Branch was auto-updated.

2026-06-08 17:32:49 +00:00 · 2021-07-13 11:25:41 +00:00
parent b75979da3f bff9ce0626
commit 8bcd3f7bbe
10 changed files with 917 additions and 273 deletions
@@ -77,10 +77,9 @@ def test_detection(ssh_key_name, private_key, splunk_ip, splunk_password, test_f

        replay_attack_dataset(splunk_ip, splunk_password, ssh_key_name, folder_name, 'test' + str(test_index), attack_data['sourcetype'], attack_data['source'], attack_data['file_name'])

-    time.sleep(60)
+    time.sleep(200)

    result_test = {}
-
    test = test_file_obj['tests'][0]

    if 'baselines' in test:
@@ -12,15 +12,10 @@ description: 'The following analytic identifies the use of WMI Event Subscriptio
  (WmiPrvSe.exe) and thus may result in elevated SYSTEM privileges. This analytic
  is restricted by commonly added process execution and a path. If the volume is low
  enough, remove the values and flag on any new subscriptions.
-
-  All event subscriptions have three components \
-
-  1. Filter - WQL Query for the events we want. EventID = 19 \
-
-  1. Consumer - An action to take upon triggering the filter. EventID = 20 \
-
-  1. Binding - Registers a filter to a consumer. EventID = 21 \
-
+  All event subscriptions have three components
+  Filter - WQL Query for the events we want. EventID equals 19
+  Consumer - An action to take upon triggering the filter. EventID equals 20
+  Binding - Registers a filter to a consumer. EventID equals 21
  Monitor for the creation of new WMI EventFilter, EventConsumer, and FilterToConsumerBinding.
  It may be pertinent to review all 3 to identify the flow of execution. In addition,
  EventCode 4104 may assist with any other PowerShell script usage that registered
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
-# On Date: 2021-07-02T15:44:59 UTC
+# On Date: 2021-07-13T07:57:29 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Security Research
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
@@ -792,7 +792,7 @@ modification_date = 2017-08-23
 id = 2c8ff66e-0b57-42af-8ad7-912438a403fc
 version = 5
 reference = ["https://blogs.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/malware-employs-powershell-to-infect-systems/", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/"]
-detection_searches = ["ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadFile - Rule", "ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Empire with PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz With PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Multiple Suspicious Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell Domain Enumeration - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell Loading DotNET into Memory via System Reflection Assembly - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Creating Thread Mutex - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Fileless Process Injection via GetProcAddress - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Processing Stream Of Data - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Using memory As Backing Store - Rule", "ESCU - Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Recon Using WMI Class - Rule", "ESCU - Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Unloading AMSI via Reflection - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Recon Running Process Or Services - Rule"]
+detection_searches = ["ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadFile - Rule", "ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Empire with PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz With PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Multiple Suspicious Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell Domain Enumeration - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell Loading DotNET into Memory via System Reflection Assembly - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Creating Thread Mutex - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Fileless Process Injection via GetProcAddress - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Processing Stream Of Data - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Using memory As Backing Store - Rule", "ESCU - Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Recon Using WMI Class - Rule", "ESCU - Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Unloading AMSI via Reflection - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Recon Running Process Or Services - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Exploitation", "Installation", "Privilege Escalation", "Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003", "T1027", "T1027.005", "T1055", "T1059.001", "T1140", "T1562", "T1592"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
 investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
@@ -1032,8 +1032,8 @@ modification_date = 2020-02-04
 id = cf309d0d-d4aa-4fbb-963d-1e79febd3756
 version = 1
 reference = ["https://www.carbonblack.com/2017/06/28/carbon-black-threat-research-technical-analysis-petya-notpetya-ransomware/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2017/06/27/closing-the-detection-to-mitigation-gap-or-to-petya-or-notpetya-whocares-.html"]
-detection_searches = ["ESCU - Allow Operation with Consent Admin - Rule", "ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", "ESCU - CMLUA Or CMSTPLUA UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Clear Unallocated Sector Using Cipher App - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Conti Common Exec parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Detect RClone Command-Line Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Renamed RClone - Rule", "ESCU - Detect SharpHound Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Detect SharpHound File Modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Detect SharpHound Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Logs Using WevtUtil - Rule", "ESCU - Known Services Killed by Ransomware - Rule", "ESCU - Modification Of Wallpaper - Rule", "ESCU - Permission Modification using Takeown App - Rule", "ESCU - Prevent Automatic Repair Mode using Bcdedit - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Revil Common Exec Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Revil Registry Entry - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Start Up During Safe Mode Boot - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Wbemprox COM Object Execution - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule"]
-mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 10", "CIS 12", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 6", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Delivery", "Exfiltration", "Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation", "Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1020", "T1021.002", "T1036.003", "T1047", "T1048", "T1053.005", "T1069.001", "T1069.002", "T1070", "T1070.001", "T1070.004", "T1071.001", "T1087.001", "T1087.002", "T1112", "T1204", "T1218.003", "T1222", "T1482", "T1485", "T1490", "T1491", "T1547.001", "T1548", "T1592"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "DE.DP", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
+detection_searches = ["ESCU - Allow File And Printing Sharing In Firewall - Rule", "ESCU - Allow Network Discovery In Firewall - Rule", "ESCU - Allow Operation with Consent Admin - Rule", "ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", "ESCU - CMLUA Or CMSTPLUA UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Clear Unallocated Sector Using Cipher App - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Conti Common Exec parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Detect RClone Command-Line Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Renamed RClone - Rule", "ESCU - Detect SharpHound Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Detect SharpHound File Modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Detect SharpHound Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Disable AMSI Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disable ETW Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Logs Using WevtUtil - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Service Stop Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Net App - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage Of SC Service Utility - Rule", "ESCU - Execute Javascript With Jscript COM CLSID - Rule", "ESCU - ICACLS Grant Command - Rule", "ESCU - Known Services Killed by Ransomware - Rule", "ESCU - Modification Of Wallpaper - Rule", "ESCU - Msmpeng Application DLL Side Loading - Rule", "ESCU - Permission Modification using Takeown App - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Disable Security Monitoring - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature - Rule", "ESCU - Prevent Automatic Repair Mode using Bcdedit - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Recursive Delete of Directory In Batch CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Revil Common Exec Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Revil Registry Entry - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Start Up During Safe Mode Boot - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Wbemprox COM Object Execution - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule"]
+mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 10", "CIS 12", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 6", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Delivery", "Exfiltration", "Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation", "Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1020", "T1021.002", "T1027.005", "T1036.003", "T1047", "T1048", "T1053.005", "T1059.005", "T1069.001", "T1069.002", "T1070", "T1070.001", "T1070.004", "T1071.001", "T1087.001", "T1087.002", "T1112", "T1204", "T1218.003", "T1222", "T1482", "T1485", "T1489", "T1490", "T1491", "T1531", "T1547.001", "T1548", "T1562.001", "T1562.007", "T1569.002", "T1574.002", "T1592"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "DE.DP", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
 investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task"]
 support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK", "ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK"]
 data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"]
@@ -1066,8 +1066,8 @@ modification_date = 2021-06-04
 id = 817cae42-f54b-457a-8a36-fbf45521e29e
 version = 1
 reference = ["https://krebsonsecurity.com/2021/05/a-closer-look-at-the-darkside-ransomware-gang/", "https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/mcafee-atr-analyzes-sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware-as-a-service-what-the-code-tells-us/"]
-detection_searches = ["ESCU - Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Modification Of Wallpaper - Rule", "ESCU - Revil Common Exec Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Revil Registry Entry - Rule", "ESCU - Wbemprox COM Object Execution - Rule"]
-mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112", "T1204", "T1218.003", "T1490", "T1491"]}
+detection_searches = ["ESCU - Allow Network Discovery In Firewall - Rule", "ESCU - Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring - Rule", "ESCU - Modification Of Wallpaper - Rule", "ESCU - Msmpeng Application DLL Side Loading - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Disable Security Monitoring - Rule", "ESCU - Revil Common Exec Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Revil Registry Entry - Rule", "ESCU - Wbemprox COM Object Execution - Rule"]
+mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112", "T1204", "T1218.003", "T1490", "T1491", "T1562.001", "T1562.007", "T1574.002"]}
 investigative_searches = []
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
-# On Date: 2021-07-02T15:44:59 UTC
+# On Date: 2021-07-13T07:57:29 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Security Research
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
-# On Date: 2021-07-02T15:44:59 UTC
+# On Date: 2021-07-13T07:57:29 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Security Research
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
@@ -431,6 +431,10 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
 definition = search *
 description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 

+[allow_file_and_printing_sharing_in_firewall_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 
+
 [allow_inbound_traffic_by_firewall_rule_registry_filter]
 definition = search *
 description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 
@@ -439,6 +443,10 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
 definition = search *
 description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 

+[allow_network_discovery_in_firewall_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 
+
 [allow_operation_with_consent_admin_filter]
 definition = search *
 description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 
@@ -1047,6 +1055,14 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
 definition = search *
 description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 

+[disable_amsi_through_registry_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 
+
+[disable_etw_through_registry_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 
+
 [disable_logs_using_wevtutil_filter]
 definition = search *
 description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 
@@ -1195,6 +1211,10 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
 definition = search *
 description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 

+[excessive_usage_of_sc_service_utility_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 
+
 [excessive_usage_of_taskkill_filter]
 definition = search *
 description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 
@@ -1219,6 +1239,10 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
 definition = search *
 description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 

+[execute_javascript_with_jscript_com_clsid_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 
+
 [execution_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension_filter]
 definition = search *
 description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 
@@ -1463,6 +1487,10 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
 definition = search *
 description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 

+[msmpeng_application_dll_side_loading_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 
+
 [multiple_archive_files_http_post_traffic_filter]
 definition = search *
 description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 
@@ -1651,6 +1679,14 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
 definition = search *
 description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 

+[powershell_disable_security_monitoring_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 
+
+[powershell_enable_smb1protocol_feature_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 
+
 [powershell_fileless_process_injection_via_getprocaddress_filter]
 definition = search *
 description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 
@@ -1739,6 +1775,10 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
 definition = search *
 description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 

+[recursive_delete_of_directory_in_batch_cmd_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 
+
 [reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys_filter]
 definition = search *
 description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
-# On Date: 2021-07-02T15:44:59 UTC
+# On Date: 2021-07-13T07:57:29 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Security Research
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
@@ -1411,6 +1411,47 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name="net.exe" OR Processes.process_name="net1.exe" AND (Processes.process="*user*" OR  Processes.process="*config*" OR Processes.process="*view /all*") by  Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name | where count >=5 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `account_discovery_with_net_app_filter`

+[ESCU - Allow File And Printing Sharing In Firewall - Rule]
+action.escu = 0
+action.escu.enabled = 1
+description = This search is to detect a suspicious modification of firewall to allow file and printer sharing. This technique was seen in ransomware to be able to discover more machine connected to the compromised host to encrypt more files
+action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.007"]}
+action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"]
+action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect a suspicious modification of firewall to allow file and printer sharing. This technique was seen in ransomware to be able to discover more machine connected to the compromised host to encrypt more files
+action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.
+action.escu.known_false_positives = network admin may modify this firewall feature that may cause this rule to be triggered.
+action.escu.creation_date = 2021-06-23
+action.escu.modification_date = 2021-06-23
+action.escu.confidence = high
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Allow File And Printing Sharing In Firewall - Rule
+action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
+action.escu.providing_technologies = []
+action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ransomware"]
+cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
+dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
+dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
+action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Allow File And Printing Sharing In Firewall - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.007"]}
+schedule_window = auto
+action.notable = 1
+action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest']
+action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to detect a suspicious modification of firewall to allow file and printer sharing. This technique was seen in ransomware to be able to discover more machine connected to the compromised host to encrypt more files
+action.notable.param.rule_title = Allow File And Printing Sharing In Firewall
+action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint
+action.notable.param.severity = high
+alert.digest_mode = 1
+disabled = true
+enableSched = 1
+allow_skew = 100%
+counttype = number of events
+relation = greater than
+quantity = 0
+realtime_schedule = 0
+is_visible = false
+search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=netsh.exe Processes.process= "*firewall*" Processes.process= "*group=\"File and Printer Sharing\"*"  Processes.process="*enable=Yes*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `allow_file_and_printing_sharing_in_firewall_filter`
+
 [ESCU - Allow Inbound Traffic By Firewall Rule Registry - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
@@ -1492,6 +1533,47 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = "*firewall*" Message = "*Public*" Message = "*Inbound*" Message = "*Allow*"  Message = "*-LocalPort*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `allow_inbound_traffic_in_firewall_rule_filter`

+[ESCU - Allow Network Discovery In Firewall - Rule]
+action.escu = 0
+action.escu.enabled = 1
+description = This search is to detect a suspicious modification to the firewall to allow network discovery on a machine. This technique was seen in couple of ransomware (revil, reddot) to discover other machine connected to the compromised host to encrypt more files.
+action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.007"]}
+action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"]
+action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect a suspicious modification to the firewall to allow network discovery on a machine. This technique was seen in couple of ransomware (revil, reddot) to discover other machine connected to the compromised host to encrypt more files.
+action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.
+action.escu.known_false_positives = network admin may modify this firewall feature that may cause this rule to be triggered.
+action.escu.creation_date = 2021-06-23
+action.escu.modification_date = 2021-06-23
+action.escu.confidence = high
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Allow Network Discovery In Firewall - Rule
+action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
+action.escu.providing_technologies = []
+action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ransomware", "Revil Ransomware"]
+cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
+dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
+dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
+action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Allow Network Discovery In Firewall - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Revil Ransomware"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.007"]}
+schedule_window = auto
+action.notable = 1
+action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest']
+action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to detect a suspicious modification to the firewall to allow network discovery on a machine. This technique was seen in couple of ransomware (revil, reddot) to discover other machine connected to the compromised host to encrypt more files.
+action.notable.param.rule_title = Allow Network Discovery In Firewall
+action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint
+action.notable.param.severity = high
+alert.digest_mode = 1
+disabled = true
+enableSched = 1
+allow_skew = 100%
+counttype = number of events
+relation = greater than
+quantity = 0
+realtime_schedule = 0
+is_visible = false
+search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=netsh.exe Processes.process= "*firewall*" Processes.process= "*group=\"Network Discovery\"*"  Processes.process="*enable*" Processes.process="*Yes*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `allow_network_discovery_in_firewall_filter`
+
 [ESCU - Allow Operation with Consent Admin - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
@@ -3828,7 +3910,7 @@ relation = greater than
 quantity = 0
 realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
-search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 Message= "*ShadowCopy*" Message = "*Delete*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `delete_shadowcopy_with_powershell_filter`
+search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 Message= "*ShadowCopy*" (Message = "*Delete*" OR Message = "*Remove*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `delete_shadowcopy_with_powershell_filter`

 [ESCU - Deleting Of Net Users - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
@@ -7241,20 +7323,10 @@ search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.proces
 [ESCU - Detect WMI Event Subscription Persistence - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
-description = The following analytic identifies the use of WMI Event Subscription to establish persistence or perform privilege escalation.  WMI can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. WMI subscription execution is proxied by the WMI Provider Host process (WmiPrvSe.exe) and thus may result in elevated SYSTEM privileges. This analytic is restricted by commonly added process execution and a path. If the volume is low enough, remove the values and flag on any new subscriptions.
-All event subscriptions have three components \
-1. Filter - WQL Query for the events we want. EventID = 19 \
-1. Consumer - An action to take upon triggering the filter. EventID = 20 \
-1. Binding - Registers a filter to a consumer. EventID = 21 \
-Monitor for the creation of new WMI EventFilter, EventConsumer, and FilterToConsumerBinding. It may be pertinent to review all 3 to identify the flow of execution. In addition, EventCode 4104 may assist with any other PowerShell script usage that registered the subscription.
+description = The following analytic identifies the use of WMI Event Subscription to establish persistence or perform privilege escalation.  WMI can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. WMI subscription execution is proxied by the WMI Provider Host process (WmiPrvSe.exe) and thus may result in elevated SYSTEM privileges. This analytic is restricted by commonly added process execution and a path. If the volume is low enough, remove the values and flag on any new subscriptions. All event subscriptions have three components 1. Filter - WQL Query for the events we want. EventID = 19 1. Consumer - An action to take upon triggering the filter. EventID = 20 1. Binding - Registers a filter to a consumer. EventID = 21 Monitor for the creation of new WMI EventFilter, EventConsumer, and FilterToConsumerBinding. It may be pertinent to review all 3 to identify the flow of execution. In addition, EventCode 4104 may assist with any other PowerShell script usage that registered the subscription.
 action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.003"]}
 action.escu.data_models = []
-action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies the use of WMI Event Subscription to establish persistence or perform privilege escalation.  WMI can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. WMI subscription execution is proxied by the WMI Provider Host process (WmiPrvSe.exe) and thus may result in elevated SYSTEM privileges. This analytic is restricted by commonly added process execution and a path. If the volume is low enough, remove the values and flag on any new subscriptions.
-All event subscriptions have three components \
-1. Filter - WQL Query for the events we want. EventID = 19 \
-1. Consumer - An action to take upon triggering the filter. EventID = 20 \
-1. Binding - Registers a filter to a consumer. EventID = 21 \
-Monitor for the creation of new WMI EventFilter, EventConsumer, and FilterToConsumerBinding. It may be pertinent to review all 3 to identify the flow of execution. In addition, EventCode 4104 may assist with any other PowerShell script usage that registered the subscription.
+action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies the use of WMI Event Subscription to establish persistence or perform privilege escalation.  WMI can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. WMI subscription execution is proxied by the WMI Provider Host process (WmiPrvSe.exe) and thus may result in elevated SYSTEM privileges. This analytic is restricted by commonly added process execution and a path. If the volume is low enough, remove the values and flag on any new subscriptions. All event subscriptions have three components 1. Filter - WQL Query for the events we want. EventID = 19 1. Consumer - An action to take upon triggering the filter. EventID = 20 1. Binding - Registers a filter to a consumer. EventID = 21 Monitor for the creation of new WMI EventFilter, EventConsumer, and FilterToConsumerBinding. It may be pertinent to review all 3 to identify the flow of execution. In addition, EventCode 4104 may assist with any other PowerShell script usage that registered the subscription.
 action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with that provide WMI Event Subscription from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA and have enabled EventID 19, 20 and 21. Tune and filter known good to limit the volume.
 action.escu.known_false_positives = It is possible some applications will create a consumer and may be required to be filtered. For tuning, add any additional LOLBin's for further depth of coverage.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-06-16
@@ -7273,12 +7345,7 @@ action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect WMI Event Subscription Persistenc
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious WMI Use"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.003"]}
 schedule_window = auto
 action.notable = 1
-action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies the use of WMI Event Subscription to establish persistence or perform privilege escalation.  WMI can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. WMI subscription execution is proxied by the WMI Provider Host process (WmiPrvSe.exe) and thus may result in elevated SYSTEM privileges. This analytic is restricted by commonly added process execution and a path. If the volume is low enough, remove the values and flag on any new subscriptions.
-All event subscriptions have three components \
-1. Filter - WQL Query for the events we want. EventID = 19 \
-1. Consumer - An action to take upon triggering the filter. EventID = 20 \
-1. Binding - Registers a filter to a consumer. EventID = 21 \
-Monitor for the creation of new WMI EventFilter, EventConsumer, and FilterToConsumerBinding. It may be pertinent to review all 3 to identify the flow of execution. In addition, EventCode 4104 may assist with any other PowerShell script usage that registered the subscription.
+action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies the use of WMI Event Subscription to establish persistence or perform privilege escalation.  WMI can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. WMI subscription execution is proxied by the WMI Provider Host process (WmiPrvSe.exe) and thus may result in elevated SYSTEM privileges. This analytic is restricted by commonly added process execution and a path. If the volume is low enough, remove the values and flag on any new subscriptions. All event subscriptions have three components 1. Filter - WQL Query for the events we want. EventID = 19 1. Consumer - An action to take upon triggering the filter. EventID = 20 1. Binding - Registers a filter to a consumer. EventID = 21 Monitor for the creation of new WMI EventFilter, EventConsumer, and FilterToConsumerBinding. It may be pertinent to review all 3 to identify the flow of execution. In addition, EventCode 4104 may assist with any other PowerShell script usage that registered the subscription.
 action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect WMI Event Subscription Persistence
 action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint
 action.notable.param.severity = high
@@ -7878,6 +7945,88 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) values(Processes.process) as process max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process="* /stext *" OR Processes.process="* /scomma *" ) by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft_filter`

+[ESCU - Disable AMSI Through Registry - Rule]
+action.escu = 0
+action.escu.enabled = 1
+description = this search is to identify modification in registry to disable AMSI windows feature to evade detections. This technique was seen in several ransomware, RAT and even APT to impaire defenses of the compromise machine and to be able to execute payload with minimal alert as much as possible.
+action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"]}
+action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"]
+action.escu.eli5 = this search is to identify modification in registry to disable AMSI windows feature to evade detections. This technique was seen in several ransomware, RAT and even APT to impaire defenses of the compromise machine and to be able to execute payload with minimal alert as much as possible.
+action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.
+action.escu.known_false_positives = network operator may disable this feature of windows but not so common.
+action.escu.creation_date = 2021-06-22
+action.escu.modification_date = 2021-06-22
+action.escu.confidence = high
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Disable AMSI Through Registry - Rule
+action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
+action.escu.providing_technologies = []
+action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ransomware"]
+cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
+dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
+dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
+action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Disable AMSI Through Registry - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"]}
+schedule_window = auto
+action.notable = 1
+action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest']
+action.notable.param.rule_description = this search is to identify modification in registry to disable AMSI windows feature to evade detections. This technique was seen in several ransomware, RAT and even APT to impaire defenses of the compromise machine and to be able to execute payload with minimal alert as much as possible.
+action.notable.param.rule_title = Disable AMSI Through Registry
+action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint
+action.notable.param.severity = high
+alert.digest_mode = 1
+disabled = true
+enableSched = 1
+allow_skew = 100%
+counttype = number of events
+relation = greater than
+quantity = 0
+realtime_schedule = 0
+is_visible = false
+search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= "*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows Script\\Settings\\AmsiEnable" Registry.registry_value_name = "DWORD (0x00000000)" by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disable_amsi_through_registry_filter`
+
+[ESCU - Disable ETW Through Registry - Rule]
+action.escu = 0
+action.escu.enabled = 1
+description = this search is to identify modification in registry to disable ETW windows feature to evade detections. This technique was seen in several ransomware, RAT and even APT to impaire defenses of the compromise machine and to be able to execute payload with minimal alert as much as possible.
+action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"]}
+action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"]
+action.escu.eli5 = this search is to identify modification in registry to disable ETW windows feature to evade detections. This technique was seen in several ransomware, RAT and even APT to impaire defenses of the compromise machine and to be able to execute payload with minimal alert as much as possible.
+action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.
+action.escu.known_false_positives = network operator may disable this feature of windows but not so common.
+action.escu.creation_date = 2021-06-22
+action.escu.modification_date = 2021-06-22
+action.escu.confidence = high
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Disable ETW Through Registry - Rule
+action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
+action.escu.providing_technologies = []
+action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ransomware"]
+cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
+dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
+dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
+action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Disable ETW Through Registry - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"]}
+schedule_window = auto
+action.notable = 1
+action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest']
+action.notable.param.rule_description = this search is to identify modification in registry to disable ETW windows feature to evade detections. This technique was seen in several ransomware, RAT and even APT to impaire defenses of the compromise machine and to be able to execute payload with minimal alert as much as possible.
+action.notable.param.rule_title = Disable ETW Through Registry
+action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint
+action.notable.param.severity = high
+alert.digest_mode = 1
+disabled = true
+enableSched = 1
+allow_skew = 100%
+counttype = number of events
+relation = greater than
+quantity = 0
+realtime_schedule = 0
+is_visible = false
+search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= "*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\.NETFramework\\ETWEnabled" Registry.registry_value_name = "DWORD (0x00000000)" by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disable_etw_through_registry_filter`
+
 [ESCU - Disable Logs Using WevtUtil - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
@@ -8058,13 +8207,13 @@ action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
-action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"]
+action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Ransomware", "Revil Ransomware"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring - Rule
-action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"]}
+action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Ransomware", "Revil Ransomware"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"]}
 schedule_window = auto
 action.notable = 1
 action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest']
@@ -8081,7 +8230,7 @@ relation = greater than
 quantity = 0
 realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
-search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= "*\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Real-Time Protection\\DisableBehaviorMonitoring" OR Registry.registry_path= "*\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Real-Time Protection\\DisableOnAccessProtection" OR Registry.registry_path= "*\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Real-Time Protection\\DisableScanOnRealtimeEnable" Registry.registry_value_name = "DWORD (0x00000001)" by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disable_windows_behavior_monitoring_filter`
+search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= "*\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Real-Time Protection\\DisableBehaviorMonitoring" OR Registry.registry_path= "*\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Real-Time Protection\\DisableOnAccessProtection" OR Registry.registry_path= "*\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Real-Time Protection\\DisableScanOnRealtimeEnable" OR Registry.registry_path= "*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Real-Time Protection\\DisableRealtimeMonitoring" OR Registry.registry_path= "*\\Real-Time Protection\\DisableIntrusionPreventionSystem" OR Registry.registry_path= "*\\Real-Time Protection\\DisableIOAVProtection" OR Registry.registry_path= "*\\Real-Time Protection\\DisableScriptScanning" Registry.registry_value_name = "DWORD (0x00000001)" by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disable_windows_behavior_monitoring_filter`

 [ESCU - Disable Windows SmartScreen Protection - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
@@ -9303,13 +9452,13 @@ action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Excessive Service Stop Attempt - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
-action.escu.analytic_story = ["XMRig"]
+action.escu.analytic_story = ["XMRig", "Ransomware"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Excessive Service Stop Attempt - Rule
-action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["XMRig"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1489"]}
+action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["XMRig", "Ransomware"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1489"]}
 schedule_window = auto
 action.notable = 1
 action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest']
@@ -9326,7 +9475,7 @@ relation = greater than
 quantity = 0
 realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
-search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime  from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = "net.exe" OR  Processes.process_name = "sc.exe" OR  Processes.process_name = "net1.exe" AND Processes.process="*stop*" OR Processes.process="*/delete*" by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user _time span=1m | where count >=5 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_service_stop_attempt_filter`
+search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime  from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = "net.exe" OR  Processes.process_name = "sc.exe" OR  Processes.process_name = "net1.exe" AND Processes.process="*stop*" OR Processes.process="*delete*" by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user _time span=1m | where count >=5 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_service_stop_attempt_filter`

 [ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Cacls App - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
@@ -9385,13 +9534,13 @@ action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Net App - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
-action.escu.analytic_story = ["XMRig"]
+action.escu.analytic_story = ["XMRig", "Ransomware"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Net App - Rule
-action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["XMRig"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1531"]}
+action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["XMRig", "Ransomware"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1531"]}
 schedule_window = auto
 action.notable = 1
 action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest']
@@ -9410,6 +9559,46 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime  from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = "net.exe" OR Processes.process_name = "net1.exe" by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user _time span=1m | where count >=10 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_usage_of_net_app_filter`

+[ESCU - Excessive Usage Of SC Service Utility - Rule]
+action.escu = 0
+action.escu.enabled = 1
+description = This search is to detect a suspicious excessive usage of sc.exe in a host machine. This technique was seen in several ransomware , xmrig and other malware to create, modify, delete or disable a service may related to security application or to gain privilege escalation.
+action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1569.002"]}
+action.escu.data_models = []
+action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect a suspicious excessive usage of sc.exe in a host machine. This technique was seen in several ransomware , xmrig and other malware to create, modify, delete or disable a service may related to security application or to gain privilege escalation.
+action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed taskkill.exe may be used.
+action.escu.known_false_positives = excessive execution of sc.exe is quite suspicious since it can modify or execute app in high privilege permission.
+action.escu.creation_date = 2021-06-24
+action.escu.modification_date = 2021-06-24
+action.escu.confidence = high
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Excessive Usage Of SC Service Utility - Rule
+action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
+action.escu.providing_technologies = []
+action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ransomware"]
+cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
+dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
+dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
+action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Excessive Usage Of SC Service Utility - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1569.002"]}
+schedule_window = auto
+action.notable = 1
+action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to detect a suspicious excessive usage of sc.exe in a host machine. This technique was seen in several ransomware , xmrig and other malware to create, modify, delete or disable a service may related to security application or to gain privilege escalation.
+action.notable.param.rule_title = Excessive Usage Of SC Service Utility
+action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint
+action.notable.param.severity = high
+alert.digest_mode = 1
+disabled = true
+enableSched = 1
+allow_skew = 100%
+counttype = number of events
+relation = greater than
+quantity = 0
+realtime_schedule = 0
+is_visible = false
+search = `sysmon` EventCode = 1 process_name = "sc.exe" |  bucket _time span=15m | stats values(process) as process count as numScExe by Computer, _time |  eventstats avg(numScExe) as avgScExe, stdev(numScExe) as stdScExe, count as numSlots by Computer |  eval upperThreshold=(avgScExe + stdScExe *3) |  eval isOutlier=if(avgScExe > 5 and avgScExe >= upperThreshold, 1, 0) |  search isOutlier=1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_usage_of_sc_service_utility_filter`
+
 [ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Taskkill - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
@@ -9655,6 +9844,47 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = |tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where (Filesystem.file_name = *.exe OR Filesystem.file_name = *.dll OR Filesystem.file_name = *.sys OR Filesystem.file_name = *.com OR Filesystem.file_name = *.vbs OR Filesystem.file_name = *.vbe OR Filesystem.file_name = *.js OR Filesystem.file_name = *.ps1 OR Filesystem.file_name = *.bat OR Filesystem.file_name = *.cmd OR Filesystem.file_name = *.pif) AND ( Filesystem.file_path = *\\windows\\fonts\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\windows\\temp\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\users\\public\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\windows\\debug\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\Users\\Administrator\\Music\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\Windows\\servicing\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\Users\\Default\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *Recycle.bin* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\Windows\\Media\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\Windows\\repair\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\AppData\\Local\\Temp*) by Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.process_id  Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `executables_or_script_creation_in_suspicious_path_filter`

+[ESCU - Execute Javascript With Jscript COM CLSID - Rule]
+action.escu = 0
+action.escu.enabled = 1
+description = This analytic will identify suspicious process of cscript.exe where it tries to execute javascript using jscript.encode CLSID (COM OBJ). This technique was seen in ransomware (reddot ransomware) where it execute javascript with this com object with combination of amsi disabling technique.
+action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.005"]}
+action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"]
+action.escu.eli5 = This analytic will identify suspicious process of cscript.exe where it tries to execute javascript using jscript.encode CLSID (COM OBJ). This technique was seen in ransomware (reddot ransomware) where it execute javascript with this com object with combination of amsi disabling technique.
+action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the Filesystem responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Filesystem` node.
+action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
+action.escu.creation_date = 2021-06-22
+action.escu.modification_date = 2021-06-22
+action.escu.confidence = high
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Execute Javascript With Jscript COM CLSID - Rule
+action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
+action.escu.providing_technologies = []
+action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ransomware"]
+cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
+dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
+dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
+action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Execute Javascript With Jscript COM CLSID - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.005"]}
+schedule_window = auto
+action.notable = 1
+action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest']
+action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic will identify suspicious process of cscript.exe where it tries to execute javascript using jscript.encode CLSID (COM OBJ). This technique was seen in ransomware (reddot ransomware) where it execute javascript with this com object with combination of amsi disabling technique.
+action.notable.param.rule_title = Execute Javascript With Jscript COM CLSID
+action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint
+action.notable.param.severity = high
+alert.digest_mode = 1
+disabled = true
+enableSched = 1
+allow_skew = 100%
+counttype = number of events
+relation = greater than
+quantity = 0
+realtime_schedule = 0
+is_visible = false
+search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = "cscript.exe" Processes.process="*-e:{F414C262-6AC0-11CF-B6D1-00AA00BBBB58}*" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process Processes.process_id Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `execute_javascript_with_jscript_com_clsid_filter`
+
 [ESCU - Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
@@ -10578,13 +10808,13 @@ action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - ICACLS Grant Command - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
-action.escu.analytic_story = ["XMRig"]
+action.escu.analytic_story = ["XMRig", "Ransomware"]
 cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - ICACLS Grant Command - Rule
-action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["XMRig"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1222"]}
+action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["XMRig", "Ransomware"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1222"]}
 schedule_window = auto
 action.notable = 1
 action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest']
@@ -12142,6 +12372,47 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Web.url) as urls min(_time) as firstTime from datamodel=Web by Web.src | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `brand_abuse_web` | `monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse_filter`

+[ESCU - Msmpeng Application DLL Side Loading - Rule]
+action.escu = 0
+action.escu.enabled = 1
+description = This search is to detect a suspicious creation of msmpeng.exe or mpsvc.dll in non default windows defender folder. This technique was seen couple days ago with revil ransomware in Kaseya Supply chain. The approach is to drop an old version of msmpeng.exe to load the actual payload name as mspvc.dll which will load the revil ransomware to the compromise machine
+action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1574.002"]}
+action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"]
+action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect a suspicious creation of msmpeng.exe or mpsvc.dll in non default windows defender folder. This technique was seen couple days ago with revil ransomware in Kaseya Supply chain. The approach is to drop an old version of msmpeng.exe to load the actual payload name as mspvc.dll which will load the revil ransomware to the compromise machine
+action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the Filesystem responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Filesystem` node.
+action.escu.known_false_positives = quite minimal false positive expected.
+action.escu.creation_date = 2021-07-05
+action.escu.modification_date = 2021-07-05
+action.escu.confidence = high
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Msmpeng Application DLL Side Loading - Rule
+action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
+action.escu.providing_technologies = []
+action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ransomware", "Revil Ransomware"]
+cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
+dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
+dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
+action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Msmpeng Application DLL Side Loading - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Revil Ransomware"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1574.002"]}
+schedule_window = auto
+action.notable = 1
+action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user']
+action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to detect a suspicious creation of msmpeng.exe or mpsvc.dll in non default windows defender folder. This technique was seen couple days ago with revil ransomware in Kaseya Supply chain. The approach is to drop an old version of msmpeng.exe to load the actual payload name as mspvc.dll which will load the revil ransomware to the compromise machine
+action.notable.param.rule_title = Msmpeng Application DLL Side Loading
+action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint
+action.notable.param.severity = high
+alert.digest_mode = 1
+disabled = true
+enableSched = 1
+allow_skew = 100%
+counttype = number of events
+relation = greater than
+quantity = 0
+realtime_schedule = 0
+is_visible = false
+search = |tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where (Filesystem.file_name = "msmpeng.exe" OR Filesystem.file_name = "mpsvc.dll")  AND Filesystem.file_path != "*\\Program Files\\windows defender\\*" by Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.process_id  Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `msmpeng_application_dll_side_loading_filter`
+
 [ESCU - Multiple Archive Files Http Post Traffic - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
@@ -14149,6 +14420,87 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = "*Threading.Mutex*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_creating_thread_mutex_filter`

+[ESCU - Powershell Disable Security Monitoring - Rule]
+action.escu = 0
+action.escu.enabled = 1
+description = This search is to identifies a modification in registry to disable the windows denfender real time behavior monitoring. This event or technique is commonly seen in RAT, bot, or Trojan to disable AV to evade detections.
+action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"]}
+action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"]
+action.escu.eli5 = This search is to identifies a modification in registry to disable the windows denfender real time behavior monitoring. This event or technique is commonly seen in RAT, bot, or Trojan to disable AV to evade detections.
+action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
+action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited false positives. However, tune based on scripts that may perform this action.
+action.escu.creation_date = 2021-07-05
+action.escu.modification_date = 2021-07-05
+action.escu.confidence = high
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Powershell Disable Security Monitoring - Rule
+action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
+action.escu.providing_technologies = []
+action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ransomware", "Revil Ransomware"]
+cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
+dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
+dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
+action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Powershell Disable Security Monitoring - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Revil Ransomware"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"]}
+schedule_window = auto
+action.notable = 1
+action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest']
+action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to identifies a modification in registry to disable the windows denfender real time behavior monitoring. This event or technique is commonly seen in RAT, bot, or Trojan to disable AV to evade detections.
+action.notable.param.rule_title = Powershell Disable Security Monitoring
+action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint
+action.notable.param.severity = high
+alert.digest_mode = 1
+disabled = true
+enableSched = 1
+allow_skew = 100%
+counttype = number of events
+relation = greater than
+quantity = 0
+realtime_schedule = 0
+is_visible = false
+search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "sqlps.exe", "sqltoolsps.exe") Processes.process="*set-mppreference*" AND Processes.process IN ("*disablerealtimemonitoring*","*disableioavprotection*","*disableintrusionpreventionsystem*","*disablescriptscanning*","*disableblockatfirstseen*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_disable_security_monitoring_filter`
+
+[ESCU - Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature - Rule]
+action.escu = 0
+action.escu.enabled = 1
+description = This search is to detect a suspicious enabling of smb1protocol through "powershell.exe". This technique was seen in some ransomware (like reddot) where it enable smb share to do the lateral movement and encrypt other files within the compromise network system.
+action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1027.005"]}
+action.escu.data_models = []
+action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect a suspicious enabling of smb1protocol through "powershell.exe". This technique was seen in some ransomware (like reddot) where it enable smb share to do the lateral movement and encrypt other files within the compromise network system.
+action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the powershell logs  from your endpoints. make sure you enable needed registry to monitor this event.
+action.escu.known_false_positives = network operator may enable or disable this windows feature.
+action.escu.creation_date = 2021-06-22
+action.escu.modification_date = 2021-06-22
+action.escu.confidence = high
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature - Rule
+action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
+action.escu.providing_technologies = []
+action.escu.analytic_story = ["Malicious PowerShell", "Ransomware"]
+cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
+dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
+dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
+action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell", "Ransomware"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1027.005"]}
+schedule_window = auto
+action.notable = 1
+action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to detect a suspicious enabling of smb1protocol through "powershell.exe". This technique was seen in some ransomware (like reddot) where it enable smb share to do the lateral movement and encrypt other files within the compromise network system.
+action.notable.param.rule_title = Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature
+action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint
+action.notable.param.severity = high
+alert.digest_mode = 1
+disabled = true
+enableSched = 1
+allow_skew = 100%
+counttype = number of events
+relation = greater than
+quantity = 0
+realtime_schedule = 0
+is_visible = false
+search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = "*Enable-WindowsOptionalFeature*" Message = "*SMB1Protocol*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_enable_smb1protocol_feature_filter`
+
 [ESCU - Powershell Fileless Process Injection via GetProcAddress - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
@@ -15085,6 +15437,47 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message= "*SELECT*" OR Message= "*Get-WmiObject*") AND (Message= "*Win32_Bios*" OR Message= "*Win32_OperatingSystem*" OR Message= "*Win32_Processor*" OR Message= "*Win32_ComputerSystem*" OR Message= "*Win32_ComputerSystemProduct*" OR Message= "*Win32_ShadowCopy*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `recon_using_wmi_class_filter`

+[ESCU - Recursive Delete of Directory In Batch CMD - Rule]
+action.escu = 0
+action.escu.enabled = 1
+description = This search is to detect a suspicious commandline designed to delete files or directory recursive using batch command. This technique was seen in ransomware (reddot) where it it tries to delete the files in recycle bin to impaire user from recovering deleted files.
+action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070.004"]}
+action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"]
+action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect a suspicious commandline designed to delete files or directory recursive using batch command. This technique was seen in ransomware (reddot) where it it tries to delete the files in recycle bin to impaire user from recovering deleted files.
+action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.
+action.escu.known_false_positives = network operator may use this batch command to delete recursively a directory or files within directory
+action.escu.creation_date = 2021-06-22
+action.escu.modification_date = 2021-06-22
+action.escu.confidence = high
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Recursive Delete of Directory In Batch CMD - Rule
+action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
+action.escu.providing_technologies = []
+action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ransomware"]
+cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
+dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
+dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
+action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Recursive Delete of Directory In Batch CMD - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070.004"]}
+schedule_window = auto
+action.notable = 1
+action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest']
+action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is to detect a suspicious commandline designed to delete files or directory recursive using batch command. This technique was seen in ransomware (reddot) where it it tries to delete the files in recycle bin to impaire user from recovering deleted files.
+action.notable.param.rule_title = Recursive Delete of Directory In Batch CMD
+action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint
+action.notable.param.severity = high
+alert.digest_mode = 1
+disabled = true
+enableSched = 1
+allow_skew = 100%
+counttype = number of events
+relation = greater than
+quantity = 0
+realtime_schedule = 0
+is_visible = false
+search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=cmd.exe Processes.process=*/c*  Processes.process=* rd * Processes.process="*/s*" Processes.process="*/q*" by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.dest |`drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `recursive_delete_of_directory_in_batch_cmd_filter`
+
 [ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
@@ -15657,7 +16050,7 @@ relation = greater than
 quantity = 0
 realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
-search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Registry.registry_key_name) as registry_key_name values(Registry.registry_path) as registry_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path="*\\SOFTWARE\\WOW6432Node\\Facebook_Assistant\\*" AND (Registry.registry_value_name = "\.*" OR Registry.registry_value_name = "Binary Data") by Registry.registry_value_name Registry.dest Registry.user | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `revil_registry_entry_filter`
+search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Registry.registry_key_name) as registry_key_name values(Registry.registry_path) as registry_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path="*\\SOFTWARE\\WOW6432Node\\Facebook_Assistant\\*" OR Registry.registry_path="*\\SOFTWARE\\WOW6432Node\\BlackLivesMatter*") AND (Registry.registry_value_name = "\.*" OR Registry.registry_value_name = "Binary Data") by Registry.registry_value_name Registry.dest Registry.user | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `revil_registry_entry_filter`

 [ESCU - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
-# On Date: 2021-07-02T15:44:59 UTC
+# On Date: 2021-07-13T07:57:29 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Security Research
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
-# On Date: 2021-07-02T15:44:59 UTC
+# On Date: 2021-07-13T07:57:29 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Security Research
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
@@ -546,7 +546,7 @@ version = 5
 references = ["https://blogs.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/malware-employs-powershell-to-infect-systems/", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadFile - Rule", "ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Empire with PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz With PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Multiple Suspicious Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell Domain Enumeration - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell Loading DotNET into Memory via System Reflection Assembly - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Creating Thread Mutex - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Fileless Process Injection via GetProcAddress - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Processing Stream Of Data - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Using memory As Backing Store - Rule", "ESCU - Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Recon Using WMI Class - Rule", "ESCU - Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Unloading AMSI via Reflection - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Recon Running Process Or Services - Rule", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadFile - Rule", "ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Empire with PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz With PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Multiple Suspicious Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell Domain Enumeration - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell Loading DotNET into Memory via System Reflection Assembly - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Creating Thread Mutex - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Fileless Process Injection via GetProcAddress - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Processing Stream Of Data - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Using memory As Backing Store - Rule", "ESCU - Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Recon Using WMI Class - Rule", "ESCU - Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Unloading AMSI via Reflection - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Recon Running Process Or Services - Rule", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
 description = Attackers are finding stealthy ways "live off the land," leveraging utilities and tools that come standard on the endpoint--such as PowerShell--to achieve their goals without downloading binary files. These searches can help you detect and investigate PowerShell command-line options that may be indicative of malicious intent.
 narrative = The searches in this Analytic Story monitor for parameters often used for malicious purposes. It is helpful to understand how often the notable events generated by this story occur, as well as the commonalities between some of these events. These factors may provide clues about whether this is a common occurrence of minimal concern or a rare event that may require more extensive investigation. Likewise, it is important to determine whether the issue is restricted to a single user/system or is broader in scope. \
 The following factors may assist you in determining whether the event is malicious: \
@@ -720,7 +720,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.carbonblack.com/2017/06/28/carbon-black-threat-research-technical-analysis-petya-notpetya-ransomware/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2017/06/27/closing-the-detection-to-mitigation-gap-or-to-petya-or-notpetya-whocares-.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Allow Operation with Consent Admin - Rule", "ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", "ESCU - CMLUA Or CMSTPLUA UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Clear Unallocated Sector Using Cipher App - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Conti Common Exec parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Detect RClone Command-Line Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Renamed RClone - Rule", "ESCU - Detect SharpHound Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Detect SharpHound File Modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Detect SharpHound Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Logs Using WevtUtil - Rule", "ESCU - Known Services Killed by Ransomware - Rule", "ESCU - Modification Of Wallpaper - Rule", "ESCU - Permission Modification using Takeown App - Rule", "ESCU - Prevent Automatic Repair Mode using Bcdedit - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Revil Common Exec Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Revil Registry Entry - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Start Up During Safe Mode Boot - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Wbemprox COM Object Execution - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Allow File And Printing Sharing In Firewall - Rule", "ESCU - Allow Network Discovery In Firewall - Rule", "ESCU - Allow Operation with Consent Admin - Rule", "ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", "ESCU - CMLUA Or CMSTPLUA UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Clear Unallocated Sector Using Cipher App - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Conti Common Exec parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Detect RClone Command-Line Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Renamed RClone - Rule", "ESCU - Detect SharpHound Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Detect SharpHound File Modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Detect SharpHound Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Disable AMSI Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disable ETW Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Logs Using WevtUtil - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Service Stop Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Net App - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage Of SC Service Utility - Rule", "ESCU - Execute Javascript With Jscript COM CLSID - Rule", "ESCU - ICACLS Grant Command - Rule", "ESCU - Known Services Killed by Ransomware - Rule", "ESCU - Modification Of Wallpaper - Rule", "ESCU - Msmpeng Application DLL Side Loading - Rule", "ESCU - Permission Modification using Takeown App - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Disable Security Monitoring - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature - Rule", "ESCU - Prevent Automatic Repair Mode using Bcdedit - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Recursive Delete of Directory In Batch CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Revil Common Exec Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Revil Registry Entry - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Start Up During Safe Mode Boot - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Wbemprox COM Object Execution - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task"]
 description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to ransomware--spikes in SMB traffic, suspicious wevtutil usage, the presence of common ransomware extensions, and system processes run from unexpected locations, and many others.
 narrative = Ransomware is an ever-present risk to the enterprise, wherein an infected host encrypts business-critical data, holding it hostage until the victim pays the attacker a ransom. There are many types and varieties of ransomware that can affect an enterprise. Attackers can deploy ransomware to enterprises through spearphishing campaigns and driveby downloads, as well as through traditional remote service-based exploitation. In the case of the WannaCry campaign, there was self-propagating wormable functionality that was used to maximize infection. Fortunately, organizations can apply several techniques--such as those in this Analytic Story--to detect and or mitigate the effects of ransomware.

@@ -742,7 +742,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://krebsonsecurity.com/2021/05/a-closer-look-at-the-darkside-ransomware-gang/", "https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/mcafee-atr-analyzes-sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware-as-a-service-what-the-code-tells-us/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Teoderick Contreras"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Modification Of Wallpaper - Rule", "ESCU - Revil Common Exec Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Revil Registry Entry - Rule", "ESCU - Wbemprox COM Object Execution - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Allow Network Discovery In Firewall - Rule", "ESCU - Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring - Rule", "ESCU - Modification Of Wallpaper - Rule", "ESCU - Msmpeng Application DLL Side Loading - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Disable Security Monitoring - Rule", "ESCU - Revil Common Exec Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Revil Registry Entry - Rule", "ESCU - Wbemprox COM Object Execution - Rule"]
 description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the Revil ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with Revil, encrypting network shares, deleting shadow volume storage, registry key modification, deleting of security logs, and more.
 narrative = Revil ransomware is a RaaS,that a single group may operates and manges the development of this ransomware. It involve the use of ransomware payloads along with exfiltration of data. Malicious actors demand payment for ransome of data and threaten deletion and exposure of exfiltrated data.

@@ -1557,6 +1557,16 @@ annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.00
 known_false_positives = admin or power user may used this series of command.
 providing_technologies = []

+[savedsearch://ESCU - Allow File And Printing Sharing In Firewall - Rule]
+type = detection
+asset_type = 
+confidence = medium
+explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious modification of firewall to allow file and printer sharing. This technique was seen in ransomware to be able to discover more machine connected to the compromised host to encrypt more files
+how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.
+annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.007"]}
+known_false_positives = network admin may modify this firewall feature that may cause this rule to be triggered.
+providing_technologies = []
+
 [savedsearch://ESCU - Allow Inbound Traffic By Firewall Rule Registry - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = 
@@ -1577,6 +1587,16 @@ annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.00
 known_false_positives = administrator may allow inbound traffic in certain network or machine.
 providing_technologies = []

+[savedsearch://ESCU - Allow Network Discovery In Firewall - Rule]
+type = detection
+asset_type = 
+confidence = medium
+explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious modification to the firewall to allow network discovery on a machine. This technique was seen in couple of ransomware (revil, reddot) to discover other machine connected to the compromised host to encrypt more files.
+how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.
+annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.007"]}
+known_false_positives = network admin may modify this firewall feature that may cause this rule to be triggered.
+providing_technologies = []
+
 [savedsearch://ESCU - Allow Operation with Consent Admin - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = 
@@ -3008,12 +3028,7 @@ providing_technologies = []
 type = detection
 asset_type = 
 confidence = medium
-explanation = The following analytic identifies the use of WMI Event Subscription to establish persistence or perform privilege escalation.  WMI can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. WMI subscription execution is proxied by the WMI Provider Host process (WmiPrvSe.exe) and thus may result in elevated SYSTEM privileges. This analytic is restricted by commonly added process execution and a path. If the volume is low enough, remove the values and flag on any new subscriptions.
-All event subscriptions have three components \
-1. Filter - WQL Query for the events we want. EventID = 19 \
-1. Consumer - An action to take upon triggering the filter. EventID = 20 \
-1. Binding - Registers a filter to a consumer. EventID = 21 \
-Monitor for the creation of new WMI EventFilter, EventConsumer, and FilterToConsumerBinding. It may be pertinent to review all 3 to identify the flow of execution. In addition, EventCode 4104 may assist with any other PowerShell script usage that registered the subscription.
+explanation = The following analytic identifies the use of WMI Event Subscription to establish persistence or perform privilege escalation.  WMI can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. WMI subscription execution is proxied by the WMI Provider Host process (WmiPrvSe.exe) and thus may result in elevated SYSTEM privileges. This analytic is restricted by commonly added process execution and a path. If the volume is low enough, remove the values and flag on any new subscriptions. All event subscriptions have three components 1. Filter - WQL Query for the events we want. EventID = 19 1. Consumer - An action to take upon triggering the filter. EventID = 20 1. Binding - Registers a filter to a consumer. EventID = 21 Monitor for the creation of new WMI EventFilter, EventConsumer, and FilterToConsumerBinding. It may be pertinent to review all 3 to identify the flow of execution. In addition, EventCode 4104 may assist with any other PowerShell script usage that registered the subscription.
 how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with that provide WMI Event Subscription from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA and have enabled EventID 19, 20 and 21. Tune and filter known good to limit the volume.
 annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.003"]}
 known_false_positives = It is possible some applications will create a consumer and may be required to be filtered. For tuning, add any additional LOLBin's for further depth of coverage.
@@ -3167,6 +3182,26 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Action
 known_false_positives = While legitimate, these NirSoft tools are prone to abuse. You should verfiy that the tool was used for a legitimate purpose.
 providing_technologies = []

+[savedsearch://ESCU - Disable AMSI Through Registry - Rule]
+type = detection
+asset_type = 
+confidence = medium
+explanation = this search is to identify modification in registry to disable AMSI windows feature to evade detections. This technique was seen in several ransomware, RAT and even APT to impaire defenses of the compromise machine and to be able to execute payload with minimal alert as much as possible.
+how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.
+annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"]}
+known_false_positives = network operator may disable this feature of windows but not so common.
+providing_technologies = []
+
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Disable ETW Through Registry - Rule]
+type = detection
+asset_type = 
+confidence = medium
+explanation = this search is to identify modification in registry to disable ETW windows feature to evade detections. This technique was seen in several ransomware, RAT and even APT to impaire defenses of the compromise machine and to be able to execute payload with minimal alert as much as possible.
+how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.
+annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"]}
+known_false_positives = network operator may disable this feature of windows but not so common.
+providing_technologies = []
+
 [savedsearch://ESCU - Disable Logs Using WevtUtil - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = 
@@ -3541,6 +3576,16 @@ annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1531"]}
 known_false_positives = unknown. Filter as needed. Modify the time span as needed.
 providing_technologies = []

+[savedsearch://ESCU - Excessive Usage Of SC Service Utility - Rule]
+type = detection
+asset_type = 
+confidence = medium
+explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious excessive usage of sc.exe in a host machine. This technique was seen in several ransomware , xmrig and other malware to create, modify, delete or disable a service may related to security application or to gain privilege escalation.
+how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed taskkill.exe may be used.
+annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1569.002"]}
+known_false_positives = excessive execution of sc.exe is quite suspicious since it can modify or execute app in high privilege permission.
+providing_technologies = []
+
 [savedsearch://ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Taskkill - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = 
@@ -3601,6 +3646,16 @@ annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036"]}
 known_false_positives = Administrators may allow creation of script or exe in the paths specified. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = []

+[savedsearch://ESCU - Execute Javascript With Jscript COM CLSID - Rule]
+type = detection
+asset_type = 
+confidence = medium
+explanation = This analytic will identify suspicious process of cscript.exe where it tries to execute javascript using jscript.encode CLSID (COM OBJ). This technique was seen in ransomware (reddot ransomware) where it execute javascript with this com object with combination of amsi disabling technique.
+how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the Filesystem responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Filesystem` node.
+annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.005"]}
+known_false_positives = unknown
+providing_technologies = []
+
 [savedsearch://ESCU - Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
@@ -4215,6 +4270,16 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["
 known_false_positives = None at this time
 providing_technologies = []

+[savedsearch://ESCU - Msmpeng Application DLL Side Loading - Rule]
+type = detection
+asset_type = 
+confidence = medium
+explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious creation of msmpeng.exe or mpsvc.dll in non default windows defender folder. This technique was seen couple days ago with revil ransomware in Kaseya Supply chain. The approach is to drop an old version of msmpeng.exe to load the actual payload name as mspvc.dll which will load the revil ransomware to the compromise machine
+how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the Filesystem responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Filesystem` node.
+annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1574.002"]}
+known_false_positives = quite minimal false positive expected.
+providing_technologies = []
+
 [savedsearch://ESCU - Multiple Archive Files Http Post Traffic - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = 
@@ -4715,6 +4780,26 @@ annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1027.00
 known_false_positives = powershell developer may used this function in their script for instance checking too.
 providing_technologies = []

+[savedsearch://ESCU - Powershell Disable Security Monitoring - Rule]
+type = detection
+asset_type = 
+confidence = medium
+explanation = This search is to identifies a modification in registry to disable the windows denfender real time behavior monitoring. This event or technique is commonly seen in RAT, bot, or Trojan to disable AV to evade detections.
+how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
+annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"]}
+known_false_positives = Limited false positives. However, tune based on scripts that may perform this action.
+providing_technologies = []
+
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature - Rule]
+type = detection
+asset_type = 
+confidence = medium
+explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious enabling of smb1protocol through "powershell.exe". This technique was seen in some ransomware (like reddot) where it enable smb share to do the lateral movement and encrypt other files within the compromise network system.
+how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the powershell logs  from your endpoints. make sure you enable needed registry to monitor this event.
+annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1027.005"]}
+known_false_positives = network operator may enable or disable this windows feature.
+providing_technologies = []
+
 [savedsearch://ESCU - Powershell Fileless Process Injection via GetProcAddress - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = 
@@ -4946,6 +5031,16 @@ annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1592"
 known_false_positives = network administrator may used this command for checking purposes
 providing_technologies = []

+[savedsearch://ESCU - Recursive Delete of Directory In Batch CMD - Rule]
+type = detection
+asset_type = 
+confidence = medium
+explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious commandline designed to delete files or directory recursive using batch command. This technique was seen in ransomware (reddot) where it it tries to delete the files in recycle bin to impaire user from recovering deleted files.
+how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.
+annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070.004"]}
+known_false_positives = network operator may use this batch command to delete recursively a directory or files within directory
+providing_technologies = []
+
 [savedsearch://ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
@@ -1,59 +1,182 @@
 mitre_id,technique,tactics,groups
-T1205.001,Port Knocking,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Command And Control,no
+T1553.006,Code Signing Policy Modification,Defense Evasion,Turla|APT39
+T1614,System Location Discovery,Discovery,no
+T1613,Container and Resource Discovery,Discovery,no
+T1552.007,Container API,Credential Access,no
+T1612,Build Image on Host,Defense Evasion,no
+T1611,Escape to Host,Privilege Escalation,no
+T1204.003,Malicious Image,Execution,no
+T1053.007,Container Orchestration Job,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
+T1610,Deploy Container,Defense Evasion|Execution,no
+T1609,Container Administration Command,Execution,no
+T1608.005,Link Target,Resource Development,Silent Librarian
+T1608.004,Drive-by Target,Resource Development,APT32|Threat Group-3390
+T1608.003,Install Digital Certificate,Resource Development,no
+T1608.002,Upload Tool,Resource Development,Threat Group-3390
+T1608.001,Upload Malware,Resource Development,APT32
+T1608,Stage Capabilities,Resource Development,no
+T1016.001,Internet Connection Discovery,Discovery,APT29|UNC2452|Turla
+T1553.005,Mark-of-the-Web Bypass,Defense Evasion,TA505
+T1555.005,Password Managers,Credential Access,Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao
+T1484.002,Domain Trust Modification,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,APT29|UNC2452
+T1484.001,Group Policy Modification,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Indrik Spider
+T1547.014,Active Setup,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
+T1606.002,SAML Tokens,Credential Access,APT29|UNC2452
+T1606.001,Web Cookies,Credential Access,APT29|UNC2452
+T1606,Forge Web Credentials,Credential Access,no
+T1555.004,Windows Credential Manager,Credential Access,Stealth Falcon|OilRig|Turla
+T1059.008,Network Device CLI,Execution,no
+T1602.002,Network Device Configuration Dump,Collection,no
+T1542.005,TFTP Boot,Defense Evasion|Persistence,no
+T1542.004,ROMMONkit,Defense Evasion|Persistence,no
+T1602.001,SNMP (MIB Dump),Collection,no
+T1602,Data from Configuration Repository,Collection,no
+T1601.002,Downgrade System Image,Defense Evasion,no
+T1601.001,Patch System Image,Defense Evasion,no
+T1601,Modify System Image,Defense Evasion,no
+T1600.002,Disable Crypto Hardware,Defense Evasion,no
+T1600.001,Reduce Key Space,Defense Evasion,no
+T1600,Weaken Encryption,Defense Evasion,no
+T1556.004,Network Device Authentication,Credential Access|Defense Evasion|Persistence,no
+T1599.001,Network Address Translation Traversal,Defense Evasion,no
+T1599,Network Boundary Bridging,Defense Evasion,no
+T1020.001,Traffic Duplication,Exfiltration,no
+T1557.002,ARP Cache Poisoning,Credential Access|Collection,Cleaver
+T1588.006,Vulnerabilities,Resource Development,Sandworm Team
+T1053.006,Systemd Timers,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
+T1562.008,Disable Cloud Logs,Defense Evasion,no
+T1547.012,Print Processors,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
+T1598.003,Spearphishing Link,Reconnaissance,Silent Librarian|Sidewinder|Sandworm Team|APT32|Kimsuky
+T1598.002,Spearphishing Attachment,Reconnaissance,Sidewinder
+T1598.001,Spearphishing Service,Reconnaissance,no
+T1598,Phishing for Information,Reconnaissance,ZIRCONIUM|APT28
+T1597.002,Purchase Technical Data,Reconnaissance,no
+T1597.001,Threat Intel Vendors,Reconnaissance,no
+T1597,Search Closed Sources,Reconnaissance,no
+T1596.005,Scan Databases,Reconnaissance,no
+T1596.004,CDNs,Reconnaissance,no
+T1596.003,Digital Certificates,Reconnaissance,no
+T1596.001,DNS/Passive DNS,Reconnaissance,no
+T1596.002,WHOIS,Reconnaissance,no
+T1596,Search Open Technical Databases,Reconnaissance,no
+T1595.002,Vulnerability Scanning,Reconnaissance,Volatile Cedar|APT28|Sandworm Team
+T1595.001,Scanning IP Blocks,Reconnaissance,no
+T1595,Active Scanning,Reconnaissance,no
+T1594,Search Victim-Owned Websites,Reconnaissance,Silent Librarian|Sandworm Team
+T1593.002,Search Engines,Reconnaissance,no
+T1593.001,Social Media,Reconnaissance,no
+T1593,Search Open Websites/Domains,Reconnaissance,Sandworm Team
+T1592.004,Client Configurations,Reconnaissance,HAFNIUM
+T1592.003,Firmware,Reconnaissance,no
+T1592.002,Software,Reconnaissance,Sandworm Team
+T1592.001,Hardware,Reconnaissance,no
+T1592,Gather Victim Host Information,Reconnaissance,no
+T1591.004,Identify Roles,Reconnaissance,no
+T1591.003,Identify Business Tempo,Reconnaissance,no
+T1591.001,Determine Physical Locations,Reconnaissance,no
+T1591.002,Business Relationships,Reconnaissance,Sandworm Team
+T1591,Gather Victim Org Information,Reconnaissance,no
+T1590.006,Network Security Appliances,Reconnaissance,no
+T1590.005,IP Addresses,Reconnaissance,HAFNIUM
+T1590.004,Network Topology,Reconnaissance,no
+T1590.003,Network Trust Dependencies,Reconnaissance,no
+T1590.002,DNS,Reconnaissance,no
+T1590.001,Domain Properties,Reconnaissance,Sandworm Team
+T1590,Gather Victim Network Information,Reconnaissance,HAFNIUM
+T1589.003,Employee Names,Reconnaissance,Silent Librarian|Sandworm Team
+T1589.002,Email Addresses,Reconnaissance,TA551|MuddyWater|HAFNIUM|APT32|Silent Librarian|Sandworm Team
+T1589.001,Credentials,Reconnaissance,APT28|Magic Hound|Chimera
+T1589,Gather Victim Identity Information,Reconnaissance,APT32
+T1588.005,Exploits,Resource Development,no
+T1588.004,Digital Certificates,Resource Development,Lazarus Group|Silent Librarian
+T1588.003,Code Signing Certificates,Resource Development,Wizard Spider
+T1588.002,Tool,Resource Development,MuddyWater|Silent Librarian|GALLIUM|Sandworm Team
+T1588.001,Malware,Resource Development,Turla|APT1
+T1588,Obtain Capabilities,Resource Development,no
+T1587.004,Exploits,Resource Development,no
+T1587.003,Digital Certificates,Resource Development,APT29|PROMETHIUM
+T1587.002,Code Signing Certificates,Resource Development,PROMETHIUM|Patchwork
+T1587.001,Malware,Resource Development,APT29|Lazarus Group|UNC2452|Sandworm Team|Turla|FIN7|Night Dragon|Cleaver
+T1587,Develop Capabilities,Resource Development,Kimsuky
+T1586.002,Email Accounts,Resource Development,Magic Hound|Kimsuky
+T1586.001,Social Media Accounts,Resource Development,no
+T1586,Compromise Accounts,Resource Development,no
+T1585.002,Email Accounts,Resource Development,Magic Hound|Silent Librarian|Sandworm Team|APT1
+T1585.001,Social Media Accounts,Resource Development,Fox Kitten|Sandworm Team|APT32|Cleaver
+T1585,Establish Accounts,Resource Development,Fox Kitten|APT17
+T1584.006,Web Services,Resource Development,Turla
+T1584.005,Botnet,Resource Development,no
+T1584.004,Server,Resource Development,Indrik Spider|Turla|APT16
+T1584.003,Virtual Private Server,Resource Development,Turla
+T1584.002,DNS Server,Resource Development,no
+T1584.001,Domains,Resource Development,APT29|UNC2452|APT1
+T1583.006,Web Services,Resource Development,ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|HAFNIUM|Lazarus Group|Turla|APT32|APT17|APT29
+T1583.005,Botnet,Resource Development,no
+T1583.004,Server,Resource Development,GALLIUM|Sandworm Team
+T1583.003,Virtual Private Server,Resource Development,HAFNIUM|TEMP.Veles
+T1583.002,DNS Server,Resource Development,no
+T1584,Compromise Infrastructure,Resource Development,no
+T1583.001,Domains,Resource Development,APT29|Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|UNC2452|Lazarus Group|Silent Librarian|menuPass|Sandworm Team|APT32|Kimsuky|APT1|APT28
+T1583,Acquire Infrastructure,Resource Development,no
+T1564.007,VBA Stomping,Defense Evasion,no
+T1558.004,AS-REP Roasting,Credential Access,no
+T1580,Cloud Infrastructure Discovery,Discovery,no
+T1218.012,Verclsid,Defense Evasion,no
+T1205.001,Port Knocking,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Command And Control,PROMETHIUM
 T1564.006,Run Virtual Instance,Defense Evasion,no
 T1564.005,Hidden File System,Defense Evasion,Strider|Equation
-T1556.003,Pluggable Authentication Modules,Credential Access|Defense Evasion,no
+T1556.003,Pluggable Authentication Modules,Credential Access|Defense Evasion|Persistence,no
 T1574.012,COR_PROFILER,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,Blue Mockingbird
 T1562.007,Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall,Defense Evasion,no
 T1098.004,SSH Authorized Keys,Persistence,no
 T1480.001,Environmental Keying,Defense Evasion,APT41|Equation
-T1059.007,JavaScript/JScript,Execution,APT32|FIN7|Cobalt Group|Molerats|TA505|Silence|Leafminer
+T1059.007,JavaScript,Execution,MuddyWater|Turla|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Evilnum|Kimsuky|FIN6|APT32|FIN7|Cobalt Group|Molerats|TA505|Silence|Leafminer
 T1578.004,Revert Cloud Instance,Defense Evasion,no
 T1578.003,Delete Cloud Instance,Defense Evasion,no
 T1578.001,Create Snapshot,Defense Evasion,no
 T1578.002,Create Cloud Instance,Defense Evasion,no
 T1127.001,MSBuild,Defense Evasion,Frankenstein
-T1027.005,Indicator Removal from Tools,Defense Evasion,Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|Patchwork|APT3|Turla|OilRig|Deep Panda
+T1027.005,Indicator Removal from Tools,Defense Evasion,Operation Wocao|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|Patchwork|APT3|Turla|OilRig|Deep Panda
 T1562.006,Indicator Blocking,Defense Evasion,no
-T1573.002,Asymmetric Cryptography,Command And Control,Tropic Trooper|Cobalt Group|OilRig|FIN8|FIN6
-T1573.001,Symmetric Cryptography,Command And Control,Frankenstein|Inception|APT28|APT33|BRONZE BUTLER|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group
+T1573.002,Asymmetric Cryptography,Command And Control,Operation Wocao|Tropic Trooper|Cobalt Group|OilRig|FIN8|FIN6
+T1573.001,Symmetric Cryptography,Command And Control,Mustang Panda|Darkhotel|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Frankenstein|Inception|APT28|APT33|BRONZE BUTLER|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group
 T1573,Encrypted Channel,Command And Control,Tropic Trooper
 T1027.004,Compile After Delivery,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|Rocke|MuddyWater
 T1574.004,Dylib Hijacking,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
 T1546.015,Component Object Model Hijacking,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,APT28
-T1071.004,DNS,Command And Control,APT39|Tropic Trooper|OilRig|Ke3chang|Cobalt Group|APT18|APT41|FIN7
-T1071.003,Mail Protocols,Command And Control,APT32|SilverTerrier|APT28
-T1071.002,File Transfer Protocols,Command And Control,APT41|SilverTerrier|Machete|Honeybee
-T1071.001,Web Protocols,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|TA505|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Inception|APT41|SilverTerrier|Machete|APT28|WIRTE|APT33|FIN4|Night Dragon|APT18|APT38|Cobalt Group|APT19|Threat Group-3390|Rancor|Orangeworm|APT37|Ke3chang|Dark Caracal|Turla|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|OilRig|Magic Hound|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon
-T1572,Protocol Tunneling,Command And Control,OilRig|Cobalt Group|FIN6
-T1048.003,Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol,Exfiltration,APT32|APT33|Thrip|FIN8|OilRig|Lazarus Group
-T1048.002,Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol,Exfiltration,no
+T1071.004,DNS,Command And Control,Chimera|APT39|Tropic Trooper|OilRig|Ke3chang|Cobalt Group|APT18|APT41|FIN7
+T1071.003,Mail Protocols,Command And Control,Turla|Kimsuky|APT32|SilverTerrier|APT28
+T1071.002,File Transfer Protocols,Command And Control,Kimsuky|APT41|SilverTerrier|Honeybee
+T1071.001,Web Protocols,Command And Control,APT29|Mustang Panda|Windshift|TA551|Higaisa|HAFNIUM|Sidewinder|Chimera|UNC2452|Sandworm Team|TA505|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Inception|APT41|SilverTerrier|APT28|WIRTE|APT33|FIN4|Night Dragon|APT18|APT38|APT19|Cobalt Group|Rancor|Orangeworm|Threat Group-3390|Ke3chang|Turla|APT37|Dark Caracal|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|Magic Hound|OilRig|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon
+T1572,Protocol Tunneling,Command And Control,Chimera|Fox Kitten|OilRig|Cobalt Group|FIN6
+T1048.003,Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol,Exfiltration,Wizard Spider|FIN6|APT32|APT33|Thrip|FIN8|OilRig|Lazarus Group
+T1048.002,Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol,Exfiltration,APT29|UNC2452
 T1048.001,Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol,Exfiltration,no
-T1001.003,Protocol Impersonation,Command And Control,Lazarus Group
-T1001.002,Steganography,Command And Control,Axiom
+T1001.003,Protocol Impersonation,Command And Control,Higaisa|Lazarus Group
+T1001.002,Steganography,Command And Control,APT29|Axiom
 T1001.001,Junk Data,Command And Control,APT28
 T1132.002,Non-Standard Encoding,Command And Control,no
-T1132.001,Standard Encoding,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|APT33|APT19|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork
+T1132.001,Standard Encoding,Command And Control,HAFNIUM|TA551|Sandworm Team|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|APT33|APT19|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork
 T1090.004,Domain Fronting,Command And Control,APT29
-T1090.003,Multi-hop Proxy,Command And Control,Inception|FIN4|APT29
-T1090.002,External Proxy,Command And Control,APT39|Silence|Soft Cell|MuddyWater|APT3|FIN5|Lazarus Group|menuPass|APT28
-T1090.001,Internal Proxy,Command And Control,APT39|Strider
+T1090.003,Multi-hop Proxy,Command And Control,APT28|Operation Wocao|Inception|FIN4|APT29
+T1090.002,External Proxy,Command And Control,APT39|Silence|GALLIUM|MuddyWater|APT3|FIN5|Lazarus Group|menuPass|APT28
+T1090.001,Internal Proxy,Command And Control,APT29|Higaisa|UNC2452|Operation Wocao|APT39|Strider
 T1102.003,One-Way Communication,Command And Control,Leviathan
-T1102.002,Bidirectional Communication,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|APT39|APT12|Turla|FIN7|APT37|Magic Hound|Carbanak
+T1102.002,Bidirectional Communication,Command And Control,ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|APT28|APT29|Sandworm Team|APT39|APT12|FIN7|Turla|APT37|Magic Hound|Carbanak
 T1102.001,Dead Drop Resolver,Command And Control,Rocke|APT41|BRONZE BUTLER|RTM|Patchwork
 T1571,Non-Standard Port,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|Rocke|DarkVishnya|Silence|APT-C-36|Magic Hound|APT33|APT32|TEMP.Veles|Lazarus Group|FIN7
-T1074.002,Remote Data Staging,Collection,Threat Group-3390|menuPass|FIN6|Night Dragon|FIN8
-T1074.001,Local Data Staging,Collection,Machete|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|Patchwork|Dragonfly 2.0|Honeybee|Leviathan|APT3|FIN5|menuPass|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28
+T1074.002,Remote Data Staging,Collection,APT29|Chimera|UNC2452|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|FIN6|Night Dragon|FIN8
+T1074.001,Local Data Staging,Collection,Mustang Panda|Sidewinder|Chimera|Kimsuky|APT39|Operation Wocao|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|Honeybee|Patchwork|Dragonfly 2.0|Leviathan|APT3|FIN5|menuPass|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28
 T1078.004,Cloud Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,APT33
 T1564.004,NTFS File Attributes,Defense Evasion,APT32
-T1564.003,Hidden Window,Defense Evasion,Gorgon Group|Deep Panda|DarkHydrus|CopyKittens|APT19|APT32|APT28|APT3|Magic Hound
-T1078.003,Local Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,Tropic Trooper|FIN10|Stolen Pencil|APT32
-T1078.002,Domain Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,TA505|APT3|Threat Group-1314
+T1564.003,Hidden Window,Defense Evasion,Higaisa|Gorgon Group|Deep Panda|DarkHydrus|CopyKittens|APT19|APT32|APT28|APT3|Magic Hound
+T1078.003,Local Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,HAFNIUM|Turla|Operation Wocao|PROMETHIUM|Tropic Trooper|FIN10|Stolen Pencil|APT32
+T1078.002,Domain Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,Indrik Spider|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|APT29|TA505|APT3|Threat Group-1314
 T1078.001,Default Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,no
 T1564.002,Hidden Users,Defense Evasion,no
-T1574.006,LD_PRELOAD,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,Rocke
-T1574.002,DLL Side-Loading,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,BRONZE BUTLER|Naikon|APT41|Soft Cell|Tropic Trooper|Patchwork|APT19|APT32|APT3|menuPass|Threat Group-3390
-T1574.001,DLL Search Order Hijacking,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,Whitefly|RTM|Threat Group-3390|menuPass
+T1574.006,Dynamic Linker Hijacking,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,APT41|Rocke
+T1574.002,DLL Side-Loading,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,Mustang Panda|Higaisa|BlackTech|Sidewinder|Chimera|BRONZE BUTLER|Naikon|APT41|GALLIUM|Tropic Trooper|Patchwork|APT19|APT32|APT3|menuPass|Threat Group-3390
+T1574.001,DLL Search Order Hijacking,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,Evilnum|APT41|Whitefly|RTM|Threat Group-3390|menuPass
 T1574.008,Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
 T1574.007,Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
 T1574.009,Path Interception by Unquoted Path,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
@@ -61,174 +184,174 @@ T1574.011,Services Registry Permissions Weakness,Persistence|Privilege Escalatio
 T1574.005,Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
 T1574.010,Services File Permissions Weakness,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
 T1574,Hijack Execution Flow,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
-T1069.001,Local Groups,Discovery,Turla|OilRig|admin@338
-T1570,Lateral Tool Transfer,Lateral Movement,APT32|Wizard Spider|Turla|FIN10
+T1069.001,Local Groups,Discovery,Chimera|Operation Wocao|Turla|OilRig|admin@338
+T1570,Lateral Tool Transfer,Lateral Movement,Chimera|GALLIUM|Operation Wocao|APT32|Wizard Spider|Turla|FIN10
 T1568.003,DNS Calculation,Command And Control,APT12
-T1204.002,Malicious File,Execution,Magic Hound|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|RTM|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|Machete|admin@338|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|BRONZE BUTLER|Cobalt Group|DarkHydrus|Gorgon Group|Patchwork|OilRig|Dark Caracal|MuddyWater|Lazarus Group|FIN7|APT32|Rancor|APT37|FIN8|APT28|Elderwood|TA459|APT29|Leviathan|menuPass|PLATINUM
-T1204.001,Malicious Link,Execution,Patchwork|Windshift|APT32|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|TA505|OilRig|Machete|Leviathan|FIN8|FIN4|Elderwood|Dragonfly 2.0|Cobalt Group|APT39|Night Dragon|APT33|Turla
+T1204.002,Malicious File,Execution,Ajax Security Team|Mustang Panda|TA551|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Kimsuky|FIN6|PROMETHIUM|APT30|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|RTM|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|Machete|admin@338|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN7|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|Dark Caracal|Cobalt Group|Gorgon Group|Patchwork|MuddyWater|DarkHydrus|OilRig|APT32|Rancor|Lazarus Group|APT29|APT28|APT37|FIN8|Elderwood|menuPass|PLATINUM|TA459|Leviathan
+T1204.001,Malicious Link,Execution,APT28|APT29|Mustang Panda|Sidewinder|ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|Evilnum|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|Patchwork|Windshift|APT32|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|TA505|OilRig|Machete|Leviathan|FIN8|FIN4|Elderwood|Dragonfly 2.0|Cobalt Group|APT39|Night Dragon|APT33|Turla
 T1195.003,Compromise Hardware Supply Chain,Initial Access,no
-T1195.002,Compromise Software Supply Chain,Initial Access,Sandworm Team|APT41
+T1195.002,Compromise Software Supply Chain,Initial Access,APT29|UNC2452|Cobalt Group|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Dragonfly|Sandworm Team|APT41
 T1195.001,Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools,Initial Access,no
-T1568.001,Fast Flux DNS,Command And Control,TA505
-T1052.001,Exfiltration over USB,Exfiltration,Tropic Trooper
-T1569.002,Service Execution,Execution,Blue Mockingbird|APT39|APT41|Silence|FIN6|APT32|Honeybee|Ke3chang
+T1568.001,Fast Flux DNS,Command And Control,menuPass|TA505
+T1052.001,Exfiltration over USB,Exfiltration,Mustang Panda|Tropic Trooper
+T1569.002,Service Execution,Execution,Chimera|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Blue Mockingbird|APT39|APT41|Silence|FIN6|APT32|Honeybee|Ke3chang
 T1569.001,Launchctl,Execution,no
 T1569,System Services,Execution,no
-T1568.002,Domain Generation Algorithms,Command And Control,APT41
-T1568,Dynamic Resolution,Command And Control,no
+T1568.002,Domain Generation Algorithms,Command And Control,TA551|APT41
+T1568,Dynamic Resolution,Command And Control,APT29|UNC2452
 T1011.001,Exfiltration Over Bluetooth,Exfiltration,no
-T1567.002,Exfiltration to Cloud Storage,Exfiltration,Leviathan|Turla
+T1567.002,Exfiltration to Cloud Storage,Exfiltration,ZIRCONIUM|HAFNIUM|Chimera|Leviathan|Turla
 T1567.001,Exfiltration to Code Repository,Exfiltration,no
-T1059.006,Python,Execution,Rocke|BRONZE BUTLER|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|Machete
-T1059.005,Visual Basic,Execution,APT33|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|Rancor|Patchwork|MuddyWater|Honeybee|FIN7|APT37|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|Turla|TA505|Silence|WIRTE|FIN4|Cobalt Group|Gorgon Group|Leviathan|TA459|Magic Hound
+T1059.006,Python,Execution,ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|Turla|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|APT29|Rocke|BRONZE BUTLER|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|Machete
+T1059.005,Visual Basic,Execution,Mustang Panda|Windshift|Higaisa|Sidewinder|APT39|Machete|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|APT33|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|Rancor|Patchwork|MuddyWater|Honeybee|FIN7|APT37|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|Turla|TA505|Silence|WIRTE|FIN4|Cobalt Group|Gorgon Group|Leviathan|TA459|Magic Hound
 T1059.004,Unix Shell,Execution,Rocke|APT41
-T1059.003,Windows Command Shell,Execution,TA505|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|OilRig|Lazarus Group|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|FIN7|APT41|Soft Cell|Turla|Silence|APT32|APT39|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Dark Caracal|Gorgon Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Rancor|Ke3chang|APT37|Leviathan|FIN8|APT28|Magic Hound|Sowbug|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN10|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Gamaredon Group|Suckfly|Patchwork|Threat Group-1314|APT3|admin@338|APT1
+T1059.003,Windows Command Shell,Execution,APT29|Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|TA551|Higaisa|Indrik Spider|Chimera|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|Machete|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|FIN6|TA505|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|OilRig|Lazarus Group|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|FIN7|APT41|GALLIUM|Turla|Silence|APT32|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Gorgon Group|Dark Caracal|Rancor|Ke3chang|Dragonfly 2.0|Leviathan|APT37|FIN8|APT28|Magic Hound|Sowbug|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN10|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Suckfly|Threat Group-1314|APT3|admin@338|APT1
 T1059.002,AppleScript,Execution,no
-T1059.001,PowerShell,Execution,Blue Mockingbird|APT39|DarkVishnya|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Inception|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|Soft Cell|TA505|WIRTE|TEMP.Veles|APT33|Gallmaker|Turla|APT19|DarkHydrus|APT28|Thrip|Gorgon Group|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Leviathan|TA459|FIN8|MuddyWater|Magic Hound|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|CopyKittens|APT32|FIN7|FIN10|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Poseidon Group|APT3|APT29|Deep Panda
-T1567,Exfiltration Over Web Service,Exfiltration,no
+T1059.001,PowerShell,Execution,Mustang Panda|Indrik Spider|HAFNIUM|Sidewinder|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Lazarus Group|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|APT39|DarkVishnya|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Inception|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|GALLIUM|TA505|WIRTE|TEMP.Veles|APT33|Gallmaker|Turla|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|APT28|Thrip|Cobalt Group|DarkHydrus|Gorgon Group|Leviathan|TA459|MuddyWater|FIN8|Magic Hound|CopyKittens|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN10|Threat Group-3390|APT32|FIN7|menuPass|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Poseidon Group|APT3|APT29|Deep Panda
+T1567,Exfiltration Over Web Service,Exfiltration,APT28
 T1497.003,Time Based Evasion,Defense Evasion|Discovery,no
-T1497.002,User Activity Based Checks,Defense Evasion|Discovery,FIN7
-T1497.001,System Checks,Defense Evasion|Discovery,Frankenstein
+T1497.002,User Activity Based Checks,Defense Evasion|Discovery,Darkhotel|FIN7
+T1497.001,System Checks,Defense Evasion|Discovery,Darkhotel|Evilnum|Frankenstein
 T1498.002,Reflection Amplification,Impact,no
 T1498.001,Direct Network Flood,Impact,no
-T1566.003,Spearphishing via Service,Initial Access,Magic Hound|Windshift|FIN6|OilRig|Dark Caracal
-T1566.002,Spearphishing Link,Initial Access,Windshift|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|Machete|Kimsuky|TA505|Stolen Pencil|APT39|FIN4|APT32|Night Dragon|Turla|APT28|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|APT33|Elderwood|Leviathan|Magic Hound|Patchwork|APT29|FIN8
-T1566.001,Spearphishing Attachment,Initial Access,Magic Hound|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Mofang|Wizard Spider|RTM|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|APT41|Machete|admin@338|Kimsuky|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|Tropic Trooper|Turla|Gorgon Group|Rancor|DarkHydrus|Cobalt Group|FIN7|OilRig|Lazarus Group|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|FIN8|MuddyWater|APT28|TA459|Leviathan|Patchwork|PLATINUM|Elderwood|APT29|APT37|menuPass
-T1566,Phishing,Initial Access,no
+T1566.003,Spearphishing via Service,Initial Access,Ajax Security Team|Lazarus Group|Magic Hound|Windshift|FIN6|OilRig|Dark Caracal
+T1566.002,Spearphishing Link,Initial Access,Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|Sidewinder|Evilnum|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|APT1|Windshift|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|Machete|Kimsuky|TA505|Stolen Pencil|APT39|FIN4|APT32|Night Dragon|Cobalt Group|Turla|APT28|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|APT33|APT29|Leviathan|Elderwood|FIN8|Patchwork|Magic Hound
+T1566.001,Spearphishing Attachment,Initial Access,Ajax Security Team|Mustang Panda|TA551|Higaisa|Sidewinder|APT1|FIN6|APT30|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Mofang|Wizard Spider|RTM|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|APT41|Machete|admin@338|Kimsuky|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|Tropic Trooper|Gorgon Group|Rancor|DarkHydrus|Cobalt Group|FIN7|APT19|Lazarus Group|OilRig|APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|Dragonfly 2.0|MuddyWater|APT28|FIN8|TA459|Elderwood|APT29|Leviathan|Patchwork|APT37|menuPass|PLATINUM
+T1566,Phishing,Initial Access,GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Dragonfly
 T1565.003,Runtime Data Manipulation,Impact,APT38
 T1565.002,Transmitted Data Manipulation,Impact,APT38
 T1565.001,Stored Data Manipulation,Impact,FIN4|APT38
 T1565,Data Manipulation,Impact,no
-T1564.001,Hidden Files and Directories,Defense Evasion,Rocke|APT32|Tropic Trooper|APT28|Lazarus Group
+T1564.001,Hidden Files and Directories,Defense Evasion,Mustang Panda|Rocke|APT32|Tropic Trooper|Lazarus Group|APT28
 T1564,Hide Artifacts,Defense Evasion,no
 T1563.002,RDP Hijacking,Lateral Movement,no
 T1563.001,SSH Hijacking,Lateral Movement,no
 T1563,Remote Service Session Hijacking,Lateral Movement,no
-T1518.001,Security Software Discovery,Discovery,Turla|Rocke|Frankenstein|The White Company|Cobalt Group|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|Tropic Trooper|FIN8|Patchwork|Naikon
+T1518.001,Security Software Discovery,Discovery,Windshift|Sidewinder|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Turla|Rocke|Frankenstein|The White Company|Cobalt Group|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|Tropic Trooper|FIN8|Patchwork|Naikon
 T1069.003,Cloud Groups,Discovery,no
-T1069.002,Domain Groups,Discovery,Turla|Wizard Spider|Inception|OilRig|FIN6|Dragonfly 2.0|Ke3chang
+T1069.002,Domain Groups,Discovery,Turla|Inception|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|Ke3chang
 T1087.004,Cloud Account,Discovery,no
 T1087.003,Email Account,Discovery,Sandworm Team|TA505
-T1087.002,Domain Account,Discovery,Turla|Sandworm Team|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN6|Poseidon Group|Ke3chang
-T1087.001,Local Account,Discovery,Turla|Poseidon Group|OilRig|Ke3chang|APT32|APT1|Threat Group-3390|APT3|admin@338
+T1087.002,Domain Account,Discovery,MuddyWater|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Chimera|Turla|Sandworm Team|Dragonfly 2.0|BRONZE BUTLER|OilRig|menuPass|FIN6|Poseidon Group|Ke3chang
+T1087.001,Local Account,Discovery,Chimera|Fox Kitten|Turla|Poseidon Group|OilRig|Ke3chang|APT32|APT1|Threat Group-3390|APT3|admin@338
 T1553.004,Install Root Certificate,Defense Evasion,no
-T1562.004,Disable or Modify System Firewall,Defense Evasion,Rocke|Lazarus Group|Kimsuky|Dragonfly 2.0|Carbanak
-T1562.003,HISTCONTROL,Defense Evasion,no
-T1562.002,Disable Windows Event Logging,Defense Evasion,Threat Group-3390
-T1562.001,Disable or Modify Tools,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Rocke|Kimsuky|Turla|Night Dragon|Gorgon Group|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda
+T1562.004,Disable or Modify System Firewall,Defense Evasion,APT29|UNC2452|Operation Wocao|Rocke|Lazarus Group|Kimsuky|Dragonfly 2.0|Carbanak
+T1562.003,Impair Command History Logging,Defense Evasion,no
+T1562.002,Disable Windows Event Logging,Defense Evasion,APT29|UNC2452|Threat Group-3390
+T1562.001,Disable or Modify Tools,Defense Evasion,APT29|MuddyWater|UNC2452|Wizard Spider|FIN6|Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Rocke|Kimsuky|Turla|Night Dragon|Gorgon Group|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda
 T1562,Impair Defenses,Defense Evasion,no
 T1003.004,LSA Secrets,Credential Access,OilRig|MuddyWater|menuPass|Leafminer|Ke3chang|Dragonfly 2.0|APT33|Threat Group-3390
 T1003.005,Cached Domain Credentials,Credential Access,OilRig|MuddyWater|Leafminer|APT33
 T1561.002,Disk Structure Wipe,Impact,Sandworm Team|Lazarus Group|APT38|APT37
 T1561.001,Disk Content Wipe,Impact,Lazarus Group
 T1561,Disk Wipe,Impact,no
-T1560.003,Archive via Custom Method,Collection,Lazarus Group|Kimsuky|CopyKittens|FIN6
+T1560.003,Archive via Custom Method,Collection,Mustang Panda|Lazarus Group|Kimsuky|CopyKittens|FIN6
 T1560.002,Archive via Library,Collection,Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390
-T1560.001,Archive via Utility,Collection,APT41|Soft Cell|Turla|Gallmaker|APT33|APT39|MuddyWater|Magic Hound|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|CopyKittens|APT3|Sowbug|menuPass|APT1|Ke3chang
+T1560.001,Archive via Utility,Collection,APT29|Mustang Panda|HAFNIUM|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Chimera|APT41|GALLIUM|Turla|Gallmaker|APT33|APT39|MuddyWater|Magic Hound|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|CopyKittens|Sowbug|APT3|menuPass|APT1|Ke3chang
 T1560,Archive Collected Data,Collection,menuPass|APT32|Honeybee|Patchwork|APT28|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Ke3chang
 T1499.004,Application or System Exploitation,Impact,no
 T1499.003,Application Exhaustion Flood,Impact,no
 T1499.002,Service Exhaustion Flood,Impact,no
 T1499.001,OS Exhaustion Flood,Impact,no
-T1491.002,External Defacement,Impact,no
+T1491.002,External Defacement,Impact,Sandworm Team
 T1491.001,Internal Defacement,Impact,Lazarus Group
-T1114.003,Email Forwarding Rule,Collection,no
-T1114.002,Remote Email Collection,Collection,APT1|FIN4|APT28|Dragonfly 2.0|Ke3chang|Leafminer
-T1114.001,Local Email Collection,Collection,Magic Hound|APT1
+T1114.003,Email Forwarding Rule,Collection,Silent Librarian|Kimsuky
+T1114.002,Remote Email Collection,Collection,APT29|HAFNIUM|Chimera|UNC2452|APT1|FIN4|Dragonfly 2.0|APT28|Leafminer|Ke3chang
+T1114.001,Local Email Collection,Collection,Chimera|Magic Hound|APT1
 T1134.005,SID-History Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
 T1134.004,Parent PID Spoofing,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
 T1134.003,Make and Impersonate Token,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
 T1134.002,Create Process with Token,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Turla|Lazarus Group
 T1134.001,Token Impersonation/Theft,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,APT28
-T1213.002,Sharepoint,Collection,Ke3chang|APT28
+T1213.002,Sharepoint,Collection,Chimera|Ke3chang|APT28
 T1213.001,Confluence,Collection,no
-T1555.003,Credentials from Web Browsers,Credential Access,Magic Hound|Sandworm Team|Inception|Stealth Falcon|OilRig|Leafminer|APT33|APT3|Kimsuky|TA505|Stolen Pencil|MuddyWater|APT37|Patchwork|Molerats
+T1555.003,Credentials from Web Browsers,Credential Access,Ajax Security Team|ZIRCONIUM|FIN6|Sandworm Team|Inception|Stealth Falcon|OilRig|Leafminer|APT33|APT3|Kimsuky|TA505|Stolen Pencil|MuddyWater|APT37|Patchwork|Molerats
 T1555.002,Securityd Memory,Credential Access,no
 T1555.001,Keychain,Credential Access,no
-T1559.002,Dynamic Data Exchange,Execution,Sharpshooter|TA505|MuddyWater|Gallmaker|Patchwork|Cobalt Group|APT37|APT28|FIN7
+T1559.002,Dynamic Data Exchange,Execution,Sidewinder|Sharpshooter|TA505|MuddyWater|Gallmaker|Patchwork|Cobalt Group|APT37|APT28|FIN7
 T1559.001,Component Object Model,Execution,Gamaredon Group|MuddyWater
 T1559,Inter-Process Communication,Execution,no
 T1558.002,Silver Ticket,Credential Access,no
 T1558.001,Golden Ticket,Credential Access,Ke3chang
 T1558,Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets,Credential Access,no
-T1557.001,LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay,Credential Access|Collection,no
-T1557,Man-in-the-Middle,Credential Access|Collection,no
-T1556.002,Password Filter DLL,Credential Access|Defense Evasion,Strider
-T1556.001,Domain Controller Authentication,Credential Access|Defense Evasion,no
-T1556,Modify Authentication Process,Credential Access|Defense Evasion,no
+T1557.001,LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay,Credential Access|Collection,Wizard Spider
+T1557,Man-in-the-Middle,Credential Access|Collection,Kimsuky
+T1556.002,Password Filter DLL,Credential Access|Defense Evasion|Persistence,Strider
+T1556.001,Domain Controller Authentication,Credential Access|Defense Evasion|Persistence,Chimera
+T1556,Modify Authentication Process,Credential Access|Defense Evasion|Persistence,no
 T1056.004,Credential API Hooking,Collection|Credential Access,PLATINUM
 T1056.003,Web Portal Capture,Collection|Credential Access,no
 T1056.002,GUI Input Capture,Collection|Credential Access,FIN4
-T1056.001,Keylogging,Collection|Credential Access,APT32|Sandworm Team|APT39|APT41|Kimsuky|menuPass|Stolen Pencil|FIN4|APT38|Ke3chang|OilRig|PLATINUM|Sowbug|Magic Hound|Group5|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT3|Darkhotel|APT28
-T1555,Credentials from Password Stores,Credential Access,APT39|OilRig|MuddyWater|Leafminer|APT33|Turla|Stealth Falcon
+T1056.001,Keylogging,Collection|Credential Access,Ajax Security Team|Operation Wocao|APT32|Sandworm Team|APT39|APT41|Kimsuky|menuPass|Stolen Pencil|FIN4|APT38|OilRig|Ke3chang|PLATINUM|Sowbug|Magic Hound|Group5|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT3|Darkhotel|APT28
+T1555,Credentials from Password Stores,Credential Access,APT29|Evilnum|UNC2452|FIN6|APT39|OilRig|MuddyWater|Leafminer|APT33|Stealth Falcon
 T1552.005,Cloud Instance Metadata API,Credential Access,no
 T1003.008,/etc/passwd and /etc/shadow,Credential Access,no
 T1003.007,Proc Filesystem,Credential Access,no
-T1003.006,DCSync,Credential Access,no
-T1558.003,Kerberoasting,Credential Access,no
+T1003.006,DCSync,Credential Access,APT29|UNC2452|Operation Wocao
+T1558.003,Kerberoasting,Credential Access,APT29|UNC2452|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider
 T1552.006,Group Policy Preferences,Credential Access,APT33
-T1003.003,NTDS,Credential Access,FIN6|Dragonfly 2.0
-T1003.002,Security Account Manager,Credential Access,Threat Group-3390|Ke3chang|Soft Cell|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|menuPass
-T1003.001,LSASS Memory,Credential Access,Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Blue Mockingbird|Silence|Threat Group-3390|Leviathan|APT41|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|Stolen Pencil|APT32|Lazarus Group|Leafminer|Magic Hound|MuddyWater|PLATINUM|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|OilRig|FIN6|APT3|APT28|APT1|Ke3chang|Cleaver
-T1110.004,Credential Stuffing,Credential Access,no
-T1110.003,Password Spraying,Credential Access,APT33|Leafminer|Lazarus Group
-T1110.002,Password Cracking,Credential Access,APT41|Dragonfly 2.0|APT3
-T1110.001,Password Guessing,Credential Access,no
-T1021.006,Windows Remote Management,Lateral Movement,Threat Group-3390
-T1021.005,VNC,Lateral Movement,GCMAN
-T1021.004,SSH,Lateral Movement,Rocke|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|OilRig|menuPass|GCMAN
+T1003.003,NTDS,Credential Access,Mustang Panda|HAFNIUM|Fox Kitten|menuPass|Wizard Spider|Chimera|FIN6|Dragonfly 2.0
+T1003.002,Security Account Manager,Credential Access,Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390|Ke3chang|GALLIUM|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|menuPass
+T1003.001,LSASS Memory,Credential Access,HAFNIUM|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Blue Mockingbird|Silence|Threat Group-3390|Leviathan|APT41|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|Stolen Pencil|APT32|Leafminer|Magic Hound|Lazarus Group|MuddyWater|PLATINUM|FIN8|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN6|APT3|APT28|APT1|Ke3chang|Cleaver
+T1110.004,Credential Stuffing,Credential Access,Chimera
+T1110.003,Password Spraying,Credential Access,Silent Librarian|Chimera|APT28|APT33|Leafminer|Lazarus Group
+T1110.002,Password Cracking,Credential Access,FIN6|APT41|Dragonfly 2.0|APT3
+T1110.001,Password Guessing,Credential Access,APT28
+T1021.006,Windows Remote Management,Lateral Movement,APT29|UNC2452|Chimera|Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390
+T1021.005,VNC,Lateral Movement,Fox Kitten|GCMAN
+T1021.004,SSH,Lateral Movement,Fox Kitten|Rocke|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|OilRig|menuPass|GCMAN
 T1021.003,Distributed Component Object Model,Lateral Movement,no
-T1021.002,SMB/Windows Admin Shares,Lateral Movement,Blue Mockingbird|APT39|APT32|Orangeworm|FIN8|APT3|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-1314|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang
-T1021.001,Remote Desktop Protocol,Lateral Movement,Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Stolen Pencil|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|APT3|OilRig|menuPass|FIN10|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|APT1|Axiom
+T1021.002,SMB/Windows Admin Shares,Lateral Movement,Fox Kitten|APT41|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|APT39|APT32|Orangeworm|FIN8|APT3|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-1314|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang
+T1021.001,Remote Desktop Protocol,Lateral Movement,Fox Kitten|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Stolen Pencil|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|APT3|OilRig|FIN10|menuPass|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|APT1|Axiom
 T1554,Compromise Client Software Binary,Persistence,no
 T1036.006,Space after Filename,Defense Evasion,no
-T1036.005,Match Legitimate Name or Location,Defense Evasion,Rocke|Sandworm Team|APT39|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Silence|APT41|menuPass|TEMP.Veles|MuddyWater|BRONZE BUTLER|Sowbug|APT32|Patchwork|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Carbanak|APT1
-T1036.004,Masquerade Task or Service,Defense Evasion,Wizard Spider|APT-C-36|Carbanak|APT32|FIN6|FIN7
-T1036.003,Rename System Utilities,Defense Evasion,menuPass|APT32|Soft Cell|PLATINUM
+T1036.005,Match Legitimate Name or Location,Defense Evasion,APT29|Mustang Panda|Sidewinder|Darkhotel|Lazarus Group|Indrik Spider|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|Machete|Chimera|PROMETHIUM|Rocke|Sandworm Team|APT39|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Silence|APT41|menuPass|TEMP.Veles|MuddyWater|BRONZE BUTLER|Sowbug|APT32|Patchwork|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Carbanak|APT1
+T1036.004,Masquerade Task or Service,Defense Evasion,ZIRCONIUM|APT29|Higaisa|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|PROMETHIUM|Wizard Spider|APT-C-36|Carbanak|APT32|FIN6|FIN7
+T1036.003,Rename System Utilities,Defense Evasion,menuPass|APT32|GALLIUM
 T1036.002,Right-to-Left Override,Defense Evasion,BRONZE BUTLER|BlackTech|Ke3chang|Scarlet Mimic
-T1036.001,Invalid Code Signature,Defense Evasion,Windshift
+T1036.001,Invalid Code Signature,Defense Evasion,Windshift|APT37
 T1553.003,SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking,Defense Evasion,no
-T1553.002,Code Signing,Defense Evasion,Patchwork|Silence|APT41|FIN6|TA505|FIN7|Honeybee|Leviathan|APT37|CopyKittens|Winnti Group|Suckfly|Molerats|Darkhotel
+T1553.002,Code Signing,Defense Evasion,APT29|GALLIUM|UNC2452|Wizard Spider|Kimsuky|PROMETHIUM|Patchwork|Silence|APT41|FIN6|TA505|FIN7|Honeybee|Leviathan|CopyKittens|Winnti Group|Suckfly|Molerats|Darkhotel
 T1553.001,Gatekeeper Bypass,Defense Evasion,no
 T1553,Subvert Trust Controls,Defense Evasion,no
-T1027.003,Steganography,Defense Evasion,BRONZE BUTLER|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|APT37
-T1027.002,Software Packing,Defense Evasion,TA505|Rocke|Soft Cell|The White Company|APT39|APT38|Dark Caracal|Elderwood|APT3|Patchwork|APT29|Night Dragon
-T1027.001,Binary Padding,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|APT32|Leviathan|BRONZE BUTLER|Moafee
+T1027.003,Steganography,Defense Evasion,TA551|BRONZE BUTLER|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|APT37
+T1027.002,Software Packing,Defense Evasion,ZIRCONIUM|Lazarus Group|TA505|Rocke|GALLIUM|The White Company|APT39|APT38|Dark Caracal|Elderwood|APT3|Patchwork|APT29|Night Dragon
+T1027.001,Binary Padding,Defense Evasion,Mustang Panda|Higaisa|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|APT32|Leviathan|BRONZE BUTLER|Moafee
 T1222.002,Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification,Defense Evasion,Rocke|APT32
-T1222.001,Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification,Defense Evasion,no
-T1552.004,Private Keys,Credential Access,Rocke
+T1222.001,Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification,Defense Evasion,Wizard Spider
+T1552.004,Private Keys,Credential Access,APT29|UNC2452|Operation Wocao|Rocke
 T1552.003,Bash History,Credential Access,no
 T1552.002,Credentials in Registry,Credential Access,APT32
-T1552.001,Credentials In Files,Credential Access,Leafminer|APT33|OilRig|TA505|Stolen Pencil|MuddyWater|APT3
+T1552.001,Credentials In Files,Credential Access,Fox Kitten|Leafminer|APT33|OilRig|TA505|Stolen Pencil|MuddyWater|APT3
 T1552,Unsecured Credentials,Credential Access,no
 T1216.001,PubPrn,Defense Evasion,APT32
-T1070.006,Timestomp,Defense Evasion,Rocke|TEMP.Veles|APT32|Lazarus Group|APT28
+T1070.006,Timestomp,Defense Evasion,APT29|UNC2452|Chimera|Kimsuky|Rocke|TEMP.Veles|APT32|Lazarus Group|APT28
 T1070.005,Network Share Connection Removal,Defense Evasion,Threat Group-3390
-T1070.004,File Deletion,Defense Evasion,Sandworm Team|Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Wizard Spider|APT41|Kimsuky|Silence|The White Company|TEMP.Veles|APT32|APT38|Patchwork|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|menuPass|FIN8|OilRig|FIN5|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|APT3|FIN10|APT28|Threat Group-3390|Group5|Lazarus Group|APT18|APT29
+T1070.004,File Deletion,Defense Evasion,APT39|Mustang Panda|Chimera|Evilnum|UNC2452|Operation Wocao|FIN6|Sandworm Team|Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Wizard Spider|APT41|Kimsuky|Silence|The White Company|TEMP.Veles|APT32|APT38|Patchwork|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|menuPass|FIN8|OilRig|FIN5|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|APT3|Threat Group-3390|FIN10|APT28|Group5|Lazarus Group|APT18|APT29
 T1070.003,Clear Command History,Defense Evasion,APT41
-T1550.004,Web Session Cookie,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,no
+T1550.004,Web Session Cookie,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,APT29|UNC2452
 T1550.001,Application Access Token,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,APT28
 T1550.003,Pass the Ticket,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|APT29
-T1550.002,Pass the Hash,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,Soft Cell|APT32|Night Dragon|APT28|APT1
-T1550,Use Alternate Authentication Material,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,no
+T1550.002,Pass the Hash,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,Chimera|Kimsuky|GALLIUM|APT32|Night Dragon|APT28|APT1
+T1550,Use Alternate Authentication Material,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,APT29|UNC2452
 T1548.004,Elevated Execution with Prompt,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
 T1548.003,Sudo and Sudo Caching,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
-T1548.002,Bypass User Access Control,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,APT37|MuddyWater|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|Threat Group-3390|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork|APT29
+T1548.002,Bypass User Account Control,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,Evilnum|APT37|MuddyWater|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|Threat Group-3390|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork|APT29
 T1548.001,Setuid and Setgid,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
 T1548,Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
 T1136.003,Cloud Account,Persistence,no
 T1070.002,Clear Linux or Mac System Logs,Defense Evasion,Rocke
-T1070.001,Clear Windows Event Logs,Defense Evasion,APT41|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|APT32|FIN8|FIN5|APT28
-T1136.002,Domain Account,Persistence,Soft Cell
-T1136.001,Local Account,Persistence,APT39|APT41|Dragonfly 2.0|Leafminer|APT3
+T1070.001,Clear Windows Event Logs,Defense Evasion,Chimera|Operation Wocao|APT41|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|APT32|FIN8|FIN5|APT28
+T1136.002,Domain Account,Persistence,HAFNIUM|GALLIUM
+T1136.001,Local Account,Persistence,Fox Kitten|APT39|APT41|Dragonfly 2.0|Leafminer|APT3
 T1547.011,Plist Modification,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
 T1547.010,Port Monitors,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
-T1547.009,Shortcut Modification,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,APT39|Darkhotel|APT29|Gorgon Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Leviathan|Lazarus Group
+T1547.009,Shortcut Modification,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,APT39|Darkhotel|APT29|Gorgon Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Lazarus Group|Leviathan
 T1547.008,LSASS Driver,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
 T1547.007,Re-opened Applications,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
 T1547.006,Kernel Modules and Extensions,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
-T1547.005,Security Support Provider,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
-T1547.004,Winlogon Helper DLL,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Tropic Trooper|Turla
+T1547.005,Security Support Provider,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Lazarus Group
+T1547.004,Winlogon Helper DLL,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Wizard Spider|Tropic Trooper|Turla
 T1547.003,Time Providers,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
 T1546.014,Emond,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
 T1546.013,PowerShell Profile,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,Turla
@@ -236,38 +359,38 @@ T1546.012,Image File Execution Options Injection,Privilege Escalation|Persistenc
 T1218.008,Odbcconf,Defense Evasion,Cobalt Group
 T1546.011,Application Shimming,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,FIN7
 T1547.002,Authentication Package,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
-T1546.010,AppInit DLLs,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
+T1546.010,AppInit DLLs,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,APT39
 T1546.009,AppCert DLLs,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,Honeybee
-T1218.007,Msiexec,Defense Evasion,TA505|Rancor
-T1546.008,Accessibility Features,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,APT41|APT3|APT29|Deep Panda|Axiom
+T1218.007,Msiexec,Defense Evasion,ZIRCONIUM|Molerats|Machete|TA505|Rancor
+T1546.008,Accessibility Features,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,Fox Kitten|APT41|APT3|APT29|Deep Panda|Axiom
 T1546.007,Netsh Helper DLL,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
 T1546.006,LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
 T1546.005,Trap,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
-T1546.004,.bash_profile and .bashrc,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
-T1546.003,Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,APT33|Blue Mockingbird|Turla|Leviathan|APT29
+T1546.004,Unix Shell Configuration Modification,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
+T1546.003,Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,Mustang Panda|UNC2452|APT33|Blue Mockingbird|Turla|Leviathan|APT29
 T1546.002,Screensaver,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
 T1546.001,Change Default File Association,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,Kimsuky
-T1547.001,Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Silence|RTM|Inception|APT41|Machete|Kimsuky|APT33|APT39|APT32|APT18|Turla|Dark Caracal|Cobalt Group|Honeybee|Threat Group-3390|Dragonfly 2.0|Gorgon Group|Ke3chang|APT19|Leviathan|MuddyWater|APT37|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|APT3|FIN10|FIN7|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT29|Darkhotel
+T1547.001,Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Windshift|Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Sidewinder|APT28|Wizard Spider|PROMETHIUM|Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Silence|RTM|Inception|APT41|Kimsuky|APT33|APT39|APT32|APT18|Turla|APT19|Honeybee|Dark Caracal|Threat Group-3390|Cobalt Group|Ke3chang|Gorgon Group|Dragonfly 2.0|APT37|MuddyWater|Leviathan|APT3|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|FIN7|FIN10|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT29|Darkhotel
 T1218.002,Control Panel,Defense Evasion,no
-T1218.010,Regsvr32,Defense Evasion,Blue Mockingbird|Inception|WIRTE|Cobalt Group|APT19|Leviathan|APT32|Deep Panda
+T1218.010,Regsvr32,Defense Evasion,TA551|Blue Mockingbird|Inception|WIRTE|APT19|Cobalt Group|Leviathan|APT32|Deep Panda
 T1218.009,Regsvcs/Regasm,Defense Evasion,no
-T1218.005,Mshta,Defense Evasion,Inception|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|FIN7
-T1218.004,InstallUtil,Defense Evasion,no
+T1218.005,Mshta,Defense Evasion,Mustang Panda|TA551|Sidewinder|Lazarus Group|Inception|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|FIN7
+T1218.004,InstallUtil,Defense Evasion,Mustang Panda|menuPass
 T1218.001,Compiled HTML File,Defense Evasion,APT41|Silence|Lazarus Group|Dark Caracal|OilRig
 T1218.003,CMSTP,Defense Evasion,Cobalt Group|MuddyWater
-T1218.011,Rundll32,Defense Evasion,APT32|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|TA505|MuddyWater|APT29|APT19|CopyKittens|APT3|Carbanak|APT28
+T1218.011,Rundll32,Defense Evasion,HAFNIUM|TA551|UNC2452|APT41|Gamaredon Group|APT32|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|TA505|MuddyWater|APT29|APT19|CopyKittens|APT3|Carbanak|APT28
 T1547,Boot or Logon Autostart Execution,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
 T1546,Event Triggered Execution,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
 T1098.003,Add Office 365 Global Administrator Role,Persistence,no
-T1098.002,Exchange Email Delegate Permissions,Persistence,Magic Hound
-T1098.001,Additional Azure Service Principal Credentials,Persistence,no
+T1098.002,Exchange Email Delegate Permissions,Persistence,APT29|UNC2452|Magic Hound
+T1098.001,Additional Cloud Credentials,Persistence,APT29|UNC2452
 T1543.004,Launch Daemon,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
-T1543.003,Windows Service,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Blue Mockingbird|DarkVishnya|Wizard Spider|APT32|APT41|Kimsuky|Tropic Trooper|Cobalt Group|Ke3chang|Honeybee|FIN7|Threat Group-3390|APT19|APT3|Lazarus Group|Carbanak
+T1543.003,Windows Service,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,PROMETHIUM|Blue Mockingbird|DarkVishnya|Wizard Spider|APT32|APT41|Kimsuky|Tropic Trooper|Cobalt Group|Ke3chang|FIN7|APT19|Honeybee|Threat Group-3390|APT3|Lazarus Group|Carbanak
 T1543.002,Systemd Service,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Rocke
 T1543.001,Launch Agent,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
 T1037.005,Startup Items,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
-T1037.004,Rc.common,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
-T1055.012,Process Hollowing,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Gorgon Group|Patchwork
+T1037.004,RC Scripts,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
+T1055.012,Process Hollowing,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Threat Group-3390|Gorgon Group|menuPass|Patchwork
 T1055.013,Process Doppelgänging,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Leafminer
 T1055.011,Extra Window Memory Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
 T1055.014,VDSO Hijacking,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
@@ -277,7 +400,7 @@ T1055.005,Thread Local Storage,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
 T1055.004,Asynchronous Procedure Call,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
 T1055.003,Thread Execution Hijacking,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
 T1055.002,Portable Executable Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Rocke|Gorgon Group
-T1055.001,Dynamic-link Library Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,TA505|Turla|Tropic Trooper|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda
+T1055.001,Dynamic-link Library Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Wizard Spider|TA505|Turla|Tropic Trooper|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda
 T1037.003,Network Logon Script,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
 T1543,Create or Modify System Process,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
 T1037.002,Logon Script (Mac),Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
@@ -285,13 +408,13 @@ T1037.001,Logon Script (Windows),Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Cobalt Group|A
 T1542.003,Bootkit,Persistence|Defense Evasion,APT41|Lazarus Group|APT28
 T1542.002,Component Firmware,Persistence|Defense Evasion,Equation
 T1542.001,System Firmware,Persistence|Defense Evasion,no
-T1505.003,Web Shell,Persistence,Tropic Trooper|Soft Cell|Threat Group-3390|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|APT32|OilRig|Deep Panda
+T1505.003,Web Shell,Persistence,Sandworm Team|HAFNIUM|Volatile Cedar|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|Tropic Trooper|GALLIUM|Threat Group-3390|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|APT32|OilRig|Deep Panda
 T1505.002,Transport Agent,Persistence,no
 T1505.001,SQL Stored Procedures,Persistence,no
 T1053.003,Cron,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Rocke
 T1053.004,Launchd,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
 T1053.001,At (Linux),Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
-T1053.005,Scheduled Task,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT-C-36|BRONZE BUTLER|APT41|Machete|Soft Cell|Silence|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|Patchwork|OilRig|Rancor|Cobalt Group|FIN8|menuPass|FIN10|APT32|FIN7|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|APT3|APT29
+T1053.005,Scheduled Task,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Mustang Panda|Higaisa|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|Molerats|Machete|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT-C-36|BRONZE BUTLER|APT41|GALLIUM|Silence|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|Cobalt Group|Rancor|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|Patchwork|FIN8|menuPass|FIN10|FIN7|APT32|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|APT3|APT29
 T1053.002,At (Windows),Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,BRONZE BUTLER|Threat Group-3390|APT18
 T1542,Pre-OS Boot,Defense Evasion|Persistence,no
 T1137.001,Office Template Macros,Persistence,MuddyWater
@@ -301,140 +424,141 @@ T1137.005,Outlook Rules,Persistence,no
 T1137.006,Add-ins,Persistence,Naikon
 T1137.002,Office Test,Persistence,APT28
 T1531,Account Access Removal,Impact,no
-T1539,Steal Web Session Cookie,Credential Access,no
+T1539,Steal Web Session Cookie,Credential Access,Evilnum
 T1529,System Shutdown/Reboot,Impact,Lazarus Group|APT38|APT37
-T1518,Software Discovery,Discovery,BRONZE BUTLER|Tropic Trooper|Inception
+T1518,Software Discovery,Discovery,Mustang Panda|Windshift|MuddyWater|Windigo|Sidewinder|Operation Wocao|BRONZE BUTLER|Tropic Trooper|Inception
+T1547.013,XDG Autostart Entries,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
 T1534,Internal Spearphishing,Lateral Movement,Gamaredon Group
 T1528,Steal Application Access Token,Credential Access,APT28
 T1535,Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions,Defense Evasion,no
-T1525,Implant Container Image,Persistence,no
+T1525,Implant Internal Image,Persistence,no
 T1538,Cloud Service Dashboard,Discovery,no
-T1530,Data from Cloud Storage Object,Collection,no
+T1530,Data from Cloud Storage Object,Collection,Fox Kitten
 T1578,Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure,Defense Evasion,no
 T1537,Transfer Data to Cloud Account,Exfiltration,no
 T1526,Cloud Service Discovery,Discovery,no
 T1505,Server Software Component,Persistence,no
-T1499,Endpoint Denial of Service,Impact,no
-T1497,Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion,Defense Evasion|Discovery,no
-T1498,Network Denial of Service,Impact,no
+T1499,Endpoint Denial of Service,Impact,Sandworm Team
+T1497,Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion,Defense Evasion|Discovery,Darkhotel
+T1498,Network Denial of Service,Impact,APT28
 T1496,Resource Hijacking,Impact,Blue Mockingbird|Rocke|APT41|Lazarus Group
 T1495,Firmware Corruption,Impact,no
 T1491,Defacement,Impact,no
 T1490,Inhibit System Recovery,Impact,no
-T1489,Service Stop,Impact,Lazarus Group
-T1486,Data Encrypted for Impact,Impact,APT41|TA505|APT38
+T1489,Service Stop,Impact,Wizard Spider|Lazarus Group
+T1486,Data Encrypted for Impact,Impact,Indrik Spider|APT41|TA505|APT38
 T1485,Data Destruction,Impact,Sandworm Team|Lazarus Group|APT38
-T1484,Group Policy Modification,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
-T1482,Domain Trust Discovery,Discovery,Wizard Spider
+T1484,Domain Policy Modification,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
+T1482,Domain Trust Discovery,Discovery,APT29|Chimera|UNC2452
 T1480,Execution Guardrails,Defense Evasion,no
 T1222,File and Directory Permissions Modification,Defense Evasion,no
+T1220,XSL Script Processing,Defense Evasion,Higaisa|Cobalt Group
 T1221,Template Injection,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|Frankenstein|Inception|APT28|Tropic Trooper|Dragonfly 2.0|DarkHydrus
-T1220,XSL Script Processing,Defense Evasion,Cobalt Group
-T1197,BITS Jobs,Defense Evasion|Persistence,Patchwork|APT41|Leviathan
-T1217,Browser Bookmark Discovery,Discovery,no
-T1213,Data from Information Repositories,Collection,Turla
-T1189,Drive-by Compromise,Initial Access,Turla|Windshift|RTM|Darkhotel|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|BRONZE BUTLER|Leafminer|Dark Caracal|APT19|APT32|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|Elderwood|APT37|Patchwork|PLATINUM
-T1203,Exploitation for Client Execution,Execution,Sandworm Team|MuddyWater|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT41|admin@338|Threat Group-3390|APT12|The White Company|APT33|APT32|APT28|Tropic Trooper|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Cobalt Group|APT37|Patchwork|Leviathan|Elderwood|TA459|APT29
+T1189,Drive-by Compromise,Initial Access,Machete|Windigo|Dragonfly|PROMETHIUM|Turla|Windshift|RTM|Darkhotel|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|Leafminer|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|APT19|APT32|Threat Group-3390|Dark Caracal|Elderwood|APT37|Patchwork|PLATINUM
+T1190,Exploit Public-Facing Application,Initial Access,Volatile Cedar|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|APT28|APT29|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Blue Mockingbird|Rocke|APT39|BlackTech|APT41|GALLIUM|Night Dragon|Axiom
+T1210,Exploitation of Remote Services,Lateral Movement,Fox Kitten|menuPass|Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390|APT28
+T1217,Browser Bookmark Discovery,Discovery,Chimera|Fox Kitten
+T1213,Data from Information Repositories,Collection,Fox Kitten|FIN6|Turla
+T1197,BITS Jobs,Defense Evasion|Persistence,APT39|Patchwork|APT41|Leviathan
+T1219,Remote Access Software,Command And Control,Mustang Panda|MuddyWater|Evilnum|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Sandworm Team|DarkVishnya|RTM|Kimsuky|Night Dragon|Thrip|Cobalt Group|Carbanak
+T1195,Supply Chain Compromise,Initial Access,no
+T1204,User Execution,Execution,no
 T1212,Exploitation for Credential Access,Credential Access,no
 T1211,Exploitation for Defense Evasion,Defense Evasion,APT28
-T1190,Exploit Public-Facing Application,Initial Access,Blue Mockingbird|Rocke|APT39|BlackTech|APT41|Soft Cell|Night Dragon|Axiom
-T1210,Exploitation of Remote Services,Lateral Movement,Threat Group-3390|APT28
-T1202,Indirect Command Execution,Defense Evasion,no
 T1200,Hardware Additions,Initial Access,DarkVishnya
-T1201,Password Policy Discovery,Discovery,Turla|OilRig
-T1219,Remote Access Software,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|DarkVishnya|RTM|Kimsuky|Night Dragon|Thrip|Cobalt Group|Carbanak
+T1202,Indirect Command Execution,Defense Evasion,no
+T1201,Password Policy Discovery,Discovery,Chimera|Turla|OilRig
 T1207,Rogue Domain Controller,Defense Evasion,no
-T1199,Trusted Relationship,Initial Access,APT28|menuPass
-T1218,Signed Binary Proxy Execution,Defense Evasion,no
-T1204,User Execution,Execution,no
+T1203,Exploitation for Client Execution,Execution,Mustang Panda|Darkhotel|Higaisa|HAFNIUM|Sidewinder|Sandworm Team|MuddyWater|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT41|admin@338|Threat Group-3390|APT12|The White Company|APT33|APT32|APT28|Tropic Trooper|BRONZE BUTLER|Lazarus Group|Cobalt Group|APT37|Patchwork|APT29|TA459|Leviathan|Elderwood
 T1216,Signed Script Proxy Execution,Defense Evasion,no
-T1195,Supply Chain Compromise,Initial Access,Elderwood
+T1199,Trusted Relationship,Initial Access,Sandworm Team|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|APT28|menuPass
+T1218,Signed Binary Proxy Execution,Defense Evasion,no
 T1205,Traffic Signaling,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Command And Control,no
 T1176,Browser Extensions,Persistence,Kimsuky|Stolen Pencil
 T1175,Component Object Model and Distributed COM,Lateral Movement|Execution,no
 T1187,Forced Authentication,Credential Access,DarkHydrus|Dragonfly 2.0
 T1185,Man in the Browser,Collection,no
-T1134,Access Token Manipulation,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Blue Mockingbird
-T1136,Create Account,Persistence,no
-T1140,Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information,Defense Evasion,Rocke|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Molerats|Frankenstein|Turla|WIRTE|Darkhotel|Tropic Trooper|menuPass|Honeybee|Threat Group-3390|APT19|Gorgon Group|Leviathan|MuddyWater|APT28|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER
 T1149,LC_MAIN Hijacking,Defense Evasion,no
-T1135,Network Share Discovery,Discovery,APT32|APT39|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT1|Dragonfly 2.0|Sowbug
+T1134,Access Token Manipulation,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,FIN6|Blue Mockingbird
+T1136,Create Account,Persistence,no
 T1137,Office Application Startup,Persistence,Gamaredon Group|APT32
+T1140,Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information,Defense Evasion,APT39|APT29|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|UNC2452|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Molerats|Frankenstein|Turla|WIRTE|Darkhotel|Tropic Trooper|Gorgon Group|menuPass|Honeybee|Threat Group-3390|APT19|Leviathan|MuddyWater|APT28|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER
+T1135,Network Share Discovery,Discovery,Chimera|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|APT32|APT39|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT1|Dragonfly 2.0|Sowbug
 T1153,Source,Execution,no
-T1133,External Remote Services,Persistence|Initial Access,Sandworm Team|APT41|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|Night Dragon|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|Ke3chang|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|APT18
+T1133,External Remote Services,Persistence|Initial Access,APT29|UNC2452|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Kimsuky|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Chimera|Sandworm Team|APT41|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|Night Dragon|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|Ke3chang|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|APT18
 T1132,Data Encoding,Command And Control,no
 T1129,Shared Modules,Execution,no
 T1127,Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution,Defense Evasion,no
 T1125,Video Capture,Collection,Silence|FIN7
-T1124,System Time Discovery,Discovery,The White Company|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Turla
+T1124,System Time Discovery,Discovery,Darkhotel|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Chimera|Operation Wocao|The White Company|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Turla
 T1123,Audio Capture,Collection,APT37
-T1120,Peripheral Device Discovery,Discovery,Turla|APT37|Gamaredon Group|Equation|APT28
-T1119,Automated Collection,Collection,Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT1|APT28|Patchwork|OilRig|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|FIN6
-T1115,Clipboard Data,Collection,APT39|APT38
-T1114,Email Collection,Collection,no
-T1113,Screen Capture,Collection,Gamaredon Group|APT39|Silence|MuddyWater|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|Dark Caracal|FIN7|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|Group5|APT28
-T1112,Modify Registry,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|Turla|APT32|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|Threat Group-3390|Honeybee|Patchwork|Gorgon Group|FIN8
-T1111,Two-Factor Authentication Interception,Credential Access,no
-T1110,Brute Force,Credential Access,DarkVishnya|APT39|OilRig|FIN5|Turla
+T1120,Peripheral Device Discovery,Discovery,Operation Wocao|Turla|APT37|Gamaredon Group|Equation|APT28
+T1119,Automated Collection,Collection,Mustang Panda|Sidewinder|Chimera|menuPass|Operation Wocao|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT1|APT28|Patchwork|OilRig|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|FIN6
+T1115,Clipboard Data,Collection,Operation Wocao|APT39|APT38
+T1114,Email Collection,Collection,Silent Librarian
+T1113,Screen Capture,Collection,GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Gamaredon Group|APT39|Silence|MuddyWater|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|Dark Caracal|FIN7|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|Group5|APT28
+T1112,Modify Registry,Defense Evasion,Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|Turla|APT32|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|Threat Group-3390|Patchwork|Gorgon Group|Honeybee|FIN8
+T1111,Two-Factor Authentication Interception,Credential Access,Chimera|Operation Wocao
+T1110,Brute Force,Credential Access,APT28|Fox Kitten|DarkVishnya|APT39|OilRig|FIN5|Turla
 T1108,Redundant Access,Defense Evasion|Persistence,no
-T1106,Native API,Execution,Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Turla|Silence|Gorgon Group|APT37
-T1105,Ingress Tool Transfer,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Silence|APT-C-36|APT41|Soft Cell|TA505|WIRTE|APT33|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Rancor|Cobalt Group|Turla|Gorgon Group|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|APT37|FIN8|PLATINUM|Leviathan|Elderwood|Magic Hound|APT3|APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN7|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28
+T1106,Native API,Execution,Higaisa|menuPass|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Turla|Silence|APT37|Gorgon Group
+T1105,Ingress Tool Transfer,Command And Control,HAFNIUM|APT29|Ajax Security Team|Mustang Panda|Windshift|Darkhotel|ZIRCONIUM|TA551|Volatile Cedar|Indrik Spider|Evilnum|Sidewinder|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|Kimsuky|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Silence|APT-C-36|APT41|GALLIUM|TA505|WIRTE|APT33|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Rancor|Cobalt Group|Gorgon Group|Turla|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|APT37|Leviathan|FIN8|PLATINUM|Elderwood|APT3|Magic Hound|APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN7|menuPass|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28
 T1104,Multi-Stage Channels,Command And Control,APT41|MuddyWater|APT3
-T1102,Web Service,Command And Control,Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Inception|FIN6
+T1102,Web Service,Command And Control,Fox Kitten|Turla|APT32|Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Inception|FIN6
 T1098,Account Manipulation,Persistence,APT3|Dragonfly 2.0|Lazarus Group
-T1095,Non-Application Layer Protocol,Command And Control,APT29|PLATINUM|APT3
+T1095,Non-Application Layer Protocol,Command And Control,HAFNIUM|Operation Wocao|FIN6|APT29|PLATINUM|APT3
 T1092,Communication Through Removable Media,Command And Control,APT28
-T1091,Replication Through Removable Media,Lateral Movement|Initial Access,Tropic Trooper|Darkhotel|APT28
-T1090,Proxy,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|APT41|Turla
-T1087,Account Discovery,Discovery,no
-T1083,File and Directory Discovery,Discovery,Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Inception|APT41|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|APT18|Leafminer|Honeybee|Dark Caracal|Dragonfly 2.0|Magic Hound|Sowbug|BRONZE BUTLER|APT3|APT28|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
-T1082,System Information Discovery,Discovery,Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|Honeybee|APT19|APT37|APT32|Magic Hound|OilRig|APT3|Sowbug|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
-T1080,Taint Shared Content,Lateral Movement,BRONZE BUTLER|Darkhotel
-T1078,Valid Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|APT39|FIN4|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|Leviathan|APT33|OilRig|FIN5|menuPass|APT28|FIN10|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390|APT18|PittyTiger|Carbanak
+T1091,Replication Through Removable Media,Lateral Movement|Initial Access,Mustang Panda|Tropic Trooper|Darkhotel|APT28
+T1090,Proxy,Command And Control,Windigo|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|APT41|Turla
+T1087,Account Discovery,Discovery,APT29|UNC2452
+T1083,File and Directory Discovery,Discovery,APT29|Mustang Panda|Darkhotel|Windigo|Sidewinder|Chimera|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|menuPass|APT39|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Inception|APT41|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|APT18|Dragonfly 2.0|Leafminer|Honeybee|Dark Caracal|Magic Hound|APT3|BRONZE BUTLER|Sowbug|APT28|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
+T1082,System Information Discovery,Discovery,APT29|Mustang Panda|Windshift|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Windigo|Sidewinder|UNC2452|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|APT37|APT19|Honeybee|APT32|Magic Hound|Sowbug|OilRig|APT3|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
+T1080,Taint Shared Content,Lateral Movement,Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Darkhotel
+T1078,Valid Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,APT29|Silent Librarian|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|APT39|FIN4|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|APT33|Leviathan|OilRig|FIN5|menuPass|FIN10|APT28|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390|APT18|PittyTiger|Carbanak
 T1074,Data Staged,Collection,Wizard Spider
 T1072,Software Deployment Tools,Execution|Lateral Movement,Silence|APT32|Threat Group-1314
 T1071,Application Layer Protocol,Command And Control,Rocke|Magic Hound|Dragonfly 2.0
-T1070,Indicator Removal on Host,Defense Evasion,no
-T1069,Permission Groups Discovery,Discovery,TA505|APT3
-T1068,Exploitation for Privilege Escalation,Privilege Escalation,Whitefly|APT33|Cobalt Group|PLATINUM|FIN8|APT32|Threat Group-3390|FIN6|APT28
+T1070,Indicator Removal on Host,Defense Evasion,APT29|UNC2452
+T1069,Permission Groups Discovery,Discovery,APT29|UNC2452|TA505|APT3
+T1068,Exploitation for Privilege Escalation,Privilege Escalation,ZIRCONIUM|Turla|Whitefly|APT33|Cobalt Group|PLATINUM|FIN8|APT32|Threat Group-3390|FIN6|APT28
 T1064,Scripting,Defense Evasion|Execution,no
 T1062,Hypervisor,Persistence,no
 T1061,Graphical User Interface,Execution,no
-T1059,Command and Scripting Interpreter,Execution,APT32|Molerats|Whitefly|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|FIN7|OilRig|FIN5|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Ke3chang
-T1057,Process Discovery,Discovery,Rocke|Frankenstein|Inception|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|APT38|Tropic Trooper|APT37|Honeybee|OilRig|APT3|Magic Hound|APT28|Winnti Group|Stealth Falcon|Poseidon Group|Lazarus Group|Molerats|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang
-T1056,Input Capture,Collection|Credential Access,no
-T1055,Process Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,APT32|Sharpshooter|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|Turla|Cobalt Group|APT37|Honeybee|PLATINUM
+T1059,Command and Scripting Interpreter,Execution,Windigo|Fox Kitten|APT32|Whitefly|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|FIN7|OilRig|FIN5|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Ke3chang
+T1057,Process Discovery,Discovery,APT29|Mustang Panda|Windshift|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Chimera|UNC2452|Operation Wocao|Rocke|Frankenstein|Inception|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|APT38|Tropic Trooper|APT37|Honeybee|OilRig|APT3|Magic Hound|APT28|Winnti Group|Stealth Falcon|Poseidon Group|Lazarus Group|Molerats|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang
+T1056,Input Capture,Collection|Credential Access,APT39
+T1055,Process Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Operation Wocao|APT32|Sharpshooter|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|Turla|Cobalt Group|APT37|Honeybee|PLATINUM
 T1053,Scheduled Task/Job,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
 T1052,Exfiltration Over Physical Medium,Exfiltration,no
 T1051,Shared Webroot,Lateral Movement,no
-T1049,System Network Connections Discovery,Discovery,Tropic Trooper|APT41|APT38|Soft Cell|APT32|APT1|OilRig|APT3|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
+T1049,System Network Connections Discovery,Discovery,Mustang Panda|MuddyWater|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Tropic Trooper|APT41|APT38|GALLIUM|APT32|APT1|APT3|OilRig|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
 T1048,Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol,Exfiltration,no
-T1047,Windows Management Instrumentation,Execution,Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT41|FIN6|Soft Cell|APT32|MuddyWater|OilRig|Threat Group-3390|FIN8|Leviathan|menuPass|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT29|Deep Panda
-T1046,Network Service Scanning,Discovery,Rocke|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT39|APT32|Leafminer|OilRig|Cobalt Group|menuPass|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390
-T1043,Commonly Used Port,Command And Control,Machete|OilRig|APT28|TEMP.Veles|Night Dragon|APT29|APT18|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN7|FIN8|APT37|Magic Hound|APT3|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390
-T1041,Exfiltration Over C2 Channel,Exfiltration,Sandworm Team|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Kimsuky|Soft Cell|APT32|APT3|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Ke3chang
-T1040,Network Sniffing,Credential Access|Discovery,Sandworm Team|DarkVishnya|APT33|Stolen Pencil|APT28
-T1039,Data from Network Shared Drive,Collection,Sowbug|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass
+T1047,Windows Management Instrumentation,Execution,Mustang Panda|Windshift|UNC2452|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT41|FIN6|GALLIUM|APT32|MuddyWater|OilRig|Threat Group-3390|Leviathan|FIN8|menuPass|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT29|Deep Panda
+T1046,Network Service Scanning,Discovery,Chimera|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Rocke|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT39|APT32|OilRig|Leafminer|Cobalt Group|menuPass|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390
+T1043,Commonly Used Port,Command And Control,OilRig|APT28|TEMP.Veles|Night Dragon|APT29|APT18|APT19|FIN7|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|APT37|Magic Hound|APT3|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390
+T1041,Exfiltration Over C2 Channel,Exfiltration,ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Chimera|APT39|Operation Wocao|Sandworm Team|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Kimsuky|GALLIUM|APT32|APT3|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Ke3chang
+T1040,Network Sniffing,Credential Access|Discovery,Kimsuky|Sandworm Team|DarkVishnya|APT33|Stolen Pencil|APT28
+T1039,Data from Network Shared Drive,Collection,Chimera|Fox Kitten|Gamaredon Group|Sowbug|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass
 T1037,Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Rocke
-T1036,Masquerading,Defense Evasion,Windshift|APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|Dragonfly 2.0
+T1036,Masquerading,Defense Evasion,APT29|Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|TA551|UNC2452|Windshift|APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|PLATINUM|Dragonfly 2.0
 T1034,Path Interception,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
-T1033,System Owner/User Discovery,Discovery,Frankenstein|APT41|Soft Cell|Tropic Trooper|APT39|MuddyWater|APT32|APT37|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|Magic Hound|FIN10|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3
+T1033,System Owner/User Discovery,Discovery,Windshift|ZIRCONIUM|Sidewinder|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT41|GALLIUM|Tropic Trooper|APT39|MuddyWater|APT32|APT37|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|Magic Hound|FIN10|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3
 T1030,Data Transfer Size Limits,Exfiltration,Threat Group-3390
-T1029,Scheduled Transfer,Exfiltration,no
-T1027,Obfuscated Files or Information,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|APT41|Machete|Soft Cell|Turla|TA505|Silence|APT33|Night Dragon|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|APT29|APT18|Tropic Trooper|Cobalt Group|Patchwork|Leafminer|APT37|Threat Group-3390|Honeybee|Dark Caracal|menuPass|APT19|BlackOasis|FIN8|Leviathan|Elderwood|MuddyWater|FIN7|Magic Hound|OilRig|APT3|APT32|Group5|Dust Storm|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT28
+T1029,Scheduled Transfer,Exfiltration,Higaisa
+T1027,Obfuscated Files or Information,Defense Evasion,APT39|Mustang Panda|Windshift|TA551|Higaisa|Sidewinder|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|FIN6|Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|APT41|GALLIUM|Turla|TA505|Silence|APT33|Night Dragon|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|APT29|APT18|Tropic Trooper|Patchwork|APT37|Honeybee|menuPass|Leafminer|Cobalt Group|Threat Group-3390|Dark Caracal|APT19|FIN8|BlackOasis|MuddyWater|Elderwood|Leviathan|FIN7|Magic Hound|OilRig|APT3|APT32|Group5|Dust Storm|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT28
 T1026,Multiband Communication,Command And Control,Lazarus Group
-T1025,Data from Removable Media,Collection,Machete|Turla|Gamaredon Group|APT28
+T1025,Data from Removable Media,Collection,Turla|Gamaredon Group|APT28
 T1021,Remote Services,Lateral Movement,no
-T1020,Automated Exfiltration,Exfiltration,Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Honeybee
-T1018,Remote System Discovery,Discovery,Sandworm Team|Rocke|Wizard Spider|Silence|Soft Cell|APT39|APT32|Deep Panda|Threat Group-3390|Dragonfly 2.0|Leafminer|Ke3chang|FIN8|APT3|FIN5|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN6|Turla
-T1016,System Network Configuration Discovery,Discovery,Sandworm Team|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT41|Soft Cell|APT32|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|Magic Hound|OilRig|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3|Naikon|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
+T1020,Automated Exfiltration,Exfiltration,Sidewinder|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Honeybee
+T1018,Remote System Discovery,Discovery,APT29|UNC2452|Chimera|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Sandworm Team|Rocke|Wizard Spider|Silence|GALLIUM|APT39|APT32|Dragonfly 2.0|Deep Panda|Threat Group-3390|Leafminer|Ke3chang|FIN8|FIN5|APT3|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN6|Turla
+T1016,System Network Configuration Discovery,Discovery,ZIRCONIUM|Mustang Panda|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Sandworm Team|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT41|GALLIUM|APT32|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|Magic Hound|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3|Naikon|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
 T1014,Rootkit,Defense Evasion,Rocke|APT41|APT28|Winnti Group
-T1012,Query Registry,Discovery,APT32|Dragonfly 2.0|Threat Group-3390|OilRig|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Turla
+T1012,Query Registry,Discovery,ZIRCONIUM|Chimera|Fox Kitten|APT39|Operation Wocao|APT32|Dragonfly 2.0|Threat Group-3390|OilRig|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Turla
 T1011,Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium,Exfiltration,no
 T1010,Application Window Discovery,Discovery,Lazarus Group
-T1008,Fallback Channels,Command And Control,APT41|OilRig|Lazarus Group
-T1007,System Service Discovery,Discovery,BRONZE BUTLER|APT1|OilRig|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
+T1008,Fallback Channels,Command And Control,Carbanak|APT41|OilRig|Lazarus Group
+T1007,System Service Discovery,Discovery,Chimera|Operation Wocao|BRONZE BUTLER|APT1|OilRig|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
 T1006,Direct Volume Access,Defense Evasion,no
-T1005,Data from Local System,Collection,Gamaredon Group|APT39|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|Soft Cell|Turla|menuPass|Dark Caracal|Dragonfly 2.0|Honeybee|APT37|APT28|APT3|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|Threat Group-3390|APT1|Ke3chang
+T1005,Data from Local System,Collection,APT29|Windigo|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|FIN6|Gamaredon Group|APT39|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|GALLIUM|Turla|menuPass|Dragonfly 2.0|Dark Caracal|Honeybee|APT37|APT28|APT3|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|Threat Group-3390|APT1|Ke3chang
 T1003,OS Credential Dumping,Credential Access,APT39|Frankenstein|APT32|APT28|Leviathan|Sowbug|Suckfly|Poseidon Group|Axiom
-T1001,Data Obfuscation,Command And Control,Axiom
+T1001,Data Obfuscation,Command And Control,Operation Wocao|Axiom
@@ -14,12 +14,10 @@ narrative: 'WMI is a Microsoft infrastructure for management data and operations
  to manage both local and remote Windows systems. Attackers are increasingly turning
  to WMI abuse in their efforts to conduct nefarious tasks, such as reconnaissance,
  detection of antivirus and virtual machines, code execution, lateral movement, persistence,
-  and data exfiltration. \
-
+  and data exfiltration. 
  The detection searches included in this Analytic Story are used to look for suspicious
  use of WMI commands that attackers may leverage to interact with remote systems.
-  The searches specifically look for the use of WMI to run processes on remote systems.\
-
+  The searches specifically look for the use of WMI to run processes on remote systems.
  In the event that unauthorized WMI execution occurs, it will be important for analysts
  and investigators to determine the context of the event. These details may provide
  insights related to how WMI was used and to what end.'