Merge branch 'develop' into issue_3131

detections/deprecated/windows_lateral_tool_transfer_remcom.yml

@@ -1,15 +1,15 @@
 name: Windows Lateral Tool Transfer RemCom
 id: e373a840-5bdc-47ef-b2fd-9cc7aaf387f0
-version: 4
-date: '2024-09-30'
+version: 5
+date: '2024-12-10'
 author: Michael Haag, Splunk
 type: TTP
-status: production
+status: deprecated
 data_source:
 - Sysmon EventID 1
 - Windows Event Log Security 4688
 - CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
-description: The following analytic identifies the execution of RemCom.exe, an open-source alternative to PsExec, used for lateral movement and remote command execution. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names, original file names, and command-line arguments. This activity is significant as it indicates potential lateral movement within the network. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute commands remotely, potentially leading to further compromise and control over additional systems within the network.
+description: NOTE - This search is deprecated in favor of `Windows Service Execution RemCom` as the latter is a more accurate name for the detection. The following analytic identifies the execution of RemCom.exe, an open-source alternative to PsExec, used for lateral movement and remote command execution. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names, original file names, and command-line arguments. This activity is significant as it indicates potential lateral movement within the network. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute commands remotely, potentially leading to further compromise and control over additional systems within the network.
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=remcom.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RemCom.exe) Processes.process="*\\*" Processes.process IN ("*/user:*", "*/pwd:*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_lateral_tool_transfer_remcom_filter`'
 how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
 known_false_positives: False positives may be present based on Administrative use. Filter as needed.

detections/endpoint/create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe.yml

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 name: Create or delete windows shares using net exe
 id: 743a322c-9a68-4a0f-9c17-85d9cce2a27c
-version: 9
-date: '2024-09-30'
+version: 10
+date: '2024-12-12'
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 status: production
 type: TTP
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ data_source:
 - Sysmon EventID 1
 - Windows Event Log Security 4688
 - CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
-search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.user) as user values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` by Processes.process Processes.process_name  Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search process=*share* | `create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe_filter`'
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.user) as user values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` by Processes.process Processes.process_name  Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search process IN ("*share* /delete*", "*share* /REMARK:*", "*share* /CACHE:*") | `create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe_filter`'
 how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
 known_false_positives: Administrators often leverage net.exe to create or delete network shares. You should verify that the activity was intentional and is legitimate.
 references:

detections/endpoint/detect_new_local_admin_account.yml

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 name: Detect New Local Admin account
 id: b25f6f62-0712-43c1-b203-083231ffd97d
-version: 5
-date: '2024-09-30'
+version: 6
+date: '2024-12-12'
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 status: production
 type: TTP
@@ -9,7 +9,13 @@ description: The following analytic detects the creation of new accounts elevate
 data_source:
 - Windows Event Log Security 4732
 - Windows Event Log Security 4720
-search: '`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4720 OR (EventCode=4732 Group_Name=Administrators) | transaction src_user connected=false maxspan=180m | rename src_user as user | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by user dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_new_local_admin_account_filter`'
+search: '`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4720 OR (EventCode=4732 Group_Name=Administrators) 
+| transaction user dest connected=false maxspan=180m 
+| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime dc(EventCode) as distinct_eventcodes by src_user user dest
+| where distinct_eventcodes>1
+| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` 
+| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
+| `detect_new_local_admin_account_filter`'
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting Windows event logs using the Splunk Windows TA and collecting event code 4720 and 4732
 known_false_positives: The activity may be legitimate. For this reason, it's best to verify the account with an administrator and ask whether there was a valid service request for the account creation. If your local administrator group name is not "Administrators", this search may generate an excessive number of false positives
 references: []

detections/endpoint/windows_service_execution_remcom.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+name: Windows Service Execution RemCom
+id: 7e3d68db-ea4d-419b-adbd-e14a525ecf09
+version: 1
+date: '2024-12-10'
+author: Michael Haag, Splunk
+type: TTP
+status: production
+data_source:
+- Sysmon EventID 1
+- Windows Event Log Security 4688
+- CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
+description: The following analytic identifies the execution of RemCom.exe, an open-source alternative to PsExec, used for lateral movement and remote command execution. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names, original file names, and command-line arguments. This activity is significant as it indicates potential lateral movement within the network. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute commands remotely, potentially leading to further compromise and control over additional systems within the network.
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=remcom.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RemCom.exe) Processes.process="*\\*" Processes.process IN ("*/user:*", "*/pwd:*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_service_execution_remcom_filter`'
+how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
+known_false_positives: False positives may be present based on Administrative use. Filter as needed.
+references:
+- https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/
+- https://github.com/kavika13/RemCom
+drilldown_searches:
+- name: View the detection results for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
+  search: '%original_detection_search% | search  user = "$user$" dest = "$dest$"'
+  earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
+  latest_offset: $info_max_time$
+- name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
+  search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$", "$dest$") starthoursago=168  | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
+  earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
+  latest_offset: $info_max_time$
+tags:
+  analytic_story:
+  - Active Directory Discovery
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  confidence: 50
+  impact: 80
+  message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to move laterally.
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1569.002
+  observable:
+  - name: user
+    type: User
+    role:
+    - Victim
+  - name: dest
+    type: Hostname
+    role:
+    - Victim
+  - name: parent_process_name
+    type: Process
+    role:
+    - Attacker
+  - name: process_name
+    type: Process
+    role:
+    - Attacker
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  required_fields:
+  - _time
+  - Processes.dest
+  - Processes.user
+  - Processes.parent_process_name
+  - Processes.parent_process
+  - Processes.original_file_name
+  - Processes.process_name
+  - Processes.process
+  - Processes.process_id
+  - Processes.parent_process_path
+  - Processes.process_path
+  - Processes.parent_process_id
+  risk_score: 40
+  security_domain: endpoint
+tests:
+- name: True Positive Test
+  attack_data:
+  - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1569.002/remcom/remcom_windows-sysmon.log
+    source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
+    sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog