Branch was auto-updated.

automated_detection_testing/detection_service.py

@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ def main(args):
 
     try:
         module = __import__('generate')
-        results = module.main(REPO_PATH = 'security_content' , OUTPUT_PATH = 'security_content/package', VERBOSE = 'True' )
+        results = module.main(REPO_PATH = 'security_content' , OUTPUT_PATH = 'security_content/dist/escu', PRODUCT = 'ESCU', VERBOSE = 'True' )
     except Exception as e:
         print('Error: ' + str(e))
 

automated_detection_testing/requirements.txt

@@ -5,6 +5,13 @@ aspy.yaml==1.3.0
 atomicwrites==1.4.0
 attackcti==0.3.4.3
 attrs==20.3.0
+azure-common==1.1.25
+azure-core==1.8.2
+azure-identity==1.4.1
+azure-mgmt-compute==17.0.0
+azure-mgmt-core==1.2.1
+azure-mgmt-network==16.0.0
+azure-mgmt-resource==15.0.0
 bcrypt==3.2.0
 boto3==1.17.30
 botocore==1.20.30
@@ -14,7 +21,6 @@ cfgv==2.0.1
 chardet==4.0.0
 configparser==5.0.2
 contextlib2==0.6.0.post1
-cryptography==3.4.4
 Deprecated==1.2.12
 dnspython==2.1.0
 docutils==0.16

detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_executed_as_a_service.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+name: Malicious Powershell Executed As A Service
+id: 8e204dfd-cae0-4ea8-a61d-e972a1ff2ff8
+version: 1
+date: '2021-04-07'
+author: Ryan Becwar
+type: batch
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
+description: This detection is to identify the abuse the Windows SC.exe to execute
+  malicious commands or payloads via PowerShell.
+search: ' `wineventlog_system` EventCode=7045 Service_File_Name IN ("*powershell.exe*",
+  "*-nop*", "*hid*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
+  by EventCode Service_File_Name Service_Name Service_Start_Type Service_Type Service_Account
+  user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
+  | `malicious_powershell_executed_as_a_service_filter`'
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting
+  Windows System logs with the Service name, Service File Name Service Start type,
+  and Service Type from your endpoints.
+known_false_positives: Creating a hidden powershell service is rare and could key
+  off of those instances.
+references:
+- https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/dosfuscation-report.pdf
+- http://az4n6.blogspot.com/2017/
+- https://www.danielbohannon.com/blog-1/2017/3/12/powershell-execution-argument-obfuscation-how-it-can-make-detection-easier
+tags:
+  analytic_story:
+  - Malicious Powershell
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1569.002/atomic_red_team/windows-system.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Privilege Escalation
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1569.002
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  required_fields:
+  - EventCode
+  - Service_File_Name
+  - Service_Type
+  - _time
+  - Service_Name
+  - Service_Start_Type
+  - Service_Account
+  - user
+  security_domain: endpoint
+  automated_detection_testing: passed

dist/escu/default/collections.conf

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
-# On Date: 2021-03-29T18:33:55 UTC
+# On Date: 2021-04-14T07:06:55 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Security Research
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############

dist/escu/default/es_investigations.conf

@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ label = AWS Cryptomining
 description = Monitor your AWS EC2 instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or EC2 instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_aws_iam_privilege_escalation]
 label = AWS IAM Privilege Escalation
@@ -25,21 +25,21 @@ label = AWS Network ACL Activity
 description = Monitor your AWS network infrastructure for bad configurations and malicious activity. Investigative searches help you probe deeper, when the facts warrant it.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_aws_security_hub_alerts]
 label = AWS Security Hub Alerts
 description = This story is focused around detecting Security Hub alerts generated from AWS
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_aws_suspicious_provisioning_activities]
 label = AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities
 description = Monitor your AWS provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your network.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_country___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_region___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_city___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_region___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_country___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_city___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_aws_user_monitoring]
 label = AWS User Monitoring
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ label = Apache Struts Vulnerability
 description = Detect and investigate activities--such as unusually long `Content-Type` length, suspicious java classes and web servers executing suspicious processes--consistent with attempts to exploit Apache Struts vulnerabilities.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_suspicious_strings_in_http_header___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_posts_from_src___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_suspicious_strings_in_http_header___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_posts_from_src___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_asset_tracking]
 label = Asset Tracking
@@ -62,6 +62,13 @@ disabled = 0
 
 panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_first_occurrence_and_last_occurrence_of_a_mac_address___response_task"]
 
+[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_bits_jobs]
+label = BITS Jobs
+description = Adversaries may abuse BITS jobs to persistently execute or clean up after malicious payloads.
+disabled = 0
+
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
+
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156]
 label = Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156
 description = Uncover activity consistent with CVE-2021-3156. Discovered by the Qualys Research Team, this vulnerability has been found to affect sudo across multiple Linux distributions (Ubuntu 20.04 and prior, Debian 10 and prior, Fedora 33 and prior). As this vulnerability was committed to code in July 2011, there will be many distributions affected. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability allows any unprivileged user to gain root privileges on the vulnerable host.
@@ -74,7 +81,7 @@ label = Brand Monitoring
 description = Detect and investigate activity that may indicate that an adversary is using faux domains to mislead users into interacting with malicious infrastructure. Monitor DNS, email, and web traffic for permutations of your brand name.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_emails_from_specific_sender___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_email_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_emails_from_specific_sender___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_email_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_clop_ransomware]
 label = Clop Ransomware
@@ -88,7 +95,7 @@ label = Cloud Cryptomining
 description = Monitor your cloud compute instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or compute instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_cloud_federated_credential_abuse]
 label = Cloud Federated Credential Abuse
@@ -109,28 +116,28 @@ label = ColdRoot MacOS RAT
 description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that relate to the ColdRoot Remote Access Trojan that affects MacOS. An example of some of these activities are changing sensative binaries in the MacOS sub-system, detecting process names and executables associated with the RAT, detecting when a keyboard tab is installed on a MacOS machine and more.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_network_traffic_from_src_ip___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_network_traffic_from_src_ip___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_collection_and_staging]
 label = Collection and Staging
 description = Monitor for and investigate activities--such as suspicious writes to the Windows Recycling Bin or email servers sending high amounts of traffic to specific hosts, for example--that may indicate that an adversary is harvesting and exfiltrating sensitive data. 
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_command_and_control]
 label = Command and Control
 description = Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures leveraged by attackers to establish and operate command and control channels. Implants installed by attackers on compromised endpoints use these channels to receive instructions and send data back to the malicious operators.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_common_phishing_frameworks]
 label = Common Phishing Frameworks
 description = Detect DNS and web requests to fake websites generated by the EvilGinx2 toolkit. These websites are designed to fool unwitting users who have clicked on a malicious link in a phishing email. 
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_certificate_logs_for_a_domain___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_domain_certificate_investigation___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_domain_certificate_investigation___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_certificate_logs_for_a_domain___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_container_implantation_monitoring_and_investigation]
 label = Container Implantation Monitoring and Investigation
@@ -144,14 +151,14 @@ label = Credential Dumping
 description = Uncover activity consistent with credential dumping, a technique wherein attackers compromise systems and attempt to obtain and exfiltrate passwords. The threat actors use these pilfered credentials to further escalate privileges and spread throughout a target environment. The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify attempts to credential dumping.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_ticket_attempts___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_previous_unseen_user___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_hash_attempts___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_failed_logins_for_multiple_destinations___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_ticket_attempts___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_failed_logins_for_multiple_destinations___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_previous_unseen_user___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_hash_attempts___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_dhs_report_ta18_074a]
 label = DHS Report TA18-074A
 description = Monitor for suspicious activities associated with DHS Technical Alert US-CERT TA18-074A. Some of the activities that adversaries used in these compromises included spearfishing attacks, malware, watering-hole domains, many and more.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_file_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_file_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_dns_amplification_attacks]
 label = DNS Amplification Attacks
@@ -179,7 +186,7 @@ label = Data Protection
 description = Fortify your data-protection arsenal--while continuing to ensure data confidentiality and integrity--with searches that monitor for and help you investigate possible signs of data exfiltration.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_deobfuscate_decode_files_or_information]
 label = Deobfuscate-Decode Files or Information
@@ -200,21 +207,28 @@ label = Disabling Security Tools
 description = Looks for activities and techniques associated with the disabling of security tools on a Windows system, such as suspicious `reg.exe` processes, processes launching netsh, and many others.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task"]
+
+[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_domain_trust_discovery]
+label = Domain Trust Discovery
+description = Adversaries may attempt to gather information on domain trust relationships that may be used to identify lateral movement opportunities in Windows multi-domain/forest environments.
+disabled = 0
+
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_dynamic_dns]
 label = Dynamic DNS
 description = Detect and investigate hosts in your environment that may be communicating with dynamic domain providers. Attackers may leverage these services to help them avoid firewall blocks and deny lists.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_emotet_malware__dhs_report_ta18_201a_]
 label = Emotet Malware  DHS Report TA18-201A 
 description = Detect rarely used executables, specific registry paths that may confer malware survivability and persistence, instances where cmd.exe is used to launch script interpreters, and other indicators that the Emotet financial malware has compromised your environment.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_f5_tmui_rce_cve_2020_5902]
 label = F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902
@@ -242,14 +256,14 @@ label = Hidden Cobra Malware
 description = Monitor for and investigate activities, including the creation or deletion of hidden shares and file writes, that may be evidence of infiltration by North Korean government-sponsored cybercriminals. Details of this activity were reported in DHS Report TA-18-149A.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_outbound_emails_to_hidden_cobra_threat_actors___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_outbound_emails_to_hidden_cobra_threat_actors___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_host_redirection]
 label = Host Redirection
 description = Detect evidence of tactics used to redirect traffic from a host to a destination other than the one intended--potentially one that is part of an adversary's attack infrastructure. An example is redirecting communications regarding patches and updates or misleading users into visiting a malicious website.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_ingress_tool_transfer]
 label = Ingress Tool Transfer
@@ -270,7 +284,7 @@ label = Kubernetes Scanning Activity
 description = This story addresses detection against Kubernetes cluster fingerprint scan and attack by providing information on items such as source ip, user agent, cluster names.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_amazon_eks_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_gcp_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_gcp_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_amazon_eks_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_kubernetes_sensitive_object_access_activity]
 label = Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity
@@ -291,14 +305,14 @@ label = Lateral Movement
 description = Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures around how attackers move laterally within the enterprise. Because lateral movement can expose the adversary to detection, it should be an important focus for security analysts.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_malicious_powershell]
 label = Malicious PowerShell
 description = Attackers are finding stealthy ways "live off the land," leveraging utilities and tools that come standard on the endpoint--such as PowerShell--to achieve their goals without downloading binary files. These searches can help you detect and investigate PowerShell command-line options that may be indicative of malicious intent.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_monitor_backup_solution]
 label = Monitor Backup Solution
@@ -312,7 +326,7 @@ label = Monitor for Unauthorized Software
 description = Identify and investigate prohibited/unauthorized software or processes that may be concealing malicious behavior within your environment. 
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_monitor_for_updates]
 label = Monitor for Updates
@@ -333,7 +347,7 @@ label = Netsh Abuse
 description = Detect activities and various techniques associated with the abuse of `netsh.exe`, which can disable local firewall settings or set up a remote connection to a host from an infected system.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_office_365_detections]
 label = Office 365 Detections
@@ -347,7 +361,7 @@ label = Orangeworm Attack Group
 description = Detect activities and various techniques associated with the Orangeworm Attack Group, a group that frequently targets the healthcare industry.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_phishing_payloads]
 label = Phishing Payloads
@@ -361,21 +375,21 @@ label = Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns
 description = Monitor your environment for suspicious behaviors that resemble the techniques employed by the MUDCARP threat group.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_prohibited_traffic_allowed_or_protocol_mismatch]
 label = Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch
 description = Detect instances of prohibited network traffic allowed in the environment, as well as protocols running on non-standard ports. Both of these types of behaviors typically violate policy and can be leveraged by attackers.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_ransomware]
 label = Ransomware
 description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to ransomware--spikes in SMB traffic, suspicious wevtutil usage, the presence of common ransomware extensions, and system processes run from unexpected locations, and many others.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_sysmon_wmi_activity_for_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_backup_logs_for_endpoint___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_sysmon_wmi_activity_for_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_backup_logs_for_endpoint___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_ransomware_cloud]
 label = Ransomware Cloud
@@ -410,7 +424,7 @@ label = SamSam Ransomware
 description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the SamSam ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with SamSam, RDP brute force attacks, the presence of files with SamSam ransomware extensions, suspicious psexec use, and more.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_backup_logs_for_endpoint___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_backup_logs_for_endpoint___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_silver_sparrow]
 label = Silver Sparrow
@@ -438,14 +452,14 @@ label = Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409
 description = Reduce the risk of CVE-2018-11409, an information disclosure vulnerability within some older versions of Splunk Enterprise, with searches designed to help ensure that your Splunk system does not leak information to authenticated users.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_network_traffic_from_src_ip___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_network_traffic_from_src_ip___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_aws_ec2_activities]
 label = Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities
 description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS EC2 instances for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as EC2 instances that originate from unusual locations or those launched by previously unseen users (among others). Included investigative searches will help you probe more deeply, when the information warrants it.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_aws_login_activities]
 label = Suspicious AWS Login Activities
@@ -459,14 +473,14 @@ label = Suspicious AWS S3 Activities
 description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS S3 buckets for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as detecting open S3 buckets and buckets being accessed from a new IP. The contextual and investigative searches will give you more information, when required.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_s3_bucket_details_via_bucketname___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_s3_bucket_details_via_bucketname___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_aws_traffic]
 label = Suspicious AWS Traffic
 description = Leverage these searches to monitor your AWS network traffic for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as a spike in blocked outbound traffic in your virtual private cloud (VPC).
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_cloud_authentication_activities]
 label = Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities
@@ -480,7 +494,7 @@ label = Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities
 description = Monitor your cloud infrastructure provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your cloud environment.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_cloud_provisioning_activities]
 label = Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities
@@ -501,21 +515,21 @@ label = Suspicious Command-Line Executions
 description = Leveraging the Windows command-line interface (CLI) is one of the most common attack techniques--one that is also detailed in the MITRE ATT&CK framework. Use this Analytic Story to help you identify unusual or suspicious use of the CLI on Windows systems.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_dns_traffic]
 label = Suspicious DNS Traffic
 description = Attackers often attempt to hide within or otherwise abuse the domain name system (DNS). You can thwart attempts to manipulate this omnipresent protocol by monitoring for these types of abuses.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_emails]
 label = Suspicious Emails
 description = Email remains one of the primary means for attackers to gain an initial foothold within the modern enterprise. Detect and investigate suspicious emails in your environment with the help of the searches in this Analytic Story.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_emails_from_specific_sender___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_email_info___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_emails_from_specific_sender___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_email_info___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_gcp_storage_activities]
 label = Suspicious GCP Storage Activities
@@ -529,14 +543,14 @@ label = Suspicious MSHTA Activity
 description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe process to execute malicious code.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_okta_activity]
 label = Suspicious Okta Activity
 description = Monitor your Okta environment for suspicious activities. Due to the Covid outbreak, many users are migrating over to leverage cloud services more and more. Okta is a popular tool to manage multiple users and the web-based applications they need to stay productive. The searches in this story will help monitor your Okta environment for suspicious activities and associated user behaviors.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_user_activities_in_okta___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_okta_activity_by_app___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_okta_activity_by_ip_address___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_okta_activity_by_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_user_activities_in_okta___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_okta_activity_by_app___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_regsvr32_activity]
 label = Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity
@@ -557,14 +571,14 @@ label = Suspicious WMI Use
 description = Attackers are increasingly abusing Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI), a framework and associated utilities available on all modern Windows operating systems. Because WMI can be leveraged to manage both local and remote systems, it is important to identify the processes executed and the user context within which the activity occurred.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_sysmon_wmi_activity_for_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_sysmon_wmi_activity_for_host___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_windows_registry_activities]
 label = Suspicious Windows Registry Activities
 description = Monitor and detect registry changes initiated from remote locations, which can be a sign that an attacker has infiltrated your system.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_zoom_child_processes]
 label = Suspicious Zoom Child Processes
@@ -592,14 +606,14 @@ label = Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications
 description = Identify unusual changes to your AWS EC2 instances that may indicate malicious activity. Modifications to your EC2 instances by previously unseen users is an example of an activity that may warrant further investigation.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_unusual_processes]
 label = Unusual Processes
 description = Quickly identify systems running new or unusual processes in your environment that could be indicators of suspicious activity. Processes run from unusual locations, those with conspicuously long command lines, and rare executables are all examples of activities that may warrant deeper investigation.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_use_of_cleartext_protocols]
 label = Use of Cleartext Protocols
@@ -613,7 +627,7 @@ label = Web Fraud Detection
 description = Monitor your environment for activity consistent with common attack techniques bad actors use when attempting to compromise web servers or other web-related assets.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_emails_from_specific_sender___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_web_session_information_via_session_id___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_emails_from_specific_sender___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_web_session_information_via_session_id___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_windows_dns_sigred_cve_2020_1350]
 label = Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350
@@ -627,42 +641,42 @@ label = Windows Defense Evasion Tactics
 description = Detect tactics used by malware to evade defenses on Windows endpoints. A few of these include suspicious `reg.exe` processes, files hidden with `attrib.exe` and disabling user-account control, among many others 
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_windows_file_extension_and_association_abuse]
 label = Windows File Extension and Association Abuse
 description = Detect and investigate suspected abuse of file extensions and Windows file associations. Some of the malicious behaviors involved may include inserting spaces before file extensions or prepending the file extension with a different one, among other techniques.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_windows_log_manipulation]
 label = Windows Log Manipulation
 description = Adversaries often try to cover their tracks by manipulating Windows logs. Use these searches to help you monitor for suspicious activity surrounding log files--an essential component of an effective defense.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_windows_persistence_techniques]
 label = Windows Persistence Techniques
 description = Monitor for activities and techniques associated with maintaining persistence on a Windows system--a sign that an adversary may have compromised your environment.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_windows_privilege_escalation]
 label = Windows Privilege Escalation
 description = Monitor for and investigate activities that may be associated with a Windows privilege-escalation attack, including unusual processes running on endpoints, modified registry keys, and more.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_windows_service_abuse]
 label = Windows Service Abuse
 description = Windows services are often used by attackers for persistence and the ability to load drivers or otherwise interact with the Windows kernel. This Analytic Story helps you monitor your environment for indications that Windows services are being modified or created in a suspicious manner.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task"]
 
 
 

dist/escu/default/macros.conf

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
-# On Date: 2021-03-29T18:33:55 UTC
+# On Date: 2021-04-14T07:06:56 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Security Research
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
@@ -431,6 +431,14 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
 definition = search *
 description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 
 
+[bits_job_persistence_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 
+
+[bitsadmin_download_file_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 
+
 [batch_file_write_to_system32_filter]
 definition = search *
 description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 
@@ -575,6 +583,10 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
 definition = search *
 description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 
 
+[dsquery_domain_discovery_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 
+
 [deleting_shadow_copies_filter]
 definition = search *
 description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 
@@ -903,10 +915,54 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
 definition = search *
 description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 
 
+[disable_registry_tool_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 
+
+[disable_show_hidden_files_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 
+
+[disable_windows_behavior_monitoring_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 
+
+[disable_windows_smartscreen_protection_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 
+
+[disabling_cmd_application_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 
+
+[disabling_controlpanel_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 
+
+[disabling_firewall_with_netsh_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 
+
+[disabling_folderoptions_windows_feature_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 
+
+[disabling_norun_windows_app_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 
+
 [disabling_remote_user_account_control_filter]
 definition = search *
 description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 
 
+[disabling_systemrestore_in_registry_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 
+
+[disabling_task_manager_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 
+
 [dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll_filter]
 definition = search *
 description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 
@@ -1255,6 +1311,10 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
 definition = search *
 description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 
 
+[powershell_start_bitstransfer_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 
+
 [process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location_filter]
 definition = search *
 description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 

dist/escu/default/savedsearches.conf

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
-# On Date: 2021-03-29T18:33:55 UTC
+# On Date: 2021-04-14T07:06:55 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Security Research
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
@@ -1080,13 +1080,13 @@ action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadFile - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
-action.escu.analytic_story = ["Malicious PowerShell"]
+action.escu.analytic_story = ["Malicious PowerShell", "Ingress Tool Transfer"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadFile - Rule
-action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001"]}
+action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell", "Ingress Tool Transfer"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001"]}
 schedule_window = auto
 alert.digest_mode = 1
 disabled = true
@@ -1114,13 +1114,13 @@ action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
-action.escu.analytic_story = ["Malicious PowerShell", "HAFNIUM Group"]
+action.escu.analytic_story = ["Malicious PowerShell", "HAFNIUM Group", "Ingress Tool Transfer"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule
-action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell", "HAFNIUM Group"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001"]}
+action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell", "HAFNIUM Group", "Ingress Tool Transfer"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001"]}
 schedule_window = auto
 alert.digest_mode = 1
 disabled = true
@@ -1302,6 +1302,74 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = bcdedit.exe Processes.process="*recoveryenabled*" (Processes.process="* no*") by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification_filter`
 
+[ESCU - BITS Job Persistence - Rule]
+action.escu = 0
+action.escu.enabled = 1
+description = The following query identifies Microsoft Background Intelligent Transfer Service utility `bitsadmin.exe` scheduling a BITS job to persist on an endpoint. The query identifies the parameters used to create, resume or add a file to a BITS job. Typically seen combined in a oneliner or ran in sequence. If identified, review the BITS job created and capture any files written to disk. It is possible for BITS to be used to upload files and this may require further network data analysis to identify. You can use `bitsadmin /list /verbose` to list out the jobs during investigation.
+action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1197"]}
+action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"]
+action.escu.eli5 = The following query identifies Microsoft Background Intelligent Transfer Service utility `bitsadmin.exe` scheduling a BITS job to persist on an endpoint. The query identifies the parameters used to create, resume or add a file to a BITS job. Typically seen combined in a oneliner or ran in sequence. If identified, review the BITS job created and capture any files written to disk. It is possible for BITS to be used to upload files and this may require further network data analysis to identify. You can use `bitsadmin /list /verbose` to list out the jobs during investigation.
+action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
+action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited false positives will be present. Typically, applications will use `BitsAdmin.exe`. Any filtering should be done based on command-line arguments (legitimate applications) or parent process.
+action.escu.creation_date = 2021-03-29
+action.escu.modification_date = 2021-03-29
+action.escu.confidence = high
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - BITS Job Persistence - Rule
+action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
+action.escu.providing_technologies = []
+action.escu.analytic_story = ["BITS Jobs"]
+cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
+dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
+dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
+action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - BITS Job Persistence - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["BITS Jobs"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1197"]}
+schedule_window = auto
+alert.digest_mode = 1
+disabled = true
+enableSched = 1
+counttype = number of events
+relation = greater than
+quantity = 0
+realtime_schedule = 0
+is_visible = false
+search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=bitsadmin.exe Processes.process IN (*create*, *addfile*, *setnotifyflags*, *setnotifycmdline*, *setminretrydelay*, *setcustomheaders*, *resume* ) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `bits_job_persistence_filter`
+
+[ESCU - BITSAdmin Download File - Rule]
+action.escu = 0
+action.escu.enabled = 1
+description = The following query identifies Microsoft Background Intelligent Transfer Service utility `bitsadmin.exe` using the `transfer` parameter to download a remote object. In addition, look for `download` or `upload` on the command-line, the switches are not required to perform a transfer. Capture any files downloaded. Review the reputation of the IP or domain used. Typically once executed, a follow on command will be used to execute the dropped file. Note that the network connection or file modification events related will not spawn or create from `bitsadmin.exe`, but the artifacts will appear in a parallel process of `svchost.exe` with a command-line similar to `svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s BITS`. It's important to review all parallel and child processes to capture any behaviors and artifacts. In some suspicious and malicious instances, BITS jobs will be created. You can use `bitsadmin /list /verbose` to list out the jobs during investigation.
+action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1197", "T1105"]}
+action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"]
+action.escu.eli5 = The following query identifies Microsoft Background Intelligent Transfer Service utility `bitsadmin.exe` using the `transfer` parameter to download a remote object. In addition, look for `download` or `upload` on the command-line, the switches are not required to perform a transfer. Capture any files downloaded. Review the reputation of the IP or domain used. Typically once executed, a follow on command will be used to execute the dropped file. Note that the network connection or file modification events related will not spawn or create from `bitsadmin.exe`, but the artifacts will appear in a parallel process of `svchost.exe` with a command-line similar to `svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s BITS`. It's important to review all parallel and child processes to capture any behaviors and artifacts. In some suspicious and malicious instances, BITS jobs will be created. You can use `bitsadmin /list /verbose` to list out the jobs during investigation.
+action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
+action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited false positives, however it may be required to filter based on parent process name or network connection.
+action.escu.creation_date = 2021-03-26
+action.escu.modification_date = 2021-03-26
+action.escu.confidence = high
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - BITSAdmin Download File - Rule
+action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
+action.escu.providing_technologies = []
+action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ingress Tool Transfer", "BITS Jobs"]
+cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
+dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
+dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
+action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - BITSAdmin Download File - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ingress Tool Transfer", "BITS Jobs"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1197", "T1105"]}
+schedule_window = auto
+alert.digest_mode = 1
+disabled = true
+enableSched = 1
+counttype = number of events
+relation = greater than
+quantity = 0
+realtime_schedule = 0
+is_visible = false
+search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=bitsadmin.exe Processes.process=*transfer* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `bitsadmin_download_file_filter`
+
 [ESCU - Batch File Write to System32 - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
@@ -1574,7 +1642,7 @@ relation = greater than
 quantity = 0
 realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
-search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as cmdline values(Processes.parent_process_name) as parent_process values(Processes.process_name) count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = "*runrun*" OR Processes.process = "*temp.dat*" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `clop_common_exec_parameter_filter`
+search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as cmdline values(Processes.parent_process_name) as parent_process values(Processes.process_name) count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name != "*temp.dat*" Processes.process = "*runrun*" OR Processes.process = "*temp.dat*" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `clop_common_exec_parameter_filter`
 
 [ESCU - Clop Ransomware Known Service Name - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
@@ -2598,6 +2666,50 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | inputlookup discovered_dns_records | rename answer as discovered_answer | join domain[|tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(DNS.record_type) as type, values(DNS.answer) as current_answer values(DNS.src) as src from datamodel=Network_Resolution where DNS.message_type=RESPONSE DNS.answer!="unknown" DNS.answer!="" by DNS.query | rename DNS.query as query | where query!="unknown" | rex field=query "(?<domain>\w+\.\w+?)(?:$|/)"] | makemv delim=" " answer |  makemv delim=" " type | sort -count | table count,src,domain,type,query,current_answer,discovered_answer | makemv current_answer  | mvexpand current_answer | makemv discovered_answer | eval n=mvfind(discovered_answer, current_answer) | where isnull(n) | `dns_record_changed_filter`
 
+[ESCU - DSQuery Domain Discovery - Rule]
+action.escu = 0
+action.escu.enabled = 1
+description = The following analytic identifies "dsquery.exe" execution with arguments looking for `TrustedDomain` query directly on the command-line. This is typically indicative of an Administrator or adversary perform domain trust discovery. Note that this query does not identify any other variations of "Dsquery.exe" usage.\
+Within this detection, it is assumed `dsquery.exe` is not moved or renamed.\
+The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, process "dsquery.exe" and its parent process.\
+DSQuery.exe is natively found in `C:\Windows\system32` and `C:\Windows\syswow64` and only on Server operating system.\
+The following DLL(s) are loaded when DSQuery.exe is launched `dsquery.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible dsquery is running within that process context in memory.\
+In addition to trust discovery, review parallel processes for additional behaviors performed. Identify the parent process and capture any files (batch files, for example) being used.
+action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1482"]}
+action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"]
+action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies "dsquery.exe" execution with arguments looking for `TrustedDomain` query directly on the command-line. This is typically indicative of an Administrator or adversary perform domain trust discovery. Note that this query does not identify any other variations of "Dsquery.exe" usage.\
+Within this detection, it is assumed `dsquery.exe` is not moved or renamed.\
+The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, process "dsquery.exe" and its parent process.\
+DSQuery.exe is natively found in `C:\Windows\system32` and `C:\Windows\syswow64` and only on Server operating system.\
+The following DLL(s) are loaded when DSQuery.exe is launched `dsquery.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible dsquery is running within that process context in memory.\
+In addition to trust discovery, review parallel processes for additional behaviors performed. Identify the parent process and capture any files (batch files, for example) being used.
+action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
+action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited false positives. If there is a true false positive, filter based on command-line or parent process.
+action.escu.creation_date = 2021-03-31
+action.escu.modification_date = 2021-03-31
+action.escu.confidence = high
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - DSQuery Domain Discovery - Rule
+action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
+action.escu.providing_technologies = []
+action.escu.analytic_story = ["Domain Trust Discovery"]
+cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
+dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
+dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
+action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - DSQuery Domain Discovery - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Domain Trust Discovery"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1482"]}
+schedule_window = auto
+alert.digest_mode = 1
+disabled = true
+enableSched = 1
+counttype = number of events
+relation = greater than
+quantity = 0
+realtime_schedule = 0
+is_visible = false
+search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=dsquery.exe Processes.process=*trustedDomain* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `dsquery_domain_discovery_filter`
+
 [ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
@@ -5514,6 +5626,312 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) values(Processes.process) as process max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process="* /stext *" OR Processes.process="* /scomma *" ) by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft_filter`
 
+[ESCU - Disable Registry Tool - Rule]
+action.escu = 0
+action.escu.enabled = 1
+description = This search is to identifies modification of registry to disable the regedit or registry tools of windows operating system. Since registry tool is a swiss knife in analyzing registry, malware such as RAT or trojan Spy disable this application to prevent the removal of their registry entry such as persistence, file less components and defense evasion.
+action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"]}
+action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"]
+action.escu.eli5 = This search is to identifies modification of registry to disable the regedit or registry tools of windows operating system. Since registry tool is a swiss knife in analyzing registry, malware such as RAT or trojan Spy disable this application to prevent the removal of their registry entry such as persistence, file less components and defense evasion.
+action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.
+action.escu.known_false_positives = admin may disable this application for non technical user.
+action.escu.creation_date = 2021-03-31
+action.escu.modification_date = 2021-03-31
+action.escu.confidence = high
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Disable Registry Tool - Rule
+action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
+action.escu.providing_technologies = []
+action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"]
+cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
+dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
+dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
+action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Disable Registry Tool - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"]}
+schedule_window = auto
+alert.digest_mode = 1
+disabled = true
+enableSched = 1
+counttype = number of events
+relation = greater than
+quantity = 0
+realtime_schedule = 0
+is_visible = false
+search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= "*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System\\DisableRegistryTools" Registry.registry_value_name = "DWORD (0x00000001)" by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disable_registry_tool_filter`
+
+[ESCU - Disable Show Hidden Files - Rule]
+action.escu = 0
+action.escu.enabled = 1
+description = The following search is to idetifies a modification in registry to prevent the user seeing all the files with hidden attributes. This event or techniques are known on some worm and trojan spy malware that will drop hidden files on the infected machine.
+action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1564.001", "T1562.001"]}
+action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"]
+action.escu.eli5 = The following search is to idetifies a modification in registry to prevent the user seeing all the files with hidden attributes. This event or techniques are known on some worm and trojan spy malware that will drop hidden files on the infected machine.
+action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.
+action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
+action.escu.creation_date = 2021-03-31
+action.escu.modification_date = 2021-03-31
+action.escu.confidence = high
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Disable Show Hidden Files - Rule
+action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
+action.escu.providing_technologies = []
+action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"]
+cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
+dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
+dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
+action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Disable Show Hidden Files - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1564.001", "T1562.001"]}
+schedule_window = auto
+alert.digest_mode = 1
+disabled = true
+enableSched = 1
+counttype = number of events
+relation = greater than
+quantity = 0
+realtime_schedule = 0
+is_visible = false
+search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path= "*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\Advanced\\Hidden" OR Registry.registry_path= "*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\Advanced\\HideFileExt" Registry.registry_value_name = "DWORD (0x00000001)") OR (Registry.registry_path= "*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\Advanced\\ShowSuperHidden" Registry.registry_value_name = "DWORD (0x00000000)") by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disable_show_hidden_files_filter`
+
+[ESCU - Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring - Rule]
+action.escu = 0
+action.escu.enabled = 1
+description = This search is to identifies a modification in registry to disable the windows denfender real time behavior monitoring. This event or technique is commonly seen in RAT, bot, or Trojan to disable AV to evade detections.
+action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"]}
+action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"]
+action.escu.eli5 = This search is to identifies a modification in registry to disable the windows denfender real time behavior monitoring. This event or technique is commonly seen in RAT, bot, or Trojan to disable AV to evade detections.
+action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.
+action.escu.known_false_positives = admin or user may choose to disable this windows features.
+action.escu.creation_date = 2021-03-31
+action.escu.modification_date = 2021-03-31
+action.escu.confidence = high
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring - Rule
+action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
+action.escu.providing_technologies = []
+action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"]
+cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
+dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
+dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
+action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"]}
+schedule_window = auto
+alert.digest_mode = 1
+disabled = true
+enableSched = 1
+counttype = number of events
+relation = greater than
+quantity = 0
+realtime_schedule = 0
+is_visible = false
+search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= "*\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Real-Time Protection\\DisableBehaviorMonitoring" OR Registry.registry_path= "*\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Real-Time Protection\\DisableOnAccessProtection" OR Registry.registry_path= "*\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Real-Time Protection\\DisableScanOnRealtimeEnable" Registry.registry_value_name = "DWORD (0x00000001)" by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disable_windows_behavior_monitoring_filter`
+
+[ESCU - Disable Windows SmartScreen Protection - Rule]
+action.escu = 0
+action.escu.enabled = 1
+description = The following search identifies a modification of registry to disable the smartscreen protection of windows machine. This is windows feature provide an early warning system against website that might engage in phishing attack or malware distribution. This modification are seen in RAT malware to cover their tracks upon downloading other of its component or other payload.
+action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"]}
+action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"]
+action.escu.eli5 = The following search identifies a modification of registry to disable the smartscreen protection of windows machine. This is windows feature provide an early warning system against website that might engage in phishing attack or malware distribution. This modification are seen in RAT malware to cover their tracks upon downloading other of its component or other payload.
+action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.
+action.escu.known_false_positives = admin or user may choose to disable this windows features.
+action.escu.creation_date = 2021-03-31
+action.escu.modification_date = 2021-03-31
+action.escu.confidence = high
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Disable Windows SmartScreen Protection - Rule
+action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
+action.escu.providing_technologies = []
+action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"]
+cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
+dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
+dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
+action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Disable Windows SmartScreen Protection - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"]}
+schedule_window = auto
+alert.digest_mode = 1
+disabled = true
+enableSched = 1
+counttype = number of events
+relation = greater than
+quantity = 0
+realtime_schedule = 0
+is_visible = false
+search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= "*HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\SmartScreenEnabled"  Registry.registry_value_name = "Off" by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disable_windows_smartscreen_protection_filter`
+
+[ESCU - Disabling CMD Application - Rule]
+action.escu = 0
+action.escu.enabled = 1
+description = this search is to identify modification in registry to disable cmd prompt application. This technique is commonly seen in RAT, Trojan or WORM to prevent triaging or deleting there samples through cmd application which is one of the tool of analyst to traverse on directory and files.
+action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"]}
+action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"]
+action.escu.eli5 = this search is to identify modification in registry to disable cmd prompt application. This technique is commonly seen in RAT, Trojan or WORM to prevent triaging or deleting there samples through cmd application which is one of the tool of analyst to traverse on directory and files.
+action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.
+action.escu.known_false_positives = admin may disable this application for non technical user.
+action.escu.creation_date = 2021-03-31
+action.escu.modification_date = 2021-03-31
+action.escu.confidence = high
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Disabling CMD Application - Rule
+action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
+action.escu.providing_technologies = []
+action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"]
+cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
+dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
+dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
+action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Disabling CMD Application - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"]}
+schedule_window = auto
+alert.digest_mode = 1
+disabled = true
+enableSched = 1
+counttype = number of events
+relation = greater than
+quantity = 0
+realtime_schedule = 0
+is_visible = false
+search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= "*\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\System\\DisableCMD" Registry.registry_value_name = "DWORD (0x00000001)" by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disabling_cmd_application_filter`
+
+[ESCU - Disabling ControlPanel - Rule]
+action.escu = 0
+action.escu.enabled = 1
+description = this search is to identify registry modification to disable control panel window. This technique is commonly seen in malware to prevent their artifacts , persistence removed on the infected machine.
+action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"]}
+action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"]
+action.escu.eli5 = this search is to identify registry modification to disable control panel window. This technique is commonly seen in malware to prevent their artifacts , persistence removed on the infected machine.
+action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.
+action.escu.known_false_positives = admin may disable this application for non technical user.
+action.escu.creation_date = 2021-03-31
+action.escu.modification_date = 2021-03-31
+action.escu.confidence = high
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Disabling ControlPanel - Rule
+action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
+action.escu.providing_technologies = []
+action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"]
+cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
+dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
+dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
+action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Disabling ControlPanel - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"]}
+schedule_window = auto
+alert.digest_mode = 1
+disabled = true
+enableSched = 1
+counttype = number of events
+relation = greater than
+quantity = 0
+realtime_schedule = 0
+is_visible = false
+search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= "*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\Explorer\\NoControlPanel" Registry.registry_value_name = "DWORD (0x00000001)" by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disabling_controlpanel_filter`
+
+[ESCU - Disabling Firewall with Netsh - Rule]
+action.escu = 0
+action.escu.enabled = 1
+description = This search is to identifies suspicious firewall disabling using netsh application. this technique is commonly seen in malware that tries to communicate or download its component or other payload to its C2 server.
+action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"]}
+action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"]
+action.escu.eli5 = This search is to identifies suspicious firewall disabling using netsh application. this technique is commonly seen in malware that tries to communicate or download its component or other payload to its C2 server.
+action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data.
+action.escu.known_false_positives = admin may disable firewall during testing or fixing network problem.
+action.escu.creation_date = 2021-03-31
+action.escu.modification_date = 2021-03-31
+action.escu.confidence = high
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Disabling Firewall with Netsh - Rule
+action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
+action.escu.providing_technologies = []
+action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"]
+cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
+dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
+dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
+action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Disabling Firewall with Netsh - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"]}
+schedule_window = auto
+alert.digest_mode = 1
+disabled = true
+enableSched = 1
+counttype = number of events
+relation = greater than
+quantity = 0
+realtime_schedule = 0
+is_visible = false
+search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=netsh.exe Processes.process= "*firewall*" (Processes.process= "*off*" OR  Processes.process= "*disable*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disabling_firewall_with_netsh_filter`
+
+[ESCU - Disabling FolderOptions Windows Feature - Rule]
+action.escu = 0
+action.escu.enabled = 1
+description = This search is to identify registry modification to disable folder options feature of windows to show hidden files, file extension and etc. This technique used by malware in combination if disabling show hidden files feature to hide their files and also to hide the file extension to lure the user base on file icons or fake file extensions.
+action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"]}
+action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"]
+action.escu.eli5 = This search is to identify registry modification to disable folder options feature of windows to show hidden files, file extension and etc. This technique used by malware in combination if disabling show hidden files feature to hide their files and also to hide the file extension to lure the user base on file icons or fake file extensions.
+action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.
+action.escu.known_false_positives = admin may disable this application for non technical user.
+action.escu.creation_date = 2021-03-31
+action.escu.modification_date = 2021-03-31
+action.escu.confidence = high
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Disabling FolderOptions Windows Feature - Rule
+action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
+action.escu.providing_technologies = []
+action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"]
+cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
+dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
+dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
+action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Disabling FolderOptions Windows Feature - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"]}
+schedule_window = auto
+alert.digest_mode = 1
+disabled = true
+enableSched = 1
+counttype = number of events
+relation = greater than
+quantity = 0
+realtime_schedule = 0
+is_visible = false
+search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= "*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\Explorer\\NoFolderOptions" Registry.registry_value_name = "DWORD (0x00000001)" by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disabling_folderoptions_windows_feature_filter`
+
+[ESCU - Disabling NoRun Windows App - Rule]
+action.escu = 0
+action.escu.enabled = 1
+description = This search is to identify modification of registry to disable run application in window start menu. this application is known to be a helpful shortcut to windows OS user to run known application and also to execute some reg or batch script. This technique is used malware to make cleaning of its infection more harder by preventing known application run easily through run shortcut.
+action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"]}
+action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"]
+action.escu.eli5 = This search is to identify modification of registry to disable run application in window start menu. this application is known to be a helpful shortcut to windows OS user to run known application and also to execute some reg or batch script. This technique is used malware to make cleaning of its infection more harder by preventing known application run easily through run shortcut.
+action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.
+action.escu.known_false_positives = admin may disable this application for non technical user.
+action.escu.creation_date = 2021-03-31
+action.escu.modification_date = 2021-03-31
+action.escu.confidence = high
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Disabling NoRun Windows App - Rule
+action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
+action.escu.providing_technologies = []
+action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"]
+cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
+dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
+dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
+action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Disabling NoRun Windows App - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"]}
+schedule_window = auto
+alert.digest_mode = 1
+disabled = true
+enableSched = 1
+counttype = number of events
+relation = greater than
+quantity = 0
+realtime_schedule = 0
+is_visible = false
+search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= "*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\Explorer\\NoRun" Registry.registry_value_name = "DWORD (0x00000001)" by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disabling_norun_windows_app_filter`
+
 [ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
@@ -5548,6 +5966,74 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=*HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System\\EnableLUA* Registry.registry_value_name="DWORD (0x00000000)" by Registry.dest, Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.action | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `disabling_remote_user_account_control_filter`
 
+[ESCU - Disabling SystemRestore In Registry - Rule]
+action.escu = 0
+action.escu.enabled = 1
+description = The following search identifies the modification of registry related in disabling the system restore of a machine. This event or behavior are seen in some RAT malware to make the restore of the infected machine  difficult and keep their infection on the box.
+action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"]}
+action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"]
+action.escu.eli5 = The following search identifies the modification of registry related in disabling the system restore of a machine. This event or behavior are seen in some RAT malware to make the restore of the infected machine  difficult and keep their infection on the box.
+action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.
+action.escu.known_false_positives = in some cases admin can disable systemrestore on a machine.
+action.escu.creation_date = 2021-03-31
+action.escu.modification_date = 2021-03-31
+action.escu.confidence = high
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Disabling SystemRestore In Registry - Rule
+action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
+action.escu.providing_technologies = []
+action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"]
+cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
+dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
+dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
+action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Disabling SystemRestore In Registry - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"]}
+schedule_window = auto
+alert.digest_mode = 1
+disabled = true
+enableSched = 1
+counttype = number of events
+relation = greater than
+quantity = 0
+realtime_schedule = 0
+is_visible = false
+search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= "*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\SystemRestore\\DisableSR" OR Registry.registry_path= "*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\SystemRestore\\DisableConfig" Registry.registry_value_name = "DWORD (0x00000001)" by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disabling_systemrestore_in_registry_filter`
+
+[ESCU - Disabling Task Manager - Rule]
+action.escu = 0
+action.escu.enabled = 1
+description = This search is to identifies modification of registry to disable the task manager of windows operating system. this event or technique are commonly seen in malware such as RAT, Trojan, TrojanSpy or worm to prevent the user to terminate their process.
+action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"]}
+action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"]
+action.escu.eli5 = This search is to identifies modification of registry to disable the task manager of windows operating system. this event or technique are commonly seen in malware such as RAT, Trojan, TrojanSpy or worm to prevent the user to terminate their process.
+action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.
+action.escu.known_false_positives = admin may disable this application for non technical user.
+action.escu.creation_date = 2021-03-31
+action.escu.modification_date = 2021-03-31
+action.escu.confidence = high
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Disabling Task Manager - Rule
+action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
+action.escu.providing_technologies = []
+action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"]
+cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
+dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
+dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
+action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Disabling Task Manager - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"]}
+schedule_window = auto
+alert.digest_mode = 1
+disabled = true
+enableSched = 1
+counttype = number of events
+relation = greater than
+quantity = 0
+realtime_schedule = 0
+is_visible = false
+search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= "*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System\\DisableTaskMgr" Registry.registry_value_name = "DWORD (0x00000001)" by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disabling_task_manager_filter`
+
 [ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
@@ -7798,13 +8284,13 @@ action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
-action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ryuk Ransomware"]
+action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ryuk Ransomware", "Domain Trust Discovery"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule
-action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ryuk Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1482"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]}
+action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ryuk Ransomware", "Domain Trust Discovery"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1482"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]}
 schedule_window = auto
 alert.digest_mode = 1
 disabled = true
@@ -8589,6 +9075,40 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Filesystem.user) as user values(Filesystem.dest) as dest values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where (Filesystem.file_path=*\\Windows\\System32\\sethc.exe* OR Filesystem.file_path=*\\Windows\\System32\\utilman.exe* OR Filesystem.file_path=*\\Windows\\System32\\osk.exe* OR Filesystem.file_path=*\\Windows\\System32\\Magnify.exe* OR Filesystem.file_path=*\\Windows\\System32\\Narrator.exe* OR Filesystem.file_path=*\\Windows\\System32\\DisplaySwitch.exe* OR Filesystem.file_path=*\\Windows\\System32\\AtBroker.exe*) by Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `overwriting_accessibility_binaries_filter`
 
+[ESCU - PowerShell Start-BitsTransfer - Rule]
+action.escu = 0
+action.escu.enabled = 1
+description = Start-BitsTransfer is the PowerShell "version" of BitsAdmin.exe. Similar functionality is present. This technique variation is not as commonly used by adversaries, but has been abused in the past. Lesser known uses include the ability to set the `-TransferType` to `Upload` for exfiltration of files. In an instance where `Upload` is used, it is highly possible files will be archived. During triage, review parallel processes and process lineage. Capture any files on disk and review. For the remote domain or IP, what is the reputation?
+action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1197"]}
+action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"]
+action.escu.eli5 = Start-BitsTransfer is the PowerShell "version" of BitsAdmin.exe. Similar functionality is present. This technique variation is not as commonly used by adversaries, but has been abused in the past. Lesser known uses include the ability to set the `-TransferType` to `Upload` for exfiltration of files. In an instance where `Upload` is used, it is highly possible files will be archived. During triage, review parallel processes and process lineage. Capture any files on disk and review. For the remote domain or IP, what is the reputation?
+action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
+action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited false positives. It is possible administrators will utilize Start-BitsTransfer for administrative tasks, otherwise filter based parent process or command-line arguments.
+action.escu.creation_date = 2021-03-29
+action.escu.modification_date = 2021-03-29
+action.escu.confidence = high
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - PowerShell Start-BitsTransfer - Rule
+action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
+action.escu.providing_technologies = []
+action.escu.analytic_story = ["BITS Jobs"]
+cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
+dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
+dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
+action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - PowerShell Start-BitsTransfer - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["BITS Jobs"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1197"]}
+schedule_window = auto
+alert.digest_mode = 1
+disabled = true
+enableSched = 1
+counttype = number of events
+relation = greater than
+quantity = 0
+realtime_schedule = 0
+is_visible = false
+search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=powershell.exe Processes.process=*start-bitstransfer* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_start_bitstransfer_filter`
+
 [ESCU - Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
@@ -9274,7 +9794,7 @@ action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search monitors for remote modifications to registry keys.
 action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]}
-action.escu.data_models = []
+action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 action.escu.eli5 = This search monitors for remote modifications to registry keys.
 action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must populate the `Endpoint` data model. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry. Deprecated because I don't think the logic is right.
 action.escu.known_false_positives = This technique may be legitimately used by administrators to modify remote registries, so it's important to filter these events out.
@@ -9301,7 +9821,7 @@ relation = greater than
 quantity = 0
 realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
-search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Registry.registry_key_name) as registry_key_name values(Registry.registry_path) as registry_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where  Registry.registry_path="\\\\*"  by Registry.dest , Registry.user | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `remote_registry_key_modifications_filter`
+search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Registry.registry_key_name) as registry_key_name values(Registry.registry_path) as registry_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where  Registry.registry_path="\\\\*"  by Registry.dest , Registry.user | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `remote_registry_key_modifications_filter`
 
 [ESCU - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
@@ -10127,7 +10647,7 @@ action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search looks for changes to registry values that control Windows file associations, executed by a process that is not typical for legitimate, routine changes to this area.
 action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.PT", "PR.IP"]}
-action.escu.data_models = []
+action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for changes to registry values that control Windows file associations, executed by a process that is not typical for legitimate, routine changes to this area.
 action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on registry changes that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Registry` nodes.
 action.escu.known_false_positives = There may be other processes in your environment that users may legitimately use to modify file associations. If this is the case and you are finding false positives, you can modify the search to add those processes as exceptions.
@@ -10154,7 +10674,7 @@ relation = greater than
 quantity = 0
 realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
-search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.parent_process_name) as parent_process_name FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name!=Explorer.exe AND Processes.process_name!=OpenWith.exe by Processes.process_id Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | join [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Registry.registry_path) as registry_path count  FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=*\\Explorer\\FileExts* by Registry.process_id Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Registry")` | table process_id dest registry_path]| `suspicious_changes_to_file_associations_filter` 
+search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.parent_process_name) as parent_process_name FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name!=Explorer.exe AND Processes.process_name!=OpenWith.exe by Processes.process_id Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | join [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Registry.registry_path) as registry_path count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=*\\Explorer\\FileExts* by Registry.process_id Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Registry")` | table process_id dest registry_path]| `suspicious_changes_to_file_associations_filter` 
 
 [ESCU - Suspicious Curl Network Connection - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
@@ -11868,13 +12388,13 @@ action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows AdFind Exe - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
-action.escu.analytic_story = ["NOBELIUM Group"]
+action.escu.analytic_story = ["NOBELIUM Group", "Domain Trust Discovery"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows AdFind Exe - Rule
-action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["NOBELIUM Group"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]}
+action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["NOBELIUM Group", "Domain Trust Discovery"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]}
 schedule_window = auto
 alert.digest_mode = 1
 disabled = true

dist/escu/default/transforms.conf

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
-# On Date: 2021-03-29T18:33:55 UTC
+# On Date: 2021-04-14T07:06:55 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Security Research
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############

dist/escu/default/use_case_library.conf

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
-# On Date: 2021-03-29T18:33:55 UTC
+# On Date: 2021-04-14T07:06:56 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Security Research
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-cloudtrail-now-tracks-cross-account-activity-to-its-origin/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - aws detect sts get session token abuse - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect attach to role policy - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect role creation - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect permanent key creation - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect sts assume role abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - aws detect attach to role policy - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect role creation - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect permanent key creation - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect sts get session token abuse - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect sts assume role abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId - Response Task"]
 description = Track when a user assumes an IAM role in another AWS account to obtain cross-account access to services and resources in that account. Accessing new roles could be an indication of malicious activity.
 narrative = Amazon Web Services (AWS) admins manage access to AWS resources and services across the enterprise using AWS's Identity and Access Management (IAM) functionality. IAM provides the ability to create and manage AWS users, groups, and roles-each with their own unique set of privileges and defined access to specific resources (such as EC2 instances, the AWS Management Console, API, or the command-line interface). Unlike conventional (human) users, IAM roles are assumable by anyone in the organization. They provide users with dynamically created temporary security credentials that expire within a set time period.\
 Herein lies the rub. In between the time between when the temporary credentials are issued and when they expire is a period of opportunity, where a user could leverage the temporary credentials to wreak havoc-spin up or remove instances, create new users, elevate privileges, and other malicious activities-throughout the environment.\
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor your AWS EC2 instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or EC2 instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior.
 narrative = Cryptomining is an intentionally difficult, resource-intensive business. Its complexity was designed into the process to ensure that the number of blocks mined each day would remain steady. So, it's par for the course that ambitious, but unscrupulous, miners make amassing the computing power of large enterprises--a practice known as cryptojacking--a top priority. \
 Cryptojacking has attracted an increasing amount of media attention since its explosion in popularity in the fall of 2017. The attacks have moved from in-browser exploits and mobile phones to enterprise cloud services, such as Amazon Web Services (AWS). It's difficult to determine exactly how widespread the practice has become, since bad actors continually evolve their ability to escape detection, including employing unlisted endpoints, moderating their CPU usage, and hiding the mining pool's IP address behind a free CDN. \
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonVPC/latest/UserGuide/VPC_Appendix_NACLs.html", "https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/how-to-help-prepare-for-ddos-attacks-by-reducing-your-attack-surface/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor your AWS network infrastructure for bad configurations and malicious activity. Investigative searches help you probe deeper, when the facts warrant it.
 narrative = AWS CloudTrail is an AWS service that helps you enable governance, compliance, and operational/risk auditing of your AWS account. Actions taken by a user, role, or an AWS service are recorded as events in CloudTrail. It is crucial for a company to monitor events and actions taken in the AWS Management Console, AWS Command Line Interface, and AWS SDKs and APIs to ensure that your servers are not vulnerable to attacks. This analytic story contains detection searches that leverage CloudTrail logs from AWS to check for bad configurations and malicious activity in your AWS network access controls.
 
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://aws.amazon.com/security-hub/features/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for User - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance - Rule", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for User - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task"]
 description = This story is focused around detecting Security Hub alerts generated from AWS
 narrative = AWS Security Hub collects and consolidates findings from AWS security services enabled in your environment, such as intrusion detection findings from Amazon GuardDuty, vulnerability scans from Amazon Inspector, S3 bucket policy findings from Amazon Macie, publicly accessible and cross-account resources from IAM Access Analyzer, and resources lacking WAF coverage from AWS Firewall Manager.
 
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Country - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Region - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From City - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Region - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Country - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From City - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor your AWS provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your network.
 narrative = Because most enterprise AWS activities originate from familiar geographic locations, monitoring for activity from unknown or unusual regions is an important security measure. This indicator can be especially useful in environments where it is impossible to add specific IPs to an allow list because they vary. \
 This Analytic Story was designed to provide you with flexibility in the precision you employ in specifying legitimate geographic regions. It can be as specific as an IP address or a city, or as broad as a region (think state) or an entire country. By determining how precise you want your geographical locations to be and monitoring for new locations that haven't previously accessed your environment, you can detect adversaries as they begin to probe your environment. Since there are legitimate reasons for activities from unfamiliar locations, this is not a standalone indicator. Nevertheless, location can be a relevant piece of information that you may wish to investigate further.
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://redlock.io/blog/cryptojacking-tesla"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in Security Group Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Detect API activity from users without MFA - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS API Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new API calls from user roles - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Security Group Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect API activity from users without MFA - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS API Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new API calls from user roles - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Detect and investigate dormant user accounts for your AWS environment that have become active again. Because inactive and ad-hoc accounts are common attack targets, it's critical to enable governance within your environment.
 narrative = It seems obvious that it is critical to monitor and control the users who have access to your cloud infrastructure. Nevertheless, it's all too common for enterprises to lose track of ad-hoc accounts, leaving their servers vulnerable to attack. In fact, this was the very oversight that led to Tesla's cryptojacking attack in February, 2018.\
 In addition to compromising the security of your data, when bad actors leverage your compute resources, it can incur monumental costs, since you will be billed for any new EC2 instances and increased bandwidth usage. \
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs/blob/v3.2/dev/rules/REQUEST-944-APPLICATION-ATTACK-JAVA.conf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Java Classes - Rule", "ESCU - Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Content-Type Length - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Suspicious Strings in HTTP Header - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Web POSTs From src - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Java Classes - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Content-Type Length - Rule", "ESCU - Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Suspicious Strings in HTTP Header - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Web POSTs From src - Response Task"]
 description = Detect and investigate activities--such as unusually long `Content-Type` length, suspicious java classes and web servers executing suspicious processes--consistent with attempts to exploit Apache Struts vulnerabilities.
 narrative = In March of 2017, a remote code-execution vulnerability in the Jakarta Multipart parser in Apache Struts, a widely used open-source framework for creating Java web applications, was disclosed and assigned to CVE-2017-5638. About two months later, hackers exploited the flaw to carry out the world's <a href=https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2017/09/07/nations-biggest-hacks-and-data-breaches-millions/644311001/> 5th largest data breach</a>. The target, credit giant Equifax, <a href=https://money.cnn.com/2017/09/16/technology/equifax-breach-security-hole/index.html>told investigators</a> that it had become aware of the vulnerability two months before the attack. \
 The exploit involved manipulating the `Content-Type HTTP` header to execute commands embedded in the header.\
@@ -129,6 +129,17 @@ searches = ["ESCU - Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address - Rule", "ESCU - G
 description = Keep a careful inventory of every asset on your network to make it easier to detect rogue devices. Unauthorized/unmanaged devices could be an indication of malicious behavior that should be investigated further.
 narrative = This Analytic Story is designed to help you develop a better understanding of what authorized and unauthorized devices are part of your enterprise. This story can help you better categorize and classify assets, providing critical business context and awareness of their assets during an incident. Information derived from this Analytic Story can be used to better inform and support other analytic stories. For successful detection, you will need to leverage the Assets and Identity Framework from Enterprise Security to populate your known assets.
 
+[analytic_story://BITS Jobs]
+category = Adversary Tactics
+last_updated = 2021-03-26
+version = 1
+references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1197/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/bits/bitsadmin-tool"]
+maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
+spec_version = 3
+searches = ["ESCU - PowerShell Start-BitsTransfer - Rule", "ESCU - BITS Job Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - BITSAdmin Download File - Rule"]
+description = Adversaries may abuse BITS jobs to persistently execute or clean up after malicious payloads.
+narrative = Windows Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) is a low-bandwidth, asynchronous file transfer mechanism exposed through Component Object Model (COM). BITS is commonly used by updaters, messengers, and other applications preferred to operate in the background (using available idle bandwidth) without interrupting other networked applications. File transfer tasks are implemented as BITS jobs, which contain a queue of one or more file operations. The interface to create and manage BITS jobs is accessible through PowerShell and the BITSAdmin tool. Adversaries may abuse BITS to download, execute, and even clean up after running malicious code. BITS tasks are self-contained in the BITS job database, without new files or registry modifications, and often permitted by host firewalls. BITS enabled execution may also enable persistence by creating long-standing jobs (the default maximum lifetime is 90 days and extendable) or invoking an arbitrary program when a job completes or errors (including after system reboots).
+
 [analytic_story://Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156]
 category = Adversary Tactics
 last_updated = 2021-01-27
@@ -136,7 +147,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-research/2021/01/26/cve-2021-3156-heap-based-buffer-overflow-in-sudo-baron-samedit"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Shannon Davis"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 Segfault - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 via OSQuery - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 via OSQuery - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 Segfault - Rule"]
 description = Uncover activity consistent with CVE-2021-3156. Discovered by the Qualys Research Team, this vulnerability has been found to affect sudo across multiple Linux distributions (Ubuntu 20.04 and prior, Debian 10 and prior, Fedora 33 and prior). As this vulnerability was committed to code in July 2011, there will be many distributions affected. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability allows any unprivileged user to gain root privileges on the vulnerable host.
 narrative = A non-privledged user is able to execute the sudoedit command to trigger a buffer overflow. After the successful buffer overflow, they are then able to gain root privileges on the affected host. The conditions needed to be run are a trailing "\" along with shell and edit flags. Monitoring the /var/log directory on Linux hosts using the Splunk Universal Forwarder will allow you to pick up this behavior when using the provided detection.
 
@@ -147,7 +158,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.zerofox.com/blog/what-is-digital-risk-monitoring/", "https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/consumer/family-safety/what-is-typosquatting/", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2016/06/explained-typosquatting/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"]
 description = Detect and investigate activity that may indicate that an adversary is using faux domains to mislead users into interacting with malicious infrastructure. Monitor DNS, email, and web traffic for permutations of your brand name.
 narrative = While you can educate your users and customers about the risks and threats posed by typosquatting, phishing, and corporate espionage, human error is a persistent fact of life. Of course, your adversaries are all too aware of this reality and will happily leverage it for nefarious purposes whenever possible&#51;phishing with lookalike addresses, embedding faux command-and-control domains in malware, and hosting malicious content on domains that closely mimic your corporate servers. This is where brand monitoring comes in.\
 You can use our adaptation of `DNSTwist`, together with the support searches in this Analytic Story, to generate permutations of specified brands and external domains. Splunk can monitor email, DNS requests, and web traffic for these permutations and provide you with early warnings and situational awareness--powerful elements of an effective defense.\
@@ -160,7 +171,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/analyst-note-cl0p-tlp-white.pdf", "https://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/115250/data-breach/qualys-clop-ransomware.html", "https://www.darkreading.com/attacks-breaches/qualys-is-the-latest-victim-of-accellion-data-breach/d/d-id/1340323"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - High File Deletion Frequency - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Create Service In Suspicious File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Process Deleting Its Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Resize ShadowStorage volume - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Clop Ransomware Known Service Name - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - Clop Common Exec Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Ransomware Notes bulk creation - Rule", "ESCU - High Process Termination Frequency - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Process Deleting Its Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Clop Ransomware Known Service Name - Rule", "ESCU - Clop Common Exec Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - High Process Termination Frequency - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - Resize ShadowStorage volume - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Create Service In Suspicious File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Ransomware Notes bulk creation - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - High File Deletion Frequency - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule"]
 description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the Clop ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with Clope, encrypting network shares, deleting and resizing shadow volume storage, registry key modification, deleting of security logs, and more.
 narrative = Clop ransomware campaigns targeting healthcare and other vertical sectors, involve the use of ransomware payloads along with exfiltration of data per HHS bulletin. Malicious actors demand payment for ransome of data and threaten deletion and exposure of exfiltrated data.
 
@@ -171,7 +182,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor your cloud compute instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or compute instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior.
 narrative = Cryptomining is an intentionally difficult, resource-intensive business. Its complexity was designed into the process to ensure that the number of blocks mined each day would remain steady. So, it's par for the course that ambitious, but unscrupulous, miners make amassing the computing power of large enterprises--a practice known as cryptojacking--a top priority. \
 Cryptojacking has attracted an increasing amount of media attention since its explosion in popularity in the fall of 2017. The attacks have moved from in-browser exploits and mobile phones to enterprise cloud services, such as Amazon Web Services (AWS), Google Cloud Platform (GCP), and Azure. It's difficult to determine exactly how widespread the practice has become, since bad actors continually evolve their ability to escape detection, including employing unlisted endpoints, moderating their CPU usage, and hiding the mining pool's IP address behind a free CDN. \
@@ -185,7 +196,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/golden-saml-newly-discovered-attack-technique-forges-authentication-to-cloud-apps", "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf", "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - O365 Excessive SSO logon errors - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Added Service Principal - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User - Rule", "ESCU - O365 New Federated Domain Added - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - AWS SAML Access by Provider User and Principal - Rule", "ESCU - AWS SAML Update identity provider - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Via PowerShell And EventCode 4703 - Rule", "ESCU - Certutil exe certificate extraction - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - AWS SAML Update identity provider - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Excessive SSO logon errors - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Via PowerShell And EventCode 4703 - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Added Service Principal - Rule", "ESCU - AWS SAML Access by Provider User and Principal - Rule", "ESCU - Certutil exe certificate extraction - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - O365 New Federated Domain Added - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule"]
 description = This analytical story addresses events that indicate abuse of cloud federated credentials. These credentials are usually extracted from endpoint desktop or servers specially those servers that provide federation services such as Windows Active Directory Federation Services. Identity Federation relies on objects such as Oauth2 tokens, cookies or SAML assertions in order to provide seamless access between cloud and perimeter environments. If these objects are either hijacked or forged then attackers will be able to pivot into victim's cloud environements.
 narrative = This story is composed of detection searches based on endpoint that addresses the use of Mimikatz, Escalation of Privileges and Abnormal processes that may indicate the extraction of Federated directory objects such as passwords, Oauth2 tokens, certificates and keys. Cloud environment (AWS, Azure) related events are also addressed in specific cloud environment detection searches.
 
@@ -196,7 +207,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.cobaltstrike.com/", "https://www.infocyte.com/blog/2020/09/02/cobalt-strike-the-new-favorite-among-thieves/", "https://bluescreenofjeff.com/2017-01-24-how-to-write-malleable-c2-profiles-for-cobalt-strike/", "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2020/09/coverage-strikes-back-cobalt-strike-paper.html", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/unauthorized-access-of-fireeye-red-team-tools.html", "https://github.com/MichaelKoczwara/Awesome-CobaltStrike-Defence", "https://github.com/zer0yu/Awesome-CobaltStrike"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 StartW - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious msbuild path - Rule", "ESCU - Cobalt Strike Named Pipes - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious GPUpdate no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious DLLHost no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious SearchProtocolHost no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious DLLHost no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious msbuild path - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 StartW - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious SearchProtocolHost no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious GPUpdate no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Cobalt Strike Named Pipes - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule"]
 description = Cobalt Strike is threat emulation software. Red teams and penetration testers use Cobalt Strike to demonstrate the risk of a breach and evaluate mature security programs. Most recently, Cobalt Strike has become the choice tool by threat groups due to its ease of use and extensibility.
 narrative = This Analytic Story supports you to detect Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) from Cobalt Strike. Cobalt Strike has many ways to be enhanced by using aggressor scripts, malleable C2 profiles, default attack packages, and much more. For endpoint behavior, Cobalt Strike is most commonly identified via named pipes, spawn to processes, and DLL function names. Many additional variables are provided for in memory operation of the beacon implant. On the network, depending on the malleable C2 profile used, it is near infinite in the amount of ways to conceal the C2 traffic with Cobalt Strike. Not every query may be specific to Cobalt Strike the tool, but the methodologies and techniques used by it.\
 Splunk Threat Research reviewed all publicly available instances of Malleabe C2 Profiles and generated a list of the most commonly used spawnto and pipenames.\
@@ -216,7 +227,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.intego.com/mac-security-blog/osxcoldroot-and-the-rat-invasion/", "https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x2A.html", "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/coldroot-rat-still-undetectable-despite-being-uploaded-on-github-two-years-ago/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Jose Hernandez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Processes Tapping Keyboard Events - Rule", "ESCU - Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection - Rule", "ESCU - Processes Tapping Keyboard Events - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip - Response Task"]
 description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that relate to the ColdRoot Remote Access Trojan that affects MacOS. An example of some of these activities are changing sensative binaries in the MacOS sub-system, detecting process names and executables associated with the RAT, detecting when a keyboard tab is installed on a MacOS machine and more.
 narrative = Conventional wisdom holds that Apple's MacOS operating system is significantly less vulnerable to attack than Windows machines. While that point is debatable, it is true that attacks against MacOS systems are much less common. However, this fact does not mean that Macs are impervious to breaches. To the contrary, research has shown that that Mac malware is increasing at an alarming rate. According to AV-test, in 2018, there were 86,865 new MacOS malware variants, up from 27,338 the year before&#151;a 31% increase. In contrast, the independent research firm found that new Windows malware had increased from 65.17M to 76.86M during that same period, less than half the rate of growth. The bottom line is that while the numbers look a lot smaller than Windows, it's definitely time to take Mac security more seriously.\
 This Analytic Story addresses the ColdRoot remote access trojan (RAT), which was uploaded to Github in 2016, but was still escaping detection by the first quarter of 2018, when a new, more feature-rich variant was discovered masquerading as an Apple audio driver. Among other capabilities, the Pascal-based ColdRoot can heist passwords from users' keychains and remotely control infected machines without detection. In the initial report of his findings, Patrick Wardle, Chief Research Officer for Digita Security, explained that the new ColdRoot RAT could start and kill processes on the breached system, spawn new remote-desktop sessions, take screen captures and assemble them into a live stream of the victim's desktop, and more.\
@@ -229,7 +240,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Collection", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1074"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin - Rule", "ESCU - Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious writes to System Volume Information - Rule", "ESCU - Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server - Rule", "ESCU - Email files written outside of the Outlook directory - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Email files written outside of the Outlook directory - Rule", "ESCU - Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious writes to System Volume Information - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin - Rule", "ESCU - Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor for and investigate activities--such as suspicious writes to the Windows Recycling Bin or email servers sending high amounts of traffic to specific hosts, for example--that may indicate that an adversary is harvesting and exfiltrating sensitive data. 
 narrative = A common adversary goal is to identify and exfiltrate data of value from a target organization. This data may include email conversations and addresses, confidential company information, links to network design/infrastructure, important dates, and so on.\
  Attacks are composed of three activities: identification, collection, and staging data for exfiltration. Identification typically involves scanning systems and observing user activity. Collection can involve the transfer of large amounts of data from various repositories. Staging/preparation includes moving data to a central location and compressing (and optionally encoding and/or encrypting) it. All of these activities provide opportunities for defenders to identify their presence. \
@@ -242,7 +253,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Command_and_Control", "https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/feature/Command-and-control-servers-The-puppet-masters-that-govern-malware"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task"]
 description = Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures leveraged by attackers to establish and operate command and control channels. Implants installed by attackers on compromised endpoints use these channels to receive instructions and send data back to the malicious operators.
 narrative = Threat actors typically architect and implement an infrastructure to use in various ways during the course of their attack campaigns. In some cases, they leverage this infrastructure for scanning and performing reconnaissance activities. In others, they may use this infrastructure to launch actual attacks. One of the most important functions of this infrastructure is to establish servers that will communicate with implants on compromised endpoints. These servers establish a command and control channel that is used to proxy data between the compromised endpoint and the attacker. These channels relay commands from the attacker to the compromised endpoint and the output of those commands back to the attacker.\
 Because this communication is so critical for an adversary, they often use techniques designed to hide the true nature of the communications. There are many different techniques used to establish and communicate over these channels. This Analytic Story provides searches that look for a variety of the techniques used for these channels, as well as indications that these channels are active, by examining logs associated with border control devices and network-access control lists.
@@ -254,7 +265,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://github.com/kgretzky/evilginx2", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1192/", "https://breakdev.org/evilginx-advanced-phishing-with-two-factor-authentication-bypass/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Splunk Research Team"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect DNS requests to Phishing Sites leveraging EvilGinx2 - Rule", "ESCU - Get Certificate logs for a domain - Response Task", "ESCU - Domain Certificate Investigation - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect DNS requests to Phishing Sites leveraging EvilGinx2 - Rule", "ESCU - Domain Certificate Investigation - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Certificate logs for a domain - Response Task"]
 description = Detect DNS and web requests to fake websites generated by the EvilGinx2 toolkit. These websites are designed to fool unwitting users who have clicked on a malicious link in a phishing email. 
 narrative = As most people know, these emails use fraudulent domains, [email scraping](https://www.cyberscoop.com/emotet-trojan-phishing-scraping-templates-cofense-geodo/), familiar contact names inserted as senders, and other tactics to lure targets into clicking a malicious link, opening an attachment with a [nefarious payload](https://www.cyberscoop.com/emotet-trojan-phishing-scraping-templates-cofense-geodo/), or entering sensitive personal information that perpetrators may intercept. This attack technique requires a relatively low level of skill and allows adversaries to easily cast a wide net. Because phishing is a technique that relies on human psychology, you will never be able to eliminate this vulnerability 100%. But you can use automated detection to significantly reduce the risks.\
 This Analytic Story focuses on detecting signs of MiTM attacks enabled by [EvilGinx2](https://github.com/kgretzky/evilginx2), a toolkit that sets up a transparent proxy between the targeted site and the user. In this way, the attacker is able to intercept credentials and two-factor identification tokens. It employs a proxy template to allow a registered domain to impersonate targeted sites, such as Linkedin, Amazon, Okta, Github, Twitter, Instagram, Reddit, Office 365, and others. It can even register SSL certificates and camouflage them via a URL shortener, making them difficult to detect. Searches in this story look for signs of MiTM attacks enabled by EvilGinx2.
@@ -266,7 +277,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://github.com/splunk/cloud-datamodel-security-research"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - GCP GCR container uploaded - Rule", "ESCU - New container uploaded to AWS ECR - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - New container uploaded to AWS ECR - Rule", "ESCU - GCP GCR container uploaded - Rule"]
 description = Use the searches in this story to monitor your Kubernetes registry repositories for upload, and deployment of potentially vulnerable, backdoor, or implanted containers. These searches provide information on source users, destination path, container names and repository names. The searches provide context to address Mitre T1525 which refers to container implantation upload to a company's repository either in Amazon Elastic Container Registry, Google Container Registry and Azure Container Registry.
 narrative = Container Registrys provide a way for organizations to keep customized images of their development and infrastructure environment in private. However if these repositories are misconfigured or priviledge users credentials are compromise, attackers can potentially upload implanted containers which can be deployed across the organization. These searches allow operator to monitor who, when and what was uploaded to container registry.
 
@@ -277,7 +288,7 @@ version = 3
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1003", "https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Create Remote Thread into LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Ntdsutil Export NTDS - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of lsass Dump with Taskmgr - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Previous Unseen User - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Create Remote Thread into LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Ntdsutil Export NTDS - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of lsass Dump with Taskmgr - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Previous Unseen User - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts - Response Task"]
 description = Uncover activity consistent with credential dumping, a technique wherein attackers compromise systems and attempt to obtain and exfiltrate passwords. The threat actors use these pilfered credentials to further escalate privileges and spread throughout a target environment. The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify attempts to credential dumping.
 narrative = Credential dumping&#151;gathering credentials from a target system, often hashed or encrypted&#151;is a common attack technique. Even though the credentials may not be in plain text, an attacker can still exfiltrate the data and set to cracking it offline, on their own systems. The threat actors target a variety of sources to extract them, including the Security Accounts Manager (SAM), Local Security Authority (LSA), NTDS from Domain Controllers, or the Group Policy Preference (GPP) files.\
 Once attackers obtain valid credentials, they use them to move throughout a target network with ease, discovering new systems and identifying assets of interest. Credentials obtained in this manner typically include those of privileged users, which may provide access to more sensitive information and system operations.\
@@ -290,7 +301,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Create local admin accounts using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Single Letter Process On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process File Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Create local admin accounts using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Single Letter Process On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process File Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor for suspicious activities associated with DHS Technical Alert US-CERT TA18-074A. Some of the activities that adversaries used in these compromises included spearfishing attacks, malware, watering-hole domains, many and more.
 narrative = The frequency of nation-state cyber attacks has increased significantly over the last decade. Employing numerous tactics and techniques, these attacks continue to escalate in complexity. \
 There is a wide range of motivations for these state-sponsored hacks, including stealing valuable corporate, military, or diplomatic data&#1151;all of which could confer advantages in various arenas. They may also target critical infrastructure. \
@@ -316,7 +327,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/", "http://www.noip.com/blog/2014/07/11/dynamic-dns-can-use-2/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/08/04/detecting-dynamic-dns-domains-in-splunk.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS record changed - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - DNS Hijack Enrichment - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS record changed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - DNS Hijack Enrichment - Response Task"]
 description = Secure your environment against DNS hijacks with searches that help you detect and investigate unauthorized changes to DNS records.
 narrative = Dubbed the Achilles heel of the Internet (see https://www.f5.com/labs/articles/threat-intelligence/dns-is-still-the-achilles-heel-of-the-internet-25613), DNS plays a critical role in routing web traffic but is notoriously vulnerable to attack. One reason is its distributed nature. It relies on unstructured connections between millions of clients and servers over inherently insecure protocols.\
 The gravity and extent of the importance of securing DNS from attacks is undeniable. The fallout of compromised DNS can be disastrous. Not only can hackers bring down an entire business, they can intercept confidential information, emails, and login credentials, as well. \
@@ -346,7 +357,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/data-protection/", "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/dns/splunk-detect-dns-tunneling-37022", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect USB device insertion - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect USB device insertion - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Fortify your data-protection arsenal--while continuing to ensure data confidentiality and integrity--with searches that monitor for and help you investigate possible signs of data exfiltration.
 narrative = Attackers can leverage a variety of resources to compromise or exfiltrate enterprise data. Common exfiltration techniques include remote-access channels via low-risk, high-payoff active-collections operations and close-access operations using insiders and removable media. While this Analytic Story is not a comprehensive listing of all the methods by which attackers can exfiltrate data, it provides a useful starting point.
 
@@ -368,7 +379,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1003", "https://github.com/SecuraBV/CVE-2020-1472", "https://www.secura.com/blog/zero-logon", "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-1472"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Jose Hernandez, Stan Miskowicz, David Dorsey, Shannon Davis Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect Zerologon via Zeek - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Computer Changed with Anonymous Account - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Computer Changed with Anonymous Account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Zerologon via Zeek - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Uncover activity related to the execution of Zerologon CVE-2020-11472, a technique wherein attackers target a Microsoft Windows Domain Controller to reset its computer account password. The result from this attack is attackers can now provide themselves high privileges and take over Domain Controller. The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify attempts to reset Domain Controller Computer Account via exploit code remotely or via the use of tool Mimikatz as payload carrier.
 narrative = This attack is a privilege escalation technique, where attacker targets a Netlogon secure channel connection to a domain controller, using Netlogon Remote Protocol (MS-NRPC). This vulnerability exposes vulnerable Windows Domain Controllers to be targeted via unaunthenticated RPC calls which eventually reset Domain Contoller computer account ($) providing the attacker the opportunity to exfil domain controller credential secrets and assign themselve high privileges that can lead to domain controller and potentially complete network takeover. The detection searches in this Analytic Story use Windows Event viewer events and Sysmon events to detect attack execution, these searches monitor access to the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process which is an indicator of the use of Mimikatz tool which has bee updated to carry this attack payload.
 
@@ -379,10 +390,21 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1089", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2015/11/vonteera-adware-uses-certificates-to-disable-anti-malware/", "https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Tools-Report.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Unload Sysmon Filter Driver - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Unload Sysmon Filter Driver - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
 description = Looks for activities and techniques associated with the disabling of security tools on a Windows system, such as suspicious `reg.exe` processes, processes launching netsh, and many others.
 narrative = Attackers employ a variety of tactics in order to avoid detection and operate without barriers. This often involves modifying the configuration of security tools to get around them or explicitly disabling them to prevent them from running. This Analytic Story includes searches that look for activity consistent with attackers attempting to disable various security mechanisms. Such activity may involve monitoring for suspicious registry activity, as this is where much of the configuration for Windows and various other programs reside, or explicitly attempting to shut down security-related services. Other times, attackers attempt various tricks to prevent specific programs from running, such as adding the certificates with which the security tools are signed to a block list (which would prevent them from running).
 
+[analytic_story://Domain Trust Discovery]
+category = Adversary Tactics
+last_updated = 2021-03-25
+version = 1
+references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1482/"]
+maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
+spec_version = 3
+searches = ["ESCU - Windows AdFind Exe - Rule", "ESCU - DSQuery Domain Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule"]
+description = Adversaries may attempt to gather information on domain trust relationships that may be used to identify lateral movement opportunities in Windows multi-domain/forest environments.
+narrative = Domain trusts provide a mechanism for a domain to allow access to resources based on the authentication procedures of another domain. Domain trusts allow the users of the trusted domain to access resources in the trusting domain. The information discovered may help the adversary conduct SID-History Injection, Pass the Ticket, and Kerberoasting. Domain trusts can be enumerated using the DSEnumerateDomainTrusts() Win32 API call, .NET methods, and LDAP. The Windows utility Nltest is known to be used by adversaries to enumerate domain trusts.
+
 [analytic_story://Dynamic DNS]
 category = Malware
 last_updated = 2018-09-06
@@ -390,7 +412,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/", "http://www.noip.com/blog/2014/07/11/dynamic-dns-can-use-2/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/08/04/detecting-dynamic-dns-domains-in-splunk.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task"]
 description = Detect and investigate hosts in your environment that may be communicating with dynamic domain providers. Attackers may leverage these services to help them avoid firewall blocks and deny lists.
 narrative = Dynamic DNS services (DDNS) are legitimate low-cost or free services that allow users to rapidly update domain resolutions to IP infrastructure. While their usage can be benign, malicious actors can abuse DDNS to host harmful payloads or interactive-command-and-control infrastructure. These attackers will manually update or automate domain resolution changes by routing dynamic domains to IP addresses that circumvent firewall blocks and deny lists and frustrate a network defender's analytic and investigative processes. These searches will look for DNS queries made from within your infrastructure to suspicious dynamic domains and then investigate more deeply, when appropriate. While this list of top-level dynamic domains is not exhaustive, it can be dynamically updated as new suspicious dynamic domains are identified.
 
@@ -401,7 +423,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-201A", "https://www.first.org/resources/papers/conf2017/Advanced-Incident-Detection-and-Threat-Hunting-using-Sysmon-and-Splunk.pdf", "https://www.vkremez.com/2017/05/emotet-banking-trojan-malware-analysis.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of tools built by NirSoft - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of tools built by NirSoft - Rule", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
 description = Detect rarely used executables, specific registry paths that may confer malware survivability and persistence, instances where cmd.exe is used to launch script interpreters, and other indicators that the Emotet financial malware has compromised your environment.
 narrative = The trojan downloader known as Emotet first surfaced in 2014, when it was discovered targeting the banking industry to steal credentials. However, according to a joint technical alert (TA) issued by three government agencies (https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-201A), Emotet has evolved far beyond those beginnings to become what a ThreatPost article called a threat-delivery service(see https://threatpost.com/emotet-malware-evolves-beyond-banking-to-threat-delivery-service/134342/).  For example, in early 2018, Emotet was found to be using its loader function to spread the Quakbot and Ransomware variants. \
 According to the TA, the the malware continues to be among the most costly and destructive malware affecting the private and public sectors. Researchers have linked it to the threat group Mealybug, which has also been on the security communitys radar since 2014.\
@@ -425,7 +447,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/understanding-service-accounts"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - GCP Detect accounts with high risk roles by project - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Detect high risk permissions by resource and account - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Detect gcploit framework - Rule", "ESCU - gcp detect oauth token abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - gcp detect oauth token abuse - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Detect accounts with high risk roles by project - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Detect gcploit framework - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Detect high risk permissions by resource and account - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Track when a user assumes an IAM role in another GCP account to obtain cross-account access to services and resources in that account. Accessing new roles could be an indication of malicious activity.
 narrative = Google Cloud Platform (GCP) admins manage access to GCP resources and services across the enterprise using GCP Identity and Access Management (IAM) functionality. IAM provides the ability to create and manage GCP users, groups, and roles-each with their own unique set of privileges and defined access to specific resources (such as Compute instances, the GCP Management Console, API, or the command-line interface). Unlike conventional (human) users, IAM roles are potentially assumable by anyone in the organization. They provide users with dynamically created temporary security credentials that expire within a set time period.\
 In between the time between when the temporary credentials are issued and when they expire is a period of opportunity, where a user could leverage the temporary credentials to wreak havoc-spin up or remove instances, create new users, elevate privileges, and other malicious activities-throughout the environment.\
@@ -438,7 +460,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/detecting-hafnium-exchange-server-zero-day-activity-in-splunk.html", "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/03/02/active-exploitation-of-microsoft-exchange-zero-day-vulnerabilities/", "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/", "https://blog.rapid7.com/2021/03/03/rapid7s-insightidr-enables-detection-and-response-to-microsoft-exchange-0-day/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Exchange Web Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Nishang PowershellTCPOneLine - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts - Rule", "ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Ntdsutil Export NTDS - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump - Rule", "ESCU - Unified Messaging Service Spawning a Process - Rule", "ESCU - W3WP Spawning Shell - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Exchange Web Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule", "ESCU - Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Nishang PowershellTCPOneLine - Rule", "ESCU - W3WP Spawning Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Ntdsutil Export NTDS - Rule", "ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump - Rule", "ESCU - Unified Messaging Service Spawning a Process - Rule"]
 description = HAFNIUM group was identified by Microsoft as exploiting 4 Microsoft Exchange CVEs in the wild - CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858 and CVE-2021-27065.
 narrative = On Tuesday, March 2, 2021, Microsoft released a set of security patches for its mail server, Microsoft Exchange. These patches respond to a group of vulnerabilities known to impact Exchange 2013, 2016, and 2019. It is important to note that an Exchange 2010 security update has also been issued, though the CVEs do not reference that version as being vulnerable.\
 While the CVEs do not shed much light on the specifics of the vulnerabilities or exploits, the first vulnerability (CVE-2021-26855) has a remote network attack vector that allows the attacker, a group Microsoft named HAFNIUM, to authenticate as the Exchange server. Three additional vulnerabilities (CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, and CVE-2021-27065) were also identified as part of this activity. When chained together along with CVE-2021-26855 for initial access, the attacker would have complete control over the Exchange server. This includes the ability to run code as SYSTEM and write to any path on the server.\
@@ -451,7 +473,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/HIDDEN-COBRA-North-Korean-Malicious-Cyber-Activity", "https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Destructive-Malware-Report.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious File Write - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Outbound Emails to Hidden Cobra Threat Actors - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious File Write - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Outbound Emails to Hidden Cobra Threat Actors - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor for and investigate activities, including the creation or deletion of hidden shares and file writes, that may be evidence of infiltration by North Korean government-sponsored cybercriminals. Details of this activity were reported in DHS Report TA-18-149A.
 narrative = North Korea's government-sponsored "cyber army" has been slowly building momentum and gaining sophistication over the last 15 years or so. As a result, the group's activity, which the US government refers to as "Hidden Cobra," has surreptitiously crept onto the collective radar as a preeminent global threat.\
 These state-sponsored actors are thought to be responsible for everything from a hack on a South Korean nuclear plant to an attack on Sony in anticipation of its release of the movie "The Interview" at the end of 2014. They're also notorious for cyberespionage. In recent years, the group seems to be focused on financial crimes, such as cryptojacking.\
@@ -465,7 +487,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2016/09/hosts-file-hijacks/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Windows hosts file modification - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Windows hosts file modification - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Detect evidence of tactics used to redirect traffic from a host to a destination other than the one intended--potentially one that is part of an adversary's attack infrastructure. An example is redirecting communications regarding patches and updates or misleading users into visiting a malicious website.
 narrative = Attackers will often attempt to manipulate client communications for nefarious purposes. In some cases, an attacker may endeavor to modify a local host file to redirect communications with resources (such as antivirus or system-update services) to prevent clients from receiving patches or updates. In other cases, an attacker might use this tactic to have the client connect to a site that looks like the intended site, but instead installs malware or collects information from the victim. Additionally, an attacker may redirect a victim in order to execute a MITM attack and observe communications.
 
@@ -476,7 +498,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - CertUtil Download With VerifyCtl and Split Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Curl Network Connection - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - BITSAdmin Download File - Rule", "ESCU - CertUtil Download With VerifyCtl and Split Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Curl Network Connection - Rule", "ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule", "ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadFile - Rule"]
 description = Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Files may be copied from an external adversary controlled system through the command and control channel to bring tools into the victim network or through alternate protocols with another tool such as FTP.
 narrative = Ingress tool transfer is a Technique under tactic Command and Control. Behaviors will include the use of living off the land binaries to download implants or binaries over alternate communication ports. It is imperative to baseline applications on endpoints to understand what generates network activity, to where, and what is its native behavior. These utilities, when abused, will write files to disk in world writeable paths.\ During triage, review the reputation of the remote public destination IP or domain. Capture any files written to disk and perform analysis. Review other parrallel processes for additional behaviors.
 
@@ -487,7 +509,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["http://www.deependresearch.org/2016/04/jboss-exploits-view-from-victim.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = In March of 2016, adversaries were seen using JexBoss--an open-source utility used for testing and exploiting JBoss application servers. These searches help detect evidence of these attacks, such as network connections to external resources or web services spawning atypical child processes, among others.
 narrative = This Analytic Story looks for probing and exploitation attempts targeting JBoss application servers. While the vulnerabilities associated with this story are rather dated, they were leveraged in a spring 2016 campaign in connection with the Samsam ransomware variant. Incidents involving this ransomware are unique, in that they begin with attacks against vulnerable services, rather than the phishing or drive-by attacks more common with ransomware. In this case, vulnerable JBoss applications appear to be the target of choice.\
 It is helpful to understand how often a notable event generated by this story occurs, as well as the commonalities between some of these events, both of which may provide clues about whether this is a common occurrence of minimal concern or a rare event that may require more extensive investigation. It may also help to understand whether the issue is restricted to a single user/system or whether it is broader in scope.\
@@ -512,7 +534,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://github.com/splunk/cloud-datamodel-security-research"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task"]
 description = This story addresses detection against Kubernetes cluster fingerprint scan and attack by providing information on items such as source ip, user agent, cluster names.
 narrative = Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration platform contains sensitve information and management priviledges of production workloads, microservices and applications. These searches allow operator to detect suspicious unauthenticated requests from the internet to kubernetes cluster.
 
@@ -523,7 +545,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/approaching-kubernetes-security-detecting-kubernetes-scan-with-splunk.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = This story addresses detection and response of accounts acccesing Kubernetes cluster sensitive objects such as configmaps or secrets providing information on items such as user user, group. object, namespace and authorization reason.
 narrative = Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration platform contains sensitive objects within its architecture, specifically configmaps and secrets, if accessed by an attacker can lead to further compromise. These searches allow operator to detect suspicious requests against Kubernetes sensitive objects.
 
@@ -534,7 +556,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/approaching-kubernetes-security-detecting-kubernetes-scan-with-splunk.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect RBAC authorizations by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect most active service accounts by pod namespace - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect most active service accounts by pod namespace - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect RBAC authorizations by account - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = This story addresses detection and response around Sensitive Role usage within a Kubernetes clusters against cluster resources and namespaces.
 narrative = Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration platform contains sensitive roles within its architecture, specifically configmaps and secrets, if accessed by an attacker can lead to further compromise. These searches allow operator to detect suspicious requests against Kubernetes role activities
 
@@ -545,7 +567,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/executive-perspective/2015/08/malware_lateral_move.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks - Rule", "ESCU - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task"]
 description = Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures around how attackers move laterally within the enterprise. Because lateral movement can expose the adversary to detection, it should be an important focus for security analysts.
 narrative = Once attackers gain a foothold within an enterprise, they will seek to expand their accesses and leverage techniques that facilitate lateral movement. Attackers will often spend quite a bit of time and effort moving laterally. Because lateral movement renders an attacker the most vulnerable to detection, it's an excellent focus for detection and investigation.\
 Indications of lateral movement can include the abuse of system utilities (such as `psexec.exe`), unauthorized use of remote desktop services, `file/admin$` shares, WMI, PowerShell, pass-the-hash, or the abuse of scheduled tasks. Organizations must be extra vigilant in detecting lateral movement techniques and look for suspicious activity in and around high-value strategic network assets, such as Active Directory, which are often considered the primary target or "crown jewels" to a persistent threat actor.\
@@ -560,7 +582,7 @@ version = 4
 references = ["https://blogs.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/malware-employs-powershell-to-infect-systems/", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques - Rule", "ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadFile - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Multiple Suspicious Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Multiple Suspicious Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule", "ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadFile - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
 description = Attackers are finding stealthy ways "live off the land," leveraging utilities and tools that come standard on the endpoint--such as PowerShell--to achieve their goals without downloading binary files. These searches can help you detect and investigate PowerShell command-line options that may be indicative of malicious intent.
 narrative = The searches in this Analytic Story monitor for parameters often used for malicious purposes. It is helpful to understand how often the notable events generated by this story occur, as well as the commonalities between some of these events. These factors may provide clues about whether this is a common occurrence of minimal concern or a rare event that may require more extensive investigation. Likewise, it is important to determine whether the issue is restricted to a single user/system or is broader in scope.\
 The following factors may assist you in determining whether the event is malicious: \
@@ -591,7 +613,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
 description = Identify and investigate prohibited/unauthorized software or processes that may be concealing malicious behavior within your environment. 
 narrative = It is critical to identify unauthorized software and processes running on enterprise endpoints and determine whether they are likely to be malicious. This Analytic Story requires the user to populate the Interesting Processes table within Enterprise Security with prohibited processes. An included support search will augment this data, adding information on processes thought to be malicious. This search requires data from endpoint detection-and-response solutions, endpoint data sources (such as Sysmon), or Windows Event Logs--assuming that the Active Directory administrator has enabled process tracking within the System Event Audit Logs.\
 It is important to investigate any software identified as suspicious, in order to understand how it was installed or executed. Analyzing authentication logs or any historic notable events might elicit additional investigative leads of interest. For best results, schedule the search to run every two weeks. 
@@ -616,7 +638,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/04/goldmax-goldfinder-sibot-analyzing-nobelium-malware/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor.html", "https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Patrick Bareiss"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Sunburst Correlation DLL and Network Event - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Supernova Webshell - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AdFind Exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Sunburst Correlation DLL and Network Event - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AdFind Exe - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Supernova Webshell - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution - Rule"]
 description = Sunburst is a trojanized updates to SolarWinds Orion IT monitoring and management software. It was discovered by FireEye in December 2020. The actors behind this campaign gained access to numerous public and private organizations around the world.
 narrative = This Analytic Story supports you to detect Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) of the NOBELIUM Group. The threat actor behind sunburst compromised the SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll, is a SolarWinds digitally-signed component of the Orion software framework that contains a backdoor that communicates via HTTP to third party servers. The detections in this Analytic Story are focusing on the dll loading events, file create events and network events to detect This malware.
 
@@ -627,7 +649,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/tn-archive/bb490939(v=technet.10)", "https://htmlpreview.github.io/?https://github.com/MatthewDemaske/blogbackup/blob/master/netshell.html", "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Processes created by netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Processes created by netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
 description = Detect activities and various techniques associated with the abuse of `netsh.exe`, which can disable local firewall settings or set up a remote connection to a host from an infected system.
 narrative = It is a common practice for attackers of all types to leverage native Windows tools and functionality to execute commands for malicious reasons. One such tool on Windows OS is `netsh.exe`,a command-line scripting utility that allows you to--either locally or remotely--display or modify the network configuration of a computer that is currently running. `Netsh.exe` can be used to discover and disable local firewall settings. It can also be used to set up a remote connection to a host from an infected system.\
 To get started, run the detection search to identify parent processes of `netsh.exe`.
@@ -639,7 +661,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://i.blackhat.com/USA-20/Thursday/us-20-Bienstock-My-Cloud-Is-APTs-Cloud-Investigating-And-Defending-Office-365.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Patrick Bareiss"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - O365 Disable MFA - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Added Service Principal - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious Rights Delegation - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User - Rule", "ESCU - O365 New Federated Domain Added - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Bypass MFA via Trusted IP - Rule", "ESCU - O365 PST export alert - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Excessive Authentication Failures Alert - Rule", "ESCU - High Number of Login Failures from a single source - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Excessive SSO logon errors - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - O365 Suspicious Rights Delegation - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Disable MFA - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Excessive SSO logon errors - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Bypass MFA via Trusted IP - Rule", "ESCU - O365 PST export alert - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Added Service Principal - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding - Rule", "ESCU - High Number of Login Failures from a single source - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Excessive Authentication Failures Alert - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding - Rule", "ESCU - O365 New Federated Domain Added - Rule"]
 description = This story is focused around detecting Office 365 Attacks.
 narrative = More and more companies are using Microsofts Office 365 cloud offering. Therefore, we see more and more attacks against Office 365. This story provides various detections for Office 365 attacks.
 
@@ -650,7 +672,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/orangeworm-targets-healthcare-us-europe-asia", "https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/healthcare-targeted-by-hacker/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
 description = Detect activities and various techniques associated with the Orangeworm Attack Group, a group that frequently targets the healthcare industry.
 narrative = In May of 2018, the attack group Orangeworm was implicated for installing a custom backdoor called Trojan.Kwampirs within large international healthcare corporations in the United States, Europe, and Asia. This malware provides the attackers with remote access to the target system, decrypting and extracting a copy of its main DLL payload from its resource section. Before writing the payload to disk, it inserts a randomly generated string into the middle of the decrypted payload in an attempt to evade hash-based detections.\
 Awareness of the Orangeworm group first surfaced in January, 2015. It has conducted targeted attacks against related industries, as well, such as pharmaceuticals and healthcare IT solution providers.\
@@ -664,7 +686,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/spear-phishing-campaign-targets-ukraine-government.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Splunk Research Team"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect Oulook exe writing a  zip file - Rule", "ESCU - Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Oulook exe writing a  zip file - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
 description = Detect signs of malicious payloads that may indicate that your environment has been breached via a phishing attack.
 narrative = Despite its simplicity, phishing remains the most pervasive and dangerous cyberthreat. In fact, research shows that as many as [91% of all successful attacks](https://digitalguardian.com/blog/91-percent-cyber-attacks-start-phishing-email-heres-how-protect-against-phishing) are initiated via a phishing email. \
 As most people know, these emails use fraudulent domains, [email scraping](https://www.cyberscoop.com/emotet-trojan-phishing-scraping-templates-cofense-geodo/), familiar contact names inserted as senders, and other tactics to lure targets into clicking a malicious link, opening an attachment with a [nefarious payload](https://www.cyberscoop.com/emotet-trojan-phishing-scraping-templates-cofense-geodo/), or entering sensitive personal information that perpetrators may intercept. This attack technique requires a relatively low level of skill and allows adversaries to easily cast a wide net. Worse, because its success relies on the gullibility of humans, it's impossible to completely "automate" it out of your environment. However, you can use ES and ESCU to detect and investigate potentially malicious payloads injected into your environment subsequent to a phishing attack. \
@@ -682,7 +704,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/scope-of-mudcarp-attacks-highlight-1/", "http://blog.amossys.fr/badflick-is-not-so-bad.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "iDefense", "email": "-", "name": "iDefense Cyber Espionage Team"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor your environment for suspicious behaviors that resemble the techniques employed by the MUDCARP threat group.
 narrative = This story was created as a joint effort between iDefense and Splunk.\
 iDefense analysts have recently discovered a Windows executable file that, upon execution, spoofs a decryption tool and then drops a file that appears to be the custom-built javascript backdoor, "Orz," which is associated with the threat actors known as MUDCARP (as well as "temp.Periscope" and "Leviathan"). The file is executed using Wscript.\
@@ -720,7 +742,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["http://www.novetta.com/2015/02/advanced-methods-to-detect-advanced-cyber-attacks-protocol-abuse/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
 description = Detect instances of prohibited network traffic allowed in the environment, as well as protocols running on non-standard ports. Both of these types of behaviors typically violate policy and can be leveraged by attackers.
 narrative = A traditional security best practice is to control the ports, protocols, and services allowed within your environment. By limiting the services and protocols to those explicitly approved by policy, administrators can minimize the attack surface. The combined effect allows both network defenders and security controls to focus and not be mired in superfluous traffic or data types. Looking for deviations to policy can identify attacker activity that abuses services and protocols to run on alternate or non-standard ports in the attempt to avoid detection or frustrate forensic analysts.
 
@@ -731,7 +753,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.carbonblack.com/2017/06/28/carbon-black-threat-research-technical-analysis-petya-notpetya-ransomware/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2017/06/27/closing-the-detection-to-mitigation-gap-or-to-petya-or-notpetya-whocares-.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware - Rule", "ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
 description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to ransomware--spikes in SMB traffic, suspicious wevtutil usage, the presence of common ransomware extensions, and system processes run from unexpected locations, and many others.
 narrative = Ransomware is an ever-present risk to the enterprise, wherein an infected host encrypts business-critical data, holding it hostage until the victim pays the attacker a ransom. There are many types and varieties of ransomware that can affect an enterprise. Attackers can deploy ransomware to enterprises through spearphishing campaigns and driveby downloads, as well as through traditional remote service-based exploitation. In the case of the WannaCry campaign, there was self-propagating wormable functionality that was used to maximize infection. Fortunately, organizations can apply several techniques--such as those in this Analytic Story--to detect and or mitigate the effects of ransomware.
 
@@ -742,7 +764,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/s3-ransomware-part-1-attack-vector/", "https://github.com/d1vious/git-wild-hunt", "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PgzNib37g0M"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - AWS Detect Users creating keys with encrypt policy without MFA - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Detect Users with KMS keys performing encryption S3 - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - AWS Detect Users with KMS keys performing encryption S3 - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Detect Users creating keys with encrypt policy without MFA - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to ransomware. These searches include cloud related objects that may be targeted by malicious actors via cloud providers own encryption features.
 narrative = Ransomware is an ever-present risk to the enterprise, wherein an infected host encrypts business-critical data, holding it hostage until the victim pays the attacker a ransom. There are many types and varieties of ransomware that can affect an enterprise.Cloud ransomware can be deployed by obtaining high privilege credentials from targeted users or resources.
 
@@ -753,7 +775,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/executive-perspective/2015/09/the_new_route_toper.html", "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/about/security-center/event-response/synful-knock.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect Port Security Violation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rogue DHCP Server - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Software Download To Network Device - Rule", "ESCU - Detect IPv6 Network Infrastructure Threats - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Traffic Mirroring - Rule", "ESCU - Detect ARP Poisoning - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Login Attempts to Routers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect IPv6 Network Infrastructure Threats - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Login Attempts to Routers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect ARP Poisoning - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rogue DHCP Server - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Software Download To Network Device - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Port Security Violation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Traffic Mirroring - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Validate the security configuration of network infrastructure and verify that only authorized users and systems are accessing critical assets. Core routing and switching infrastructure are common strategic targets for attackers.
 narrative = Networking devices, such as routers and switches, are often overlooked as resources that attackers will leverage to subvert an enterprise. Advanced threats actors have shown a proclivity to target these critical assets as a means to siphon and redirect network traffic, flash backdoored operating systems, and implement cryptographic weakened algorithms to more easily decrypt network traffic.\
 This Analytic Story helps you gain a better understanding of how your network devices are interacting with your hosts. By compromising your network devices, attackers can obtain direct access to the company's internal infrastructure&#151; effectively increasing the attack surface and accessing private services/data.
@@ -765,7 +787,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/detecting-ryuk-using-splunk-attack-range.html", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/big-game-hunting-with-ryuk-another-lucrative-targeted-ransomware/", "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-302a"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Jose Hernandez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Ryuk Wake on LAN Command - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Security Account Manager Stopped - Rule", "ESCU - Windows connhost exe started forcefully - Rule", "ESCU - Ryuk Test Files Detected - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", "ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Ryuk Wake on LAN Command - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Security Account Manager Stopped - Rule", "ESCU - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Ryuk Test Files Detected - Rule", "ESCU - Windows connhost exe started forcefully - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the Ryuk ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with Ryuk, Stopping Security Access Manager, DisableAntiSpyware registry key modification, suspicious psexec use, and more.
 narrative = Cybersecurity Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) released Alert (AA20-302A) on October 28th called “Ransomware Activity Targeting the Healthcare and Public Health Sector.” This alert details TTPs associated with ongoing and possible imminent attacks against the Healthcare sector, and is a joint advisory in coordination with other U.S. Government agencies. The objective of these malicious campaigns is to infiltrate targets in named sectors and to drop ransomware payloads, which will likely cause disruption of service and increase risk of actual harm to the health and safety of patients at hospitals, even with the aggravant of an ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. This document specifically refers to several crimeware exploitation frameworks, emphasizing the use of Ryuk ransomware as payload. The Ryuk ransomware payload is not new. It has been well documented and identified in multiple variants. Payloads need a carrier, and for Ryuk it has often been exploitation frameworks such as Cobalt Strike, or popular crimeware frameworks such as Emotet or Trickbot.
 
@@ -788,7 +810,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/an-in-depth-analysis-of-samsam-ransomware-and-boss-spider/", "https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2018/07/31/samsam-the-almost-6-million-ransomware/", "https://thehackernews.com/2018/07/samsam-ransomware-attacks.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Samsam Test File Write - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - File with Samsam Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Batch File Write to System32 - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Batch File Write to System32 - Rule", "ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - File with Samsam Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Samsam Test File Write - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task"]
 description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the SamSam ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with SamSam, RDP brute force attacks, the presence of files with SamSam ransomware extensions, suspicious psexec use, and more.
 narrative = The first version of the SamSam ransomware (a.k.a. Samas or SamsamCrypt) was launched in 2015 by a group of Iranian threat actors. The malicious software has affected and continues to affect thousands of victims and has raised almost $6M in ransom.\
 Although categorized under the heading of ransomware, SamSam campaigns have some importance distinguishing characteristics. Most notable is the fact that conventional ransomware is a numbers game. Perpetrators use a "spray-and-pray" approach with phishing campaigns or other mechanisms, charging a small ransom (typically under $1,000). The goal is to find a large number of victims willing to pay these mini-ransoms, adding up to a lucrative payday. They use relatively simple methods for infecting systems.\
@@ -804,7 +826,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://redcanary.com/blog/clipping-silver-sparrows-wings/", "https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/5-things-you-need-to-know-about-silver-sparrow/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious SQLite3 LSQuarantine Behavior - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage via OSquery - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Curl Network Connection - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage via OSquery - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Curl Network Connection - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious SQLite3 LSQuarantine Behavior - Rule"]
 description = Silver Sparrow, identified by Red Canary Intelligence, is a new forward looking MacOS (Intel and M1) malicious software downloader utilizing JavaScript for execution and a launchAgent to establish persistence.
 narrative = Silver Sparrow works is a dropper and uses typical persistence mechanisms on a Mac. It is cross platform, covering both Intel and Apple M1 architecture. To this date, no implant has been downloaded for malicious purposes. During installation of the update.pkg or updater.pkg file, the malicious software utilizes JavaScript to generate files and scripts on disk for persistence.These files later download a implant from an S3 bucket every hour. This analytic assists with identifying different types of macOS malware families establishing LaunchAgent persistence. Per SentinelOne source, it is predicted that Silver Sparrow is likely selling itself as a mechanism to 3rd party “affiliates” or pay-per-install (PPI) partners, typically seen as commodity adware/malware. Additional indicators and behaviors may be found within the references.
 
@@ -846,7 +868,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-11409", "https://www.splunk.com/view/SP-CAAAP5E#VulnerabilityDescriptionsandRatings", "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44865/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip - Response Task"]
 description = Reduce the risk of CVE-2018-11409, an information disclosure vulnerability within some older versions of Splunk Enterprise, with searches designed to help ensure that your Splunk system does not leak information to authenticated users.
 narrative = Although there have been no reports of it being exploited, Splunk Enterprise versions through 7.0.1 reportedly have a vulnerability that may expose information through a REST endpoint (read more here: https://www.splunk.com/view/SP-CAAAP5E#VulnerabilityDescriptionsandRatings). NIST has included it in its vulnerability database (read more here: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-11409). The REST endpoint that exposes system information is also necessary for the proper operation of Splunk clustering and instrumentation. Customers should upgrade to the latest version to reduce the risk of this vulnerability.\
 Splunk Enterprise exposes partial information about the host operating system, hardware, and Splunk license. Splunk Enterprise before 6.6.0 exposes this information without authentication. Splunk Enterprise 6.6.0 and later exposes this information only to authenticated Splunk users. Based on the information exposure, Splunk characterizes this issue as a low severity impact.\
@@ -860,7 +882,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task"]
 description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS EC2 instances for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as EC2 instances that originate from unusual locations or those launched by previously unseen users (among others). Included investigative searches will help you probe more deeply, when the information warrants it.
 narrative = AWS CloudTrail is an AWS service that helps you enable governance, compliance, and risk auditing within your AWS account. Actions taken by a user, role, or an AWS service are recorded as events in CloudTrail. It is crucial for a company to monitor events and actions taken in the AWS Console, AWS command-line interface, and AWS SDKs and APIs to ensure that your EC2 instances are not vulnerable to attacks. This Analytic Story identifies suspicious activities in your AWS EC2 instances and helps you respond and investigate those activities.
 
@@ -871,7 +893,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integration.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new user AWS Console Login - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect new user AWS Console Login - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor your AWS authentication events using your CloudTrail logs. Searches within this Analytic Story will help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious logins. 
 narrative = It is important to monitor and control who has access to your AWS infrastructure. Detecting suspicious logins to your AWS infrastructure will provide good starting points for investigations. Abusive behaviors caused by compromised credentials can lead to direct monetary costs, as you will be billed for any EC2 instances created by the attacker.
 
@@ -882,7 +904,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/security-data-protection/cloud/public-aws-s3-buckets-writable/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect New Open S3 buckets - Rule", "ESCU - Detect S3 access from a new IP - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI - Rule", "ESCU - Detect S3 access from a new IP - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Open S3 buckets - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task"]
 description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS S3 buckets for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as detecting open S3 buckets and buckets being accessed from a new IP. The contextual and investigative searches will give you more information, when required.
 narrative = As cloud computing has exploded, so has the number of creative attacks on virtual environments. And as the number-two cloud-service provider, Amazon Web Services (AWS) has certainly had its share.\
 Amazon's "shared responsibility" model dictates that the company has responsibility for the environment outside of the VM and the customer is responsible for the security inside of the S3 container. As such, it's important to stay vigilant for activities that may belie suspicious behavior inside of your environment.\
@@ -895,7 +917,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/hiding-cloudcobalt-strike-beacon-c2-using-amazon-apis/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task"]
 description = Leverage these searches to monitor your AWS network traffic for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as a spike in blocked outbound traffic in your virtual private cloud (VPC).
 narrative = A virtual private cloud (VPC) is an on-demand managed cloud-computing service that isolates computing resources for each client. Inside the VPC container, the environment resembles a physical network. \
 Amazon's VPC service enables you to launch EC2 instances and leverage other Amazon resources. The traffic that flows in and out of this VPC can be controlled via network access-control rules and security groups. Amazon also has a feature called VPC Flow Logs that enables you to log IP traffic going to and from the network interfaces in your VPC. This data is stored using Amazon CloudWatch Logs.\
@@ -909,7 +931,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-cloudtrail-now-tracks-cross-account-activity-to-its-origin/", "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integration.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by New User - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by New User - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor your cloud authentication events. Searches within this Analytic Story leverage the recent cloud updates to the Authentication data model to help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious login activity. 
 narrative = It is important to monitor and control who has access to your cloud infrastructure. Detecting suspicious logins will provide good starting points for investigations. Abusive behaviors caused by compromised credentials can lead to direct monetary costs, as you will be billed for any compute activity whether legitimate or otherwise.\
 This Analytic Story has data model versions of cloud searches leveraging Authentication data, including those looking for suspicious login activity, and cross-account activity for AWS.
@@ -921,7 +943,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed - Rule", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor your cloud infrastructure provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your cloud environment.
 narrative = Monitoring your cloud infrastructure logs allows you enable governance, compliance, and risk auditing. It is crucial for a company to monitor events and actions taken in the their cloud environments to ensure that your instances are not vulnerable to attacks. This Analytic Story identifies suspicious activities in your cloud compute instances and helps you respond and investigate those activities.
 
@@ -932,7 +954,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor your cloud infrastructure provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your cloud environment.
 narrative = Because most enterprise cloud infrastructure activities originate from familiar geographic locations, monitoring for activity from unknown or unusual regions is an important security measure. This indicator can be especially useful in environments where it is impossible to add specific IPs to an allow list because they vary.\
 This Analytic Story was designed to provide you with flexibility in the precision you employ in specifying legitimate geographic regions. It can be as specific as an IP address or a city, or as broad as a region (think state) or an entire country. By determining how precise you want your geographical locations to be and monitoring for new locations that haven't previously accessed your environment, you can detect adversaries as they begin to probe your environment. Since there are legitimate reasons for activities from unfamiliar locations, this is not a standalone indicator. Nevertheless, location can be a relevant piece of information that you may wish to investigate further.
@@ -956,7 +978,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1059", "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/macro-malware", "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
 description = Leveraging the Windows command-line interface (CLI) is one of the most common attack techniques--one that is also detailed in the MITRE ATT&CK framework. Use this Analytic Story to help you identify unusual or suspicious use of the CLI on Windows systems.
 narrative = The ability to execute arbitrary commands via the Windows CLI is a primary goal for the adversary. With access to the shell, an attacker can easily run scripts and interact with the target system. Often, attackers may only have limited access to the shell or may obtain access in unusual ways. In addition, malware may execute and interact with the CLI in ways that would be considered unusual and inconsistent with typical user activity. This provides defenders with opportunities to identify suspicious use and investigate, as appropriate. This Analytic Story contains various searches to help identify this suspicious activity, as well as others to aid you in deeper investigation.
 
@@ -967,7 +989,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["http://blogs.splunk.com/2015/10/01/random-words-on-entropy-and-dns/", "http://www.darkreading.com/analytics/security-monitoring/got-malware-three-signs-revealed-in-dns-traffic/d/d-id/1139680", "https://live.paloaltonetworks.com/t5/Threat-Vulnerability-Articles/What-are-suspicious-DNS-queries/ta-p/71454"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
 description = Attackers often attempt to hide within or otherwise abuse the domain name system (DNS). You can thwart attempts to manipulate this omnipresent protocol by monitoring for these types of abuses.
 narrative = Although DNS is one of the fundamental underlying protocols that make the Internet work, it is often ignored (perhaps because of its complexity and effectiveness).  However, attackers have discovered ways to abuse the protocol to meet their objectives. One potential abuse involves manipulating DNS to hijack traffic and redirect it to an IP address under the attacker's control. This could inadvertently send users intending to visit google.com, for example, to an unrelated malicious website. Another technique involves using the DNS protocol for command-and-control activities with the attacker's malicious code or to covertly exfiltrate data. The searches within this Analytic Story look for these types of abuses.
 
@@ -978,7 +1000,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/06/26/phishing-hits-a-new-level-of-quality/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly - Rule", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly - Rule", "ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task"]
 description = Email remains one of the primary means for attackers to gain an initial foothold within the modern enterprise. Detect and investigate suspicious emails in your environment with the help of the searches in this Analytic Story.
 narrative = It is a common practice for attackers of all types to leverage targeted spearphishing campaigns and mass mailers to deliver weaponized email messages and attachments. Fortunately, there are a number of ways to monitor email data in Splunk to detect suspicious content.\
 Once a phishing message has been detected, the next steps are to answer the following questions: \
@@ -1004,7 +1026,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/", "https://redcanary.com/blog/windows-registry-attacks-threat-detection/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/005/", "https://medium.com/@mbromileyDFIR/malware-monday-aebb456356c5"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Detect mshta inline hta execution - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious mshta spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Detect mshta renamed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious mshta child process - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect mshta renamed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious mshta spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious mshta child process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect mshta inline hta execution - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe process to execute malicious code.
 narrative = One common adversary tactic is to bypass application control solutions via the mshta.exe process, which loads Microsoft HTML applications (mshtml.dll) with the .hta suffix. In these cases, attackers use the trusted Windows utility to proxy execution of malicious files, whether an .hta application, javascript, or VBScript.\
 The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an attacker is leveraging mshta.exe to execute malicious code.\
@@ -1027,7 +1049,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1078", "https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Credential_stuffing", "https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/answer/What-is-a-password-spraying-attack-and-how-does-it-work"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Okta User Logins From Multiple Cities - Rule", "ESCU - Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentials From The Same IP - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Failed SSO Attempts - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Account Lockout Events - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate User Activities In Okta - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by app - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Okta User Logins From Multiple Cities - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Account Lockout Events - Rule", "ESCU - Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentials From The Same IP - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Failed SSO Attempts - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate User Activities In Okta - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by app - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor your Okta environment for suspicious activities. Due to the Covid outbreak, many users are migrating over to leverage cloud services more and more. Okta is a popular tool to manage multiple users and the web-based applications they need to stay productive. The searches in this story will help monitor your Okta environment for suspicious activities and associated user behaviors.
 narrative = Okta is the leading single sign on (SSO) provider, allowing users to authenticate once to Okta, and from there access a variety of web-based applications. These applications are assigned to users and allow administrators to centrally manage which users are allowed to access which applications. It also provides centralized logging to help understand how the applications are used and by whom. \
 While SSO is a major convenience for users, it also provides attackers with an opportunity. If the attacker can gain access to Okta, they can access a variety of applications. As such monitoring the environment is important. \
@@ -1051,7 +1073,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 StartW - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - setupapi - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - advpack - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 dllregisterserver - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - syssetup - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 dllregisterserver - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - syssetup - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 StartW - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - advpack - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - setupapi - Rule"]
 description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage rundll32.exe to execute arbitrary malicious code.
 narrative = One common adversary tactic is to bypass application control solutions via the rundll32.exe process. Natively, rundll32.exe will load DLLs and is a great example of a Living off the Land Binary. Rundll32.exe may load malicious DLLs by ordinals, function names or directly. The queries in this story focus on loading default DLLs, syssetup.dll, ieadvpack.dll, advpack.dll and setupapi.dll from disk that may be abused by adversaries. Additionally, two analytics developed to assist with identifying DLLRegisterServer, Start and StartW functions being called. The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an adversary is leveraging rundll32.exe to execute malicious code.
 
@@ -1062,7 +1084,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Graeber-Abusing-Windows-Management-Instrumentation-WMI-To-Build-A-Persistent%20Asynchronous-And-Fileless-Backdoor-wp.pdf", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/wmimplant_a_wmi_ba.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon - Rule", "ESCU - Script Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Process Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Temporary Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Script Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Temporary Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - Process Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task"]
 description = Attackers are increasingly abusing Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI), a framework and associated utilities available on all modern Windows operating systems. Because WMI can be leveraged to manage both local and remote systems, it is important to identify the processes executed and the user context within which the activity occurred.
 narrative = WMI is a Microsoft infrastructure for management data and operations on Windows operating systems. It includes of a set of utilities that can be leveraged to manage both local and remote Windows systems. Attackers are increasingly turning to WMI abuse in their efforts to conduct nefarious tasks, such as reconnaissance, detection of antivirus and virtual machines, code execution, lateral movement, persistence, and data exfiltration. \
 The detection searches included in this Analytic Story are used to look for suspicious use of WMI commands that attackers may leverage to interact with remote systems. The searches specifically look for the use of WMI to run processes on remote systems.\
@@ -1075,7 +1097,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://redcanary.com/blog/windows-registry-attacks-threat-detection/", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1112"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor and detect registry changes initiated from remote locations, which can be a sign that an attacker has infiltrated your system.
 narrative = Attackers are developing increasingly sophisticated techniques for hijacking target servers, while evading detection. One such technique that has become progressively more common is registry modification.\
  The registry is a key component of the Windows operating system. It has a hierarchical database called "registry" that contains settings, options, and values for executables. Once the threat actor gains access to a machine, they can use reg.exe to modify their account to obtain administrator-level privileges, maintain persistence, and move laterally within the environment.\
@@ -1088,7 +1110,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://blog.rapid7.com/2020/04/02/dispelling-zoom-bugbears-what-you-need-to-know-about-the-latest-zoom-vulnerabilities/", "https://threatpost.com/two-zoom-zero-day-flaws-uncovered/154337/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - First Time Seen Child Process of Zoom - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process File Activity - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Child Process of Zoom - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process File Activity - Response Task"]
 description = Attackers are using Zoom as an vector to increase privileges on a sytems. This story detects new child processes of zoom and provides investigative actions for this detection.
 narrative = Zoom is a leader in modern enterprise video communications and its usage has increased dramatically with a large amount of the population under stay-at-home orders due to the COVID-19 pandemic. With increased usage has come increased scrutiny and several security flaws have been found with this application on both Windows and macOS systems.\
 Current detections focus on finding new child processes of this application on a per host basis. Investigative searches are included to gather information needed during an investigation.
@@ -1112,7 +1134,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/001/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1127.001/T1127.001.md", "https://github.com/infosecn1nja/MaliciousMacroMSBuild", "https://github.com/xorrior/RandomPS-Scripts/blob/master/Invoke-ExecuteMSBuild.ps1", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/", "https://github.com/MHaggis/CBR-Queries/blob/master/msbuild.md"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious msbuild path - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious msbuild path - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule"]
 description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the msbuild.exe process to execute malicious code.
 narrative = Adversaries may use MSBuild to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. MSBuild.exe (Microsoft Build Engine) is a software build platform used by Visual Studio and is native to Windows. It handles XML formatted project files that define requirements for loading and building various platforms and configurations.\
 The inline task capability of MSBuild that was introduced in .NET version 4 allows for C# code to be inserted into an XML project file. MSBuild will compile and execute the inline task. MSBuild.exe is a signed Microsoft binary, so when it is used this way it can execute arbitrary code and bypass application control defenses that are configured to allow MSBuild.exe execution.\
@@ -1136,7 +1158,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - EC2 Instance Modified With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - EC2 Instance Modified With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Identify unusual changes to your AWS EC2 instances that may indicate malicious activity. Modifications to your EC2 instances by previously unseen users is an example of an activity that may warrant further investigation.
 narrative = A common attack technique is to infiltrate a cloud instance and make modifications. The adversary can then secure access to your infrastructure or hide their activities. So it's important to stay alert to changes that may indicate that your environment has been compromised. \
  Searches within this Analytic Story can help you detect the presence of a threat by monitoring for EC2 instances that have been created or changed--either by users that have never previously performed these activities or by known users who modify or create instances in a way that have not been done before. This story also provides investigative searches that help you go deeper once you detect suspicious behavior.
@@ -1148,7 +1170,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/08/monitoring-windows-console-activity-part-two.html", "https://www.splunk.com/pdfs/technical-briefs/advanced-threat-detection-and-response-tech-brief.pdf", "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/logging/detecting-security-incidents-windows-workstation-event-logs-34262"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
 description = Quickly identify systems running new or unusual processes in your environment that could be indicators of suspicious activity. Processes run from unusual locations, those with conspicuously long command lines, and rare executables are all examples of activities that may warrant deeper investigation.
 narrative = Being able to profile a host's processes within your environment can help you more quickly identify processes that seem out of place when compared to the rest of the population of hosts or asset types.\
 This Analytic Story lets you identify processes that are either a) not typically seen running or b) have some sort of suspicious command-line arguments associated with them. This Analytic Story will also help you identify the user running these processes and the associated process activity on the host.\
@@ -1172,7 +1194,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.fbi.gov/scams-and-safety/common-fraud-schemes/internet-fraud", "https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2017-internet-crime-report-released-050718"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Jim Apger"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Web Fraud - Anomalous User Clickspeed - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Account Harvesting - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Password Sharing Across Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Web Session Information via session id - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Web Fraud - Anomalous User Clickspeed - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Password Sharing Across Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Account Harvesting - Rule", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Web Session Information via session id - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor your environment for activity consistent with common attack techniques bad actors use when attempting to compromise web servers or other web-related assets.
 narrative = The Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) defines Internet fraud as the use of Internet services or software with Internet access to defraud victims or to otherwise take advantage of them. According to the Bureau, Internet crime schemes are used to steal millions of dollars each year from victims and continue to plague the Internet through various methods. The agency includes phishing scams, data breaches, Denial of Service (DOS) attacks, email account compromise, malware, spoofing, and ransomware in this category.\
 These crimes are not the fraud itself, but rather the attack techniques commonly employed by fraudsters in their pursuit of data that enables them to commit malicious actssuch as obtaining and using stolen credit cards. They represent a serious problem that is steadily increasing and not likely to go away anytime soon.\
@@ -1188,7 +1210,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://research.checkpoint.com/2020/resolving-your-way-into-domain-admin-exploiting-a-17-year-old-bug-in-windows-dns-servers/", "https://support.microsoft.com/en-au/help/4569509/windows-dns-server-remote-code-execution-vulnerability"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Shannon Davis"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Splunk Stream - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Zeek - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Zeek - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Splunk Stream - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Uncover activity consistent with CVE-2020-1350, or SIGRed. Discovered by Checkpoint researchers, this vulnerability affects Windows 2003 to 2019, and is triggered by a malicious DNS response (only affects DNS over TCP). An attacker can use the malicious payload to cause a buffer overflow on the vulnerable system, leading to compromise.  The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify the large response payload for SIG and KEY DNS records which can be used for the exploit.
 narrative = When a client requests a DNS record for a particular domain, that request gets routed first through the client's locally configured DNS server, then to any DNS server(s) configured as forwarders, and then onto the target domain's own DNS server(s).  If a attacker wanted to, they could host a malicious DNS server that responds to the initial request with a specially crafted large response (~65KB).  This response would flow through to the client's local DNS server, which if not patched for CVE-2020-1350, would cause the buffer overflow. The detection searches in this Analytic Story use wire data to detect the malicious behavior. Searches for Splunk Stream and Zeek are included.  The Splunk Stream search correlates across stream:dns and stream:tcp, while the Zeek search correlates across bro:dns:json and bro:conn:json.  These correlations are required to pick up both the DNS record types (SIG and KEY) along with the payload size (>65KB).
 
@@ -1199,7 +1221,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Defense_Evasion"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Eventvwr UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - FodHelper UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Disabling ControlPanel - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling SystemRestore In Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Eventvwr UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - FodHelper UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling NoRun Windows App - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling CMD Application - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Firewall with Netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Registry Tool - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Windows SmartScreen Protection - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling FolderOptions Windows Feature - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Show Hidden Files - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Task Manager - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
 description = Detect tactics used by malware to evade defenses on Windows endpoints. A few of these include suspicious `reg.exe` processes, files hidden with `attrib.exe` and disabling user-account control, among many others 
 narrative = Defense evasion is a tactic--identified in the MITRE ATT&CK framework--that adversaries employ in a variety of ways to bypass or defeat defensive security measures. There are many techniques enumerated by the MITRE ATT&CK framework that are applicable in this context. This Analytic Story includes searches designed to identify the use of such techniques on Windows platforms.
 
@@ -1210,7 +1232,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2013/12/file-extensions-2/", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1042"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule", "ESCU - Execution of File with Multiple Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Execution of File with Multiple Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
 description = Detect and investigate suspected abuse of file extensions and Windows file associations. Some of the malicious behaviors involved may include inserting spaces before file extensions or prepending the file extension with a different one, among other techniques.
 narrative = Attackers use a variety of techniques to entice users to run malicious code or to persist on an endpoint. One way to accomplish these goals is to leverage file extensions and the mechanism Windows uses to associate files with specific applications. \
  Since its earliest days, Windows has used extensions to identify file types. Users have become familiar with these extensions and their application associations. For example, if users see that a file ends in `.doc` or `.docx`, they will assume that it is a Microsoft Word document and expect that double-clicking will open it using `winword.exe`. The user will typically also presume that the `.docx` file is safe. \
@@ -1225,7 +1247,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/", "https://zeltser.com/security-incident-log-review-checklist/", "http://journeyintoir.blogspot.com/2013/01/re-introducing-usnjrnl.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
 description = Adversaries often try to cover their tracks by manipulating Windows logs. Use these searches to help you monitor for suspicious activity surrounding log files--an essential component of an effective defense.
 narrative = Because attackers often modify system logs to cover their tracks and/or to thwart the investigative process, log monitoring is an industry-recognized best practice. While there are legitimate reasons to manipulate system logs, it is still worthwhile to keep track of who manipulated the logs, when they manipulated them, and in what way they manipulated them (determining which accesses, tools, or utilities were employed). Even if no malicious activity is detected, the knowledge of an attempt to manipulate system logs may be indicative of a broader security risk that should be thoroughly investigated.\
 The Analytic Story gives users two different ways to detect manipulation of Windows Event Logs and one way to detect deletion of the Update Sequence Number (USN) Change Journal. The story helps determine the history of the host and the users who have accessed it. Finally, the story aides in investigation by retrieving all the information on the process that caused these events (if the process has been identified).
@@ -1237,7 +1259,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["http://www.fuzzysecurity.com/tutorials/19.html", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2010/07/malware-persistence-windows-registry.html", "http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/common-malware-persistence-mechanisms/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/fin7-shim-databases-persistence.html", "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dq2Hv7J9fvk"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Certutil exe certificate extraction - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Certutil exe certificate extraction - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor for activities and techniques associated with maintaining persistence on a Windows system--a sign that an adversary may have compromised your environment.
 narrative = Maintaining persistence is one of the first steps taken by attackers after the initial compromise. Attackers leverage various custom and built-in tools to ensure survivability and persistent access within a compromised enterprise. This Analytic Story provides searches to help you identify various behaviors used by attackers to maintain persistent access to a Windows environment.
 
@@ -1248,7 +1270,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Child Processes of Spoolsv exe - Rule", "ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Overwriting Accessibility Binaries - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Overwriting Accessibility Binaries - Rule", "ESCU - Child Processes of Spoolsv exe - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor for and investigate activities that may be associated with a Windows privilege-escalation attack, including unusual processes running on endpoints, modified registry keys, and more.
 narrative = Privilege escalation is a "land-and-expand" technique, wherein an adversary gains an initial foothold on a host and then exploits its weaknesses to increase his privileges. The motivation is simple: certain actions on a Windows machine--such as installing software--may require higher-level privileges than those the attacker initially acquired. By increasing his privilege level, the attacker can gain the control required to carry out his malicious ends. This Analytic Story provides searches to detect and investigate behaviors that attackers may use to elevate their privileges in your environment.
 
@@ -1259,7 +1281,7 @@ version = 3
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1050", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1031"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
 description = Windows services are often used by attackers for persistence and the ability to load drivers or otherwise interact with the Windows kernel. This Analytic Story helps you monitor your environment for indications that Windows services are being modified or created in a suspicious manner.
 narrative = The Windows operating system uses a services architecture to allow for running code in the background, similar to a UNIX daemon. Attackers will often leverage Windows services for persistence, hiding in plain sight, seeking the ability to run privileged code that can interact with the kernel. In many cases, attackers will create a new service to host their malicious code. Attackers have also been observed modifying unnecessary or unused services to point to their own code, as opposed to what was intended. In these cases, attackers often use tools to create or modify services in ways that are not typical for most environments, providing opportunities for detection.
 
@@ -1621,6 +1643,26 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"
 known_false_positives = Administrators may modify the boot configuration.
 providing_technologies = []
 
+[savedsearch://ESCU - BITS Job Persistence - Rule]
+type = detection
+asset_type = 
+confidence = medium
+explanation = The following query identifies Microsoft Background Intelligent Transfer Service utility `bitsadmin.exe` scheduling a BITS job to persist on an endpoint. The query identifies the parameters used to create, resume or add a file to a BITS job. Typically seen combined in a oneliner or ran in sequence. If identified, review the BITS job created and capture any files written to disk. It is possible for BITS to be used to upload files and this may require further network data analysis to identify. You can use `bitsadmin /list /verbose` to list out the jobs during investigation.
+how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
+annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1197"]}
+known_false_positives = Limited false positives will be present. Typically, applications will use `BitsAdmin.exe`. Any filtering should be done based on command-line arguments (legitimate applications) or parent process.
+providing_technologies = []
+
+[savedsearch://ESCU - BITSAdmin Download File - Rule]
+type = detection
+asset_type = 
+confidence = medium
+explanation = The following query identifies Microsoft Background Intelligent Transfer Service utility `bitsadmin.exe` using the `transfer` parameter to download a remote object. In addition, look for `download` or `upload` on the command-line, the switches are not required to perform a transfer. Capture any files downloaded. Review the reputation of the IP or domain used. Typically once executed, a follow on command will be used to execute the dropped file. Note that the network connection or file modification events related will not spawn or create from `bitsadmin.exe`, but the artifacts will appear in a parallel process of `svchost.exe` with a command-line similar to `svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s BITS`. It's important to review all parallel and child processes to capture any behaviors and artifacts. In some suspicious and malicious instances, BITS jobs will be created. You can use `bitsadmin /list /verbose` to list out the jobs during investigation.
+how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
+annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1197", "T1105"]}
+known_false_positives = Limited false positives, however it may be required to filter based on parent process name or network connection.
+providing_technologies = []
+
 [savedsearch://ESCU - Batch File Write to System32 - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
@@ -2002,6 +2044,21 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phase
 known_false_positives = Legitimate DNS changes can be detected in this search. Investigate, verify and update the list of provided current answers for the domains in question as appropriate.
 providing_technologies = []
 
+[savedsearch://ESCU - DSQuery Domain Discovery - Rule]
+type = detection
+asset_type = 
+confidence = medium
+explanation = The following analytic identifies "dsquery.exe" execution with arguments looking for `TrustedDomain` query directly on the command-line. This is typically indicative of an Administrator or adversary perform domain trust discovery. Note that this query does not identify any other variations of "Dsquery.exe" usage.\
+Within this detection, it is assumed `dsquery.exe` is not moved or renamed.\
+The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, process "dsquery.exe" and its parent process.\
+DSQuery.exe is natively found in `C:\Windows\system32` and `C:\Windows\syswow64` and only on Server operating system.\
+The following DLL(s) are loaded when DSQuery.exe is launched `dsquery.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible dsquery is running within that process context in memory.\
+In addition to trust discovery, review parallel processes for additional behaviors performed. Identify the parent process and capture any files (batch files, for example) being used.
+how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
+annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1482"]}
+known_false_positives = Limited false positives. If there is a true false positive, filter based on command-line or parent process.
+providing_technologies = []
+
 [savedsearch://ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
@@ -2857,6 +2914,96 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Action
 known_false_positives = While legitimate, these NirSoft tools are prone to abuse. You should verfiy that the tool was used for a legitimate purpose.
 providing_technologies = []
 
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Disable Registry Tool - Rule]
+type = detection
+asset_type = 
+confidence = medium
+explanation = This search is to identifies modification of registry to disable the regedit or registry tools of windows operating system. Since registry tool is a swiss knife in analyzing registry, malware such as RAT or trojan Spy disable this application to prevent the removal of their registry entry such as persistence, file less components and defense evasion.
+how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.
+annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"]}
+known_false_positives = admin may disable this application for non technical user.
+providing_technologies = []
+
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Disable Show Hidden Files - Rule]
+type = detection
+asset_type = 
+confidence = medium
+explanation = The following search is to idetifies a modification in registry to prevent the user seeing all the files with hidden attributes. This event or techniques are known on some worm and trojan spy malware that will drop hidden files on the infected machine.
+how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.
+annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1564.001", "T1562.001"]}
+known_false_positives = unknown
+providing_technologies = []
+
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring - Rule]
+type = detection
+asset_type = 
+confidence = medium
+explanation = This search is to identifies a modification in registry to disable the windows denfender real time behavior monitoring. This event or technique is commonly seen in RAT, bot, or Trojan to disable AV to evade detections.
+how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.
+annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"]}
+known_false_positives = admin or user may choose to disable this windows features.
+providing_technologies = []
+
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Disable Windows SmartScreen Protection - Rule]
+type = detection
+asset_type = 
+confidence = medium
+explanation = The following search identifies a modification of registry to disable the smartscreen protection of windows machine. This is windows feature provide an early warning system against website that might engage in phishing attack or malware distribution. This modification are seen in RAT malware to cover their tracks upon downloading other of its component or other payload.
+how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.
+annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"]}
+known_false_positives = admin or user may choose to disable this windows features.
+providing_technologies = []
+
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Disabling CMD Application - Rule]
+type = detection
+asset_type = 
+confidence = medium
+explanation = this search is to identify modification in registry to disable cmd prompt application. This technique is commonly seen in RAT, Trojan or WORM to prevent triaging or deleting there samples through cmd application which is one of the tool of analyst to traverse on directory and files.
+how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.
+annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"]}
+known_false_positives = admin may disable this application for non technical user.
+providing_technologies = []
+
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Disabling ControlPanel - Rule]
+type = detection
+asset_type = 
+confidence = medium
+explanation = this search is to identify registry modification to disable control panel window. This technique is commonly seen in malware to prevent their artifacts , persistence removed on the infected machine.
+how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.
+annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"]}
+known_false_positives = admin may disable this application for non technical user.
+providing_technologies = []
+
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Disabling Firewall with Netsh - Rule]
+type = detection
+asset_type = 
+confidence = medium
+explanation = This search is to identifies suspicious firewall disabling using netsh application. this technique is commonly seen in malware that tries to communicate or download its component or other payload to its C2 server.
+how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data.
+annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"]}
+known_false_positives = admin may disable firewall during testing or fixing network problem.
+providing_technologies = []
+
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Disabling FolderOptions Windows Feature - Rule]
+type = detection
+asset_type = 
+confidence = medium
+explanation = This search is to identify registry modification to disable folder options feature of windows to show hidden files, file extension and etc. This technique used by malware in combination if disabling show hidden files feature to hide their files and also to hide the file extension to lure the user base on file icons or fake file extensions.
+how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.
+annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"]}
+known_false_positives = admin may disable this application for non technical user.
+providing_technologies = []
+
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Disabling NoRun Windows App - Rule]
+type = detection
+asset_type = 
+confidence = medium
+explanation = This search is to identify modification of registry to disable run application in window start menu. this application is known to be a helpful shortcut to windows OS user to run known application and also to execute some reg or batch script. This technique is used malware to make cleaning of its infection more harder by preventing known application run easily through run shortcut.
+how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.
+annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"]}
+known_false_positives = admin may disable this application for non technical user.
+providing_technologies = []
+
 [savedsearch://ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
@@ -2867,6 +3014,26 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"
 known_false_positives = This registry key may be modified via administrators to implement a change in system policy. This type of change should be a very rare occurrence.
 providing_technologies = []
 
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Disabling SystemRestore In Registry - Rule]
+type = detection
+asset_type = 
+confidence = medium
+explanation = The following search identifies the modification of registry related in disabling the system restore of a machine. This event or behavior are seen in some RAT malware to make the restore of the infected machine  difficult and keep their infection on the box.
+how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.
+annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"]}
+known_false_positives = in some cases admin can disable systemrestore on a machine.
+providing_technologies = []
+
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Disabling Task Manager - Rule]
+type = detection
+asset_type = 
+confidence = medium
+explanation = This search is to identifies modification of registry to disable the task manager of windows operating system. this event or technique are commonly seen in malware such as RAT, Trojan, TrojanSpy or worm to prevent the user to terminate their process.
+how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.
+annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"]}
+known_false_positives = admin may disable this application for non technical user.
+providing_technologies = []
+
 [savedsearch://ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
@@ -3747,6 +3914,16 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"
 known_false_positives = Microsoft may provide updates to these binaries. Verify that these changes do not correspond with your normal software update cycle.
 providing_technologies = []
 
+[savedsearch://ESCU - PowerShell Start-BitsTransfer - Rule]
+type = detection
+asset_type = 
+confidence = medium
+explanation = Start-BitsTransfer is the PowerShell "version" of BitsAdmin.exe. Similar functionality is present. This technique variation is not as commonly used by adversaries, but has been abused in the past. Lesser known uses include the ability to set the `-TransferType` to `Upload` for exfiltration of files. In an instance where `Upload` is used, it is highly possible files will be archived. During triage, review parallel processes and process lineage. Capture any files on disk and review. For the remote domain or IP, what is the reputation?
+how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
+annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1197"]}
+known_false_positives = Limited false positives. It is possible administrators will utilize Start-BitsTransfer for administrative tasks, otherwise filter based parent process or command-line arguments.
+providing_technologies = []
+
 [savedsearch://ESCU - Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint

dist/escu/lookups/mitre_enrichment.csv

@@ -1,5 +1,107 @@
 mitre_id,technique,tactics,groups
-T1205.001,Port Knocking,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Command And Control,no
+T1484.002,Domain Trust Modification,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,UNC2452
+T1484.001,Group Policy Modification,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
+T1606.002,SAML Tokens,Credential Access,UNC2452
+T1606.001,Web Cookies,Credential Access,UNC2452
+T1606,Forge Web Credentials,Credential Access,no
+T1059.008,Network Device CLI,Execution,no
+T1602.002,Network Device Configuration Dump,Collection,no
+T1542.005,TFTP Boot,Defense Evasion|Persistence,no
+T1542.004,ROMMONkit,Defense Evasion|Persistence,no
+T1602.001,SNMP (MIB Dump),Collection,no
+T1602,Data from Configuration Repository,Collection,no
+T1601.002,Downgrade System Image,Defense Evasion,no
+T1601.001,Patch System Image,Defense Evasion,no
+T1601,Modify System Image,Defense Evasion,no
+T1600.002,Disable Crypto Hardware,Defense Evasion,no
+T1600.001,Reduce Key Space,Defense Evasion,no
+T1600,Weaken Encryption,Defense Evasion,no
+T1556.004,Network Device Authentication,Credential Access|Defense Evasion,no
+T1599.001,Network Address Translation Traversal,Defense Evasion,no
+T1599,Network Boundary Bridging,Defense Evasion,no
+T1020.001,Traffic Duplication,Exfiltration,no
+T1557.002,ARP Cache Poisoning,Credential Access|Collection,Cleaver
+T1588.006,Vulnerabilities,Resource Development,no
+T1053.006,Systemd Timers,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
+T1562.008,Disable Cloud Logs,Defense Evasion,no
+T1547.012,Print Processors,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
+T1598.003,Spearphishing Link,Reconnaissance,no
+T1598.002,Spearphishing Attachment,Reconnaissance,no
+T1598.001,Spearphishing Service,Reconnaissance,no
+T1598,Phishing for Information,Reconnaissance,no
+T1597.002,Purchase Technical Data,Reconnaissance,no
+T1597.001,Threat Intel Vendors,Reconnaissance,no
+T1597,Search Closed Sources,Reconnaissance,no
+T1596.005,Scan Databases,Reconnaissance,no
+T1596.004,CDNs,Reconnaissance,no
+T1596.003,Digital Certificates,Reconnaissance,no
+T1596.001,DNS/Passive DNS,Reconnaissance,no
+T1596.002,WHOIS,Reconnaissance,no
+T1596,Search Open Technical Databases,Reconnaissance,no
+T1595.002,Vulnerability Scanning,Reconnaissance,no
+T1595.001,Scanning IP Blocks,Reconnaissance,no
+T1595,Active Scanning,Reconnaissance,no
+T1594,Search Victim-Owned Websites,Reconnaissance,no
+T1593.002,Search Engines,Reconnaissance,no
+T1593.001,Social Media,Reconnaissance,no
+T1593,Search Open Websites/Domains,Reconnaissance,no
+T1592.004,Client Configurations,Reconnaissance,no
+T1592.003,Firmware,Reconnaissance,no
+T1592.002,Software,Reconnaissance,no
+T1592.001,Hardware,Reconnaissance,no
+T1592,Gather Victim Host Information,Reconnaissance,no
+T1591.004,Identify Roles,Reconnaissance,no
+T1591.003,Identify Business Tempo,Reconnaissance,no
+T1591.001,Determine Physical Locations,Reconnaissance,no
+T1591.002,Business Relationships,Reconnaissance,no
+T1591,Gather Victim Org Information,Reconnaissance,no
+T1590.006,Network Security Appliances,Reconnaissance,no
+T1590.005,IP Addresses,Reconnaissance,no
+T1590.004,Network Topology,Reconnaissance,no
+T1590.003,Network Trust Dependencies,Reconnaissance,no
+T1590.002,DNS,Reconnaissance,no
+T1590.001,Domain Properties,Reconnaissance,no
+T1590,Gather Victim Network Information,Reconnaissance,no
+T1589.003,Employee Names,Reconnaissance,no
+T1589.002,Email Addresses,Reconnaissance,no
+T1589.001,Credentials,Reconnaissance,no
+T1589,Gather Victim Identity Information,Reconnaissance,no
+T1588.005,Exploits,Resource Development,no
+T1588.004,Digital Certificates,Resource Development,no
+T1588.003,Code Signing Certificates,Resource Development,Wizard Spider
+T1588.002,Tool,Resource Development,no
+T1588.001,Malware,Resource Development,Turla|APT1
+T1588,Obtain Capabilities,Resource Development,no
+T1587.004,Exploits,Resource Development,no
+T1587.003,Digital Certificates,Resource Development,APT29|PROMETHIUM
+T1587.002,Code Signing Certificates,Resource Development,PROMETHIUM|Patchwork
+T1587.001,Malware,Resource Development,UNC2452|Turla|FIN7|Night Dragon|Cleaver
+T1587,Develop Capabilities,Resource Development,no
+T1586.002,Email Accounts,Resource Development,no
+T1586.001,Social Media Accounts,Resource Development,no
+T1586,Compromise Accounts,Resource Development,no
+T1585.002,Email Accounts,Resource Development,APT1
+T1585.001,Social Media Accounts,Resource Development,Cleaver
+T1585,Establish Accounts,Resource Development,APT17
+T1584.006,Web Services,Resource Development,Turla
+T1584.005,Botnet,Resource Development,no
+T1584.004,Server,Resource Development,Turla|APT16
+T1584.003,Virtual Private Server,Resource Development,Turla
+T1584.002,DNS Server,Resource Development,no
+T1584.001,Domains,Resource Development,APT1
+T1583.006,Web Services,Resource Development,APT17|APT29
+T1583.005,Botnet,Resource Development,no
+T1583.004,Server,Resource Development,no
+T1583.003,Virtual Private Server,Resource Development,TEMP.Veles
+T1583.002,DNS Server,Resource Development,no
+T1584,Compromise Infrastructure,Resource Development,no
+T1583.001,Domains,Resource Development,APT1|APT28
+T1583,Acquire Infrastructure,Resource Development,no
+T1564.007,VBA Stomping,Defense Evasion,no
+T1558.004,AS-REP Roasting,Credential Access,no
+T1580,Cloud Infrastructure Discovery,Discovery,no
+T1218.012,Verclsid,Defense Evasion,no
+T1205.001,Port Knocking,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Command And Control,PROMETHIUM
 T1564.006,Run Virtual Instance,Defense Evasion,no
 T1564.005,Hidden File System,Defense Evasion,Strider|Equation
 T1556.003,Pluggable Authentication Modules,Credential Access|Defense Evasion,no
@@ -7,7 +109,7 @@ T1574.012,COR_PROFILER,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,Blue Moc
 T1562.007,Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall,Defense Evasion,no
 T1098.004,SSH Authorized Keys,Persistence,no
 T1480.001,Environmental Keying,Defense Evasion,APT41|Equation
-T1059.007,JavaScript/JScript,Execution,APT32|FIN7|Cobalt Group|Molerats|TA505|Silence|Leafminer
+T1059.007,JavaScript/JScript,Execution,FIN6|APT32|FIN7|Cobalt Group|Molerats|TA505|Silence|Leafminer
 T1578.004,Revert Cloud Instance,Defense Evasion,no
 T1578.003,Delete Cloud Instance,Defense Evasion,no
 T1578.001,Create Snapshot,Defense Evasion,no
@@ -24,31 +126,31 @@ T1546.015,Component Object Model Hijacking,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,APT2
 T1071.004,DNS,Command And Control,APT39|Tropic Trooper|OilRig|Ke3chang|Cobalt Group|APT18|APT41|FIN7
 T1071.003,Mail Protocols,Command And Control,APT32|SilverTerrier|APT28
 T1071.002,File Transfer Protocols,Command And Control,APT41|SilverTerrier|Machete|Honeybee
-T1071.001,Web Protocols,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|TA505|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Inception|APT41|SilverTerrier|Machete|APT28|WIRTE|APT33|FIN4|Night Dragon|APT18|APT38|Cobalt Group|APT19|Threat Group-3390|Rancor|Orangeworm|APT37|Ke3chang|Dark Caracal|Turla|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|OilRig|Magic Hound|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon
+T1071.001,Web Protocols,Command And Control,UNC2452|Sandworm Team|TA505|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Inception|APT41|SilverTerrier|Machete|APT28|WIRTE|APT33|FIN4|Night Dragon|APT18|APT38|Threat Group-3390|Ke3chang|Dark Caracal|APT19|Cobalt Group|Rancor|Orangeworm|APT37|Turla|Lazarus Group|APT32|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|OilRig|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon
 T1572,Protocol Tunneling,Command And Control,OilRig|Cobalt Group|FIN6
-T1048.003,Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol,Exfiltration,APT32|APT33|Thrip|FIN8|OilRig|Lazarus Group
-T1048.002,Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol,Exfiltration,no
+T1048.003,Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol,Exfiltration,Wizard Spider|FIN6|APT32|APT33|Thrip|FIN8|OilRig|Lazarus Group
+T1048.002,Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol,Exfiltration,UNC2452
 T1048.001,Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol,Exfiltration,no
 T1001.003,Protocol Impersonation,Command And Control,Lazarus Group
-T1001.002,Steganography,Command And Control,Axiom
+T1001.002,Steganography,Command And Control,APT29|Axiom
 T1001.001,Junk Data,Command And Control,APT28
 T1132.002,Non-Standard Encoding,Command And Control,no
 T1132.001,Standard Encoding,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|APT33|APT19|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork
 T1090.004,Domain Fronting,Command And Control,APT29
 T1090.003,Multi-hop Proxy,Command And Control,Inception|FIN4|APT29
 T1090.002,External Proxy,Command And Control,APT39|Silence|Soft Cell|MuddyWater|APT3|FIN5|Lazarus Group|menuPass|APT28
-T1090.001,Internal Proxy,Command And Control,APT39|Strider
+T1090.001,Internal Proxy,Command And Control,UNC2452|APT39|Strider
 T1102.003,One-Way Communication,Command And Control,Leviathan
-T1102.002,Bidirectional Communication,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|APT39|APT12|Turla|FIN7|APT37|Magic Hound|Carbanak
+T1102.002,Bidirectional Communication,Command And Control,APT29|Sandworm Team|APT39|APT12|Turla|FIN7|APT37|Magic Hound|Carbanak
 T1102.001,Dead Drop Resolver,Command And Control,Rocke|APT41|BRONZE BUTLER|RTM|Patchwork
 T1571,Non-Standard Port,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|Rocke|DarkVishnya|Silence|APT-C-36|Magic Hound|APT33|APT32|TEMP.Veles|Lazarus Group|FIN7
-T1074.002,Remote Data Staging,Collection,Threat Group-3390|menuPass|FIN6|Night Dragon|FIN8
-T1074.001,Local Data Staging,Collection,Machete|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|Patchwork|Dragonfly 2.0|Honeybee|Leviathan|APT3|FIN5|menuPass|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28
+T1074.002,Remote Data Staging,Collection,UNC2452|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|FIN6|Night Dragon|FIN8
+T1074.001,Local Data Staging,Collection,Machete|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|Honeybee|Dragonfly 2.0|Patchwork|Leviathan|APT3|FIN5|menuPass|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28
 T1078.004,Cloud Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,APT33
 T1564.004,NTFS File Attributes,Defense Evasion,APT32
 T1564.003,Hidden Window,Defense Evasion,Gorgon Group|Deep Panda|DarkHydrus|CopyKittens|APT19|APT32|APT28|APT3|Magic Hound
-T1078.003,Local Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,Tropic Trooper|FIN10|Stolen Pencil|APT32
-T1078.002,Domain Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,TA505|APT3|Threat Group-1314
+T1078.003,Local Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,PROMETHIUM|Tropic Trooper|FIN10|Stolen Pencil|APT32
+T1078.002,Domain Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,Wizard Spider|APT29|TA505|APT3|Threat Group-1314
 T1078.001,Default Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,no
 T1564.002,Hidden Users,Defense Evasion,no
 T1574.006,LD_PRELOAD,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,Rocke
@@ -64,37 +166,37 @@ T1574,Hijack Execution Flow,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
 T1069.001,Local Groups,Discovery,Turla|OilRig|admin@338
 T1570,Lateral Tool Transfer,Lateral Movement,APT32|Wizard Spider|Turla|FIN10
 T1568.003,DNS Calculation,Command And Control,APT12
-T1204.002,Malicious File,Execution,Magic Hound|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|RTM|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|Machete|admin@338|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|BRONZE BUTLER|Cobalt Group|DarkHydrus|Gorgon Group|Patchwork|OilRig|Dark Caracal|MuddyWater|Lazarus Group|FIN7|APT32|Rancor|APT37|FIN8|APT28|Elderwood|TA459|APT29|Leviathan|menuPass|PLATINUM
-T1204.001,Malicious Link,Execution,Patchwork|Windshift|APT32|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|TA505|OilRig|Machete|Leviathan|FIN8|FIN4|Elderwood|Dragonfly 2.0|Cobalt Group|APT39|Night Dragon|APT33|Turla
+T1204.002,Malicious File,Execution,FIN6|PROMETHIUM|APT30|Magic Hound|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|RTM|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|Machete|admin@338|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|Dragonfly 2.0|Dark Caracal|FIN7|APT32|Cobalt Group|DarkHydrus|Patchwork|Rancor|MuddyWater|BRONZE BUTLER|APT19|Gorgon Group|OilRig|Lazarus Group|APT29|menuPass|TA459|FIN8|Elderwood|PLATINUM|Leviathan|APT37|APT28
+T1204.001,Malicious Link,Execution,Wizard Spider|Patchwork|Windshift|APT32|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|TA505|OilRig|Machete|Leviathan|FIN8|FIN4|Elderwood|Dragonfly 2.0|Cobalt Group|APT39|Night Dragon|APT33|Turla
 T1195.003,Compromise Hardware Supply Chain,Initial Access,no
-T1195.002,Compromise Software Supply Chain,Initial Access,Sandworm Team|APT41
+T1195.002,Compromise Software Supply Chain,Initial Access,UNC2452|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Dragonfly|Sandworm Team|APT41
 T1195.001,Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools,Initial Access,no
-T1568.001,Fast Flux DNS,Command And Control,TA505
+T1568.001,Fast Flux DNS,Command And Control,Machete|TA505
 T1052.001,Exfiltration over USB,Exfiltration,Tropic Trooper
-T1569.002,Service Execution,Execution,Blue Mockingbird|APT39|APT41|Silence|FIN6|APT32|Honeybee|Ke3chang
+T1569.002,Service Execution,Execution,Wizard Spider|Blue Mockingbird|APT39|APT41|Silence|FIN6|APT32|Ke3chang|Honeybee
 T1569.001,Launchctl,Execution,no
 T1569,System Services,Execution,no
 T1568.002,Domain Generation Algorithms,Command And Control,APT41
-T1568,Dynamic Resolution,Command And Control,no
+T1568,Dynamic Resolution,Command And Control,UNC2452
 T1011.001,Exfiltration Over Bluetooth,Exfiltration,no
 T1567.002,Exfiltration to Cloud Storage,Exfiltration,Leviathan|Turla
 T1567.001,Exfiltration to Code Repository,Exfiltration,no
-T1059.006,Python,Execution,Rocke|BRONZE BUTLER|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|Machete
-T1059.005,Visual Basic,Execution,APT33|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|Rancor|Patchwork|MuddyWater|Honeybee|FIN7|APT37|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|Turla|TA505|Silence|WIRTE|FIN4|Cobalt Group|Gorgon Group|Leviathan|TA459|Magic Hound
+T1059.006,Python,Execution,APT29|Rocke|BRONZE BUTLER|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|Machete
+T1059.005,Visual Basic,Execution,Lazarus Group|APT33|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|Rancor|Patchwork|MuddyWater|Honeybee|FIN7|APT37|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|Turla|TA505|Silence|WIRTE|FIN4|Gorgon Group|Cobalt Group|Leviathan|TA459|Magic Hound
 T1059.004,Unix Shell,Execution,Rocke|APT41
-T1059.003,Windows Command Shell,Execution,TA505|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|OilRig|Lazarus Group|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|FIN7|APT41|Soft Cell|Turla|Silence|APT32|APT39|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Dark Caracal|Gorgon Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Rancor|Ke3chang|APT37|Leviathan|FIN8|APT28|Magic Hound|Sowbug|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN10|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Gamaredon Group|Suckfly|Patchwork|Threat Group-1314|APT3|admin@338|APT1
+T1059.003,Windows Command Shell,Execution,UNC2452|Wizard Spider|FIN6|TA505|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|OilRig|Lazarus Group|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|FIN7|APT41|Soft Cell|Turla|Silence|APT32|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Gorgon Group|Ke3chang|Dragonfly 2.0|Rancor|Dark Caracal|APT37|APT28|Leviathan|FIN8|Sowbug|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|FIN10|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Suckfly|Threat Group-1314|APT3|admin@338|APT1
 T1059.002,AppleScript,Execution,no
-T1059.001,PowerShell,Execution,Blue Mockingbird|APT39|DarkVishnya|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Inception|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|Soft Cell|TA505|WIRTE|TEMP.Veles|APT33|Gallmaker|Turla|APT19|DarkHydrus|APT28|Thrip|Gorgon Group|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Leviathan|TA459|FIN8|MuddyWater|Magic Hound|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|CopyKittens|APT32|FIN7|FIN10|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Poseidon Group|APT3|APT29|Deep Panda
+T1059.001,PowerShell,Execution,UNC2452|Lazarus Group|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|APT39|DarkVishnya|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Inception|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|Soft Cell|TA505|WIRTE|TEMP.Veles|APT33|Gallmaker|Turla|APT19|DarkHydrus|APT28|Gorgon Group|Thrip|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Leviathan|TA459|MuddyWater|FIN8|Magic Hound|CopyKittens|BRONZE BUTLER|OilRig|FIN10|Threat Group-3390|APT32|FIN7|menuPass|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Poseidon Group|APT3|APT29|Deep Panda
 T1567,Exfiltration Over Web Service,Exfiltration,no
 T1497.003,Time Based Evasion,Defense Evasion|Discovery,no
 T1497.002,User Activity Based Checks,Defense Evasion|Discovery,FIN7
 T1497.001,System Checks,Defense Evasion|Discovery,Frankenstein
 T1498.002,Reflection Amplification,Impact,no
 T1498.001,Direct Network Flood,Impact,no
-T1566.003,Spearphishing via Service,Initial Access,Magic Hound|Windshift|FIN6|OilRig|Dark Caracal
-T1566.002,Spearphishing Link,Initial Access,Windshift|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|Machete|Kimsuky|TA505|Stolen Pencil|APT39|FIN4|APT32|Night Dragon|Turla|APT28|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|APT33|Elderwood|Leviathan|Magic Hound|Patchwork|APT29|FIN8
-T1566.001,Spearphishing Attachment,Initial Access,Magic Hound|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Mofang|Wizard Spider|RTM|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|APT41|Machete|admin@338|Kimsuky|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|Tropic Trooper|Turla|Gorgon Group|Rancor|DarkHydrus|Cobalt Group|FIN7|OilRig|Lazarus Group|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|FIN8|MuddyWater|APT28|TA459|Leviathan|Patchwork|PLATINUM|Elderwood|APT29|APT37|menuPass
-T1566,Phishing,Initial Access,no
+T1566.003,Spearphishing via Service,Initial Access,Lazarus Group|Magic Hound|Windshift|FIN6|OilRig|Dark Caracal
+T1566.002,Spearphishing Link,Initial Access,Wizard Spider|APT1|Windshift|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|Machete|Kimsuky|TA505|Stolen Pencil|APT39|FIN4|APT32|Night Dragon|APT28|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Turla|OilRig|APT33|Leviathan|Patchwork|Elderwood|APT29|Magic Hound|FIN8
+T1566.001,Spearphishing Attachment,Initial Access,APT1|FIN6|APT30|Magic Hound|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Mofang|Wizard Spider|RTM|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|APT41|Machete|admin@338|Kimsuky|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|Tropic Trooper|Turla|Lazarus Group|Cobalt Group|FIN7|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|Gorgon Group|Rancor|DarkHydrus|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|PLATINUM|MuddyWater|TA459|Leviathan|Elderwood|APT29|APT37|menuPass|APT28|Patchwork
+T1566,Phishing,Initial Access,GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Dragonfly
 T1565.003,Runtime Data Manipulation,Impact,APT38
 T1565.002,Transmitted Data Manipulation,Impact,APT38
 T1565.001,Stored Data Manipulation,Impact,FIN4|APT38
@@ -104,18 +206,18 @@ T1564,Hide Artifacts,Defense Evasion,no
 T1563.002,RDP Hijacking,Lateral Movement,no
 T1563.001,SSH Hijacking,Lateral Movement,no
 T1563,Remote Service Session Hijacking,Lateral Movement,no
-T1518.001,Security Software Discovery,Discovery,Turla|Rocke|Frankenstein|The White Company|Cobalt Group|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|Tropic Trooper|FIN8|Patchwork|Naikon
+T1518.001,Security Software Discovery,Discovery,Wizard Spider|Turla|Rocke|Frankenstein|The White Company|Cobalt Group|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|Tropic Trooper|FIN8|Patchwork|Naikon
 T1069.003,Cloud Groups,Discovery,no
 T1069.002,Domain Groups,Discovery,Turla|Wizard Spider|Inception|OilRig|FIN6|Dragonfly 2.0|Ke3chang
 T1087.004,Cloud Account,Discovery,no
 T1087.003,Email Account,Discovery,Sandworm Team|TA505
-T1087.002,Domain Account,Discovery,Turla|Sandworm Team|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN6|Poseidon Group|Ke3chang
+T1087.002,Domain Account,Discovery,Wizard Spider|Chimera|Turla|Sandworm Team|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN6|Poseidon Group|Ke3chang
 T1087.001,Local Account,Discovery,Turla|Poseidon Group|OilRig|Ke3chang|APT32|APT1|Threat Group-3390|APT3|admin@338
 T1553.004,Install Root Certificate,Defense Evasion,no
-T1562.004,Disable or Modify System Firewall,Defense Evasion,Rocke|Lazarus Group|Kimsuky|Dragonfly 2.0|Carbanak
-T1562.003,HISTCONTROL,Defense Evasion,no
-T1562.002,Disable Windows Event Logging,Defense Evasion,Threat Group-3390
-T1562.001,Disable or Modify Tools,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Rocke|Kimsuky|Turla|Night Dragon|Gorgon Group|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda
+T1562.004,Disable or Modify System Firewall,Defense Evasion,UNC2452|Rocke|Lazarus Group|Kimsuky|Dragonfly 2.0|Carbanak
+T1562.003,Impair Command History Logging,Defense Evasion,no
+T1562.002,Disable Windows Event Logging,Defense Evasion,UNC2452|Threat Group-3390
+T1562.001,Disable or Modify Tools,Defense Evasion,UNC2452|Wizard Spider|FIN6|Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Rocke|Kimsuky|Turla|Night Dragon|Gorgon Group|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda
 T1562,Impair Defenses,Defense Evasion,no
 T1003.004,LSA Secrets,Credential Access,OilRig|MuddyWater|menuPass|Leafminer|Ke3chang|Dragonfly 2.0|APT33|Threat Group-3390
 T1003.005,Cached Domain Credentials,Credential Access,OilRig|MuddyWater|Leafminer|APT33
@@ -124,8 +226,8 @@ T1561.001,Disk Content Wipe,Impact,Lazarus Group
 T1561,Disk Wipe,Impact,no
 T1560.003,Archive via Custom Method,Collection,Lazarus Group|Kimsuky|CopyKittens|FIN6
 T1560.002,Archive via Library,Collection,Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390
-T1560.001,Archive via Utility,Collection,APT41|Soft Cell|Turla|Gallmaker|APT33|APT39|MuddyWater|Magic Hound|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|CopyKittens|APT3|Sowbug|menuPass|APT1|Ke3chang
-T1560,Archive Collected Data,Collection,menuPass|APT32|Honeybee|Patchwork|APT28|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Ke3chang
+T1560.001,Archive via Utility,Collection,UNC2452|Chimera|APT41|Soft Cell|Turla|Gallmaker|APT33|APT39|MuddyWater|Magic Hound|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|CopyKittens|Sowbug|APT3|menuPass|APT1|Ke3chang
+T1560,Archive Collected Data,Collection,menuPass|APT32|Patchwork|APT28|Dragonfly 2.0|Honeybee|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Ke3chang
 T1499.004,Application or System Exploitation,Impact,no
 T1499.003,Application Exhaustion Flood,Impact,no
 T1499.002,Service Exhaustion Flood,Impact,no
@@ -133,7 +235,7 @@ T1499.001,OS Exhaustion Flood,Impact,no
 T1491.002,External Defacement,Impact,no
 T1491.001,Internal Defacement,Impact,Lazarus Group
 T1114.003,Email Forwarding Rule,Collection,no
-T1114.002,Remote Email Collection,Collection,APT1|FIN4|APT28|Dragonfly 2.0|Ke3chang|Leafminer
+T1114.002,Remote Email Collection,Collection,UNC2452|APT1|FIN4|Ke3chang|Leafminer|Dragonfly 2.0|APT28
 T1114.001,Local Email Collection,Collection,Magic Hound|APT1
 T1134.005,SID-History Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
 T1134.004,Parent PID Spoofing,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
@@ -142,93 +244,93 @@ T1134.002,Create Process with Token,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Turla|L
 T1134.001,Token Impersonation/Theft,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,APT28
 T1213.002,Sharepoint,Collection,Ke3chang|APT28
 T1213.001,Confluence,Collection,no
-T1555.003,Credentials from Web Browsers,Credential Access,Magic Hound|Sandworm Team|Inception|Stealth Falcon|OilRig|Leafminer|APT33|APT3|Kimsuky|TA505|Stolen Pencil|MuddyWater|APT37|Patchwork|Molerats
+T1555.003,Credentials from Web Browsers,Credential Access,FIN6|Magic Hound|Sandworm Team|Inception|Stealth Falcon|OilRig|Leafminer|APT33|APT3|Kimsuky|TA505|Stolen Pencil|MuddyWater|APT37|Patchwork|Molerats
 T1555.002,Securityd Memory,Credential Access,no
 T1555.001,Keychain,Credential Access,no
-T1559.002,Dynamic Data Exchange,Execution,Sharpshooter|TA505|MuddyWater|Gallmaker|Patchwork|Cobalt Group|APT37|APT28|FIN7
+T1559.002,Dynamic Data Exchange,Execution,Sharpshooter|TA505|MuddyWater|Gallmaker|Cobalt Group|Patchwork|APT37|FIN7|APT28
 T1559.001,Component Object Model,Execution,Gamaredon Group|MuddyWater
 T1559,Inter-Process Communication,Execution,no
 T1558.002,Silver Ticket,Credential Access,no
 T1558.001,Golden Ticket,Credential Access,Ke3chang
 T1558,Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets,Credential Access,no
-T1557.001,LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay,Credential Access|Collection,no
+T1557.001,LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay,Credential Access|Collection,Wizard Spider
 T1557,Man-in-the-Middle,Credential Access|Collection,no
 T1556.002,Password Filter DLL,Credential Access|Defense Evasion,Strider
-T1556.001,Domain Controller Authentication,Credential Access|Defense Evasion,no
+T1556.001,Domain Controller Authentication,Credential Access|Defense Evasion,Chimera
 T1556,Modify Authentication Process,Credential Access|Defense Evasion,no
 T1056.004,Credential API Hooking,Collection|Credential Access,PLATINUM
 T1056.003,Web Portal Capture,Collection|Credential Access,no
 T1056.002,GUI Input Capture,Collection|Credential Access,FIN4
-T1056.001,Keylogging,Collection|Credential Access,APT32|Sandworm Team|APT39|APT41|Kimsuky|menuPass|Stolen Pencil|FIN4|APT38|Ke3chang|OilRig|PLATINUM|Sowbug|Magic Hound|Group5|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT3|Darkhotel|APT28
-T1555,Credentials from Password Stores,Credential Access,APT39|OilRig|MuddyWater|Leafminer|APT33|Turla|Stealth Falcon
+T1056.001,Keylogging,Collection|Credential Access,APT32|Sandworm Team|APT39|APT41|Kimsuky|menuPass|Stolen Pencil|FIN4|APT38|OilRig|Ke3chang|PLATINUM|Sowbug|Magic Hound|Group5|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT3|Darkhotel|APT28
+T1555,Credentials from Password Stores,Credential Access,UNC2452|FIN6|APT39|OilRig|MuddyWater|Leafminer|APT33|Turla|Stealth Falcon
 T1552.005,Cloud Instance Metadata API,Credential Access,no
 T1003.008,/etc/passwd and /etc/shadow,Credential Access,no
 T1003.007,Proc Filesystem,Credential Access,no
-T1003.006,DCSync,Credential Access,no
-T1558.003,Kerberoasting,Credential Access,no
+T1003.006,DCSync,Credential Access,UNC2452
+T1558.003,Kerberoasting,Credential Access,UNC2452|Wizard Spider
 T1552.006,Group Policy Preferences,Credential Access,APT33
-T1003.003,NTDS,Credential Access,FIN6|Dragonfly 2.0
-T1003.002,Security Account Manager,Credential Access,Threat Group-3390|Ke3chang|Soft Cell|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|menuPass
-T1003.001,LSASS Memory,Credential Access,Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Blue Mockingbird|Silence|Threat Group-3390|Leviathan|APT41|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|Stolen Pencil|APT32|Lazarus Group|Leafminer|Magic Hound|MuddyWater|PLATINUM|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|OilRig|FIN6|APT3|APT28|APT1|Ke3chang|Cleaver
+T1003.003,NTDS,Credential Access,Wizard Spider|Chimera|FIN6|Dragonfly 2.0
+T1003.002,Security Account Manager,Credential Access,Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390|Ke3chang|Soft Cell|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|menuPass
+T1003.001,LSASS Memory,Credential Access,Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Blue Mockingbird|Silence|Threat Group-3390|Leviathan|APT41|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|Stolen Pencil|APT32|Leafminer|Lazarus Group|Magic Hound|MuddyWater|FIN8|PLATINUM|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN6|APT3|APT28|APT1|Ke3chang|Cleaver
 T1110.004,Credential Stuffing,Credential Access,no
-T1110.003,Password Spraying,Credential Access,APT33|Leafminer|Lazarus Group
-T1110.002,Password Cracking,Credential Access,APT41|Dragonfly 2.0|APT3
-T1110.001,Password Guessing,Credential Access,no
-T1021.006,Windows Remote Management,Lateral Movement,Threat Group-3390
+T1110.003,Password Spraying,Credential Access,APT28|APT33|Leafminer|Lazarus Group
+T1110.002,Password Cracking,Credential Access,FIN6|APT41|Dragonfly 2.0|APT3
+T1110.001,Password Guessing,Credential Access,APT28
+T1021.006,Windows Remote Management,Lateral Movement,UNC2452|Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390
 T1021.005,VNC,Lateral Movement,GCMAN
 T1021.004,SSH,Lateral Movement,Rocke|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|OilRig|menuPass|GCMAN
 T1021.003,Distributed Component Object Model,Lateral Movement,no
-T1021.002,SMB/Windows Admin Shares,Lateral Movement,Blue Mockingbird|APT39|APT32|Orangeworm|FIN8|APT3|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-1314|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang
-T1021.001,Remote Desktop Protocol,Lateral Movement,Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Stolen Pencil|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|APT3|OilRig|menuPass|FIN10|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|APT1|Axiom
+T1021.002,SMB/Windows Admin Shares,Lateral Movement,Wizard Spider|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|APT39|APT32|Orangeworm|FIN8|APT3|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-1314|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang
+T1021.001,Remote Desktop Protocol,Lateral Movement,Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Stolen Pencil|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|APT3|OilRig|FIN10|menuPass|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|APT1|Axiom
 T1554,Compromise Client Software Binary,Persistence,no
 T1036.006,Space after Filename,Defense Evasion,no
-T1036.005,Match Legitimate Name or Location,Defense Evasion,Rocke|Sandworm Team|APT39|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Silence|APT41|menuPass|TEMP.Veles|MuddyWater|BRONZE BUTLER|Sowbug|APT32|Patchwork|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Carbanak|APT1
-T1036.004,Masquerade Task or Service,Defense Evasion,Wizard Spider|APT-C-36|Carbanak|APT32|FIN6|FIN7
+T1036.005,Match Legitimate Name or Location,Defense Evasion,UNC2452|Chimera|PROMETHIUM|Rocke|Sandworm Team|APT39|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Silence|APT41|menuPass|TEMP.Veles|MuddyWater|BRONZE BUTLER|Sowbug|APT32|Patchwork|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Carbanak|APT1
+T1036.004,Masquerade Task or Service,Defense Evasion,UNC2452|Lazarus Group|PROMETHIUM|Wizard Spider|APT-C-36|Carbanak|APT32|FIN6|FIN7
 T1036.003,Rename System Utilities,Defense Evasion,menuPass|APT32|Soft Cell|PLATINUM
 T1036.002,Right-to-Left Override,Defense Evasion,BRONZE BUTLER|BlackTech|Ke3chang|Scarlet Mimic
-T1036.001,Invalid Code Signature,Defense Evasion,Windshift
+T1036.001,Invalid Code Signature,Defense Evasion,Windshift|APT37
 T1553.003,SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking,Defense Evasion,no
-T1553.002,Code Signing,Defense Evasion,Patchwork|Silence|APT41|FIN6|TA505|FIN7|Honeybee|Leviathan|APT37|CopyKittens|Winnti Group|Suckfly|Molerats|Darkhotel
+T1553.002,Code Signing,Defense Evasion,UNC2452|Wizard Spider|PROMETHIUM|Patchwork|Silence|APT41|FIN6|TA505|FIN7|Honeybee|Leviathan|CopyKittens|Winnti Group|Suckfly|Molerats|Darkhotel
 T1553.001,Gatekeeper Bypass,Defense Evasion,no
 T1553,Subvert Trust Controls,Defense Evasion,no
 T1027.003,Steganography,Defense Evasion,BRONZE BUTLER|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|APT37
-T1027.002,Software Packing,Defense Evasion,TA505|Rocke|Soft Cell|The White Company|APT39|APT38|Dark Caracal|Elderwood|APT3|Patchwork|APT29|Night Dragon
-T1027.001,Binary Padding,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|APT32|Leviathan|BRONZE BUTLER|Moafee
+T1027.002,Software Packing,Defense Evasion,Lazarus Group|TA505|Rocke|Soft Cell|The White Company|APT39|APT38|Dark Caracal|Elderwood|APT3|Patchwork|APT29|Night Dragon
+T1027.001,Binary Padding,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|APT32|Patchwork|Leviathan|BRONZE BUTLER|Moafee
 T1222.002,Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification,Defense Evasion,Rocke|APT32
-T1222.001,Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification,Defense Evasion,no
-T1552.004,Private Keys,Credential Access,Rocke
+T1222.001,Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification,Defense Evasion,Wizard Spider
+T1552.004,Private Keys,Credential Access,UNC2452|Rocke
 T1552.003,Bash History,Credential Access,no
 T1552.002,Credentials in Registry,Credential Access,APT32
 T1552.001,Credentials In Files,Credential Access,Leafminer|APT33|OilRig|TA505|Stolen Pencil|MuddyWater|APT3
 T1552,Unsecured Credentials,Credential Access,no
 T1216.001,PubPrn,Defense Evasion,APT32
-T1070.006,Timestomp,Defense Evasion,Rocke|TEMP.Veles|APT32|Lazarus Group|APT28
+T1070.006,Timestomp,Defense Evasion,UNC2452|Rocke|TEMP.Veles|APT32|Lazarus Group|APT28
 T1070.005,Network Share Connection Removal,Defense Evasion,Threat Group-3390
-T1070.004,File Deletion,Defense Evasion,Sandworm Team|Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Wizard Spider|APT41|Kimsuky|Silence|The White Company|TEMP.Veles|APT32|APT38|Patchwork|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|menuPass|FIN8|OilRig|FIN5|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|APT3|FIN10|APT28|Threat Group-3390|Group5|Lazarus Group|APT18|APT29
+T1070.004,File Deletion,Defense Evasion,UNC2452|FIN6|Sandworm Team|Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Wizard Spider|APT41|Kimsuky|Silence|The White Company|TEMP.Veles|APT32|APT38|Honeybee|Patchwork|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|menuPass|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN5|APT3|OilRig|Magic Hound|FIN10|APT28|Threat Group-3390|Group5|Lazarus Group|APT18|APT29
 T1070.003,Clear Command History,Defense Evasion,APT41
-T1550.004,Web Session Cookie,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,no
+T1550.004,Web Session Cookie,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,UNC2452
 T1550.001,Application Access Token,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,APT28
 T1550.003,Pass the Ticket,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|APT29
 T1550.002,Pass the Hash,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,Soft Cell|APT32|Night Dragon|APT28|APT1
-T1550,Use Alternate Authentication Material,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,no
+T1550,Use Alternate Authentication Material,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,UNC2452
 T1548.004,Elevated Execution with Prompt,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
 T1548.003,Sudo and Sudo Caching,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
-T1548.002,Bypass User Access Control,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,APT37|MuddyWater|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|Threat Group-3390|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork|APT29
+T1548.002,Bypass User Account Control,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,APT37|MuddyWater|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|Threat Group-3390|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork|APT29
 T1548.001,Setuid and Setgid,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
 T1548,Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
 T1136.003,Cloud Account,Persistence,no
 T1070.002,Clear Linux or Mac System Logs,Defense Evasion,Rocke
 T1070.001,Clear Windows Event Logs,Defense Evasion,APT41|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|APT32|FIN8|FIN5|APT28
 T1136.002,Domain Account,Persistence,Soft Cell
-T1136.001,Local Account,Persistence,APT39|APT41|Dragonfly 2.0|Leafminer|APT3
+T1136.001,Local Account,Persistence,APT39|APT41|Leafminer|Dragonfly 2.0|APT3
 T1547.011,Plist Modification,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
 T1547.010,Port Monitors,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
 T1547.009,Shortcut Modification,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,APT39|Darkhotel|APT29|Gorgon Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Leviathan|Lazarus Group
 T1547.008,LSASS Driver,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
 T1547.007,Re-opened Applications,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
 T1547.006,Kernel Modules and Extensions,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
-T1547.005,Security Support Provider,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
-T1547.004,Winlogon Helper DLL,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Tropic Trooper|Turla
+T1547.005,Security Support Provider,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Lazarus Group
+T1547.004,Winlogon Helper DLL,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Wizard Spider|Tropic Trooper|Turla
 T1547.003,Time Providers,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
 T1546.014,Emond,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
 T1546.013,PowerShell Profile,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,Turla
@@ -244,30 +346,30 @@ T1546.007,Netsh Helper DLL,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
 T1546.006,LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
 T1546.005,Trap,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
 T1546.004,.bash_profile and .bashrc,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
-T1546.003,Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,APT33|Blue Mockingbird|Turla|Leviathan|APT29
+T1546.003,Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,UNC2452|APT33|Blue Mockingbird|Turla|Leviathan|APT29
 T1546.002,Screensaver,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
 T1546.001,Change Default File Association,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,Kimsuky
-T1547.001,Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Silence|RTM|Inception|APT41|Machete|Kimsuky|APT33|APT39|APT32|APT18|Turla|Dark Caracal|Cobalt Group|Honeybee|Threat Group-3390|Dragonfly 2.0|Gorgon Group|Ke3chang|APT19|Leviathan|MuddyWater|APT37|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|APT3|FIN10|FIN7|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT29|Darkhotel
+T1547.001,Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Wizard Spider|PROMETHIUM|Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Silence|RTM|Inception|APT41|Machete|Kimsuky|APT33|APT39|APT32|APT18|Turla|Dark Caracal|Cobalt Group|Honeybee|APT19|Ke3chang|Threat Group-3390|Dragonfly 2.0|Gorgon Group|MuddyWater|APT37|Leviathan|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|APT3|FIN10|FIN7|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT29|Darkhotel
 T1218.002,Control Panel,Defense Evasion,no
-T1218.010,Regsvr32,Defense Evasion,Blue Mockingbird|Inception|WIRTE|Cobalt Group|APT19|Leviathan|APT32|Deep Panda
+T1218.010,Regsvr32,Defense Evasion,Blue Mockingbird|Inception|WIRTE|APT19|Cobalt Group|Leviathan|APT32|Deep Panda
 T1218.009,Regsvcs/Regasm,Defense Evasion,no
-T1218.005,Mshta,Defense Evasion,Inception|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|FIN7
-T1218.004,InstallUtil,Defense Evasion,no
-T1218.001,Compiled HTML File,Defense Evasion,APT41|Silence|Lazarus Group|Dark Caracal|OilRig
+T1218.005,Mshta,Defense Evasion,Lazarus Group|Inception|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|FIN7
+T1218.004,InstallUtil,Defense Evasion,menuPass
+T1218.001,Compiled HTML File,Defense Evasion,APT41|Silence|OilRig|Lazarus Group|Dark Caracal
 T1218.003,CMSTP,Defense Evasion,Cobalt Group|MuddyWater
-T1218.011,Rundll32,Defense Evasion,APT32|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|TA505|MuddyWater|APT29|APT19|CopyKittens|APT3|Carbanak|APT28
+T1218.011,Rundll32,Defense Evasion,UNC2452|Gamaredon Group|APT32|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|TA505|MuddyWater|APT29|APT19|CopyKittens|APT3|Carbanak|APT28
 T1547,Boot or Logon Autostart Execution,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
 T1546,Event Triggered Execution,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
 T1098.003,Add Office 365 Global Administrator Role,Persistence,no
-T1098.002,Exchange Email Delegate Permissions,Persistence,Magic Hound
-T1098.001,Additional Azure Service Principal Credentials,Persistence,no
+T1098.002,Exchange Email Delegate Permissions,Persistence,UNC2452|Magic Hound
+T1098.001,Additional Cloud Credentials,Persistence,UNC2452
 T1543.004,Launch Daemon,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
-T1543.003,Windows Service,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Blue Mockingbird|DarkVishnya|Wizard Spider|APT32|APT41|Kimsuky|Tropic Trooper|Cobalt Group|Ke3chang|Honeybee|FIN7|Threat Group-3390|APT19|APT3|Lazarus Group|Carbanak
+T1543.003,Windows Service,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,PROMETHIUM|Blue Mockingbird|DarkVishnya|Wizard Spider|APT32|APT41|Kimsuky|Tropic Trooper|Threat Group-3390|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|Ke3chang|FIN7|APT19|APT3|Lazarus Group|Carbanak
 T1543.002,Systemd Service,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Rocke
 T1543.001,Launch Agent,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
 T1037.005,Startup Items,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
 T1037.004,Rc.common,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
-T1055.012,Process Hollowing,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Gorgon Group|Patchwork
+T1055.012,Process Hollowing,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,menuPass|Gorgon Group|Threat Group-3390|Patchwork
 T1055.013,Process Doppelgänging,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Leafminer
 T1055.011,Extra Window Memory Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
 T1055.014,VDSO Hijacking,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
@@ -277,7 +379,7 @@ T1055.005,Thread Local Storage,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
 T1055.004,Asynchronous Procedure Call,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
 T1055.003,Thread Execution Hijacking,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
 T1055.002,Portable Executable Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Rocke|Gorgon Group
-T1055.001,Dynamic-link Library Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,TA505|Turla|Tropic Trooper|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda
+T1055.001,Dynamic-link Library Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Wizard Spider|TA505|Turla|Tropic Trooper|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda
 T1037.003,Network Logon Script,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
 T1543,Create or Modify System Process,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
 T1037.002,Logon Script (Mac),Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
@@ -291,7 +393,7 @@ T1505.001,SQL Stored Procedures,Persistence,no
 T1053.003,Cron,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Rocke
 T1053.004,Launchd,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
 T1053.001,At (Linux),Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
-T1053.005,Scheduled Task,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT-C-36|BRONZE BUTLER|APT41|Machete|Soft Cell|Silence|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|Patchwork|OilRig|Rancor|Cobalt Group|FIN8|menuPass|FIN10|APT32|FIN7|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|APT3|APT29
+T1053.005,Scheduled Task,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,UNC2452|Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT-C-36|BRONZE BUTLER|APT41|Machete|Soft Cell|Silence|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|Cobalt Group|OilRig|Rancor|Dragonfly 2.0|Patchwork|FIN8|FIN7|APT32|menuPass|FIN10|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|APT3|APT29
 T1053.002,At (Windows),Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,BRONZE BUTLER|Threat Group-3390|APT18
 T1542,Pre-OS Boot,Defense Evasion|Persistence,no
 T1137.001,Office Template Macros,Persistence,MuddyWater
@@ -316,52 +418,52 @@ T1526,Cloud Service Discovery,Discovery,no
 T1505,Server Software Component,Persistence,no
 T1499,Endpoint Denial of Service,Impact,no
 T1497,Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion,Defense Evasion|Discovery,no
-T1498,Network Denial of Service,Impact,no
+T1498,Network Denial of Service,Impact,APT28
 T1496,Resource Hijacking,Impact,Blue Mockingbird|Rocke|APT41|Lazarus Group
 T1495,Firmware Corruption,Impact,no
 T1491,Defacement,Impact,no
 T1490,Inhibit System Recovery,Impact,no
-T1489,Service Stop,Impact,Lazarus Group
+T1489,Service Stop,Impact,Wizard Spider|Lazarus Group
 T1486,Data Encrypted for Impact,Impact,APT41|TA505|APT38
 T1485,Data Destruction,Impact,Sandworm Team|Lazarus Group|APT38
-T1484,Group Policy Modification,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
-T1482,Domain Trust Discovery,Discovery,Wizard Spider
+T1484,Domain Policy Modification,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
+T1482,Domain Trust Discovery,Discovery,UNC2452|Wizard Spider
 T1480,Execution Guardrails,Defense Evasion,no
+T1220,XSL Script Processing,Defense Evasion,Cobalt Group
 T1222,File and Directory Permissions Modification,Defense Evasion,no
 T1221,Template Injection,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|Frankenstein|Inception|APT28|Tropic Trooper|Dragonfly 2.0|DarkHydrus
-T1220,XSL Script Processing,Defense Evasion,Cobalt Group
-T1197,BITS Jobs,Defense Evasion|Persistence,Patchwork|APT41|Leviathan
-T1217,Browser Bookmark Discovery,Discovery,no
-T1213,Data from Information Repositories,Collection,Turla
-T1189,Drive-by Compromise,Initial Access,Turla|Windshift|RTM|Darkhotel|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|BRONZE BUTLER|Leafminer|Dark Caracal|APT19|APT32|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|Elderwood|APT37|Patchwork|PLATINUM
-T1203,Exploitation for Client Execution,Execution,Sandworm Team|MuddyWater|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT41|admin@338|Threat Group-3390|APT12|The White Company|APT33|APT32|APT28|Tropic Trooper|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Cobalt Group|APT37|Patchwork|Leviathan|Elderwood|TA459|APT29
-T1212,Exploitation for Credential Access,Credential Access,no
-T1211,Exploitation for Defense Evasion,Defense Evasion,APT28
-T1190,Exploit Public-Facing Application,Initial Access,Blue Mockingbird|Rocke|APT39|BlackTech|APT41|Soft Cell|Night Dragon|Axiom
-T1210,Exploitation of Remote Services,Lateral Movement,Threat Group-3390|APT28
-T1202,Indirect Command Execution,Defense Evasion,no
+T1203,Exploitation for Client Execution,Execution,Sandworm Team|MuddyWater|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT41|admin@338|Threat Group-3390|APT12|The White Company|APT33|APT32|APT28|Tropic Trooper|BRONZE BUTLER|Lazarus Group|Cobalt Group|APT29|Patchwork|Leviathan|APT37|Elderwood|TA459
 T1200,Hardware Additions,Initial Access,DarkVishnya
-T1201,Password Policy Discovery,Discovery,Turla|OilRig
-T1219,Remote Access Software,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|DarkVishnya|RTM|Kimsuky|Night Dragon|Thrip|Cobalt Group|Carbanak
+T1202,Indirect Command Execution,Defense Evasion,no
+T1213,Data from Information Repositories,Collection,FIN6|Turla
 T1207,Rogue Domain Controller,Defense Evasion,no
-T1199,Trusted Relationship,Initial Access,APT28|menuPass
-T1218,Signed Binary Proxy Execution,Defense Evasion,no
 T1204,User Execution,Execution,no
-T1216,Signed Script Proxy Execution,Defense Evasion,no
+T1217,Browser Bookmark Discovery,Discovery,no
+T1190,Exploit Public-Facing Application,Initial Access,UNC2452|APT28|APT29|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Blue Mockingbird|Rocke|APT39|BlackTech|APT41|Soft Cell|Night Dragon|Axiom
+T1210,Exploitation of Remote Services,Lateral Movement,Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390|APT28
+T1197,BITS Jobs,Defense Evasion|Persistence,Patchwork|APT41|Leviathan
+T1201,Password Policy Discovery,Discovery,Turla|OilRig
 T1195,Supply Chain Compromise,Initial Access,Elderwood
 T1205,Traffic Signaling,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Command And Control,no
+T1189,Drive-by Compromise,Initial Access,Dragonfly|PROMETHIUM|Turla|Windshift|RTM|Darkhotel|APT38|Lazarus Group|APT32|Dark Caracal|Dragonfly 2.0|BRONZE BUTLER|Leafminer|APT19|Threat Group-3390|APT37|Patchwork|PLATINUM|Elderwood
+T1212,Exploitation for Credential Access,Credential Access,no
+T1219,Remote Access Software,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|DarkVishnya|RTM|Kimsuky|Night Dragon|Thrip|Cobalt Group|Carbanak
+T1211,Exploitation for Defense Evasion,Defense Evasion,APT28
+T1218,Signed Binary Proxy Execution,Defense Evasion,no
+T1216,Signed Script Proxy Execution,Defense Evasion,no
+T1199,Trusted Relationship,Initial Access,GOLD SOUTHFIELD|APT28|menuPass
 T1176,Browser Extensions,Persistence,Kimsuky|Stolen Pencil
 T1175,Component Object Model and Distributed COM,Lateral Movement|Execution,no
-T1187,Forced Authentication,Credential Access,DarkHydrus|Dragonfly 2.0
 T1185,Man in the Browser,Collection,no
-T1134,Access Token Manipulation,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Blue Mockingbird
-T1136,Create Account,Persistence,no
-T1140,Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information,Defense Evasion,Rocke|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Molerats|Frankenstein|Turla|WIRTE|Darkhotel|Tropic Trooper|menuPass|Honeybee|Threat Group-3390|APT19|Gorgon Group|Leviathan|MuddyWater|APT28|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER
+T1187,Forced Authentication,Credential Access,Dragonfly 2.0|DarkHydrus
 T1149,LC_MAIN Hijacking,Defense Evasion,no
-T1135,Network Share Discovery,Discovery,APT32|APT39|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT1|Dragonfly 2.0|Sowbug
+T1136,Create Account,Persistence,no
+T1134,Access Token Manipulation,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,FIN6|Blue Mockingbird
+T1135,Network Share Discovery,Discovery,Wizard Spider|APT32|APT39|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT1|Dragonfly 2.0|Sowbug
+T1140,Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information,Defense Evasion,UNC2452|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Molerats|Frankenstein|Turla|WIRTE|Darkhotel|Tropic Trooper|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|Gorgon Group|APT19|Honeybee|Leviathan|MuddyWater|APT28|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER
 T1137,Office Application Startup,Persistence,Gamaredon Group|APT32
 T1153,Source,Execution,no
-T1133,External Remote Services,Persistence|Initial Access,Sandworm Team|APT41|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|Night Dragon|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|Ke3chang|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|APT18
+T1133,External Remote Services,Persistence|Initial Access,Wizard Spider|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Chimera|Sandworm Team|APT41|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|Night Dragon|Ke3chang|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|APT18
 T1132,Data Encoding,Command And Control,no
 T1129,Shared Modules,Execution,no
 T1127,Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution,Defense Evasion,no
@@ -369,72 +471,72 @@ T1125,Video Capture,Collection,Silence|FIN7
 T1124,System Time Discovery,Discovery,The White Company|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Turla
 T1123,Audio Capture,Collection,APT37
 T1120,Peripheral Device Discovery,Discovery,Turla|APT37|Gamaredon Group|Equation|APT28
-T1119,Automated Collection,Collection,Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT1|APT28|Patchwork|OilRig|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|FIN6
+T1119,Automated Collection,Collection,Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT1|APT28|Patchwork|FIN5|OilRig|Threat Group-3390|FIN6
 T1115,Clipboard Data,Collection,APT39|APT38
 T1114,Email Collection,Collection,no
-T1113,Screen Capture,Collection,Gamaredon Group|APT39|Silence|MuddyWater|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|Dark Caracal|FIN7|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|Group5|APT28
-T1112,Modify Registry,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|Turla|APT32|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|Threat Group-3390|Honeybee|Patchwork|Gorgon Group|FIN8
+T1113,Screen Capture,Collection,Gamaredon Group|APT39|Silence|MuddyWater|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN7|Dark Caracal|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|Group5|APT28
+T1112,Modify Registry,Defense Evasion,Lazarus Group|Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|Turla|APT32|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|Patchwork|APT19|Gorgon Group|Threat Group-3390|Honeybee|FIN8
 T1111,Two-Factor Authentication Interception,Credential Access,no
 T1110,Brute Force,Credential Access,DarkVishnya|APT39|OilRig|FIN5|Turla
 T1108,Redundant Access,Defense Evasion|Persistence,no
-T1106,Native API,Execution,Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Turla|Silence|Gorgon Group|APT37
-T1105,Ingress Tool Transfer,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Silence|APT-C-36|APT41|Soft Cell|TA505|WIRTE|APT33|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Rancor|Cobalt Group|Turla|Gorgon Group|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|APT37|FIN8|PLATINUM|Leviathan|Elderwood|Magic Hound|APT3|APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN7|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28
+T1106,Native API,Execution,Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Turla|Silence|APT37|Gorgon Group
+T1105,Ingress Tool Transfer,Command And Control,UNC2452|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Silence|APT-C-36|APT41|Soft Cell|TA505|WIRTE|APT33|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Rancor|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|Cobalt Group|Turla|Gorgon Group|APT37|Leviathan|Elderwood|PLATINUM|FIN8|Magic Hound|APT32|APT3|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN7|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28
 T1104,Multi-Stage Channels,Command And Control,APT41|MuddyWater|APT3
-T1102,Web Service,Command And Control,Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Inception|FIN6
+T1102,Web Service,Command And Control,Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Inception|FIN6
 T1098,Account Manipulation,Persistence,APT3|Dragonfly 2.0|Lazarus Group
-T1095,Non-Application Layer Protocol,Command And Control,APT29|PLATINUM|APT3
+T1095,Non-Application Layer Protocol,Command And Control,FIN6|APT29|PLATINUM|APT3
 T1092,Communication Through Removable Media,Command And Control,APT28
 T1091,Replication Through Removable Media,Lateral Movement|Initial Access,Tropic Trooper|Darkhotel|APT28
-T1090,Proxy,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|APT41|Turla
-T1087,Account Discovery,Discovery,no
-T1083,File and Directory Discovery,Discovery,Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Inception|APT41|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|APT18|Leafminer|Honeybee|Dark Caracal|Dragonfly 2.0|Magic Hound|Sowbug|BRONZE BUTLER|APT3|APT28|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
-T1082,System Information Discovery,Discovery,Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|Honeybee|APT19|APT37|APT32|Magic Hound|OilRig|APT3|Sowbug|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
-T1080,Taint Shared Content,Lateral Movement,BRONZE BUTLER|Darkhotel
-T1078,Valid Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|APT39|FIN4|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|Leviathan|APT33|OilRig|FIN5|menuPass|APT28|FIN10|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390|APT18|PittyTiger|Carbanak
+T1090,Proxy,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|APT41|Turla
+T1087,Account Discovery,Discovery,UNC2452
+T1083,File and Directory Discovery,Discovery,UNC2452|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Inception|APT41|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|APT18|Dragonfly 2.0|Leafminer|Honeybee|Dark Caracal|APT3|BRONZE BUTLER|Sowbug|Magic Hound|APT28|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
+T1082,System Information Discovery,Discovery,UNC2452|Wizard Spider|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|APT37|Honeybee|APT19|APT32|Magic Hound|Sowbug|OilRig|APT3|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
+T1080,Taint Shared Content,Lateral Movement,Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Darkhotel
+T1078,Valid Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,UNC2452|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|APT39|FIN4|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|Leviathan|APT33|FIN8|FIN5|OilRig|APT28|FIN10|menuPass|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390|APT18|PittyTiger|Carbanak
 T1074,Data Staged,Collection,Wizard Spider
 T1072,Software Deployment Tools,Execution|Lateral Movement,Silence|APT32|Threat Group-1314
 T1071,Application Layer Protocol,Command And Control,Rocke|Magic Hound|Dragonfly 2.0
-T1070,Indicator Removal on Host,Defense Evasion,no
-T1069,Permission Groups Discovery,Discovery,TA505|APT3
+T1070,Indicator Removal on Host,Defense Evasion,UNC2452
+T1069,Permission Groups Discovery,Discovery,UNC2452|TA505|APT3
 T1068,Exploitation for Privilege Escalation,Privilege Escalation,Whitefly|APT33|Cobalt Group|PLATINUM|FIN8|APT32|Threat Group-3390|FIN6|APT28
 T1064,Scripting,Defense Evasion|Execution,no
 T1062,Hypervisor,Persistence,no
 T1061,Graphical User Interface,Execution,no
-T1059,Command and Scripting Interpreter,Execution,APT32|Molerats|Whitefly|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|FIN7|OilRig|FIN5|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Ke3chang
-T1057,Process Discovery,Discovery,Rocke|Frankenstein|Inception|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|APT38|Tropic Trooper|APT37|Honeybee|OilRig|APT3|Magic Hound|APT28|Winnti Group|Stealth Falcon|Poseidon Group|Lazarus Group|Molerats|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang
+T1059,Command and Scripting Interpreter,Execution,APT32|Molerats|Whitefly|APT39|APT19|FIN7|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|FIN5|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Ke3chang
+T1057,Process Discovery,Discovery,UNC2452|Rocke|Frankenstein|Inception|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|APT38|Tropic Trooper|APT37|Honeybee|OilRig|APT3|Magic Hound|APT28|Winnti Group|Stealth Falcon|Poseidon Group|Lazarus Group|Molerats|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang
 T1056,Input Capture,Collection|Credential Access,no
-T1055,Process Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,APT32|Sharpshooter|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|Turla|Cobalt Group|APT37|Honeybee|PLATINUM
+T1055,Process Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,APT32|Sharpshooter|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|Cobalt Group|APT37|Turla|Honeybee|PLATINUM
 T1053,Scheduled Task/Job,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
 T1052,Exfiltration Over Physical Medium,Exfiltration,no
 T1051,Shared Webroot,Lateral Movement,no
-T1049,System Network Connections Discovery,Discovery,Tropic Trooper|APT41|APT38|Soft Cell|APT32|APT1|OilRig|APT3|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
+T1049,System Network Connections Discovery,Discovery,Tropic Trooper|APT41|APT38|Soft Cell|APT32|APT1|OilRig|APT3|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
 T1048,Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol,Exfiltration,no
-T1047,Windows Management Instrumentation,Execution,Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT41|FIN6|Soft Cell|APT32|MuddyWater|OilRig|Threat Group-3390|FIN8|Leviathan|menuPass|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT29|Deep Panda
-T1046,Network Service Scanning,Discovery,Rocke|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT39|APT32|Leafminer|OilRig|Cobalt Group|menuPass|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390
-T1043,Commonly Used Port,Command And Control,Machete|OilRig|APT28|TEMP.Veles|Night Dragon|APT29|APT18|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN7|FIN8|APT37|Magic Hound|APT3|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390
+T1047,Windows Management Instrumentation,Execution,UNC2452|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT41|FIN6|Soft Cell|APT32|MuddyWater|OilRig|Threat Group-3390|FIN8|Leviathan|menuPass|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT29|Deep Panda
+T1046,Network Service Scanning,Discovery,Rocke|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT39|APT32|Cobalt Group|Leafminer|OilRig|menuPass|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390
+T1043,Commonly Used Port,Command And Control,OilRig|APT28|TEMP.Veles|Night Dragon|APT29|APT18|FIN7|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|FIN8|APT37|APT3|Magic Hound|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390
 T1041,Exfiltration Over C2 Channel,Exfiltration,Sandworm Team|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Kimsuky|Soft Cell|APT32|APT3|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Ke3chang
 T1040,Network Sniffing,Credential Access|Discovery,Sandworm Team|DarkVishnya|APT33|Stolen Pencil|APT28
-T1039,Data from Network Shared Drive,Collection,Sowbug|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass
+T1039,Data from Network Shared Drive,Collection,Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Sowbug|menuPass
 T1037,Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Rocke
-T1036,Masquerading,Defense Evasion,Windshift|APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|Dragonfly 2.0
+T1036,Masquerading,Defense Evasion,UNC2452|Windshift|APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|Dragonfly 2.0
 T1034,Path Interception,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
-T1033,System Owner/User Discovery,Discovery,Frankenstein|APT41|Soft Cell|Tropic Trooper|APT39|MuddyWater|APT32|APT37|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|Magic Hound|FIN10|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3
+T1033,System Owner/User Discovery,Discovery,Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT41|Soft Cell|Tropic Trooper|APT39|MuddyWater|APT32|APT37|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|Magic Hound|FIN10|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3
 T1030,Data Transfer Size Limits,Exfiltration,Threat Group-3390
 T1029,Scheduled Transfer,Exfiltration,no
-T1027,Obfuscated Files or Information,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|APT41|Machete|Soft Cell|Turla|TA505|Silence|APT33|Night Dragon|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|APT29|APT18|Tropic Trooper|Cobalt Group|Patchwork|Leafminer|APT37|Threat Group-3390|Honeybee|Dark Caracal|menuPass|APT19|BlackOasis|FIN8|Leviathan|Elderwood|MuddyWater|FIN7|Magic Hound|OilRig|APT3|APT32|Group5|Dust Storm|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT28
+T1027,Obfuscated Files or Information,Defense Evasion,UNC2452|FIN6|Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|APT41|Machete|Soft Cell|Turla|TA505|Silence|APT33|Night Dragon|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|APT29|APT18|Tropic Trooper|menuPass|Honeybee|Patchwork|Threat Group-3390|APT19|Cobalt Group|Leafminer|APT37|Dark Caracal|FIN8|MuddyWater|FIN7|BlackOasis|Leviathan|Elderwood|OilRig|Magic Hound|APT3|APT32|Group5|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|Putter Panda|APT28
 T1026,Multiband Communication,Command And Control,Lazarus Group
 T1025,Data from Removable Media,Collection,Machete|Turla|Gamaredon Group|APT28
 T1021,Remote Services,Lateral Movement,no
-T1020,Automated Exfiltration,Exfiltration,Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Honeybee
-T1018,Remote System Discovery,Discovery,Sandworm Team|Rocke|Wizard Spider|Silence|Soft Cell|APT39|APT32|Deep Panda|Threat Group-3390|Dragonfly 2.0|Leafminer|Ke3chang|FIN8|APT3|FIN5|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN6|Turla
-T1016,System Network Configuration Discovery,Discovery,Sandworm Team|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT41|Soft Cell|APT32|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|Magic Hound|OilRig|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3|Naikon|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
+T1020,Automated Exfiltration,Exfiltration,Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Honeybee
+T1018,Remote System Discovery,Discovery,UNC2452|Sandworm Team|Rocke|Wizard Spider|Silence|Soft Cell|APT39|APT32|Threat Group-3390|Dragonfly 2.0|Ke3chang|Leafminer|Deep Panda|FIN8|FIN5|APT3|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN6|Turla
+T1016,System Network Configuration Discovery,Discovery,Wizard Spider|Sandworm Team|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT41|Soft Cell|APT32|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|OilRig|Magic Hound|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3|Naikon|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
 T1014,Rootkit,Defense Evasion,Rocke|APT41|APT28|Winnti Group
-T1012,Query Registry,Discovery,APT32|Dragonfly 2.0|Threat Group-3390|OilRig|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Turla
+T1012,Query Registry,Discovery,APT32|Threat Group-3390|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Turla
 T1011,Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium,Exfiltration,no
 T1010,Application Window Discovery,Discovery,Lazarus Group
 T1008,Fallback Channels,Command And Control,APT41|OilRig|Lazarus Group
 T1007,System Service Discovery,Discovery,BRONZE BUTLER|APT1|OilRig|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
 T1006,Direct Volume Access,Defense Evasion,no
-T1005,Data from Local System,Collection,Gamaredon Group|APT39|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|Soft Cell|Turla|menuPass|Dark Caracal|Dragonfly 2.0|Honeybee|APT37|APT28|APT3|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|Threat Group-3390|APT1|Ke3chang
+T1005,Data from Local System,Collection,UNC2452|FIN6|Gamaredon Group|APT39|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|Soft Cell|Turla|menuPass|Dark Caracal|Dragonfly 2.0|Honeybee|APT28|APT37|APT3|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|Threat Group-3390|APT1|Ke3chang
 T1003,OS Credential Dumping,Credential Access,APT39|Frankenstein|APT32|APT28|Leviathan|Sowbug|Suckfly|Poseidon Group|Axiom
 T1001,Data Obfuscation,Command And Control,Axiom

tests/endpoint/malicious_powershell_executed_as_a_service.test.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+name: Malicious Powershell Executed As A Service Unit Test
+tests:
+- name: Malicious Powershell Executed As A Service
+  file: endpoint/malicious_powershell_executed_as_a_service.yml
+  pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0'
+  earliest_time: '-24h'
+  latest_time: 'now'
+  attack_data:
+  - file_name: windows-system.log
+    data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1569.002/atomic_red_team/windows-system.log
+    source: WinEventLog:System
+    sourcetype: WinEventLog