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Merge branch 'fin7' of https://github.com/splunk/security_content into fin7
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@@ -6,21 +6,25 @@ author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
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type: Anomaly
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datamodel:
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- Endpoint
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description: This search is to detect a suspicious MS scripting process such as wscript.exe or cscript.exe that loading wmi module to process
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wmi query. This behavior was seen in FIN7 implant where it uses javascript to execute wmi query to parse host information that will send to its C2
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server. this anomaly detections is a good initial step to hunt further a suspicious wmi query or wmi related events to the host that may
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give you good information regarding process that are commonly using wmi query or modules or might be an attacker using this technique.
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search: '`sysmon` EventCode =7 Image IN ("*\\wscript.exe", "*\\cscript.exe") ImageLoaded IN ("*\\fastprox.dll", "*\\wbemdisp.dll", "*\\wbemprox.dll", "*\\wbemsvc.dll" , "*\\wmiutils.dll", "*\\wbemcomn.dll")
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| stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count
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by Image EventCode process_name ProcessId ProcessGuid Computer ImageLoaded
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| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
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| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
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description: This search is to detect a suspicious MS scripting process such as wscript.exe
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or cscript.exe that loading wmi module to process wmi query. This behavior was seen
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in FIN7 implant where it uses javascript to execute wmi query to parse host information
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that will send to its C2 server. this anomaly detections is a good initial step
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to hunt further a suspicious wmi query or wmi related events to the host that may
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give you good information regarding process that are commonly using wmi query or
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modules or might be an attacker using this technique.
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search: '`sysmon` EventCode =7 Image IN ("*\\wscript.exe", "*\\cscript.exe") ImageLoaded
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IN ("*\\fastprox.dll", "*\\wbemdisp.dll", "*\\wbemprox.dll", "*\\wbemsvc.dll" ,
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"*\\wmiutils.dll", "*\\wbemcomn.dll") | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
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as lastTime count by Image EventCode process_name ProcessId ProcessGuid Computer
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ImageLoaded | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
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| `ms_scripting_process_loading_wmi_module_filter`'
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how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting
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logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your
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endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the
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Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used.
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known_false_positives: automation scripting language may used by network operator to do ldap query.
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known_false_positives: automation scripting language may used by network operator
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to do ldap query.
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references:
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- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/08/fin7-pursuing-an-enigmatic-and-evasive-global-criminal-operation.html
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- https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046/
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@@ -44,14 +48,13 @@ tags:
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- process_name
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- ProcessId
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- ProcessGuid
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- Computer
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- Computer
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- ImageLoaded
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security_domain: endpoint
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impact: 30
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confidence: 30
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# (impact * confidence)/100
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confidence: 30
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risk_score: 9
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context:
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context:
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- Source:Endpoint
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- Stage:Execution
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message: $process_name$ loading wmi modules $ImageLoaded$ in $dest$
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@@ -59,4 +62,5 @@ tags:
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- name: dest
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type: Endpoint
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role:
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- Victim
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- Victim
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automated_detection_testing: passed
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