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@@ -7,10 +7,10 @@ type: TTP
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datamodel:
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- Endpoint
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description: This analytic is developed to detect suspicious registry modification
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to change the default file association of windows to malicious payload. This techninique
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to change the default file association of windows to malicious payload. This technique
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was seen in some APT where it modify the default process to run file association,
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like .txt to notepad.exe. Instead notepad.exe it will point to a Script or other
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payload that will load malicious command to the compromised host.
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payload that will load malicious commands to the compromised host.
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search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
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max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path
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="*\\shell\\open\\command\\*" Registry.registry_path = "*HKCR\\*" by Registry.dest Registry.user
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@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ tags:
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- Windows Privilege Escalation
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- Windows Registry Abuse
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- Hermetic Wiper
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- Prestige Ransomware
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confidence: 100
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context:
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- Source:Endpoint
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@@ -27,6 +27,8 @@ tags:
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analytic_story:
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- Hidden Cobra Malware
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- CISA AA22-277A
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- Windows Post-Exploitation
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- Prestige Ransomware
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asset_type: Endpoint
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cis20:
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- CIS 8
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@@ -25,6 +25,8 @@ references:
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tags:
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analytic_story:
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- Active Directory Discovery
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- Windows Post-Exploitation
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- Prestige Ransomware
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confidence: 50
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context:
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- Source:Endpoint
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@@ -28,6 +28,8 @@ tags:
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analytic_story:
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- XMRig
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- Azorult
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- Windows Post-Exploitation
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- Prestige Ransomware
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confidence: 100
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context:
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- Source:Endpoint
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@@ -29,6 +29,8 @@ tags:
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- XMRig
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- Ransomware
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- Azorult
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- Windows Post-Exploitation
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- Prestige Ransomware
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confidence: 70
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context:
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- Source:Endpoint
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@@ -30,6 +30,8 @@ tags:
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- Active Directory Discovery
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- Windows Discovery Techniques
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- Azorult
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- Windows Post-Exploitation
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- Prestige Ransomware
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confidence: 50
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context:
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- Source:Endpoint
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@@ -25,6 +25,8 @@ tags:
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analytic_story:
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- Active Directory Discovery
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- Qakbot
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- Windows Post-Exploitation
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- Prestige Ransomware
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confidence: 50
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context:
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- Source:Endpoint
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@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@ tags:
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analytic_story:
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- Active Directory Discovery
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- Azorult
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- Windows Post-Exploitation
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- Prestige Ransomware
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confidence: 50
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context:
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- Source:Endpoint
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@@ -27,6 +27,8 @@ tags:
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- Active Directory Discovery
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- Qakbot
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- CISA AA22-277A
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- Windows Post-Exploitation
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- Prestige Ransomware
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confidence: 50
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context:
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- Source:Endpoint
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@@ -30,6 +30,8 @@ tags:
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- Active Directory Discovery
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- Qakbot
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- CISA AA22-277A
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- Windows Post-Exploitation
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- Prestige Ransomware
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confidence: 30
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context:
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- Source:Endpoint
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@@ -35,6 +35,8 @@ tags:
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- Ransomware
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- Malicious PowerShell
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- Qakbot
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- Windows Post-Exploitation
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- Prestige Ransomware
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confidence: 80
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context:
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- Source:Endpoint
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@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
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name: Windows Change Default File Association For No File Ext
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id: dbdf52ad-d6a1-4b68-975f-0a10939d8e38
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version: 1
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date: '2022-11-30'
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author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
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type: TTP
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datamodel:
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- Endpoint
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description: This analytic is developed to detect suspicious process commandline
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to change or set the default file association of a file without file extension with notepad.exe. This technique
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was seen in some APT and ransomware Prestige where it set/modify the default process to run file association,
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like .txt to notepad.exe.
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search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
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where `process_reg` AND Processes.process="* add *" AND Processes.process="* HKCR\\*" AND Processes.process="*\\shell\\open\\command*" AND Processes.process= *Notepad.exe*
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by Process.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.dest Processes.user
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| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
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| rex field=process "Notepad\.exe (?<file_name_association>.*$)"
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| rex field=file_name_association "\.(?<extension>[^\.]*$)"
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| where isnull(extension) and isnotnull(file_name_association)
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| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
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| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
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| `windows_change_default_file_association_for_no_file_ext_filter`'
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how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data
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that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model
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in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response
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product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data
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used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes
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to the registry.
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known_false_positives: unknown
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references:
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- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/10/14/new-prestige-ransomware-impacts-organizations-in-ukraine-and-poland/
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tags:
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analytic_story:
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- Prestige Ransomware
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asset_type: Endpoint
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cis20:
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- CIS 3
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- CIS 5
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- CIS 16
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confidence: 100
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context:
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- Source:Endpoint
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- Stage:Privilege Escalation
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dataset:
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- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/prestige_ransomware/sysmon.log
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impact: 80
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kill_chain_phases:
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- Exploitation
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message: process with commandline $process$ set or change the file association of a file with no file extension in $dest$
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mitre_attack_id:
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- T1546.001
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- T1546
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nist:
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- DE.CM
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observable:
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- name: dest
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type: Hostname
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role:
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- Victim
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product:
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- Splunk Enterprise
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- Splunk Enterprise Security
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- Splunk Cloud
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required_fields:
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- _time
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- Processes.dest
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- Processes.user
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- Processes.parent_process_name
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- Processes.parent_process
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- Processes.original_file_name
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- Processes.process_name
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- Processes.process
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- Processes.process_id
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- Processes.parent_process_path
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- Processes.process_path
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- Processes.parent_process_id
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risk_score: 80
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security_domain: endpoint
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@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
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name: Windows Change Default File Association For No File Ext Unit Test
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tests:
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- name: Windows Change Default File Association For No File Ext
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file: endpoint/windows_change_default_file_association_for_no_file_ext.yml
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pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0'
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earliest_time: -24h
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latest_time: now
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attack_data:
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- file_name: sysmon.log
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data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/prestige_ransomware/sysmon.log
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source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
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sourcetype: xmlwineventlog
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update_timestamp: true
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