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automated_detection_testing/requirements.txt
+1 -1
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@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ s3transfer==0.3.4
six==1.13.0
smmap==3.0.5
splunk-sdk==1.6.15
tabulate==0.8.8
tabulate==0.8.9
termcolor==1.1.0
toml==0.10.2
urllib3==1.26.3
detections/application/multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentails_from_the_same_ip.yml
+2 -2
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@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ how_to_implement: This search is specific to Okta and requires Okta logs are bei
ingested in your Splunk deployment.
known_false_positives: A single public IP address servicing multiple legitmate users
may trigger this search. In addition, the threshold of 5 distinct users may be too
low for your needs. You may modify the included filter macro `multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentials_from_the_same_ip_filter` to raise
the threshold or except specific IP adresses from triggering this search.
low for your needs. You may modify the included filter macro `multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentials_from_the_same_ip_filter`
to raise the threshold or except specific IP adresses from triggering this search.
references: []
tags:
analytic_story:
detections/cloud/aws_saml_access_by_provider_user_and_principal.yml
+1 -1
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@@ -36,8 +36,8 @@ tags:
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078/assume_role_with_saml/assume_role_with_saml.json
mitre_attack_id:
- T1078
security_domain: threat
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
security_domain: threat
detections/cloud/aws_saml_update_identity_provider.yml
+1 -1
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@@ -32,8 +32,8 @@ tags:
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078/update_saml_provider/update_saml_provider.json
mitre_attack_id:
- T1078
security_domain: threat
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
security_domain: threat
detections/cloud/o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user.yml
+1 -1
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@@ -32,8 +32,8 @@ tags:
- Actions on Objective
mitre_attack_id:
- T1136.003
security_domain: threat
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
security_domain: threat
detections/cloud/o365_added_service_principal.yml
+1 -1
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@@ -35,8 +35,8 @@ tags:
- Actions on Objective
mitre_attack_id:
- T1136.003
security_domain: threat
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
security_domain: threat
detections/cloud/o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors.yml
+1 -1
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@@ -30,8 +30,8 @@ tags:
- Actions on Objective
mitre_attack_id:
- T1556
security_domain: threat
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
security_domain: threat
detections/cloud/o365_new_federated_domain_added.yml
+1 -1
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@@ -34,8 +34,8 @@ tags:
- Actions on Objective
mitre_attack_id:
- T1136.003
security_domain: threat
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
security_domain: threat
detections/endpoint/certutil_exe_certificate_extraction.yml
+1 -1
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@@ -29,8 +29,8 @@ tags:
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/certutil_exe_certificate_extraction/windows-sysmon.log
kill_chain_phases:
- Installation
security_domain: endpoint
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
security_domain: endpoint
detections/endpoint/creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr.yml
+1 -1
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@@ -42,8 +42,8 @@ tags:
- T1003.001
nist:
- DE.CM
security_domain: endpoint
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
security_domain: endpoint
detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy.yml
+1 -1
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@@ -39,8 +39,8 @@ tags:
- T1003.003
nist:
- DE.CM
security_domain: endpoint
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
security_domain: endpoint
detections/endpoint/detect_html_help_renamed.yml
+19 -19
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@@ -2,6 +2,9 @@ name: Detect HTML Help Renamed
id: 62fed254-513b-460e-953d-79771493a9f3
version: 1
date: '2021-02-11'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
type: batch
datamodel: []
description: The following analytic identifies a renamed instance of hh.exe (HTML
Help) executing a Compiled HTML Help (CHM). This particular technique will load
Windows script code from a compiled help file. CHM files may contain nearly any
@@ -13,32 +16,33 @@ description: The following analytic identifies a renamed instance of hh.exe (HTM
or WSH script code. During investigation, identify script content origination. Validate
it is the legitimate version of hh.exe by reviewing the PE metadata. hh.exe is natively
found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64.
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting
logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your
endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the
Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed hh.exe may be used.
type: batch
datamodel: []
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/001/
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.001/T1218.001.md
- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Hh/
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
search: '`sysmon` EventID=1 OriginalFileName=HH.exe NOT process_name=hh.exe | stats
count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, User, parent_process_name,
process_name, OriginalFileName, process_path, CommandLine | rename Computer as dest
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_html_help_renamed_filter`'
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting
logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your
endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the
Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed hh.exe may be used.
known_false_positives: Although unlikely a renamed instance of hh.exe will be used
legitimately, filter as needed.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/001/
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.001/T1218.001.md
- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Hh/
tags:
analytic_story:
- Suspicious Compiled HTML Activity
mitre_attack_id:
- T1218.001
kill_chain_phases:
- Actions on Objectives
asset_type: Endpoint
automated_detection_testing: passed
cis20:
- CIS 8
dataset:
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
kill_chain_phases:
- Actions on Objectives
mitre_attack_id:
- T1218.001
nist:
- PR.PT
- DE.CM
@@ -47,7 +51,3 @@ tags:
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
security_domain: endpoint
asset_type: Endpoint
dataset:
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
automated_detection_testing: passed
detections/endpoint/detect_html_help_spawn_child_process.yml
+30 -25
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@@ -2,41 +2,50 @@ name: Detect HTML Help Spawn Child Process
id: 723716de-ee55-4cd4-9759-c44e7e55ba4b
version: 1
date: '2021-02-11'
description: The following analytic identifies hh.exe (HTML Help) execution of a Compiled HTML Help (CHM) that spawns a child process.
This particular technique will load Windows script code from a compiled help file. CHM files may contain nearly any file type embedded, but only execute html/htm.
Upon a successful execution, the following script engines may be used for execution - JScript, VBScript, VBScript.Encode, JScript.Encode, JScript.Compact. Analyst may identify vbscript.dll or jscript.dll loading into hh.exe upon execution.
The "htm" and "html" file extensions were the only extensions observed to be supported for the execution of Shortcut commands or WSH script code.
During investigation, identify script content origination. Review child process events and investigate further.
hh.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64.
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
type: batch
datamodel:
- Endpoint
description: The following analytic identifies hh.exe (HTML Help) execution of a Compiled
HTML Help (CHM) that spawns a child process. This particular technique will load
Windows script code from a compiled help file. CHM files may contain nearly any
file type embedded, but only execute html/htm. Upon a successful execution, the
following script engines may be used for execution - JScript, VBScript, VBScript.Encode,
JScript.Encode, JScript.Compact. Analyst may identify vbscript.dll or jscript.dll
loading into hh.exe upon execution. The "htm" and "html" file extensions were the
only extensions observed to be supported for the execution of Shortcut commands
or WSH script code. During investigation, identify script content origination. Review
child process events and investigate further. hh.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32
and C:\Windows\syswow64.
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=hh.exe
by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name
Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_html_help_spawn_child_process_filter`'
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications (ex. web browsers)
may spawn a child process. Filter as needed.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/001/
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.001/T1218.001.md
- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Hh/
- https://gist.github.com/mgeeky/cce31c8602a144d8f2172a73d510e0e7
- https://cyberforensicator.com/2019/01/20/silence-dissecting-malicious-chm-files-and-performing-forensic-analysis/
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=hh.exe
by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name
Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_html_help_spawn_child_process_filter`'
known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications (ex. web browsers)
may spawn a child process. Filter as needed.
tags:
analytic_story:
- Suspicious Compiled HTML Activity
mitre_attack_id:
- T1218.001
kill_chain_phases:
- Actions on Objectives
asset_type: Endpoint
automated_detection_testing: passed
cis20:
- CIS 8
dataset:
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
kill_chain_phases:
- Actions on Objectives
mitre_attack_id:
- T1218.001
nist:
- PR.PT
- DE.CM
@@ -45,7 +54,3 @@ tags:
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
security_domain: endpoint
asset_type: Endpoint
dataset:
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
automated_detection_testing: passed
detections/endpoint/detect_html_help_url_in_command_line.yml
+31 -27
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@@ -2,20 +2,32 @@ name: Detect HTML Help URL in Command Line
id: 8c5835b9-39d9-438b-817c-95f14c69a31e
version: 1
date: '2021-02-11'
description: The following analytic identifies hh.exe (HTML Help) execution of a Compiled HTML Help (CHM) file from a remote url.
This particular technique will load Windows script code from a compiled help file. CHM files may contain nearly any file type embedded, but only execute html/htm.
Upon a successful execution, the following script engines may be used for execution - JScript, VBScript, VBScript.Encode, JScript.Encode, JScript.Compact. Analyst may identify vbscript.dll or jscript.dll loading into hh.exe upon execution.
The "htm" and "html" file extensions were the only extensions observed to be supported for the execution of Shortcut commands or WSH script code.
During investigation, identify script content origination.
Review reputation of remote IP and domain.
Some instances, it is worth decompiling the .chm file to review its original contents.
hh.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64.
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
type: batch
datamodel:
- Endpoint
description: The following analytic identifies hh.exe (HTML Help) execution of a Compiled
HTML Help (CHM) file from a remote url. This particular technique will load Windows
script code from a compiled help file. CHM files may contain nearly any file type
embedded, but only execute html/htm. Upon a successful execution, the following
script engines may be used for execution - JScript, VBScript, VBScript.Encode, JScript.Encode,
JScript.Compact. Analyst may identify vbscript.dll or jscript.dll loading into hh.exe
upon execution. The "htm" and "html" file extensions were the only extensions observed
to be supported for the execution of Shortcut commands or WSH script code. During
investigation, identify script content origination. Review reputation of remote
IP and domain. Some instances, it is worth decompiling the .chm file to review its
original contents. hh.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64.
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=hh.exe
Processes.process=*http* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process
Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `detect_html_help_url_in_command_line_filter`'
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may retrieve
a CHM remotely, filter as needed.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/001/
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.001/T1218.001.md
@@ -23,23 +35,19 @@ references:
- https://blog.sevagas.com/?Hacking-around-HTA-files
- https://gist.github.com/mgeeky/cce31c8602a144d8f2172a73d510e0e7
- https://cyberforensicator.com/2019/01/20/silence-dissecting-malicious-chm-files-and-performing-forensic-analysis/
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=hh.exe
Processes.process=*http* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process
Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `detect_html_help_url_in_command_line_filter`'
known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may retrieve a CHM remotely, filter as needed.
tags:
analytic_story:
- Suspicious Compiled HTML Activity
mitre_attack_id:
- T1218.001
kill_chain_phases:
- Actions on Objectives
asset_type: Endpoint
automated_detection_testing: passed
cis20:
- CIS 8
dataset:
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
kill_chain_phases:
- Actions on Objectives
mitre_attack_id:
- T1218.001
nist:
- PR.PT
- DE.CM
@@ -48,7 +56,3 @@ tags:
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
security_domain: endpoint
asset_type: Endpoint
dataset:
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
automated_detection_testing: passed
detections/endpoint/detect_html_help_using_infotech_storage_handlers.yml
+20 -20
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@@ -2,6 +2,10 @@ name: Detect HTML Help Using InfoTech Storage Handlers
id: 0b2eefa5-5508-450d-b970-3dd2fb761aec
version: 1
date: '2021-02-11'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
type: batch
datamodel:
- Endpoint
description: The following analytic identifies hh.exe (HTML Help) execution of a Compiled
HTML Help (CHM) file using InfoTech Storage Handlers. This particular technique
will load Windows script code from a compiled help file, using InfoTech Storage
@@ -15,12 +19,17 @@ description: The following analytic identifies hh.exe (HTML Help) execution of a
the execution of Shortcut commands or WSH script code. During investigation, identify
script content origination. hh.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and
C:\Windows\syswow64.
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=hh.exe
Processes.process IN ("*its:*", "*mk:@MSITStore:*") by Processes.dest Processes.user
Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id
Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_html_help_using_infotech_storage_handlers_filter`'
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
type: batch
datamodel:
- Endpoint
known_false_positives: It is rare to see instances of InfoTech Storage Handlers being
used, but it does happen in some legitimate instances. Filter as needed.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/001/
- https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/851869
@@ -28,24 +37,19 @@ references:
- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Hh/
- https://gist.github.com/mgeeky/cce31c8602a144d8f2172a73d510e0e7
- https://cyberforensicator.com/2019/01/20/silence-dissecting-malicious-chm-files-and-performing-forensic-analysis/
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=hh.exe
Processes.process IN ("*its:*", "*mk:@MSITStore:*") by Processes.dest Processes.user
Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id
Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_html_help_using_infotech_storage_handlers_filter`'
known_false_positives: It is rare to see instances of InfoTech Storage Handlers being
used, but it does happen in some legitimate instances. Filter as needed.
tags:
analytic_story:
- Suspicious Compiled HTML Activity
mitre_attack_id:
- T1218.001
kill_chain_phases:
- Actions on Objectives
asset_type: Endpoint
automated_detection_testing: passed
cis20:
- CIS 8
dataset:
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
kill_chain_phases:
- Actions on Objectives
mitre_attack_id:
- T1218.001
nist:
- PR.PT
- DE.CM
@@ -54,7 +58,3 @@ tags:
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
security_domain: endpoint
asset_type: Endpoint
dataset:
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
automated_detection_testing: passed
detections/endpoint/detect_regasm_spawning_a_process.yml
+20 -20
View File
@@ -2,6 +2,10 @@ name: Detect Regasm Spawning a Process
id: 72170ec5-f7d2-42f5-aefb-2b8be6aad15f
version: 1
date: '2021-02-12'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
type: batch
datamodel:
- Endpoint
description: The following analytic identifies regasm.exe spawning a process. This
particular technique has been used in the wild to bypass application control products.
Regasm.exe and Regsvcs.exe are signed by Microsoft. Spawning of a child process
@@ -10,35 +14,35 @@ description: The following analytic identifies regasm.exe spawning a process. Th
suspicious behavior. Gather any other file modifications and review accordingly.
regsvcs.exe and regasm.exe are natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v*\regasm|regsvcs.exe
and C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v*\regasm|regsvcs.exe.
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
type: batch
datamodel:
- Endpoint
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009/
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.009/T1218.009.md
- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvcs/
- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regasm/
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=regasm.exe
by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name
Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_regasm_spawning_a_process_filter`'
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
known_false_positives: Although unlikely, limited instances of regasm.exe or regsvcs.exe
may cause a false positive. Filter based endpoint usage, command line arguments,
or process lineage.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009/
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.009/T1218.009.md
- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvcs/
- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regasm/
tags:
analytic_story:
- Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity
mitre_attack_id:
- T1218.009
kill_chain_phases:
- Actions on Objectives
asset_type: Endpoint
automated_detection_testing: passed
cis20:
- CIS 8
dataset:
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.009/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
kill_chain_phases:
- Actions on Objectives
mitre_attack_id:
- T1218.009
nist:
- PR.PT
- DE.CM
@@ -47,7 +51,3 @@ tags:
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
security_domain: endpoint
asset_type: Endpoint
dataset:
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.009/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
automated_detection_testing: passed
detections/endpoint/detect_regasm_with_network_connection.yml
+19 -19
View File
@@ -2,6 +2,9 @@ name: Detect Regasm with Network Connection
id: 07921114-6db4-4e2e-ae58-3ea8a52ae93f
version: 1
date: '2021-02-16'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
type: batch
datamodel: []
description: The following analytic identifies regasm.exe with a network connection
to a public IP address, exluding private IP space. This particular technique has
been used in the wild to bypass application control products. Regasm.exe and Regsvcs.exe
@@ -12,33 +15,34 @@ description: The following analytic identifies regasm.exe with a network connect
and review accordingly. Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain and block
as needed. regsvcs.exe and regasm.exe are natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v*\regasm|regsvcs.exe
and C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v*\regasm|regsvcs.exe.
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting
logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your
endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the
Sysmon TA.
type: batch
datamodel: []
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009/
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.009/T1218.009.md
- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regasm/
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
search: '`sysmon` EventID=3 dest_ip!=10.0.0.0/12 dest_ip!=172.16.0.0/12 dest_ip!=192.168.0.0/16
process_name=regasm.exe | rename Computer as dest | stats count min(_time) as firstTime
max(_time) as lastTime by dest, User, process_name, src_ip, dest_host, dest_ip |
`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_regasm_with_network_connection_filter`'
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting
logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your
endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the
Sysmon TA.
known_false_positives: Although unlikely, limited instances of regasm.exe with a network
connection may cause a false positive. Filter based endpoint usage, command line
arguments, or process lineage.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009/
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.009/T1218.009.md
- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regasm/
tags:
analytic_story:
- Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity
mitre_attack_id:
- T1218.009
kill_chain_phases:
- Actions on Objectives
asset_type: Endpoint
automated_detection_testing: passed
cis20:
- CIS 8
dataset:
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.009/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
kill_chain_phases:
- Actions on Objectives
mitre_attack_id:
- T1218.009
nist:
- PR.PT
- DE.CM
@@ -47,7 +51,3 @@ tags:
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
security_domain: endpoint
asset_type: Endpoint
dataset:
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.009/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
automated_detection_testing: passed
detections/endpoint/detect_regasm_with_no_command_line_arguments.yml
+19 -19
View File
@@ -2,40 +2,44 @@ name: Detect Regasm with no Command Line Arguments
id: c3bc1430-04e7-4178-835f-047d8e6e97df
version: 1
date: '2021-02-12'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
type: batch
datamodel: []
description: The following analytic identifies regasm.exe with no command line arguments.
This particular behavior occurs when another process injects into regasm.exe, no
command line arguments will be present. During investigation, identify any network
connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related
to credential dumping or file writes. Regasm.exe are natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v*\regasm|regsvcs.exe
and C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v*\regasm|regsvcs.exe.
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting
logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your
endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the
Sysmon TA.
type: batch
datamodel: []
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009/
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.009/T1218.009.md
- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regasm/
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
search: '`sysmon` EventID=1 (process_name=regasm.exe OR OriginalFileName=RegAsm.exe)
| regex CommandLine="(regasm\.exe.{0,4}$)" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime
max(_time) as lastTime by dest, User, ParentImage,ParentCommandLine, process_name,
OriginalFileName, process_path, CommandLine | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_regasm_with_no_command_line_arguments_filter`'
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting
logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your
endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the
Sysmon TA.
known_false_positives: Although unlikely, limited instances of regasm.exe or may cause
a false positive. Filter based endpoint usage, command line arguments, or process
lineage.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009/
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.009/T1218.009.md
- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regasm/
tags:
analytic_story:
- Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity
mitre_attack_id:
- T1218.009
kill_chain_phases:
- Actions on Objectives
asset_type: Endpoint
automated_detection_testing: passed
cis20:
- CIS 8
dataset:
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.009/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
kill_chain_phases:
- Actions on Objectives
mitre_attack_id:
- T1218.009
nist:
- PR.PT
- DE.CM
@@ -44,7 +48,3 @@ tags:
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
security_domain: endpoint
asset_type: Endpoint
dataset:
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.009/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
automated_detection_testing: passed
detections/endpoint/detect_regsvcs_spawning_a_process.yml
+19 -19
View File
@@ -2,6 +2,10 @@ name: Detect Regsvcs Spawning a Process
id: bc477b57-5c21-4ab6-9c33-668772e7f114
version: 1
date: '2021-02-12'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
type: batch
datamodel:
- Endpoint
description: The following analytic identifies regsvcs.exe spawning a process. This
particular technique has been used in the wild to bypass application control products.
Regasm.exe and Regsvcs.exe are signed by Microsoft. Spawning of a child process
@@ -10,34 +14,34 @@ description: The following analytic identifies regsvcs.exe spawning a process. T
suspicious behavior. Gather any other file modifications and review accordingly.
regsvcs.exe and regasm.exe are natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v*\regasm|regsvcs.exe
and C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v*\regasm|regsvcs.exe.
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
type: batch
datamodel:
- Endpoint
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009/
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.009/T1218.009.md
- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvcs/
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=regsvcs.exe
by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name
Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_regsvcs_spawning_a_process_filter`'
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
known_false_positives: Although unlikely, limited instances of regasm.exe or regsvcs.exe
may cause a false positive. Filter based endpoint usage, command line arguments,
or process lineage.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009/
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.009/T1218.009.md
- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvcs/
tags:
analytic_story:
- Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity
mitre_attack_id:
- T1218.009
kill_chain_phases:
- Actions on Objectives
asset_type: Endpoint
automated_detection_testing: passed
cis20:
- CIS 8
dataset:
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.009/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
kill_chain_phases:
- Actions on Objectives
mitre_attack_id:
- T1218.009
nist:
- PR.PT
- DE.CM
@@ -46,7 +50,3 @@ tags:
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
security_domain: endpoint
asset_type: Endpoint
dataset:
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.009/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
automated_detection_testing: passed
detections/endpoint/detect_regsvcs_with_network_connection.yml
+19 -19
View File
@@ -2,6 +2,9 @@ name: Detect Regsvcs with Network Connection
id: e3e7a1c0-f2b9-445c-8493-f30a63522d1a
version: 1
date: '2021-02-16'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
type: batch
datamodel: []
description: The following analytic identifies Regsvcs.exe with a network connection
to a public IP address, exluding private IP space. This particular technique has
been used in the wild to bypass application control products. Regasm.exe and Regsvcs.exe
@@ -12,33 +15,34 @@ description: The following analytic identifies Regsvcs.exe with a network connec
and review accordingly. Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain and block
as needed. regsvcs.exe and regasm.exe are natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v*\regasm|regsvcs.exe
and C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v*\regasm|regsvcs.exe.
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting
logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your
endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the
Sysmon TA.
type: batch
datamodel: []
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009/
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.009/T1218.009.md
- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvcs/
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
search: '`sysmon` EventID=3 dest_ip!=10.0.0.0/12 dest_ip!=172.16.0.0/12 dest_ip!=192.168.0.0/16
process_name=regsvcs.exe | rename Computer as dest | stats count min(_time) as firstTime
max(_time) as lastTime by dest, User, process_name, src_ip, dest_host, dest_ip |
`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_regsvcs_with_network_connection_filter`'
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting
logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your
endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the
Sysmon TA.
known_false_positives: Although unlikely, limited instances of regsvcs.exe may cause
a false positive. Filter based endpoint usage, command line arguments, or process
lineage.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009/
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.009/T1218.009.md
- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvcs/
tags:
analytic_story:
- Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity
mitre_attack_id:
- T1218.009
kill_chain_phases:
- Actions on Objectives
asset_type: Endpoint
automated_detection_testing: passed
cis20:
- CIS 8
dataset:
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.009/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
kill_chain_phases:
- Actions on Objectives
mitre_attack_id:
- T1218.009
nist:
- PR.PT
- DE.CM
@@ -47,7 +51,3 @@ tags:
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
security_domain: Endpoint
asset_type: Endpoint
dataset:
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.009/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
automated_detection_testing: passed
detections/endpoint/detect_regsvcs_with_no_command_line_arguments.yml
+19 -19
View File
@@ -2,40 +2,44 @@ name: Detect Regsvcs with No Command Line Arguments
id: 6b74d578-a02e-4e94-a0d1-39440d0bf254
version: 1
date: '2021-02-12'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
type: batch
datamodel: []
description: The following analytic identifies regsvcs.exe with no command line arguments.
This particular behavior occurs when another process injects into regsvcs.exe, no
command line arguments will be present. During investigation, identify any network
connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related
to credential dumping or file writes. Regasm.exe are natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v*\regasm|regsvcs.exe
and C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v*\regasm|regsvcs.exe.
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting
logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your
endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the
Sysmon TA.
type: batch
datamodel: []
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009/
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.009/T1218.009.md
- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvcs/
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
search: '`sysmon` EventID=1 (process_name=regsvcs.exe OR OriginalFileName=RegSvcs.exe)
| regex CommandLine="(regsvcs\.exe.{0,4}$)" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime
max(_time) as lastTime by dest, User, ParentImage,ParentCommandLine, process_name,
OriginalFileName, process_path, CommandLine | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_regsvcs_with_no_command_line_arguments_filter`'
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting
logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your
endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the
Sysmon TA.
known_false_positives: Although unlikely, limited instances of regsvcs.exe may cause
a false positive. Filter based endpoint usage, command line arguments, or process
lineage.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009/
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.009/T1218.009.md
- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvcs/
tags:
analytic_story:
- Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity
mitre_attack_id:
- T1218.009
kill_chain_phases:
- Actions on Objectives
asset_type: Endpoint
automated_detection_testing: passed
cis20:
- CIS 8
dataset:
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.009/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
kill_chain_phases:
- Actions on Objectives
mitre_attack_id:
- T1218.009
nist:
- PR.PT
- DE.CM
@@ -44,7 +48,3 @@ tags:
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
security_domain: endpoint
asset_type: Endpoint
dataset:
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.009/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
automated_detection_testing: passed
detections/endpoint/detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass.yml
+1 -1
View File
@@ -49,8 +49,8 @@ tags:
- T1218.010
nist:
- DE.CM
security_domain: endpoint
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
security_domain: endpoint
detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___advpack.yml
+1 -1
View File
@@ -47,8 +47,8 @@ tags:
nist:
- PR.PT
- DE.CM
security_domain: endpoint
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
security_domain: endpoint
detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___setupapi.yml
+1 -1
View File
@@ -47,8 +47,8 @@ tags:
nist:
- PR.PT
- DE.CM
security_domain: endpoint
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
security_domain: endpoint
detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___syssetup.yml
+1 -1
View File
@@ -47,8 +47,8 @@ tags:
nist:
- PR.PT
- DE.CM
security_domain: endpoint
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
security_domain: endpoint
detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.yml
+1 -1
View File
@@ -38,8 +38,8 @@ tags:
- T1003.001
nist:
- DE.CM
security_domain: endpoint
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
security_domain: endpoint
detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump.yml
+1 -1
View File
@@ -46,8 +46,8 @@ tags:
- T1003.001
nist:
- DE.CM
security_domain: endpoint
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
security_domain: endpoint
detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump_rename.yml
+1 -1
View File
@@ -44,8 +44,8 @@ tags:
- T1003.001
nist:
- DE.CM
security_domain: endpoint
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
security_domain: endpoint
detections/endpoint/ntdsutil_export_ntds.yml
+1 -1
View File
@@ -50,8 +50,8 @@ tags:
- T1003.003
nist:
- DE.CM
security_domain: endpoint
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
security_domain: endpoint
detections/endpoint/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml
+2 -2
View File
@@ -21,8 +21,8 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
process_name, process, process_path, file_hash | `process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location_filter` '
how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records filesystem and process activity
from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model. This is typically populated
via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint
data sources, such as Sysmon.
via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data
sources, such as Sysmon.
known_false_positives: This detection should yield little or no false positive results.
It is uncommon for LNK files to be executed from temporary or user directories.
references:
detections/endpoint/suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path.yml
+1 -1
View File
@@ -46,8 +46,8 @@ tags:
- T1218.010
nist:
- DE.CM
security_domain: endpoint
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
security_domain: endpoint
detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver.yml
+1 -1
View File
@@ -49,8 +49,8 @@ tags:
nist:
- PR.PT
- DE.CM
security_domain: endpoint
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
security_domain: endpoint
detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_rename.yml
+1 -1
View File
@@ -43,8 +43,8 @@ tags:
nist:
- PR.PT
- DE.CM
security_domain: endpoint
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
security_domain: endpoint
detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_startw.yml
+3 -3
View File
@@ -7,8 +7,8 @@ type: batch
datamodel:
- Endpoint
description: The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe executing a DLL function
name, Start and StartW, on the command line that is commonly observed with Cobalt Strike
x86 and x64 DLL payloads. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32
name, Start and StartW, on the command line that is commonly observed with Cobalt
Strike x86 and x64 DLL payloads. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32
and C:\Windows\syswow64. Typically, the DLL will be written and loaded from a world
writeable path or user location. In most instances it will not have a valid certificate
(Unsigned). During investigation, review the parent process and other parallel application
@@ -49,8 +49,8 @@ tags:
nist:
- PR.PT
- DE.CM
security_domain: endpoint
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
security_domain: endpoint
detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments.yml
+1 -1
View File
@@ -44,8 +44,8 @@ tags:
nist:
- PR.PT
- DE.CM
security_domain: endpoint
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
security_domain: endpoint
detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_oulook_exe_writing_a__zip_file.yml
+2 -2
View File
@@ -25,8 +25,8 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(
!= "" | `detect_oulook_exe_writing_a__zip_file_filter` '
how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records filesystem and process activity
from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model. This is typically populated
via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint
data sources, such as Sysmon.
via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data
sources, such as Sysmon.
known_false_positives: It is not uncommon for outlook to write legitimate zip files
to the disk.
references: []
docs/mitre-map/coverage.csv
+21120 -11968
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docs/mitre-map/coverage.json
+12320 -6688
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docs/mitre-map/detections.csv
+15488 -9152
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docs/mitre-map/detections.json
+8365 -7661
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docs/splunk_docs_categories.wiki
+354 -9
View File
@@ -346,6 +346,57 @@ version = 1
</div>
</div>
===Cobalt Strike===
Cobalt Strike is threat emulation software. Red teams and penetration testers use Cobalt Strike to demonstrate the risk of a breach and evaluate mature security programs. Most recently, Cobalt Strike has become the choice tool by threat groups due to its ease of use and extensibility.
<div class="toccolours mw-collapsible">
<div class="mw-collapsible-content">
====Narrative====
This Analytic Story supports you to detect Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) from Cobalt Strike. Cobalt Strike has many ways to be enhanced by using aggressor scripts, malleable C2 profiles, default attack packages, and much more. For endpoint behavior, Cobalt Strike is most commonly identified via named pipes, spawn to processes, and DLL function names. On the network, depending on the malleable C2 profile used, it is near infinite in the amount of ways to conceal the C2 traffic with Cobalt Strike.\
In generating content for Cobalt Strike, the following is considered:\
1. Is it normal for <spawnto_ value> to have no command line arguments? No command line arguments and a network connection?\
1. What is the default, or normal, process lineage for <spawnto_ value>?\
1. Does the <spawnto_ value> make network connections?\
1. Is it normal for <spawnto_ value> to load jscript, vbscript, Amsi.dll, and clr.dll?.
====Detections====
* Suspicious Rundll32 StartW
* Suspicious Rundll32 no CommandLine Arguments
====Data Models====
* Endpoint
====Tags====
=====ATT&CK=====
* T1218.011
=====Kill Chain Phases=====
* Actions on Objectives
=====CIS=====
* CIS 8
=====NIST=====
* DE.CM
* PR.PT
====References====
* https://www.cobaltstrike.com/
* https://www.infocyte.com/blog/2020/09/02/cobalt-strike-the-new-favorite-among-thieves/
* https://bluescreenofjeff.com/2017-01-24-how-to-write-malleable-c2-profiles-for-cobalt-strike/
* https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2020/09/coverage-strikes-back-cobalt-strike-paper.html
* https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/unauthorized-access-of-fireeye-red-team-tools.html
date = 2021-02-16
version = 1
</div>
</div>
===Collection and Staging===
Monitor for and investigate activities--such as suspicious writes to the Windows Recycling Bin or email servers sending high amounts of traffic to specific hosts, for example--that may indicate that an adversary is harvesting and exfiltrating sensitive data.
@@ -542,12 +593,16 @@ The detection searches in this Analytic Story monitor access to the Local Securi
* Create Remote Thread into LSASS
* Creation of Shadow Copy
* Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell
* Creation of lsass Dump with Taskmgr
* Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy
* Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy
* Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access
* Detect Dump LSASS Memory using comsvcs - SSA
* Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images
* Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL
* Dump LSASS via procdump
* Dump LSASS via procdump Rename
* Ntdsutil export ntds
* Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS
====Data Models====
@@ -1293,6 +1348,55 @@ version = 2
</div>
</div>
===Suspicious Compiled HTML Activity===
Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe process to execute malicious code.
<div class="toccolours mw-collapsible">
<div class="mw-collapsible-content">
====Narrative====
Adversaries may abuse Compiled HTML files (.chm) to conceal malicious code. CHM files are commonly distributed as part of the Microsoft HTML Help system. CHM files are compressed compilations of various content such as HTML documents, images, and scripting/web related programming languages such VBA, JScript, Java, and ActiveX. CHM content is displayed using underlying components of the Internet Explorer browser loaded by the HTML Help executable program (hh.exe). \
HH.exe relies upon hhctrl.ocx to load CHM topics.This will load upon execution of a chm file. \
During investigation, review all parallel processes and child processes. It is possible for file modification events to occur and it is best to capture the CHM file and decompile it for further analysis. \
Upon usage of InfoTech Storage Handlers, ms-its, its, mk, itss.dll will load.
====Detections====
* Detect HTML Help Renamed
* Detect HTML Help Spawn Child Process
* Detect HTML Help URL in Command Line
* Detect HTML Help Using InfoTech Storage Handlers
====Data Models====
* Endpoint
====Tags====
=====ATT&CK=====
* T1218.001
=====Kill Chain Phases=====
* Actions on Objectives
=====CIS=====
* CIS 8
=====NIST=====
* DE.CM
* PR.PT
====References====
* https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/
* https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/001/
* https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/htmlhelp/nf-htmlhelp-htmlhelpa
date = 2021-02-11
version = 1
</div>
</div>
===Suspicious DNS Traffic===
Attackers often attempt to hide within or otherwise abuse the domain name system (DNS). You can thwart attempts to manipulate this omnipresent protocol by monitoring for these types of abuses.
@@ -1415,9 +1519,15 @@ Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe proce
<div class="mw-collapsible-content">
====Narrative====
One common adversary tactic is to bypass application white-listing solutions via the mshta.exe process, which loads Microsoft HTML applications (mshtml.dll) with the .hta suffix. In these cases, attackers use the trusted Windows utility to proxy execution of malicious files, whether an .hta application, javascript, or VBScript.\
The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an attacker is leveraging mshta.exe to execute malicious code. \
Triage \ Validate execution \ 1. Determine if MSHTA.exe executed. Validate the OriginalFileName of MSHTA.exe and further PE metadata. If executed outside of c:\windows\system32 or c:\windows\syswow64, it should be highly suspect. 2. Determine if script code was executed with MSHTA. \ Situational Awareness \ The objective of this step is meant to identify suspicious behavioral indicators related to executed of Script code by MSHTA.exe. \ 1. Parent process. Is the parent process a known LOLBin? Is the parent process an Office Application? 2. Module loads. Are the known MSHTA.exe modules being loaded by a non-standard application? Is MSHTA loading any suspicious .DLLs? 3. Network connections. Any network connections? Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain. \ Retrieval of script code \ The objective of this step is to confirm the executed script code is benign or malicious.
One common adversary tactic is to bypass application control solutions via the mshta.exe process, which loads Microsoft HTML applications (mshtml.dll) with the .hta suffix. In these cases, attackers use the trusted Windows utility to proxy execution of malicious files, whether an .hta application, javascript, or VBScript.\
The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an attacker is leveraging mshta.exe to execute malicious code.\
Triage\ Validate execution \ 1. Determine if MSHTA.exe executed. Validate the OriginalFileName of MSHTA.exe and further PE metadata. If executed outside of c:\windows\system32 or c:\windows\syswow64, it should be highly suspect.\
1. Determine if script code was executed with MSHTA.\
Situational Awareness\ The objective of this step is meant to identify suspicious behavioral indicators related to executed of Script code by MSHTA.exe.\
1. Parent process. Is the parent process a known LOLBin? Is the parent process an Office Application?\
1. Module loads. Are the known MSHTA.exe modules being loaded by a non-standard application? Is MSHTA loading any suspicious .DLLs?\
1. Network connections. Any network connections? Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain.\
Retrieval of script code\ The objective of this step is to confirm the executed script code is benign or malicious.
====Detections====
* Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line
@@ -1477,7 +1587,7 @@ While SSO is a major convenience for users, it also provides attackers with an o
With people moving quickly to adopt web-based applications and ways to manage them, many are still struggling to understand how best to monitor these environments. This analytic story provides searches to help monitor this environment, and identify events and activity that warrant further investigation such as credential stuffing or password spraying attacks, and users logging in from multiple locations when travel is disallowed.
====Detections====
* Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentails From The Same IP
* Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentials From The Same IP
* Okta Account Lockout Events
* Okta Failed SSO Attempts
* Okta User Logins From Multiple Cities
@@ -1509,6 +1619,153 @@ version = 1
</div>
</div>
===Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity===
Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe process to execute malicious code.
<div class="toccolours mw-collapsible">
<div class="mw-collapsible-content">
====Narrative====
Adversaries may abuse Regsvcs and Regasm to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. Regsvcs and Regasm are Windows command-line utilities that are used to register .NET Component Object Model (COM) assemblies. Both are digitally signed by Microsoft. The following queries assist with detecting suspicious and malicious usage of Regasm.exe and Regsvcs.exe. Upon reviewing usage of Regasm.exe Regsvcs.exe, review file modification events for possible script code written. Review parallel process events for csc.exe being utilized to compile script code.
====Detections====
* Detect Regasm Spawning a Process
* Detect Regasm with Network Connection
* Detect Regasm with no Command Line Arguments
* Detect Regsvcs Spawning a Process
* Detect Regsvcs with Network Connection
* Detect Regsvcs with No Command Line Arguments
====Data Models====
* Endpoint
====Tags====
=====ATT&CK=====
* T1218.009
=====Kill Chain Phases=====
* Actions on Objectives
=====CIS=====
* CIS 8
=====NIST=====
* DE.CM
* PR.PT
====References====
* https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009/
* https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/blob/master/documentation/modules/evasion/windows/applocker_evasion_regasm_regsvcs.md
* https://oddvar.moe/2017/12/13/applocker-case-study-how-insecure-is-it-really-part-1/
date = 2021-02-11
version = 1
</div>
</div>
===Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity===
Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the regsvr32.exe process to execute malicious code.
<div class="toccolours mw-collapsible">
<div class="mw-collapsible-content">
====Narrative====
One common adversary tactic is to bypass application control solutions via the regsvr32.exe process. This particular bypass was popularized with "SquiblyDoo" using the "scrobj.dll" dll to load .sct scriptlets. This technique is still widely used by adversaries to bypass detection and prevention controls. The file extension of the DLL is irrelevant (it may load a .txt file extension for example). The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an adversary is leveraging regsvr32.exe to execute malicious code. Validate execution Determine if regsvr32.exe executed. Validate the OriginalFileName of regsvr32.exe and further PE metadata. If executed outside of c:\windows\system32 or c:\windows\syswow64, it should be highly suspect. Determine if script code was executed with regsvr32. Situational Awareness - The objective of this step is meant to identify suspicious behavioral indicators related to executed of Script code by regsvr32.exe. Parent process. Is the parent process a known LOLBin? Is the parent process an Office Application? Module loads. Is regsvr32 loading any suspicious .DLLs? Unsigned or signed from non-standard paths. Network connections. Any network connections? Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain. Retrieval of Script Code - confirm the executed script code is benign or malicious.
====Detections====
* Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass
* Suspicious Regsvr32 Register Suspicious Path
====Data Models====
* Endpoint
====Tags====
=====ATT&CK=====
* T1218.010
=====Kill Chain Phases=====
* Actions on Objectives
=====CIS=====
* CIS 16
* CIS 8
=====NIST=====
* DE.CM
====References====
* https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010/
* https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.010/T1218.010.md
* https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvr32/
date = 2021-01-29
version = 1
</div>
</div>
===Suspicious Rundll32 Activity===
Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage rundll32.exe to execute arbitrary malicious code.
<div class="toccolours mw-collapsible">
<div class="mw-collapsible-content">
====Narrative====
One common adversary tactic is to bypass application control solutions via the rundll32.exe process. Natively, rundll32.exe will load DLLs and is a great example of a Living off the Land Binary. Rundll32.exe may load malicious DLLs by ordinals, function names or directly. The queries in this story focus on loading default DLLs, syssetup.dll, ieadvpack.dll, advpack.dll and setupapi.dll from disk that may be abused by adversaries. Additionally, two analytics developed to assist with identifying DLLRegisterServer, Start and StartW functions being called. The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an adversary is leveraging rundll32.exe to execute malicious code.
====Detections====
* Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - advpack
* Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - setupapi
* Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - syssetup
* Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL
* Suspicious Rundll32 Rename
* Suspicious Rundll32 StartW
* Suspicious Rundll32 dllregisterserver
* Suspicious Rundll32 no CommandLine Arguments
====Data Models====
* Endpoint
====Tags====
=====ATT&CK=====
* T1003.001
* T1036.003
* T1218.011
=====Kill Chain Phases=====
* Actions on Objectives
=====CIS=====
* CIS 16
* CIS 3
* CIS 5
* CIS 8
=====NIST=====
* DE.CM
* PR.PT
====References====
* https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/
* https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md
* https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32
date = 2021-02-03
version = 1
</div>
</div>
===Suspicious Windows Registry Activities===
Monitor and detect registry changes initiated from remote locations, which can be a sign that an attacker has infiltrated your system.
@@ -1727,10 +1984,20 @@ Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the msbuild.exe pro
<div class="mw-collapsible-content">
====Narrative====
Adversaries may use MSBuild to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. MSBuild.exe (Microsoft Build Engine) is a software build platform used by Visual Studio and is native to Windows. It handles XML formatted project files that define requirements for loading and building various platforms and configurations. \
The inline task capability of MSBuild that was introduced in .NET version 4 allows for C# code to be inserted into an XML project file. MSBuild will compile and execute the inline task. MSBuild.exe is a signed Microsoft binary, so when it is used this way it can execute arbitrary code and bypass application control defenses that are configured to allow MSBuild.exe execution. \
The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an adversary is leveraging msbuild.exe to execute malicious code. \
Triage \ Validate execution \ 1. Determine if MSBuild.exe executed. Validate the OriginalFileName of MSBuild.exe and further PE metadata. 2. Determine if script code was executed with MSBuild. Situational Awareness \ The objective of this step is meant to identify suspicious behavioral indicators related to executed of Script code by MSBuild.exe. \ 1. Parent process. Is the parent process a known LOLBin? Is the parent process an Office Application? 2. Module loads. Are the known MSBuild.exe modules being loaded by a non-standard application? Is MSbuild loading any suspicious .DLLs? 3. Network connections. Any network connections? Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain. \ Retrieval of script code \ The objective of this step is to confirm the executed script code is benign or malicious.
Adversaries may use MSBuild to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. MSBuild.exe (Microsoft Build Engine) is a software build platform used by Visual Studio and is native to Windows. It handles XML formatted project files that define requirements for loading and building various platforms and configurations.\
The inline task capability of MSBuild that was introduced in .NET version 4 allows for C# code to be inserted into an XML project file. MSBuild will compile and execute the inline task. MSBuild.exe is a signed Microsoft binary, so when it is used this way it can execute arbitrary code and bypass application control defenses that are configured to allow MSBuild.exe execution.\
The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an adversary is leveraging msbuild.exe to execute malicious code.\
Triage\
Validate execution\
1. Determine if MSBuild.exe executed. Validate the OriginalFileName of MSBuild.exe and further PE metadata.\
1. Determine if script code was executed with MSBuild.\
Situational Awareness\
The objective of this step is meant to identify suspicious behavioral indicators related to executed of Script code by MSBuild.exe.\
1. Parent process. Is the parent process a known LOLBin? Is the parent process an Office Application?\
1. Module loads. Are the known MSBuild.exe modules being loaded by a non-standard application? Is MSbuild loading any suspicious .DLLs?\
1. Network connections. Any network connections? Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain.\
Retrieval of script code\
The objective of this step is to confirm the executed script code is benign or malicious.
====Detections====
* Suspicious MSBuild Rename
@@ -1932,6 +2199,7 @@ Monitor for activities and techniques associated with maintaining persistence on
Maintaining persistence is one of the first steps taken by attackers after the initial compromise. Attackers leverage various custom and built-in tools to ensure survivability and persistent access within a compromised enterprise. This Analytic Story provides searches to help you identify various behaviors used by attackers to maintain persistent access to a Windows environment.
====Detections====
* Certutil exe certificate extraction
* Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe
* Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe
* Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors
@@ -2705,6 +2973,78 @@ version = 1
</div>
</div>
===Cloud Federated Credential Abuse===
This analytical story addresses events that indicate abuse of cloud federated credentials. These credentials are usually extracted from endpoint desktop or servers specially those servers that provide federation services such as Windows Active Directory Federation Services. Identity Federation relies on objects such as Oauth2 tokens, cookies or SAML assertions in order to provide seamless access between cloud and perimeter environments. If these objects are either hijacked or forged then attackers will be able to pivot into victim's cloud environements.
<div class="toccolours mw-collapsible">
<div class="mw-collapsible-content">
====Narrative====
This story is composed of detection searches based on endpoint that addresses the use of Mimikatz, Escalation of Privileges and Abnormal processes that may indicate the extraction of Federated directory objects such as passwords, Oauth2 tokens, certificates and keys. Cloud environment (AWS, Azure) related events are also addressed in specific cloud environment detection searches.
====Detections====
* AWS SAML Access by Provider User and Principal
* AWS SAML Update identity provider
* Certutil exe certificate extraction
* Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images
* Detect Mimikatz Via PowerShell And EventCode 4703
* Detect Rare Executables
* O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User
* O365 Added Service Principal
* O365 Excessive SSO logon errors
* O365 New Federated Domain Added
* Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation
* Uncommon Processes On Endpoint
====Data Models====
* Endpoint
====Tags====
=====ATT&CK=====
* T1003.001
* T1078
* T1136.003
* T1204.002
* T1546.012
* T1556
=====Kill Chain Phases=====
* Actions on Objective
* Actions on Objectives
* Command and Control
* Installation
=====CIS=====
* CIS 16
* CIS 2
* CIS 3
* CIS 5
* CIS 6
* CIS 8
=====NIST=====
* DE.AE
* DE.CM
* ID.AM
* PR.AC
* PR.DS
* PR.IP
* PR.PT
====References====
* https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/golden-saml-newly-discovered-attack-technique-forges-authentication-to-cloud-apps
* https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf
* https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a
date = 2021-01-26
version = 1
</div>
</div>
===Container Implantation Monitoring and Investigation===
Use the searches in this story to monitor your Kubernetes registry repositories for upload, and deployment of potentially vulnerable, backdoor, or implanted containers. These searches provide information on source users, destination path, container names and repository names. The searches provide context to address Mitre T1525 which refers to container implantation upload to a company's repository either in Amazon Elastic Container Registry, Google Container Registry and Azure Container Registry.
@@ -2926,9 +3266,13 @@ More and more companies are using Microsofts Office 365 cloud offering. Therefor
====Detections====
* High Number of Login Failures from a single source
* O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User
* O365 Added Service Principal
* O365 Bypass MFA via Trusted IP
* O365 Disable MFA
* O365 Excessive Authentication Failures Alert
* O365 Excessive SSO logon errors
* O365 New Federated Domain Added
* O365 PST export alert
* O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding
* O365 Suspicious Rights Delegation
@@ -2944,6 +3288,7 @@ More and more companies are using Microsofts Office 365 cloud offering. Therefor
* T1114
* T1114.002
* T1114.003
* T1136.003
* T1556
* T1562.007
@@ -3376,7 +3721,7 @@ Similar to other cloud providers, GCP operates on a shared responsibility model.
* PR.DS
====References====
* https://cloud.google.com/blog/products/gcp/4-steps-for-hardening-your-cloud-storage-buckets-taking-charge-of-your-security
* https://cloud.google.com/blog/product/gcp/4-steps-for-hardening-your-cloud-storage-buckets-taking-charge-of-your-security
* https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/gcp/google-cloud-platform-gcp-bucket-enumeration/
date = 2020-08-05
docs/stories_categories.md
+330 -9
View File
@@ -294,6 +294,8 @@ Another search detects incidents wherein a single password is used across multip
* [Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156](#Baron-Samedit-CVE-2021-3156)
* [Cobalt Strike](#Cobalt-Strike)
* [Collection and Staging](#Collection-and-Staging)
* [Command and Control](#Command-and-Control)
@@ -326,6 +328,8 @@ Another search detects incidents wherein a single password is used across multip
* [Suspicious Command-Line Executions](#Suspicious-Command-Line-Executions)
* [Suspicious Compiled HTML Activity](#Suspicious-Compiled-HTML-Activity)
* [Suspicious DNS Traffic](#Suspicious-DNS-Traffic)
* [Suspicious Emails](#Suspicious-Emails)
@@ -334,6 +338,12 @@ Another search detects incidents wherein a single password is used across multip
* [Suspicious Okta Activity](#Suspicious-Okta-Activity)
* [Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity](#Suspicious-Regsvcs-Regasm-Activity)
* [Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity](#Suspicious-Regsvr32-Activity)
* [Suspicious Rundll32 Activity](#Suspicious-Rundll32-Activity)
* [Suspicious Windows Registry Activities](#Suspicious-Windows-Registry-Activities)
* [Suspicious WMI Use](#Suspicious-WMI-Use)
@@ -391,6 +401,51 @@ A non-privledged user is able to execute the sudoedit command to trigger a buffe
##### References
* https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-research/2021/01/26/cve-2021-3156-heap-based-buffer-overflow-in-sudo-baron-samedit
### Cobalt Strike
* id = bcfd17e8-5461-400a-80a2-3b7d1459220c
* date = 2021-02-16
* version = 1
#### Description
Cobalt Strike is threat emulation software. Red teams and penetration testers use Cobalt Strike to demonstrate the risk of a breach and evaluate mature security programs. Most recently, Cobalt Strike has become the choice tool by threat groups due to its ease of use and extensibility.
#### Narrative
This Analytic Story supports you to detect Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) from Cobalt Strike. Cobalt Strike has many ways to be enhanced by using aggressor scripts, malleable C2 profiles, default attack packages, and much more. For endpoint behavior, Cobalt Strike is most commonly identified via named pipes, spawn to processes, and DLL function names. On the network, depending on the malleable C2 profile used, it is near infinite in the amount of ways to conceal the C2 traffic with Cobalt Strike.\
In generating content for Cobalt Strike, the following is considered:\
1. Is it normal for <spawnto_ value> to have no command line arguments? No command line arguments and a network connection?\
1. What is the default, or normal, process lineage for <spawnto_ value>?\
1. Does the <spawnto_ value> make network connections?\
1. Is it normal for <spawnto_ value> to load jscript, vbscript, Amsi.dll, and clr.dll?.
#### Detections
* Suspicious Rundll32 StartW
* Suspicious Rundll32 no CommandLine Arguments
#### Data Models
* Endpoint
#### Mappings
##### ATT&CK
* T1218.011
##### Kill Chain Phases
* Actions on Objectives
###### CIS
* CIS 8
##### NIST
* DE.CM
* PR.PT
##### References
* https://www.cobaltstrike.com/
* https://www.infocyte.com/blog/2020/09/02/cobalt-strike-the-new-favorite-among-thieves/
* https://bluescreenofjeff.com/2017-01-24-how-to-write-malleable-c2-profiles-for-cobalt-strike/
* https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2020/09/coverage-strikes-back-cobalt-strike-paper.html
* https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/unauthorized-access-of-fireeye-red-team-tools.html
### Collection and Staging
* id = 8e03c61e-13c4-4dcd-bfbe-5ce5a8dc031a
* date = 2020-02-03
@@ -570,12 +625,16 @@ The detection searches in this Analytic Story monitor access to the Local Securi
* Create Remote Thread into LSASS
* Creation of Shadow Copy
* Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell
* Creation of lsass Dump with Taskmgr
* Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy
* Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy
* Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access
* Detect Dump LSASS Memory using comsvcs - SSA
* Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images
* Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL
* Dump LSASS via procdump
* Dump LSASS via procdump Rename
* Ntdsutil export ntds
* Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS
#### Data Models
@@ -1242,6 +1301,49 @@ The ability to execute arbitrary commands via the Windows CLI is a primary goal
* https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/macro-malware
* https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf
### Suspicious Compiled HTML Activity
* id = a09db4d1-3827-4833-87b8-3a397e532119
* date = 2021-02-11
* version = 1
#### Description
Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe process to execute malicious code.
#### Narrative
Adversaries may abuse Compiled HTML files (.chm) to conceal malicious code. CHM files are commonly distributed as part of the Microsoft HTML Help system. CHM files are compressed compilations of various content such as HTML documents, images, and scripting/web related programming languages such VBA, JScript, Java, and ActiveX. CHM content is displayed using underlying components of the Internet Explorer browser loaded by the HTML Help executable program (hh.exe). \
HH.exe relies upon hhctrl.ocx to load CHM topics.This will load upon execution of a chm file. \
During investigation, review all parallel processes and child processes. It is possible for file modification events to occur and it is best to capture the CHM file and decompile it for further analysis. \
Upon usage of InfoTech Storage Handlers, ms-its, its, mk, itss.dll will load.
#### Detections
* Detect HTML Help Renamed
* Detect HTML Help Spawn Child Process
* Detect HTML Help URL in Command Line
* Detect HTML Help Using InfoTech Storage Handlers
#### Data Models
* Endpoint
#### Mappings
##### ATT&CK
* T1218.001
##### Kill Chain Phases
* Actions on Objectives
###### CIS
* CIS 8
##### NIST
* DE.CM
* PR.PT
##### References
* https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/
* https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/001/
* https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/htmlhelp/nf-htmlhelp-htmlhelpa
### Suspicious DNS Traffic
* id = 3c3835c0-255d-4f9e-ab84-e29ec9ec9b56
* date = 2017-09-18
@@ -1353,9 +1455,15 @@ Once a phishing message has been detected, the next steps are to answer the foll
Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe process to execute malicious code.
#### Narrative
One common adversary tactic is to bypass application white-listing solutions via the mshta.exe process, which loads Microsoft HTML applications (mshtml.dll) with the .hta suffix. In these cases, attackers use the trusted Windows utility to proxy execution of malicious files, whether an .hta application, javascript, or VBScript.\
The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an attacker is leveraging mshta.exe to execute malicious code. \
Triage \ Validate execution \ 1. Determine if MSHTA.exe executed. Validate the OriginalFileName of MSHTA.exe and further PE metadata. If executed outside of c:\windows\system32 or c:\windows\syswow64, it should be highly suspect. 2. Determine if script code was executed with MSHTA. \ Situational Awareness \ The objective of this step is meant to identify suspicious behavioral indicators related to executed of Script code by MSHTA.exe. \ 1. Parent process. Is the parent process a known LOLBin? Is the parent process an Office Application? 2. Module loads. Are the known MSHTA.exe modules being loaded by a non-standard application? Is MSHTA loading any suspicious .DLLs? 3. Network connections. Any network connections? Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain. \ Retrieval of script code \ The objective of this step is to confirm the executed script code is benign or malicious.
One common adversary tactic is to bypass application control solutions via the mshta.exe process, which loads Microsoft HTML applications (mshtml.dll) with the .hta suffix. In these cases, attackers use the trusted Windows utility to proxy execution of malicious files, whether an .hta application, javascript, or VBScript.\
The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an attacker is leveraging mshta.exe to execute malicious code.\
Triage\ Validate execution \ 1. Determine if MSHTA.exe executed. Validate the OriginalFileName of MSHTA.exe and further PE metadata. If executed outside of c:\windows\system32 or c:\windows\syswow64, it should be highly suspect.\
1. Determine if script code was executed with MSHTA.\
Situational Awareness\ The objective of this step is meant to identify suspicious behavioral indicators related to executed of Script code by MSHTA.exe.\
1. Parent process. Is the parent process a known LOLBin? Is the parent process an Office Application?\
1. Module loads. Are the known MSHTA.exe modules being loaded by a non-standard application? Is MSHTA loading any suspicious .DLLs?\
1. Network connections. Any network connections? Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain.\
Retrieval of script code\ The objective of this step is to confirm the executed script code is benign or malicious.
#### Detections
* Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line
@@ -1409,7 +1517,7 @@ While SSO is a major convenience for users, it also provides attackers with an o
With people moving quickly to adopt web-based applications and ways to manage them, many are still struggling to understand how best to monitor these environments. This analytic story provides searches to help monitor this environment, and identify events and activity that warrant further investigation such as credential stuffing or password spraying attacks, and users logging in from multiple locations when travel is disallowed.
#### Detections
* Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentails From The Same IP
* Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentials From The Same IP
* Okta Account Lockout Events
* Okta Failed SSO Attempts
* Okta User Logins From Multiple Cities
@@ -1434,6 +1542,135 @@ With people moving quickly to adopt web-based applications and ways to manage th
* https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Credential_stuffing
* https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/answer/What-is-a-password-spraying-attack-and-how-does-it-work
### Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity
* id = 2cdf33a0-4805-4b61-b025-59c20f418fbe
* date = 2021-02-11
* version = 1
#### Description
Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe process to execute malicious code.
#### Narrative
Adversaries may abuse Regsvcs and Regasm to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. Regsvcs and Regasm are Windows command-line utilities that are used to register .NET Component Object Model (COM) assemblies. Both are digitally signed by Microsoft. The following queries assist with detecting suspicious and malicious usage of Regasm.exe and Regsvcs.exe. Upon reviewing usage of Regasm.exe Regsvcs.exe, review file modification events for possible script code written. Review parallel process events for csc.exe being utilized to compile script code.
#### Detections
* Detect Regasm Spawning a Process
* Detect Regasm with Network Connection
* Detect Regasm with no Command Line Arguments
* Detect Regsvcs Spawning a Process
* Detect Regsvcs with Network Connection
* Detect Regsvcs with No Command Line Arguments
#### Data Models
* Endpoint
#### Mappings
##### ATT&CK
* T1218.009
##### Kill Chain Phases
* Actions on Objectives
###### CIS
* CIS 8
##### NIST
* DE.CM
* PR.PT
##### References
* https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009/
* https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/blob/master/documentation/modules/evasion/windows/applocker_evasion_regasm_regsvcs.md
* https://oddvar.moe/2017/12/13/applocker-case-study-how-insecure-is-it-really-part-1/
### Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity
* id = b8bee41e-624f-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
* date = 2021-01-29
* version = 1
#### Description
Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the regsvr32.exe process to execute malicious code.
#### Narrative
One common adversary tactic is to bypass application control solutions via the regsvr32.exe process. This particular bypass was popularized with "SquiblyDoo" using the "scrobj.dll" dll to load .sct scriptlets. This technique is still widely used by adversaries to bypass detection and prevention controls. The file extension of the DLL is irrelevant (it may load a .txt file extension for example). The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an adversary is leveraging regsvr32.exe to execute malicious code. Validate execution Determine if regsvr32.exe executed. Validate the OriginalFileName of regsvr32.exe and further PE metadata. If executed outside of c:\windows\system32 or c:\windows\syswow64, it should be highly suspect. Determine if script code was executed with regsvr32. Situational Awareness - The objective of this step is meant to identify suspicious behavioral indicators related to executed of Script code by regsvr32.exe. Parent process. Is the parent process a known LOLBin? Is the parent process an Office Application? Module loads. Is regsvr32 loading any suspicious .DLLs? Unsigned or signed from non-standard paths. Network connections. Any network connections? Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain. Retrieval of Script Code - confirm the executed script code is benign or malicious.
#### Detections
* Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass
* Suspicious Regsvr32 Register Suspicious Path
#### Data Models
* Endpoint
#### Mappings
##### ATT&CK
* T1218.010
##### Kill Chain Phases
* Actions on Objectives
###### CIS
* CIS 16
* CIS 8
##### NIST
* DE.CM
##### References
* https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010/
* https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.010/T1218.010.md
* https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvr32/
### Suspicious Rundll32 Activity
* id = 80a65487-854b-42f1-80a1-935e4c170694
* date = 2021-02-03
* version = 1
#### Description
Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage rundll32.exe to execute arbitrary malicious code.
#### Narrative
One common adversary tactic is to bypass application control solutions via the rundll32.exe process. Natively, rundll32.exe will load DLLs and is a great example of a Living off the Land Binary. Rundll32.exe may load malicious DLLs by ordinals, function names or directly. The queries in this story focus on loading default DLLs, syssetup.dll, ieadvpack.dll, advpack.dll and setupapi.dll from disk that may be abused by adversaries. Additionally, two analytics developed to assist with identifying DLLRegisterServer, Start and StartW functions being called. The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an adversary is leveraging rundll32.exe to execute malicious code.
#### Detections
* Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - advpack
* Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - setupapi
* Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - syssetup
* Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL
* Suspicious Rundll32 Rename
* Suspicious Rundll32 StartW
* Suspicious Rundll32 dllregisterserver
* Suspicious Rundll32 no CommandLine Arguments
#### Data Models
* Endpoint
#### Mappings
##### ATT&CK
* T1003.001
* T1036.003
* T1218.011
##### Kill Chain Phases
* Actions on Objectives
###### CIS
* CIS 16
* CIS 3
* CIS 5
* CIS 8
##### NIST
* DE.CM
* PR.PT
##### References
* https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/
* https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md
* https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32
### Suspicious Windows Registry Activities
* id = 2b1800dd-92f9-47dd-a981-fdf1351e5d55
* date = 2018-05-31
@@ -1629,10 +1866,20 @@ The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity t
Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the msbuild.exe process to execute malicious code.
#### Narrative
Adversaries may use MSBuild to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. MSBuild.exe (Microsoft Build Engine) is a software build platform used by Visual Studio and is native to Windows. It handles XML formatted project files that define requirements for loading and building various platforms and configurations. \
The inline task capability of MSBuild that was introduced in .NET version 4 allows for C# code to be inserted into an XML project file. MSBuild will compile and execute the inline task. MSBuild.exe is a signed Microsoft binary, so when it is used this way it can execute arbitrary code and bypass application control defenses that are configured to allow MSBuild.exe execution. \
The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an adversary is leveraging msbuild.exe to execute malicious code. \
Triage \ Validate execution \ 1. Determine if MSBuild.exe executed. Validate the OriginalFileName of MSBuild.exe and further PE metadata. 2. Determine if script code was executed with MSBuild. Situational Awareness \ The objective of this step is meant to identify suspicious behavioral indicators related to executed of Script code by MSBuild.exe. \ 1. Parent process. Is the parent process a known LOLBin? Is the parent process an Office Application? 2. Module loads. Are the known MSBuild.exe modules being loaded by a non-standard application? Is MSbuild loading any suspicious .DLLs? 3. Network connections. Any network connections? Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain. \ Retrieval of script code \ The objective of this step is to confirm the executed script code is benign or malicious.
Adversaries may use MSBuild to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. MSBuild.exe (Microsoft Build Engine) is a software build platform used by Visual Studio and is native to Windows. It handles XML formatted project files that define requirements for loading and building various platforms and configurations.\
The inline task capability of MSBuild that was introduced in .NET version 4 allows for C# code to be inserted into an XML project file. MSBuild will compile and execute the inline task. MSBuild.exe is a signed Microsoft binary, so when it is used this way it can execute arbitrary code and bypass application control defenses that are configured to allow MSBuild.exe execution.\
The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an adversary is leveraging msbuild.exe to execute malicious code.\
Triage\
Validate execution\
1. Determine if MSBuild.exe executed. Validate the OriginalFileName of MSBuild.exe and further PE metadata.\
1. Determine if script code was executed with MSBuild.\
Situational Awareness\
The objective of this step is meant to identify suspicious behavioral indicators related to executed of Script code by MSBuild.exe.\
1. Parent process. Is the parent process a known LOLBin? Is the parent process an Office Application?\
1. Module loads. Are the known MSBuild.exe modules being loaded by a non-standard application? Is MSbuild loading any suspicious .DLLs?\
1. Network connections. Any network connections? Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain.\
Retrieval of script code\
The objective of this step is to confirm the executed script code is benign or malicious.
#### Detections
* Suspicious MSBuild Rename
@@ -1810,6 +2057,7 @@ Monitor for activities and techniques associated with maintaining persistence on
Maintaining persistence is one of the first steps taken by attackers after the initial compromise. Attackers leverage various custom and built-in tools to ensure survivability and persistent access within a compromised enterprise. This Analytic Story provides searches to help you identify various behaviors used by attackers to maintain persistent access to a Windows environment.
#### Detections
* Certutil exe certificate extraction
* Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe
* Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe
* Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors
@@ -2228,6 +2476,8 @@ Various legacy protocols operate by default in the clear, without the protection
* [Cloud Cryptomining](#Cloud-Cryptomining)
* [Cloud Federated Credential Abuse](#Cloud-Federated-Credential-Abuse)
* [Container Implantation Monitoring and Investigation](#Container-Implantation-Monitoring-and-Investigation)
* [GCP Cross Account Activity](#GCP-Cross-Account-Activity)
@@ -2546,6 +2796,72 @@ This Analytic Story is focused on detecting suspicious new instances in your clo
##### References
* https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf
### Cloud Federated Credential Abuse
* id = cecdc1e7-0af2-4a55-8967-b9ea62c0317d
* date = 2021-01-26
* version = 1
#### Description
This analytical story addresses events that indicate abuse of cloud federated credentials. These credentials are usually extracted from endpoint desktop or servers specially those servers that provide federation services such as Windows Active Directory Federation Services. Identity Federation relies on objects such as Oauth2 tokens, cookies or SAML assertions in order to provide seamless access between cloud and perimeter environments. If these objects are either hijacked or forged then attackers will be able to pivot into victim's cloud environements.
#### Narrative
This story is composed of detection searches based on endpoint that addresses the use of Mimikatz, Escalation of Privileges and Abnormal processes that may indicate the extraction of Federated directory objects such as passwords, Oauth2 tokens, certificates and keys. Cloud environment (AWS, Azure) related events are also addressed in specific cloud environment detection searches.
#### Detections
* AWS SAML Access by Provider User and Principal
* AWS SAML Update identity provider
* Certutil exe certificate extraction
* Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images
* Detect Mimikatz Via PowerShell And EventCode 4703
* Detect Rare Executables
* O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User
* O365 Added Service Principal
* O365 Excessive SSO logon errors
* O365 New Federated Domain Added
* Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation
* Uncommon Processes On Endpoint
#### Data Models
* Endpoint
#### Mappings
##### ATT&CK
* T1003.001
* T1078
* T1136.003
* T1204.002
* T1546.012
* T1556
##### Kill Chain Phases
* Actions on Objective
* Actions on Objectives
* Command and Control
* Installation
###### CIS
* CIS 16
* CIS 2
* CIS 3
* CIS 5
* CIS 6
* CIS 8
##### NIST
* DE.AE
* DE.CM
* ID.AM
* PR.AC
* PR.DS
* PR.IP
* PR.PT
##### References
* https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/golden-saml-newly-discovered-attack-technique-forges-authentication-to-cloud-apps
* https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf
* https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a
### Container Implantation Monitoring and Investigation
* id = aa0e28b1-0521-4b6f-9d2a-7b87e34af246
* date = 2020-02-20
@@ -2738,9 +3054,13 @@ More and more companies are using Microsofts Office 365 cloud offering. Therefor
#### Detections
* High Number of Login Failures from a single source
* O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User
* O365 Added Service Principal
* O365 Bypass MFA via Trusted IP
* O365 Disable MFA
* O365 Excessive Authentication Failures Alert
* O365 Excessive SSO logon errors
* O365 New Federated Domain Added
* O365 PST export alert
* O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding
* O365 Suspicious Rights Delegation
@@ -2756,6 +3076,7 @@ More and more companies are using Microsofts Office 365 cloud offering. Therefor
* T1114
* T1114.002
* T1114.003
* T1136.003
* T1556
* T1562.007
@@ -3134,7 +3455,7 @@ Similar to other cloud providers, GCP operates on a shared responsibility model.
* PR.DS
##### References
* https://cloud.google.com/blog/products/gcp/4-steps-for-hardening-your-cloud-storage-buckets-taking-charge-of-your-security
* https://cloud.google.com/blog/product/gcp/4-steps-for-hardening-your-cloud-storage-buckets-taking-charge-of-your-security
* https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/gcp/google-cloud-platform-gcp-bucket-enumeration/
### Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications
package/app.manifest
+1 -1
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
"id": {
"group": null,
"name": "DA-ESS-ContentUpdate",
"version": "3.14.0"
"version": "3.15.0"
},
"author": [
{
package/default/analytic_stories.conf
+202 -82
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
#############
# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
# On Date: 2021-02-04T23:39:19 UTC
# On Date: 2021-02-18T18:09:13 UTC
# Author: Splunk Security Research
# Contact: research@splunk.com
#############
@@ -16,8 +16,8 @@ version = 1
reference = ["https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-cloudtrail-now-tracks-cross-account-activity-to-its-origin/"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - aws detect attach to role policy - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect permanent key creation - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect role creation - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect sts assume role abuse - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect sts get session token abuse - Rule"]
mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1550"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
support_searches = ["batch - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId - Response Task"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity"]
data_models = []
providing_technologies = none
description = Track when a user assumes an IAM role in another AWS account to obtain cross-account access to services and resources in that account. Accessing new roles could be an indication of malicious activity.
@@ -34,8 +34,8 @@ version = 1
reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 12", "CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1535"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP", "ID.AM"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task"]
support_searches = ["batch - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK", "batch - Previously Seen EC2 Instance Types", "batch - Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User", "batch - Previously Seen EC2 AMIs", "batch - Previously Seen AWS Regions"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User", "ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Regions", "ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Instance Types", "ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 AMIs", "ESCU - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK"]
data_models = []
providing_technologies = none
description = Monitor your AWS EC2 instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or EC2 instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior.
@@ -53,8 +53,8 @@ version = 2
reference = ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonVPC/latest/UserGuide/VPC_Appendix_NACLs.html", "https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/how-to-help-prepare-for-ddos-attacks-by-reducing-your-attack-surface/"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 11", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.007"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "DE.DP", "PR.AC"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
support_searches = ["batch - Baseline of Network ACL Activity by ARN", "batch - Baseline of blocked outbound traffic from AWS"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of blocked outbound traffic from AWS", "ESCU - Baseline of Network ACL Activity by ARN"]
data_models = []
providing_technologies = none
description = Monitor your AWS network infrastructure for bad configurations and malicious activity. Investigative searches help you probe deeper, when the facts warrant it.
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ version = 1
reference = ["https://aws.amazon.com/security-hub/features/"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for User - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task"]
support_searches = []
data_models = []
providing_technologies = none
@@ -85,8 +85,8 @@ version = 1
reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Country - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Region - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From City - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task"]
support_searches = ["batch - Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Country - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From City - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Region - Response Task"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources"]
data_models = []
providing_technologies = none
description = Monitor your AWS provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your network.
@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.p
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect API activity from users without MFA - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS API Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Security Group Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new API calls from user roles - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "DE.DP", "ID.AM", "PR.AC"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task"]
support_searches = ["batch - Previously seen API call per user roles in CloudTrail", "batch - Baseline of Security Group Activity by ARN", "batch - Create a list of approved AWS service accounts", "batch - Baseline of API Calls per User ARN"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of API Calls per User ARN", "ESCU - Create a list of approved AWS service accounts", "ESCU - Previously seen API call per user roles in CloudTrail", "ESCU - Baseline of Security Group Activity by ARN"]
data_models = []
providing_technologies = none
description = Detect and investigate dormant user accounts for your AWS environment that have become active again. Because inactive and ad-hoc accounts are common attack targets, it's critical to enable governance within your environment.
@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ version = 1
reference = ["https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs/blob/v3.2/dev/rules/REQUEST-944-APPLICATION-ATTACK-JAVA.conf"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Java Classes - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Content-Type Length - Rule", "ESCU - Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 18", "CIS 3", "CIS 4", "CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Delivery", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1082"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.RA", "PR.IP", "PR.MA", "PR.PT", "RS.MI"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Suspicious Strings in HTTP Header - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Web POSTs From src - Response Task"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate Suspicious Strings in HTTP Header - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Web POSTs From src - Response Task"]
support_searches = []
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
providing_technologies = none
@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ reference = ["https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/inventory-of-authorized-and-un
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Delivery", "Reconnaissance"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get First Occurrence and Last Occurrence of a MAC Address - Response Task"]
support_searches = ["batch - Count of assets by category"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Count of assets by category"]
data_models = ["Network_Sessions"]
providing_technologies = none
description = Keep a careful inventory of every asset on your network to make it easier to detect rogue devices. Unauthorized/unmanaged devices could be an indication of malicious behavior that should be investigated further.
@@ -182,8 +182,8 @@ version = 1
reference = ["https://www.zerofox.com/blog/what-is-digital-risk-monitoring/", "https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/consumer/family-safety/what-is-typosquatting/", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2016/06/explained-typosquatting/"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Delivery"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"]
support_searches = ["batch - DNSTwist Domain Names"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - DNSTwist Domain Names"]
data_models = ["Email", "Network_Resolution", "Web"]
providing_technologies = none
description = Detect and investigate activity that may indicate that an adversary is using faux domains to mislead users into interacting with malicious infrastructure. Monitor DNS, email, and web traffic for permutations of your brand name.
@@ -200,8 +200,8 @@ version = 1
reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 12", "CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1535"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP", "ID.AM"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task"]
support_searches = ["batch - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched", "batch - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Update", "batch - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Initial", "batch - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Update", "batch - Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Initial", "batch - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Destroyed", "batch - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Initial", "batch - Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Update", "batch - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Initial", "batch - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Update"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Update", "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Update", "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Destroyed", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Update"]
data_models = ["Change"]
providing_technologies = none
description = Monitor your cloud compute instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or compute instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior.
@@ -210,6 +210,43 @@ Cryptojacking has attracted an increasing amount of media attention since its ex
When malicious miners appropriate a cloud instance, often spinning up hundreds of new instances, the costs can become astronomical for the account holder. So it is critically important to monitor your systems for suspicious activities that could indicate that your network has been infiltrated. \
This Analytic Story is focused on detecting suspicious new instances in your cloud environment to help prevent cryptominers from gaining a foothold. It contains detection searches that will detect when a previously unused instance type or AMI is used. It also contains support searches to build lookup files to ensure proper execution of the detection searches.
[Cloud Federated Credential Abuse]
category = Cloud Security
creation_date = 2021-01-26
modification_date = 2021-01-26
id = cecdc1e7-0af2-4a55-8967-b9ea62c0317d
version = 1
reference = ["https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/golden-saml-newly-discovered-attack-technique-forges-authentication-to-cloud-apps", "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf", "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - AWS SAML Access by Provider User and Principal - Rule", "ESCU - AWS SAML Update identity provider - Rule", "ESCU - Certutil exe certificate extraction - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Via PowerShell And EventCode 4703 - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Added Service Principal - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Excessive SSO logon errors - Rule", "ESCU - O365 New Federated Domain Added - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16", "CIS 2", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objective", "Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001", "T1078", "T1136.003", "T1204.002", "T1546.012", "T1556"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.AC", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = []
support_searches = []
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
providing_technologies = none
description = This analytical story addresses events that indicate abuse of cloud federated credentials. These credentials are usually extracted from endpoint desktop or servers specially those servers that provide federation services such as Windows Active Directory Federation Services. Identity Federation relies on objects such as Oauth2 tokens, cookies or SAML assertions in order to provide seamless access between cloud and perimeter environments. If these objects are either hijacked or forged then attackers will be able to pivot into victim's cloud environements.
narrative = This story is composed of detection searches based on endpoint that addresses the use of Mimikatz, Escalation of Privileges and Abnormal processes that may indicate the extraction of Federated directory objects such as passwords, Oauth2 tokens, certificates and keys. Cloud environment (AWS, Azure) related events are also addressed in specific cloud environment detection searches.
[Cobalt Strike]
category = Adversary Tactics
creation_date = 2021-02-16
modification_date = 2021-02-16
id = bcfd17e8-5461-400a-80a2-3b7d1459220c
version = 1
reference = ["https://www.cobaltstrike.com/", "https://www.infocyte.com/blog/2020/09/02/cobalt-strike-the-new-favorite-among-thieves/", "https://bluescreenofjeff.com/2017-01-24-how-to-write-malleable-c2-profiles-for-cobalt-strike/", "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2020/09/coverage-strikes-back-cobalt-strike-paper.html", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/unauthorized-access-of-fireeye-red-team-tools.html"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 StartW - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 no CommandLine Arguments - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.011"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = []
support_searches = []
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
providing_technologies = none
description = Cobalt Strike is threat emulation software. Red teams and penetration testers use Cobalt Strike to demonstrate the risk of a breach and evaluate mature security programs. Most recently, Cobalt Strike has become the choice tool by threat groups due to its ease of use and extensibility.
narrative = This Analytic Story supports you to detect Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) from Cobalt Strike. Cobalt Strike has many ways to be enhanced by using aggressor scripts, malleable C2 profiles, default attack packages, and much more. For endpoint behavior, Cobalt Strike is most commonly identified via named pipes, spawn to processes, and DLL function names. On the network, depending on the malleable C2 profile used, it is near infinite in the amount of ways to conceal the C2 traffic with Cobalt Strike.\
In generating content for Cobalt Strike, the following is considered:\
1. Is it normal for <spawnto_ value> to have no command line arguments? No command line arguments and a network connection?\
1. What is the default, or normal, process lineage for <spawnto_ value>?\
1. Does the <spawnto_ value> make network connections?\
1. Is it normal for <spawnto_ value> to load jscript, vbscript, Amsi.dll, and clr.dll?.
[ColdRoot MacOS RAT]
category = Malware
creation_date = 2019-01-09
@@ -255,8 +292,8 @@ version = 1
reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Command_and_Control", "https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/feature/Command-and-control-servers-The-puppet-masters-that-govern-malware"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 11", "CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048", "T1048.003", "T1071.001", "T1071.004", "T1095", "T1189"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.AC", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
support_searches = ["batch - Baseline of blocked outbound traffic from AWS", "batch - Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of blocked outbound traffic from AWS", "ESCU - Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK"]
data_models = ["Network_Resolution", "Network_Traffic"]
providing_technologies = none
description = Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures leveraged by attackers to establish and operate command and control channels. Implants installed by attackers on compromised endpoints use these channels to receive instructions and send data back to the malicious operators.
@@ -303,9 +340,9 @@ modification_date = 2020-02-04
id = 854d78bf-d0e2-4f4e-b05c-640905f86d7a
version = 3
reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1003", "https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for.html"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", "ESCU - Create Remote Thread into LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS - Rule"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", "ESCU - Create Remote Thread into LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of lsass Dump with Taskmgr - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Ntdsutil export ntds - Rule", "ESCU - Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001", "T1003.002", "T1003.003", "T1059.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Previous Unseen User - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts - Response Task"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Previous Unseen User - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts - Response Task"]
support_searches = []
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
providing_technologies = none
@@ -323,8 +360,8 @@ version = 2
reference = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Create local admin accounts using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Single Letter Process On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 16", "CIS 2", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.002", "T1053.005", "T1059.001", "T1059.003", "T1071.002", "T1112", "T1136.001", "T1204.002", "T1543.003", "T1547.001", "T1562.004"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process File Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
support_searches = ["batch - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", "batch - Previously seen command line arguments"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process File Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments"]
data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"]
providing_technologies = none
description = Monitor for suspicious activities associated with DHS Technical Alert US-CERT TA18-074A. Some of the activities that adversaries used in these compromises included spearfishing attacks, malware, watering-hole domains, many and more.
@@ -360,7 +397,7 @@ reference = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insight
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS record changed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003", "T1071.004", "T1189"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - DNS Hijack Enrichment - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task"]
support_searches = ["batch - Discover DNS records"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Discover DNS records"]
data_models = ["Network_Resolution"]
providing_technologies = none
description = Secure your environment against DNS hijacks with searches that help you detect and investigate unauthorized changes to DNS records.
@@ -399,7 +436,7 @@ version = 1
reference = ["https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/data-protection/", "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/dns/splunk-detect-dns-tunneling-37022", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect USB device insertion - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003", "T1189"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.DS", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
support_searches = []
data_models = ["Change_Analysis", "Network_Resolution"]
providing_technologies = none
@@ -432,7 +469,7 @@ reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1089", "https://blog.malw
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Unload Sysmon Filter Driver - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112", "T1543.003", "T1553.004", "T1562.001", "T1562.004"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
support_searches = ["batch - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", "batch - Previously seen command line arguments"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments"]
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
providing_technologies = none
description = Looks for activities and techniques associated with the disabling of security tools on a Windows system, such as suspicious `reg.exe` processes, processes launching netsh, and many others.
@@ -447,7 +484,7 @@ version = 2
reference = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/", "http://www.noip.com/blog/2014/07/11/dynamic-dns-can-use-2/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/08/04/detecting-dynamic-dns-domains-in-splunk.html"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1071.001", "T1189"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "DE.DP", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task"]
support_searches = []
data_models = ["Network_Resolution", "Web"]
providing_technologies = none
@@ -463,8 +500,8 @@ version = 1
reference = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-201A", "https://www.first.org/resources/papers/conf2017/Advanced-Incident-Detection-and-Threat-Hunting-using-Sysmon-and-Splunk.pdf", "https://www.vkremez.com/2017/05/emotet-banking-trojan-malware-analysis.html"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of tools built by NirSoft - Rule", "ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 2", "CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Delivery", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.002", "T1059.003", "T1072", "T1547.001", "T1566.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
support_searches = ["batch - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK"]
data_models = ["Email", "Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"]
providing_technologies = none
description = Detect rarely used executables, specific registry paths that may confer malware survivability and persistence, instances where cmd.exe is used to launch script interpreters, and other indicators that the Emotet financial malware has compromised your environment.
@@ -515,8 +552,8 @@ version = 2
reference = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/HIDDEN-COBRA-North-Korean-Malicious-Cyber-Activity", "https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Destructive-Malware-Report.pdf"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious File Write - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 16", "CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001", "T1021.002", "T1048.003", "T1059.001", "T1059.003", "T1070.005", "T1071.002", "T1071.004"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Outbound Emails to Hidden Cobra Threat Actors - Response Task"]
support_searches = ["batch - Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK", "batch - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", "batch - Previously seen command line arguments"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Outbound Emails to Hidden Cobra Threat Actors - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments", "ESCU - Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK"]
data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Resolution", "Network_Traffic"]
providing_technologies = none
description = Monitor for and investigate activities, including the creation or deletion of hidden shares and file writes, that may be evidence of infiltration by North Korean government-sponsored cybercriminals. Details of this activity were reported in DHS Report TA-18-149A.
@@ -628,7 +665,7 @@ version = 2
reference = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/executive-perspective/2015/08/malware_lateral_move.html"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks - Rule", "ESCU - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001", "T1053.005", "T1550.002", "T1558.003"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
support_searches = []
data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"]
providing_technologies = none
@@ -648,7 +685,7 @@ version = 4
reference = ["https://blogs.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/malware-employs-powershell-to-infect-systems/", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Multiple Suspicious Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1027", "T1059.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
support_searches = []
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
providing_technologies = none
@@ -674,7 +711,7 @@ reference = ["https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/03/04/tracking-locky-ransomware-u
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Extended Period Without Successful Netbackup Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Unsuccessful Netbackup backups - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - All backup logs for host - Response Task"]
support_searches = ["batch - Monitor Unsuccessful Backups", "batch - Monitor Successful Backups"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Monitor Successful Backups", "ESCU - Monitor Unsuccessful Backups"]
data_models = []
providing_technologies = none
description = Address common concerns when monitoring your backup processes. These searches can help you reduce risks from ransomware, device theft, or denial of physical access to a host by backing up data on endpoints.
@@ -725,7 +762,7 @@ reference = ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/tn-archive/bb49
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Processes created by netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.004"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
support_searches = ["batch - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", "batch - Previously seen command line arguments"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments"]
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
providing_technologies = none
description = Detect activities and various techniques associated with the abuse of `netsh.exe`, which can disable local firewall settings or set up a remote connection to a host from an infected system.
@@ -739,8 +776,8 @@ modification_date = 2020-12-16
id = 1a51dd71-effc-48b2-abc4-3e9cdb61e5b9
version = 1
reference = ["https://i.blackhat.com/USA-20/Thursday/us-20-Bienstock-My-Cloud-Is-APTs-Cloud-Investigating-And-Defending-Office-365.pdf"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - High Number of Login Failures from a single source - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Bypass MFA via Trusted IP - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Disable MFA - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Excessive Authentication Failures Alert - Rule", "ESCU - O365 PST export alert - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious Rights Delegation - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objective", "Actions on Objectives", "Not Applicable"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110", "T1110.001", "T1114", "T1114.002", "T1114.003", "T1556", "T1562.007"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP"]}
detection_searches = ["ESCU - High Number of Login Failures from a single source - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Added Service Principal - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Bypass MFA via Trusted IP - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Disable MFA - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Excessive Authentication Failures Alert - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Excessive SSO logon errors - Rule", "ESCU - O365 New Federated Domain Added - Rule", "ESCU - O365 PST export alert - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious Rights Delegation - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objective", "Actions on Objectives", "Not Applicable"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110", "T1110.001", "T1114", "T1114.002", "T1114.003", "T1136.003", "T1556", "T1562.007"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP"]}
investigative_searches = []
support_searches = []
data_models = []
@@ -757,8 +794,8 @@ version = 2
reference = ["https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/orangeworm-targets-healthcare-us-europe-asia", "https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/healthcare-targeted-by-hacker/"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 2", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001", "T1059.003", "T1543.003", "T1569.002"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
support_searches = ["batch - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update", "batch - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial", "batch - Previously seen command line arguments"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments", "ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial"]
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
providing_technologies = none
description = Detect activities and various techniques associated with the Orangeworm Attack Group, a group that frequently targets the healthcare industry.
@@ -799,8 +836,8 @@ version = 1
reference = ["https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/scope-of-mudcarp-attacks-highlight-1/", "http://blog.amossys.fr/badflick-is-not-so-bad.html"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001", "T1059.003", "T1547.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
support_searches = ["batch - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK", "batch - Previously seen command line arguments"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments", "ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK"]
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
providing_technologies = none
description = Monitor your environment for suspicious behaviors that resemble the techniques employed by the MUDCARP threat group.
@@ -842,7 +879,7 @@ version = 1
reference = ["http://www.novetta.com/2015/02/advanced-methods-to-detect-advanced-cyber-attacks-protocol-abuse/"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048", "T1048.003", "T1071.001", "T1189"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.DS", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
support_searches = []
data_models = ["Network_Resolution", "Network_Traffic"]
providing_technologies = none
@@ -858,8 +895,8 @@ version = 1
reference = ["https://www.carbonblack.com/2017/06/28/carbon-black-threat-research-technical-analysis-petya-notpetya-ransomware/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2017/06/27/closing-the-detection-to-mitigation-gap-or-to-petya-or-notpetya-whocares-.html"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 10", "CIS 12", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 6", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.002", "T1036.003", "T1047", "T1048", "T1053.005", "T1070", "T1070.001", "T1071.001", "T1485", "T1490", "T1547.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "DE.DP", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
support_searches = ["batch - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", "batch - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", "ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK"]
data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"]
providing_technologies = none
description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to ransomware--spikes in SMB traffic, suspicious wevtutil usage, the presence of common ransomware extensions, and system processes run from unexpected locations, and many others.
@@ -940,7 +977,7 @@ version = 1
reference = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/an-in-depth-analysis-of-samsam-ransomware-and-boss-spider/", "https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2018/07/31/samsam-the-almost-6-million-ransomware/", "https://thehackernews.com/2018/07/samsam-ransomware-attacks.html"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Batch File Write to System32 - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - File with Samsam Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Samsam Test File Write - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 10", "CIS 12", "CIS 16", "CIS 18", "CIS 2", "CIS 3", "CIS 4", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Delivery", "Installation", "Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001", "T1021.002", "T1082", "T1204.002", "T1485", "T1486", "T1490"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "ID.RA", "PR.AC", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.MA", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
support_searches = []
data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic", "Web"]
providing_technologies = none
@@ -962,7 +999,7 @@ reference = ["https://meltdownattack.com/"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Spectre and Meltdown Vulnerable Systems - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 4"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "ID.RA", "PR.IP", "RS.MI"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
support_searches = ["batch - Systems Ready for Spectre-Meltdown Windows Patch"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Systems Ready for Spectre-Meltdown Windows Patch"]
data_models = ["Vulnerabilities"]
providing_technologies = none
description = Assess and mitigate your systems' vulnerability to Spectre and Meltdown exploitation with the searches in this Analytic Story.
@@ -1022,7 +1059,7 @@ reference = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive-attac
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ESCU - Sunburst Correlation DLL and Network Event - Rule", "ESCU - Supernova Webshell - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AdFind Exe - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 18", "CIS 2", "CIS 3", "CIS 4", "CIS 5", "CIS 6", "CIS 7", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Exfiltration", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018", "T1027", "T1053.005", "T1059.003", "T1071.001", "T1071.002", "T1203", "T1505.003", "T1543.003", "T1569.002"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "ID.RA", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = []
support_searches = ["batch - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update", "batch - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial"]
data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic", "Web"]
providing_technologies = none
description = Sunburst is a trojanized updates to SolarWinds Orion IT monitoring and management software. It was discovered by FireEye in December 2020. The actors behind this campaign gained access to numerous public and private organizations around the world.
@@ -1037,8 +1074,8 @@ version = 1
reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 12", "CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1535"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP", "ID.AM"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task"]
support_searches = ["batch - Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User", "batch - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK", "batch - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK", "batch - Previously Seen AWS Regions"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User", "ESCU - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Regions"]
data_models = []
providing_technologies = none
description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS EC2 instances for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as EC2 instances that originate from unusual locations or those launched by previously unseen users (among others). Included investigative searches will help you probe more deeply, when the information warrants it.
@@ -1054,7 +1091,7 @@ reference = ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integr
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new user AWS Console Login - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1535"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
support_searches = ["batch - Update previously seen users in CloudTrail", "batch - Previously seen users in CloudTrail"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Update previously seen users in CloudTrail", "ESCU - Previously seen users in CloudTrail"]
data_models = ["Authentication"]
providing_technologies = none
description = Monitor your AWS authentication events using your CloudTrail logs. Searches within this Analytic Story will help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious logins.
@@ -1069,8 +1106,8 @@ version = 2
reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/security-data-protection/cloud/public-aws-s3-buckets-writable/"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Open S3 buckets - Rule", "ESCU - Detect S3 access from a new IP - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13", "CIS 14"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1530"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "DE.DP", "PR.AC", "PR.DS"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task"]
support_searches = ["batch - Previously seen S3 bucket access by remote IP", "batch - Baseline of S3 Bucket deletion activity by ARN"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of S3 Bucket deletion activity by ARN", "ESCU - Previously seen S3 bucket access by remote IP"]
data_models = []
providing_technologies = none
description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS S3 buckets for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as detecting open S3 buckets and buckets being accessed from a new IP. The contextual and investigative searches will give you more information, when required.
@@ -1087,8 +1124,8 @@ version = 1
reference = ["https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/hiding-cloudcobalt-strike-beacon-c2-using-amazon-apis/"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
support_searches = ["batch - Baseline of blocked outbound traffic from AWS"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of blocked outbound traffic from AWS"]
data_models = []
providing_technologies = none
description = Leverage these searches to monitor your AWS network traffic for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as a spike in blocked outbound traffic in your virtual private cloud (VPC).
@@ -1107,7 +1144,7 @@ reference = ["https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-cloudtrail-now-tracks-cr
detection_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by New User - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP", "PR.AC", "PR.DS"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task"]
support_searches = ["batch - Previously Seen Users In CloudTrail - Update", "batch - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Update", "batch - Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail - Initial", "batch - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Initial"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Users In CloudTrail - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail - Initial"]
data_models = ["Authentication"]
providing_technologies = none
description = Monitor your cloud authentication events. Searches within this Analytic Story leverage the recent cloud updates to the Authentication data model to help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious login activity.
@@ -1124,7 +1161,7 @@ reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.p
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP", "ID.AM"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
support_searches = ["batch - Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Initial", "batch - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched", "batch - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Destroyed", "batch - Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Update"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Update", "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Destroyed", "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched"]
data_models = ["Change"]
providing_technologies = none
description = Monitor your cloud infrastructure provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your cloud environment.
@@ -1140,7 +1177,7 @@ reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.p
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
support_searches = ["batch - Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial", "batch - Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial"]
data_models = ["Change"]
providing_technologies = none
description = Monitor your cloud infrastructure provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your cloud environment.
@@ -1157,7 +1194,7 @@ reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.p
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "DE.DP", "ID.AM", "PR.AC"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
support_searches = ["batch - Baseline Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls Per User", "batch - Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Initial", "batch - Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Update", "batch - Baseline Of Cloud Security Group API Calls Per User"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Initial", "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Security Group API Calls Per User", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Update", "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls Per User"]
data_models = ["Change"]
providing_technologies = none
description = Detect and investigate suspicious activities by users and roles in your cloud environments.
@@ -1174,12 +1211,31 @@ reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1059", "https://www.micro
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036.003", "T1059.001", "T1059.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
support_searches = ["batch - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK", "batch - Previously seen command line arguments"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments", "ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK"]
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
providing_technologies = none
description = Leveraging the Windows command-line interface (CLI) is one of the most common attack techniques--one that is also detailed in the MITRE ATT&CK framework. Use this Analytic Story to help you identify unusual or suspicious use of the CLI on Windows systems.
narrative = The ability to execute arbitrary commands via the Windows CLI is a primary goal for the adversary. With access to the shell, an attacker can easily run scripts and interact with the target system. Often, attackers may only have limited access to the shell or may obtain access in unusual ways. In addition, malware may execute and interact with the CLI in ways that would be considered unusual and inconsistent with typical user activity. This provides defenders with opportunities to identify suspicious use and investigate, as appropriate. This Analytic Story contains various searches to help identify this suspicious activity, as well as others to aid you in deeper investigation.
[Suspicious Compiled HTML Activity]
category = Adversary Tactics
creation_date = 2021-02-11
modification_date = 2021-02-11
id = a09db4d1-3827-4833-87b8-3a397e532119
version = 1
reference = ["https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/001/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/htmlhelp/nf-htmlhelp-htmlhelpa"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect HTML Help Renamed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect HTML Help Spawn Child Process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect HTML Help URL in Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Detect HTML Help Using InfoTech Storage Handlers - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = []
support_searches = []
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
providing_technologies = none
description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe process to execute malicious code.
narrative = Adversaries may abuse Compiled HTML files (.chm) to conceal malicious code. CHM files are commonly distributed as part of the Microsoft HTML Help system. CHM files are compressed compilations of various content such as HTML documents, images, and scripting/web related programming languages such VBA, JScript, Java, and ActiveX. CHM content is displayed using underlying components of the Internet Explorer browser loaded by the HTML Help executable program (hh.exe). \
HH.exe relies upon hhctrl.ocx to load CHM topics.This will load upon execution of a chm file. \
During investigation, review all parallel processes and child processes. It is possible for file modification events to occur and it is best to capture the CHM file and decompile it for further analysis. \
Upon usage of InfoTech Storage Handlers, ms-its, its, mk, itss.dll will load.
[Suspicious DNS Traffic]
category = Adversary Tactics
creation_date = 2017-09-18
@@ -1189,8 +1245,8 @@ version = 1
reference = ["http://blogs.splunk.com/2015/10/01/random-words-on-entropy-and-dns/", "http://www.darkreading.com/analytics/security-monitoring/got-malware-three-signs-revealed-in-dns-traffic/d/d-id/1139680", "https://live.paloaltonetworks.com/t5/Threat-Vulnerability-Articles/What-are-suspicious-DNS-queries/ta-p/71454"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003", "T1071.004", "T1189"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task"]
support_searches = ["batch - Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK"]
data_models = ["Network_Resolution"]
providing_technologies = none
description = Attackers often attempt to hide within or otherwise abuse the domain name system (DNS). You can thwart attempts to manipulate this omnipresent protocol by monitoring for these types of abuses.
@@ -1205,8 +1261,8 @@ version = 1
reference = ["https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/06/26/phishing-hits-a-new-level-of-quality/"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 3", "CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.IP"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task"]
support_searches = ["batch - DNSTwist Domain Names"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - DNSTwist Domain Names"]
data_models = ["Email", "UEBA"]
providing_technologies = none
description = Email remains one of the primary means for attackers to gain an initial foothold within the modern enterprise. Detect and investigate suspicious emails in your environment with the help of the searches in this Analytic Story.
@@ -1222,7 +1278,7 @@ creation_date = 2020-08-05
modification_date = 2020-08-05
id = 4d656b2e-d6be-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003
version = 1
reference = ["https://cloud.google.com/blog/products/gcp/4-steps-for-hardening-your-cloud-storage-buckets-taking-charge-of-your-security", "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/gcp/google-cloud-platform-gcp-bucket-enumeration/"]
reference = ["https://cloud.google.com/blog/product/gcp/4-steps-for-hardening-your-cloud-storage-buckets-taking-charge-of-your-security", "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/gcp/google-cloud-platform-gcp-bucket-enumeration/"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect GCP Storage access from a new IP - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Open GCP Storage Buckets - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13", "CIS 14"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1530"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.DS"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
@@ -1242,13 +1298,19 @@ reference = ["https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/", "htt
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Detect mshta inline hta execution - Rule", "ESCU - Detect mshta renamed - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious mshta child process - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious mshta spawn - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.003", "T1218.005", "T1547.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
support_searches = ["batch - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK", "batch - Previously seen command line arguments"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments", "ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK"]
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
providing_technologies = none
description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe process to execute malicious code.
narrative = One common adversary tactic is to bypass application white-listing solutions via the mshta.exe process, which loads Microsoft HTML applications (mshtml.dll) with the .hta suffix. In these cases, attackers use the trusted Windows utility to proxy execution of malicious files, whether an .hta application, javascript, or VBScript.\
The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an attacker is leveraging mshta.exe to execute malicious code. \
Triage \ Validate execution \ 1. Determine if MSHTA.exe executed. Validate the OriginalFileName of MSHTA.exe and further PE metadata. If executed outside of c:\windows\system32 or c:\windows\syswow64, it should be highly suspect. 2. Determine if script code was executed with MSHTA. \ Situational Awareness \ The objective of this step is meant to identify suspicious behavioral indicators related to executed of Script code by MSHTA.exe. \ 1. Parent process. Is the parent process a known LOLBin? Is the parent process an Office Application? 2. Module loads. Are the known MSHTA.exe modules being loaded by a non-standard application? Is MSHTA loading any suspicious .DLLs? 3. Network connections. Any network connections? Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain. \ Retrieval of script code \ The objective of this step is to confirm the executed script code is benign or malicious.
narrative = One common adversary tactic is to bypass application control solutions via the mshta.exe process, which loads Microsoft HTML applications (mshtml.dll) with the .hta suffix. In these cases, attackers use the trusted Windows utility to proxy execution of malicious files, whether an .hta application, javascript, or VBScript.\
The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an attacker is leveraging mshta.exe to execute malicious code.\
Triage\ Validate execution \ 1. Determine if MSHTA.exe executed. Validate the OriginalFileName of MSHTA.exe and further PE metadata. If executed outside of c:\windows\system32 or c:\windows\syswow64, it should be highly suspect.\
1. Determine if script code was executed with MSHTA.\
Situational Awareness\ The objective of this step is meant to identify suspicious behavioral indicators related to executed of Script code by MSHTA.exe.\
1. Parent process. Is the parent process a known LOLBin? Is the parent process an Office Application?\
1. Module loads. Are the known MSHTA.exe modules being loaded by a non-standard application? Is MSHTA loading any suspicious .DLLs?\
1. Network connections. Any network connections? Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain.\
Retrieval of script code\ The objective of this step is to confirm the executed script code is benign or malicious.
[Suspicious Okta Activity]
category = Adversary Tactics
@@ -1257,9 +1319,9 @@ modification_date = 2020-04-02
id = 9cbd34af-8f39-4476-a423-bacd126c750b
version = 1
reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1078", "https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Credential_stuffing", "https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/answer/What-is-a-password-spraying-attack-and-how-does-it-work"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentails From The Same IP - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Account Lockout Events - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Failed SSO Attempts - Rule", "ESCU - Okta User Logins From Multiple Cities - Rule"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentials From The Same IP - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Account Lockout Events - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Failed SSO Attempts - Rule", "ESCU - Okta User Logins From Multiple Cities - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate User Activities In Okta - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by app - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address - Response Task"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by app - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate User Activities In Okta - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address - Response Task"]
support_searches = []
data_models = []
providing_technologies = none
@@ -1268,6 +1330,54 @@ narrative = Okta is the leading single sign on (SSO) provider, allowing users to
While SSO is a major convenience for users, it also provides attackers with an opportunity. If the attacker can gain access to Okta, they can access a variety of applications. As such monitoring the environment is important. \
With people moving quickly to adopt web-based applications and ways to manage them, many are still struggling to understand how best to monitor these environments. This analytic story provides searches to help monitor this environment, and identify events and activity that warrant further investigation such as credential stuffing or password spraying attacks, and users logging in from multiple locations when travel is disallowed.
[Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity]
category = Adversary Tactics
creation_date = 2021-02-11
modification_date = 2021-02-11
id = 2cdf33a0-4805-4b61-b025-59c20f418fbe
version = 1
reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009/", "https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/blob/master/documentation/modules/evasion/windows/applocker_evasion_regasm_regsvcs.md", "https://oddvar.moe/2017/12/13/applocker-case-study-how-insecure-is-it-really-part-1/"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Regasm Spawning a Process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regasm with Network Connection - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regasm with no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regsvcs Spawning a Process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regsvcs with Network Connection - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regsvcs with No Command Line Arguments - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.009"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = []
support_searches = []
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
providing_technologies = none
description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe process to execute malicious code.
narrative = Adversaries may abuse Regsvcs and Regasm to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. Regsvcs and Regasm are Windows command-line utilities that are used to register .NET Component Object Model (COM) assemblies. Both are digitally signed by Microsoft. The following queries assist with detecting suspicious and malicious usage of Regasm.exe and Regsvcs.exe. Upon reviewing usage of Regasm.exe Regsvcs.exe, review file modification events for possible script code written. Review parallel process events for csc.exe being utilized to compile script code.
[Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity]
category = Adversary Tactics
creation_date = 2021-01-29
modification_date = 2021-01-29
id = b8bee41e-624f-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
version = 1
reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.010/T1218.010.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvr32/"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Regsvr32 Register Suspicious Path - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.010"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
investigative_searches = []
support_searches = []
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
providing_technologies = none
description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the regsvr32.exe process to execute malicious code.
narrative = One common adversary tactic is to bypass application control solutions via the regsvr32.exe process. This particular bypass was popularized with "SquiblyDoo" using the "scrobj.dll" dll to load .sct scriptlets. This technique is still widely used by adversaries to bypass detection and prevention controls. The file extension of the DLL is irrelevant (it may load a .txt file extension for example). The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an adversary is leveraging regsvr32.exe to execute malicious code. Validate execution Determine if regsvr32.exe executed. Validate the OriginalFileName of regsvr32.exe and further PE metadata. If executed outside of c:\windows\system32 or c:\windows\syswow64, it should be highly suspect. Determine if script code was executed with regsvr32. Situational Awareness - The objective of this step is meant to identify suspicious behavioral indicators related to executed of Script code by regsvr32.exe. Parent process. Is the parent process a known LOLBin? Is the parent process an Office Application? Module loads. Is regsvr32 loading any suspicious .DLLs? Unsigned or signed from non-standard paths. Network connections. Any network connections? Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain. Retrieval of Script Code - confirm the executed script code is benign or malicious.
[Suspicious Rundll32 Activity]
category = Adversary Tactics
creation_date = 2021-02-03
modification_date = 2021-02-03
id = 80a65487-854b-42f1-80a1-935e4c170694
version = 1
reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - advpack - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - setupapi - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - syssetup - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 StartW - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 dllregisterserver - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 no CommandLine Arguments - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001", "T1036.003", "T1218.011"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = []
support_searches = []
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
providing_technologies = none
description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage rundll32.exe to execute arbitrary malicious code.
narrative = One common adversary tactic is to bypass application control solutions via the rundll32.exe process. Natively, rundll32.exe will load DLLs and is a great example of a Living off the Land Binary. Rundll32.exe may load malicious DLLs by ordinals, function names or directly. The queries in this story focus on loading default DLLs, syssetup.dll, ieadvpack.dll, advpack.dll and setupapi.dll from disk that may be abused by adversaries. Additionally, two analytics developed to assist with identifying DLLRegisterServer, Start and StartW functions being called. The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an adversary is leveraging rundll32.exe to execute malicious code.
[Suspicious WMI Use]
category = Adversary Tactics
creation_date = 2018-10-23
@@ -1277,7 +1387,7 @@ version = 2
reference = ["https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Graeber-Abusing-Windows-Management-Instrumentation-WMI-To-Build-A-Persistent%20Asynchronous-And-Fileless-Backdoor-wp.pdf", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/wmimplant_a_wmi_ba.html"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Process Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - Script Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Temporary Event Subscription - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047", "T1546.003"], "nist": ["PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
support_searches = []
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
providing_technologies = none
@@ -1314,7 +1424,7 @@ reference = ["https://blog.rapid7.com/2020/04/02/dispelling-zoom-bugbears-what-y
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Child Process of Zoom - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.003", "T1068"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process File Activity - Response Task"]
support_searches = ["batch - Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Update", "batch - Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Initial"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Update"]
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
providing_technologies = none
description = Attackers are using Zoom as an vector to increase privileges on a sytems. This story detects new child processes of zoom and provides investigative actions for this detection.
@@ -1352,10 +1462,20 @@ support_searches = []
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
providing_technologies = none
description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the msbuild.exe process to execute malicious code.
narrative = Adversaries may use MSBuild to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. MSBuild.exe (Microsoft Build Engine) is a software build platform used by Visual Studio and is native to Windows. It handles XML formatted project files that define requirements for loading and building various platforms and configurations. \
The inline task capability of MSBuild that was introduced in .NET version 4 allows for C# code to be inserted into an XML project file. MSBuild will compile and execute the inline task. MSBuild.exe is a signed Microsoft binary, so when it is used this way it can execute arbitrary code and bypass application control defenses that are configured to allow MSBuild.exe execution. \
The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an adversary is leveraging msbuild.exe to execute malicious code. \
Triage \ Validate execution \ 1. Determine if MSBuild.exe executed. Validate the OriginalFileName of MSBuild.exe and further PE metadata. 2. Determine if script code was executed with MSBuild. Situational Awareness \ The objective of this step is meant to identify suspicious behavioral indicators related to executed of Script code by MSBuild.exe. \ 1. Parent process. Is the parent process a known LOLBin? Is the parent process an Office Application? 2. Module loads. Are the known MSBuild.exe modules being loaded by a non-standard application? Is MSbuild loading any suspicious .DLLs? 3. Network connections. Any network connections? Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain. \ Retrieval of script code \ The objective of this step is to confirm the executed script code is benign or malicious.
narrative = Adversaries may use MSBuild to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. MSBuild.exe (Microsoft Build Engine) is a software build platform used by Visual Studio and is native to Windows. It handles XML formatted project files that define requirements for loading and building various platforms and configurations.\
The inline task capability of MSBuild that was introduced in .NET version 4 allows for C# code to be inserted into an XML project file. MSBuild will compile and execute the inline task. MSBuild.exe is a signed Microsoft binary, so when it is used this way it can execute arbitrary code and bypass application control defenses that are configured to allow MSBuild.exe execution.\
The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an adversary is leveraging msbuild.exe to execute malicious code.\
Triage\
Validate execution\
1. Determine if MSBuild.exe executed. Validate the OriginalFileName of MSBuild.exe and further PE metadata.\
1. Determine if script code was executed with MSBuild.\
Situational Awareness\
The objective of this step is meant to identify suspicious behavioral indicators related to executed of Script code by MSBuild.exe.\
1. Parent process. Is the parent process a known LOLBin? Is the parent process an Office Application?\
1. Module loads. Are the known MSBuild.exe modules being loaded by a non-standard application? Is MSbuild loading any suspicious .DLLs?\
1. Network connections. Any network connections? Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain.\
Retrieval of script code\
The objective of this step is to confirm the executed script code is benign or malicious.
[Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications]
category = Cloud Security
@@ -1366,8 +1486,8 @@ version = 1
reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - EC2 Instance Modified With Previously Unseen User - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
support_searches = ["batch - Previously Seen EC2 Modifications By User"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Modifications By User"]
data_models = []
providing_technologies = none
description = Identify unusual changes to your AWS EC2 instances that may indicate malicious activity. Modifications to your EC2 instances by previously unseen users is an example of an activity that may warrant further investigation.
@@ -1384,7 +1504,7 @@ reference = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/08/monitoring-wi
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 2", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1016", "T1036.003", "T1204.002", "T1218.011"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
support_searches = ["batch - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK"]
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
providing_technologies = none
description = Quickly identify systems running new or unusual processes in your environment that could be indicators of suspicious activity. Processes run from unusual locations, those with conspicuously long command lines, and rare executables are all examples of activities that may warrant deeper investigation.
@@ -1417,7 +1537,7 @@ version = 1
reference = ["https://www.fbi.gov/scams-and-safety/common-fraud-schemes/internet-fraud", "https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2017-internet-crime-report-released-050718"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Web Fraud - Account Harvesting - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Anomalous User Clickspeed - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Password Sharing Across Accounts - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16", "CIS 6"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1136"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "DE.DP"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Web Session Information via session id - Response Task"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Web Session Information via session id - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task"]
support_searches = []
data_models = []
providing_technologies = none
@@ -1505,7 +1625,7 @@ modification_date = 2018-05-31
id = 30874d4f-20a1-488f-85ec-5d52ef74e3f9
version = 2
reference = ["http://www.fuzzysecurity.com/tutorials/19.html", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2010/07/malware-persistence-windows-registry.html", "http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/common-malware-persistence-mechanisms/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/fin7-shim-databases-persistence.html", "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dq2Hv7J9fvk"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters - Rule"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Certutil exe certificate extraction - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005", "T1222.001", "T1543.003", "T1546.011", "T1547.001", "T1547.010", "T1564.001", "T1574.009", "T1574.011"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
support_searches = []
@@ -1540,7 +1660,7 @@ reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1050", "https://attack.mi
detection_searches = ["ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 2", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543.003", "T1569.002", "T1574.011"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
support_searches = ["batch - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update", "batch - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial"]
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
providing_technologies = none
description = Windows services are often used by attackers for persistence and the ability to load drivers or otherwise interact with the Windows kernel. This Analytic Story helps you monitor your environment for indications that Windows services are being modified or created in a suspicious manner.
package/default/analyticstories.conf
+503 -108
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package/default/app.conf
+2 -2
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@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
is_configured = false
state = enabled
state_change_requires_restart = false
build = 18409
build = 19704
[triggers]
reload.analytic_stories = simple
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ reload.content-version = simple
[launcher]
author = Splunk
version = 3.14.0
version = 3.15.0
description = Explore the Analytic Stories included with ES Content Updates.
[ui]
package/default/collections.conf
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
#############
# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
# On Date: 2021-02-04T23:39:18 UTC
# On Date: 2021-02-18T18:09:13 UTC
# Author: Splunk Security Research
# Contact: research@splunk.com
#############
package/default/content-version.conf
+1 -1
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@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
[content-version]
version = 3.14.0
version = 3.15.0
package/default/es_investigations.conf
+73 -31
View File
@@ -4,35 +4,35 @@ label = AWS Cross Account Activity
description = Track when a user assumes an IAM role in another AWS account to obtain cross-account access to services and resources in that account. Accessing new roles could be an indication of malicious activity.
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_accesskeyid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_accesskeyid___response_task"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_aws_cryptomining]
label = AWS Cryptomining
description = Monitor your AWS EC2 instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or EC2 instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior.
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name___response_task"]
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name___response_task"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_aws_network_acl_activity]
label = AWS Network ACL Activity
description = Monitor your AWS network infrastructure for bad configurations and malicious activity. Investigative searches help you probe deeper, when the facts warrant it.
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task"]
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_aws_security_hub_alerts]
label = AWS Security Hub Alerts
description = This story is focused around detecting Security Hub alerts generated from AWS
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task"]
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details___response_task"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_aws_suspicious_provisioning_activities]
label = AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities
description = Monitor your AWS provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your network.
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_country___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_region___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_city___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest___response_task"]
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_country___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_city___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_region___response_task"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_aws_user_monitoring]
label = AWS User Monitoring
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ label = Apache Struts Vulnerability
description = Detect and investigate activities--such as unusually long `Content-Type` length, suspicious java classes and web servers executing suspicious processes--consistent with attempts to exploit Apache Struts vulnerabilities.
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_suspicious_strings_in_http_header___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_posts_from_src___response_task"]
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_suspicious_strings_in_http_header___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_posts_from_src___response_task"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_asset_tracking]
label = Asset Tracking
@@ -67,14 +67,28 @@ label = Brand Monitoring
description = Detect and investigate activity that may indicate that an adversary is using faux domains to mislead users into interacting with malicious infrastructure. Monitor DNS, email, and web traffic for permutations of your brand name.
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_email_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_emails_from_specific_sender___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task"]
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_email_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_emails_from_specific_sender___response_task"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_cloud_cryptomining]
label = Cloud Cryptomining
description = Monitor your cloud compute instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or compute instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior.
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest___response_task"]
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest___response_task"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_cloud_federated_credential_abuse]
label = Cloud Federated Credential Abuse
description = This analytical story addresses events that indicate abuse of cloud federated credentials. These credentials are usually extracted from endpoint desktop or servers specially those servers that provide federation services such as Windows Active Directory Federation Services. Identity Federation relies on objects such as Oauth2 tokens, cookies or SAML assertions in order to provide seamless access between cloud and perimeter environments. If these objects are either hijacked or forged then attackers will be able to pivot into victim's cloud environements.
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_cobalt_strike]
label = Cobalt Strike
description = Cobalt Strike is threat emulation software. Red teams and penetration testers use Cobalt Strike to demonstrate the risk of a breach and evaluate mature security programs. Most recently, Cobalt Strike has become the choice tool by threat groups due to its ease of use and extensibility.
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_coldroot_macos_rat]
label = ColdRoot MacOS RAT
@@ -95,7 +109,7 @@ label = Command and Control
description = Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures leveraged by attackers to establish and operate command and control channels. Implants installed by attackers on compromised endpoints use these channels to receive instructions and send data back to the malicious operators.
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task"]
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_common_phishing_frameworks]
label = Common Phishing Frameworks
@@ -116,14 +130,14 @@ label = Credential Dumping
description = Uncover activity consistent with credential dumping, a technique wherein attackers compromise systems and attempt to obtain and exfiltrate passwords. The threat actors use these pilfered credentials to further escalate privileges and spread throughout a target environment. The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify attempts to credential dumping.
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_failed_logins_for_multiple_destinations___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_previous_unseen_user___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_ticket_attempts___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_hash_attempts___response_task"]
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_failed_logins_for_multiple_destinations___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_previous_unseen_user___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_hash_attempts___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_ticket_attempts___response_task"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_dhs_report_ta18_074a]
label = DHS Report TA18-074A
description = Monitor for suspicious activities associated with DHS Technical Alert US-CERT TA18-074A. Some of the activities that adversaries used in these compromises included spearfishing attacks, malware, watering-hole domains, many and more.
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_file_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task"]
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_file_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_dns_amplification_attacks]
label = DNS Amplification Attacks
@@ -151,7 +165,7 @@ label = Data Protection
description = Fortify your data-protection arsenal--while continuing to ensure data confidentiality and integrity--with searches that monitor for and help you investigate possible signs of data exfiltration.
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task"]
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_detect_zerologon_attack]
label = Detect Zerologon Attack
@@ -172,14 +186,14 @@ label = Dynamic DNS
description = Detect and investigate hosts in your environment that may be communicating with dynamic domain providers. Attackers may leverage these services to help them avoid firewall blocks and deny lists.
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task"]
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_emotet_malware__dhs_report_ta18_201a_]
label = Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A
description = Detect rarely used executables, specific registry paths that may confer malware survivability and persistence, instances where cmd.exe is used to launch script interpreters, and other indicators that the Emotet financial malware has compromised your environment.
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task"]
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_f5_tmui_rce_cve_2020_5902]
label = F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902
@@ -200,7 +214,7 @@ label = Hidden Cobra Malware
description = Monitor for and investigate activities, including the creation or deletion of hidden shares and file writes, that may be evidence of infiltration by North Korean government-sponsored cybercriminals. Details of this activity were reported in DHS Report TA-18-149A.
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_outbound_emails_to_hidden_cobra_threat_actors___response_task"]
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_outbound_emails_to_hidden_cobra_threat_actors___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_host_redirection]
label = Host Redirection
@@ -242,14 +256,14 @@ label = Lateral Movement
description = Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures around how attackers move laterally within the enterprise. Because lateral movement can expose the adversary to detection, it should be an important focus for security analysts.
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task"]
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_malicious_powershell]
label = Malicious PowerShell
description = Attackers are finding stealthy ways "live off the land," leveraging utilities and tools that come standard on the endpoint--such as PowerShell--to achieve their goals without downloading binary files. These searches can help you detect and investigate PowerShell command-line options that may be indicative of malicious intent.
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task"]
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_monitor_backup_solution]
label = Monitor Backup Solution
@@ -291,7 +305,7 @@ label = Orangeworm Attack Group
description = Detect activities and various techniques associated with the Orangeworm Attack Group, a group that frequently targets the healthcare industry.
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task"]
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_phishing_payloads]
label = Phishing Payloads
@@ -305,21 +319,21 @@ label = Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns
description = Monitor your environment for suspicious behaviors that resemble the techniques employed by the MUDCARP threat group.
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task"]
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_prohibited_traffic_allowed_or_protocol_mismatch]
label = Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch
description = Detect instances of prohibited network traffic allowed in the environment, as well as protocols running on non-standard ports. Both of these types of behaviors typically violate policy and can be leveraged by attackers.
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task"]
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_ransomware]
label = Ransomware
description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to ransomware--spikes in SMB traffic, suspicious wevtutil usage, the presence of common ransomware extensions, and system processes run from unexpected locations, and many others.
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_sysmon_wmi_activity_for_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_backup_logs_for_endpoint___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task"]
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_sysmon_wmi_activity_for_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_backup_logs_for_endpoint___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_ransomware_cloud]
label = Ransomware Cloud
@@ -354,7 +368,7 @@ label = SamSam Ransomware
description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the SamSam ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with SamSam, RDP brute force attacks, the presence of files with SamSam ransomware extensions, suspicious psexec use, and more.
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_backup_logs_for_endpoint___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task"]
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_backup_logs_for_endpoint___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerabilities]
label = Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities
@@ -389,7 +403,7 @@ label = Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities
description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS EC2 instances for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as EC2 instances that originate from unusual locations or those launched by previously unseen users (among others). Included investigative searches will help you probe more deeply, when the information warrants it.
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest___response_task"]
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest___response_task"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_aws_login_activities]
label = Suspicious AWS Login Activities
@@ -403,14 +417,14 @@ label = Suspicious AWS S3 Activities
description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS S3 buckets for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as detecting open S3 buckets and buckets being accessed from a new IP. The contextual and investigative searches will give you more information, when required.
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_s3_bucket_details_via_bucketname___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task"]
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_s3_bucket_details_via_bucketname___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_aws_traffic]
label = Suspicious AWS Traffic
description = Leverage these searches to monitor your AWS network traffic for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as a spike in blocked outbound traffic in your virtual private cloud (VPC).
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task"]
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_cloud_authentication_activities]
label = Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities
@@ -447,19 +461,26 @@ disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_compiled_html_activity]
label = Suspicious Compiled HTML Activity
description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe process to execute malicious code.
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_dns_traffic]
label = Suspicious DNS Traffic
description = Attackers often attempt to hide within or otherwise abuse the domain name system (DNS). You can thwart attempts to manipulate this omnipresent protocol by monitoring for these types of abuses.
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task"]
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_emails]
label = Suspicious Emails
description = Email remains one of the primary means for attackers to gain an initial foothold within the modern enterprise. Detect and investigate suspicious emails in your environment with the help of the searches in this Analytic Story.
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_email_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_emails_from_specific_sender___response_task"]
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_email_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_emails_from_specific_sender___response_task"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_gcp_storage_activities]
label = Suspicious GCP Storage Activities
@@ -480,14 +501,35 @@ label = Suspicious Okta Activity
description = Monitor your Okta environment for suspicious activities. Due to the Covid outbreak, many users are migrating over to leverage cloud services more and more. Okta is a popular tool to manage multiple users and the web-based applications they need to stay productive. The searches in this story will help monitor your Okta environment for suspicious activities and associated user behaviors.
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_user_activities_in_okta___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_okta_activity_by_app___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_okta_activity_by_ip_address___response_task"]
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_okta_activity_by_app___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_user_activities_in_okta___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_okta_activity_by_ip_address___response_task"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_regsvcs_regasm_activity]
label = Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity
description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe process to execute malicious code.
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_regsvr32_activity]
label = Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity
description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the regsvr32.exe process to execute malicious code.
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_rundll32_activity]
label = Suspicious Rundll32 Activity
description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage rundll32.exe to execute arbitrary malicious code.
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_wmi_use]
label = Suspicious WMI Use
description = Attackers are increasingly abusing Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI), a framework and associated utilities available on all modern Windows operating systems. Because WMI can be leveraged to manage both local and remote systems, it is important to identify the processes executed and the user context within which the activity occurred.
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_sysmon_wmi_activity_for_host___response_task"]
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_sysmon_wmi_activity_for_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_windows_registry_activities]
label = Suspicious Windows Registry Activities
@@ -522,7 +564,7 @@ label = Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications
description = Identify unusual changes to your AWS EC2 instances that may indicate malicious activity. Modifications to your EC2 instances by previously unseen users is an example of an activity that may warrant further investigation.
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task"]
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_unusual_processes]
label = Unusual Processes
@@ -543,7 +585,7 @@ label = Web Fraud Detection
description = Monitor your environment for activity consistent with common attack techniques bad actors use when attempting to compromise web servers or other web-related assets.
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_emails_from_specific_sender___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_web_session_information_via_session_id___response_task"]
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_web_session_information_via_session_id___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_emails_from_specific_sender___response_task"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_windows_dns_sigred_cve_2020_1350]
label = Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350
package/default/macros.conf
+122 -2
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
#############
# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
# On Date: 2021-02-04T23:39:19 UTC
# On Date: 2021-02-18T18:09:13 UTC
# Author: Splunk Security Research
# Contact: research@splunk.com
#############
@@ -331,6 +331,14 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[aws_saml_access_by_provider_user_and_principal_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[aws_saml_update_identity_provider_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
@@ -399,6 +407,10 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[certutil_exe_certificate_extraction_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
@@ -479,6 +491,10 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
@@ -579,6 +595,22 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[detect_html_help_renamed_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[detect_html_help_spawn_child_process_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[detect_html_help_url_in_command_line_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[detect_html_help_using_infotech_storage_handlers_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
@@ -651,10 +683,50 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[detect_regasm_spawning_a_process_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[detect_regasm_with_network_connection_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[detect_regasm_with_no_command_line_arguments_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[detect_regsvcs_spawning_a_process_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[detect_regsvcs_with_network_connection_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[detect_regsvcs_with_no_command_line_arguments_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[detect_rogue_dhcp_server_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___advpack_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___setupapi_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___syssetup_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
@@ -779,6 +851,14 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[dump_lsass_via_procdump_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[dump_lsass_via_procdump_rename_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
@@ -1007,7 +1087,7 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentails_from_the_same_ip_filter]
[multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentials_from_the_same_ip_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
@@ -1023,6 +1103,18 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[ntdsutil_export_ntds_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[o365_added_service_principal_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
@@ -1035,6 +1127,14 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[o365_new_federated_domain_added_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[o365_pst_export_alert_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
@@ -1271,6 +1371,26 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[suspicious_rundll32_rename_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[suspicious_rundll32_startw_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[suspicious_rundll32_no_commandline_arguments_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
package/default/savedsearches.conf
+1464 -1848
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File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
package/default/transforms.conf
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
#############
# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
# On Date: 2021-02-04T23:39:18 UTC
# On Date: 2021-02-18T18:09:13 UTC
# Author: Splunk Security Research
# Contact: research@splunk.com
#############
package/default/use_case_library.conf
+503 -108
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File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
package/lookups/rare_process_allow_list_default.csv
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
process,whitelist
process,allow_list
splunk-regmon.exe,true
winword.exe,true
excel.exe,true
1 process whitelist allow_list
2 splunk-regmon.exe true true
3 winword.exe true true
4 excel.exe true true
package/lookups/rare_process_allow_list_local.csv
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1 +1 @@
process,whitelist
process,allow_list
1 process whitelist allow_list