Branch was auto-updated.

bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/builder/backend_splunk_ba.py

@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ class SplunkBABackend(TextQueryBackend):
     add_escaped : ClassVar[str] = "\\"
 
     re_expression : ClassVar[str] = "match_regex({field}, /(?i){regex}/)=true"
-    re_escape_char : ClassVar[str] = "\\"
+    re_escape_char : ClassVar[str] = ""
     re_escape : ClassVar[Tuple[str]] = ('"',)
 
     cidr_expression : ClassVar[str] = "{value}"

dev_ssa/endpoint/ssa___attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 name: Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe
 id: 14038953-e5f2-4daf-acff-5452062baf03
-version: 2
+version: 3
 date: '2021-11-29'
 author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk
 status: production
@@ -17,12 +17,12 @@ search:
     - cmd.exe
   selection2:
     process.cmd_line|re:
-    - HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System
-    - HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SAM
-    - HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Security
-    - HKLM\System
-    - HKLM\SAM
-    - HKLM\Security
+    - HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\System
+    - HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SAM
+    - HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Security
+    - HKLM\\System
+    - HKLM\\SAM
+    - HKLM\\Security
   selection3:
     process.cmd_line|re: save
   condition: selection1 and (selection2) and selection3

dev_ssa/endpoint/ssa___windows_powershell_connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.yml

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 name: Windows Powershell Connect to Internet With Hidden Window
 id: 477e068e-8b6d-11ec-b6c1-81af21670352
-version: 1
+version: 2
 date: '2022-02-11'
 author: Jose Hernandez, David Dorsey, Michael Haag Splunk
 status: production
@@ -24,9 +24,8 @@ search:
     - sqltoolsps.exe
     - sqlps.exe
     - pwsh.exe
-    - pwsh.exe
   selection2:
-    process.cmd_line|re: (?i)[\-|\/]w(in*d*o*w*s*t*y*l*e*)*\s+[^-]
+    process.cmd_line|re: '[\-|\/]w(in*d*o*w*s*t*y*l*e*)*\s+h(i*d*d*e*n*)\s+'
   condition: selection1 and selection2
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your
   hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be

dist/ssa/srs/ssa___attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 name: Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe
 id: 14038953-e5f2-4daf-acff-5452062baf03
-version: 2
+version: 3
 description: The following analytic identifies the use of `reg.exe` attempting to
   export Windows registry keys that contain hashed credentials. Adversaries will utilize
   this technique to capture and perform offline password cracking.

dist/ssa/srs/ssa___windows_os_credential_dumping_with_ntdsutil_export_ntds.yml

@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@ references:
 - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/cc753343(v=ws.11)
 - https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf
 - https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/vss_ps.dll-97B15BDAE9777F454C9A6BA25E938DB3.html
+- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/05/24/volt-typhoon-targets-us-critical-infrastructure-with-living-off-the-land-techniques/
 tags:
   required_fields:
   - process.pid
@@ -109,6 +110,7 @@ tags:
     - Credential Dumping
     - HAFNIUM Group
     - Living Off The Land
+    - Volt Typhoon
     cis20:
     - CIS 10
     kill_chain_phases:

dist/ssa/srs/ssa___windows_powershell_connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.yml

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 name: Windows Powershell Connect to Internet With Hidden Window
 id: 477e068e-8b6d-11ec-b6c1-81af21670352
-version: 1
+version: 2
 description: The following hunting analytic identifies PowerShell commands utilizing
   the WindowStyle parameter to hide the window on the compromised endpoint. This combination
   of command-line options is suspicious because it is overriding the default PowerShell
@@ -28,8 +28,8 @@ search: ' | from read_ba_enriched_events() | eval timestamp = ucast(map_get(inpu
   "string", null) | eval device=ucast(map_get(input_event,"device"), "map<string,
   any>", null) | eval device_hostname=ucast(map_get(device,"hostname"), "string",
   null) | where (process_file_name="powershell_ise.exe" OR process_file_name="powershell.exe"
-  OR process_file_name="sqltoolsps.exe" OR process_file_name="sqlps.exe" OR process_file_name="pwsh.exe"
-  OR process_file_name="pwsh.exe") AND match_regex(process_cmd_line, /(?i)(?i)[\\-|\\/]w(in*d*o*w*s*t*y*l*e*)*\\s+[^-]/)=true
+  OR process_file_name="sqltoolsps.exe" OR process_file_name="sqlps.exe" OR process_file_name="pwsh.exe")
+  AND match_regex(process_cmd_line, /(?i)[\-|\/]w(in*d*o*w*s*t*y*l*e*)*\s+h(i*d*d*e*n*)\s+/)=true
   
   | eval body=create_map(
     "devices", [

ssa_detections/endpoint/ssa___attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 name: Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe
 id: 14038953-e5f2-4daf-acff-5452062baf03
-version: 2
+version: 3
 date: '2021-11-29'
 author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk
 type: TTP

ssa_detections/endpoint/ssa___windows_os_credential_dumping_with_ntdsutil_export_ntds.yml

@@ -48,11 +48,13 @@ references:
 - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/cc753343(v=ws.11)
 - https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf
 - https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/vss_ps.dll-97B15BDAE9777F454C9A6BA25E938DB3.html
+- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/05/24/volt-typhoon-targets-us-critical-infrastructure-with-living-off-the-land-techniques/
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Credential Dumping
   - HAFNIUM Group
   - Living Off The Land
+  - Volt Typhoon
   asset_type: Endpoint
   confidence: 50
   impact: 100

ssa_detections/endpoint/ssa___windows_powershell_connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.yml

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 name: Windows Powershell Connect to Internet With Hidden Window
 id: 477e068e-8b6d-11ec-b6c1-81af21670352
-version: 1
+version: 2
 date: '2022-02-11'
 author: Jose Hernandez, David Dorsey, Michael Haag Splunk
 type: Anomaly
@@ -34,8 +34,8 @@ search: ' | from read_ba_enriched_events() | eval timestamp = ucast(map_get(inpu
   "string", null) | eval device=ucast(map_get(input_event,"device"), "map<string,
   any>", null) | eval device_hostname=ucast(map_get(device,"hostname"), "string",
   null) | where (process_file_name="powershell_ise.exe" OR process_file_name="powershell.exe"
-  OR process_file_name="sqltoolsps.exe" OR process_file_name="sqlps.exe" OR process_file_name="pwsh.exe"
-  OR process_file_name="pwsh.exe") AND match_regex(process_cmd_line, /(?i)(?i)[\\-|\\/]w(in*d*o*w*s*t*y*l*e*)*\\s+[^-]/)=true
+  OR process_file_name="sqltoolsps.exe" OR process_file_name="sqlps.exe" OR process_file_name="pwsh.exe")
+  AND match_regex(process_cmd_line, /(?i)[\-|\/]w(in*d*o*w*s*t*y*l*e*)*\s+h(i*d*d*e*n*)\s+/)=true
   --finding_report--'
 how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your
   hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be

ssa_detections/endpoint/ssa___windows_remote_create_service.yml

@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ search: ' | from read_ba_enriched_events() | eval timestamp = ucast(map_get(inpu
   "string", null) | eval device=ucast(map_get(input_event,"device"), "map<string,
   any>", null) | eval device_hostname=ucast(map_get(device,"hostname"), "string",
   null) | where (match_regex(process_cmd_line, /(?i)create/)=true OR match_regex(process_cmd_line,
-  /(?i)\\\\/)=true) AND process_file_name="sc.exe" --finding_report--'
+  /(?i)\\/)=true) AND process_file_name="sc.exe" --finding_report--'
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
   on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
   your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition,

ssa_detections/endpoint/ssa___windows_service_create_with_tscon.yml

@@ -33,7 +33,8 @@ search: ' | from read_ba_enriched_events() | eval timestamp = ucast(map_get(inpu
   "string", null) | eval actor_process_file_name=ucast(map_get(actor_process_file,"name"),
   "string", null) | eval device=ucast(map_get(input_event,"device"), "map<string,
   any>", null) | eval device_hostname=ucast(map_get(device,"hostname"), "string",
-  null) | where like(process_cmd_line, "%/dest:rdp-tcp%") --finding_report--'
+  null) | where match_regex(process_cmd_line, /(?i)/dest:rdp-tcp/)=true AND process_file_name="sc.exe"
+  --finding_report--'
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
   on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
   your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition,