7 +200,7 @@ label = Hidden Cobra Malware
|
||||
description = Monitor for and investigate activities, including the creation or deletion of hidden shares and file writes, that may be evidence of infiltration by North Korean government-sponsored cybercriminals. Details of this activity were reported in DHS Report TA-18-149A.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_outbound_emails_to_hidden_cobra_threat_actors___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_outbound_emails_to_hidden_cobra_threat_actors___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_host_redirection]
|
||||
label = Host Redirection
|
||||
@@ -214,7 +221,7 @@ label = Kubernetes Scanning Activity
|
||||
description = This story addresses detection against Kubernetes cluster fingerprint scan and attack by providing information on items such as source ip, user agent, cluster names.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_gcp_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_amazon_eks_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_amazon_eks_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_gcp_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_kubernetes_sensitive_object_access_activity]
|
||||
label = Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity
|
||||
@@ -235,28 +242,28 @@ label = Lateral Movement
|
||||
description = Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures around how attackers move laterally within the enterprise. Because lateral movement can expose the adversary to detection, it should be an important focus for security analysts.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_malicious_powershell]
|
||||
label = Malicious PowerShell
|
||||
description = Attackers are finding stealthy ways "live off the land," leveraging utilities and tools that come standard on the endpoint--such as PowerShell--to achieve their goals without downloading binary files. These searches can help you detect and investigate PowerShell command-line options that may be indicative of malicious intent.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_monitor_backup_solution]
|
||||
label = Monitor Backup Solution
|
||||
description = Address common concerns when monitoring your backup processes. These searches can help you reduce risks from ransomware, device theft, or denial of physical access to a host by backing up data on endpoints.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_all_backup_logs_for_host___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_all_backup_logs_for_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_monitor_for_unauthorized_software]
|
||||
label = Monitor for Unauthorized Software
|
||||
description = Identify and investigate prohibited/unauthorized software or processes that may be concealing malicious behavior within your environment.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_monitor_for_updates]
|
||||
label = Monitor for Updates
|
||||
@@ -270,7 +277,7 @@ label = Netsh Abuse
|
||||
description = Detect activities and various techniques associated with the abuse of `netsh.exe`, which can disable local firewall settings or set up a remote connection to a host from an infected system.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_office_365_detections]
|
||||
label = Office 365 Detections
|
||||
@@ -284,7 +291,7 @@ label = Orangeworm Attack Group
|
||||
description = Detect activities and various techniques associated with the Orangeworm Attack Group, a group that frequently targets the healthcare industry.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_phishing_payloads]
|
||||
label = Phishing Payloads
|
||||
@@ -298,21 +305,21 @@ label = Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns
|
||||
description = Monitor your environment for suspicious behaviors that resemble the techniques employed by the MUDCARP threat group.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_prohibited_traffic_allowed_or_protocol_mismatch]
|
||||
label = Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch
|
||||
description = Detect instances of prohibited network traffic allowed in the environment, as well as protocols running on non-standard ports. Both of these types of behaviors typically violate policy and can be leveraged by attackers.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_ransomware]
|
||||
label = Ransomware
|
||||
description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to ransomware--spikes in SMB traffic, suspicious wevtutil usage, the presence of common ransomware extensions, and system processes run from unexpected locations, and many others.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_backup_logs_for_endpoint___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_sysmon_wmi_activity_for_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_sysmon_wmi_activity_for_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_backup_logs_for_endpoint___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_ransomware_cloud]
|
||||
label = Ransomware Cloud
|
||||
@@ -347,7 +354,7 @@ label = SamSam Ransomware
|
||||
description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the SamSam ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with SamSam, RDP brute force attacks, the presence of files with SamSam ransomware extensions, suspicious psexec use, and more.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_backup_logs_for_endpoint___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_backup_logs_for_endpoint___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerabilities]
|
||||
label = Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities
|
||||
@@ -368,7 +375,7 @@ label = Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409
|
||||
description = Reduce the risk of CVE-2018-11409, an information disclosure vulnerability within some older versions of Splunk Enterprise, with searches designed to help ensure that your Splunk system does not leak information to authenticated users.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_network_traffic_from_src_ip___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_network_traffic_from_src_ip___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_sunburst_malware]
|
||||
label = Sunburst Malware
|
||||
@@ -382,7 +389,7 @@ label = Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities
|
||||
description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS EC2 instances for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as EC2 instances that originate from unusual locations or those launched by previously unseen users (among others). Included investigative searches will help you probe more deeply, when the information warrants it.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_aws_login_activities]
|
||||
label = Suspicious AWS Login Activities
|
||||
@@ -396,21 +403,21 @@ label = Suspicious AWS S3 Activities
|
||||
description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS S3 buckets for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as detecting open S3 buckets and buckets being accessed from a new IP. The contextual and investigative searches will give you more information, when required.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_s3_bucket_details_via_bucketname___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_s3_bucket_details_via_bucketname___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_aws_traffic]
|
||||
label = Suspicious AWS Traffic
|
||||
description = Leverage these searches to monitor your AWS network traffic for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as a spike in blocked outbound traffic in your virtual private cloud (VPC).
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_cloud_authentication_activities]
|
||||
label = Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities
|
||||
description = Monitor your cloud authentication events. Searches within this Analytic Story leverage the recent cloud updates to the Authentication data model to help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious login activity.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_user_activities_by_user_field___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_user_activities_by_user_field___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_cloud_instance_activities]
|
||||
label = Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities
|
||||
@@ -438,21 +445,21 @@ label = Suspicious Command-Line Executions
|
||||
description = Leveraging the Windows command-line interface (CLI) is one of the most common attack techniques--one that is also detailed in the MITRE ATT&CK framework. Use this Analytic Story to help you identify unusual or suspicious use of the CLI on Windows systems.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_dns_traffic]
|
||||
label = Suspicious DNS Traffic
|
||||
description = Attackers often attempt to hide within or otherwise abuse the domain name system (DNS). You can thwart attempts to manipulate this omnipresent protocol by monitoring for these types of abuses.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_emails]
|
||||
label = Suspicious Emails
|
||||
description = Email remains one of the primary means for attackers to gain an initial foothold within the modern enterprise. Detect and investigate suspicious emails in your environment with the help of the searches in this Analytic Story.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_emails_from_specific_sender___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_email_info___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_emails_from_specific_sender___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_email_info___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_gcp_storage_activities]
|
||||
label = Suspicious GCP Storage Activities
|
||||
@@ -466,7 +473,7 @@ label = Suspicious MSHTA Activity
|
||||
description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe process to execute malicious code.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_okta_activity]
|
||||
label = Suspicious Okta Activity
|
||||
@@ -480,14 +487,14 @@ label = Suspicious WMI Use
|
||||
description = Attackers are increasingly abusing Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI), a framework and associated utilities available on all modern Windows operating systems. Because WMI can be leveraged to manage both local and remote systems, it is important to identify the processes executed and the user context within which the activity occurred.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_sysmon_wmi_activity_for_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_sysmon_wmi_activity_for_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_windows_registry_activities]
|
||||
label = Suspicious Windows Registry Activities
|
||||
description = Monitor and detect registry changes initiated from remote locations, which can be a sign that an attacker has infiltrated your system.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_zoom_child_processes]
|
||||
label = Suspicious Zoom Child Processes
|
||||
@@ -515,28 +522,28 @@ label = Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications
|
||||
description = Identify unusual changes to your AWS EC2 instances that may indicate malicious activity. Modifications to your EC2 instances by previously unseen users is an example of an activity that may warrant further investigation.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_unusual_processes]
|
||||
label = Unusual Processes
|
||||
description = Quickly identify systems running new or unusual processes in your environment that could be indicators of suspicious activity. Processes run from unusual locations, those with conspicuously long command lines, and rare executables are all examples of activities that may warrant deeper investigation.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_use_of_cleartext_protocols]
|
||||
label = Use of Cleartext Protocols
|
||||
description = Leverage searches that detect cleartext network protocols that may leak credentials or should otherwise be encrypted.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_web_fraud_detection]
|
||||
label = Web Fraud Detection
|
||||
description = Monitor your environment for activity consistent with common attack techniques bad actors use when attempting to compromise web servers or other web-related assets.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_web_session_information_via_session_id___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_emails_from_specific_sender___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_web_session_information_via_session_id___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_emails_from_specific_sender___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_windows_dns_sigred_cve_2020_1350]
|
||||
label = Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350
|
||||
@@ -550,42 +557,42 @@ label = Windows Defense Evasion Tactics
|
||||
description = Detect tactics used by malware to evade defenses on Windows endpoints. A few of these include suspicious `reg.exe` processes, files hidden with `attrib.exe` and disabling user-account control, among many others
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_windows_file_extension_and_association_abuse]
|
||||
label = Windows File Extension and Association Abuse
|
||||
description = Detect and investigate suspected abuse of file extensions and Windows file associations. Some of the malicious behaviors involved may include inserting spaces before file extensions or prepending the file extension with a different one, among other techniques.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_windows_log_manipulation]
|
||||
label = Windows Log Manipulation
|
||||
description = Adversaries often try to cover their tracks by manipulating Windows logs. Use these searches to help you monitor for suspicious activity surrounding log files--an essential component of an effective defense.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_windows_persistence_techniques]
|
||||
label = Windows Persistence Techniques
|
||||
description = Monitor for activities and techniques associated with maintaining persistence on a Windows system--a sign that an adversary may have compromised your environment.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_windows_privilege_escalation]
|
||||
label = Windows Privilege Escalation
|
||||
description = Monitor for and investigate activities that may be associated with a Windows privilege-escalation attack, including unusual processes running on endpoints, modified registry keys, and more.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_windows_service_abuse]
|
||||
label = Windows Service Abuse
|
||||
description = Windows services are often used by attackers for persistence and the ability to load drivers or otherwise interact with the Windows kernel. This Analytic Story helps you monitor your environment for indications that Windows services are being modified or created in a suspicious manner.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
+31
-11
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
||||
#############
|
||||
# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
|
||||
# On Date: 2021-01-27T20:07:16 UTC
|
||||
# On Date: 2021-02-04T22:56:28 UTC
|
||||
# Author: Splunk Security Research
|
||||
# Contact: research@splunk.com
|
||||
#############
|
||||
@@ -14,8 +14,8 @@ description = customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcet
|
||||
definition = sourcetype=aws:s3:accesslogs
|
||||
description = customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.
|
||||
|
||||
[aws_securityhub_firehose]
|
||||
definition = sourcetype="aws:securityhub:firehose"
|
||||
[aws_securityhub_finding]
|
||||
definition = sourcetype="aws:securityhub:finding"
|
||||
description = customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.
|
||||
|
||||
[brand_abuse_dns]
|
||||
@@ -118,6 +118,10 @@ description = This macro limits the output to process names that are in the Wind
|
||||
definition = sourcetype=mscs:storage:blob:json
|
||||
description = customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype) for Kubernetes data from Azure. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.
|
||||
|
||||
[linux_hosts]
|
||||
definition = index=*
|
||||
description = customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.
|
||||
|
||||
[netbackup]
|
||||
definition = sourcetype="netbackup_logs"
|
||||
description = customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.
|
||||
@@ -134,6 +138,10 @@ description = customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcet
|
||||
definition = eventtype=okta_log
|
||||
description = customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.
|
||||
|
||||
[osquery_process]
|
||||
definition = eventtype="osquery-process"
|
||||
description = customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.
|
||||
|
||||
[previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role_forget_window]
|
||||
definition = "-90d@d"
|
||||
description = Use this macro to determine how long to keep track of cloud api calls per user role
|
||||
@@ -174,14 +182,14 @@ description = Use this macro to determine how long to keep track of cloud region
|
||||
definition = "-70m@m"
|
||||
description = Use this macro to determine how far into the past the window should be to determine if the region is new or not
|
||||
|
||||
[previously_seen_windows_service_window]
|
||||
definition = "-70m@m"
|
||||
description = Use this macro to determine how far back you should be checking for new Windows services
|
||||
|
||||
[previously_seen_windows_services_forget_window]
|
||||
definition = "-90d@d"
|
||||
description = Use this macro to determine how long to keep track of Windows services
|
||||
|
||||
[previously_seen_windows_services_window]
|
||||
definition = "-70m@m"
|
||||
description = Use this macro to determine how far back you should be checking for new Windows services
|
||||
|
||||
[previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_forget_window]
|
||||
definition = "-90d@d"
|
||||
description = Use this macro to determine how long to keep track of zoom child processes
|
||||
@@ -531,6 +539,18 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_segfault_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_via_osquery_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[detect_computer_changed_with_anonymous_account_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
@@ -1055,6 +1075,10 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[process_execution_via_wmi_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
@@ -1235,10 +1259,6 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[suspicious_lnk_file_launching_a_process_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[suspicious_msbuild_rename_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
+567
-188
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
||||
#############
|
||||
# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
|
||||
# On Date: 2021-01-27T20:07:16 UTC
|
||||
# On Date: 2021-02-04T22:56:28 UTC
|
||||
# Author: Splunk Security Research
|
||||
# Contact: research@splunk.com
|
||||
#############
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
||||
#############
|
||||
# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
|
||||
# On Date: 2021-01-27T20:07:16 UTC
|
||||
# On Date: 2021-02-04T22:56:28 UTC
|
||||
# Author: Splunk Security Research
|
||||
# Contact: research@splunk.com
|
||||
#############
|
||||
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-cloudtrail-now-tracks-cross-account-activity-to-its-origin/"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - aws detect sts assume role abuse - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect role creation - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect permanent key creation - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect sts get session token abuse - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect attach to role policy - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - aws detect permanent key creation - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect attach to role policy - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect role creation - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect sts assume role abuse - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect sts get session token abuse - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Track when a user assumes an IAM role in another AWS account to obtain cross-account access to services and resources in that account. Accessing new roles could be an indication of malicious activity.
|
||||
narrative = Amazon Web Services (AWS) admins manage access to AWS resources and services across the enterprise using AWS's Identity and Access Management (IAM) functionality. IAM provides the ability to create and manage AWS users, groups, and roles-each with their own unique set of privileges and defined access to specific resources (such as EC2 instances, the AWS Management Console, API, or the command-line interface). Unlike conventional (human) users, IAM roles are assumable by anyone in the organization. They provide users with dynamically created temporary security credentials that expire within a set time period.\
|
||||
Herein lies the rub. In between the time between when the temporary credentials are issued and when they expire is a period of opportunity, where a user could leverage the temporary credentials to wreak havoc-spin up or remove instances, create new users, elevate privileges, and other malicious activities-throughout the environment.\
|
||||
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Monitor your AWS EC2 instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or EC2 instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior.
|
||||
narrative = Cryptomining is an intentionally difficult, resource-intensive business. Its complexity was designed into the process to ensure that the number of blocks mined each day would remain steady. So, it's par for the course that ambitious, but unscrupulous, miners make amassing the computing power of large enterprises--a practice known as cryptojacking--a top priority. \
|
||||
Cryptojacking has attracted an increasing amount of media attention since its explosion in popularity in the fall of 2017. The attacks have moved from in-browser exploits and mobile phones to enterprise cloud services, such as Amazon Web Services (AWS). It's difficult to determine exactly how widespread the practice has become, since bad actors continually evolve their ability to escape detection, including employing unlisted endpoints, moderating their CPU usage, and hiding the mining pool's IP address behind a free CDN. \
|
||||
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ version = 2
|
||||
references = ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonVPC/latest/UserGuide/VPC_Appendix_NACLs.html", "https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/how-to-help-prepare-for-ddos-attacks-by-reducing-your-attack-surface/"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Monitor your AWS network infrastructure for bad configurations and malicious activity. Investigative searches help you probe deeper, when the facts warrant it.
|
||||
narrative = AWS CloudTrail is an AWS service that helps you enable governance, compliance, and operational/risk auditing of your AWS account. Actions taken by a user, role, or an AWS service are recorded as events in CloudTrail. It is crucial for a company to monitor events and actions taken in the AWS Management Console, AWS Command Line Interface, and AWS SDKs and APIs to ensure that your servers are not vulnerable to attacks. This analytic story contains detection searches that leverage CloudTrail logs from AWS to check for bad configurations and malicious activity in your AWS network access controls.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://aws.amazon.com/security-hub/features/"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for User - Rule", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for User - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance - Rule", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = This story is focused around detecting Security Hub alerts generated from AWS
|
||||
narrative = AWS Security Hub collects and consolidates findings from AWS security services enabled in your environment, such as intrusion detection findings from Amazon GuardDuty, vulnerability scans from Amazon Inspector, S3 bucket policy findings from Amazon Macie, publicly accessible and cross-account resources from IAM Access Analyzer, and resources lacking WAF coverage from AWS Firewall Manager.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Country - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Region - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From City - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From City - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Region - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Country - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Monitor your AWS provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your network.
|
||||
narrative = Because most enterprise AWS activities originate from familiar geographic locations, monitoring for activity from unknown or unusual regions is an important security measure. This indicator can be especially useful in environments where it is impossible to add specific IPs to an allow list because they vary. \
|
||||
This Analytic Story was designed to provide you with flexibility in the precision you employ in specifying legitimate geographic regions. It can be as specific as an IP address or a city, or as broad as a region (think state) or an entire country. By determining how precise you want your geographical locations to be and monitoring for new locations that haven't previously accessed your environment, you can detect adversaries as they begin to probe your environment. Since there are legitimate reasons for activities from unfamiliar locations, this is not a standalone indicator. Nevertheless, location can be a relevant piece of information that you may wish to investigate further.
|
||||
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://redlock.io/blog/cryptojacking-tesla"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS API Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect API activity from users without MFA - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new API calls from user roles - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Security Group Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new API calls from user roles - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Security Group Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect API activity from users without MFA - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS API Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Detect and investigate dormant user accounts for your AWS environment that have become active again. Because inactive and ad-hoc accounts are common attack targets, it's critical to enable governance within your environment.
|
||||
narrative = It seems obvious that it is critical to monitor and control the users who have access to your cloud infrastructure. Nevertheless, it's all too common for enterprises to lose track of ad-hoc accounts, leaving their servers vulnerable to attack. In fact, this was the very oversight that led to Tesla's cryptojacking attack in February, 2018.\
|
||||
In addition to compromising the security of your data, when bad actors leverage your compute resources, it can incur monumental costs, since you will be billed for any new EC2 instances and increased bandwidth usage. \
|
||||
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs/blob/v3.2/dev/rules/REQUEST-944-APPLICATION-ATTACK-JAVA.conf"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Unusually Long Content-Type Length - Rule", "ESCU - Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Java Classes - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Web POSTs From src - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Suspicious Strings in HTTP Header - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Java Classes - Rule", "ESCU - Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Content-Type Length - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Suspicious Strings in HTTP Header - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Web POSTs From src - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Detect and investigate activities--such as unusually long `Content-Type` length, suspicious java classes and web servers executing suspicious processes--consistent with attempts to exploit Apache Struts vulnerabilities.
|
||||
narrative = In March of 2017, a remote code-execution vulnerability in the Jakarta Multipart parser in Apache Struts, a widely used open-source framework for creating Java web applications, was disclosed and assigned to CVE-2017-5638. About two months later, hackers exploited the flaw to carry out the world's <a href=https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2017/09/07/nations-biggest-hacks-and-data-breaches-millions/644311001/> 5th largest data breach</a>. The target, credit giant Equifax, <a href=https://money.cnn.com/2017/09/16/technology/equifax-breach-security-hole/index.html>told investigators</a> that it had become aware of the vulnerability two months before the attack. \
|
||||
The exploit involved manipulating the `Content-Type HTTP` header to execute commands embedded in the header.\
|
||||
@@ -113,10 +113,21 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/inventory-of-authorized-and-unauthorized-devices/"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get First Occurrence and Last Occurrence of a MAC Address - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address - Rule", "ESCU - Get First Occurrence and Last Occurrence of a MAC Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Keep a careful inventory of every asset on your network to make it easier to detect rogue devices. Unauthorized/unmanaged devices could be an indication of malicious behavior that should be investigated further.
|
||||
narrative = This Analytic Story is designed to help you develop a better understanding of what authorized and unauthorized devices are part of your enterprise. This story can help you better categorize and classify assets, providing critical business context and awareness of their assets during an incident. Information derived from this Analytic Story can be used to better inform and support other analytic stories. For successful detection, you will need to leverage the Assets and Identity Framework from Enterprise Security to populate your known assets.
|
||||
|
||||
[analytic_story://Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156]
|
||||
category = Adversary Tactics
|
||||
last_updated = 2021-01-27
|
||||
version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-research/2021/01/26/cve-2021-3156-heap-based-buffer-overflow-in-sudo-baron-samedit"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Shannon Davis"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 Segfault - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 via OSQuery - Rule"]
|
||||
description = Uncover activity consistent with CVE-2021-3156. Discovered by the Qualys Research Team, this vulnerability has been found to affect sudo across multiple Linux distributions (Ubuntu 20.04 and prior, Debian 10 and prior, Fedora 33 and prior). As this vulnerability was committed to code in July 2011, there will be many distributions affected. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability allows any unprivileged user to gain root privileges on the vulnerable host.
|
||||
narrative = A non-privledged user is able to execute the sudoedit command to trigger a buffer overflow. After the successful buffer overflow, they are then able to gain root privileges on the affected host. The conditions needed to be run are a trailing "\" along with shell and edit flags. Monitoring the /var/log directory on Linux hosts using the Splunk Universal Forwarder will allow you to pick up this behavior when using the provided detection.
|
||||
|
||||
[analytic_story://Brand Monitoring]
|
||||
category = Abuse
|
||||
last_updated = 2017-12-19
|
||||
@@ -124,7 +135,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://www.zerofox.com/blog/what-is-digital-risk-monitoring/", "https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/consumer/family-safety/what-is-typosquatting/", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2016/06/explained-typosquatting/"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Detect and investigate activity that may indicate that an adversary is using faux domains to mislead users into interacting with malicious infrastructure. Monitor DNS, email, and web traffic for permutations of your brand name.
|
||||
narrative = While you can educate your users and customers about the risks and threats posed by typosquatting, phishing, and corporate espionage, human error is a persistent fact of life. Of course, your adversaries are all too aware of this reality and will happily leverage it for nefarious purposes whenever possible3phishing with lookalike addresses, embedding faux command-and-control domains in malware, and hosting malicious content on domains that closely mimic your corporate servers. This is where brand monitoring comes in.\
|
||||
You can use our adaptation of `DNSTwist`, together with the support searches in this Analytic Story, to generate permutations of specified brands and external domains. Splunk can monitor email, DNS requests, and web traffic for these permutations and provide you with early warnings and situational awareness--powerful elements of an effective defense.\
|
||||
@@ -137,7 +148,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image - Rule", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Monitor your cloud compute instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or compute instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior.
|
||||
narrative = Cryptomining is an intentionally difficult, resource-intensive business. Its complexity was designed into the process to ensure that the number of blocks mined each day would remain steady. So, it's par for the course that ambitious, but unscrupulous, miners make amassing the computing power of large enterprises--a practice known as cryptojacking--a top priority. \
|
||||
Cryptojacking has attracted an increasing amount of media attention since its explosion in popularity in the fall of 2017. The attacks have moved from in-browser exploits and mobile phones to enterprise cloud services, such as Amazon Web Services (AWS), Google Cloud Platform (GCP), and Azure. It's difficult to determine exactly how widespread the practice has become, since bad actors continually evolve their ability to escape detection, including employing unlisted endpoints, moderating their CPU usage, and hiding the mining pool's IP address behind a free CDN. \
|
||||
@@ -151,7 +162,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://www.intego.com/mac-security-blog/osxcoldroot-and-the-rat-invasion/", "https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x2A.html", "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/coldroot-rat-still-undetectable-despite-being-uploaded-on-github-two-years-ago/"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Jose Hernandez"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection - Rule", "ESCU - Processes Tapping Keyboard Events - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Processes Tapping Keyboard Events - Rule", "ESCU - Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that relate to the ColdRoot Remote Access Trojan that affects MacOS. An example of some of these activities are changing sensative binaries in the MacOS sub-system, detecting process names and executables associated with the RAT, detecting when a keyboard tab is installed on a MacOS machine and more.
|
||||
narrative = Conventional wisdom holds that Apple's MacOS operating system is significantly less vulnerable to attack than Windows machines. While that point is debatable, it is true that attacks against MacOS systems are much less common. However, this fact does not mean that Macs are impervious to breaches. To the contrary, research has shown that that Mac malware is increasing at an alarming rate. According to AV-test, in 2018, there were 86,865 new MacOS malware variants, up from 27,338 the year before—a 31% increase. In contrast, the independent research firm found that new Windows malware had increased from 65.17M to 76.86M during that same period, less than half the rate of growth. The bottom line is that while the numbers look a lot smaller than Windows, it's definitely time to take Mac security more seriously.\
|
||||
This Analytic Story addresses the ColdRoot remote access trojan (RAT), which was uploaded to Github in 2016, but was still escaping detection by the first quarter of 2018, when a new, more feature-rich variant was discovered masquerading as an Apple audio driver. Among other capabilities, the Pascal-based ColdRoot can heist passwords from users' keychains and remotely control infected machines without detection. In the initial report of his findings, Patrick Wardle, Chief Research Officer for Digita Security, explained that the new ColdRoot RAT could start and kill processes on the breached system, spawn new remote-desktop sessions, take screen captures and assemble them into a live stream of the victim's desktop, and more.\
|
||||
@@ -164,7 +175,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Collection", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1074"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts - Rule", "ESCU - Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin - Rule", "ESCU - Email files written outside of the Outlook directory - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious writes to System Volume Information - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Email files written outside of the Outlook directory - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious writes to System Volume Information - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin - Rule", "ESCU - Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server - Rule", "ESCU - Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Monitor for and investigate activities--such as suspicious writes to the Windows Recycling Bin or email servers sending high amounts of traffic to specific hosts, for example--that may indicate that an adversary is harvesting and exfiltrating sensitive data.
|
||||
narrative = A common adversary goal is to identify and exfiltrate data of value from a target organization. This data may include email conversations and addresses, confidential company information, links to network design/infrastructure, important dates, and so on.\
|
||||
Attacks are composed of three activities: identification, collection, and staging data for exfiltration. Identification typically involves scanning systems and observing user activity. Collection can involve the transfer of large amounts of data from various repositories. Staging/preparation includes moving data to a central location and compressing (and optionally encoding and/or encrypting) it. All of these activities provide opportunities for defenders to identify their presence. \
|
||||
@@ -177,7 +188,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Command_and_Control", "https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/feature/Command-and-control-servers-The-puppet-masters-that-govern-malware"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures leveraged by attackers to establish and operate command and control channels. Implants installed by attackers on compromised endpoints use these channels to receive instructions and send data back to the malicious operators.
|
||||
narrative = Threat actors typically architect and implement an infrastructure to use in various ways during the course of their attack campaigns. In some cases, they leverage this infrastructure for scanning and performing reconnaissance activities. In others, they may use this infrastructure to launch actual attacks. One of the most important functions of this infrastructure is to establish servers that will communicate with implants on compromised endpoints. These servers establish a command and control channel that is used to proxy data between the compromised endpoint and the attacker. These channels relay commands from the attacker to the compromised endpoint and the output of those commands back to the attacker.\
|
||||
Because this communication is so critical for an adversary, they often use techniques designed to hide the true nature of the communications. There are many different techniques used to establish and communicate over these channels. This Analytic Story provides searches that look for a variety of the techniques used for these channels, as well as indications that these channels are active, by examining logs associated with border control devices and network-access control lists.
|
||||
@@ -201,7 +212,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://github.com/splunk/cloud-datamodel-security-research"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - New container uploaded to AWS ECR - Rule", "ESCU - GCP GCR container uploaded - Rule"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - GCP GCR container uploaded - Rule", "ESCU - New container uploaded to AWS ECR - Rule"]
|
||||
description = Use the searches in this story to monitor your Kubernetes registry repositories for upload, and deployment of potentially vulnerable, backdoor, or implanted containers. These searches provide information on source users, destination path, container names and repository names. The searches provide context to address Mitre T1525 which refers to container implantation upload to a company's repository either in Amazon Elastic Container Registry, Google Container Registry and Azure Container Registry.
|
||||
narrative = Container Registrys provide a way for organizations to keep customized images of their development and infrastructure environment in private. However if these repositories are misconfigured or priviledge users credentials are compromise, attackers can potentially upload implanted containers which can be deployed across the organization. These searches allow operator to monitor who, when and what was uploaded to container registry.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -212,7 +223,7 @@ version = 3
|
||||
references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1003", "https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for.html"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Create Remote Thread into LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Previous Unseen User - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Create Remote Thread into LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Previous Unseen User - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Uncover activity consistent with credential dumping, a technique wherein attackers compromise systems and attempt to obtain and exfiltrate passwords. The threat actors use these pilfered credentials to further escalate privileges and spread throughout a target environment. The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify attempts to credential dumping.
|
||||
narrative = Credential dumping—gathering credentials from a target system, often hashed or encrypted—is a common attack technique. Even though the credentials may not be in plain text, an attacker can still exfiltrate the data and set to cracking it offline, on their own systems. The threat actors target a variety of sources to extract them, including the Security Accounts Manager (SAM), Local Security Authority (LSA), NTDS from Domain Controllers, or the Group Policy Preference (GPP) files.\
|
||||
Once attackers obtain valid credentials, they use them to move throughout a target network with ease, discovering new systems and identifying assets of interest. Credentials obtained in this manner typically include those of privileged users, which may provide access to more sensitive information and system operations.\
|
||||
@@ -225,7 +236,7 @@ version = 2
|
||||
references = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Single Letter Process On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Create local admin accounts using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process File Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Create local admin accounts using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Single Letter Process On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process File Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Monitor for suspicious activities associated with DHS Technical Alert US-CERT TA18-074A. Some of the activities that adversaries used in these compromises included spearfishing attacks, malware, watering-hole domains, many and more.
|
||||
narrative = The frequency of nation-state cyber attacks has increased significantly over the last decade. Employing numerous tactics and techniques, these attacks continue to escalate in complexity. \
|
||||
There is a wide range of motivations for these state-sponsored hacks, including stealing valuable corporate, military, or diplomatic dataѿall of which could confer advantages in various arenas. They may also target critical infrastructure. \
|
||||
@@ -251,7 +262,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/", "http://www.noip.com/blog/2014/07/11/dynamic-dns-can-use-2/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/08/04/detecting-dynamic-dns-domains-in-splunk.html"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - DNS record changed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - DNS Hijack Enrichment - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS record changed - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - DNS Hijack Enrichment - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Secure your environment against DNS hijacks with searches that help you detect and investigate unauthorized changes to DNS records.
|
||||
narrative = Dubbed the Achilles heel of the Internet (see https://www.f5.com/labs/articles/threat-intelligence/dns-is-still-the-achilles-heel-of-the-internet-25613), DNS plays a critical role in routing web traffic but is notoriously vulnerable to attack. One reason is its distributed nature. It relies on unstructured connections between millions of clients and servers over inherently insecure protocols.\
|
||||
The gravity and extent of the importance of securing DNS from attacks is undeniable. The fallout of compromised DNS can be disastrous. Not only can hackers bring down an entire business, they can intercept confidential information, emails, and login credentials, as well. \
|
||||
@@ -281,7 +292,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/data-protection/", "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/dns/splunk-detect-dns-tunneling-37022", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Detect USB device insertion - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Detect USB device insertion - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Fortify your data-protection arsenal--while continuing to ensure data confidentiality and integrity--with searches that monitor for and help you investigate possible signs of data exfiltration.
|
||||
narrative = Attackers can leverage a variety of resources to compromise or exfiltrate enterprise data. Common exfiltration techniques include remote-access channels via low-risk, high-payoff active-collections operations and close-access operations using insiders and removable media. While this Analytic Story is not a comprehensive listing of all the methods by which attackers can exfiltrate data, it provides a useful starting point.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -292,7 +303,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1003", "https://github.com/SecuraBV/CVE-2020-1472", "https://www.secura.com/blog/zero-logon", "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-1472"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Jose Hernandez, Stan Miskowicz, David Dorsey, Shannon Davis Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Computer Changed with Anonymous Account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Zerologon via Zeek - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Zerologon via Zeek - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Computer Changed with Anonymous Account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Uncover activity related to the execution of Zerologon CVE-2020-11472, a technique wherein attackers target a Microsoft Windows Domain Controller to reset its computer account password. The result from this attack is attackers can now provide themselves high privileges and take over Domain Controller. The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify attempts to reset Domain Controller Computer Account via exploit code remotely or via the use of tool Mimikatz as payload carrier.
|
||||
narrative = This attack is a privilege escalation technique, where attacker targets a Netlogon secure channel connection to a domain controller, using Netlogon Remote Protocol (MS-NRPC). This vulnerability exposes vulnerable Windows Domain Controllers to be targeted via unaunthenticated RPC calls which eventually reset Domain Contoller computer account ($) providing the attacker the opportunity to exfil domain controller credential secrets and assign themselve high privileges that can lead to domain controller and potentially complete network takeover. The detection searches in this Analytic Story use Windows Event viewer events and Sysmon events to detect attack execution, these searches monitor access to the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process which is an indicator of the use of Mimikatz tool which has bee updated to carry this attack payload.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -303,7 +314,7 @@ version = 2
|
||||
references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1089", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2015/11/vonteera-adware-uses-certificates-to-disable-anti-malware/", "https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Tools-Report.pdf"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Unload Sysmon Filter Driver - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Unload Sysmon Filter Driver - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Looks for activities and techniques associated with the disabling of security tools on a Windows system, such as suspicious `reg.exe` processes, processes launching netsh, and many others.
|
||||
narrative = Attackers employ a variety of tactics in order to avoid detection and operate without barriers. This often involves modifying the configuration of security tools to get around them or explicitly disabling them to prevent them from running. This Analytic Story includes searches that look for activity consistent with attackers attempting to disable various security mechanisms. Such activity may involve monitoring for suspicious registry activity, as this is where much of the configuration for Windows and various other programs reside, or explicitly attempting to shut down security-related services. Other times, attackers attempt various tricks to prevent specific programs from running, such as adding the certificates with which the security tools are signed to a block list (which would prevent them from running).
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -314,7 +325,7 @@ version = 2
|
||||
references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/", "http://www.noip.com/blog/2014/07/11/dynamic-dns-can-use-2/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/08/04/detecting-dynamic-dns-domains-in-splunk.html"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Detect and investigate hosts in your environment that may be communicating with dynamic domain providers. Attackers may leverage these services to help them avoid firewall blocks and deny lists.
|
||||
narrative = Dynamic DNS services (DDNS) are legitimate low-cost or free services that allow users to rapidly update domain resolutions to IP infrastructure. While their usage can be benign, malicious actors can abuse DDNS to host harmful payloads or interactive-command-and-control infrastructure. These attackers will manually update or automate domain resolution changes by routing dynamic domains to IP addresses that circumvent firewall blocks and deny lists and frustrate a network defender's analytic and investigative processes. These searches will look for DNS queries made from within your infrastructure to suspicious dynamic domains and then investigate more deeply, when appropriate. While this list of top-level dynamic domains is not exhaustive, it can be dynamically updated as new suspicious dynamic domains are identified.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -325,7 +336,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-201A", "https://www.first.org/resources/papers/conf2017/Advanced-Incident-Detection-and-Threat-Hunting-using-Sysmon-and-Splunk.pdf", "https://www.vkremez.com/2017/05/emotet-banking-trojan-malware-analysis.html"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Detection of tools built by NirSoft - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of tools built by NirSoft - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Detect rarely used executables, specific registry paths that may confer malware survivability and persistence, instances where cmd.exe is used to launch script interpreters, and other indicators that the Emotet financial malware has compromised your environment.
|
||||
narrative = The trojan downloader known as Emotet first surfaced in 2014, when it was discovered targeting the banking industry to steal credentials. However, according to a joint technical alert (TA) issued by three government agencies (https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-201A), Emotet has evolved far beyond those beginnings to become what a ThreatPost article called a threat-delivery service(see https://threatpost.com/emotet-malware-evolves-beyond-banking-to-threat-delivery-service/134342/). For example, in early 2018, Emotet was found to be using its loader function to spread the Quakbot and Ransomware variants. \
|
||||
According to the TA, the the malware continues to be among the most costly and destructive malware affecting the private and public sectors. Researchers have linked it to the threat group Mealybug, which has also been on the security communitys radar since 2014.\
|
||||
@@ -349,7 +360,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/understanding-service-accounts"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - GCP Detect gcploit framework - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Detect high risk permissions by resource and account - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Detect accounts with high risk roles by project - Rule", "ESCU - gcp detect oauth token abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - gcp detect oauth token abuse - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Detect high risk permissions by resource and account - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Detect gcploit framework - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Detect accounts with high risk roles by project - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Track when a user assumes an IAM role in another GCP account to obtain cross-account access to services and resources in that account. Accessing new roles could be an indication of malicious activity.
|
||||
narrative = Google Cloud Platform (GCP) admins manage access to GCP resources and services across the enterprise using GCP Identity and Access Management (IAM) functionality. IAM provides the ability to create and manage GCP users, groups, and roles-each with their own unique set of privileges and defined access to specific resources (such as Compute instances, the GCP Management Console, API, or the command-line interface). Unlike conventional (human) users, IAM roles are potentially assumable by anyone in the organization. They provide users with dynamically created temporary security credentials that expire within a set time period.\
|
||||
In between the time between when the temporary credentials are issued and when they expire is a period of opportunity, where a user could leverage the temporary credentials to wreak havoc-spin up or remove instances, create new users, elevate privileges, and other malicious activities-throughout the environment.\
|
||||
@@ -362,7 +373,7 @@ version = 2
|
||||
references = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/HIDDEN-COBRA-North-Korean-Malicious-Cyber-Activity", "https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Destructive-Malware-Report.pdf"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious File Write - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Outbound Emails to Hidden Cobra Threat Actors - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious File Write - Rule", "ESCU - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Outbound Emails to Hidden Cobra Threat Actors - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Monitor for and investigate activities, including the creation or deletion of hidden shares and file writes, that may be evidence of infiltration by North Korean government-sponsored cybercriminals. Details of this activity were reported in DHS Report TA-18-149A.
|
||||
narrative = North Korea's government-sponsored "cyber army" has been slowly building momentum and gaining sophistication over the last 15 years or so. As a result, the group's activity, which the US government refers to as "Hidden Cobra," has surreptitiously crept onto the collective radar as a preeminent global threat.\
|
||||
These state-sponsored actors are thought to be responsible for everything from a hack on a South Korean nuclear plant to an attack on Sony in anticipation of its release of the movie "The Interview" at the end of 2014. They're also notorious for cyberespionage. In recent years, the group seems to be focused on financial crimes, such as cryptojacking.\
|
||||
@@ -376,7 +387,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2016/09/hosts-file-hijacks/"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Windows hosts file modification - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Windows hosts file modification - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Detect evidence of tactics used to redirect traffic from a host to a destination other than the one intended--potentially one that is part of an adversary's attack infrastructure. An example is redirecting communications regarding patches and updates or misleading users into visiting a malicious website.
|
||||
narrative = Attackers will often attempt to manipulate client communications for nefarious purposes. In some cases, an attacker may endeavor to modify a local host file to redirect communications with resources (such as antivirus or system-update services) to prevent clients from receiving patches or updates. In other cases, an attacker might use this tactic to have the client connect to a site that looks like the intended site, but instead installs malware or collects information from the victim. Additionally, an attacker may redirect a victim in order to execute a MITM attack and observe communications.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -412,7 +423,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://github.com/splunk/cloud-datamodel-security-research"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = This story addresses detection against Kubernetes cluster fingerprint scan and attack by providing information on items such as source ip, user agent, cluster names.
|
||||
narrative = Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration platform contains sensitve information and management priviledges of production workloads, microservices and applications. These searches allow operator to detect suspicious unauthenticated requests from the internet to kubernetes cluster.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -423,7 +434,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/approaching-kubernetes-security-detecting-kubernetes-scan-with-splunk.html"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = This story addresses detection and response of accounts acccesing Kubernetes cluster sensitive objects such as configmaps or secrets providing information on items such as user user, group. object, namespace and authorization reason.
|
||||
narrative = Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration platform contains sensitive objects within its architecture, specifically configmaps and secrets, if accessed by an attacker can lead to further compromise. These searches allow operator to detect suspicious requests against Kubernetes sensitive objects.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -434,7 +445,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/approaching-kubernetes-security-detecting-kubernetes-scan-with-splunk.html"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect RBAC authorizations by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect most active service accounts by pod namespace - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect most active service accounts by pod namespace - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect RBAC authorizations by account - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = This story addresses detection and response around Sensitive Role usage within a Kubernetes clusters against cluster resources and namespaces.
|
||||
narrative = Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration platform contains sensitive roles within its architecture, specifically configmaps and secrets, if accessed by an attacker can lead to further compromise. These searches allow operator to detect suspicious requests against Kubernetes role activities
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -445,7 +456,7 @@ version = 2
|
||||
references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/executive-perspective/2015/08/malware_lateral_move.html"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ESCU - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ESCU - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures around how attackers move laterally within the enterprise. Because lateral movement can expose the adversary to detection, it should be an important focus for security analysts.
|
||||
narrative = Once attackers gain a foothold within an enterprise, they will seek to expand their accesses and leverage techniques that facilitate lateral movement. Attackers will often spend quite a bit of time and effort moving laterally. Because lateral movement renders an attacker the most vulnerable to detection, it's an excellent focus for detection and investigation.\
|
||||
Indications of lateral movement can include the abuse of system utilities (such as `psexec.exe`), unauthorized use of remote desktop services, `file/admin$` shares, WMI, PowerShell, pass-the-hash, or the abuse of scheduled tasks. Organizations must be extra vigilant in detecting lateral movement techniques and look for suspicious activity in and around high-value strategic network assets, such as Active Directory, which are often considered the primary target or "crown jewels" to a persistent threat actor.\
|
||||
@@ -460,7 +471,7 @@ version = 4
|
||||
references = ["https://blogs.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/malware-employs-powershell-to-infect-systems/", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Multiple Suspicious Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Multiple Suspicious Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Attackers are finding stealthy ways "live off the land," leveraging utilities and tools that come standard on the endpoint--such as PowerShell--to achieve their goals without downloading binary files. These searches can help you detect and investigate PowerShell command-line options that may be indicative of malicious intent.
|
||||
narrative = The searches in this Analytic Story monitor for parameters often used for malicious purposes. It is helpful to understand how often the notable events generated by this story occur, as well as the commonalities between some of these events. These factors may provide clues about whether this is a common occurrence of minimal concern or a rare event that may require more extensive investigation. Likewise, it is important to determine whether the issue is restricted to a single user/system or is broader in scope.\
|
||||
The following factors may assist you in determining whether the event is malicious: \
|
||||
@@ -480,7 +491,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/03/04/tracking-locky-ransomware-using-carbon-black/"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Extended Period Without Successful Netbackup Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Unsuccessful Netbackup backups - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - All backup logs for host - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Unsuccessful Netbackup backups - Rule", "ESCU - Extended Period Without Successful Netbackup Backups - Rule", "ESCU - All backup logs for host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Address common concerns when monitoring your backup processes. These searches can help you reduce risks from ransomware, device theft, or denial of physical access to a host by backing up data on endpoints.
|
||||
narrative = Having backups is a standard best practice that helps ensure continuity of business operations. Having mature backup processes can also help you reduce the risks of many security-related incidents and streamline your response processes. The detection searches in this Analytic Story will help you identify systems that have backup failures, as well as systems that have not been backed up for an extended period of time. The story will also return the notable event history and all of the backup logs for an endpoint.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -491,7 +502,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Identify and investigate prohibited/unauthorized software or processes that may be concealing malicious behavior within your environment.
|
||||
narrative = It is critical to identify unauthorized software and processes running on enterprise endpoints and determine whether they are likely to be malicious. This Analytic Story requires the user to populate the Interesting Processes table within Enterprise Security with prohibited processes. An included support search will augment this data, adding information on processes thought to be malicious. This search requires data from endpoint detection-and-response solutions, endpoint data sources (such as Sysmon), or Windows Event Logs--assuming that the Active Directory administrator has enabled process tracking within the System Event Audit Logs.\
|
||||
It is important to investigate any software identified as suspicious, in order to understand how it was installed or executed. Analyzing authentication logs or any historic notable events might elicit additional investigative leads of interest. For best results, schedule the search to run every two weeks.
|
||||
@@ -516,7 +527,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/tn-archive/bb490939(v=technet.10)", "https://htmlpreview.github.io/?https://github.com/MatthewDemaske/blogbackup/blob/master/netshell.html", "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Processes created by netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Processes created by netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Detect activities and various techniques associated with the abuse of `netsh.exe`, which can disable local firewall settings or set up a remote connection to a host from an infected system.
|
||||
narrative = It is a common practice for attackers of all types to leverage native Windows tools and functionality to execute commands for malicious reasons. One such tool on Windows OS is `netsh.exe`,a command-line scripting utility that allows you to--either locally or remotely--display or modify the network configuration of a computer that is currently running. `Netsh.exe` can be used to discover and disable local firewall settings. It can also be used to set up a remote connection to a host from an infected system.\
|
||||
To get started, run the detection search to identify parent processes of `netsh.exe`.
|
||||
@@ -528,7 +539,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://i.blackhat.com/USA-20/Thursday/us-20-Bienstock-My-Cloud-Is-APTs-Cloud-Investigating-And-Defending-Office-365.pdf"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Patrick Bareiss"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - O365 PST export alert - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious Rights Delegation - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding - Rule", "ESCU - High Number of Login Failures from a single source - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Excessive Authentication Failures Alert - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Disable MFA - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Bypass MFA via Trusted IP - Rule"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - O365 Bypass MFA via Trusted IP - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Disable MFA - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding - Rule", "ESCU - High Number of Login Failures from a single source - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Excessive Authentication Failures Alert - Rule", "ESCU - O365 PST export alert - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious Rights Delegation - Rule"]
|
||||
description = This story is focused around detecting Office 365 Attacks.
|
||||
narrative = More and more companies are using Microsofts Office 365 cloud offering. Therefore, we see more and more attacks against Office 365. This story provides various detections for Office 365 attacks.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -539,7 +550,7 @@ version = 2
|
||||
references = ["https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/orangeworm-targets-healthcare-us-europe-asia", "https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/healthcare-targeted-by-hacker/"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Detect activities and various techniques associated with the Orangeworm Attack Group, a group that frequently targets the healthcare industry.
|
||||
narrative = In May of 2018, the attack group Orangeworm was implicated for installing a custom backdoor called Trojan.Kwampirs within large international healthcare corporations in the United States, Europe, and Asia. This malware provides the attackers with remote access to the target system, decrypting and extracting a copy of its main DLL payload from its resource section. Before writing the payload to disk, it inserts a randomly generated string into the middle of the decrypted payload in an attempt to evade hash-based detections.\
|
||||
Awareness of the Orangeworm group first surfaced in January, 2015. It has conducted targeted attacks against related industries, as well, such as pharmaceuticals and healthcare IT solution providers.\
|
||||
@@ -553,7 +564,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/spear-phishing-campaign-targets-ukraine-government.html"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Splunk Research Team"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious LNK file launching a process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Oulook exe writing a zip file - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Oulook exe writing a zip file - Rule", "ESCU - Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Detect signs of malicious payloads that may indicate that your environment has been breached via a phishing attack.
|
||||
narrative = Despite its simplicity, phishing remains the most pervasive and dangerous cyberthreat. In fact, research shows that as many as [91% of all successful attacks](https://digitalguardian.com/blog/91-percent-cyber-attacks-start-phishing-email-heres-how-protect-against-phishing) are initiated via a phishing email. \
|
||||
As most people know, these emails use fraudulent domains, [email scraping](https://www.cyberscoop.com/emotet-trojan-phishing-scraping-templates-cofense-geodo/), familiar contact names inserted as senders, and other tactics to lure targets into clicking a malicious link, opening an attachment with a [nefarious payload](https://www.cyberscoop.com/emotet-trojan-phishing-scraping-templates-cofense-geodo/), or entering sensitive personal information that perpetrators may intercept. This attack technique requires a relatively low level of skill and allows adversaries to easily cast a wide net. Worse, because its success relies on the gullibility of humans, it's impossible to completely "automate" it out of your environment. However, you can use ES and ESCU to detect and investigate potentially malicious payloads injected into your environment subsequent to a phishing attack. \
|
||||
@@ -571,7 +582,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/scope-of-mudcarp-attacks-highlight-1/", "http://blog.amossys.fr/badflick-is-not-so-bad.html"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "iDefense", "email": "-", "name": "iDefense Cyber Espionage Team"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Monitor your environment for suspicious behaviors that resemble the techniques employed by the MUDCARP threat group.
|
||||
narrative = This story was created as a joint effort between iDefense and Splunk.\
|
||||
iDefense analysts have recently discovered a Windows executable file that, upon execution, spoofs a decryption tool and then drops a file that appears to be the custom-built javascript backdoor, "Orz," which is associated with the threat actors known as MUDCARP (as well as "temp.Periscope" and "Leviathan"). The file is executed using Wscript.\
|
||||
@@ -609,7 +620,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["http://www.novetta.com/2015/02/advanced-methods-to-detect-advanced-cyber-attacks-protocol-abuse/"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Detect instances of prohibited network traffic allowed in the environment, as well as protocols running on non-standard ports. Both of these types of behaviors typically violate policy and can be leveraged by attackers.
|
||||
narrative = A traditional security best practice is to control the ports, protocols, and services allowed within your environment. By limiting the services and protocols to those explicitly approved by policy, administrators can minimize the attack surface. The combined effect allows both network defenders and security controls to focus and not be mired in superfluous traffic or data types. Looking for deviations to policy can identify attacker activity that abuses services and protocols to run on alternate or non-standard ports in the attempt to avoid detection or frustrate forensic analysts.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -620,7 +631,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://www.carbonblack.com/2017/06/28/carbon-black-threat-research-technical-analysis-petya-notpetya-ransomware/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2017/06/27/closing-the-detection-to-mitigation-gap-or-to-petya-or-notpetya-whocares-.html"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to ransomware--spikes in SMB traffic, suspicious wevtutil usage, the presence of common ransomware extensions, and system processes run from unexpected locations, and many others.
|
||||
narrative = Ransomware is an ever-present risk to the enterprise, wherein an infected host encrypts business-critical data, holding it hostage until the victim pays the attacker a ransom. There are many types and varieties of ransomware that can affect an enterprise. Attackers can deploy ransomware to enterprises through spearphishing campaigns and driveby downloads, as well as through traditional remote service-based exploitation. In the case of the WannaCry campaign, there was self-propagating wormable functionality that was used to maximize infection. Fortunately, organizations can apply several techniques--such as those in this Analytic Story--to detect and or mitigate the effects of ransomware.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -631,7 +642,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/s3-ransomware-part-1-attack-vector/", "https://github.com/d1vious/git-wild-hunt", "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PgzNib37g0M"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - AWS Detect Users creating keys with encrypt policy without MFA - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Detect Users with KMS keys performing encryption S3 - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - AWS Detect Users with KMS keys performing encryption S3 - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Detect Users creating keys with encrypt policy without MFA - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to ransomware. These searches include cloud related objects that may be targeted by malicious actors via cloud providers own encryption features.
|
||||
narrative = Ransomware is an ever-present risk to the enterprise, wherein an infected host encrypts business-critical data, holding it hostage until the victim pays the attacker a ransom. There are many types and varieties of ransomware that can affect an enterprise.Cloud ransomware can be deployed by obtaining high privilege credentials from targeted users or resources.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -642,7 +653,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/executive-perspective/2015/09/the_new_route_toper.html", "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/about/security-center/event-response/synful-knock.html"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Rogue DHCP Server - Rule", "ESCU - Detect ARP Poisoning - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Software Download To Network Device - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Port Security Violation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Traffic Mirroring - Rule", "ESCU - Detect IPv6 Network Infrastructure Threats - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Login Attempts to Routers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Traffic Mirroring - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Login Attempts to Routers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Port Security Violation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Software Download To Network Device - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rogue DHCP Server - Rule", "ESCU - Detect IPv6 Network Infrastructure Threats - Rule", "ESCU - Detect ARP Poisoning - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Validate the security configuration of network infrastructure and verify that only authorized users and systems are accessing critical assets. Core routing and switching infrastructure are common strategic targets for attackers.
|
||||
narrative = Networking devices, such as routers and switches, are often overlooked as resources that attackers will leverage to subvert an enterprise. Advanced threats actors have shown a proclivity to target these critical assets as a means to siphon and redirect network traffic, flash backdoored operating systems, and implement cryptographic weakened algorithms to more easily decrypt network traffic.\
|
||||
This Analytic Story helps you gain a better understanding of how your network devices are interacting with your hosts. By compromising your network devices, attackers can obtain direct access to the company's internal infrastructure— effectively increasing the attack surface and accessing private services/data.
|
||||
@@ -654,7 +665,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/detecting-ryuk-using-splunk-attack-range.html", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/big-game-hunting-with-ryuk-another-lucrative-targeted-ransomware/", "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-302a"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Jose Hernandez"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", "ESCU - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Windows connhost exe started forcefully - Rule", "ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Ryuk Test Files Detected - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Security Account Manager Stopped - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Ryuk Test Files Detected - Rule", "ESCU - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows connhost exe started forcefully - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Security Account Manager Stopped - Rule", "ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the Ryuk ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with Ryuk, Stopping Security Access Manager, DisableAntiSpyware registry key modification, suspicious psexec use, and more.
|
||||
narrative = Cybersecurity Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) released Alert (AA20-302A) on October 28th called “Ransomware Activity Targeting the Healthcare and Public Health Sector.” This alert details TTPs associated with ongoing and possible imminent attacks against the Healthcare sector, and is a joint advisory in coordination with other U.S. Government agencies. The objective of these malicious campaigns is to infiltrate targets in named sectors and to drop ransomware payloads, which will likely cause disruption of service and increase risk of actual harm to the health and safety of patients at hospitals, even with the aggravant of an ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. This document specifically refers to several crimeware exploitation frameworks, emphasizing the use of Ryuk ransomware as payload. The Ryuk ransomware payload is not new. It has been well documented and identified in multiple variants. Payloads need a carrier, and for Ryuk it has often been exploitation frameworks such as Cobalt Strike, or popular crimeware frameworks such as Emotet or Trickbot.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -677,7 +688,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/an-in-depth-analysis-of-samsam-ransomware-and-boss-spider/", "https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2018/07/31/samsam-the-almost-6-million-ransomware/", "https://thehackernews.com/2018/07/samsam-ransomware-attacks.html"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Batch File Write to System32 - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - File with Samsam Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Samsam Test File Write - Rule", "ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - File with Samsam Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Batch File Write to System32 - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Samsam Test File Write - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the SamSam ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with SamSam, RDP brute force attacks, the presence of files with SamSam ransomware extensions, suspicious psexec use, and more.
|
||||
narrative = The first version of the SamSam ransomware (a.k.a. Samas or SamsamCrypt) was launched in 2015 by a group of Iranian threat actors. The malicious software has affected and continues to affect thousands of victims and has raised almost $6M in ransom.\
|
||||
Although categorized under the heading of ransomware, SamSam campaigns have some importance distinguishing characteristics. Most notable is the fact that conventional ransomware is a numbers game. Perpetrators use a "spray-and-pray" approach with phishing campaigns or other mechanisms, charging a small ransom (typically under $1,000). The goal is to find a large number of victims willing to pay these mini-ransoms, adding up to a lucrative payday. They use relatively simple methods for infecting systems.\
|
||||
@@ -724,7 +735,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-11409", "https://www.splunk.com/view/SP-CAAAP5E#VulnerabilityDescriptionsandRatings", "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44865/"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Reduce the risk of CVE-2018-11409, an information disclosure vulnerability within some older versions of Splunk Enterprise, with searches designed to help ensure that your Splunk system does not leak information to authenticated users.
|
||||
narrative = Although there have been no reports of it being exploited, Splunk Enterprise versions through 7.0.1 reportedly have a vulnerability that may expose information through a REST endpoint (read more here: https://www.splunk.com/view/SP-CAAAP5E#VulnerabilityDescriptionsandRatings). NIST has included it in its vulnerability database (read more here: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-11409). The REST endpoint that exposes system information is also necessary for the proper operation of Splunk clustering and instrumentation. Customers should upgrade to the latest version to reduce the risk of this vulnerability.\
|
||||
Splunk Enterprise exposes partial information about the host operating system, hardware, and Splunk license. Splunk Enterprise before 6.6.0 exposes this information without authentication. Splunk Enterprise 6.6.0 and later exposes this information only to authenticated Splunk users. Based on the information exposure, Splunk characterizes this issue as a low severity impact.\
|
||||
@@ -738,7 +749,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor.html", "https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Patrick Bareiss"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AdFind Exe - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Sunburst Correlation DLL and Network Event - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Supernova Webshell - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Sunburst Correlation DLL and Network Event - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AdFind Exe - Rule", "ESCU - Supernova Webshell - Rule"]
|
||||
description = Sunburst is a trojanized updates to SolarWinds Orion IT monitoring and management software. It was discovered by FireEye in December 2020. The actors behind this campaign gained access to numerous public and private organizations around the world.
|
||||
narrative = This Analytic Story supports you to detect Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) from the Sunburst malware. The threat actor behind sunburst compromised the SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll, is a SolarWinds digitally-signed component of the Orion software framework that contains a backdoor that communicates via HTTP to third party servers. The detections in this Analytic Story are focusing on the dll loading events, file create events and network events to detect This malware.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -749,7 +760,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - Rule", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS EC2 instances for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as EC2 instances that originate from unusual locations or those launched by previously unseen users (among others). Included investigative searches will help you probe more deeply, when the information warrants it.
|
||||
narrative = AWS CloudTrail is an AWS service that helps you enable governance, compliance, and risk auditing within your AWS account. Actions taken by a user, role, or an AWS service are recorded as events in CloudTrail. It is crucial for a company to monitor events and actions taken in the AWS Console, AWS command-line interface, and AWS SDKs and APIs to ensure that your EC2 instances are not vulnerable to attacks. This Analytic Story identifies suspicious activities in your AWS EC2 instances and helps you respond and investigate those activities.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -760,7 +771,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integration.html"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Detect new user AWS Console Login - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new user AWS Console Login - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Monitor your AWS authentication events using your CloudTrail logs. Searches within this Analytic Story will help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious logins.
|
||||
narrative = It is important to monitor and control who has access to your AWS infrastructure. Detecting suspicious logins to your AWS infrastructure will provide good starting points for investigations. Abusive behaviors caused by compromised credentials can lead to direct monetary costs, as you will be billed for any EC2 instances created by the attacker.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -771,7 +782,7 @@ version = 2
|
||||
references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/security-data-protection/cloud/public-aws-s3-buckets-writable/"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI - Rule", "ESCU - Detect S3 access from a new IP - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Open S3 buckets - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI - Rule", "ESCU - Detect S3 access from a new IP - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Open S3 buckets - Rule", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS S3 buckets for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as detecting open S3 buckets and buckets being accessed from a new IP. The contextual and investigative searches will give you more information, when required.
|
||||
narrative = As cloud computing has exploded, so has the number of creative attacks on virtual environments. And as the number-two cloud-service provider, Amazon Web Services (AWS) has certainly had its share.\
|
||||
Amazon's "shared responsibility" model dictates that the company has responsibility for the environment outside of the VM and the customer is responsible for the security inside of the S3 container. As such, it's important to stay vigilant for activities that may belie suspicious behavior inside of your environment.\
|
||||
@@ -784,7 +795,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/hiding-cloudcobalt-strike-beacon-c2-using-amazon-apis/"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Leverage these searches to monitor your AWS network traffic for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as a spike in blocked outbound traffic in your virtual private cloud (VPC).
|
||||
narrative = A virtual private cloud (VPC) is an on-demand managed cloud-computing service that isolates computing resources for each client. Inside the VPC container, the environment resembles a physical network. \
|
||||
Amazon's VPC service enables you to launch EC2 instances and leverage other Amazon resources. The traffic that flows in and out of this VPC can be controlled via network access-control rules and security groups. Amazon also has a feature called VPC Flow Logs that enables you to log IP traffic going to and from the network interfaces in your VPC. This data is stored using Amazon CloudWatch Logs.\
|
||||
@@ -798,7 +809,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-cloudtrail-now-tracks-cross-account-activity-to-its-origin/", "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integration.html"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by New User - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by New User - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Monitor your cloud authentication events. Searches within this Analytic Story leverage the recent cloud updates to the Authentication data model to help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious login activity.
|
||||
narrative = It is important to monitor and control who has access to your cloud infrastructure. Detecting suspicious logins will provide good starting points for investigations. Abusive behaviors caused by compromised credentials can lead to direct monetary costs, as you will be billed for any compute activity whether legitimate or otherwise.\
|
||||
This Analytic Story has data model versions of cloud searches leveraging Authentication data, including those looking for suspicious login activity, and cross-account activity for AWS.
|
||||
@@ -810,7 +821,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed - Rule", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed - Rule", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Monitor your cloud infrastructure provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your cloud environment.
|
||||
narrative = Monitoring your cloud infrastructure logs allows you enable governance, compliance, and risk auditing. It is crucial for a company to monitor events and actions taken in the their cloud environments to ensure that your instances are not vulnerable to attacks. This Analytic Story identifies suspicious activities in your cloud compute instances and helps you respond and investigate those activities.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -821,7 +832,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Monitor your cloud infrastructure provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your cloud environment.
|
||||
narrative = Because most enterprise cloud infrastructure activities originate from familiar geographic locations, monitoring for activity from unknown or unusual regions is an important security measure. This indicator can be especially useful in environments where it is impossible to add specific IPs to an allow list because they vary.\
|
||||
This Analytic Story was designed to provide you with flexibility in the precision you employ in specifying legitimate geographic regions. It can be as specific as an IP address or a city, or as broad as a region (think state) or an entire country. By determining how precise you want your geographical locations to be and monitoring for new locations that haven't previously accessed your environment, you can detect adversaries as they begin to probe your environment. Since there are legitimate reasons for activities from unfamiliar locations, this is not a standalone indicator. Nevertheless, location can be a relevant piece of information that you may wish to investigate further.
|
||||
@@ -833,7 +844,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://redlock.io/blog/cryptojacking-tesla"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Detect and investigate suspicious activities by users and roles in your cloud environments.
|
||||
narrative = It seems obvious that it is critical to monitor and control the users who have access to your cloud infrastructure. Nevertheless, it's all too common for enterprises to lose track of ad-hoc accounts, leaving their servers vulnerable to attack. In fact, this was the very oversight that led to Tesla's cryptojacking attack in February, 2018.\
|
||||
In addition to compromising the security of your data, when bad actors leverage your compute resources, it can incur monumental costs, since you will be billed for any new instances and increased bandwidth usage.
|
||||
@@ -845,7 +856,7 @@ version = 2
|
||||
references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1059", "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/macro-malware", "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Leveraging the Windows command-line interface (CLI) is one of the most common attack techniques--one that is also detailed in the MITRE ATT&CK framework. Use this Analytic Story to help you identify unusual or suspicious use of the CLI on Windows systems.
|
||||
narrative = The ability to execute arbitrary commands via the Windows CLI is a primary goal for the adversary. With access to the shell, an attacker can easily run scripts and interact with the target system. Often, attackers may only have limited access to the shell or may obtain access in unusual ways. In addition, malware may execute and interact with the CLI in ways that would be considered unusual and inconsistent with typical user activity. This provides defenders with opportunities to identify suspicious use and investigate, as appropriate. This Analytic Story contains various searches to help identify this suspicious activity, as well as others to aid you in deeper investigation.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -856,7 +867,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["http://blogs.splunk.com/2015/10/01/random-words-on-entropy-and-dns/", "http://www.darkreading.com/analytics/security-monitoring/got-malware-three-signs-revealed-in-dns-traffic/d/d-id/1139680", "https://live.paloaltonetworks.com/t5/Threat-Vulnerability-Articles/What-are-suspicious-DNS-queries/ta-p/71454"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Attackers often attempt to hide within or otherwise abuse the domain name system (DNS). You can thwart attempts to manipulate this omnipresent protocol by monitoring for these types of abuses.
|
||||
narrative = Although DNS is one of the fundamental underlying protocols that make the Internet work, it is often ignored (perhaps because of its complexity and effectiveness). However, attackers have discovered ways to abuse the protocol to meet their objectives. One potential abuse involves manipulating DNS to hijack traffic and redirect it to an IP address under the attacker's control. This could inadvertently send users intending to visit google.com, for example, to an unrelated malicious website. Another technique involves using the DNS protocol for command-and-control activities with the attacker's malicious code or to covertly exfiltrate data. The searches within this Analytic Story look for these types of abuses.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -867,7 +878,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/06/26/phishing-hits-a-new-level-of-quality/"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly - Rule", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Email remains one of the primary means for attackers to gain an initial foothold within the modern enterprise. Detect and investigate suspicious emails in your environment with the help of the searches in this Analytic Story.
|
||||
narrative = It is a common practice for attackers of all types to leverage targeted spearphishing campaigns and mass mailers to deliver weaponized email messages and attachments. Fortunately, there are a number of ways to monitor email data in Splunk to detect suspicious content.\
|
||||
Once a phishing message has been detected, the next steps are to answer the following questions: \
|
||||
@@ -893,7 +904,7 @@ version = 2
|
||||
references = ["https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/", "https://redcanary.com/blog/windows-registry-attacks-threat-detection/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/005/", "https://medium.com/@mbromileyDFIR/malware-monday-aebb456356c5"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect mshta renamed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect mshta inline hta execution - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious mshta child process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious mshta spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious mshta spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious mshta child process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect mshta renamed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect mshta inline hta execution - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe process to execute malicious code.
|
||||
narrative = One common adversary tactic is to bypass application white-listing solutions via the mshta.exe process, which loads Microsoft HTML applications (mshtml.dll) with the .hta suffix. In these cases, attackers use the trusted Windows utility to proxy execution of malicious files, whether an .hta application, javascript, or VBScript.\
|
||||
The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an attacker is leveraging mshta.exe to execute malicious code. \
|
||||
@@ -906,7 +917,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1078", "https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Credential_stuffing", "https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/answer/What-is-a-password-spraying-attack-and-how-does-it-work"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentails From The Same IP - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Account Lockout Events - Rule", "ESCU - Okta User Logins From Multiple Cities - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Failed SSO Attempts - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate User Activities In Okta - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by app - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Okta Account Lockout Events - Rule", "ESCU - Okta User Logins From Multiple Cities - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Failed SSO Attempts - Rule", "ESCU - Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentails From The Same IP - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate User Activities In Okta - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by app - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Monitor your Okta environment for suspicious activities. Due to the Covid outbreak, many users are migrating over to leverage cloud services more and more. Okta is a popular tool to manage multiple users and the web-based applications they need to stay productive. The searches in this story will help monitor your Okta environment for suspicious activities and associated user behaviors.
|
||||
narrative = Okta is the leading single sign on (SSO) provider, allowing users to authenticate once to Okta, and from there access a variety of web-based applications. These applications are assigned to users and allow administrators to centrally manage which users are allowed to access which applications. It also provides centralized logging to help understand how the applications are used and by whom. \
|
||||
While SSO is a major convenience for users, it also provides attackers with an opportunity. If the attacker can gain access to Okta, they can access a variety of applications. As such monitoring the environment is important. \
|
||||
@@ -919,7 +930,7 @@ version = 2
|
||||
references = ["https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Graeber-Abusing-Windows-Management-Instrumentation-WMI-To-Build-A-Persistent%20Asynchronous-And-Fileless-Backdoor-wp.pdf", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/wmimplant_a_wmi_ba.html"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Temporary Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - Process Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Script Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - Script Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon - Rule", "ESCU - Process Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Temporary Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Attackers are increasingly abusing Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI), a framework and associated utilities available on all modern Windows operating systems. Because WMI can be leveraged to manage both local and remote systems, it is important to identify the processes executed and the user context within which the activity occurred.
|
||||
narrative = WMI is a Microsoft infrastructure for management data and operations on Windows operating systems. It includes of a set of utilities that can be leveraged to manage both local and remote Windows systems. Attackers are increasingly turning to WMI abuse in their efforts to conduct nefarious tasks, such as reconnaissance, detection of antivirus and virtual machines, code execution, lateral movement, persistence, and data exfiltration. \
|
||||
The detection searches included in this Analytic Story are used to look for suspicious use of WMI commands that attackers may leverage to interact with remote systems. The searches specifically look for the use of WMI to run processes on remote systems.\
|
||||
@@ -932,7 +943,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://redcanary.com/blog/windows-registry-attacks-threat-detection/", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1112"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Monitor and detect registry changes initiated from remote locations, which can be a sign that an attacker has infiltrated your system.
|
||||
narrative = Attackers are developing increasingly sophisticated techniques for hijacking target servers, while evading detection. One such technique that has become progressively more common is registry modification.\
|
||||
The registry is a key component of the Windows operating system. It has a hierarchical database called "registry" that contains settings, options, and values for executables. Once the threat actor gains access to a machine, they can use reg.exe to modify their account to obtain administrator-level privileges, maintain persistence, and move laterally within the environment.\
|
||||
@@ -957,7 +968,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218/T1218.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler/"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler usage - Rule"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler usage - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule"]
|
||||
description = Monitor and detect behaviors used by attackers who leverage trusted developer utilities to execute malicious code.
|
||||
narrative = Adversaries may take advantage of trusted developer utilities to proxy execution of malicious payloads. There are many utilities used for software development related tasks that can be used to execute code in various forms to assist in development, debugging, and reverse engineering. These utilities may often be signed with legitimate certificates that allow them to execute on a system and proxy execution of malicious code through a trusted process that effectively bypasses application control solutions.\
|
||||
The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an adversary is leveraging microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe to execute malicious code.
|
||||
@@ -969,7 +980,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/001/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1127.001/T1127.001.md", "https://github.com/infosecn1nja/MaliciousMacroMSBuild", "https://github.com/xorrior/RandomPS-Scripts/blob/master/Invoke-ExecuteMSBuild.ps1", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/", "https://github.com/MHaggis/CBR-Queries/blob/master/msbuild.md"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious msbuild path - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Spawn - Rule"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious msbuild path - Rule"]
|
||||
description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the msbuild.exe process to execute malicious code.
|
||||
narrative = Adversaries may use MSBuild to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. MSBuild.exe (Microsoft Build Engine) is a software build platform used by Visual Studio and is native to Windows. It handles XML formatted project files that define requirements for loading and building various platforms and configurations. \
|
||||
The inline task capability of MSBuild that was introduced in .NET version 4 allows for C# code to be inserted into an XML project file. MSBuild will compile and execute the inline task. MSBuild.exe is a signed Microsoft binary, so when it is used this way it can execute arbitrary code and bypass application control defenses that are configured to allow MSBuild.exe execution. \
|
||||
@@ -983,7 +994,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - EC2 Instance Modified With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - EC2 Instance Modified With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Identify unusual changes to your AWS EC2 instances that may indicate malicious activity. Modifications to your EC2 instances by previously unseen users is an example of an activity that may warrant further investigation.
|
||||
narrative = A common attack technique is to infiltrate a cloud instance and make modifications. The adversary can then secure access to your infrastructure or hide their activities. So it's important to stay alert to changes that may indicate that your environment has been compromised. \
|
||||
Searches within this Analytic Story can help you detect the presence of a threat by monitoring for EC2 instances that have been created or changed--either by users that have never previously performed these activities or by known users who modify or create instances in a way that have not been done before. This story also provides investigative searches that help you go deeper once you detect suspicious behavior.
|
||||
@@ -995,7 +1006,7 @@ version = 2
|
||||
references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/08/monitoring-windows-console-activity-part-two.html", "https://www.splunk.com/pdfs/technical-briefs/advanced-threat-detection-and-response-tech-brief.pdf", "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/logging/detecting-security-incidents-windows-workstation-event-logs-34262"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Quickly identify systems running new or unusual processes in your environment that could be indicators of suspicious activity. Processes run from unusual locations, those with conspicuously long command lines, and rare executables are all examples of activities that may warrant deeper investigation.
|
||||
narrative = Being able to profile a host's processes within your environment can help you more quickly identify processes that seem out of place when compared to the rest of the population of hosts or asset types.\
|
||||
This Analytic Story lets you identify processes that are either a) not typically seen running or b) have some sort of suspicious command-line arguments associated with them. This Analytic Story will also help you identify the user running these processes and the associated process activity on the host.\
|
||||
@@ -1008,7 +1019,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://www.monkey.org/~dugsong/dsniff/"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Protocols passing authentication in cleartext - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Protocols passing authentication in cleartext - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Leverage searches that detect cleartext network protocols that may leak credentials or should otherwise be encrypted.
|
||||
narrative = Various legacy protocols operate by default in the clear, without the protections of encryption. This potentially leaks sensitive information that can be exploited by passively sniffing network traffic. Depending on the protocol, this information could be highly sensitive, or could allow for session hijacking. In addition, these protocols send authentication information, which would allow for the harvesting of usernames and passwords that could potentially be used to authenticate and compromise secondary systems.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1019,7 +1030,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://www.fbi.gov/scams-and-safety/common-fraud-schemes/internet-fraud", "https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2017-internet-crime-report-released-050718"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Jim Apger"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Web Fraud - Password Sharing Across Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Anomalous User Clickspeed - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Account Harvesting - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Web Session Information via session id - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Web Fraud - Anomalous User Clickspeed - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Password Sharing Across Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Account Harvesting - Rule", "ESCU - Get Web Session Information via session id - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Monitor your environment for activity consistent with common attack techniques bad actors use when attempting to compromise web servers or other web-related assets.
|
||||
narrative = The Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) defines Internet fraud as the use of Internet services or software with Internet access to defraud victims or to otherwise take advantage of them. According to the Bureau, Internet crime schemes are used to steal millions of dollars each year from victims and continue to plague the Internet through various methods. The agency includes phishing scams, data breaches, Denial of Service (DOS) attacks, email account compromise, malware, spoofing, and ransomware in this category.\
|
||||
These crimes are not the fraud itself, but rather the attack techniques commonly employed by fraudsters in their pursuit of data that enables them to commit malicious actssuch as obtaining and using stolen credit cards. They represent a serious problem that is steadily increasing and not likely to go away anytime soon.\
|
||||
@@ -1035,7 +1046,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://research.checkpoint.com/2020/resolving-your-way-into-domain-admin-exploiting-a-17-year-old-bug-in-windows-dns-servers/", "https://support.microsoft.com/en-au/help/4569509/windows-dns-server-remote-code-execution-vulnerability"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Shannon Davis"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Splunk Stream - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Zeek - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Zeek - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Splunk Stream - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Uncover activity consistent with CVE-2020-1350, or SIGRed. Discovered by Checkpoint researchers, this vulnerability affects Windows 2003 to 2019, and is triggered by a malicious DNS response (only affects DNS over TCP). An attacker can use the malicious payload to cause a buffer overflow on the vulnerable system, leading to compromise. The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify the large response payload for SIG and KEY DNS records which can be used for the exploit.
|
||||
narrative = When a client requests a DNS record for a particular domain, that request gets routed first through the client's locally configured DNS server, then to any DNS server(s) configured as forwarders, and then onto the target domain's own DNS server(s). If a attacker wanted to, they could host a malicious DNS server that responds to the initial request with a specially crafted large response (~65KB). This response would flow through to the client's local DNS server, which if not patched for CVE-2020-1350, would cause the buffer overflow. The detection searches in this Analytic Story use wire data to detect the malicious behavior. Searches for Splunk Stream and Zeek are included. The Splunk Stream search correlates across stream:dns and stream:tcp, while the Zeek search correlates across bro:dns:json and bro:conn:json. These correlations are required to pick up both the DNS record types (SIG and KEY) along with the payload size (>65KB).
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1046,7 +1057,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Defense_Evasion"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Detect tactics used by malware to evade defenses on Windows endpoints. A few of these include suspicious `reg.exe` processes, files hidden with `attrib.exe` and disabling user-account control, among many others
|
||||
narrative = Defense evasion is a tactic--identified in the MITRE ATT&CK framework--that adversaries employ in a variety of ways to bypass or defeat defensive security measures. There are many techniques enumerated by the MITRE ATT&CK framework that are applicable in this context. This Analytic Story includes searches designed to identify the use of such techniques on Windows platforms.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1057,7 +1068,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2013/12/file-extensions-2/", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1042"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule", "ESCU - Execution of File with Multiple Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule", "ESCU - Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Execution of File with Multiple Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Detect and investigate suspected abuse of file extensions and Windows file associations. Some of the malicious behaviors involved may include inserting spaces before file extensions or prepending the file extension with a different one, among other techniques.
|
||||
narrative = Attackers use a variety of techniques to entice users to run malicious code or to persist on an endpoint. One way to accomplish these goals is to leverage file extensions and the mechanism Windows uses to associate files with specific applications. \
|
||||
Since its earliest days, Windows has used extensions to identify file types. Users have become familiar with these extensions and their application associations. For example, if users see that a file ends in `.doc` or `.docx`, they will assume that it is a Microsoft Word document and expect that double-clicking will open it using `winword.exe`. The user will typically also presume that the `.docx` file is safe. \
|
||||
@@ -1072,7 +1083,7 @@ version = 2
|
||||
references = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/", "https://zeltser.com/security-incident-log-review-checklist/", "http://journeyintoir.blogspot.com/2013/01/re-introducing-usnjrnl.html"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Adversaries often try to cover their tracks by manipulating Windows logs. Use these searches to help you monitor for suspicious activity surrounding log files--an essential component of an effective defense.
|
||||
narrative = Because attackers often modify system logs to cover their tracks and/or to thwart the investigative process, log monitoring is an industry-recognized best practice. While there are legitimate reasons to manipulate system logs, it is still worthwhile to keep track of who manipulated the logs, when they manipulated them, and in what way they manipulated them (determining which accesses, tools, or utilities were employed). Even if no malicious activity is detected, the knowledge of an attempt to manipulate system logs may be indicative of a broader security risk that should be thoroughly investigated.\
|
||||
The Analytic Story gives users two different ways to detect manipulation of Windows Event Logs and one way to detect deletion of the Update Sequence Number (USN) Change Journal. The story helps determine the history of the host and the users who have accessed it. Finally, the story aides in investigation by retrieving all the information on the process that caused these events (if the process has been identified).
|
||||
@@ -1084,7 +1095,7 @@ version = 2
|
||||
references = ["http://www.fuzzysecurity.com/tutorials/19.html", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2010/07/malware-persistence-windows-registry.html", "http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/common-malware-persistence-mechanisms/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/fin7-shim-databases-persistence.html", "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dq2Hv7J9fvk"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Monitor for activities and techniques associated with maintaining persistence on a Windows system--a sign that an adversary may have compromised your environment.
|
||||
narrative = Maintaining persistence is one of the first steps taken by attackers after the initial compromise. Attackers leverage various custom and built-in tools to ensure survivability and persistent access within a compromised enterprise. This Analytic Story provides searches to help you identify various behaviors used by attackers to maintain persistent access to a Windows environment.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1095,7 +1106,7 @@ version = 2
|
||||
references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Child Processes of Spoolsv exe - Rule", "ESCU - Overwriting Accessibility Binaries - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Overwriting Accessibility Binaries - Rule", "ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Child Processes of Spoolsv exe - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Monitor for and investigate activities that may be associated with a Windows privilege-escalation attack, including unusual processes running on endpoints, modified registry keys, and more.
|
||||
narrative = Privilege escalation is a "land-and-expand" technique, wherein an adversary gains an initial foothold on a host and then exploits its weaknesses to increase his privileges. The motivation is simple: certain actions on a Windows machine--such as installing software--may require higher-level privileges than those the attacker initially acquired. By increasing his privilege level, the attacker can gain the control required to carry out his malicious ends. This Analytic Story provides searches to detect and investigate behaviors that attackers may use to elevate their privileges in your environment.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1106,7 +1117,7 @@ version = 3
|
||||
references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1050", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1031"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Windows services are often used by attackers for persistence and the ability to load drivers or otherwise interact with the Windows kernel. This Analytic Story helps you monitor your environment for indications that Windows services are being modified or created in a suspicious manner.
|
||||
narrative = The Windows operating system uses a services architecture to allow for running code in the background, similar to a UNIX daemon. Attackers will often leverage Windows services for persistence, hiding in plain sight, seeking the ability to run privileged code that can interact with the kernel. In many cases, attackers will create a new service to host their malicious code. Attackers have also been observed modifying unnecessary or unused services to point to their own code, as opposed to what was intended. In these cases, attackers often use tools to create or modify services in ways that are not typical for most environments, providing opportunities for detection.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1770,6 +1781,36 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Act
|
||||
known_false_positives = Legitimate logon activity by authorized NTLM systems may be detected by this search. Please investigate as appropriate.
|
||||
providing_technologies = []
|
||||
|
||||
[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 - Rule]
|
||||
type = detection
|
||||
asset_type = Endpoint
|
||||
confidence = medium
|
||||
explanation = This search detects the heap-based buffer overflow of sudoedit
|
||||
how_to_implement = Splunk Universal Forwarder running on Linux systems, capturing logs from the /var/log directory. The vulnerability is exposed when a non privledged user tries passing in a single \ character at the end of the command while using the shell and edit flags.
|
||||
annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
|
||||
known_false_positives = unknown
|
||||
providing_technologies = []
|
||||
|
||||
[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 Segfault - Rule]
|
||||
type = detection
|
||||
asset_type = Endpoint
|
||||
confidence = medium
|
||||
explanation = This search detects the heap-based buffer overflow of sudoedit
|
||||
how_to_implement = Splunk Universal Forwarder running on Linux systems (tested on Centos and Ubuntu), where segfaults are being logged. This also captures instances where the exploit has been compiled into a binary. The detection looks for greater than 5 instances of sudoedit combined with segfault over your search time period on a single host
|
||||
annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
|
||||
known_false_positives = If sudoedit is throwing segfaults for other reasons this will pick those up too.
|
||||
providing_technologies = []
|
||||
|
||||
[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 via OSQuery - Rule]
|
||||
type = detection
|
||||
asset_type = Endpoint
|
||||
confidence = medium
|
||||
explanation = This search detects the heap-based buffer overflow of sudoedit
|
||||
how_to_implement = OSQuery installed and configured to pick up process events (info at https://osquery.io) as well as using the Splunk OSQuery Add-on https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/4402. The vulnerability is exposed when a non privledged user tries passing in a single \ character at the end of the command while using the shell and edit flags.
|
||||
annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
|
||||
known_false_positives = unknown
|
||||
providing_technologies = []
|
||||
|
||||
[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Computer Changed with Anonymous Account - Rule]
|
||||
type = detection
|
||||
asset_type = Windows
|
||||
@@ -3104,6 +3145,16 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"
|
||||
known_false_positives = Microsoft may provide updates to these binaries. Verify that these changes do not correspond with your normal software update cycle.
|
||||
providing_technologies = []
|
||||
|
||||
[savedsearch://ESCU - Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location - Rule]
|
||||
type = detection
|
||||
asset_type = Endpoint
|
||||
confidence = medium
|
||||
explanation = This search looks for a process launching an `*.lnk` file under `C:\User*` or `*\Local\Temp\*`. This is common behavior used by various spear phishing tools.
|
||||
how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records filesystem and process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response products, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon.
|
||||
annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]}
|
||||
known_false_positives = This detection should yield little or no false positive results. It is uncommon for LNK files to be executed from temporary or user directories.
|
||||
providing_technologies = []
|
||||
|
||||
[savedsearch://ESCU - Process Execution via WMI - Rule]
|
||||
type = detection
|
||||
asset_type = Endpoint
|
||||
@@ -3559,16 +3610,6 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 7", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation
|
||||
known_false_positives = There are no known false positives.
|
||||
providing_technologies = []
|
||||
|
||||
[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious LNK file launching a process - Rule]
|
||||
type = detection
|
||||
asset_type = Endpoint
|
||||
confidence = medium
|
||||
explanation = This search looks for a ``*.lnk` file under `C:\User*` or `*\Local\Temp\*` executing a process. This is common behavior used by various spear phishing tools.
|
||||
how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records filesystem and process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response products, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon.
|
||||
annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]}
|
||||
known_false_positives = This detection should yield little or no false positive results. It is uncommon for LNK files to execute process from temporary or user directories.
|
||||
providing_technologies = []
|
||||
|
||||
[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule]
|
||||
type = detection
|
||||
asset_type = Endpoint
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user