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improved detections and tests

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P4T12ICK
2021-01-13 14:05:53 +01:00
parent 65f935b24f
commit 8d40be7a12
11 changed files with 1020 additions and 400 deletions
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bin/generate.py
+2 -1
View File
@@ -482,7 +482,7 @@ def prepare_stories(stories, detections):
for cis in detection['tags']['cis20']:
sto_to_ciss[story].add(cis)
else:
sto_to_ciss[story] = set(detection['tags']['cis20'])
sto_to_ciss[story] = set(detection['tags']['cis20'])
if 'nist' in detection['tags']:
if story in sto_to_nists.keys():
@@ -570,6 +570,7 @@ def main(args):
# process all detections
detections = []
detections = load_objects("detections/*/*.yml", VERBOSE, REPO_PATH)
detections.extend(load_objects("detections/*/*/*.yml", VERBOSE, REPO_PATH))
try:
if VERBOSE:
detections/cloud/detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa.yml → detections/deprecated/detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa.yml
View File
detections/cloud/detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles.yml → detections/deprecated/detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles.yml
View File
package/default/analytic_stories.conf
+96 -96
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
#############
# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security-content
# On Date: 2020-12-18T01:01:56 UTC
# On Date: 2021-01-13T13:05:35 UTC
# Author: Splunk Security Research
# Contact: research@splunk.com
#############
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ version = 1
reference = ["https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-cloudtrail-now-tracks-cross-account-activity-to-its-origin/"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - aws detect attach to role policy - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect permanent key creation - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect role creation - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect sts assume role abuse - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect sts get session token abuse - Rule"]
mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1550"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity"]
data_models = []
providing_technologies = none
@@ -34,8 +34,8 @@ version = 1
reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 12", "CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1535"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP", "ID.AM"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Regions", "ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 AMIs", "ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Instance Types", "ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User", "ESCU - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Regions", "ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Instance Types", "ESCU - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User", "ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 AMIs"]
data_models = []
providing_technologies = none
description = Monitor your AWS EC2 instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or EC2 instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior.
@@ -53,8 +53,8 @@ version = 2
reference = ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonVPC/latest/UserGuide/VPC_Appendix_NACLs.html", "https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/how-to-help-prepare-for-ddos-attacks-by-reducing-your-attack-surface/"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 11", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.007"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "DE.DP", "PR.AC"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of Network ACL Activity by ARN", "ESCU - Baseline of blocked outbound traffic from AWS"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of blocked outbound traffic from AWS", "ESCU - Baseline of Network ACL Activity by ARN"]
data_models = []
providing_technologies = none
description = Monitor your AWS network infrastructure for bad configurations and malicious activity. Investigative searches help you probe deeper, when the facts warrant it.
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ version = 1
reference = ["https://aws.amazon.com/security-hub/features/"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for User - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId"]
support_searches = []
data_models = []
providing_technologies = none
@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ version = 1
reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From City", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Region", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Country", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Region", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From City", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Country", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources"]
data_models = []
providing_technologies = none
@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.p
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect API activity from users without MFA - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS API Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Security Group Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new API calls from user roles - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "DE.DP", "ID.AM", "PR.AC"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Create a list of approved AWS service accounts", "ESCU - Previously seen API call per user roles in CloudTrail", "ESCU - Baseline of Security Group Activity by ARN", "ESCU - Baseline of API Calls per User ARN"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of API Calls per User ARN", "ESCU - Create a list of approved AWS service accounts", "ESCU - Previously seen API call per user roles in CloudTrail", "ESCU - Baseline of Security Group Activity by ARN"]
data_models = []
providing_technologies = none
description = Detect and investigate dormant user accounts for your AWS environment that have become active again. Because inactive and ad-hoc accounts are common attack targets, it's critical to enable governance within your environment.
@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ id = 2dcfd6a2-e7d2-4873-b6ba-adaf819d2a1e
version = 1
reference = ["https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs/blob/v3.2/dev/rules/REQUEST-944-APPLICATION-ATTACK-JAVA.conf"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Java Classes - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Content-Type Length - Rule", "ESCU - Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 18", "CIS 3", "CIS 4"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Delivery", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1082"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.RA", "PR.IP", "PR.MA", "PR.PT", "RS.MI"]}
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 18", "CIS 3", "CIS 4", "CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Delivery", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1082"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.RA", "PR.IP", "PR.MA", "PR.PT", "RS.MI"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Investigate Web POSTs From src", "ESCU - Investigate Suspicious Strings in HTTP Header"]
support_searches = []
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
@@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ id = 91c676cf-0b23-438d-abee-f6335e1fce77
version = 1
reference = ["https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/inventory-of-authorized-and-unauthorized-devices/"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["PR.DS"]}
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Delivery", "Reconnaissance"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get First Occurrence and Last Occurrence of a MAC Address"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Count of assets by category"]
data_models = ["Network_Sessions"]
@@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ version = 1
reference = ["https://www.zerofox.com/blog/what-is-digital-risk-monitoring/", "https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/consumer/family-safety/what-is-typosquatting/", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2016/06/explained-typosquatting/"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Delivery"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Email Info", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Email Info", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - DNSTwist Domain Names"]
data_models = ["Email", "Network_Resolution", "Web"]
providing_technologies = none
@@ -184,8 +184,8 @@ version = 1
reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 12", "CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1535"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP", "ID.AM"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Initial", "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Destroyed", "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Update"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Update", "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched", "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Destroyed", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Initial"]
data_models = ["Change"]
providing_technologies = none
description = Monitor your cloud compute instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or compute instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior.
@@ -201,9 +201,9 @@ modification_date = 2019-01-09
id = bd91a2bc-d20b-4f44-a982-1bea98e86390
version = 1
reference = ["https://www.intego.com/mac-security-blog/osxcoldroot-and-the-rat-invasion/", "https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x2A.html", "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/coldroot-rat-still-undetectable-despite-being-uploaded-on-github-two-years-ago/"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "nist": ["PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection - Rule", "ESCU - Processes Tapping Keyboard Events - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 4", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Installation"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "DE.DP", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
support_searches = []
data_models = []
providing_technologies = none
@@ -239,8 +239,8 @@ version = 1
reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Command_and_Control", "https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/feature/Command-and-control-servers-The-puppet-masters-that-govern-malware"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 11", "CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048", "T1048.003", "T1071.001", "T1071.004", "T1095"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.AC", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK", "ESCU - Baseline of blocked outbound traffic from AWS"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of blocked outbound traffic from AWS", "ESCU - Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK"]
data_models = ["Network_Resolution", "Network_Traffic"]
providing_technologies = none
description = Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures leveraged by attackers to establish and operate command and control channels. Implants installed by attackers on compromised endpoints use these channels to receive instructions and send data back to the malicious operators.
@@ -255,8 +255,8 @@ id = 9a64ab44-9214-4639-8163-7eaa2621bd61
version = 1
reference = ["https://github.com/kgretzky/evilginx2", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1192/", "https://breakdev.org/evilginx-advanced-phishing-with-two-factor-authentication-bypass/"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect DNS requests to Phishing Sites leveraging EvilGinx2 - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Certificate logs for a domain", "ESCU - Domain Certificate Investigation"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.003"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.IP"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Domain Certificate Investigation", "ESCU - Get Certificate logs for a domain"]
support_searches = []
data_models = ["Network_Resolution"]
providing_technologies = none
@@ -289,7 +289,7 @@ version = 3
reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1003", "https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for.html"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", "ESCU - Create Remote Thread into LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001", "T1003.002", "T1003.003", "T1059.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts", "ESCU - Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations", "ESCU - Investigate Previous Unseen User", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts", "ESCU - Investigate Previous Unseen User", "ESCU - Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts"]
support_searches = []
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
providing_technologies = none
@@ -307,8 +307,8 @@ version = 2
reference = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Create local admin accounts using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Single Letter Process On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 16", "CIS 2", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.002", "T1053.005", "T1059.001", "T1059.003", "T1071.002", "T1112", "T1136.001", "T1204.002", "T1543.003", "T1547.001", "T1562.004"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process File Activity", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Process Info"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Process File Activity", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments", "ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK"]
data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"]
providing_technologies = none
description = Monitor for suspicious activities associated with DHS Technical Alert US-CERT TA18-074A. Some of the activities that adversaries used in these compromises included spearfishing attacks, malware, watering-hole domains, many and more.
@@ -325,7 +325,7 @@ id = e8afd39e-3294-11e6-b39d-a45e60c6700
version = 1
reference = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA13-088A", "https://www.imperva.com/learn/application-security/dns-amplification/"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Large Volume of DNS ANY Queries - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1498.002"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]}
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 11", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1498.002"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History"]
support_searches = []
data_models = ["Network_Resolution"]
@@ -342,7 +342,7 @@ id = 8169f17b-ef68-4b59-aa28-586907301221
version = 1
reference = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/", "http://www.noip.com/blog/2014/07/11/dynamic-dns-can-use-2/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/08/04/detecting-dynamic-dns-domains-in-splunk.html"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS record changed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003", "T1071.004"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003", "T1071.004"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - DNS Hijack Enrichment", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Discover DNS records"]
data_models = ["Network_Resolution"]
@@ -366,7 +366,7 @@ id = 66b0fe0c-1351-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002
version = 1
reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0010/"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect SNICat SNI Exfiltration - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1041"], "nist": ["DE.AE"]}
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1041"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.DS"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History"]
support_searches = []
data_models = []
@@ -382,8 +382,8 @@ id = 91c676cf-0b23-438d-abee-f6335e1fce33
version = 1
reference = ["https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/data-protection/", "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/dns/splunk-detect-dns-tunneling-37022", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect USB device insertion - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1071.004"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.DS", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Process Info"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1071.004"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.DS", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
support_searches = []
data_models = ["Change_Analysis", "Network_Resolution"]
providing_technologies = none
@@ -416,7 +416,7 @@ reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1089", "https://blog.malw
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Unload Sysmon Filter Driver - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112", "T1543.003", "T1553.004", "T1562.001", "T1562.004"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments", "ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK"]
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
providing_technologies = none
description = Looks for activities and techniques associated with the disabling of security tools on a Windows system, such as suspicious `reg.exe` processes, processes launching netsh, and many others.
@@ -430,8 +430,8 @@ id = 8169f17b-ef68-4b59-aae8-586907301221
version = 2
reference = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/", "http://www.noip.com/blog/2014/07/11/dynamic-dns-can-use-2/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/08/04/detecting-dynamic-dns-domains-in-splunk.html"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1071.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "DE.DP", "PR.IP"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1071.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "DE.DP", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
support_searches = []
data_models = ["Network_Resolution", "Web"]
providing_technologies = none
@@ -445,9 +445,9 @@ modification_date = 2020-01-27
id = bb9f5ed2-916e-4364-bb6d-91c310efcf52
version = 1
reference = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-201A", "https://www.first.org/resources/papers/conf2017/Advanced-Incident-Detection-and-Threat-Hunting-using-Sysmon-and-Splunk.pdf", "https://www.vkremez.com/2017/05/emotet-banking-trojan-malware-analysis.html"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 2", "CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Delivery", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.002", "T1059.003", "T1547.001", "T1566.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources", "ESCU - Get Process Info"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of tools built by NirSoft - Rule", "ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 2", "CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Delivery", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.002", "T1059.003", "T1072", "T1547.001", "T1566.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK"]
data_models = ["Email", "Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"]
providing_technologies = none
@@ -464,7 +464,7 @@ id = 7678c968-d46e-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003
version = 1
reference = ["https://www.ptsecurity.com/ww-en/about/news/f5-fixes-critical-vulnerability-discovered-by-positive-technologies-in-big-ip-application-delivery-controller/", "https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K52145254", "https://blog.cloudflare.com/cve-2020-5902-helping-to-protect-against-the-f5-tmui-rce-vulnerability/"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902 - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 11", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History"]
support_searches = []
data_models = []
@@ -497,10 +497,10 @@ modification_date = 2020-01-22
id = baf7580b-d4b4-4774-8173-7d198e9da335
version = 2
reference = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/HIDDEN-COBRA-North-Korean-Malicious-Cyber-Activity", "https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Destructive-Malware-Report.pdf"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious File Write - Rule"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious File Write - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 16", "CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001", "T1021.002", "T1059.001", "T1059.003", "T1070.005", "T1071.002", "T1071.004"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Outbound Emails to Hidden Cobra Threat Actors", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources", "ESCU - Get Process Info"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK", "ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Outbound Emails to Hidden Cobra Threat Actors"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments", "ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", "ESCU - Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK"]
data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Resolution", "Network_Traffic"]
providing_technologies = none
description = Monitor for and investigate activities, including the creation or deletion of hidden shares and file writes, that may be evidence of infiltration by North Korean government-sponsored cybercriminals. Details of this activity were reported in DHS Report TA-18-149A.
@@ -517,7 +517,7 @@ id = 2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c50fe268af4
version = 1
reference = ["https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2016/09/hosts-file-hijacks/"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Windows hosts file modification - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003", "T1071.004"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.AC", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003", "T1071.004"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.AC", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host"]
support_searches = []
data_models = ["Network_Resolution"]
@@ -533,7 +533,7 @@ id = 1f5294cb-b85f-4c2d-9c58-ffcf248f52bd
version = 1
reference = ["http://www.deependresearch.org/2016/04/jboss-exploits-view-from-victim.html"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 18"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1082"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 18", "CIS 4"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1082"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.RA", "PR.IP", "PR.MA", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History"]
support_searches = []
data_models = ["Web"]
@@ -564,7 +564,7 @@ version = 1
reference = ["https://github.com/splunk/cloud-datamodel-security-research"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint - Rule"]
mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1526"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip"]
support_searches = []
data_models = []
providing_technologies = none
@@ -610,9 +610,9 @@ modification_date = 2020-02-04
id = 399d65dc-1f08-499b-a259-aad9051f38ad
version = 2
reference = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/executive-perspective/2015/08/malware_lateral_move.html"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks - Rule", "ESCU - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16", "CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001", "T1053.005", "T1550.002", "T1558.003"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources", "ESCU - Get Process Info"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks - Rule", "ESCU - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001", "T1053.005", "T1550.002", "T1558.003"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity"]
support_searches = []
data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"]
providing_technologies = none
@@ -631,8 +631,8 @@ id = 2c8ff66e-0b57-42af-8ad7-912438a403fc
version = 4
reference = ["https://blogs.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/malware-employs-powershell-to-infect-systems/", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Multiple Suspicious Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1027", "T1059.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1027", "T1059.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info"]
support_searches = []
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
providing_technologies = none
@@ -672,7 +672,7 @@ id = 8892a655-6205-43f7-abba-06460e38c8ae
version = 1
reference = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 2"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["PR.DS"]}
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 2"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Installation"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info"]
support_searches = []
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
@@ -689,7 +689,7 @@ id = 9ef8d677-7b52-4213-a038-99cfc7acc2d8
version = 1
reference = ["https://learn.cisecurity.org/20-controls-download"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - No Windows Updates in a time frame - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 18"], "nist": ["PR.MA"]}
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 18"], "nist": ["PR.MA", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History"]
support_searches = []
data_models = ["Updates"]
@@ -709,7 +709,7 @@ reference = ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/tn-archive/bb49
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Processes created by netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.004"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments", "ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK"]
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
providing_technologies = none
description = Detect activities and various techniques associated with the abuse of `netsh.exe`, which can disable local firewall settings or set up a remote connection to a host from an infected system.
@@ -740,9 +740,9 @@ id = bb9f5ed2-916e-4364-bb6d-97c370efcf52
version = 2
reference = ["https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/orangeworm-targets-healthcare-us-europe-asia", "https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/healthcare-targeted-by-hacker/"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001", "T1059.003", "T1543.003", "T1569.002"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update", "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 2", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001", "T1059.003", "T1543.003", "T1569.002"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments", "ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial"]
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
providing_technologies = none
description = Detect activities and various techniques associated with the Orangeworm Attack Group, a group that frequently targets the healthcare industry.
@@ -759,8 +759,8 @@ modification_date = 2019-04-29
id = 57226b40-94f3-4ce5-b101-a75f67759c27
version = 1
reference = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/spear-phishing-campaign-targets-ukraine-government.html"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious LNK file launching a process - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.002"], "nist": ["PR.DS"]}
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Oulook exe writing a zip file - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious LNK file launching a process - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001", "T1566.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Parent Process Info"]
support_searches = []
data_models = []
@@ -784,8 +784,8 @@ version = 1
reference = ["https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/scope-of-mudcarp-attacks-highlight-1/", "http://blog.amossys.fr/badflick-is-not-so-bad.html"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001", "T1059.003", "T1547.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments", "ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK"]
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
providing_technologies = none
description = Monitor your environment for suspicious behaviors that resemble the techniques employed by the MUDCARP threat group.
@@ -826,8 +826,8 @@ id = 6d13121c-90f3-446d-8ac3-27efbbc65218
version = 1
reference = ["http://www.novetta.com/2015/02/advanced-methods-to-detect-advanced-cyber-attacks-protocol-abuse/"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048", "T1048.003", "T1071.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Process Info"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048", "T1048.003", "T1071.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.DS", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity"]
support_searches = []
data_models = ["Network_Resolution", "Network_Traffic"]
providing_technologies = none
@@ -841,9 +841,9 @@ modification_date = 2020-02-04
id = cf309d0d-d4aa-4fbb-963d-1e79febd3756
version = 1
reference = ["https://www.carbonblack.com/2017/06/28/carbon-black-threat-research-technical-analysis-petya-notpetya-ransomware/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2017/06/27/closing-the-detection-to-mitigation-gap-or-to-petya-or-notpetya-whocares-.html"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 10", "CIS 12", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 6", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.002", "T1036.003", "T1047", "T1048", "T1053.005", "T1070", "T1070.001", "T1071.001", "T1485", "T1490", "T1547.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "DE.DP", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK", "ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK"]
data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"]
providing_technologies = none
@@ -890,7 +890,7 @@ modification_date = 2020-11-06
id = 507edc74-13d5-4339-878e-b9744ded1f35
version = 1
reference = ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/detecting-ryuk-using-splunk-attack-range.html", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/big-game-hunting-with-ryuk-another-lucrative-targeted-ransomware/", "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-302a"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Ryuk Test Files Detected - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Security Account Manager Stopped - Rule", "ESCU - Windows connhost exe started forcefully - Rule"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Ryuk Test Files Detected - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Security Account Manager Stopped - Rule", "ESCU - Windows connhost exe started forcefully - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 16", "CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Delivery", "Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001", "T1059.003", "T1485", "T1486", "T1489", "T1562.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History"]
support_searches = []
@@ -907,7 +907,7 @@ id = 4f6632f5-449c-4686-80df-57625f59bab3
version = 1
reference = ["https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/66.html", "https://www.incapsula.com/web-application-security/sql-injection.html"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - SQL Injection with Long URLs - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 18"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13", "CIS 18", "CIS 4"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "ID.RA", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History"]
support_searches = []
data_models = ["Web"]
@@ -923,9 +923,9 @@ modification_date = 2018-12-13
id = c4b89506-fbcf-4cb7-bfd6-527e54789604
version = 1
reference = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/an-in-depth-analysis-of-samsam-ransomware-and-boss-spider/", "https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2018/07/31/samsam-the-almost-6-million-ransomware/", "https://thehackernews.com/2018/07/samsam-ransomware-attacks.html"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Batch File Write to System32 - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - File with Samsam Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Samsam Test File Write - Rule"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Batch File Write to System32 - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - File with Samsam Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Samsam Test File Write - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 10", "CIS 12", "CIS 16", "CIS 18", "CIS 2", "CIS 3", "CIS 4", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Delivery", "Installation", "Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001", "T1021.002", "T1082", "T1204.002", "T1485", "T1486", "T1490"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "ID.RA", "PR.AC", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.MA", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity"]
support_searches = []
data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic", "Web"]
providing_technologies = none
@@ -945,7 +945,7 @@ id = 6d3306f6-bb2b-4219-8609-8efad64032f2
version = 1
reference = ["https://meltdownattack.com/"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Spectre and Meltdown Vulnerable Systems - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 4"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 4"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "ID.RA", "PR.IP", "RS.MI"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Systems Ready for Spectre-Meltdown Windows Patch"]
data_models = ["Vulnerabilities"]
@@ -961,7 +961,7 @@ id = 4e692b96-de2d-4bd1-9105-37e2368a8db1
version = 1
reference = ["http://www.splunk.com/view/SP-CAAAPQ6#announce", "https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2016-4859"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Open Redirect in Splunk Web - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 18"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 18", "CIS 3", "CIS 4"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "ID.RA", "PR.AC", "PR.IP", "PR.PT", "RS.MI"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History"]
support_searches = []
data_models = []
@@ -986,8 +986,8 @@ id = 1fc34cbc-34e9-43ba-87ab-6811c9e95400
version = 1
reference = ["https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-11409", "https://www.splunk.com/view/SP-CAAAP5E#VulnerabilityDescriptionsandRatings", "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44865/"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 18"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 18", "CIS 3", "CIS 4"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "ID.RA", "PR.AC", "PR.IP", "PR.PT", "RS.MI"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
support_searches = []
data_models = []
providing_technologies = none
@@ -1004,11 +1004,11 @@ modification_date = 2020-12-14
id = 758196b5-2e21-424f-a50c-6e421ce926c2
version = 1
reference = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor.html", "https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ESCU - Sunburst Correlation DLL and Network Event - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AdFind Exe - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 2", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 6", "CIS 7", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018", "T1027", "T1053.005", "T1059.003", "T1071.001", "T1071.002", "T1203", "T1543.003", "T1569.002"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ESCU - Sunburst Correlation DLL and Network Event - Rule", "ESCU - Supernova Webshell - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AdFind Exe - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 18", "CIS 2", "CIS 3", "CIS 4", "CIS 5", "CIS 6", "CIS 7", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Exfiltration", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018", "T1027", "T1053.005", "T1059.003", "T1071.001", "T1071.002", "T1203", "T1505.003", "T1543.003", "T1569.002"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "ID.RA", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = []
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update"]
data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial"]
data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic", "Web"]
providing_technologies = none
description = Sunburst is a trojanized updates to SolarWinds Orion IT monitoring and management software. It was discovered by FireEye in December 2020. The actors behind this campaign gained access to numerous public and private organizations around the world.
narrative = This Analytic Story supports you to detect Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) from the Sunburst malware. The threat actor behind sunburst compromised the SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll, is a SolarWinds digitally-signed component of the Orion software framework that contains a backdoor that communicates via HTTP to third party servers. The detections in this Analytic Story are focusing on the dll loading events, file create events and network events to detect This malware.
@@ -1022,8 +1022,8 @@ version = 1
reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 12", "CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1535"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP", "ID.AM"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK", "ESCU - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Regions", "ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User", "ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Regions", "ESCU - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK", "ESCU - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK"]
data_models = []
providing_technologies = none
description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS EC2 instances for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as EC2 instances that originate from unusual locations or those launched by previously unseen users (among others). Included investigative searches will help you probe more deeply, when the information warrants it.
@@ -1039,7 +1039,7 @@ reference = ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integr
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new user AWS Console Login - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1535"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously seen users in CloudTrail", "ESCU - Update previously seen users in CloudTrail"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Update previously seen users in CloudTrail", "ESCU - Previously seen users in CloudTrail"]
data_models = ["Authentication"]
providing_technologies = none
description = Monitor your AWS authentication events using your CloudTrail logs. Searches within this Analytic Story will help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious logins.
@@ -1052,10 +1052,10 @@ modification_date = 2018-07-24
id = 2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c50w3168af3
version = 2
reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/security-data-protection/cloud/public-aws-s3-buckets-writable/"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect New Open S3 buckets - Rule", "ESCU - Detect S3 access from a new IP - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion - Rule"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Open S3 buckets - Rule", "ESCU - Detect S3 access from a new IP - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13", "CIS 14"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1530"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "DE.DP", "PR.AC", "PR.DS"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously seen S3 bucket access by remote IP", "ESCU - Baseline of S3 Bucket deletion activity by ARN"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of S3 Bucket deletion activity by ARN", "ESCU - Previously seen S3 bucket access by remote IP"]
data_models = []
providing_technologies = none
description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS S3 buckets for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as detecting open S3 buckets and buckets being accessed from a new IP. The contextual and investigative searches will give you more information, when required.
@@ -1071,8 +1071,8 @@ id = 2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c50f2168af3
version = 1
reference = ["https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/hiding-cloudcobalt-strike-beacon-c2-using-amazon-apis/"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "nist": ["PR.AC"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of blocked outbound traffic from AWS"]
data_models = []
providing_technologies = none
@@ -1090,9 +1090,9 @@ id = 6380ebbb-55c5-4fce-b754-01fd565fb73c
version = 1
reference = ["https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-cloudtrail-now-tracks-cross-account-activity-to-its-origin/", "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integration.html"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by New User - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP"]}
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP", "PR.AC", "PR.DS"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Users In CloudTrail - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Initial"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Users In CloudTrail - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail - Initial"]
data_models = ["Authentication"]
providing_technologies = none
description = Monitor your cloud authentication events. Searches within this Analytic Story leverage the recent cloud updates to the Authentication data model to help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious login activity.
@@ -1109,7 +1109,7 @@ reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.p
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP", "ID.AM"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched", "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Destroyed", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Update"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Update", "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Destroyed", "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched"]
data_models = ["Change"]
providing_technologies = none
description = Monitor your cloud infrastructure provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your cloud environment.
@@ -1142,7 +1142,7 @@ reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.p
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "DE.DP", "ID.AM", "PR.AC"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Security Group API Calls Per User", "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls Per User", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Initial"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Security Group API Calls Per User", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Initial", "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls Per User"]
data_models = ["Change"]
providing_technologies = none
description = Detect and investigate suspicious activities by users and roles in your cloud environments.
@@ -1159,7 +1159,7 @@ reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1059", "https://www.micro
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036.003", "T1059.001", "T1059.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments", "ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK"]
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
providing_technologies = none
description = Leveraging the Windows command-line interface (CLI) is one of the most common attack techniques--one that is also detailed in the MITRE ATT&CK framework. Use this Analytic Story to help you identify unusual or suspicious use of the CLI on Windows systems.
@@ -1174,7 +1174,7 @@ version = 1
reference = ["http://blogs.splunk.com/2015/10/01/random-words-on-entropy-and-dns/", "http://www.darkreading.com/analytics/security-monitoring/got-malware-three-signs-revealed-in-dns-traffic/d/d-id/1139680", "https://live.paloaltonetworks.com/t5/Threat-Vulnerability-Articles/What-are-suspicious-DNS-queries/ta-p/71454"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003", "T1071.004"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Process Info"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK"]
data_models = ["Network_Resolution"]
providing_technologies = none
@@ -1227,7 +1227,7 @@ reference = ["https://redcanary.com/blog/windows-registry-attacks-threat-detecti
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect mshta exe running scripts in command-line arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.003", "T1218.005", "T1547.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments", "ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK"]
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
providing_technologies = none
description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe process to execute malicious code.
@@ -1244,7 +1244,7 @@ version = 1
reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1078", "https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Credential_stuffing", "https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/answer/What-is-a-password-spraying-attack-and-how-does-it-work"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentails From The Same IP - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Account Lockout Events - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Failed SSO Attempts - Rule", "ESCU - Okta User Logins From Multiple Cities - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate User Activities In Okta", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by app", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate User Activities In Okta", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by app"]
support_searches = []
data_models = []
providing_technologies = none
@@ -1260,7 +1260,7 @@ modification_date = 2018-10-23
id = c8ddc5be-69bc-4202-b3ab-4010b27d7ad5
version = 2
reference = ["https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Graeber-Abusing-Windows-Management-Instrumentation-WMI-To-Build-A-Persistent%20Asynchronous-And-Fileless-Backdoor-wp.pdf", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/wmimplant_a_wmi_ba.html"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Process Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - Script Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon - Rule"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Process Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - Script Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Temporary Event Subscription - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047", "T1546.003"], "nist": ["PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info"]
support_searches = []
@@ -1349,7 +1349,7 @@ id = 826e6431-aeef-41b4-9fc0-6d0985d65a21
version = 1
reference = ["https://www.monkey.org/~dugsong/dsniff/"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Protocols passing authentication in cleartext - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 14"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["PR.DS"]}
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 14", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Reconnaissance"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.AC", "PR.DS", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity"]
support_searches = []
data_models = ["Network_Traffic"]
@@ -1366,7 +1366,7 @@ version = 1
reference = ["https://www.fbi.gov/scams-and-safety/common-fraud-schemes/internet-fraud", "https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2017-internet-crime-report-released-050718"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Web Fraud - Account Harvesting - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Anomalous User Clickspeed - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Password Sharing Across Accounts - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16", "CIS 6"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1136"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "DE.DP"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Web Session Information via session id", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Web Session Information via session id", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender"]
support_searches = []
data_models = []
providing_technologies = none
@@ -1470,8 +1470,8 @@ modification_date = 2020-02-04
id = 644e22d3-598a-429c-a007-16fdb802cae5
version = 2
reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Overwriting Accessibility Binaries - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 2", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204.002", "T1546.008", "T1546.012"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.PT"]}
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Child Processes of Spoolsv exe - Rule", "ESCU - Overwriting Accessibility Binaries - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 2", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068", "T1204.002", "T1546.008", "T1546.012"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.AC", "PR.DS", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info"]
support_searches = []
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
@@ -1487,9 +1487,9 @@ id = 6dbd810e-f66d-414b-8dfc-e46de55cbfe2
version = 3
reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1050", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1031"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543.003", "T1569.002", "T1574.011"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 2", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543.003", "T1569.002", "T1574.011"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial"]
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
providing_technologies = none
description = Windows services are often used by attackers for persistence and the ability to load drivers or otherwise interact with the Windows kernel. This Analytic Story helps you monitor your environment for indications that Windows services are being modified or created in a suspicious manner.
package/default/collections.conf
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
#############
# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security-content
# On Date: 2020-12-18T01:01:56 UTC
# On Date: 2021-01-13T13:05:35 UTC
# Author: Splunk Security Research
# Contact: research@splunk.com
#############
package/default/es_investigations.conf
+34 -34
View File
@@ -4,35 +4,35 @@ label = AWS Cross Account Activity
description = Track when a user assumes an IAM role in another AWS account to obtain cross-account access to services and resources in that account. Accessing new roles could be an indication of malicious activity.
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_accesskeyid"]
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_accesskeyid", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_aws_cryptomining]
label = AWS Cryptomining
description = Monitor your AWS EC2 instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or EC2 instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior.
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name"]
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_aws_network_acl_activity]
label = AWS Network ACL Activity
description = Monitor your AWS network infrastructure for bad configurations and malicious activity. Investigative searches help you probe deeper, when the facts warrant it.
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address"]
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_aws_security_hub_alerts]
label = AWS Security Hub Alerts
description = This story is focused around detecting Security Hub alerts generated from AWS
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details"]
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_aws_suspicious_provisioning_activities]
label = AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities
description = Monitor your AWS provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your network.
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_city", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_region", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_country", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address"]
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_region", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_city", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_country", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_aws_user_monitoring]
label = AWS User Monitoring
@@ -60,21 +60,21 @@ label = Brand Monitoring
description = Detect and investigate activity that may indicate that an adversary is using faux domains to mislead users into interacting with malicious infrastructure. Monitor DNS, email, and web traffic for permutations of your brand name.
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic", "panel://workbench_panel_get_email_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_emails_from_specific_sender"]
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_email_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_emails_from_specific_sender"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_cloud_cryptomining]
label = Cloud Cryptomining
description = Monitor your cloud compute instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or compute instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior.
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name"]
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_coldroot_macos_rat]
label = ColdRoot MacOS RAT
description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that relate to the ColdRoot Remote Access Trojan that affects MacOS. An example of some of these activities are changing sensative binaries in the MacOS sub-system, detecting process names and executables associated with the RAT, detecting when a keyboard tab is installed on a MacOS machine and more.
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_network_traffic_from_src_ip"]
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_network_traffic_from_src_ip", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_collection_and_staging]
label = Collection and Staging
@@ -88,16 +88,16 @@ label = Command and Control
description = Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures leveraged by attackers to establish and operate command and control channels. Implants installed by attackers on compromised endpoints use these channels to receive instructions and send data back to the malicious operators.
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address"]
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_common_phishing_frameworks]
label = Common Phishing Frameworks
description = Detect DNS and web requests to fake websites generated by the EvilGinx2 toolkit. These websites are designed to fool unwitting users who have clicked on a malicious link in a phishing email.
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_certificate_logs_for_a_domain", "panel://workbench_panel_domain_certificate_investigation"]
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_domain_certificate_investigation", "panel://workbench_panel_get_certificate_logs_for_a_domain"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_container_implantation_monitoring_and_investigation]
label = Container Implantation Monitoring and Investigation
description = Use the searches in this story to monitor your Kubernetes registry repositories for upload, and deployment of potentially vulnerable, backdoor, or implanted containers. These searches provide information on source users, destination path, container names and repository names. The searches provide context to address Mitre T1525 which refers to container implantation upload to a company's repository either in Amazon Elastic Container Registry, Google Container Registry and Azure Container Registry.
disabled = 0
@@ -109,14 +109,14 @@ label = Credential Dumping
description = Uncover activity consistent with credential dumping, a technique wherein attackers compromise systems and attempt to obtain and exfiltrate passwords. The threat actors use these pilfered credentials to further escalate privileges and spread throughout a target environment. The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify attempts to credential dumping.
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_hash_attempts", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_failed_logins_for_multiple_destinations", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_previous_unseen_user", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_ticket_attempts"]
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_ticket_attempts", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_previous_unseen_user", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_failed_logins_for_multiple_destinations", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_hash_attempts"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_dhs_report_ta18_074a]
label = DHS Report TA18-074A
description = Monitor for suspicious activities associated with DHS Technical Alert US-CERT TA18-074A. Some of the activities that adversaries used in these compromises included spearfishing attacks, malware, watering-hole domains, many and more.
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_file_activity", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info"]
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_file_activity", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_dns_amplification_attacks]
label = DNS Amplification Attacks
@@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ label = Data Protection
description = Fortify your data-protection arsenal--while continuing to ensure data confidentiality and integrity--with searches that monitor for and help you investigate possible signs of data exfiltration.
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info"]
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_detect_zerologon_attack]
label = Detect Zerologon Attack
@@ -165,14 +165,14 @@ label = Dynamic DNS
description = Detect and investigate hosts in your environment that may be communicating with dynamic domain providers. Attackers may leverage these services to help them avoid firewall blocks and blacklists.
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host"]
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_emotet_malware__dhs_report_ta18_201a_]
label = Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A
description = Detect rarely used executables, specific registry paths that may confer malware survivability and persistence, instances where cmd.exe is used to launch script interpreters, and other indicators that the Emotet financial malware has compromised your environment.
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info"]
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_f5_tmui_rce_cve_2020_5902]
label = F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902
@@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ label = Hidden Cobra Malware
description = Monitor for and investigate activities, including the creation or deletion of hidden shares and file writes, that may be evidence of infiltration by North Korean government-sponsored cybercriminals. Details of this activity were reported in DHS Report TA-18-149A.
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_outbound_emails_to_hidden_cobra_threat_actors", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info"]
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity", "panel://workbench_panel_get_outbound_emails_to_hidden_cobra_threat_actors"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_host_redirection]
label = Host Redirection
@@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ label = Kubernetes Scanning Activity
description = This story addresses detection against Kubernetes cluster fingerprint scan and attack by providing information on items such as source ip, user agent, cluster names.
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_amazon_eks_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip", "panel://workbench_panel_gcp_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip"]
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_amazon_eks_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_gcp_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_kubernetes_sensitive_object_access_activity]
label = Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity
@@ -235,14 +235,14 @@ label = Lateral Movement
description = Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures around how attackers move laterally within the enterprise. Because lateral movement can expose the adversary to detection, it should be an important focus for security analysts.
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info"]
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_malicious_powershell]
label = Malicious PowerShell
description = Attackers are finding stealthy ways "live off the land," leveraging utilities and tools that come standard on the endpoint--such as PowerShell--to achieve their goals without downloading binary files. These searches can help you detect and investigate PowerShell command-line options that may be indicative of malicious intent.
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info"]
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_monitor_backup_solution]
label = Monitor Backup Solution
@@ -272,7 +272,7 @@ disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_office_365_detections]
label = Office 365 Detections
description = This story is focused around detecting Office 365 Attacks.
disabled = 0
@@ -284,7 +284,7 @@ label = Orangeworm Attack Group
description = Detect activities and various techniques associated with the Orangeworm Attack Group, a group that frequently targets the healthcare industry.
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info"]
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_phishing_payloads]
label = Phishing Payloads
@@ -298,21 +298,21 @@ label = Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns
description = Monitor your environment for suspicious behaviors that resemble the techniques employed by the MUDCARP threat group.
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info"]
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_prohibited_traffic_allowed_or_protocol_mismatch]
label = Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch
description = Detect instances of prohibited network traffic allowed in the environment, as well as protocols running on non-standard ports. Both of these types of behaviors typically violate policy and can be leveraged by attackers.
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info"]
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_ransomware]
label = Ransomware
description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to ransomware--spikes in SMB traffic, suspicious wevtutil usage, the presence of common ransomware extensions, and system processes run from unexpected locations, and many others.
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources", "panel://workbench_panel_get_backup_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_sysmon_wmi_activity_for_host"]
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources", "panel://workbench_panel_get_sysmon_wmi_activity_for_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_backup_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_ransomware_cloud]
label = Ransomware Cloud
@@ -347,7 +347,7 @@ label = SamSam Ransomware
description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the SamSam ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with SamSam, RDP brute force attacks, the presence of files with SamSam ransomware extensions, suspicious psexec use, and more.
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources", "panel://workbench_panel_get_backup_logs_for_endpoint"]
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications", "panel://workbench_panel_get_backup_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerabilities]
label = Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities
@@ -368,9 +368,9 @@ label = Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409
description = Reduce the risk of CVE-2018-11409, an information disclosure vulnerability within some older versions of Splunk Enterprise, with searches designed to help ensure that your Splunk system does not leak information to authenticated users.
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_network_traffic_from_src_ip"]
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_network_traffic_from_src_ip", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_sunburst_malware]
label = Sunburst Malware
description = Sunburst is a trojanized updates to SolarWinds Orion IT monitoring and management software. It was discovered by FireEye in December 2020. The actors behind this campaign gained access to numerous public and private organizations around the world.
disabled = 0
@@ -382,7 +382,7 @@ label = Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities
description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS EC2 instances for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as EC2 instances that originate from unusual locations or those launched by previously unseen users (among others). Included investigative searches will help you probe more deeply, when the information warrants it.
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name"]
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_aws_login_activities]
label = Suspicious AWS Login Activities
@@ -396,14 +396,14 @@ label = Suspicious AWS S3 Activities
description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS S3 buckets for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as detecting open S3 buckets and buckets being accessed from a new IP. The contextual and investigative searches will give you more information, when required.
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_s3_bucket_details_via_bucketname", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address"]
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_s3_bucket_details_via_bucketname", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_aws_traffic]
label = Suspicious AWS Traffic
description = Leverage these searches to monitor your AWS network traffic for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as a spike in blocked outbound traffic in your virtual private cloud (VPC).
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address"]
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_cloud_authentication_activities]
label = Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities
@@ -445,7 +445,7 @@ label = Suspicious DNS Traffic
description = Attackers often attempt to hide within or otherwise abuse the domain name system (DNS). You can thwart attempts to manipulate this omnipresent protocol by monitoring for these types of abuses.
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info"]
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_emails]
label = Suspicious Emails
@@ -473,7 +473,7 @@ label = Suspicious Okta Activity
description = Monitor your Okta environment for suspicious activities. Due to the Covid outbreak, many users are migrating over to leverage cloud services more and more. Okta is a popular tool to manage multiple users and the web-based applications they need to stay productive. The searches in this story will help monitor your Okta environment for suspicious activities and associated user behaviors.
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_user_activities_in_okta", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_okta_activity_by_app", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_okta_activity_by_ip_address"]
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_user_activities_in_okta", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_okta_activity_by_ip_address", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_okta_activity_by_app"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_wmi_use]
label = Suspicious WMI Use
@@ -522,7 +522,7 @@ label = Web Fraud Detection
description = Monitor your environment for activity consistent with common attack techniques bad actors use when attempting to compromise web servers or other web-related assets.
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_web_session_information_via_session_id", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_emails_from_specific_sender"]
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_web_session_information_via_session_id", "panel://workbench_panel_get_emails_from_specific_sender"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_windows_dns_sigred_cve_2020_1350]
label = Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350
package/default/macros.conf
+45 -1
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
#############
# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security-content
# On Date: 2020-12-18T01:01:56 UTC
# On Date: 2021-01-13T13:05:35 UTC
# Author: Splunk Security Research
# Contact: research@splunk.com
#############
@@ -387,6 +387,10 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
@@ -583,10 +587,18 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[detect_new_open_s3_buckets_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[detect_oulook_exe_writing_a__zip_file_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[detect_outbound_smb_traffic_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
@@ -719,6 +731,10 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[disabling_remote_user_account_control_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
@@ -915,6 +931,10 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[macos___re_opened_applications_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[malicious_powershell_process___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
@@ -1003,6 +1023,10 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[processes_tapping_keyboard_events_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[processes_created_by_netsh_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
@@ -1055,6 +1079,10 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[remote_desktop_process_running_on_system_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
@@ -1135,6 +1163,10 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[spike_in_file_writes_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[splunk_enterprise_information_disclosure_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
@@ -1143,6 +1175,10 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[supernova_webshell_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[suspicious_changes_to_file_associations_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
@@ -1227,10 +1263,18 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[wmi_permanent_event_subscription_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[wmi_permanent_event_subscription___sysmon_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[wmi_temporary_event_subscription_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[web_fraud___account_harvesting_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
package/default/savedsearches.conf
+433 -65
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
#############
# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security-content
# On Date: 2020-12-18T01:01:56 UTC
# On Date: 2021-01-13T13:05:35 UTC
# Author: Splunk Security Research
# Contact: research@splunk.com
#############
@@ -10,10 +10,10 @@
[ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City - Rule]
action.escu = 0
action.escu.enabled = 1
description = This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen cities. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with "Run" or "Create."
description = This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen cities. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with "Run" or "Create." This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.
action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]}
action.escu.data_models = []
action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen cities. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with "Run" or "Create."
action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen cities. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with "Run" or "Create." This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.
action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources" support search once to create a history of previously seen locations that have provisioned AWS resources.
action.escu.known_false_positives = This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define "false positive" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no "false positives" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\
This search will fire any time a new city is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your city, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you.
@@ -49,10 +49,10 @@ search = `cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceI
[ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country - Rule]
action.escu = 0
action.escu.enabled = 1
description = This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen countries. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with "Run" or "Create."
description = This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen countries. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with "Run" or "Create." This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.
action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]}
action.escu.data_models = []
action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen countries. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with "Run" or "Create."
action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen countries. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with "Run" or "Create." This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.
action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources" support search once to create a history of previously seen locations that have provisioned AWS resources.
action.escu.known_false_positives = This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define "false positive" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching over plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no "false positives" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\
This search will fire any time a new country is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your country, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you.
@@ -83,10 +83,10 @@ search = `cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceI
[ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule]
action.escu = 0
action.escu.enabled = 1
description = This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen IP addresses. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with "Run" or "Create."
description = This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen IP addresses. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with "Run" or "Create." This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.
action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]}
action.escu.data_models = []
action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen IP addresses. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with "Run" or "Create."
action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen IP addresses. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with "Run" or "Create." This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.
action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources" support search once to create a history of previously seen locations that have provisioned AWS resources.
action.escu.known_false_positives = This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define "false positive" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no "false positives" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\
This search will fire any time a new IP address is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your country, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you.
@@ -117,10 +117,10 @@ search = `cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) [search `cloudtrail`
[ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region - Rule]
action.escu = 0
action.escu.enabled = 1
description = This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen regions. Region in this context is similar to a state in the United States. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with "Run" or "Create."
description = This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen regions. Region in this context is similar to a state in the United States. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with "Run" or "Create." This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.
action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]}
action.escu.data_models = []
action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen regions. Region in this context is similar to a state in the United States. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with "Run" or "Create."
action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen regions. Region in this context is similar to a state in the United States. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with "Run" or "Create." This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.
action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources" support search once to create a history of previously seen locations that have provisioned AWS resources.
action.escu.known_false_positives = This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define "false positive" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no "false positives" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\
This search will fire any time a new region is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your region, there should be few false positives. If you are located in regions where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you.
@@ -151,10 +151,10 @@ search = `cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceI
[ESCU - AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account - Rule]
action.escu = 0
action.escu.enabled = 1
description = This search looks for AssumeRole events where an IAM role in a different account is requested for the first time.
description = This search looks for AssumeRole events where an IAM role in a different account is requested for the first time. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Authentication Datamodel.
action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["PR.AC", "PR.DS", "DE.AE"]}
action.escu.data_models = ["Authentication"]
action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for AssumeRole events where an IAM role in a different account is requested for the first time.
action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for AssumeRole events where an IAM role in a different account is requested for the first time. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Authentication Datamodel.
action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Initial` to build the initial table of source IP address, geographic locations, and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account_filter` macro.
action.escu.known_false_positives = Using multiple AWS accounts and roles is perfectly valid behavior. It's suspicious when an account requests privileges of an account it hasn't before. You should validate with the account owner that this is a legitimate request.
action.escu.creation_date = 2020-05-28
@@ -189,14 +189,14 @@ search = | tstats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=
[ESCU - AWS Detect Users creating keys with encrypt policy without MFA - Rule]
action.escu = 0
action.escu.enabled = 1
description = This search provides detection of accounts creating KMS with encrypt policy and without using MFA.
description = This search provides detection of KMS keys which action kms:Encrypt is accessible for everyone (also outside of your organization). This is an identicator that your account is compromised and the attacker uses the encryption key to compromise another company.
action.escu.mappings = {"mitre_attack": ["T1486"]}
action.escu.data_models = []
action.escu.eli5 = This search provides detection of accounts creating KMS with encrypt policy and without using MFA.
action.escu.eli5 = This search provides detection of KMS keys which action kms:Encrypt is accessible for everyone (also outside of your organization). This is an identicator that your account is compromised and the attacker uses the encryption key to compromise another company.
action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudtrail logs
action.escu.known_false_positives = Not all KMS key creations are malicious. Particulary look for kms:Encrypt only policy. It is very unusual to create a key to encrypt only and not to decrypt.
action.escu.creation_date = 2020-10-27
action.escu.modification_date = 2020-10-27
action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
action.escu.creation_date = 2021-01-11
action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-11
action.escu.confidence = high
action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Detect Users creating keys with encrypt policy without MFA - Rule
action.escu.search_type = detection
@@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ relation = greater than
quantity = 0
realtime_schedule = 0
is_visible = false
search = `cloudtrail` eventName=CreateKey userIdentity.sessionContext.attributes.mfaAuthenticated=false (requestParameters.policy = "*kms:Encrypt*" AND requestParameters.policy != "*kms:Decrypt*") eventSource="kms.amazonaws.com" | table userIdentity.sessionContext.attributes.creationDate userIdentity.sessionContext.attributes.mfaAuthenticated user user_access_key requestParameters.keyUsage responseElements.keyMetadata.arn |`aws_detect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa_filter`
search = `cloudtrail` eventName=CreateKey OR eventName=PutKeyPolicy | spath input=requestParameters.policy output=key_policy_statements path=Statement{} | mvexpand key_policy_statements | spath input=key_policy_statements output=key_policy_action_1 path=Action | spath input=key_policy_statements output=key_policy_action_2 path=Action{} | eval key_policy_action=mvappend(key_policy_action_1, key_policy_action_2) | spath input=key_policy_statements output=key_policy_principal path=Principal.AWS | search key_policy_action="kms:Encrypt" AND key_policy_principal="*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by eventName eventSource eventID awsRegion userIdentity.principalId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`aws_detect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa_filter`
[ESCU - AWS Detect Users with KMS keys performing encryption S3 - Rule]
action.escu = 0
@@ -227,9 +227,9 @@ action.escu.mappings = {"mitre_attack": ["T1486"]}
action.escu.data_models = []
action.escu.eli5 = This search provides detection of users with KMS keys performing encryption specifically against S3 buckets.
action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudtrail logs
action.escu.known_false_positives = Not all operations with KMS keys are malicious. It is very unusual to create a key to encrypt only and not to decrypt. This search compliments the creation of KMS keys with encrypt policy.
action.escu.creation_date = 2020-10-27
action.escu.modification_date = 2020-10-27
action.escu.known_false_positives = bucket with S3 encryption
action.escu.creation_date = 2021-01-11
action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-11
action.escu.confidence = high
action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Detect Users with KMS keys performing encryption S3 - Rule
action.escu.search_type = detection
@@ -250,7 +250,7 @@ relation = greater than
quantity = 0
realtime_schedule = 0
is_visible = false
search = `cloudtrail` eventName = CopyObject requestParameters.x-amz-server-side-encryption = "aws:kms" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(bucket_name) values(object_path) by eventName http_user_agent user vendor_region requestParameters.x-amz-server-side-encryption-aws-kms-key-id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|`aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3_filter`
search = `cloudtrail` eventName=CopyObject requestParameters.x-amz-server-side-encryption="aws:kms" | rename requestParameters.bucketName AS bucket_name, requestParameters.x-amz-copy-source AS src_file, requestParameters.key AS dest_file | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(src_file) AS src_file values(dest_file) AS dest_file values(userAgent) AS userAgent values(region) AS region values(src) AS src by user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3_filter`
[ESCU - AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster sensitive object access - Rule]
action.escu = 0
@@ -289,13 +289,13 @@ search = `aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` objectRef.resource=secrets OR configmaps sourc
action.escu = 0
action.escu.enabled = 1
description = The search looks for CloudTrail events to detect if any network ACLs were created with all the ports open to a specified CIDR.
action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]}
action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.007"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]}
action.escu.data_models = []
action.escu.eli5 = The search looks for CloudTrail events to detect if any network ACLs were created with all the ports open to a specified CIDR.
action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS, version 4.4.0 or later, and configure your CloudTrail inputs.
action.escu.known_false_positives = It's possible that an admin has created this ACL with all ports open for some legitimate purpose however, this should be scoped and not allowed in production environment.
action.escu.creation_date = 2017-01-10
action.escu.modification_date = 2017-01-10
action.escu.creation_date = 2021-01-11
action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-11
action.escu.confidence = high
action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports - Rule
action.escu.search_type = detection
@@ -311,7 +311,7 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports - Rule
action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytics_story": ["AWS Network ACL Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]}
action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytics_story": ["AWS Network ACL Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.007"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]}
schedule_window = auto
alert.digest_mode = 1
disabled = true
@@ -321,19 +321,19 @@ relation = greater than
quantity = 0
realtime_schedule = 0
is_visible = false
search = `cloudtrail` eventName=CreateNetworkAclEntry | mvexpand requestParameters | mvexpand responseElements | search requestParameters.portRange.from=1024 requestParameters.portRange.to=65535 requestParameters.ruleAction=allow | rename userIdentity.arn as arn | rename requestParameters.networkAclId as networkAclId | table _time aws_account_id src userName arn networkAclId requestParameters.* responseElements.* | `aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports_filter`
search = `cloudtrail` eventName=CreateNetworkAclEntry OR eventName=ReplaceNetworkAclEntry requestParameters.ruleAction=allow requestParameters.egress=false requestParameters.aclProtocol=-1 | append [search `cloudtrail` eventName=CreateNetworkAclEntry OR eventName=ReplaceNetworkAclEntry requestParameters.ruleAction=allow requestParameters.egress=false requestParameters.aclProtocol!=-1 | eval port_range='requestParameters.portRange.to' - 'requestParameters.portRange.from' | where port_range>1024] | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by userName userIdentity.principalId eventName requestParameters.ruleAction requestParameters.egress requestParameters.aclProtocol requestParameters.portRange.to requestParameters.portRange.from src userAgent requestParameters.cidrBlock | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports_filter`
[ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule]
action.escu = 0
action.escu.enabled = 1
description = Enforcing network-access controls is one of the defensive mechanisms used by cloud administrators to restrict access to a cloud instance. After the attacker has gained control of the AWS console by compromising an admin account, they can delete a network ACL and gain access to the instance from anywhere. This search will query the CloudTrail logs to detect users deleting network ACLs.
action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]}
action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.007"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]}
action.escu.data_models = []
action.escu.eli5 = Enforcing network-access controls is one of the defensive mechanisms used by cloud administrators to restrict access to a cloud instance. After the attacker has gained control of the AWS console by compromising an admin account, they can delete a network ACL and gain access to the instance from anywhere. This search will query the CloudTrail logs to detect users deleting network ACLs.
action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.
action.escu.known_false_positives = It's possible that a user has legitimately deleted a network ACL.
action.escu.creation_date = 2017-01-10
action.escu.modification_date = 2017-01-10
action.escu.creation_date = 2021-01-12
action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-12
action.escu.confidence = high
action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule
action.escu.search_type = detection
@@ -349,7 +349,7 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule
action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytics_story": ["AWS Network ACL Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]}
action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytics_story": ["AWS Network ACL Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.007"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]}
schedule_window = auto
alert.digest_mode = 1
disabled = true
@@ -359,15 +359,15 @@ relation = greater than
quantity = 0
realtime_schedule = 0
is_visible = false
search = `cloudtrail` eventName=DeleteNetworkAcl|rename userIdentity.arn as arn | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(errorMessage) values(errorCode) values(userAgent) values(userIdentity.*) by src userName arn eventName | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `aws_network_access_control_list_deleted_filter`
search = `cloudtrail` eventName=DeleteNetworkAclEntry requestParameters.egress=false | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by userName userIdentity.principalId eventName requestParameters.egress src userAgent | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_network_access_control_list_deleted_filter`
[ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule]
action.escu = 0
action.escu.enabled = 1
description = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user successfully launches an abnormally high number of instances.
description = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user successfully launches an abnormally high number of instances. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel
action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]}
action.escu.data_models = []
action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user successfully launches an abnormally high number of instances.
action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user successfully launches an abnormally high number of instances. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel
action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. The threshold value should be tuned to your environment.
action.escu.known_false_positives = Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a human user.
action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21
@@ -402,10 +402,10 @@ search = `cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success | bucket span=10m
[ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule]
action.escu = 0
action.escu.enabled = 1
description = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user successfully launches an abnormally high number of instances.
description = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user successfully launches an abnormally high number of instances. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.
action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]}
action.escu.data_models = []
action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user successfully launches an abnormally high number of instances.
action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user successfully launches an abnormally high number of instances. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.
action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. The threshold value should be tuned to your environment.
action.escu.known_false_positives = Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a human user.
action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21
@@ -440,10 +440,10 @@ search = `cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success `abnormally_high_
[ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - Rule]
action.escu = 0
action.escu.enabled = 1
description = This search looks for CloudTrail events where an abnormally high number of instances were successfully terminated by a user in a 10-minute window
description = This search looks for CloudTrail events where an abnormally high number of instances were successfully terminated by a user in a 10-minute window. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.
action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]}
action.escu.data_models = []
action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for CloudTrail events where an abnormally high number of instances were successfully terminated by a user in a 10-minute window
action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for CloudTrail events where an abnormally high number of instances were successfully terminated by a user in a 10-minute window. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.
action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.
action.escu.known_false_positives = Many service accounts configured with your AWS infrastructure are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter out service accounts from the output. Always verify whether this search alerted on a human user.
action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21
@@ -473,10 +473,10 @@ search = `cloudtrail` eventName=TerminateInstances errorCode=success | bucket sp
[ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK - Rule]
action.escu = 0
action.escu.enabled = 1
description = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user successfully terminates an abnormally high number of instances.
description = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user successfully terminates an abnormally high number of instances. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.
action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]}
action.escu.data_models = []
action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user successfully terminates an abnormally high number of instances.
action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user successfully terminates an abnormally high number of instances. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.
action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. The threshold value should be tuned to your environment.
action.escu.known_false_positives = Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a human user.
action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21
@@ -919,6 +919,39 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
is_visible = false
search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Filesystem.dest) as dest values(Filesystem.file_name) as file_name values(Filesystem.user) as user from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem by Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| rex field=file_name "(?<file_extension>\.[^\.]+)$" | search file_path=*system32* AND file_extension=.bat | `batch_file_write_to_system32_filter`
[ESCU - Child Processes of Spoolsv exe - Rule]
action.escu = 0
action.escu.enabled = 1
description = This search looks for child processes of spoolsv.exe. This activity is associated with a POC privilege-escalation exploit associated with CVE-2018-8440. Spoolsv.exe is the process associated with the Print Spooler service in Windows and typically runs as SYSTEM.
action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068"], "nist": ["PR.AC", "PR.PT", "DE.CM"]}
action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"]
action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for child processes of spoolsv.exe. This activity is associated with a POC privilege-escalation exploit associated with CVE-2018-8440. Spoolsv.exe is the process associated with the Print Spooler service in Windows and typically runs as SYSTEM.
action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. Update the `children_of_spoolsv_filter` macro to filter out legitimate child processes spawned by spoolsv.exe.
action.escu.known_false_positives = Some legitimate printer-related processes may show up as children of spoolsv.exe. You should confirm that any activity as legitimate and may be added as exclusions in the search.
action.escu.creation_date = 2020-03-16
action.escu.modification_date = 2020-03-16
action.escu.confidence = high
action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Child Processes of Spoolsv exe - Rule
action.escu.search_type = detection
action.escu.providing_technologies = []
action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Privilege Escalation"]
cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Child Processes of Spoolsv exe - Rule
action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytics_story": ["Windows Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068"], "nist": ["PR.AC", "PR.PT", "DE.CM"]}
schedule_window = auto
alert.digest_mode = 1
disabled = true
enableSched = 1
counttype = number of events
relation = greater than
quantity = 0
realtime_schedule = 0
is_visible = false
search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=spoolsv.exe AND Processes.process_name!=regsvr32.exe by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe_filter`
[ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule]
action.escu = 0
action.escu.enabled = 1
@@ -1185,10 +1218,10 @@ search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) as firs
[ESCU - Cloud Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule]
action.escu = 0
action.escu.enabled = 1
description = Enforcing network-access controls is one of the defensive mechanisms used by cloud administrators to restrict access to a cloud instance. After the attacker has gained control of the console by compromising an admin account, they can delete a network ACL and gain access to the instance from anywhere. This search will query the Change datamodel to detect users deleting network ACLs.
description = Enforcing network-access controls is one of the defensive mechanisms used by cloud administrators to restrict access to a cloud instance. After the attacker has gained control of the console by compromising an admin account, they can delete a network ACL and gain access to the instance from anywhere. This search will query the Change datamodel to detect users deleting network ACLs. Deprecated because it's a duplicate
action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]}
action.escu.data_models = []
action.escu.eli5 = Enforcing network-access controls is one of the defensive mechanisms used by cloud administrators to restrict access to a cloud instance. After the attacker has gained control of the console by compromising an admin account, they can delete a network ACL and gain access to the instance from anywhere. This search will query the Change datamodel to detect users deleting network ACLs.
action.escu.eli5 = Enforcing network-access controls is one of the defensive mechanisms used by cloud administrators to restrict access to a cloud instance. After the attacker has gained control of the console by compromising an admin account, they can delete a network ACL and gain access to the instance from anywhere. This search will query the Change datamodel to detect users deleting network ACLs. Deprecated because it's a duplicate
action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted_filter` macro.
action.escu.known_false_positives = It's possible that a user has legitimately deleted a network ACL.
action.escu.creation_date = 2020-09-08
@@ -1933,10 +1966,10 @@ search = `cisco_networks` facility="PM" mnemonic="ERR_DISABLE" disable_cause="ar
[ESCU - Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts - Rule]
action.escu = 0
action.escu.enabled = 1
description = This search looks for successful CloudTrail activity by user accounts that are not listed in the identity table or `aws_service_accounts.csv`. It returns event names and count, as well as the first and last time a specific user or service is detected, grouped by users.
description = This search looks for successful CloudTrail activity by user accounts that are not listed in the identity table or `aws_service_accounts.csv`. It returns event names and count, as well as the first and last time a specific user or service is detected, grouped by users. Deprecated because managing this list can be quite hard.
action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "ID.AM"]}
action.escu.data_models = []
action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for successful CloudTrail activity by user accounts that are not listed in the identity table or `aws_service_accounts.csv`. It returns event names and count, as well as the first and last time a specific user or service is detected, grouped by users.
action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for successful CloudTrail activity by user accounts that are not listed in the identity table or `aws_service_accounts.csv`. It returns event names and count, as well as the first and last time a specific user or service is detected, grouped by users. Deprecated because managing this list can be quite hard.
action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. You must also populate the `identity_lookup_expanded` lookup shipped with the Asset and Identity framework to be able to look up users in your identity table in Enterprise Security (ES). Leverage the support search called "Create a list of approved AWS service accounts": run it once every 30 days to create and validate a list of service accounts.\
This search produces fields (`eventName`,`firstTime`,`lastTime`) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\n1. **Label:** AWS Event Name, **Field:** eventName\
1. \
@@ -2662,6 +2695,44 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
is_visible = false
search = `google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.resource.type=gcs_bucket data.protoPayload.methodName=storage.setIamPermissions | spath output=action path=data.protoPayload.serviceData.policyDelta.bindingDeltas{}.action | spath output=user path=data.protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail | spath output=location path=data.protoPayload.resourceLocation.currentLocations{} | spath output=src path=data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp | spath output=bucketName path=data.protoPayload.resourceName | spath output=role path=data.protoPayload.serviceData.policyDelta.bindingDeltas{}.role | spath output=member path=data.protoPayload.serviceData.policyDelta.bindingDeltas{}.member | search (member=allUsers AND action=ADD) | table _time, bucketName, src, user, location, action, role, member | search `detect_new_open_gcp_storage_buckets_filter`
[ESCU - Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI - Rule]
action.escu = 0
action.escu.enabled = 1
description = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user has created an open/public S3 bucket over the aws cli.
action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1530"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]}
action.escu.data_models = []
action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user has created an open/public S3 bucket over the aws cli.
action.escu.how_to_implement = none
action.escu.known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created a public bucket for a specific purpose. That said, AWS strongly advises against granting full control to the "All Users" group.
action.escu.creation_date = 2021-01-12
action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-12
action.escu.confidence = high
action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI - Rule
action.escu.search_type = detection
action.escu.providing_technologies = []
action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious AWS S3 Activities"]
action.risk = 1
action.risk.param._risk_object = src
action.risk.param._risk_object_type = system
action.risk.param._risk_score = 20
action.risk.param.verbose = 0
cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI - Rule
action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytics_story": ["Suspicious AWS S3 Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1530"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]}
schedule_window = auto
alert.digest_mode = 1
disabled = true
enableSched = 1
counttype = number of events
relation = greater than
quantity = 0
realtime_schedule = 0
is_visible = false
search = `cloudtrail` eventSource="s3.amazonaws.com" eventName=PutBucketAcl OR requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-read-acp IN ("*AuthenticatedUsers","*AllUsers") OR requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-write IN ("*AuthenticatedUsers","*AllUsers") OR requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-write-acp IN ("*AuthenticatedUsers","*AllUsers") OR requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-full-control IN ("*AuthenticatedUsers","*AllUsers") | rename requestParameters.bucketName AS bucketName | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by userName userIdentity.principalId userAgent bucketName requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-read requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-read-acp requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-write requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-write-acp requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-full-control | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli_filter`
[ESCU - Detect New Open S3 buckets - Rule]
action.escu = 0
action.escu.enabled = 1
@@ -2669,10 +2740,10 @@ description = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user has created a
action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1530"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]}
action.escu.data_models = []
action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user has created an open/public S3 bucket.
action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), and then configure your CloudTrail inputs. The threshold value should be tuned to your environment.
action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk.
action.escu.known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created a public bucket for a specific purpose. That said, AWS strongly advises against granting full control to the "All Users" group.
action.escu.creation_date = 2018-07-25
action.escu.modification_date = 2018-07-25
action.escu.creation_date = 2021-01-12
action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-12
action.escu.confidence = high
action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect New Open S3 buckets - Rule
action.escu.search_type = detection
@@ -2698,7 +2769,40 @@ relation = greater than
quantity = 0
realtime_schedule = 0
is_visible = false
search = `cloudtrail` AllUsers eventName=PutBucketAcl | spath output=userIdentityArn path=userIdentity.arn | spath output=bucketName path=requestParameters.bucketName | spath output=aclControlList path=requestParameters.AccessControlPolicy.AccessControlList | spath input=aclControlList output=grantee path=Grant{} | mvexpand grantee | spath input=grantee | search Grantee.URI=*AllUsers | rename userIdentityArn as user| table _time, src,awsRegion Permission, Grantee.URI, bucketName, user | `detect_new_open_s3_buckets_filter`
search = `cloudtrail` eventSource=s3.amazonaws.com eventName=PutBucketAcl | rex field=_raw "(?<json_field>{.+})" | spath input=json_field output=grantees path=requestParameters.AccessControlPolicy.AccessControlList.Grant{} | search grantees=* | mvexpand grantees | spath input=grantees output=uri path=Grantee.URI | spath input=grantees output=permission path=Permission | search uri IN ("http://acs.amazonaws.com/groups/global/AllUsers","http://acs.amazonaws.com/groups/global/AuthenticatedUsers") | search permission IN ("READ","READ_ACP","WRITE","WRITE_ACP","FULL_CONTROL") | rename requestParameters.bucketName AS bucketName | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by userName userIdentity.principalId userAgent uri permission bucketName | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_new_open_s3_buckets_filter`
[ESCU - Detect Oulook exe writing a zip file - Rule]
action.escu = 0
action.escu.enabled = 1
description = This search looks for execution of process `outlook.exe` where the process is writing a `.zip` file to the disk.
action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]}
action.escu.data_models = []
action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for execution of process `outlook.exe` where the process is writing a `.zip` file to the disk.
action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records filesystem and process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response products, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon.
action.escu.known_false_positives = It is not uncommon for outlook to write legitimate zip files to the disk.
action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21
action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21
action.escu.confidence = high
action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Oulook exe writing a zip file - Rule
action.escu.search_type = detection
action.escu.providing_technologies = []
action.escu.analytic_story = ["Phishing Payloads"]
cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Oulook exe writing a zip file - Rule
action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytics_story": ["Phishing Payloads"], "cis20": ["CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]}
schedule_window = auto
alert.digest_mode = 1
disabled = true
enableSched = 1
counttype = number of events
relation = greater than
quantity = 0
realtime_schedule = 0
is_visible = false
search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=outlook.exe OR Processes.process_name=explorer.exe by _time span=5m Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_id Processes.dest Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename process_id as malicious_id| rename parent_process_id as outlook_id| join malicious_id type=inner[| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path values(Filesystem.file_name) as file_name FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where (Filesystem.file_path=*zip* OR Filesystem.file_name=*.lnk ) AND (Filesystem.file_path=C:\\Users* OR Filesystem.file_path=*Local\\Temp*) by _time span=5m Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_hash Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename process_id as malicious_id| fields malicious_id outlook_id dest file_path file_name file_hash count file_id] | table firstTime lastTime user malicious_id outlook_id process_name parent_process_name file_name file_path | where file_name != "" | `detect_oulook_exe_writing_a__zip_file_filter`
[ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule]
action.escu = 0
@@ -2707,7 +2811,7 @@ description = This search looks for outbound SMB connections made by hosts withi
action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1071.002"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
action.escu.data_models = ["Network_Traffic"]
action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for outbound SMB connections made by hosts within your network to the Internet. SMB traffic is used for Windows file-sharing activity. One of the techniques often used by attackers involves retrieving the credential hash using an SMB request made to a compromised server controlled by the threat actor.
action.escu.how_to_implement = In order to run this search effectively, we highly recommend that you leverage the Assets and Identity framework. It is important that you have good understanding of how your network segments are designed, and be able to distinguish internal from external address space. Add a category named `internal` to the CIDRs that host the company's assets in `assets_by_cidr.csv` lookup file, which is located in `$SPLUNK_HOME/etc/apps/SA-IdentityManagement/lookups/`. More information on updating this lookup can be found here: https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.0.0/Admin/Addassetandidentitydata. This search also requires you to be ingesting your network traffic and populating the Network_Traffic data model
action.escu.how_to_implement = In order to run this search effectively, we highly recommend that you leverage the Assets and Identity framework. It is important that you have good understanding of how your network segments are designed, and be able to distinguish internal from external address space. Add a category named `internal` to the CIDRs that host the companys assets in `assets_by_cidr.csv` lookup file, which is located in `$SPLUNK_HOME/etc/apps/SA-IdentityManagement/lookups/`. More information on updating this lookup can be found here: https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.0.0/Admin/Addassetandidentitydata. This search also requires you to be ingesting your network traffic and populating the Network_Traffic data model
action.escu.known_false_positives = It is likely that the outbound Server Message Block (SMB) traffic is legitimate, if the company's internal networks are not well-defined in the Assets and Identity Framework. Categorize the internal CIDR blocks as `internal` in the lookup file to avoid creating notable events for traffic destined to those CIDR blocks. Any other network connection that is going out to the Internet should be investigated and blocked. Best practices suggest preventing external communications of all SMB versions and related protocols at the network boundary.
action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21
action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21
@@ -2731,7 +2835,7 @@ relation = greater than
quantity = 0
realtime_schedule = 0
is_visible = false
search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest values(All_Traffic.action) from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.action !=blocked All_Traffic.dest_category !=internal (All_Traffic.dest_port=139 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=445 OR All_Traffic.app=smb) by All_Traffic.src_ip All_Traffic.dest_ip | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` | search ( dest_ip!=10.0.0.0/8 AND dest_ip!=172.16.0.0/12 AND dest_ip!=192.168.0.0/16) | `security_content_ctime(earliest)`| `security_content_ctime(latest)` | `detect_outbound_smb_traffic_filter`
search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` earliest(_time) as start_time latest(_time) as end_time values(All_Traffic.action) as action values(All_Traffic.app) as app values(All_Traffic.dest_ip) as dest_ip values(All_Traffic.dest_port) as dest_port values(sourcetype) as sourcetype count from datamodel=Network_Traffic where ((All_Traffic.dest_port=139 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=445 OR All_Traffic.app="smb") AND NOT (All_Traffic.action="blocked" OR All_Traffic.dest_category="internal" OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=10.0.0.0/8 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=172.16.0.0/12 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=192.168.0.0/16 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=100.64.0.0/10)) by All_Traffic.src_ip | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` | `security_content_ctime(start_time)` | `security_content_ctime(end_time)` | `detect_outbound_smb_traffic_filter`
[ESCU - Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe - Rule]
action.escu = 0
@@ -3044,10 +3148,10 @@ search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
[ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS API Activity - Rule]
action.escu = 0
action.escu.enabled = 1
description = This search will detect users creating spikes of API activity in your AWS environment. It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest data.
description = This search will detect users creating spikes of API activity in your AWS environment. It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest data. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.
action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"]}
action.escu.data_models = []
action.escu.eli5 = This search will detect users creating spikes of API activity in your AWS environment. It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest data.
action.escu.eli5 = This search will detect users creating spikes of API activity in your AWS environment. It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest data. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.
action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. You can modify `dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold` to better fit your environment. The `dataPointThreshold` variable is the minimum number of data points required to have a statistically significant amount of data to determine. The `deviationThreshold` variable is the number of standard deviations away from the mean that the value must be to be considered a spike.\
This search produces fields (`eventName`,`numberOfApiCalls`,`uniqueApisCalled`) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\n1. **Label:** AWS Event Name, **Field:** eventName\
1. \
@@ -3154,10 +3258,10 @@ search = `aws_securityhub_firehose` "findings{}.Resources{}.Type"= AwsIamUser |
[ESCU - Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity - Rule]
action.escu = 0
action.escu.enabled = 1
description = This search will detect users creating spikes in API activity related to network access-control lists (ACLs)in your AWS environment.
description = This search will detect users creating spikes in API activity related to network access-control lists (ACLs)in your AWS environment. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.
action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.007"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"]}
action.escu.data_models = []
action.escu.eli5 = This search will detect users creating spikes in API activity related to network access-control lists (ACLs)in your AWS environment.
action.escu.eli5 = This search will detect users creating spikes in API activity related to network access-control lists (ACLs)in your AWS environment. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.
action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. You can modify `dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold` to better fit your environment. The `dataPointThreshold` variable is the minimum number of data points required to have a statistically significant amount of data to determine. The `deviationThreshold` variable is the number of standard deviations away from the mean that the value must be to be considered a spike. This search works best when you run the "Baseline of Network ACL Activity by ARN" support search once to create a lookup file of previously seen Network ACL Activity. To add or remove API event names related to network ACLs, edit the macro `network_acl_events`.
action.escu.known_false_positives = The false-positive rate may vary based on the values of`dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold`. Please modify this according the your environment.
action.escu.creation_date = 2018-05-21
@@ -3230,10 +3334,10 @@ search = `cloudtrail` eventName=DeleteBucket [search `cloudtrail` eventName=Dele
[ESCU - Detect Spike in Security Group Activity - Rule]
action.escu = 0
action.escu.enabled = 1
description = This search will detect users creating spikes in API activity related to security groups in your AWS environment. It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest data.
description = This search will detect users creating spikes in API activity related to security groups in your AWS environment. It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest data. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.
action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"]}
action.escu.data_models = []
action.escu.eli5 = This search will detect users creating spikes in API activity related to security groups in your AWS environment. It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest data.
action.escu.eli5 = This search will detect users creating spikes in API activity related to security groups in your AWS environment. It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest data. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.
action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. You can modify `dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold` to better fit your environment. The `dataPointThreshold` variable is the minimum number of data points required to have a statistically significant amount of data to determine. The `deviationThreshold` variable is the number of standard deviations away from the mean that the value must be to be considered a spike.This search works best when you run the "Baseline of Security Group Activity by ARN" support search once to create a history of previously seen Security Group Activity. To add or remove API event names for security groups, edit the macro `security_group_api_calls`.
action.escu.known_false_positives = Based on the values of`dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold`, the false positive rate may vary. Please modify this according the your environment.
action.escu.creation_date = 2018-04-18
@@ -3844,6 +3948,39 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
is_visible = false
search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` dc("DNS.query") as count from datamodel=Network_Resolution where nodename=DNS "DNS.message_type"="QUERY" NOT (`cim_corporate_web_domain_search("DNS.query")`) NOT "DNS.query"="*.in-addr.arpa" NOT ("DNS.src_category"="svc_infra_dns" OR "DNS.src_category"="svc_infra_webproxy" OR "DNS.src_category"="svc_infra_email*" ) by "DNS.src","DNS.query" | rename "DNS.src" as src "DNS.query" as message | eval length=len(message) | stats sum(length) as length by src | append [ tstats `security_content_summariesonly` dc("DNS.answer") as count from datamodel=Network_Resolution where nodename=DNS "DNS.message_type"="QUERY" NOT (`cim_corporate_web_domain_search("DNS.query")`) NOT "DNS.query"="*.in-addr.arpa" NOT ("DNS.src_category"="svc_infra_dns" OR "DNS.src_category"="svc_infra_webproxy" OR "DNS.src_category"="svc_infra_email*" ) by "DNS.src","DNS.answer" | rename "DNS.src" as src "DNS.answer" as message | eval message=if(message=="unknown","", message) | eval length=len(message) | stats sum(length) as length by src ] | stats sum(length) as length by src | where length > 10000 | `detection_of_dns_tunnels_filter`
[ESCU - Detection of tools built by NirSoft - Rule]
action.escu = 0
action.escu.enabled = 1
description = This search looks for specific command-line arguments that may indicate the execution of tools made by Nirsoft, which are legitimate, but may be abused by attackers.
action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1072"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]}
action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"]
action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for specific command-line arguments that may indicate the execution of tools made by Nirsoft, which are legitimate, but may be abused by attackers.
action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model.
action.escu.known_false_positives = While legitimate, these NirSoft tools are prone to abuse. You should verfiy that the tool was used for a legitimate purpose.
action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21
action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21
action.escu.confidence = high
action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detection of tools built by NirSoft - Rule
action.escu.search_type = detection
action.escu.providing_technologies = []
action.escu.analytic_story = ["Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A "]
cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detection of tools built by NirSoft - Rule
action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytics_story": ["Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A "], "cis20": ["CIS 3"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1072"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]}
schedule_window = auto
alert.digest_mode = 1
disabled = true
enableSched = 1
counttype = number of events
relation = greater than
quantity = 0
realtime_schedule = 0
is_visible = false
search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) values(Processes.process) as process max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process="* /stext *" OR Processes.process="* /scomma *" ) by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft_filter`
[ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule]
action.escu = 0
action.escu.enabled = 1
@@ -3913,10 +4050,10 @@ search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
[ESCU - EC2 Instance Modified With Previously Unseen User - Rule]
action.escu = 0
action.escu.enabled = 1
description = This search looks for EC2 instances being modified by users who have not previously modified them.
description = This search looks for EC2 instances being modified by users who have not previously modified them. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.
action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]}
action.escu.data_models = []
action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for EC2 instances being modified by users who have not previously modified them.
action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for EC2 instances being modified by users who have not previously modified them. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.
action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User" support search once to create a history of previously seen ARNs. To add or remove APIs that modify an EC2 instance, edit the macro `ec2_modification_api_calls`.
action.escu.known_false_positives = It's possible that a new user will start to modify EC2 instances when they haven't before for any number of reasons. Verify with the user that is modifying instances that this is the intended behavior.
action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21
@@ -3955,7 +4092,7 @@ description = This search looks for CloudTrail events where an instance is start
action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]}
action.escu.data_models = []
action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for CloudTrail events where an instance is started in a particular region in the last one hour and then compares it to a lookup file of previously seen regions where an instance was started
action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. Run the "Previously seen AWS Regions" support search only once to create of baseline of previously seen regions.
action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. Run the "Previously seen AWS Regions" support search only once to create of baseline of previously seen regions. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.
action.escu.known_false_positives = It's possible that a user has unknowingly started an instance in a new region. Please verify that this activity is legitimate.
action.escu.creation_date = 2018-02-23
action.escu.modification_date = 2018-02-23
@@ -3989,10 +4126,10 @@ search = `cloudtrail` earliest=-1h StartInstances | stats earliest(_time) as ear
[ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI - Rule]
action.escu = 0
action.escu.enabled = 1
description = This search looks for EC2 instances being created with previously unseen AMIs.
description = This search looks for EC2 instances being created with previously unseen AMIs. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.
action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]}
action.escu.data_models = []
action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for EC2 instances being created with previously unseen AMIs.
action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for EC2 instances being created with previously unseen AMIs. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.
action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen EC2 AMIs" support search once to create a history of previously seen AMIs.
action.escu.known_false_positives = After a new AMI is created, the first systems created with that AMI will cause this alert to fire. Verify that the AMI being used was created by a legitimate user.
action.escu.creation_date = 2018-03-12
@@ -4022,10 +4159,10 @@ search = `cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances [search `cloudtrail` eventName=RunI
[ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule]
action.escu = 0
action.escu.enabled = 1
description = This search looks for EC2 instances being created with previously unseen instance types.
description = This search looks for EC2 instances being created with previously unseen instance types. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.
action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]}
action.escu.data_models = []
action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for EC2 instances being created with previously unseen instance types.
action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for EC2 instances being created with previously unseen instance types. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.
action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen EC2 Instance Types" support search once to create a history of previously seen instance types.
action.escu.known_false_positives = It is possible that an admin will create a new system using a new instance type never used before. Verify with the creator that they intended to create the system with the new instance type.
action.escu.creation_date = 2020-02-07
@@ -4055,10 +4192,10 @@ search = `cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances [search `cloudtrail` eventName=RunI
[ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule]
action.escu = 0
action.escu.enabled = 1
description = This search looks for EC2 instances being created by users who have not created them before.
description = This search looks for EC2 instances being created by users who have not created them before. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.
action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]}
action.escu.data_models = []
action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for EC2 instances being created by users who have not created them before.
action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for EC2 instances being created by users who have not created them before. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.
action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User" support search once to create a history of previously seen ARNs.
action.escu.known_false_positives = It's possible that a user will start to create EC2 instances when they haven't before for any number of reasons. Verify with the user that is launching instances that this is the intended behavior.
action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21
@@ -5473,6 +5610,39 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
is_visible = false
search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Resolution where nodename=DNS "DNS.message_type"="QUERY" "DNS.record_type"="ANY" by "DNS.dest" | `drop_dm_object_name("DNS")` | where count>200 | `large_volume_of_dns_any_queries_filter`
[ESCU - MacOS - Re-opened Applications - Rule]
action.escu = 0
action.escu.enabled = 1
description = This search looks for processes referencing the plist files that determine which applications are re-opened when a user reboots their machine.
action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Command and Control"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM"]}
action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"]
action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for processes referencing the plist files that determine which applications are re-opened when a user reboots their machine.
action.escu.how_to_implement = In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest process data from your osquery deployed agents with the [splunk.conf](https://github.com/splunk/TA-osquery/blob/master/config/splunk.conf) pack enabled. Also the [TA-OSquery](https://github.com/splunk/TA-osquery) must be deployed across your indexers and universal forwarders in order to have the data populate the Endpoint data model.
action.escu.known_false_positives = At this stage, there are no known false positives. During testing, no process events refering the com.apple.loginwindow.plist files were observed during normal operation of re-opening applications on reboot. Therefore, it can be asumed that any occurences of this in the process events would be worth investigating. In the event that the legitimate modification by the system of these files is in fact logged to the process log, then the process_name of that process can be whitelisted.
action.escu.creation_date = 2020-02-07
action.escu.modification_date = 2020-02-07
action.escu.confidence = high
action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - MacOS - Re-opened Applications - Rule
action.escu.search_type = detection
action.escu.providing_technologies = []
action.escu.analytic_story = []
cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - MacOS - Re-opened Applications - Rule
action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Command and Control"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM"]}
schedule_window = auto
alert.digest_mode = 1
disabled = true
enableSched = 1
counttype = number of events
relation = greater than
quantity = 0
realtime_schedule = 0
is_visible = false
search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process="*com.apple.loginwindow*" by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `macos___re_opened_applications_filter`
[ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule]
action.escu = 0
action.escu.enabled = 1
@@ -6199,6 +6369,39 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
is_visible = false
search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name = *WmiPrvSE.exe by Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.process_name | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `process_execution_via_wmi_filter`
[ESCU - Processes Tapping Keyboard Events - Rule]
action.escu = 0
action.escu.enabled = 1
description = This search looks for processes in an MacOS system that is tapping keyboard events in MacOS, and essentially monitoring all keystrokes made by a user. This is a common technique used by RATs to log keystrokes from a victim, although it can also be used by legitimate processes like Siri to react on human input
action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 4", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "nist": ["DE.DP"]}
action.escu.data_models = []
action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for processes in an MacOS system that is tapping keyboard events in MacOS, and essentially monitoring all keystrokes made by a user. This is a common technique used by RATs to log keystrokes from a victim, although it can also be used by legitimate processes like Siri to react on human input
action.escu.how_to_implement = In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest data from your osquery deployed agents with the [osx-attacks.conf](https://github.com/facebook/osquery/blob/experimental/packs/osx-attacks.conf#L599) pack enabled. Also the [TA-OSquery](https://github.com/d1vious/TA-osquery) must be deployed across your indexers and universal forwarders in order to have the osquery data populate the Alerts data model.
action.escu.known_false_positives = There might be some false positives as keyboard event taps are used by processes like Siri and Zoom video chat, for some good examples of processes to exclude please see [this](https://github.com/facebook/osquery/pull/5345#issuecomment-454639161) comment.
action.escu.creation_date = 2019-01-25
action.escu.modification_date = 2019-01-25
action.escu.confidence = high
action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Processes Tapping Keyboard Events - Rule
action.escu.search_type = detection
action.escu.providing_technologies = []
action.escu.analytic_story = ["ColdRoot MacOS RAT"]
cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Processes Tapping Keyboard Events - Rule
action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytics_story": ["ColdRoot MacOS RAT"], "cis20": ["CIS 4", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "nist": ["DE.DP"]}
schedule_window = auto
alert.digest_mode = 1
disabled = true
enableSched = 1
counttype = number of events
relation = greater than
quantity = 0
realtime_schedule = 0
is_visible = false
search = | from datamodel Alerts.Alerts | search app=osquery:results name=pack_osx-attacks_Keyboard_Event_Taps | rename columns.cmdline as cmd, columns.name as process_name, columns.pid as process_id| dedup host,process_name | table host,process_name, cmd, process_id | `processes_tapping_keyboard_events_filter`
[ESCU - Processes created by netsh - Rule]
action.escu = 0
action.escu.enabled = 1
@@ -6628,6 +6831,39 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
is_visible = false
search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=3389 AND All_Traffic.dest_category!=common_rdp_destination AND All_Traffic.src_category!=common_rdp_source by All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_desktop_network_traffic_filter`
[ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule]
action.escu = 0
action.escu.enabled = 1
description = This search looks for the remote desktop process mstsc.exe running on systems upon which it doesn't typically run. This is accomplished by filtering out all systems that are noted in the `common_rdp_source category` in the Assets and Identity framework.
action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 9", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]}
action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"]
action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for the remote desktop process mstsc.exe running on systems upon which it doesn't typically run. This is accomplished by filtering out all systems that are noted in the `common_rdp_source category` in the Assets and Identity framework.
action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the processes node. The search requires you to identify systems that do not commonly use remote desktop. You can use the included support search "Identify Systems Using Remote Desktop" to identify these systems. After identifying them, you will need to add the "common_rdp_source" category to that system using the Enterprise Security Assets and Identities framework. This can be done by adding an entry in the assets.csv file located in `SA-IdentityManagement/lookups`.
action.escu.known_false_positives = Remote Desktop may be used legitimately by users on the network.
action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21
action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21
action.escu.confidence = high
action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule
action.escu.search_type = detection
action.escu.providing_technologies = []
action.escu.analytic_story = ["Hidden Cobra Malware", "Lateral Movement"]
cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule
action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytics_story": ["Hidden Cobra Malware", "Lateral Movement"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 9", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]}
schedule_window = auto
alert.digest_mode = 1
disabled = true
enableSched = 1
counttype = number of events
relation = greater than
quantity = 0
realtime_schedule = 0
is_visible = false
search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process=*mstsc.exe AND Processes.dest_category!=common_rdp_source by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `remote_desktop_process_running_on_system_filter`
[ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule]
action.escu = 0
action.escu.enabled = 1
@@ -7291,6 +7527,39 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
is_visible = false
search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Vulnerabilities where Vulnerabilities.cve ="CVE-2017-5753" OR Vulnerabilities.cve ="CVE-2017-5715" OR Vulnerabilities.cve ="CVE-2017-5754" by Vulnerabilities.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Vulnerabilities)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems_filter`
[ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule]
action.escu = 0
action.escu.enabled = 1
description = The search looks for a sharp increase in the number of files written to a particular host
action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
action.escu.data_models = []
action.escu.eli5 = The search looks for a sharp increase in the number of files written to a particular host
action.escu.how_to_implement = In order to implement this search, you must populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection and response products, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the file system.
action.escu.known_false_positives = It is important to understand that if you happen to install any new applications on your hosts or are copying a large number of files, you can expect to see a large increase of file modifications.
action.escu.creation_date = 2020-03-16
action.escu.modification_date = 2020-03-16
action.escu.confidence = high
action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule
action.escu.search_type = detection
action.escu.providing_technologies = []
action.escu.analytic_story = ["SamSam Ransomware", "Ryuk Ransomware", "Ransomware"]
cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule
action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytics_story": ["SamSam Ransomware", "Ryuk Ransomware", "Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
schedule_window = auto
alert.digest_mode = 1
disabled = true
enableSched = 1
counttype = number of events
relation = greater than
quantity = 0
realtime_schedule = 0
is_visible = false
search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.action=created by _time span=1h, Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | eventstats max(_time) as maxtime | stats count as num_data_samples max(eval(if(_time >= relative_time(maxtime, "-1d@d"), count, null))) as "count" avg(eval(if(_time<relative_time(maxtime, "-1d@d"), count,null))) as avg stdev(eval(if(_time<relative_time(maxtime, "-1d@d"), count, null))) as stdev by "dest" | eval upperBound=(avg+stdev*4), isOutlier=if((count > upperBound) AND num_data_samples >=20, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `spike_in_file_writes_filter`
[ESCU - Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure - Rule]
action.escu = 0
action.escu.enabled = 1
@@ -7331,7 +7600,7 @@ description = The malware sunburst will load the malicious dll by SolarWinds.Bus
action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1203"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
action.escu.data_models = []
action.escu.eli5 = The malware sunburst will load the malicious dll by SolarWinds.BusinessLayerHost.exe. After a period of 12-14 days, the malware will attempt to resolve a subdomain of avsvmcloud.com. This detections will correlate both events.
action.escu.how_to_implement = This detection relies on sysmon logs with the Event ID 6, Driver loaded. Please tune your sysmon config that you DriverLoad event for SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll is captured by Sysmon. Additionally, you need sysmon logs for Event ID 22, DNS Query. We suggest to run this detection at least once a day over the last 14 days.
action.escu.how_to_implement = This detection relies on sysmon logs with the Event ID 7, Driver loaded. Please tune your sysmon config that you DriverLoad event for SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll is captured by Sysmon. Additionally, you need sysmon logs for Event ID 22, DNS Query. We suggest to run this detection at least once a day over the last 14 days.
action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
action.escu.creation_date = 2020-12-14
action.escu.modification_date = 2020-12-14
@@ -7357,6 +7626,39 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
is_visible = false
search = (`sysmon` EventCode=7 ImageLoaded=*SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll) OR (`sysmon` EventCode=22 QueryName=*avsvmcloud.com) | eventstats dc(EventCode) AS dc_events | where dc_events=2 | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(ImageLoaded) AS ImageLoaded values(QueryName) AS QueryName by host | rename host as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event_filter`
[ESCU - Supernova Webshell - Rule]
action.escu = 0
action.escu.enabled = 1
description = This search aims to detect the Supernova webshell used in the SUNBURST attack.
action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 4", "CIS 13", "CIS 18"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack": ["T1505.003"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "ID.RA", "PR.PT", "PR.IP", "DE.CM"]}
action.escu.data_models = ["Web"]
action.escu.eli5 = This search aims to detect the Supernova webshell used in the SUNBURST attack.
action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be monitoring web traffic to your Solarwinds Orion. The logs should be ingested into splunk and populating/mapped to the Web data model.
action.escu.known_false_positives = There might be false positives associted with this detection since items like args as a web argument is pretty generic.
action.escu.creation_date = 2021-01-06
action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-06
action.escu.confidence = high
action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Supernova Webshell - Rule
action.escu.search_type = detection
action.escu.providing_technologies = []
action.escu.analytic_story = ["Sunburst Malware"]
cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Supernova Webshell - Rule
action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytics_story": ["Sunburst Malware"], "cis20": ["CIS 4", "CIS 13", "CIS 18"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack": ["T1505.003"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "ID.RA", "PR.PT", "PR.IP", "DE.CM"]}
schedule_window = auto
alert.digest_mode = 1
disabled = true
enableSched = 1
counttype = number of events
relation = greater than
quantity = 0
realtime_schedule = 0
is_visible = false
search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Web.Web where web.url=*logoimagehandler.ashx*codes* OR Web.url=*logoimagehandler.ashx*clazz* OR Web.url=*logoimagehandler.ashx*method* OR Web.url=*logoimagehandler.ashx*args* by Web.src Web.dest Web.url Web.vendor_product Web.user Web.http_user_agent _time span=1s | `supernova_webshell_filter`
[ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule]
action.escu = 0
action.escu.enabled = 1
@@ -8052,6 +8354,39 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
is_visible = false
search = `stream_http` | eval cs_content_type_length = len(cs_content_type) | where cs_content_type_length > 100 | table endtime src_ip dest_ip cs_content_type_length cs_content_type url | `unusually_long_content_type_length_filter`
[ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Rule]
action.escu = 0
action.escu.enabled = 1
description = This search looks for the creation of WMI permanent event subscriptions.
action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]}
action.escu.data_models = []
action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for the creation of WMI permanent event subscriptions.
action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting the Windows WMI activity logs. This can be done by adding a stanza to inputs.conf on the system generating logs with a title of [WinEventLog://Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity/Operational].
action.escu.known_false_positives = Although unlikely, administrators may use event subscriptions for legitimate purposes.
action.escu.creation_date = 2018-10-23
action.escu.modification_date = 2018-10-23
action.escu.confidence = high
action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Rule
action.escu.search_type = detection
action.escu.providing_technologies = []
action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious WMI Use"]
cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Rule
action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytics_story": ["Suspicious WMI Use"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]}
schedule_window = auto
alert.digest_mode = 1
disabled = true
enableSched = 1
counttype = number of events
relation = greater than
quantity = 0
realtime_schedule = 0
is_visible = false
search = `wmi` EventCode=5861 Binding | rex field=Message "Consumer =\s+(?<consumer>[^;|^$]+)" | search consumer!="NTEventLogEventConsumer=\"SCM Event Log Consumer\"" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by ComputerName, consumer, Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename ComputerName as dest | `wmi_permanent_event_subscription_filter`
[ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon - Rule]
action.escu = 0
action.escu.enabled = 1
@@ -8085,6 +8420,39 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
is_visible = false
search = `sysmon` EventCode=21 | rename host as dest | table _time, dest, user, Operation, EventType, Query, Consumer, Filter | `wmi_permanent_event_subscription___sysmon_filter`
[ESCU - WMI Temporary Event Subscription - Rule]
action.escu = 0
action.escu.enabled = 1
description = This search looks for the creation of WMI temporary event subscriptions.
action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]}
action.escu.data_models = []
action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for the creation of WMI temporary event subscriptions.
action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting the Windows WMI activity logs. This can be done by adding a stanza to inputs.conf on the system generating logs with a title of [WinEventLog://Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity/Operational].
action.escu.known_false_positives = Some software may create WMI temporary event subscriptions for various purposes. The included search contains an exception for two of these that occur by default on Windows 10 systems. You may need to modify the search to create exceptions for other legitimate events.
action.escu.creation_date = 2018-10-23
action.escu.modification_date = 2018-10-23
action.escu.confidence = high
action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - WMI Temporary Event Subscription - Rule
action.escu.search_type = detection
action.escu.providing_technologies = []
action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious WMI Use"]
cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - WMI Temporary Event Subscription - Rule
action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytics_story": ["Suspicious WMI Use"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]}
schedule_window = auto
alert.digest_mode = 1
disabled = true
enableSched = 1
counttype = number of events
relation = greater than
quantity = 0
realtime_schedule = 0
is_visible = false
search = `wmi` EventCode=5860 Temporary | rex field=Message "NotificationQuery =\s+(?<query>[^;|^$]+)" | search query!="SELECT * FROM Win32_ProcessStartTrace WHERE ProcessName = 'wsmprovhost.exe'" AND query!="SELECT * FROM __InstanceOperationEvent WHERE TargetInstance ISA 'AntiVirusProduct' OR TargetInstance ISA 'FirewallProduct' OR TargetInstance ISA 'AntiSpywareProduct'" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by ComputerName, query | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wmi_temporary_event_subscription_filter`
[ESCU - Web Fraud - Account Harvesting - Rule]
action.escu = 0
action.escu.enabled = 1
package/default/transforms.conf
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
#############
# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security-content
# On Date: 2020-12-18T01:01:56 UTC
# On Date: 2021-01-13T13:05:35 UTC
# Author: Splunk Security Research
# Contact: research@splunk.com
#############
package/default/use_case_library.conf
+201 -91
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
#############
# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security-content
# On Date: 2020-12-18T01:01:56 UTC
# On Date: 2021-01-13T13:05:35 UTC
# Author: Splunk Security Research
# Contact: research@splunk.com
#############
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-cloudtrail-now-tracks-cross-account-activity-to-its-origin/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - aws detect sts assume role abuse - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect role creation - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect sts get session token abuse - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect attach to role policy - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect permanent key creation - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId"]
searches = ["ESCU - aws detect sts assume role abuse - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect attach to role policy - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect sts get session token abuse - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect permanent key creation - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect role creation - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
description = Track when a user assumes an IAM role in another AWS account to obtain cross-account access to services and resources in that account. Accessing new roles could be an indication of malicious activity.
narrative = Amazon Web Services (AWS) admins manage access to AWS resources and services across the enterprise using AWS's Identity and Access Management (IAM) functionality. IAM provides the ability to create and manage AWS users, groups, and roles-each with their own unique set of privileges and defined access to specific resources (such as EC2 instances, the AWS Management Console, API, or the command-line interface). Unlike conventional (human) users, IAM roles are assumable by anyone in the organization. They provide users with dynamically created temporary security credentials that expire within a set time period.\
Herein lies the rub. In between the time between when the temporary credentials are issued and when they expire is a period of opportunity, where a user could leverage the temporary credentials to wreak havoc-spin up or remove instances, create new users, elevate privileges, and other malicious activities-throughout the environment.\
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name"]
searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId"]
description = Monitor your AWS EC2 instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or EC2 instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior.
narrative = Cryptomining is an intentionally difficult, resource-intensive business. Its complexity was designed into the process to ensure that the number of blocks mined each day would remain steady. So, it's par for the course that ambitious, but unscrupulous, miners make amassing the computing power of large enterprises--a practice known as cryptojacking--a top priority. \
Cryptojacking has attracted an increasing amount of media attention since its explosion in popularity in the fall of 2017. The attacks have moved from in-browser exploits and mobile phones to enterprise cloud services, such as Amazon Web Services (AWS). It's difficult to determine exactly how widespread the practice has become, since bad actors continually evolve their ability to escape detection, including employing unlisted endpoints, moderating their CPU usage, and hiding the mining pool's IP address behind a free CDN. \
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ version = 2
references = ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonVPC/latest/UserGuide/VPC_Appendix_NACLs.html", "https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/how-to-help-prepare-for-ddos-attacks-by-reducing-your-attack-surface/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address"]
searches = ["ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address"]
description = Monitor your AWS network infrastructure for bad configurations and malicious activity. Investigative searches help you probe deeper, when the facts warrant it.
narrative = AWS CloudTrail is an AWS service that helps you enable governance, compliance, and operational/risk auditing of your AWS account. Actions taken by a user, role, or an AWS service are recorded as events in CloudTrail. It is crucial for a company to monitor events and actions taken in the AWS Management Console, AWS Command Line Interface, and AWS SDKs and APIs to ensure that your servers are not vulnerable to attacks. This analytic story contains detection searches that leverage CloudTrail logs from AWS to check for bad configurations and malicious activity in your AWS network access controls.
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://aws.amazon.com/security-hub/features/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for User - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details"]
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for User - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId"]
description = This story is focused around detecting Security Hub alerts generated from AWS
narrative = AWS Security Hub collects and consolidates findings from AWS security services enabled in your environment, such as intrusion detection findings from Amazon GuardDuty, vulnerability scans from Amazon Inspector, S3 bucket policy findings from Amazon Macie, publicly accessible and cross-account resources from IAM Access Analyzer, and resources lacking WAF coverage from AWS Firewall Manager.
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From City", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Region", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Country", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address"]
searches = ["ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Region", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From City", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Country", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address"]
description = Monitor your AWS provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your network.
narrative = Because most enterprise AWS activities originate from familiar geographic locations, monitoring for activity from unknown or unusual regions is an important security measure. This indicator can be especially useful in environments where it is impossible to whitelist specific IPs (because they vary).\
This Analytic Story was designed to provide you with flexibility in the precision you employ in specifying legitimate geographic regions. It can be as specific as an IP address or a city, or as broad as a region (think state) or an entire country. By determining how precise you want your geographical locations to be and monitoring for new locations that haven't previously accessed your environment, you can detect adversaries as they begin to probe your environment. Since there are legitimate reasons for activities from unfamiliar locations, this is not a standalone indicator. Nevertheless, location can be a relevant piece of information that you may wish to investigate further.
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://redlock.io/blog/cryptojacking-tesla"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in Security Group Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new API calls from user roles - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS API Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect API activity from users without MFA - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field"]
searches = ["ESCU - Detect new API calls from user roles - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Security Group Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS API Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Detect API activity from users without MFA - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field"]
description = Detect and investigate dormant user accounts for your AWS environment that have become active again. Because inactive and ad-hoc accounts are common attack targets, it's critical to enable governance within your environment.
narrative = It seems obvious that it is critical to monitor and control the users who have access to your cloud infrastructure. Nevertheless, it's all too common for enterprises to lose track of ad-hoc accounts, leaving their servers vulnerable to attack. In fact, this was the very oversight that led to Tesla's cryptojacking attack in February, 2018.\
In addition to compromising the security of your data, when bad actors leverage your compute resources, it can incur monumental costs, since you will be billed for any new EC2 instances and increased bandwidth usage. \
@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://www.zerofox.com/blog/what-is-digital-risk-monitoring/", "https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/consumer/family-safety/what-is-typosquatting/", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2016/06/explained-typosquatting/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Email Info", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender"]
searches = ["ESCU - Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Email Info", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender"]
description = Detect and investigate activity that may indicate that an adversary is using faux domains to mislead users into interacting with malicious infrastructure. Monitor DNS, email, and web traffic for permutations of your brand name.
narrative = While you can educate your users and customers about the risks and threats posed by typosquatting, phishing, and corporate espionage, human error is a persistent fact of life. Of course, your adversaries are all too aware of this reality and will happily leverage it for nefarious purposes whenever possible&#51;phishing with lookalike addresses, embedding faux command-and-control domains in malware, and hosting malicious content on domains that closely mimic your corporate servers. This is where brand monitoring comes in.\
You can use our adaptation of `DNSTwist`, together with the support searches in this Analytic Story, to generate permutations of specified brands and external domains. Splunk can monitor email, DNS requests, and web traffic for these permutations and provide you with early warnings and situational awareness--powerful elements of an effective defense.\
@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name"]
searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId"]
description = Monitor your cloud compute instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or compute instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior.
narrative = Cryptomining is an intentionally difficult, resource-intensive business. Its complexity was designed into the process to ensure that the number of blocks mined each day would remain steady. So, it's par for the course that ambitious, but unscrupulous, miners make amassing the computing power of large enterprises--a practice known as cryptojacking--a top priority. \
Cryptojacking has attracted an increasing amount of media attention since its explosion in popularity in the fall of 2017. The attacks have moved from in-browser exploits and mobile phones to enterprise cloud services, such as Amazon Web Services (AWS), Google Cloud Platform (GCP), and Azure. It's difficult to determine exactly how widespread the practice has become, since bad actors continually evolve their ability to escape detection, including employing unlisted endpoints, moderating their CPU usage, and hiding the mining pool's IP address behind a free CDN. \
@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://www.intego.com/mac-security-blog/osxcoldroot-and-the-rat-invasion/", "https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x2A.html", "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/coldroot-rat-still-undetectable-despite-being-uploaded-on-github-two-years-ago/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Jose Hernandez"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip"]
searches = ["ESCU - Processes Tapping Keyboard Events - Rule", "ESCU - Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that relate to the ColdRoot Remote Access Trojan that affects MacOS. An example of some of these activities are changing sensative binaries in the MacOS sub-system, detecting process names and executables associated with the RAT, detecting when a keyboard tab is installed on a MacOS machine and more.
narrative = Conventional wisdom holds that Apple's MacOS operating system is significantly less vulnerable to attack than Windows machines. While that point is debatable, it is true that attacks against MacOS systems are much less common. However, this fact does not mean that Macs are impervious to breaches. To the contrary, research has shown that that Mac malware is increasing at an alarming rate. According to AV-test, in 2018, there were 86,865 new MacOS malware variants, up from 27,338 the year before&#151;a 31% increase. In contrast, the independent research firm found that new Windows malware had increased from 65.17M to 76.86M during that same period, less than half the rate of growth. The bottom line is that while the numbers look a lot smaller than Windows, it's definitely time to take Mac security more seriously.\
This Analytic Story addresses the ColdRoot remote access trojan (RAT), which was uploaded to Github in 2016, but was still escaping detection by the first quarter of 2018, when a new, more feature-rich variant was discovered masquerading as an Apple audio driver. Among other capabilities, the Pascal-based ColdRoot can heist passwords from users' keychains and remotely control infected machines without detection. In the initial report of his findings, Patrick Wardle, Chief Research Officer for Digita Security, explained that the new ColdRoot RAT could start and kill processes on the breached system, spawn new remote-desktop sessions, take screen captures and assemble them into a live stream of the victim's desktop, and more.\
@@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Collection", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1074"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin - Rule", "ESCU - Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious writes to System Volume Information - Rule", "ESCU - Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts - Rule", "ESCU - Email files written outside of the Outlook directory - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info"]
searches = ["ESCU - Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious writes to System Volume Information - Rule", "ESCU - Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin - Rule", "ESCU - Email files written outside of the Outlook directory - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info"]
description = Monitor for and investigate activities--such as suspicious writes to the Windows Recycling Bin or email servers sending high amounts of traffic to specific hosts, for example--that may indicate that an adversary is harvesting and exfiltrating sensitive data.
narrative = A common adversary goal is to identify and exfiltrate data of value from a target organization. This data may include email conversations and addresses, confidential company information, links to network design/infrastructure, important dates, and so on.\
Attacks are composed of three activities: identification, collection, and staging data for exfiltration. Identification typically involves scanning systems and observing user activity. Collection can involve the transfer of large amounts of data from various repositories. Staging/preparation includes moving data to a central location and compressing (and optionally encoding and/or encrypting) it. All of these activities provide opportunities for defenders to identify their presence. \
@@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Command_and_Control", "https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/feature/Command-and-control-servers-The-puppet-masters-that-govern-malware"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address"]
searches = ["ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address"]
description = Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures leveraged by attackers to establish and operate command and control channels. Implants installed by attackers on compromised endpoints use these channels to receive instructions and send data back to the malicious operators.
narrative = Threat actors typically architect and implement an infrastructure to use in various ways during the course of their attack campaigns. In some cases, they leverage this infrastructure for scanning and performing reconnaissance activities. In others, they may use this infrastructure to launch actual attacks. One of the most important functions of this infrastructure is to establish servers that will communicate with implants on compromised endpoints. These servers establish a command and control channel that is used to proxy data between the compromised endpoint and the attacker. These channels relay commands from the attacker to the compromised endpoint and the output of those commands back to the attacker.\
Because this communication is so critical for an adversary, they often use techniques designed to hide the true nature of the communications. There are many different techniques used to establish and communicate over these channels. This Analytic Story provides searches that look for a variety of the techniques used for these channels, as well as indications that these channels are active, by examining logs associated with border control devices and network-access control lists.
@@ -189,7 +189,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://github.com/kgretzky/evilginx2", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1192/", "https://breakdev.org/evilginx-advanced-phishing-with-two-factor-authentication-bypass/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Splunk Research Team"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Detect DNS requests to Phishing Sites leveraging EvilGinx2 - Rule", "ESCU - Get Certificate logs for a domain", "ESCU - Domain Certificate Investigation"]
searches = ["ESCU - Detect DNS requests to Phishing Sites leveraging EvilGinx2 - Rule", "ESCU - Domain Certificate Investigation", "ESCU - Get Certificate logs for a domain"]
description = Detect DNS and web requests to fake websites generated by the EvilGinx2 toolkit. These websites are designed to fool unwitting users who have clicked on a malicious link in a phishing email.
narrative = As most people know, these emails use fraudulent domains, [email scraping](https://www.cyberscoop.com/emotet-trojan-phishing-scraping-templates-cofense-geodo/), familiar contact names inserted as senders, and other tactics to lure targets into clicking a malicious link, opening an attachment with a [nefarious payload](https://www.cyberscoop.com/emotet-trojan-phishing-scraping-templates-cofense-geodo/), or entering sensitive personal information that perpetrators may intercept. This attack technique requires a relatively low level of skill and allows adversaries to easily cast a wide net. Because phishing is a technique that relies on human psychology, you will never be able to eliminate this vulnerability 100%. But you can use automated detection to significantly reduce the risks.\
This Analytic Story focuses on detecting signs of MiTM attacks enabled by [EvilGinx2](https://github.com/kgretzky/evilginx2), a toolkit that sets up a transparent proxy between the targeted site and the user. In this way, the attacker is able to intercept credentials and two-factor identification tokens. It employs a proxy template to allow a registered domain to impersonate targeted sites, such as Linkedin, Amazon, Okta, Github, Twitter, Instagram, Reddit, Office 365, and others. It can even register SSL certificates and camouflage them via a URL shortener, making them difficult to detect. Searches in this story look for signs of MiTM attacks enabled by EvilGinx2.
@@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ version = 3
references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1003", "https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for.html"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell - Rule", "ESCU - Create Remote Thread into LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts", "ESCU - Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations", "ESCU - Investigate Previous Unseen User", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts"]
searches = ["ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Create Remote Thread into LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts", "ESCU - Investigate Previous Unseen User", "ESCU - Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts"]
description = Uncover activity consistent with credential dumping, a technique wherein attackers compromise systems and attempt to obtain and exfiltrate passwords. The threat actors use these pilfered credentials to further escalate privileges and spread throughout a target environment. The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify attempts to credential dumping.
narrative = Credential dumping&#151;gathering credentials from a target system, often hashed or encrypted&#151;is a common attack technique. Even though the credentials may not be in plain text, an attacker can still exfiltrate the data and set to cracking it offline, on their own systems. The threat actors target a variety of sources to extract them, including the Security Accounts Manager (SAM), Local Security Authority (LSA), NTDS from Domain Controllers, or the Group Policy Preference (GPP) files.\
Once attackers obtain valid credentials, they use them to move throughout a target network with ease, discovering new systems and identifying assets of interest. Credentials obtained in this manner typically include those of privileged users, which may provide access to more sensitive information and system operations.\
@@ -225,7 +225,7 @@ version = 2
references = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Single Letter Process On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Create local admin accounts using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process File Activity", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Process Info"]
searches = ["ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Create local admin accounts using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Single Letter Process On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Process File Activity", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity"]
description = Monitor for suspicious activities associated with DHS Technical Alert US-CERT TA18-074A. Some of the activities that adversaries used in these compromises included spearfishing attacks, malware, watering-hole domains, many and more.
narrative = The frequency of nation-state cyber attacks has increased significantly over the last decade. Employing numerous tactics and techniques, these attacks continue to escalate in complexity. \
There is a wide range of motivations for these state-sponsored hacks, including stealing valuable corporate, military, or diplomatic data&#1151;all of which could confer advantages in various arenas. They may also target critical infrastructure. \
@@ -251,7 +251,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/", "http://www.noip.com/blog/2014/07/11/dynamic-dns-can-use-2/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/08/04/detecting-dynamic-dns-domains-in-splunk.html"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - DNS record changed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Hijack Enrichment", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host"]
searches = ["ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS record changed - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Hijack Enrichment", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host"]
description = Secure your environment against DNS hijacks with searches that help you detect and investigate unauthorized changes to DNS records.
narrative = Dubbed the Achilles heel of the Internet (see https://www.f5.com/labs/articles/threat-intelligence/dns-is-still-the-achilles-heel-of-the-internet-25613), DNS plays a critical role in routing web traffic but is notoriously vulnerable to attack. One reason is its distributed nature. It relies on unstructured connections between millions of clients and servers over inherently insecure protocols.\
The gravity and extent of the importance of securing DNS from attacks is undeniable. The fallout of compromised DNS can be disastrous. Not only can hackers bring down an entire business, they can intercept confidential information, emails, and login credentials, as well. \
@@ -281,7 +281,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/data-protection/", "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/dns/splunk-detect-dns-tunneling-37022", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect USB device insertion - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Process Info"]
searches = ["ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect USB device insertion - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
description = Fortify your data-protection arsenal--while continuing to ensure data confidentiality and integrity--with searches that monitor for and help you investigate possible signs of data exfiltration.
narrative = Attackers can leverage a variety of resources to compromise or exfiltrate enterprise data. Common exfiltration techniques include remote-access channels via low-risk, high-payoff active-collections operations and close-access operations using insiders and removable media. While this Analytic Story is not a comprehensive listing of all the methods by which attackers can exfiltrate data, it provides a useful starting point.
@@ -292,7 +292,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1003", "https://github.com/SecuraBV/CVE-2020-1472", "https://www.secura.com/blog/zero-logon", "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-1472"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Jose Hernandez, Stan Miskowicz, David Dorsey, Shannon Davis Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Computer Changed with Anonymous Account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Zerologon via Zeek - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Computer Changed with Anonymous Account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Zerologon via Zeek - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
description = Uncover activity related to the execution of Zerologon CVE-2020-11472, a technique wherein attackers target a Microsoft Windows Domain Controller to reset its computer account password. The result from this attack is attackers can now provide themselves high privileges and take over Domain Controller. The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify attempts to reset Domain Controller Computer Account via exploit code remotely or via the use of tool Mimikatz as payload carrier.
narrative = This attack is a privilege escalation technique, where attacker targets a Netlogon secure channel connection to a domain controller, using Netlogon Remote Protocol (MS-NRPC). This vulnerability exposes vulnerable Windows Domain Controllers to be targeted via unaunthenticated RPC calls which eventually reset Domain Contoller computer account ($) providing the attacker the opportunity to exfil domain controller credential secrets and assign themselve high privileges that can lead to domain controller and potentially complete network takeover. The detection searches in this Analytic Story use Windows Event viewer events and Sysmon events to detect attack execution, these searches monitor access to the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process which is an indicator of the use of Mimikatz tool which has bee updated to carry this attack payload.
@@ -303,7 +303,7 @@ version = 2
references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1089", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2015/11/vonteera-adware-uses-certificates-to-disable-anti-malware/", "https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Tools-Report.pdf"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule", "ESCU - Unload Sysmon Filter Driver - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info"]
searches = ["ESCU - Unload Sysmon Filter Driver - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info"]
description = Looks for activities and techniques associated with the disabling of security tools on a Windows system, such as suspicious `reg.exe` processes, processes launching netsh, and many others.
narrative = Attackers employ a variety of tactics in order to avoid detection and operate without barriers. This often involves modifying the configuration of security tools to get around them or explicitly disabling them to prevent them from running. This Analytic Story includes searches that look for activity consistent with attackers attempting to disable various security mechanisms. Such activity may involve monitoring for suspicious registry activity, as this is where much of the configuration for Windows and various other programs reside, or explicitly attempting to shut down security-related services. Other times, attackers attempt various tricks to prevent specific programs from running, such as adding the certificates with which the security tools are signed to a blacklist (which would prevent them from running).
@@ -314,7 +314,7 @@ version = 2
references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/", "http://www.noip.com/blog/2014/07/11/dynamic-dns-can-use-2/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/08/04/detecting-dynamic-dns-domains-in-splunk.html"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host"]
searches = ["ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
description = Detect and investigate hosts in your environment that may be communicating with dynamic domain providers. Attackers may leverage these services to help them avoid firewall blocks and blacklists.
narrative = Dynamic DNS services (DDNS) are legitimate low-cost or free services that allow users to rapidly update domain resolutions to IP infrastructure. While their usage can be benign, malicious actors can abuse DDNS to host harmful payloads or interactive-command-and-control infrastructure. These attackers will manually update or automate domain resolution changes by routing dynamic domains to IP addresses that circumvent firewall blocks and blacklists and frustrate a network defender's analytic and investigative processes. These searches will look for DNS queries made from within your infrastructure to suspicious dynamic domains and then investigate more deeply, when appropriate. While this list of top-level dynamic domains is not exhaustive, it can be dynamically updated as new suspicious dynamic domains are identified.
@@ -325,7 +325,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-201A", "https://www.first.org/resources/papers/conf2017/Advanced-Incident-Detection-and-Threat-Hunting-using-Sysmon-and-Splunk.pdf", "https://www.vkremez.com/2017/05/emotet-banking-trojan-malware-analysis.html"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources", "ESCU - Get Process Info"]
searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of tools built by NirSoft - Rule", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity"]
description = Detect rarely used executables, specific registry paths that may confer malware survivability and persistence, instances where cmd.exe is used to launch script interpreters, and other indicators that the Emotet financial malware has compromised your environment.
narrative = The trojan downloader known as Emotet first surfaced in 2014, when it was discovered targeting the banking industry to steal credentials. However, according to a joint technical alert (TA) issued by three government agencies (https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-201A), Emotet has evolved far beyond those beginnings to become what a ThreatPost article called a threat-delivery service(see https://threatpost.com/emotet-malware-evolves-beyond-banking-to-threat-delivery-service/134342/). For example, in early 2018, Emotet was found to be using its loader function to spread the Quakbot and Ransomware variants. \
According to the TA, the the malware continues to be among the most costly and destructive malware affecting the private and public sectors. Researchers have linked it to the threat group Mealybug, which has also been on the security communitys radar since 2014.\
@@ -349,7 +349,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/understanding-service-accounts"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - GCP Detect gcploit framework - Rule", "ESCU - gcp detect oauth token abuse - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Detect high risk permissions by resource and account - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Detect accounts with high risk roles by project - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
searches = ["ESCU - gcp detect oauth token abuse - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Detect high risk permissions by resource and account - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Detect gcploit framework - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Detect accounts with high risk roles by project - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
description = Track when a user assumes an IAM role in another GCP account to obtain cross-account access to services and resources in that account. Accessing new roles could be an indication of malicious activity.
narrative = Google Cloud Platform (GCP) admins manage access to GCP resources and services across the enterprise using GCP Identity and Access Management (IAM) functionality. IAM provides the ability to create and manage GCP users, groups, and roles-each with their own unique set of privileges and defined access to specific resources (such as Compute instances, the GCP Management Console, API, or the command-line interface). Unlike conventional (human) users, IAM roles are potentially assumable by anyone in the organization. They provide users with dynamically created temporary security credentials that expire within a set time period.\
In between the time between when the temporary credentials are issued and when they expire is a period of opportunity, where a user could leverage the temporary credentials to wreak havoc-spin up or remove instances, create new users, elevate privileges, and other malicious activities-throughout the environment.\
@@ -362,7 +362,7 @@ version = 2
references = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/HIDDEN-COBRA-North-Korean-Malicious-Cyber-Activity", "https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Destructive-Malware-Report.pdf"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious File Write - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Outbound Emails to Hidden Cobra Threat Actors", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources", "ESCU - Get Process Info"]
searches = ["ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious File Write - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Outbound Emails to Hidden Cobra Threat Actors"]
description = Monitor for and investigate activities, including the creation or deletion of hidden shares and file writes, that may be evidence of infiltration by North Korean government-sponsored cybercriminals. Details of this activity were reported in DHS Report TA-18-149A.
narrative = North Korea's government-sponsored "cyber army" has been slowly building momentum and gaining sophistication over the last 15 years or so. As a result, the group's activity, which the US government refers to as "Hidden Cobra," has surreptitiously crept onto the collective radar as a preeminent global threat.\
These state-sponsored actors are thought to be responsible for everything from a hack on a South Korean nuclear plant to an attack on Sony in anticipation of its release of the movie "The Interview" at the end of 2014. They're also notorious for cyberespionage. In recent years, the group seems to be focused on financial crimes, such as cryptojacking.\
@@ -376,7 +376,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2016/09/hosts-file-hijacks/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Windows hosts file modification - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host"]
searches = ["ESCU - Windows hosts file modification - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host"]
description = Detect evidence of tactics used to redirect traffic from a host to a destination other than the one intended--potentially one that is part of an adversary's attack infrastructure. An example is redirecting communications regarding patches and updates or misleading users into visiting a malicious website.
narrative = Attackers will often attempt to manipulate client communications for nefarious purposes. In some cases, an attacker may endeavor to modify a local host file to redirect communications with resources (such as antivirus or system-update services) to prevent clients from receiving patches or updates. In other cases, an attacker might use this tactic to have the client connect to a site that looks like the intended site, but instead installs malware or collects information from the victim. Additionally, an attacker may redirect a victim in order to execute a MITM attack and observe communications.
@@ -412,7 +412,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://github.com/splunk/cloud-datamodel-security-research"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip"]
searches = ["ESCU - Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip"]
description = This story addresses detection against Kubernetes cluster fingerprint scan and attack by providing information on items such as source ip, user agent, cluster names.
narrative = Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration platform contains sensitve information and management priviledges of production workloads, microservices and applications. These searches allow operator to detect suspicious unauthenticated requests from the internet to kubernetes cluster.
@@ -423,7 +423,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/approaching-kubernetes-security-detecting-kubernetes-scan-with-splunk.html"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
searches = ["ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
description = This story addresses detection and response of accounts acccesing Kubernetes cluster sensitive objects such as configmaps or secrets providing information on items such as user user, group. object, namespace and authorization reason.
narrative = Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration platform contains sensitive objects within its architecture, specifically configmaps and secrets, if accessed by an attacker can lead to further compromise. These searches allow operator to detect suspicious requests against Kubernetes sensitive objects.
@@ -434,7 +434,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/approaching-kubernetes-security-detecting-kubernetes-scan-with-splunk.html"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect RBAC authorizations by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect most active service accounts by pod namespace - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
searches = ["ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect most active service accounts by pod namespace - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect RBAC authorizations by account - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
description = This story addresses detection and response around Sensitive Role usage within a Kubernetes clusters against cluster resources and namespaces.
narrative = Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration platform contains sensitive roles within its architecture, specifically configmaps and secrets, if accessed by an attacker can lead to further compromise. These searches allow operator to detect suspicious requests against Kubernetes role activities
@@ -445,7 +445,7 @@ version = 2
references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/executive-perspective/2015/08/malware_lateral_move.html"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks - Rule", "ESCU - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources", "ESCU - Get Process Info"]
searches = ["ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks - Rule", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity"]
description = Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures around how attackers move laterally within the enterprise. Because lateral movement can expose the adversary to detection, it should be an important focus for security analysts.
narrative = Once attackers gain a foothold within an enterprise, they will seek to expand their accesses and leverage techniques that facilitate lateral movement. Attackers will often spend quite a bit of time and effort moving laterally. Because lateral movement renders an attacker the most vulnerable to detection, it's an excellent focus for detection and investigation.\
Indications of lateral movement can include the abuse of system utilities (such as `psexec.exe`), unauthorized use of remote desktop services, `file/admin$` shares, WMI, PowerShell, pass-the-hash, or the abuse of scheduled tasks. Organizations must be extra vigilant in detecting lateral movement techniques and look for suspicious activity in and around high-value strategic network assets, such as Active Directory, which are often considered the primary target or "crown jewels" to a persistent threat actor.\
@@ -460,7 +460,7 @@ version = 4
references = ["https://blogs.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/malware-employs-powershell-to-infect-systems/", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Multiple Suspicious Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info"]
searches = ["ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Multiple Suspicious Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info"]
description = Attackers are finding stealthy ways "live off the land," leveraging utilities and tools that come standard on the endpoint--such as PowerShell--to achieve their goals without downloading binary files. These searches can help you detect and investigate PowerShell command-line options that may be indicative of malicious intent.
narrative = The searches in this Analytic Story monitor for parameters often used for malicious purposes. It is helpful to understand how often the notable events generated by this story occur, as well as the commonalities between some of these events. These factors may provide clues about whether this is a common occurrence of minimal concern or a rare event that may require more extensive investigation. Likewise, it is important to determine whether the issue is restricted to a single user/system or is broader in scope.\
The following factors may assist you in determining whether the event is malicious: \
@@ -480,7 +480,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/03/04/tracking-locky-ransomware-using-carbon-black/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Unsuccessful Netbackup backups - Rule", "ESCU - Extended Period Without Successful Netbackup Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - All backup logs for host"]
searches = ["ESCU - Extended Period Without Successful Netbackup Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Unsuccessful Netbackup backups - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - All backup logs for host"]
description = Address common concerns when monitoring your backup processes. These searches can help you reduce risks from ransomware, device theft, or denial of physical access to a host by backing up data on endpoints.
narrative = Having backups is a standard best practice that helps ensure continuity of business operations. Having mature backup processes can also help you reduce the risks of many security-related incidents and streamline your response processes. The detection searches in this Analytic Story will help you identify systems that have backup failures, as well as systems that have not been backed up for an extended period of time. The story will also return the notable event history and all of the backup logs for an endpoint.
@@ -528,7 +528,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://i.blackhat.com/USA-20/Thursday/us-20-Bienstock-My-Cloud-Is-APTs-Cloud-Investigating-And-Defending-Office-365.pdf"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Patrick Bareiss"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - High Number of Login Failures from a single source - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious Rights Delegation - Rule"]
searches = ["ESCU - O365 Suspicious Rights Delegation - Rule", "ESCU - High Number of Login Failures from a single source - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding - Rule"]
description = This story is focused around detecting Office 365 Attacks.
narrative = More and more companies are using Microsofts Office 365 cloud offering. Therefore, we see more and more attacks against Office 365. This story provides various detections for Office 365 attacks.
@@ -539,7 +539,7 @@ version = 2
references = ["https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/orangeworm-targets-healthcare-us-europe-asia", "https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/healthcare-targeted-by-hacker/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info"]
searches = ["ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info"]
description = Detect activities and various techniques associated with the Orangeworm Attack Group, a group that frequently targets the healthcare industry.
narrative = In May of 2018, the attack group Orangeworm was implicated for installing a custom backdoor called Trojan.Kwampirs within large international healthcare corporations in the United States, Europe, and Asia. This malware provides the attackers with remote access to the target system, decrypting and extracting a copy of its main DLL payload from its resource section. Before writing the payload to disk, it inserts a randomly generated string into the middle of the decrypted payload in an attempt to evade hash-based detections.\
Awareness of the Orangeworm group first surfaced in January, 2015. It has conducted targeted attacks against related industries, as well, such as pharmaceuticals and healthcare IT solution providers.\
@@ -554,7 +554,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/spear-phishing-campaign-targets-ukraine-government.html"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Splunk Research Team"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious LNK file launching a process - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info"]
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Oulook exe writing a zip file - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious LNK file launching a process - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info"]
description = Detect signs of malicious payloads that may indicate that your environment has been breached via a phishing attack.
narrative = Despite its simplicity, phishing remains the most pervasive and dangerous cyberthreat. In fact, research shows that as many as [91% of all successful attacks](https://digitalguardian.com/blog/91-percent-cyber-attacks-start-phishing-email-heres-how-protect-against-phishing) are initiated via a phishing email. \
As most people know, these emails use fraudulent domains, [email scraping](https://www.cyberscoop.com/emotet-trojan-phishing-scraping-templates-cofense-geodo/), familiar contact names inserted as senders, and other tactics to lure targets into clicking a malicious link, opening an attachment with a [nefarious payload](https://www.cyberscoop.com/emotet-trojan-phishing-scraping-templates-cofense-geodo/), or entering sensitive personal information that perpetrators may intercept. This attack technique requires a relatively low level of skill and allows adversaries to easily cast a wide net. Worse, because its success relies on the gullibility of humans, it's impossible to completely "automate" it out of your environment. However, you can use ES and ESCU to detect and investigate potentially malicious payloads injected into your environment subsequent to a phishing attack. \
@@ -572,7 +572,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/scope-of-mudcarp-attacks-highlight-1/", "http://blog.amossys.fr/badflick-is-not-so-bad.html"]
maintainers = [{"company": "iDefense", "email": "-", "name": "iDefense Cyber Espionage Team"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info"]
searches = ["ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info"]
description = Monitor your environment for suspicious behaviors that resemble the techniques employed by the MUDCARP threat group.
narrative = This story was created as a joint effort between iDefense and Splunk.\
iDefense analysts have recently discovered a Windows executable file that, upon execution, spoofs a decryption tool and then drops a file that appears to be the custom-built javascript backdoor, "Orz," which is associated with the threat actors known as MUDCARP (as well as "temp.Periscope" and "Leviathan"). The file is executed using Wscript.\
@@ -610,7 +610,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["http://www.novetta.com/2015/02/advanced-methods-to-detect-advanced-cyber-attacks-protocol-abuse/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Process Info"]
searches = ["ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity"]
description = Detect instances of prohibited network traffic allowed in the environment, as well as protocols running on non-standard ports. Both of these types of behaviors typically violate policy and can be leveraged by attackers.
narrative = A traditional security best practice is to control the ports, protocols, and services allowed within your environment. By limiting the services and protocols to those explicitly approved by policy, administrators can minimize the attack surface. The combined effect allows both network defenders and security controls to focus and not be mired in superfluous traffic or data types. Looking for deviations to policy can identify attacker activity that abuses services and protocols to run on alternate or non-standard ports in the attempt to avoid detection or frustrate forensic analysts.
@@ -621,7 +621,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://www.carbonblack.com/2017/06/28/carbon-black-threat-research-technical-analysis-petya-notpetya-ransomware/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2017/06/27/closing-the-detection-to-mitigation-gap-or-to-petya-or-notpetya-whocares-.html"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host"]
searches = ["ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity"]
description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to ransomware--spikes in SMB traffic, suspicious wevtutil usage, the presence of common ransomware extensions, and system processes run from unexpected locations, and many others.
narrative = Ransomware is an ever-present risk to the enterprise, wherein an infected host encrypts business-critical data, holding it hostage until the victim pays the attacker a ransom. There are many types and varieties of ransomware that can affect an enterprise. Attackers can deploy ransomware to enterprises through spearphishing campaigns and driveby downloads, as well as through traditional remote service-based exploitation. In the case of the WannaCry campaign, there was self-propagating wormable functionality that was used to maximize infection. Fortunately, organizations can apply several techniques--such as those in this Analytic Story--to detect and or mitigate the effects of ransomware.
@@ -632,7 +632,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/s3-ransomware-part-1-attack-vector/", "https://github.com/d1vious/git-wild-hunt", "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PgzNib37g0M"]
maintainers = [{"company": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - AWS Detect Users creating keys with encrypt policy without MFA - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Detect Users with KMS keys performing encryption S3 - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
searches = ["ESCU - AWS Detect Users with KMS keys performing encryption S3 - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Detect Users creating keys with encrypt policy without MFA - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to ransomware. These searches include cloud related objects that may be targeted by malicious actors via cloud providers own encryption features.
narrative = Ransomware is an ever-present risk to the enterprise, wherein an infected host encrypts business-critical data, holding it hostage until the victim pays the attacker a ransom. There are many types and varieties of ransomware that can affect an enterprise.Cloud ransomware can be deployed by obtaining high privilege credentials from targeted users or resources.
@@ -643,7 +643,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/executive-perspective/2015/09/the_new_route_toper.html", "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/about/security-center/event-response/synful-knock.html"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Detect New Login Attempts to Routers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Software Download To Network Device - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Port Security Violation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect ARP Poisoning - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rogue DHCP Server - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Traffic Mirroring - Rule", "ESCU - Detect IPv6 Network Infrastructure Threats - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
searches = ["ESCU - Detect ARP Poisoning - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Port Security Violation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rogue DHCP Server - Rule", "ESCU - Detect IPv6 Network Infrastructure Threats - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Login Attempts to Routers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Software Download To Network Device - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Traffic Mirroring - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
description = Validate the security configuration of network infrastructure and verify that only authorized users and systems are accessing critical assets. Core routing and switching infrastructure are common strategic targets for attackers.
narrative = Networking devices, such as routers and switches, are often overlooked as resources that attackers will leverage to subvert an enterprise. Advanced threats actors have shown a proclivity to target these critical assets as a means to siphon and redirect network traffic, flash backdoored operating systems, and implement cryptographic weakened algorithms to more easily decrypt network traffic.\
This Analytic Story helps you gain a better understanding of how your network devices are interacting with your hosts. By compromising your network devices, attackers can obtain direct access to the company's internal infrastructure&#151; effectively increasing the attack surface and accessing private services/data.
@@ -655,7 +655,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/detecting-ryuk-using-splunk-attack-range.html", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/big-game-hunting-with-ryuk-another-lucrative-targeted-ransomware/", "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-302a"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Jose Hernandez"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Ryuk Test Files Detected - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Security Account Manager Stopped - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Windows connhost exe started forcefully - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
searches = ["ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - Ryuk Test Files Detected - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Security Account Manager Stopped - Rule", "ESCU - Windows connhost exe started forcefully - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the Ryuk ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with Ryuk, Stopping Security Access Manager, DisableAntiSpyware registry key modification, suspicious psexec use, and more.
narrative = Cybersecurity Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) released Alert (AA20-302A) on October 28th called “Ransomware Activity Targeting the Healthcare and Public Health Sector.” This alert details TTPs associated with ongoing and possible imminent attacks against the Healthcare sector, and is a joint advisory in coordination with other U.S. Government agencies. The objective of these malicious campaigns is to infiltrate targets in named sectors and to drop ransomware payloads, which will likely cause disruption of service and increase risk of actual harm to the health and safety of patients at hospitals, even with the aggravant of an ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. This document specifically refers to several crimeware exploitation frameworks, emphasizing the use of Ryuk ransomware as payload. The Ryuk ransomware payload is not new. It has been well documented and identified in multiple variants. Payloads need a carrier, and for Ryuk it has often been exploitation frameworks such as Cobalt Strike, or popular crimeware frameworks such as Emotet or Trickbot.
@@ -678,7 +678,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/an-in-depth-analysis-of-samsam-ransomware-and-boss-spider/", "https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2018/07/31/samsam-the-almost-6-million-ransomware/", "https://thehackernews.com/2018/07/samsam-ransomware-attacks.html"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - File with Samsam Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Batch File Write to System32 - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Samsam Test File Write - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint"]
searches = ["ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Batch File Write to System32 - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Samsam Test File Write - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - File with Samsam Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity"]
description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the SamSam ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with SamSam, RDP brute force attacks, the presence of files with SamSam ransomware extensions, suspicious psexec use, and more.
narrative = The first version of the SamSam ransomware (a.k.a. Samas or SamsamCrypt) was launched in 2015 by a group of Iranian threat actors. The malicious software has affected and continues to affect thousands of victims and has raised almost $6M in ransom.\
Although categorized under the heading of ransomware, SamSam campaigns have some importance distinguishing characteristics. Most notable is the fact that conventional ransomware is a numbers game. Perpetrators use a "spray-and-pray" approach with phishing campaigns or other mechanisms, charging a small ransom (typically under $1,000). The goal is to find a large number of victims willing to pay these mini-ransoms, adding up to a lucrative payday. They use relatively simple methods for infecting systems.\
@@ -725,7 +725,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-11409", "https://www.splunk.com/view/SP-CAAAP5E#VulnerabilityDescriptionsandRatings", "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44865/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip"]
searches = ["ESCU - Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
description = Reduce the risk of CVE-2018-11409, an information disclosure vulnerability within some older versions of Splunk Enterprise, with searches designed to help ensure that your Splunk system does not leak information to authenticated users.
narrative = Although there have been no reports of it being exploited, Splunk Enterprise versions through 7.0.1 reportedly have a vulnerability that may expose information through a REST endpoint (read more here: https://www.splunk.com/view/SP-CAAAP5E#VulnerabilityDescriptionsandRatings). NIST has included it in its vulnerability database (read more here: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-11409). The REST endpoint that exposes system information is also necessary for the proper operation of Splunk clustering and instrumentation. Customers should upgrade to the latest version to reduce the risk of this vulnerability.\
Splunk Enterprise exposes partial information about the host operating system, hardware, and Splunk license. Splunk Enterprise before 6.6.0 exposes this information without authentication. Splunk Enterprise 6.6.0 and later exposes this information only to authenticated Splunk users. Based on the information exposure, Splunk characterizes this issue as a low severity impact.\
@@ -739,7 +739,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor.html", "https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Patrick Bareiss"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Sunburst Correlation DLL and Network Event - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AdFind Exe - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule"]
searches = ["ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Sunburst Correlation DLL and Network Event - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Supernova Webshell - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AdFind Exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule"]
description = Sunburst is a trojanized updates to SolarWinds Orion IT monitoring and management software. It was discovered by FireEye in December 2020. The actors behind this campaign gained access to numerous public and private organizations around the world.
narrative = This Analytic Story supports you to detect Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) from the Sunburst malware. The threat actor behind sunburst compromised the SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll, is a SolarWinds digitally-signed component of the Orion software framework that contains a backdoor that communicates via HTTP to third party servers. The detections in this Analytic Story are focusing on the dll loading events, file create events and network events to detect This malware.
@@ -750,7 +750,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name"]
searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId"]
description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS EC2 instances for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as EC2 instances that originate from unusual locations or those launched by previously unseen users (among others). Included investigative searches will help you probe more deeply, when the information warrants it.
narrative = AWS CloudTrail is an AWS service that helps you enable governance, compliance, and risk auditing within your AWS account. Actions taken by a user, role, or an AWS service are recorded as events in CloudTrail. It is crucial for a company to monitor events and actions taken in the AWS Console, AWS command-line interface, and AWS SDKs and APIs to ensure that your EC2 instances are not vulnerable to attacks. This Analytic Story identifies suspicious activities in your AWS EC2 instances and helps you respond and investigate those activities.
@@ -761,7 +761,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integration.html"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new user AWS Console Login - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN"]
searches = ["ESCU - Detect new user AWS Console Login - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN"]
description = Monitor your AWS authentication events using your CloudTrail logs. Searches within this Analytic Story will help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious logins.
narrative = It is important to monitor and control who has access to your AWS infrastructure. Detecting suspicious logins to your AWS infrastructure will provide good starting points for investigations. Abusive behaviors caused by compromised credentials can lead to direct monetary costs, as you will be billed for any EC2 instances created by the attacker.
@@ -772,7 +772,7 @@ version = 2
references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/security-data-protection/cloud/public-aws-s3-buckets-writable/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Open S3 buckets - Rule", "ESCU - Detect S3 access from a new IP - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address"]
searches = ["ESCU - Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI - Rule", "ESCU - Detect S3 access from a new IP - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Open S3 buckets - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion - Rule", "ESCU - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address"]
description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS S3 buckets for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as detecting open S3 buckets and buckets being accessed from a new IP. The contextual and investigative searches will give you more information, when required.
narrative = As cloud computing has exploded, so has the number of creative attacks on virtual environments. And as the number-two cloud-service provider, Amazon Web Services (AWS) has certainly had its share.\
Amazon's "shared responsibility" model dictates that the company has responsibility for the environment outside of the VM and the customer is responsible for the security inside of the S3 container. As such, it's important to stay vigilant for activities that may belie suspicious behavior inside of your environment.\
@@ -785,7 +785,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/hiding-cloudcobalt-strike-beacon-c2-using-amazon-apis/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address"]
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address"]
description = Leverage these searches to monitor your AWS network traffic for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as a spike in blocked outbound traffic in your virtual private cloud (VPC).
narrative = A virtual private cloud (VPC) is an on-demand managed cloud-computing service that isolates computing resources for each client. Inside the VPC container, the environment resembles a physical network. \
Amazon's VPC service enables you to launch EC2 instances and leverage other Amazon resources. The traffic that flows in and out of this VPC can be controlled via network access-control rules and security groups. Amazon also has a feature called VPC Flow Logs that enables you to log IP traffic going to and from the network interfaces in your VPC. This data is stored using Amazon CloudWatch Logs.\
@@ -811,7 +811,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address"]
searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address"]
description = Monitor your cloud infrastructure provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your cloud environment.
narrative = Monitoring your cloud infrastructure logs allows you enable governance, compliance, and risk auditing. It is crucial for a company to monitor events and actions taken in the their cloud environments to ensure that your instances are not vulnerable to attacks. This Analytic Story identifies suspicious activities in your cloud compute instances and helps you respond and investigate those activities.
@@ -822,7 +822,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
searches = ["ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
description = Monitor your cloud infrastructure provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your cloud environment.
narrative = Because most enterprise cloud infrastructure activities originate from familiar geographic locations, monitoring for activity from unknown or unusual regions is an important security measure. This indicator can be especially useful in environments where it is impossible to whitelist specific IPs (because they vary).\
This Analytic Story was designed to provide you with flexibility in the precision you employ in specifying legitimate geographic regions. It can be as specific as an IP address or a city, or as broad as a region (think state) or an entire country. By determining how precise you want your geographical locations to be and monitoring for new locations that haven't previously accessed your environment, you can detect adversaries as they begin to probe your environment. Since there are legitimate reasons for activities from unfamiliar locations, this is not a standalone indicator. Nevertheless, location can be a relevant piece of information that you may wish to investigate further.
@@ -834,7 +834,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://redlock.io/blog/cryptojacking-tesla"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN"]
searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN"]
description = Detect and investigate suspicious activities by users and roles in your cloud environments.
narrative = It seems obvious that it is critical to monitor and control the users who have access to your cloud infrastructure. Nevertheless, it's all too common for enterprises to lose track of ad-hoc accounts, leaving their servers vulnerable to attack. In fact, this was the very oversight that led to Tesla's cryptojacking attack in February, 2018.\
In addition to compromising the security of your data, when bad actors leverage your compute resources, it can incur monumental costs, since you will be billed for any new instances and increased bandwidth usage.
@@ -846,7 +846,7 @@ version = 2
references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1059", "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/macro-malware", "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info"]
searches = ["ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info"]
description = Leveraging the Windows command-line interface (CLI) is one of the most common attack techniques--one that is also detailed in the MITRE ATT&CK framework. Use this Analytic Story to help you identify unusual or suspicious use of the CLI on Windows systems.
narrative = The ability to execute arbitrary commands via the Windows CLI is a primary goal for the adversary. With access to the shell, an attacker can easily run scripts and interact with the target system. Often, attackers may only have limited access to the shell or may obtain access in unusual ways. In addition, malware may execute and interact with the CLI in ways that would be considered unusual and inconsistent with typical user activity. This provides defenders with opportunities to identify suspicious use and investigate, as appropriate. This Analytic Story contains various searches to help identify this suspicious activity, as well as others to aid you in deeper investigation.
@@ -857,7 +857,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["http://blogs.splunk.com/2015/10/01/random-words-on-entropy-and-dns/", "http://www.darkreading.com/analytics/security-monitoring/got-malware-three-signs-revealed-in-dns-traffic/d/d-id/1139680", "https://live.paloaltonetworks.com/t5/Threat-Vulnerability-Articles/What-are-suspicious-DNS-queries/ta-p/71454"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Process Info"]
searches = ["ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
description = Attackers often attempt to hide within or otherwise abuse the domain name system (DNS). You can thwart attempts to manipulate this omnipresent protocol by monitoring for these types of abuses.
narrative = Although DNS is one of the fundamental underlying protocols that make the Internet work, it is often ignored (perhaps because of its complexity and effectiveness). However, attackers have discovered ways to abuse the protocol to meet their objectives. One potential abuse involves manipulating DNS to hijack traffic and redirect it to an IP address under the attacker's control. This could inadvertently send users intending to visit google.com, for example, to an unrelated malicious website. Another technique involves using the DNS protocol for command-and-control activities with the attacker's malicious code or to covertly exfiltrate data. The searches within this Analytic Story look for these types of abuses.
@@ -868,7 +868,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/06/26/phishing-hits-a-new-level-of-quality/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly - Rule", "ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Email Info", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender"]
searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Email Info", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender"]
description = Email remains one of the primary means for attackers to gain an initial foothold within the modern enterprise. Detect and investigate suspicious emails in your environment with the help of the searches in this Analytic Story.
narrative = It is a common practice for attackers of all types to leverage targeted spearphishing campaigns and mass mailers to deliver weaponized email messages and attachments. Fortunately, there are a number of ways to monitor email data in Splunk to detect suspicious content.\
Once a phishing message has been detected, the next steps are to answer the following questions: \
@@ -894,7 +894,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://redcanary.com/blog/windows-registry-attacks-threat-detection/", "https://medium.com/@mbromileyDFIR/malware-monday-aebb456356c5", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1170"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect mshta exe running scripts in command-line arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info"]
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Detect mshta exe running scripts in command-line arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info"]
description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe process to execute malicious code.
narrative = One common adversary tactic is to bypass application white-listing solutions via the mshta.exe process, which executes Microsoft HTML applications with the .hta suffix. In these cases, attackers use the trusted Windows utility to eproxy execution of malicious files, whether an .hta application, javascript, or VBScript.\
One example of a notable mshta.exe attack was the Kovter malware (https://medium.com/@mbromileyDFIR/malware-monday-aebb456356c5) that was implicated in ransomware and click-fraud attacks. Kovter utilized .hta to execute a series of javascript commands, each progressively more dangerous. According to the Mitre Parternship Network (https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1170), FIN7 has leveraged mshta.exe, as has the MuddyWater group, who used it to execute its POWERSTATS payload (which then used the utility to execute additional payloads).\
@@ -907,7 +907,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1078", "https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Credential_stuffing", "https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/answer/What-is-a-password-spraying-attack-and-how-does-it-work"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentails From The Same IP - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Account Lockout Events - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Failed SSO Attempts - Rule", "ESCU - Okta User Logins From Multiple Cities - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate User Activities In Okta", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by app", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address"]
searches = ["ESCU - Okta Failed SSO Attempts - Rule", "ESCU - Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentails From The Same IP - Rule", "ESCU - Okta User Logins From Multiple Cities - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Account Lockout Events - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate User Activities In Okta", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by app"]
description = Monitor your Okta environment for suspicious activities. Due to the Covid outbreak, many users are migrating over to leverage cloud services more and more. Okta is a popular tool to manage multiple users and the web-based applications they need to stay productive. The searches in this story will help monitor your Okta environment for suspicious activities and associated user behaviors.
narrative = Okta is the leading single sign on (SSO) provider, allowing users to authenticate once to Okta, and from there access a variety of web-based applications. These applications are assigned to users and allow administrators to centrally manage which users are allowed to access which applications. It also provides centralized logging to help understand how the applications are used and by whom. \
While SSO is a major convenience for users, it also provides attackers with an opportunity. If the attacker can gain access to Okta, they can access a variety of applications. As such monitoring the environment is important. \
@@ -920,7 +920,7 @@ version = 2
references = ["https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Graeber-Abusing-Windows-Management-Instrumentation-WMI-To-Build-A-Persistent%20Asynchronous-And-Fileless-Backdoor-wp.pdf", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/wmimplant_a_wmi_ba.html"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Script Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - Process Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info"]
searches = ["ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Temporary Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - Process Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - Script Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info"]
description = Attackers are increasingly abusing Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI), a framework and associated utilities available on all modern Windows operating systems. Because WMI can be leveraged to manage both local and remote systems, it is important to identify the processes executed and the user context within which the activity occurred.
narrative = WMI is a Microsoft infrastructure for management data and operations on Windows operating systems. It includes of a set of utilities that can be leveraged to manage both local and remote Windows systems. Attackers are increasingly turning to WMI abuse in their efforts to conduct nefarious tasks, such as reconnaissance, detection of antivirus and virtual machines, code execution, lateral movement, persistence, and data exfiltration. \
The detection searches included in this Analytic Story are used to look for suspicious use of WMI commands that attackers may leverage to interact with remote systems. The searches specifically look for the use of WMI to run processes on remote systems.\
@@ -933,7 +933,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://redcanary.com/blog/windows-registry-attacks-threat-detection/", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1112"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info"]
searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info"]
description = Monitor and detect registry changes initiated from remote locations, which can be a sign that an attacker has infiltrated your system.
narrative = Attackers are developing increasingly sophisticated techniques for hijacking target servers, while evading detection. One such technique that has become progressively more common is registry modification.\
The registry is a key component of the Windows operating system. It has a hierarchical database called "registry" that contains settings, options, and values for executables. Once the threat actor gains access to a machine, they can use reg.exe to modify their account to obtain administrator-level privileges, maintain persistence, and move laterally within the environment.\
@@ -970,7 +970,7 @@ version = 2
references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/08/monitoring-windows-console-activity-part-two.html", "https://www.splunk.com/pdfs/technical-briefs/advanced-threat-detection-and-response-tech-brief.pdf", "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/logging/detecting-security-incidents-windows-workstation-event-logs-34262"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule", "ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info"]
searches = ["ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info"]
description = Quickly identify systems running new or unusual processes in your environment that could be indicators of suspicious activity. Processes run from unusual locations, those with conspicuously long command lines, and rare executables are all examples of activities that may warrant deeper investigation.
narrative = Being able to profile a host's processes within your environment can help you more quickly identify processes that seem out of place when compared to the rest of the population of hosts or asset types.\
This Analytic Story lets you identify processes that are either a) not typically seen running or b) have some sort of suspicious command-line arguments associated with them. This Analytic Story will also help you identify the user running these processes and the associated process activity on the host.\
@@ -994,7 +994,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://www.fbi.gov/scams-and-safety/common-fraud-schemes/internet-fraud", "https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2017-internet-crime-report-released-050718"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Jim Apger"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Web Fraud - Password Sharing Across Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Anomalous User Clickspeed - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Account Harvesting - Rule", "ESCU - Get Web Session Information via session id", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender"]
searches = ["ESCU - Web Fraud - Account Harvesting - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Anomalous User Clickspeed - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Password Sharing Across Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Web Session Information via session id", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender"]
description = Monitor your environment for activity consistent with common attack techniques bad actors use when attempting to compromise web servers or other web-related assets.
narrative = The Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) defines Internet fraud as the use of Internet services or software with Internet access to defraud victims or to otherwise take advantage of them. According to the Bureau, Internet crime schemes are used to steal millions of dollars each year from victims and continue to plague the Internet through various methods. The agency includes phishing scams, data breaches, Denial of Service (DOS) attacks, email account compromise, malware, spoofing, and ransomware in this category.\
These crimes are not the fraud itself, but rather the attack techniques commonly employed by fraudsters in their pursuit of data that enables them to commit malicious actssuch as obtaining and using stolen credit cards. They represent a serious problem that is steadily increasing and not likely to go away anytime soon.\
@@ -1021,7 +1021,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Defense_Evasion"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info"]
searches = ["ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info"]
description = Detect tactics used by malware to evade defenses on Windows endpoints. A few of these include suspicious `reg.exe` processes, files hidden with `attrib.exe` and disabling user-account control, among many others
narrative = Defense evasion is a tactic--identified in the MITRE ATT&CK framework--that adversaries employ in a variety of ways to bypass or defeat defensive security measures. There are many techniques enumerated by the MITRE ATT&CK framework that are applicable in this context. This Analytic Story includes searches designed to identify the use of such techniques on Windows platforms.
@@ -1032,7 +1032,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2013/12/file-extensions-2/", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1042"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Execution of File with Multiple Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info"]
searches = ["ESCU - Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule", "ESCU - Execution of File with Multiple Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info"]
description = Detect and investigate suspected abuse of file extensions and Windows file associations. Some of the malicious behaviors involved may include inserting spaces before file extensions or prepending the file extension with a different one, among other techniques.
narrative = Attackers use a variety of techniques to entice users to run malicious code or to persist on an endpoint. One way to accomplish these goals is to leverage file extensions and the mechanism Windows uses to associate files with specific applications. \
Since its earliest days, Windows has used extensions to identify file types. Users have become familiar with these extensions and their application associations. For example, if users see that a file ends in `.doc` or `.docx`, they will assume that it is a Microsoft Word document and expect that double-clicking will open it using `winword.exe`. The user will typically also presume that the `.docx` file is safe. \
@@ -1047,7 +1047,7 @@ version = 2
references = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/", "https://zeltser.com/security-incident-log-review-checklist/", "http://journeyintoir.blogspot.com/2013/01/re-introducing-usnjrnl.html"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info"]
searches = ["ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info"]
description = Adversaries often try to cover their tracks by manipulating Windows logs. Use these searches to help you monitor for suspicious activity surrounding log files--an essential component of an effective defense.
narrative = Because attackers often modify system logs to cover their tracks and/or to thwart the investigative process, log monitoring is an industry-recognized best practice. While there are legitimate reasons to manipulate system logs, it is still worthwhile to keep track of who manipulated the logs, when they manipulated them, and in what way they manipulated them (determining which accesses, tools, or utilities were employed). Even if no malicious activity is detected, the knowledge of an attempt to manipulate system logs may be indicative of a broader security risk that should be thoroughly investigated.\
The Analytic Story gives users two different ways to detect manipulation of Windows Event Logs and one way to detect deletion of the Update Sequence Number (USN) Change Journal. The story helps determine the history of the host and the users who have accessed it. Finally, the story aides in investigation by retrieving all the information on the process that caused these events (if the process has been identified).
@@ -1059,7 +1059,7 @@ version = 2
references = ["http://www.fuzzysecurity.com/tutorials/19.html", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2010/07/malware-persistence-windows-registry.html", "http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/common-malware-persistence-mechanisms/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/fin7-shim-databases-persistence.html", "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dq2Hv7J9fvk"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info"]
searches = ["ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info"]
description = Monitor for activities and techniques associated with maintaining persistence on a Windows system--a sign that an adversary may have compromised your environment.
narrative = Maintaining persistence is one of the first steps taken by attackers after the initial compromise. Attackers leverage various custom and built-in tools to ensure survivability and persistent access within a compromised enterprise. This Analytic Story provides searches to help you identify various behaviors used by attackers to maintain persistent access to a Windows environment.
@@ -1070,7 +1070,7 @@ version = 2
references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Overwriting Accessibility Binaries - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info"]
searches = ["ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Overwriting Accessibility Binaries - Rule", "ESCU - Child Processes of Spoolsv exe - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info"]
description = Monitor for and investigate activities that may be associated with a Windows privilege-escalation attack, including unusual processes running on endpoints, modified registry keys, and more.
narrative = Privilege escalation is a "land-and-expand" technique, wherein an adversary gains an initial foothold on a host and then exploits its weaknesses to increase his privileges. The motivation is simple: certain actions on a Windows machine--such as installing software--may require higher-level privileges than those the attacker initially acquired. By increasing his privilege level, the attacker can gain the control required to carry out his malicious ends. This Analytic Story provides searches to detect and investigate behaviors that attackers may use to elevate their privileges in your environment.
@@ -1081,7 +1081,7 @@ version = 3
references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1050", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1031"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info"]
searches = ["ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info"]
description = Windows services are often used by attackers for persistence and the ability to load drivers or otherwise interact with the Windows kernel. This Analytic Story helps you monitor your environment for indications that Windows services are being modified or created in a suspicious manner.
narrative = The Windows operating system uses a services architecture to allow for running code in the background, similar to a UNIX daemon. Attackers will often leverage Windows services for persistence, hiding in plain sight, seeking the ability to run privileged code that can interact with the kernel. In many cases, attackers will create a new service to host their malicious code. Attackers have also been observed modifying unnecessary or unused services to point to their own code, as opposed to what was intended. In these cases, attackers often use tools to create or modify services in ways that are not typical for most environments, providing opportunities for detection.
@@ -1093,7 +1093,7 @@ narrative = The Windows operating system uses a services architecture to allow f
type = detection
asset_type = AWS Instance
confidence = medium
explanation = This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen cities. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with "Run" or "Create."
explanation = This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen cities. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with "Run" or "Create." This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.
how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources" support search once to create a history of previously seen locations that have provisioned AWS resources.
annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]}
known_false_positives = This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define "false positive" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no "false positives" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\
@@ -1104,7 +1104,7 @@ providing_technologies = []
type = detection
asset_type = AWS Instance
confidence = medium
explanation = This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen countries. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with "Run" or "Create."
explanation = This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen countries. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with "Run" or "Create." This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.
how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources" support search once to create a history of previously seen locations that have provisioned AWS resources.
annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]}
known_false_positives = This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define "false positive" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching over plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no "false positives" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\
@@ -1115,7 +1115,7 @@ providing_technologies = []
type = detection
asset_type = AWS Instance
confidence = medium
explanation = This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen IP addresses. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with "Run" or "Create."
explanation = This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen IP addresses. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with "Run" or "Create." This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.
how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources" support search once to create a history of previously seen locations that have provisioned AWS resources.
annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]}
known_false_positives = This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define "false positive" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no "false positives" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\
@@ -1126,7 +1126,7 @@ providing_technologies = []
type = detection
asset_type = AWS Instance
confidence = medium
explanation = This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen regions. Region in this context is similar to a state in the United States. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with "Run" or "Create."
explanation = This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen regions. Region in this context is similar to a state in the United States. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with "Run" or "Create." This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.
how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources" support search once to create a history of previously seen locations that have provisioned AWS resources.
annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]}
known_false_positives = This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define "false positive" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no "false positives" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\
@@ -1137,7 +1137,7 @@ providing_technologies = []
type = detection
asset_type = AWS Instance
confidence = medium
explanation = This search looks for AssumeRole events where an IAM role in a different account is requested for the first time.
explanation = This search looks for AssumeRole events where an IAM role in a different account is requested for the first time. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Authentication Datamodel.
how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Initial` to build the initial table of source IP address, geographic locations, and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account_filter` macro.
annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["PR.AC", "PR.DS", "DE.AE"]}
known_false_positives = Using multiple AWS accounts and roles is perfectly valid behavior. It's suspicious when an account requests privileges of an account it hasn't before. You should validate with the account owner that this is a legitimate request.
@@ -1147,10 +1147,10 @@ providing_technologies = []
type = detection
asset_type = AWS Account
confidence = medium
explanation = This search provides detection of accounts creating KMS with encrypt policy and without using MFA.
explanation = This search provides detection of KMS keys which action kms:Encrypt is accessible for everyone (also outside of your organization). This is an identicator that your account is compromised and the attacker uses the encryption key to compromise another company.
how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudtrail logs
annotations = {"mitre_attack": ["T1486"]}
known_false_positives = Not all KMS key creations are malicious. Particulary look for kms:Encrypt only policy. It is very unusual to create a key to encrypt only and not to decrypt.
known_false_positives = unknown
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Detect Users with KMS keys performing encryption S3 - Rule]
@@ -1160,7 +1160,7 @@ confidence = medium
explanation = This search provides detection of users with KMS keys performing encryption specifically against S3 buckets.
how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudtrail logs
annotations = {"mitre_attack": ["T1486"]}
known_false_positives = Not all operations with KMS keys are malicious. It is very unusual to create a key to encrypt only and not to decrypt. This search compliments the creation of KMS keys with encrypt policy.
known_false_positives = bucket with S3 encryption
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster sensitive object access - Rule]
@@ -1179,7 +1179,7 @@ asset_type = AWS Instance
confidence = medium
explanation = The search looks for CloudTrail events to detect if any network ACLs were created with all the ports open to a specified CIDR.
how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS, version 4.4.0 or later, and configure your CloudTrail inputs.
annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]}
annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.007"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]}
known_false_positives = It's possible that an admin has created this ACL with all ports open for some legitimate purpose however, this should be scoped and not allowed in production environment.
providing_technologies = []
@@ -1189,7 +1189,7 @@ asset_type = AWS Instance
confidence = medium
explanation = Enforcing network-access controls is one of the defensive mechanisms used by cloud administrators to restrict access to a cloud instance. After the attacker has gained control of the AWS console by compromising an admin account, they can delete a network ACL and gain access to the instance from anywhere. This search will query the CloudTrail logs to detect users deleting network ACLs.
how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.
annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]}
annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.007"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]}
known_false_positives = It's possible that a user has legitimately deleted a network ACL.
providing_technologies = []
@@ -1197,7 +1197,7 @@ providing_technologies = []
type = detection
asset_type = AWS Instance
confidence = medium
explanation = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user successfully launches an abnormally high number of instances.
explanation = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user successfully launches an abnormally high number of instances. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel
how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. The threshold value should be tuned to your environment.
annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]}
known_false_positives = Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a human user.
@@ -1207,7 +1207,7 @@ providing_technologies = []
type = detection
asset_type = AWS Instance
confidence = medium
explanation = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user successfully launches an abnormally high number of instances.
explanation = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user successfully launches an abnormally high number of instances. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.
how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. The threshold value should be tuned to your environment.
annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]}
known_false_positives = Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a human user.
@@ -1217,7 +1217,7 @@ providing_technologies = []
type = detection
asset_type = AWS Instance
confidence = medium
explanation = This search looks for CloudTrail events where an abnormally high number of instances were successfully terminated by a user in a 10-minute window
explanation = This search looks for CloudTrail events where an abnormally high number of instances were successfully terminated by a user in a 10-minute window. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.
how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.
annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]}
known_false_positives = Many service accounts configured with your AWS infrastructure are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter out service accounts from the output. Always verify whether this search alerted on a human user.
@@ -1227,7 +1227,7 @@ providing_technologies = []
type = detection
asset_type = AWS Instance
confidence = medium
explanation = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user successfully terminates an abnormally high number of instances.
explanation = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user successfully terminates an abnormally high number of instances. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.
how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. The threshold value should be tuned to your environment.
annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]}
known_false_positives = Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a human user.
@@ -1353,6 +1353,16 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_att
known_false_positives = It is possible for this search to generate a notable event for a batch file write to a path that includes the string "system32", but is not the actual Windows system directory. As such, you should confirm the path of the batch file identified by the search. In addition, a false positive may be generated by an administrator copying a legitimate batch file in this directory tree. You should confirm that the activity is legitimate and modify the search to add exclusions, as necessary.
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - Child Processes of Spoolsv exe - Rule]
type = detection
asset_type = Endpoint
confidence = medium
explanation = This search looks for child processes of spoolsv.exe. This activity is associated with a POC privilege-escalation exploit associated with CVE-2018-8440. Spoolsv.exe is the process associated with the Print Spooler service in Windows and typically runs as SYSTEM.
how_to_implement = You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. Update the `children_of_spoolsv_filter` macro to filter out legitimate child processes spawned by spoolsv.exe.
annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068"], "nist": ["PR.AC", "PR.PT", "DE.CM"]}
known_false_positives = Some legitimate printer-related processes may show up as children of spoolsv.exe. You should confirm that any activity as legitimate and may be added as exclusions in the search.
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule]
type = detection
asset_type = Endpoint
@@ -1429,7 +1439,7 @@ providing_technologies = []
type = detection
asset_type = Instance
confidence = medium
explanation = Enforcing network-access controls is one of the defensive mechanisms used by cloud administrators to restrict access to a cloud instance. After the attacker has gained control of the console by compromising an admin account, they can delete a network ACL and gain access to the instance from anywhere. This search will query the Change datamodel to detect users deleting network ACLs.
explanation = Enforcing network-access controls is one of the defensive mechanisms used by cloud administrators to restrict access to a cloud instance. After the attacker has gained control of the console by compromising an admin account, they can delete a network ACL and gain access to the instance from anywhere. This search will query the Change datamodel to detect users deleting network ACLs. Deprecated because it's a duplicate
how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted_filter` macro.
annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]}
known_false_positives = It's possible that a user has legitimately deleted a network ACL.
@@ -1663,7 +1673,7 @@ providing_technologies = []
type = detection
asset_type = AWS Instance
confidence = medium
explanation = This search looks for successful CloudTrail activity by user accounts that are not listed in the identity table or `aws_service_accounts.csv`. It returns event names and count, as well as the first and last time a specific user or service is detected, grouped by users.
explanation = This search looks for successful CloudTrail activity by user accounts that are not listed in the identity table or `aws_service_accounts.csv`. It returns event names and count, as well as the first and last time a specific user or service is detected, grouped by users. Deprecated because managing this list can be quite hard.
how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. You must also populate the `identity_lookup_expanded` lookup shipped with the Asset and Identity framework to be able to look up users in your identity table in Enterprise Security (ES). Leverage the support search called "Create a list of approved AWS service accounts": run it once every 30 days to create and validate a list of service accounts.\
This search produces fields (`eventName`,`firstTime`,`lastTime`) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\n1. **Label:** AWS Event Name, **Field:** eventName\
1. \
@@ -1883,22 +1893,42 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that a GCP admin has legitimately created a public bucket for a specific purpose. That said, GCP strongly advises against granting full control to the "allUsers" group.
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI - Rule]
type = detection
asset_type = S3 Bucket
confidence = medium
explanation = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user has created an open/public S3 bucket over the aws cli.
how_to_implement = none
annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1530"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]}
known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created a public bucket for a specific purpose. That said, AWS strongly advises against granting full control to the "All Users" group.
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect New Open S3 buckets - Rule]
type = detection
asset_type = S3 Bucket
confidence = medium
explanation = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user has created an open/public S3 bucket.
how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), and then configure your CloudTrail inputs. The threshold value should be tuned to your environment.
how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk.
annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1530"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]}
known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created a public bucket for a specific purpose. That said, AWS strongly advises against granting full control to the "All Users" group.
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Oulook exe writing a zip file - Rule]
type = detection
asset_type = Endpoint
confidence = medium
explanation = This search looks for execution of process `outlook.exe` where the process is writing a `.zip` file to the disk.
how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records filesystem and process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response products, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon.
annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]}
known_false_positives = It is not uncommon for outlook to write legitimate zip files to the disk.
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule]
type = detection
asset_type = Endpoint
confidence = medium
explanation = This search looks for outbound SMB connections made by hosts within your network to the Internet. SMB traffic is used for Windows file-sharing activity. One of the techniques often used by attackers involves retrieving the credential hash using an SMB request made to a compromised server controlled by the threat actor.
how_to_implement = In order to run this search effectively, we highly recommend that you leverage the Assets and Identity framework. It is important that you have good understanding of how your network segments are designed, and be able to distinguish internal from external address space. Add a category named `internal` to the CIDRs that host the company's assets in `assets_by_cidr.csv` lookup file, which is located in `$SPLUNK_HOME/etc/apps/SA-IdentityManagement/lookups/`. More information on updating this lookup can be found here: https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.0.0/Admin/Addassetandidentitydata. This search also requires you to be ingesting your network traffic and populating the Network_Traffic data model
how_to_implement = In order to run this search effectively, we highly recommend that you leverage the Assets and Identity framework. It is important that you have good understanding of how your network segments are designed, and be able to distinguish internal from external address space. Add a category named `internal` to the CIDRs that host the companys assets in `assets_by_cidr.csv` lookup file, which is located in `$SPLUNK_HOME/etc/apps/SA-IdentityManagement/lookups/`. More information on updating this lookup can be found here: https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.0.0/Admin/Addassetandidentitydata. This search also requires you to be ingesting your network traffic and populating the Network_Traffic data model
annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1071.002"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
known_false_positives = It is likely that the outbound Server Message Block (SMB) traffic is legitimate, if the company's internal networks are not well-defined in the Assets and Identity Framework. Categorize the internal CIDR blocks as `internal` in the lookup file to avoid creating notable events for traffic destined to those CIDR blocks. Any other network connection that is going out to the Internet should be investigated and blocked. Best practices suggest preventing external communications of all SMB versions and related protocols at the network boundary.
providing_technologies = []
@@ -1997,7 +2027,7 @@ providing_technologies = []
type = detection
asset_type = AWS Instance
confidence = medium
explanation = This search will detect users creating spikes of API activity in your AWS environment. It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest data.
explanation = This search will detect users creating spikes of API activity in your AWS environment. It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest data. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.
how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. You can modify `dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold` to better fit your environment. The `dataPointThreshold` variable is the minimum number of data points required to have a statistically significant amount of data to determine. The `deviationThreshold` variable is the number of standard deviations away from the mean that the value must be to be considered a spike.\
This search produces fields (`eventName`,`numberOfApiCalls`,`uniqueApisCalled`) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\n1. **Label:** AWS Event Name, **Field:** eventName\
1. \
@@ -2033,7 +2063,7 @@ providing_technologies = []
type = detection
asset_type = AWS Instance
confidence = medium
explanation = This search will detect users creating spikes in API activity related to network access-control lists (ACLs)in your AWS environment.
explanation = This search will detect users creating spikes in API activity related to network access-control lists (ACLs)in your AWS environment. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.
how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. You can modify `dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold` to better fit your environment. The `dataPointThreshold` variable is the minimum number of data points required to have a statistically significant amount of data to determine. The `deviationThreshold` variable is the number of standard deviations away from the mean that the value must be to be considered a spike. This search works best when you run the "Baseline of Network ACL Activity by ARN" support search once to create a lookup file of previously seen Network ACL Activity. To add or remove API event names related to network ACLs, edit the macro `network_acl_events`.
annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.007"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"]}
known_false_positives = The false-positive rate may vary based on the values of`dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold`. Please modify this according the your environment.
@@ -2053,7 +2083,7 @@ providing_technologies = []
type = detection
asset_type = AWS Instance
confidence = medium
explanation = This search will detect users creating spikes in API activity related to security groups in your AWS environment. It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest data.
explanation = This search will detect users creating spikes in API activity related to security groups in your AWS environment. It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest data. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.
how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. You can modify `dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold` to better fit your environment. The `dataPointThreshold` variable is the minimum number of data points required to have a statistically significant amount of data to determine. The `deviationThreshold` variable is the number of standard deviations away from the mean that the value must be to be considered a spike.This search works best when you run the "Baseline of Security Group Activity by ARN" support search once to create a history of previously seen Security Group Activity. To add or remove API event names for security groups, edit the macro `security_group_api_calls`.
annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"]}
known_false_positives = Based on the values of`dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold`, the false positive rate may vary. Please modify this according the your environment.
@@ -2237,6 +2267,16 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control",
known_false_positives = It's possible that normal DNS traffic will exhibit this behavior. If an alert is generated, please investigate and validate as appropriate. The threshold can also be modified to better suit your environment.
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - Detection of tools built by NirSoft - Rule]
type = detection
asset_type = Endpoint
confidence = medium
explanation = This search looks for specific command-line arguments that may indicate the execution of tools made by Nirsoft, which are legitimate, but may be abused by attackers.
how_to_implement = You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model.
annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1072"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]}
known_false_positives = While legitimate, these NirSoft tools are prone to abuse. You should verfiy that the tool was used for a legitimate purpose.
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule]
type = detection
asset_type = Endpoint
@@ -2261,7 +2301,7 @@ providing_technologies = []
type = detection
asset_type = AWS Instance
confidence = medium
explanation = This search looks for EC2 instances being modified by users who have not previously modified them.
explanation = This search looks for EC2 instances being modified by users who have not previously modified them. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.
how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User" support search once to create a history of previously seen ARNs. To add or remove APIs that modify an EC2 instance, edit the macro `ec2_modification_api_calls`.
annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]}
known_false_positives = It's possible that a new user will start to modify EC2 instances when they haven't before for any number of reasons. Verify with the user that is modifying instances that this is the intended behavior.
@@ -2272,7 +2312,7 @@ type = detection
asset_type = AWS Instance
confidence = medium
explanation = This search looks for CloudTrail events where an instance is started in a particular region in the last one hour and then compares it to a lookup file of previously seen regions where an instance was started
how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. Run the "Previously seen AWS Regions" support search only once to create of baseline of previously seen regions.
how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. Run the "Previously seen AWS Regions" support search only once to create of baseline of previously seen regions. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.
annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]}
known_false_positives = It's possible that a user has unknowingly started an instance in a new region. Please verify that this activity is legitimate.
providing_technologies = []
@@ -2281,7 +2321,7 @@ providing_technologies = []
type = detection
asset_type = AWS Instance
confidence = medium
explanation = This search looks for EC2 instances being created with previously unseen AMIs.
explanation = This search looks for EC2 instances being created with previously unseen AMIs. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.
how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen EC2 AMIs" support search once to create a history of previously seen AMIs.
annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]}
known_false_positives = After a new AMI is created, the first systems created with that AMI will cause this alert to fire. Verify that the AMI being used was created by a legitimate user.
@@ -2291,7 +2331,7 @@ providing_technologies = []
type = detection
asset_type = AWS Instance
confidence = medium
explanation = This search looks for EC2 instances being created with previously unseen instance types.
explanation = This search looks for EC2 instances being created with previously unseen instance types. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.
how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen EC2 Instance Types" support search once to create a history of previously seen instance types.
annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]}
known_false_positives = It is possible that an admin will create a new system using a new instance type never used before. Verify with the creator that they intended to create the system with the new instance type.
@@ -2301,7 +2341,7 @@ providing_technologies = []
type = detection
asset_type = AWS Instance
confidence = medium
explanation = This search looks for EC2 instances being created by users who have not created them before.
explanation = This search looks for EC2 instances being created by users who have not created them before. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.
how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User" support search once to create a history of previously seen ARNs.
annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]}
known_false_positives = It's possible that a user will start to create EC2 instances when they haven't before for any number of reasons. Verify with the user that is launching instances that this is the intended behavior.
@@ -2729,6 +2769,16 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 11", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on
known_false_positives = Legitimate ANY requests may trigger this search, however it is unusual to see a large volume of them under typical circumstances. You may modify the threshold in the search to better suit your environment.
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - MacOS - Re-opened Applications - Rule]
type = detection
asset_type = Endpoint
confidence = medium
explanation = This search looks for processes referencing the plist files that determine which applications are re-opened when a user reboots their machine.
how_to_implement = In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest process data from your osquery deployed agents with the [splunk.conf](https://github.com/splunk/TA-osquery/blob/master/config/splunk.conf) pack enabled. Also the [TA-OSquery](https://github.com/splunk/TA-osquery) must be deployed across your indexers and universal forwarders in order to have the data populate the Endpoint data model.
annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Command and Control"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM"]}
known_false_positives = At this stage, there are no known false positives. During testing, no process events refering the com.apple.loginwindow.plist files were observed during normal operation of re-opening applications on reboot. Therefore, it can be asumed that any occurences of this in the process events would be worth investigating. In the event that the legitimate modification by the system of these files is in fact logged to the process log, then the process_name of that process can be whitelisted.
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule]
type = detection
asset_type = Endpoint
@@ -2949,6 +2999,16 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Ob
known_false_positives = Although unlikely, administrators may use wmi to execute commands for legitimate purposes.
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - Processes Tapping Keyboard Events - Rule]
type = detection
asset_type = Endpoint
confidence = medium
explanation = This search looks for processes in an MacOS system that is tapping keyboard events in MacOS, and essentially monitoring all keystrokes made by a user. This is a common technique used by RATs to log keystrokes from a victim, although it can also be used by legitimate processes like Siri to react on human input
how_to_implement = In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest data from your osquery deployed agents with the [osx-attacks.conf](https://github.com/facebook/osquery/blob/experimental/packs/osx-attacks.conf#L599) pack enabled. Also the [TA-OSquery](https://github.com/d1vious/TA-osquery) must be deployed across your indexers and universal forwarders in order to have the osquery data populate the Alerts data model.
annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 4", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "nist": ["DE.DP"]}
known_false_positives = There might be some false positives as keyboard event taps are used by processes like Siri and Zoom video chat, for some good examples of processes to exclude please see [this](https://github.com/facebook/osquery/pull/5345#issuecomment-454639161) comment.
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - Processes created by netsh - Rule]
type = detection
asset_type = Endpoint
@@ -3079,6 +3139,16 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 9", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Act
known_false_positives = Remote Desktop may be used legitimately by users on the network.
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule]
type = detection
asset_type = Endpoint
confidence = medium
explanation = This search looks for the remote desktop process mstsc.exe running on systems upon which it doesn't typically run. This is accomplished by filtering out all systems that are noted in the `common_rdp_source category` in the Assets and Identity framework.
how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the processes node. The search requires you to identify systems that do not commonly use remote desktop. You can use the included support search "Identify Systems Using Remote Desktop" to identify these systems. After identifying them, you will need to add the "common_rdp_source" category to that system using the Enterprise Security Assets and Identities framework. This can be done by adding an entry in the assets.csv file located in `SA-IdentityManagement/lookups`.
annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 9", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]}
known_false_positives = Remote Desktop may be used legitimately by users on the network.
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule]
type = detection
asset_type = Endpoint
@@ -3282,6 +3352,16 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 4"], "nist": ["ID.RA", "RS.MI", "PR.IP", "DE.CM"]}
known_false_positives = It is possible that your vulnerability scanner is not detecting that the patches have been applied.
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule]
type = detection
asset_type = Endpoint
confidence = medium
explanation = The search looks for a sharp increase in the number of files written to a particular host
how_to_implement = In order to implement this search, you must populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection and response products, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the file system.
annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
known_false_positives = It is important to understand that if you happen to install any new applications on your hosts or are copying a large number of files, you can expect to see a large increase of file modifications.
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure - Rule]
type = detection
asset_type = Splunk Server
@@ -3297,11 +3377,21 @@ type = detection
asset_type = Windows
confidence = medium
explanation = The malware sunburst will load the malicious dll by SolarWinds.BusinessLayerHost.exe. After a period of 12-14 days, the malware will attempt to resolve a subdomain of avsvmcloud.com. This detections will correlate both events.
how_to_implement = This detection relies on sysmon logs with the Event ID 6, Driver loaded. Please tune your sysmon config that you DriverLoad event for SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll is captured by Sysmon. Additionally, you need sysmon logs for Event ID 22, DNS Query. We suggest to run this detection at least once a day over the last 14 days.
how_to_implement = This detection relies on sysmon logs with the Event ID 7, Driver loaded. Please tune your sysmon config that you DriverLoad event for SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll is captured by Sysmon. Additionally, you need sysmon logs for Event ID 22, DNS Query. We suggest to run this detection at least once a day over the last 14 days.
annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1203"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
known_false_positives = unknown
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - Supernova Webshell - Rule]
type = detection
asset_type =
confidence = medium
explanation = This search aims to detect the Supernova webshell used in the SUNBURST attack.
how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be monitoring web traffic to your Solarwinds Orion. The logs should be ingested into splunk and populating/mapped to the Web data model.
annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 4", "CIS 13", "CIS 18"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack": ["T1505.003"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "ID.RA", "PR.PT", "PR.IP", "DE.CM"]}
known_false_positives = There might be false positives associted with this detection since items like args as a web argument is pretty generic.
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule]
type = detection
asset_type = Endpoint
@@ -3514,6 +3604,16 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 4", "CIS 18", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phas
known_false_positives = Very few legitimate Content-Type fields will have a length greater than 100 characters.
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Rule]
type = detection
asset_type = Endpoint
confidence = medium
explanation = This search looks for the creation of WMI permanent event subscriptions.
how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting the Windows WMI activity logs. This can be done by adding a stanza to inputs.conf on the system generating logs with a title of [WinEventLog://Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity/Operational].
annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]}
known_false_positives = Although unlikely, administrators may use event subscriptions for legitimate purposes.
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon - Rule]
type = detection
asset_type = Endpoint
@@ -3524,6 +3624,16 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Ob
known_false_positives = Although unlikely, administrators may use event subscriptions for legitimate purposes.
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - WMI Temporary Event Subscription - Rule]
type = detection
asset_type = Endpoint
confidence = medium
explanation = This search looks for the creation of WMI temporary event subscriptions.
how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting the Windows WMI activity logs. This can be done by adding a stanza to inputs.conf on the system generating logs with a title of [WinEventLog://Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity/Operational].
annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]}
known_false_positives = Some software may create WMI temporary event subscriptions for various purposes. The included search contains an exception for two of these that occur by default on Windows 10 systems. You may need to modify the search to create exceptions for other legitimate events.
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - Web Fraud - Account Harvesting - Rule]
type = detection
asset_type = Account
package/lookups/mitre_enrichment.csv
+207 -110
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,102 @@
mitre_id,technique,tactics,groups
T1205.001,Port Knocking,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Command And Control,no
T1059.008,Network Device CLI,Execution,no
T1602.002,Network Device Configuration Dump,Collection,no
T1542.005,TFTP Boot,Defense Evasion|Persistence,no
T1542.004,ROMMONkit,Defense Evasion|Persistence,no
T1602.001,SNMP (MIB Dump),Collection,no
T1602,Data from Configuration Repository,Collection,no
T1601.002,Downgrade System Image,Defense Evasion,no
T1601.001,Patch System Image,Defense Evasion,no
T1601,Modify System Image,Defense Evasion,no
T1600.002,Disable Crypto Hardware,Defense Evasion,no
T1600.001,Reduce Key Space,Defense Evasion,no
T1600,Weaken Encryption,Defense Evasion,no
T1556.004,Network Device Authentication,Credential Access|Defense Evasion,no
T1599.001,Network Address Translation Traversal,Defense Evasion,no
T1599,Network Boundary Bridging,Defense Evasion,no
T1020.001,Traffic Duplication,Exfiltration,no
T1557.002,ARP Cache Poisoning,Credential Access|Collection,Cleaver
T1588.006,Vulnerabilities,Resource Development,no
T1053.006,Systemd Timers,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
T1562.008,Disable Cloud Logs,Defense Evasion,no
T1547.012,Print Processors,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
T1598.003,Spearphishing Link,Reconnaissance,no
T1598.002,Spearphishing Attachment,Reconnaissance,no
T1598.001,Spearphishing Service,Reconnaissance,no
T1598,Phishing for Information,Reconnaissance,no
T1597.002,Purchase Technical Data,Reconnaissance,no
T1597.001,Threat Intel Vendors,Reconnaissance,no
T1597,Search Closed Sources,Reconnaissance,no
T1596.005,Scan Databases,Reconnaissance,no
T1596.004,CDNs,Reconnaissance,no
T1596.003,Digital Certificates,Reconnaissance,no
T1596.001,DNS/Passive DNS,Reconnaissance,no
T1596.002,WHOIS,Reconnaissance,no
T1596,Search Open Technical Databases,Reconnaissance,no
T1595.002,Vulnerability Scanning,Reconnaissance,no
T1595.001,Scanning IP Blocks,Reconnaissance,no
T1595,Active Scanning,Reconnaissance,no
T1594,Search Victim-Owned Websites,Reconnaissance,no
T1593.002,Search Engines,Reconnaissance,no
T1593.001,Social Media,Reconnaissance,no
T1593,Search Open Websites/Domains,Reconnaissance,no
T1592.004,Client Configurations,Reconnaissance,no
T1592.003,Firmware,Reconnaissance,no
T1592.002,Software,Reconnaissance,no
T1592.001,Hardware,Reconnaissance,no
T1592,Gather Victim Host Information,Reconnaissance,no
T1591.004,Identify Roles,Reconnaissance,no
T1591.003,Identify Business Tempo,Reconnaissance,no
T1591.001,Determine Physical Locations,Reconnaissance,no
T1591.002,Business Relationships,Reconnaissance,no
T1591,Gather Victim Org Information,Reconnaissance,no
T1590.006,Network Security Appliances,Reconnaissance,no
T1590.005,IP Addresses,Reconnaissance,no
T1590.004,Network Topology,Reconnaissance,no
T1590.003,Network Trust Dependencies,Reconnaissance,no
T1590.002,DNS,Reconnaissance,no
T1590.001,Domain Properties,Reconnaissance,no
T1590,Gather Victim Network Information,Reconnaissance,no
T1589.003,Employee Names,Reconnaissance,no
T1589.002,Email Addresses,Reconnaissance,no
T1589.001,Credentials,Reconnaissance,no
T1589,Gather Victim Identity Information,Reconnaissance,no
T1588.005,Exploits,Resource Development,no
T1588.004,Digital Certificates,Resource Development,no
T1588.003,Code Signing Certificates,Resource Development,Wizard Spider
T1588.002,Tool,Resource Development,no
T1588.001,Malware,Resource Development,Turla|APT1
T1588,Obtain Capabilities,Resource Development,no
T1587.004,Exploits,Resource Development,no
T1587.003,Digital Certificates,Resource Development,APT29|PROMETHIUM
T1587.002,Code Signing Certificates,Resource Development,PROMETHIUM|Patchwork
T1587.001,Malware,Resource Development,Turla|FIN7|Night Dragon|Cleaver
T1587,Develop Capabilities,Resource Development,no
T1586.002,Email Accounts,Resource Development,no
T1586.001,Social Media Accounts,Resource Development,no
T1586,Compromise Accounts,Resource Development,no
T1585.002,Email Accounts,Resource Development,APT1
T1585.001,Social Media Accounts,Resource Development,Cleaver
T1585,Establish Accounts,Resource Development,APT17
T1584.006,Web Services,Resource Development,Turla
T1584.005,Botnet,Resource Development,no
T1584.004,Server,Resource Development,Turla|APT16
T1584.003,Virtual Private Server,Resource Development,Turla
T1584.002,DNS Server,Resource Development,no
T1584.001,Domains,Resource Development,APT1
T1583.006,Web Services,Resource Development,APT17|APT29
T1583.005,Botnet,Resource Development,no
T1583.004,Server,Resource Development,no
T1583.003,Virtual Private Server,Resource Development,TEMP.Veles
T1583.002,DNS Server,Resource Development,no
T1584,Compromise Infrastructure,Resource Development,no
T1583.001,Domains,Resource Development,APT1|APT28
T1583,Acquire Infrastructure,Resource Development,no
T1564.007,VBA Stomping,Defense Evasion,no
T1558.004,AS-REP Roasting,Credential Access,no
T1580,Cloud Infrastructure Discovery,Discovery,no
T1218.012,Verclsid,Defense Evasion,no
T1205.001,Port Knocking,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Command And Control,PROMETHIUM
T1564.006,Run Virtual Instance,Defense Evasion,no
T1564.005,Hidden File System,Defense Evasion,Strider|Equation
T1556.003,Pluggable Authentication Modules,Credential Access|Defense Evasion,no
@@ -7,7 +104,7 @@ T1574.012,COR_PROFILER,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,Blue Moc
T1562.007,Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall,Defense Evasion,no
T1098.004,SSH Authorized Keys,Persistence,no
T1480.001,Environmental Keying,Defense Evasion,APT41|Equation
T1059.007,JavaScript/JScript,Execution,APT32|FIN7|Cobalt Group|Molerats|TA505|Silence|Leafminer
T1059.007,JavaScript/JScript,Execution,FIN6|APT32|FIN7|Cobalt Group|Molerats|TA505|Silence|Leafminer
T1578.004,Revert Cloud Instance,Defense Evasion,no
T1578.003,Delete Cloud Instance,Defense Evasion,no
T1578.001,Create Snapshot,Defense Evasion,no
@@ -24,13 +121,13 @@ T1546.015,Component Object Model Hijacking,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,APT2
T1071.004,DNS,Command And Control,APT39|Tropic Trooper|OilRig|Ke3chang|Cobalt Group|APT18|APT41|FIN7
T1071.003,Mail Protocols,Command And Control,APT32|SilverTerrier|APT28
T1071.002,File Transfer Protocols,Command And Control,APT41|SilverTerrier|Machete|Honeybee
T1071.001,Web Protocols,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|TA505|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Inception|APT41|SilverTerrier|Machete|APT28|WIRTE|APT33|FIN4|Night Dragon|APT18|APT38|Cobalt Group|APT19|Threat Group-3390|Rancor|Orangeworm|APT37|Ke3chang|Dark Caracal|Turla|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|OilRig|Magic Hound|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon
T1071.001,Web Protocols,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|TA505|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Inception|APT41|SilverTerrier|Machete|APT28|WIRTE|APT33|FIN4|Night Dragon|APT18|APT38|Threat Group-3390|Cobalt Group|APT37|Turla|APT19|Rancor|Orangeworm|Dark Caracal|Ke3chang|Lazarus Group|APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|OilRig|Magic Hound|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon
T1572,Protocol Tunneling,Command And Control,OilRig|Cobalt Group|FIN6
T1048.003,Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol,Exfiltration,APT32|APT33|Thrip|FIN8|OilRig|Lazarus Group
T1048.003,Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol,Exfiltration,Wizard Spider|FIN6|APT32|APT33|Thrip|FIN8|OilRig|Lazarus Group
T1048.002,Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol,Exfiltration,no
T1048.001,Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol,Exfiltration,no
T1001.003,Protocol Impersonation,Command And Control,Lazarus Group
T1001.002,Steganography,Command And Control,Axiom
T1001.002,Steganography,Command And Control,APT29|Axiom
T1001.001,Junk Data,Command And Control,APT28
T1132.002,Non-Standard Encoding,Command And Control,no
T1132.001,Standard Encoding,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|APT33|APT19|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork
@@ -39,20 +136,20 @@ T1090.003,Multi-hop Proxy,Command And Control,Inception|FIN4|APT29
T1090.002,External Proxy,Command And Control,APT39|Silence|Soft Cell|MuddyWater|APT3|FIN5|Lazarus Group|menuPass|APT28
T1090.001,Internal Proxy,Command And Control,APT39|Strider
T1102.003,One-Way Communication,Command And Control,Leviathan
T1102.002,Bidirectional Communication,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|APT39|APT12|Turla|FIN7|APT37|Magic Hound|Carbanak
T1102.002,Bidirectional Communication,Command And Control,APT29|Sandworm Team|APT39|APT12|Turla|FIN7|APT37|Magic Hound|Carbanak
T1102.001,Dead Drop Resolver,Command And Control,Rocke|APT41|BRONZE BUTLER|RTM|Patchwork
T1571,Non-Standard Port,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|Rocke|DarkVishnya|Silence|APT-C-36|Magic Hound|APT33|APT32|TEMP.Veles|Lazarus Group|FIN7
T1074.002,Remote Data Staging,Collection,Threat Group-3390|menuPass|FIN6|Night Dragon|FIN8
T1074.001,Local Data Staging,Collection,Machete|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|Patchwork|Dragonfly 2.0|Honeybee|Leviathan|APT3|FIN5|menuPass|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28
T1074.001,Local Data Staging,Collection,Machete|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|Patchwork|Honeybee|Dragonfly 2.0|Leviathan|FIN5|APT3|menuPass|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28
T1078.004,Cloud Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,APT33
T1564.004,NTFS File Attributes,Defense Evasion,APT32
T1564.003,Hidden Window,Defense Evasion,Gorgon Group|Deep Panda|DarkHydrus|CopyKittens|APT19|APT32|APT28|APT3|Magic Hound
T1078.003,Local Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,Tropic Trooper|FIN10|Stolen Pencil|APT32
T1078.002,Domain Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,TA505|APT3|Threat Group-1314
T1078.003,Local Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,PROMETHIUM|Tropic Trooper|FIN10|Stolen Pencil|APT32
T1078.002,Domain Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,Wizard Spider|APT29|TA505|APT3|Threat Group-1314
T1078.001,Default Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,no
T1564.002,Hidden Users,Defense Evasion,no
T1574.006,LD_PRELOAD,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,Rocke
T1574.002,DLL Side-Loading,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,BRONZE BUTLER|Naikon|APT41|Soft Cell|Tropic Trooper|Patchwork|APT19|APT32|APT3|menuPass|Threat Group-3390
T1574.002,DLL Side-Loading,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,BRONZE BUTLER|Naikon|APT41|Soft Cell|Tropic Trooper|APT19|Patchwork|APT32|APT3|menuPass|Threat Group-3390
T1574.001,DLL Search Order Hijacking,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,Whitefly|RTM|Threat Group-3390|menuPass
T1574.008,Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
T1574.007,Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
@@ -64,14 +161,14 @@ T1574,Hijack Execution Flow,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
T1069.001,Local Groups,Discovery,Turla|OilRig|admin@338
T1570,Lateral Tool Transfer,Lateral Movement,APT32|Wizard Spider|Turla|FIN10
T1568.003,DNS Calculation,Command And Control,APT12
T1204.002,Malicious File,Execution,Magic Hound|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|RTM|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|Machete|admin@338|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|BRONZE BUTLER|Cobalt Group|DarkHydrus|Gorgon Group|Patchwork|OilRig|Dark Caracal|MuddyWater|Lazarus Group|FIN7|APT32|Rancor|APT37|FIN8|APT28|Elderwood|TA459|APT29|Leviathan|menuPass|PLATINUM
T1204.001,Malicious Link,Execution,Patchwork|Windshift|APT32|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|TA505|OilRig|Machete|Leviathan|FIN8|FIN4|Elderwood|Dragonfly 2.0|Cobalt Group|APT39|Night Dragon|APT33|Turla
T1204.002,Malicious File,Execution,FIN6|PROMETHIUM|APT30|Magic Hound|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|RTM|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|Machete|admin@338|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|Cobalt Group|BRONZE BUTLER|DarkHydrus|APT32|Dark Caracal|FIN7|Gorgon Group|OilRig|MuddyWater|Lazarus Group|Patchwork|Rancor|TA459|APT28|FIN8|APT37|APT29|menuPass|Elderwood|Leviathan|PLATINUM
T1204.001,Malicious Link,Execution,Wizard Spider|Patchwork|Windshift|APT32|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|TA505|OilRig|Machete|Leviathan|FIN8|FIN4|Elderwood|Dragonfly 2.0|Cobalt Group|APT39|Night Dragon|APT33|Turla
T1195.003,Compromise Hardware Supply Chain,Initial Access,no
T1195.002,Compromise Software Supply Chain,Initial Access,Sandworm Team|APT41
T1195.002,Compromise Software Supply Chain,Initial Access,GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Dragonfly|Sandworm Team|APT41
T1195.001,Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools,Initial Access,no
T1568.001,Fast Flux DNS,Command And Control,TA505
T1568.001,Fast Flux DNS,Command And Control,Machete|TA505
T1052.001,Exfiltration over USB,Exfiltration,Tropic Trooper
T1569.002,Service Execution,Execution,Blue Mockingbird|APT39|APT41|Silence|FIN6|APT32|Honeybee|Ke3chang
T1569.002,Service Execution,Execution,Wizard Spider|Blue Mockingbird|APT39|APT41|Silence|FIN6|APT32|Honeybee|Ke3chang
T1569.001,Launchctl,Execution,no
T1569,System Services,Execution,no
T1568.002,Domain Generation Algorithms,Command And Control,APT41
@@ -79,22 +176,22 @@ T1568,Dynamic Resolution,Command And Control,no
T1011.001,Exfiltration Over Bluetooth,Exfiltration,no
T1567.002,Exfiltration to Cloud Storage,Exfiltration,Leviathan|Turla
T1567.001,Exfiltration to Code Repository,Exfiltration,no
T1059.006,Python,Execution,Rocke|BRONZE BUTLER|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|Machete
T1059.005,Visual Basic,Execution,APT33|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|Rancor|Patchwork|MuddyWater|Honeybee|FIN7|APT37|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|Turla|TA505|Silence|WIRTE|FIN4|Cobalt Group|Gorgon Group|Leviathan|TA459|Magic Hound
T1059.006,Python,Execution,APT29|Rocke|BRONZE BUTLER|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|Machete
T1059.005,Visual Basic,Execution,Lazarus Group|APT33|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|Rancor|Patchwork|MuddyWater|Honeybee|FIN7|APT37|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|Turla|TA505|Silence|WIRTE|FIN4|Cobalt Group|Gorgon Group|TA459|Leviathan|Magic Hound
T1059.004,Unix Shell,Execution,Rocke|APT41
T1059.003,Windows Command Shell,Execution,TA505|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|OilRig|Lazarus Group|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|FIN7|APT41|Soft Cell|Turla|Silence|APT32|APT39|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Dark Caracal|Gorgon Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Rancor|Ke3chang|APT37|Leviathan|FIN8|APT28|Magic Hound|Sowbug|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN10|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Gamaredon Group|Suckfly|Patchwork|Threat Group-1314|APT3|admin@338|APT1
T1059.003,Windows Command Shell,Execution,Wizard Spider|FIN6|TA505|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|OilRig|Lazarus Group|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|FIN7|APT41|Soft Cell|Turla|Silence|APT32|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Gorgon Group|Dark Caracal|Ke3chang|Dragonfly 2.0|Rancor|APT37|Leviathan|FIN8|APT28|Sowbug|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|FIN10|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Suckfly|Threat Group-1314|APT3|admin@338|APT1
T1059.002,AppleScript,Execution,no
T1059.001,PowerShell,Execution,Blue Mockingbird|APT39|DarkVishnya|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Inception|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|Soft Cell|TA505|WIRTE|TEMP.Veles|APT33|Gallmaker|Turla|APT19|DarkHydrus|APT28|Thrip|Gorgon Group|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Leviathan|TA459|FIN8|MuddyWater|Magic Hound|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|CopyKittens|APT32|FIN7|FIN10|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Poseidon Group|APT3|APT29|Deep Panda
T1059.001,PowerShell,Execution,Lazarus Group|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|APT39|DarkVishnya|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Inception|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|Soft Cell|TA505|WIRTE|TEMP.Veles|APT33|Gallmaker|Turla|Gorgon Group|APT19|DarkHydrus|APT28|Dragonfly 2.0|Thrip|Cobalt Group|Leviathan|TA459|MuddyWater|FIN8|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|CopyKittens|OilRig|FIN10|APT32|FIN7|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Poseidon Group|APT3|APT29|Deep Panda
T1567,Exfiltration Over Web Service,Exfiltration,no
T1497.003,Time Based Evasion,Defense Evasion|Discovery,no
T1497.002,User Activity Based Checks,Defense Evasion|Discovery,FIN7
T1497.001,System Checks,Defense Evasion|Discovery,Frankenstein
T1498.002,Reflection Amplification,Impact,no
T1498.001,Direct Network Flood,Impact,no
T1566.003,Spearphishing via Service,Initial Access,Magic Hound|Windshift|FIN6|OilRig|Dark Caracal
T1566.002,Spearphishing Link,Initial Access,Windshift|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|Machete|Kimsuky|TA505|Stolen Pencil|APT39|FIN4|APT32|Night Dragon|Turla|APT28|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|APT33|Elderwood|Leviathan|Magic Hound|Patchwork|APT29|FIN8
T1566.001,Spearphishing Attachment,Initial Access,Magic Hound|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Mofang|Wizard Spider|RTM|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|APT41|Machete|admin@338|Kimsuky|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|Tropic Trooper|Turla|Gorgon Group|Rancor|DarkHydrus|Cobalt Group|FIN7|OilRig|Lazarus Group|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|FIN8|MuddyWater|APT28|TA459|Leviathan|Patchwork|PLATINUM|Elderwood|APT29|APT37|menuPass
T1566,Phishing,Initial Access,no
T1566.003,Spearphishing via Service,Initial Access,Lazarus Group|Magic Hound|Windshift|FIN6|OilRig|Dark Caracal
T1566.002,Spearphishing Link,Initial Access,Wizard Spider|APT1|Windshift|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|Machete|Kimsuky|TA505|Stolen Pencil|APT39|FIN4|APT32|Night Dragon|OilRig|Turla|APT28|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|APT33|Elderwood|APT29|Leviathan|Patchwork|Magic Hound|FIN8
T1566.001,Spearphishing Attachment,Initial Access,APT1|FIN6|APT30|Magic Hound|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Mofang|Wizard Spider|RTM|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|APT41|Machete|admin@338|Kimsuky|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|Tropic Trooper|Turla|Cobalt Group|FIN7|OilRig|Gorgon Group|Rancor|DarkHydrus|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|Lazarus Group|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|MuddyWater|TA459|APT28|PLATINUM|Patchwork|Elderwood|APT29|Leviathan|APT37|menuPass
T1566,Phishing,Initial Access,GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Dragonfly
T1565.003,Runtime Data Manipulation,Impact,APT38
T1565.002,Transmitted Data Manipulation,Impact,APT38
T1565.001,Stored Data Manipulation,Impact,FIN4|APT38
@@ -104,18 +201,18 @@ T1564,Hide Artifacts,Defense Evasion,no
T1563.002,RDP Hijacking,Lateral Movement,no
T1563.001,SSH Hijacking,Lateral Movement,no
T1563,Remote Service Session Hijacking,Lateral Movement,no
T1518.001,Security Software Discovery,Discovery,Turla|Rocke|Frankenstein|The White Company|Cobalt Group|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|Tropic Trooper|FIN8|Patchwork|Naikon
T1518.001,Security Software Discovery,Discovery,Wizard Spider|Turla|Rocke|Frankenstein|The White Company|Cobalt Group|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|Tropic Trooper|FIN8|Patchwork|Naikon
T1069.003,Cloud Groups,Discovery,no
T1069.002,Domain Groups,Discovery,Turla|Wizard Spider|Inception|OilRig|FIN6|Dragonfly 2.0|Ke3chang
T1087.004,Cloud Account,Discovery,no
T1087.003,Email Account,Discovery,Sandworm Team|TA505
T1087.002,Domain Account,Discovery,Turla|Sandworm Team|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN6|Poseidon Group|Ke3chang
T1087.002,Domain Account,Discovery,Wizard Spider|Chimera|Turla|Sandworm Team|Dragonfly 2.0|BRONZE BUTLER|OilRig|menuPass|FIN6|Poseidon Group|Ke3chang
T1087.001,Local Account,Discovery,Turla|Poseidon Group|OilRig|Ke3chang|APT32|APT1|Threat Group-3390|APT3|admin@338
T1553.004,Install Root Certificate,Defense Evasion,no
T1562.004,Disable or Modify System Firewall,Defense Evasion,Rocke|Lazarus Group|Kimsuky|Dragonfly 2.0|Carbanak
T1562.003,HISTCONTROL,Defense Evasion,no
T1562.003,Impair Command History Logging,Defense Evasion,no
T1562.002,Disable Windows Event Logging,Defense Evasion,Threat Group-3390
T1562.001,Disable or Modify Tools,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Rocke|Kimsuky|Turla|Night Dragon|Gorgon Group|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda
T1562.001,Disable or Modify Tools,Defense Evasion,Wizard Spider|FIN6|Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Rocke|Kimsuky|Turla|Night Dragon|Gorgon Group|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda
T1562,Impair Defenses,Defense Evasion,no
T1003.004,LSA Secrets,Credential Access,OilRig|MuddyWater|menuPass|Leafminer|Ke3chang|Dragonfly 2.0|APT33|Threat Group-3390
T1003.005,Cached Domain Credentials,Credential Access,OilRig|MuddyWater|Leafminer|APT33
@@ -124,8 +221,8 @@ T1561.001,Disk Content Wipe,Impact,Lazarus Group
T1561,Disk Wipe,Impact,no
T1560.003,Archive via Custom Method,Collection,Lazarus Group|Kimsuky|CopyKittens|FIN6
T1560.002,Archive via Library,Collection,Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390
T1560.001,Archive via Utility,Collection,APT41|Soft Cell|Turla|Gallmaker|APT33|APT39|MuddyWater|Magic Hound|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|CopyKittens|APT3|Sowbug|menuPass|APT1|Ke3chang
T1560,Archive Collected Data,Collection,menuPass|APT32|Honeybee|Patchwork|APT28|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Ke3chang
T1560.001,Archive via Utility,Collection,Chimera|APT41|Soft Cell|Turla|Gallmaker|APT33|APT39|MuddyWater|Magic Hound|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|CopyKittens|APT3|Sowbug|menuPass|APT1|Ke3chang
T1560,Archive Collected Data,Collection,menuPass|APT32|Patchwork|Honeybee|APT28|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Ke3chang
T1499.004,Application or System Exploitation,Impact,no
T1499.003,Application Exhaustion Flood,Impact,no
T1499.002,Service Exhaustion Flood,Impact,no
@@ -142,60 +239,60 @@ T1134.002,Create Process with Token,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Turla|L
T1134.001,Token Impersonation/Theft,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,APT28
T1213.002,Sharepoint,Collection,Ke3chang|APT28
T1213.001,Confluence,Collection,no
T1555.003,Credentials from Web Browsers,Credential Access,Magic Hound|Sandworm Team|Inception|Stealth Falcon|OilRig|Leafminer|APT33|APT3|Kimsuky|TA505|Stolen Pencil|MuddyWater|APT37|Patchwork|Molerats
T1555.003,Credentials from Web Browsers,Credential Access,FIN6|Magic Hound|Sandworm Team|Inception|Stealth Falcon|OilRig|Leafminer|APT33|APT3|Kimsuky|TA505|Stolen Pencil|MuddyWater|APT37|Patchwork|Molerats
T1555.002,Securityd Memory,Credential Access,no
T1555.001,Keychain,Credential Access,no
T1559.002,Dynamic Data Exchange,Execution,Sharpshooter|TA505|MuddyWater|Gallmaker|Patchwork|Cobalt Group|APT37|APT28|FIN7
T1559.002,Dynamic Data Exchange,Execution,Sharpshooter|TA505|MuddyWater|Gallmaker|Patchwork|Cobalt Group|APT37|FIN7|APT28
T1559.001,Component Object Model,Execution,Gamaredon Group|MuddyWater
T1559,Inter-Process Communication,Execution,no
T1558.002,Silver Ticket,Credential Access,no
T1558.001,Golden Ticket,Credential Access,Ke3chang
T1558,Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets,Credential Access,no
T1557.001,LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay,Credential Access|Collection,no
T1557.001,LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay,Credential Access|Collection,Wizard Spider
T1557,Man-in-the-Middle,Credential Access|Collection,no
T1556.002,Password Filter DLL,Credential Access|Defense Evasion,Strider
T1556.001,Domain Controller Authentication,Credential Access|Defense Evasion,no
T1556.001,Domain Controller Authentication,Credential Access|Defense Evasion,Chimera
T1556,Modify Authentication Process,Credential Access|Defense Evasion,no
T1056.004,Credential API Hooking,Collection|Credential Access,PLATINUM
T1056.003,Web Portal Capture,Collection|Credential Access,no
T1056.002,GUI Input Capture,Collection|Credential Access,FIN4
T1056.001,Keylogging,Collection|Credential Access,APT32|Sandworm Team|APT39|APT41|Kimsuky|menuPass|Stolen Pencil|FIN4|APT38|Ke3chang|OilRig|PLATINUM|Sowbug|Magic Hound|Group5|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT3|Darkhotel|APT28
T1555,Credentials from Password Stores,Credential Access,APT39|OilRig|MuddyWater|Leafminer|APT33|Turla|Stealth Falcon
T1056.001,Keylogging,Collection|Credential Access,APT32|Sandworm Team|APT39|APT41|Kimsuky|menuPass|Stolen Pencil|FIN4|APT38|Ke3chang|OilRig|PLATINUM|Magic Hound|Sowbug|Group5|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT3|Darkhotel|APT28
T1555,Credentials from Password Stores,Credential Access,FIN6|APT39|OilRig|MuddyWater|Leafminer|APT33|Turla|Stealth Falcon
T1552.005,Cloud Instance Metadata API,Credential Access,no
T1003.008,/etc/passwd and /etc/shadow,Credential Access,no
T1003.007,Proc Filesystem,Credential Access,no
T1003.006,DCSync,Credential Access,no
T1558.003,Kerberoasting,Credential Access,no
T1558.003,Kerberoasting,Credential Access,Wizard Spider
T1552.006,Group Policy Preferences,Credential Access,APT33
T1003.003,NTDS,Credential Access,FIN6|Dragonfly 2.0
T1003.002,Security Account Manager,Credential Access,Threat Group-3390|Ke3chang|Soft Cell|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|menuPass
T1003.001,LSASS Memory,Credential Access,Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Blue Mockingbird|Silence|Threat Group-3390|Leviathan|APT41|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|Stolen Pencil|APT32|Lazarus Group|Leafminer|Magic Hound|MuddyWater|PLATINUM|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|OilRig|FIN6|APT3|APT28|APT1|Ke3chang|Cleaver
T1003.003,NTDS,Credential Access,Wizard Spider|Chimera|FIN6|Dragonfly 2.0
T1003.002,Security Account Manager,Credential Access,Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390|Ke3chang|Soft Cell|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|menuPass
T1003.001,LSASS Memory,Credential Access,Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Blue Mockingbird|Silence|Threat Group-3390|Leviathan|APT41|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|Stolen Pencil|APT32|Lazarus Group|Magic Hound|Leafminer|MuddyWater|FIN8|PLATINUM|BRONZE BUTLER|OilRig|FIN6|APT3|APT28|APT1|Ke3chang|Cleaver
T1110.004,Credential Stuffing,Credential Access,no
T1110.003,Password Spraying,Credential Access,APT33|Leafminer|Lazarus Group
T1110.002,Password Cracking,Credential Access,APT41|Dragonfly 2.0|APT3
T1110.001,Password Guessing,Credential Access,no
T1021.006,Windows Remote Management,Lateral Movement,Threat Group-3390
T1110.003,Password Spraying,Credential Access,APT28|APT33|Leafminer|Lazarus Group
T1110.002,Password Cracking,Credential Access,FIN6|APT41|Dragonfly 2.0|APT3
T1110.001,Password Guessing,Credential Access,APT28
T1021.006,Windows Remote Management,Lateral Movement,Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390
T1021.005,VNC,Lateral Movement,GCMAN
T1021.004,SSH,Lateral Movement,Rocke|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|OilRig|menuPass|GCMAN
T1021.003,Distributed Component Object Model,Lateral Movement,no
T1021.002,SMB/Windows Admin Shares,Lateral Movement,Blue Mockingbird|APT39|APT32|Orangeworm|FIN8|APT3|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-1314|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang
T1021.001,Remote Desktop Protocol,Lateral Movement,Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Stolen Pencil|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|APT3|OilRig|menuPass|FIN10|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|APT1|Axiom
T1021.002,SMB/Windows Admin Shares,Lateral Movement,Wizard Spider|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|APT39|APT32|Orangeworm|FIN8|APT3|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-1314|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang
T1021.001,Remote Desktop Protocol,Lateral Movement,Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Stolen Pencil|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|APT3|OilRig|menuPass|FIN10|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|APT1|Axiom
T1554,Compromise Client Software Binary,Persistence,no
T1036.006,Space after Filename,Defense Evasion,no
T1036.005,Match Legitimate Name or Location,Defense Evasion,Rocke|Sandworm Team|APT39|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Silence|APT41|menuPass|TEMP.Veles|MuddyWater|BRONZE BUTLER|Sowbug|APT32|Patchwork|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Carbanak|APT1
T1036.004,Masquerade Task or Service,Defense Evasion,Wizard Spider|APT-C-36|Carbanak|APT32|FIN6|FIN7
T1036.005,Match Legitimate Name or Location,Defense Evasion,Chimera|PROMETHIUM|Rocke|Sandworm Team|APT39|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Silence|APT41|menuPass|TEMP.Veles|MuddyWater|BRONZE BUTLER|Sowbug|APT32|Patchwork|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Carbanak|APT1
T1036.004,Masquerade Task or Service,Defense Evasion,Lazarus Group|PROMETHIUM|Wizard Spider|APT-C-36|Carbanak|APT32|FIN6|FIN7
T1036.003,Rename System Utilities,Defense Evasion,menuPass|APT32|Soft Cell|PLATINUM
T1036.002,Right-to-Left Override,Defense Evasion,BRONZE BUTLER|BlackTech|Ke3chang|Scarlet Mimic
T1036.001,Invalid Code Signature,Defense Evasion,Windshift
T1036.001,Invalid Code Signature,Defense Evasion,Windshift|APT37
T1553.003,SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking,Defense Evasion,no
T1553.002,Code Signing,Defense Evasion,Patchwork|Silence|APT41|FIN6|TA505|FIN7|Honeybee|Leviathan|APT37|CopyKittens|Winnti Group|Suckfly|Molerats|Darkhotel
T1553.002,Code Signing,Defense Evasion,Wizard Spider|PROMETHIUM|Patchwork|Silence|APT41|FIN6|TA505|FIN7|Honeybee|Leviathan|CopyKittens|Winnti Group|Suckfly|Molerats|Darkhotel
T1553.001,Gatekeeper Bypass,Defense Evasion,no
T1553,Subvert Trust Controls,Defense Evasion,no
T1027.003,Steganography,Defense Evasion,BRONZE BUTLER|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|APT37
T1027.002,Software Packing,Defense Evasion,TA505|Rocke|Soft Cell|The White Company|APT39|APT38|Dark Caracal|Elderwood|APT3|Patchwork|APT29|Night Dragon
T1027.001,Binary Padding,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|APT32|Leviathan|BRONZE BUTLER|Moafee
T1027.002,Software Packing,Defense Evasion,Lazarus Group|TA505|Rocke|Soft Cell|The White Company|APT39|APT38|Dark Caracal|Elderwood|APT3|Patchwork|APT29|Night Dragon
T1027.001,Binary Padding,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|APT32|Patchwork|Leviathan|BRONZE BUTLER|Moafee
T1222.002,Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification,Defense Evasion,Rocke|APT32
T1222.001,Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification,Defense Evasion,no
T1222.001,Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification,Defense Evasion,Wizard Spider
T1552.004,Private Keys,Credential Access,Rocke
T1552.003,Bash History,Credential Access,no
T1552.002,Credentials in Registry,Credential Access,APT32
@@ -204,7 +301,7 @@ T1552,Unsecured Credentials,Credential Access,no
T1216.001,PubPrn,Defense Evasion,APT32
T1070.006,Timestomp,Defense Evasion,Rocke|TEMP.Veles|APT32|Lazarus Group|APT28
T1070.005,Network Share Connection Removal,Defense Evasion,Threat Group-3390
T1070.004,File Deletion,Defense Evasion,Sandworm Team|Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Wizard Spider|APT41|Kimsuky|Silence|The White Company|TEMP.Veles|APT32|APT38|Patchwork|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|menuPass|FIN8|OilRig|FIN5|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|APT3|FIN10|APT28|Threat Group-3390|Group5|Lazarus Group|APT18|APT29
T1070.004,File Deletion,Defense Evasion,FIN6|Sandworm Team|Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Wizard Spider|APT41|Kimsuky|Silence|The White Company|TEMP.Veles|APT32|APT38|menuPass|Patchwork|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|OilRig|Magic Hound|FIN5|APT3|FIN10|Threat Group-3390|APT28|Group5|Lazarus Group|APT18|APT29
T1070.003,Clear Command History,Defense Evasion,APT41
T1550.004,Web Session Cookie,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,no
T1550.001,Application Access Token,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,APT28
@@ -213,22 +310,22 @@ T1550.002,Pass the Hash,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,Soft Cell|APT32|Night D
T1550,Use Alternate Authentication Material,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,no
T1548.004,Elevated Execution with Prompt,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
T1548.003,Sudo and Sudo Caching,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
T1548.002,Bypass User Access Control,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,APT37|MuddyWater|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|Threat Group-3390|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork|APT29
T1548.002,Bypass User Account Control,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,APT37|MuddyWater|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|Threat Group-3390|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork|APT29
T1548.001,Setuid and Setgid,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
T1548,Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
T1136.003,Cloud Account,Persistence,no
T1070.002,Clear Linux or Mac System Logs,Defense Evasion,Rocke
T1070.001,Clear Windows Event Logs,Defense Evasion,APT41|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|APT32|FIN8|FIN5|APT28
T1070.001,Clear Windows Event Logs,Defense Evasion,APT41|APT38|APT32|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|FIN5|APT28
T1136.002,Domain Account,Persistence,Soft Cell
T1136.001,Local Account,Persistence,APT39|APT41|Dragonfly 2.0|Leafminer|APT3
T1136.001,Local Account,Persistence,APT39|APT41|Leafminer|Dragonfly 2.0|APT3
T1547.011,Plist Modification,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
T1547.010,Port Monitors,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
T1547.009,Shortcut Modification,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,APT39|Darkhotel|APT29|Gorgon Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Leviathan|Lazarus Group
T1547.008,LSASS Driver,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
T1547.007,Re-opened Applications,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
T1547.006,Kernel Modules and Extensions,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
T1547.005,Security Support Provider,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
T1547.004,Winlogon Helper DLL,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Tropic Trooper|Turla
T1547.005,Security Support Provider,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Lazarus Group
T1547.004,Winlogon Helper DLL,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Wizard Spider|Tropic Trooper|Turla
T1547.003,Time Providers,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
T1546.014,Emond,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
T1546.013,PowerShell Profile,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,Turla
@@ -247,22 +344,22 @@ T1546.004,.bash_profile and .bashrc,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
T1546.003,Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,APT33|Blue Mockingbird|Turla|Leviathan|APT29
T1546.002,Screensaver,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
T1546.001,Change Default File Association,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,Kimsuky
T1547.001,Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Silence|RTM|Inception|APT41|Machete|Kimsuky|APT33|APT39|APT32|APT18|Turla|Dark Caracal|Cobalt Group|Honeybee|Threat Group-3390|Dragonfly 2.0|Gorgon Group|Ke3chang|APT19|Leviathan|MuddyWater|APT37|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|APT3|FIN10|FIN7|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT29|Darkhotel
T1547.001,Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Wizard Spider|PROMETHIUM|Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Silence|RTM|Inception|APT41|Machete|Kimsuky|APT33|APT39|APT32|APT18|Turla|Threat Group-3390|Dragonfly 2.0|Gorgon Group|Dark Caracal|Cobalt Group|Honeybee|APT19|Ke3chang|Leviathan|MuddyWater|APT37|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|APT3|FIN10|FIN7|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT29|Darkhotel
T1218.002,Control Panel,Defense Evasion,no
T1218.010,Regsvr32,Defense Evasion,Blue Mockingbird|Inception|WIRTE|Cobalt Group|APT19|Leviathan|APT32|Deep Panda
T1218.009,Regsvcs/Regasm,Defense Evasion,no
T1218.005,Mshta,Defense Evasion,Inception|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|FIN7
T1218.004,InstallUtil,Defense Evasion,no
T1218.005,Mshta,Defense Evasion,Lazarus Group|Inception|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|FIN7
T1218.004,InstallUtil,Defense Evasion,menuPass
T1218.001,Compiled HTML File,Defense Evasion,APT41|Silence|Lazarus Group|Dark Caracal|OilRig
T1218.003,CMSTP,Defense Evasion,Cobalt Group|MuddyWater
T1218.011,Rundll32,Defense Evasion,APT32|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|TA505|MuddyWater|APT29|APT19|CopyKittens|APT3|Carbanak|APT28
T1218.011,Rundll32,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|APT32|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|TA505|MuddyWater|APT29|APT19|CopyKittens|APT3|Carbanak|APT28
T1547,Boot or Logon Autostart Execution,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
T1546,Event Triggered Execution,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
T1098.003,Add Office 365 Global Administrator Role,Persistence,no
T1098.002,Exchange Email Delegate Permissions,Persistence,Magic Hound
T1098.001,Additional Azure Service Principal Credentials,Persistence,no
T1098.001,Additional Cloud Credentials,Persistence,no
T1543.004,Launch Daemon,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
T1543.003,Windows Service,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Blue Mockingbird|DarkVishnya|Wizard Spider|APT32|APT41|Kimsuky|Tropic Trooper|Cobalt Group|Ke3chang|Honeybee|FIN7|Threat Group-3390|APT19|APT3|Lazarus Group|Carbanak
T1543.003,Windows Service,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,PROMETHIUM|Blue Mockingbird|DarkVishnya|Wizard Spider|APT32|APT41|Kimsuky|Tropic Trooper|Ke3chang|Cobalt Group|Honeybee|Threat Group-3390|FIN7|APT19|APT3|Lazarus Group|Carbanak
T1543.002,Systemd Service,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Rocke
T1543.001,Launch Agent,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
T1037.005,Startup Items,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
@@ -277,7 +374,7 @@ T1055.005,Thread Local Storage,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
T1055.004,Asynchronous Procedure Call,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
T1055.003,Thread Execution Hijacking,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
T1055.002,Portable Executable Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Rocke|Gorgon Group
T1055.001,Dynamic-link Library Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,TA505|Turla|Tropic Trooper|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda
T1055.001,Dynamic-link Library Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Wizard Spider|TA505|Turla|Tropic Trooper|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda
T1037.003,Network Logon Script,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
T1543,Create or Modify System Process,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
T1037.002,Logon Script (Mac),Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
@@ -285,13 +382,13 @@ T1037.001,Logon Script (Windows),Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Cobalt Group|A
T1542.003,Bootkit,Persistence|Defense Evasion,APT41|Lazarus Group|APT28
T1542.002,Component Firmware,Persistence|Defense Evasion,Equation
T1542.001,System Firmware,Persistence|Defense Evasion,no
T1505.003,Web Shell,Persistence,Tropic Trooper|Soft Cell|Threat Group-3390|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|APT32|OilRig|Deep Panda
T1505.003,Web Shell,Persistence,Tropic Trooper|Soft Cell|Threat Group-3390|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|APT32|Deep Panda
T1505.002,Transport Agent,Persistence,no
T1505.001,SQL Stored Procedures,Persistence,no
T1053.003,Cron,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Rocke
T1053.004,Launchd,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
T1053.001,At (Linux),Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
T1053.005,Scheduled Task,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT-C-36|BRONZE BUTLER|APT41|Machete|Soft Cell|Silence|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|Patchwork|OilRig|Rancor|Cobalt Group|FIN8|menuPass|FIN10|APT32|FIN7|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|APT3|APT29
T1053.005,Scheduled Task,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT-C-36|BRONZE BUTLER|APT41|Machete|Soft Cell|Silence|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|OilRig|Rancor|Dragonfly 2.0|Cobalt Group|Patchwork|FIN8|FIN10|menuPass|APT32|FIN7|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|APT3|APT29
T1053.002,At (Windows),Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,BRONZE BUTLER|Threat Group-3390|APT18
T1542,Pre-OS Boot,Defense Evasion|Persistence,no
T1137.001,Office Template Macros,Persistence,MuddyWater
@@ -316,12 +413,12 @@ T1526,Cloud Service Discovery,Discovery,no
T1505,Server Software Component,Persistence,no
T1499,Endpoint Denial of Service,Impact,no
T1497,Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion,Defense Evasion|Discovery,no
T1498,Network Denial of Service,Impact,no
T1498,Network Denial of Service,Impact,APT28
T1496,Resource Hijacking,Impact,Blue Mockingbird|Rocke|APT41|Lazarus Group
T1495,Firmware Corruption,Impact,no
T1491,Defacement,Impact,no
T1490,Inhibit System Recovery,Impact,no
T1489,Service Stop,Impact,Lazarus Group
T1489,Service Stop,Impact,Wizard Spider|Lazarus Group
T1486,Data Encrypted for Impact,Impact,APT41|TA505|APT38
T1485,Data Destruction,Impact,Sandworm Team|Lazarus Group|APT38
T1484,Group Policy Modification,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
@@ -330,38 +427,38 @@ T1480,Execution Guardrails,Defense Evasion,no
T1222,File and Directory Permissions Modification,Defense Evasion,no
T1221,Template Injection,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|Frankenstein|Inception|APT28|Tropic Trooper|Dragonfly 2.0|DarkHydrus
T1220,XSL Script Processing,Defense Evasion,Cobalt Group
T1197,BITS Jobs,Defense Evasion|Persistence,Patchwork|APT41|Leviathan
T1217,Browser Bookmark Discovery,Discovery,no
T1213,Data from Information Repositories,Collection,Turla
T1189,Drive-by Compromise,Initial Access,Turla|Windshift|RTM|Darkhotel|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|BRONZE BUTLER|Leafminer|Dark Caracal|APT19|APT32|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|Elderwood|APT37|Patchwork|PLATINUM
T1203,Exploitation for Client Execution,Execution,Sandworm Team|MuddyWater|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT41|admin@338|Threat Group-3390|APT12|The White Company|APT33|APT32|APT28|Tropic Trooper|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Cobalt Group|APT37|Patchwork|Leviathan|Elderwood|TA459|APT29
T1189,Drive-by Compromise,Initial Access,Dragonfly|PROMETHIUM|Turla|Windshift|RTM|Darkhotel|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|BRONZE BUTLER|Leafminer|APT32|Lazarus Group|APT19|Dark Caracal|Threat Group-3390|Elderwood|APT37|Patchwork|PLATINUM
T1212,Exploitation for Credential Access,Credential Access,no
T1211,Exploitation for Defense Evasion,Defense Evasion,APT28
T1190,Exploit Public-Facing Application,Initial Access,Blue Mockingbird|Rocke|APT39|BlackTech|APT41|Soft Cell|Night Dragon|Axiom
T1210,Exploitation of Remote Services,Lateral Movement,Threat Group-3390|APT28
T1202,Indirect Command Execution,Defense Evasion,no
T1217,Browser Bookmark Discovery,Discovery,no
T1190,Exploit Public-Facing Application,Initial Access,APT28|APT29|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Blue Mockingbird|Rocke|APT39|BlackTech|APT41|Soft Cell|Night Dragon|Axiom
T1210,Exploitation of Remote Services,Lateral Movement,Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390|APT28
T1203,Exploitation for Client Execution,Execution,Sandworm Team|MuddyWater|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT41|admin@338|Threat Group-3390|APT12|The White Company|APT33|APT32|APT28|Tropic Trooper|Lazarus Group|Cobalt Group|BRONZE BUTLER|APT37|Patchwork|Leviathan|APT29|Elderwood|TA459
T1200,Hardware Additions,Initial Access,DarkVishnya
T1201,Password Policy Discovery,Discovery,Turla|OilRig
T1219,Remote Access Software,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|DarkVishnya|RTM|Kimsuky|Night Dragon|Thrip|Cobalt Group|Carbanak
T1202,Indirect Command Execution,Defense Evasion,no
T1207,Rogue Domain Controller,Defense Evasion,no
T1199,Trusted Relationship,Initial Access,APT28|menuPass
T1197,BITS Jobs,Defense Evasion|Persistence,Patchwork|APT41|Leviathan
T1211,Exploitation for Defense Evasion,Defense Evasion,APT28
T1219,Remote Access Software,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|DarkVishnya|RTM|Kimsuky|Night Dragon|Thrip|Cobalt Group|Carbanak
T1218,Signed Binary Proxy Execution,Defense Evasion,no
T1204,User Execution,Execution,no
T1213,Data from Information Repositories,Collection,FIN6|Turla
T1216,Signed Script Proxy Execution,Defense Evasion,no
T1201,Password Policy Discovery,Discovery,Turla|OilRig
T1204,User Execution,Execution,no
T1195,Supply Chain Compromise,Initial Access,Elderwood
T1205,Traffic Signaling,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Command And Control,no
T1199,Trusted Relationship,Initial Access,GOLD SOUTHFIELD|APT28|menuPass
T1176,Browser Extensions,Persistence,Kimsuky|Stolen Pencil
T1175,Component Object Model and Distributed COM,Lateral Movement|Execution,no
T1187,Forced Authentication,Credential Access,DarkHydrus|Dragonfly 2.0
T1185,Man in the Browser,Collection,no
T1134,Access Token Manipulation,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Blue Mockingbird
T1140,Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information,Defense Evasion,Rocke|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Molerats|Frankenstein|Turla|WIRTE|Darkhotel|Tropic Trooper|menuPass|Honeybee|Gorgon Group|APT19|Threat Group-3390|Leviathan|APT28|MuddyWater|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER
T1134,Access Token Manipulation,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,FIN6|Blue Mockingbird
T1136,Create Account,Persistence,no
T1140,Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information,Defense Evasion,Rocke|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Molerats|Frankenstein|Turla|WIRTE|Darkhotel|Tropic Trooper|menuPass|Honeybee|Threat Group-3390|APT19|Gorgon Group|Leviathan|MuddyWater|APT28|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER
T1149,LC_MAIN Hijacking,Defense Evasion,no
T1135,Network Share Discovery,Discovery,APT32|APT39|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT1|Dragonfly 2.0|Sowbug
T1137,Office Application Startup,Persistence,Gamaredon Group|APT32
T1153,Source,Execution,no
T1133,External Remote Services,Persistence|Initial Access,Sandworm Team|APT41|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|Night Dragon|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|Ke3chang|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|APT18
T1135,Network Share Discovery,Discovery,Wizard Spider|APT32|APT39|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT1|Dragonfly 2.0|Sowbug
T1133,External Remote Services,Persistence|Initial Access,Wizard Spider|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Chimera|Sandworm Team|APT41|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|Night Dragon|OilRig|Ke3chang|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|APT18
T1132,Data Encoding,Command And Control,no
T1129,Shared Modules,Execution,no
T1127,Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution,Defense Evasion,no
@@ -369,28 +466,28 @@ T1125,Video Capture,Collection,Silence|FIN7
T1124,System Time Discovery,Discovery,The White Company|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Turla
T1123,Audio Capture,Collection,APT37
T1120,Peripheral Device Discovery,Discovery,Turla|APT37|Gamaredon Group|Equation|APT28
T1119,Automated Collection,Collection,Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT1|APT28|Patchwork|OilRig|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|FIN6
T1119,Automated Collection,Collection,Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT1|APT28|Patchwork|OilRig|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|FIN6
T1115,Clipboard Data,Collection,APT39|APT38
T1114,Email Collection,Collection,no
T1113,Screen Capture,Collection,Gamaredon Group|APT39|Silence|MuddyWater|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|Dark Caracal|FIN7|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|Group5|APT28
T1112,Modify Registry,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|Turla|APT32|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|Threat Group-3390|Honeybee|Patchwork|Gorgon Group|FIN8
T1112,Modify Registry,Defense Evasion,Lazarus Group|Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|Turla|APT32|APT38|Patchwork|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|Threat Group-3390|Honeybee|Gorgon Group|FIN8
T1111,Two-Factor Authentication Interception,Credential Access,no
T1110,Brute Force,Credential Access,DarkVishnya|APT39|OilRig|FIN5|Turla
T1108,Redundant Access,Defense Evasion|Persistence,no
T1106,Native API,Execution,Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Turla|Silence|Gorgon Group|APT37
T1105,Ingress Tool Transfer,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Silence|APT-C-36|APT41|Soft Cell|TA505|WIRTE|APT33|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Rancor|Cobalt Group|Turla|Gorgon Group|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|APT37|FIN8|PLATINUM|Leviathan|Elderwood|Magic Hound|APT3|APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN7|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28
T1106,Native API,Execution,Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Turla|Silence|Gorgon Group|APT37
T1105,Ingress Tool Transfer,Command And Control,Chimera|Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Silence|APT-C-36|APT41|Soft Cell|TA505|WIRTE|APT33|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Rancor|Cobalt Group|Turla|Gorgon Group|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|APT37|FIN8|Leviathan|Elderwood|PLATINUM|APT3|Magic Hound|APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN7|menuPass|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28
T1104,Multi-Stage Channels,Command And Control,APT41|MuddyWater|APT3
T1102,Web Service,Command And Control,Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Inception|FIN6
T1098,Account Manipulation,Persistence,APT3|Dragonfly 2.0|Lazarus Group
T1095,Non-Application Layer Protocol,Command And Control,APT29|PLATINUM|APT3
T1102,Web Service,Command And Control,Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Inception|FIN6
T1098,Account Manipulation,Persistence,Dragonfly 2.0|APT3|Lazarus Group
T1095,Non-Application Layer Protocol,Command And Control,FIN6|APT29|PLATINUM|APT3
T1092,Communication Through Removable Media,Command And Control,APT28
T1091,Replication Through Removable Media,Lateral Movement|Initial Access,Tropic Trooper|Darkhotel|APT28
T1090,Proxy,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|APT41|Turla
T1090,Proxy,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|APT41|Turla
T1087,Account Discovery,Discovery,no
T1083,File and Directory Discovery,Discovery,Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Inception|APT41|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|APT18|Leafminer|Honeybee|Dark Caracal|Dragonfly 2.0|Magic Hound|Sowbug|BRONZE BUTLER|APT3|APT28|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
T1082,System Information Discovery,Discovery,Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|Honeybee|APT19|APT37|APT32|Magic Hound|OilRig|APT3|Sowbug|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
T1080,Taint Shared Content,Lateral Movement,BRONZE BUTLER|Darkhotel
T1078,Valid Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|APT39|FIN4|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|Leviathan|APT33|OilRig|FIN5|menuPass|APT28|FIN10|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390|APT18|PittyTiger|Carbanak
T1083,File and Directory Discovery,Discovery,Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Inception|APT41|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|APT18|Leafminer|Honeybee|Dragonfly 2.0|Dark Caracal|APT3|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|Sowbug|APT28|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
T1082,System Information Discovery,Discovery,Wizard Spider|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|APT19|APT32|Honeybee|APT37|Sowbug|OilRig|Magic Hound|APT3|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
T1080,Taint Shared Content,Lateral Movement,Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Darkhotel
T1078,Valid Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,Chimera|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|APT39|FIN4|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|Leviathan|APT33|OilRig|FIN5|APT28|menuPass|FIN10|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390|APT18|PittyTiger|Carbanak
T1074,Data Staged,Collection,Wizard Spider
T1072,Software Deployment Tools,Execution|Lateral Movement,Silence|APT32|Threat Group-1314
T1071,Application Layer Protocol,Command And Control,Rocke|Magic Hound|Dragonfly 2.0
@@ -400,34 +497,34 @@ T1068,Exploitation for Privilege Escalation,Privilege Escalation,Whitefly|APT33|
T1064,Scripting,Defense Evasion|Execution,no
T1062,Hypervisor,Persistence,no
T1061,Graphical User Interface,Execution,no
T1059,Command and Scripting Interpreter,Execution,APT32|Molerats|Whitefly|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|FIN7|OilRig|FIN5|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Ke3chang
T1059,Command and Scripting Interpreter,Execution,APT32|Molerats|Whitefly|APT39|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN7|OilRig|FIN5|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Ke3chang
T1057,Process Discovery,Discovery,Rocke|Frankenstein|Inception|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|APT38|Tropic Trooper|APT37|Honeybee|OilRig|APT3|Magic Hound|APT28|Winnti Group|Stealth Falcon|Poseidon Group|Lazarus Group|Molerats|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang
T1056,Input Capture,Collection|Credential Access,no
T1055,Process Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,APT32|Sharpshooter|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|Turla|Cobalt Group|APT37|Honeybee|PLATINUM
T1055,Process Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,APT32|Sharpshooter|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|Cobalt Group|APT37|Honeybee|Turla|PLATINUM
T1053,Scheduled Task/Job,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
T1052,Exfiltration Over Physical Medium,Exfiltration,no
T1051,Shared Webroot,Lateral Movement,no
T1049,System Network Connections Discovery,Discovery,Tropic Trooper|APT41|APT38|Soft Cell|APT32|APT1|OilRig|APT3|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
T1048,Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol,Exfiltration,no
T1047,Windows Management Instrumentation,Execution,Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT41|FIN6|Soft Cell|APT32|MuddyWater|OilRig|Threat Group-3390|FIN8|Leviathan|menuPass|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT29|Deep Panda
T1046,Network Service Scanning,Discovery,Rocke|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT39|APT32|Leafminer|OilRig|Cobalt Group|menuPass|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390
T1043,Commonly Used Port,Command And Control,Machete|OilRig|APT28|TEMP.Veles|Night Dragon|APT29|APT18|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN7|FIN8|APT37|Magic Hound|APT3|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390
T1047,Windows Management Instrumentation,Execution,Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT41|FIN6|Soft Cell|APT32|MuddyWater|OilRig|Threat Group-3390|Leviathan|FIN8|menuPass|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT29|Deep Panda
T1046,Network Service Scanning,Discovery,Rocke|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT39|APT32|Cobalt Group|Leafminer|OilRig|menuPass|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390
T1043,Commonly Used Port,Command And Control,OilRig|APT28|TEMP.Veles|Night Dragon|APT29|APT18|APT19|FIN7|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|APT37|Magic Hound|APT3|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390
T1041,Exfiltration Over C2 Channel,Exfiltration,Sandworm Team|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Kimsuky|Soft Cell|APT32|APT3|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Ke3chang
T1040,Network Sniffing,Credential Access|Discovery,Sandworm Team|DarkVishnya|APT33|Stolen Pencil|APT28
T1039,Data from Network Shared Drive,Collection,Sowbug|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass
T1039,Data from Network Shared Drive,Collection,Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Sowbug|menuPass
T1037,Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Rocke
T1036,Masquerading,Defense Evasion,Windshift|APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|Dragonfly 2.0
T1034,Path Interception,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
T1033,System Owner/User Discovery,Discovery,Frankenstein|APT41|Soft Cell|Tropic Trooper|APT39|MuddyWater|APT32|APT37|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|Magic Hound|FIN10|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3
T1033,System Owner/User Discovery,Discovery,Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT41|Soft Cell|Tropic Trooper|APT39|MuddyWater|APT32|APT37|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|Magic Hound|FIN10|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3
T1030,Data Transfer Size Limits,Exfiltration,Threat Group-3390
T1029,Scheduled Transfer,Exfiltration,no
T1027,Obfuscated Files or Information,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|APT41|Machete|Soft Cell|Turla|TA505|Silence|APT33|Night Dragon|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|APT29|APT18|Tropic Trooper|Cobalt Group|Patchwork|Leafminer|APT37|Threat Group-3390|Honeybee|Dark Caracal|menuPass|APT19|BlackOasis|FIN8|Leviathan|Elderwood|MuddyWater|FIN7|Magic Hound|OilRig|APT3|APT32|Group5|Dust Storm|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT28
T1027,Obfuscated Files or Information,Defense Evasion,FIN6|Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|APT41|Machete|Soft Cell|Turla|TA505|Silence|APT33|Night Dragon|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|APT29|APT18|Tropic Trooper|Honeybee|Leafminer|APT37|Dark Caracal|Patchwork|Threat Group-3390|APT19|menuPass|Cobalt Group|BlackOasis|Elderwood|FIN8|Leviathan|MuddyWater|FIN7|OilRig|Magic Hound|APT3|APT32|Group5|Dust Storm|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT28
T1026,Multiband Communication,Command And Control,Lazarus Group
T1025,Data from Removable Media,Collection,Machete|Turla|Gamaredon Group|APT28
T1021,Remote Services,Lateral Movement,no
T1020,Automated Exfiltration,Exfiltration,Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Honeybee
T1018,Remote System Discovery,Discovery,Sandworm Team|Rocke|Wizard Spider|Silence|Soft Cell|APT39|APT32|Deep Panda|Threat Group-3390|Dragonfly 2.0|Leafminer|Ke3chang|FIN8|APT3|FIN5|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN6|Turla
T1016,System Network Configuration Discovery,Discovery,Sandworm Team|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT41|Soft Cell|APT32|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|Magic Hound|OilRig|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3|Naikon|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
T1020,Automated Exfiltration,Exfiltration,Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Honeybee
T1018,Remote System Discovery,Discovery,Sandworm Team|Rocke|Wizard Spider|Silence|Soft Cell|APT39|APT32|Deep Panda|Threat Group-3390|Dragonfly 2.0|Ke3chang|Leafminer|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN5|APT3|menuPass|FIN6|Turla
T1016,System Network Configuration Discovery,Discovery,Wizard Spider|Sandworm Team|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT41|Soft Cell|APT32|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|Magic Hound|OilRig|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3|Naikon|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
T1014,Rootkit,Defense Evasion,Rocke|APT41|APT28|Winnti Group
T1012,Query Registry,Discovery,APT32|Dragonfly 2.0|Threat Group-3390|OilRig|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Turla
T1011,Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium,Exfiltration,no
@@ -435,6 +532,6 @@ T1010,Application Window Discovery,Discovery,Lazarus Group
T1008,Fallback Channels,Command And Control,APT41|OilRig|Lazarus Group
T1007,System Service Discovery,Discovery,BRONZE BUTLER|APT1|OilRig|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
T1006,Direct Volume Access,Defense Evasion,no
T1005,Data from Local System,Collection,Gamaredon Group|APT39|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|Soft Cell|Turla|menuPass|Dark Caracal|Dragonfly 2.0|Honeybee|APT37|APT28|APT3|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|Threat Group-3390|APT1|Ke3chang
T1005,Data from Local System,Collection,FIN6|Gamaredon Group|APT39|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|Soft Cell|Turla|menuPass|Dark Caracal|Honeybee|Dragonfly 2.0|APT37|APT28|BRONZE BUTLER|APT3|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|Threat Group-3390|APT1|Ke3chang
T1003,OS Credential Dumping,Credential Access,APT39|Frankenstein|APT32|APT28|Leviathan|Sowbug|Suckfly|Poseidon Group|Axiom
T1001,Data Obfuscation,Command And Control,Axiom
1 mitre_id technique tactics groups
2 T1205.001 T1059.008 Port Knocking Network Device CLI Defense Evasion|Persistence|Command And Control Execution no
3 T1602.002 Network Device Configuration Dump Collection no
4 T1542.005 TFTP Boot Defense Evasion|Persistence no
5 T1542.004 ROMMONkit Defense Evasion|Persistence no
6 T1602.001 SNMP (MIB Dump) Collection no
7 T1602 Data from Configuration Repository Collection no
8 T1601.002 Downgrade System Image Defense Evasion no
9 T1601.001 Patch System Image Defense Evasion no
10 T1601 Modify System Image Defense Evasion no
11 T1600.002 Disable Crypto Hardware Defense Evasion no
12 T1600.001 Reduce Key Space Defense Evasion no
13 T1600 Weaken Encryption Defense Evasion no
14 T1556.004 Network Device Authentication Credential Access|Defense Evasion no
15 T1599.001 Network Address Translation Traversal Defense Evasion no
16 T1599 Network Boundary Bridging Defense Evasion no
17 T1020.001 Traffic Duplication Exfiltration no
18 T1557.002 ARP Cache Poisoning Credential Access|Collection Cleaver
19 T1588.006 Vulnerabilities Resource Development no
20 T1053.006 Systemd Timers Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation no
21 T1562.008 Disable Cloud Logs Defense Evasion no
22 T1547.012 Print Processors Persistence|Privilege Escalation no
23 T1598.003 Spearphishing Link Reconnaissance no
24 T1598.002 Spearphishing Attachment Reconnaissance no
25 T1598.001 Spearphishing Service Reconnaissance no
26 T1598 Phishing for Information Reconnaissance no
27 T1597.002 Purchase Technical Data Reconnaissance no
28 T1597.001 Threat Intel Vendors Reconnaissance no
29 T1597 Search Closed Sources Reconnaissance no
30 T1596.005 Scan Databases Reconnaissance no
31 T1596.004 CDNs Reconnaissance no
32 T1596.003 Digital Certificates Reconnaissance no
33 T1596.001 DNS/Passive DNS Reconnaissance no
34 T1596.002 WHOIS Reconnaissance no
35 T1596 Search Open Technical Databases Reconnaissance no
36 T1595.002 Vulnerability Scanning Reconnaissance no
37 T1595.001 Scanning IP Blocks Reconnaissance no
38 T1595 Active Scanning Reconnaissance no
39 T1594 Search Victim-Owned Websites Reconnaissance no
40 T1593.002 Search Engines Reconnaissance no
41 T1593.001 Social Media Reconnaissance no
42 T1593 Search Open Websites/Domains Reconnaissance no
43 T1592.004 Client Configurations Reconnaissance no
44 T1592.003 Firmware Reconnaissance no
45 T1592.002 Software Reconnaissance no
46 T1592.001 Hardware Reconnaissance no
47 T1592 Gather Victim Host Information Reconnaissance no
48 T1591.004 Identify Roles Reconnaissance no
49 T1591.003 Identify Business Tempo Reconnaissance no
50 T1591.001 Determine Physical Locations Reconnaissance no
51 T1591.002 Business Relationships Reconnaissance no
52 T1591 Gather Victim Org Information Reconnaissance no
53 T1590.006 Network Security Appliances Reconnaissance no
54 T1590.005 IP Addresses Reconnaissance no
55 T1590.004 Network Topology Reconnaissance no
56 T1590.003 Network Trust Dependencies Reconnaissance no
57 T1590.002 DNS Reconnaissance no
58 T1590.001 Domain Properties Reconnaissance no
59 T1590 Gather Victim Network Information Reconnaissance no
60 T1589.003 Employee Names Reconnaissance no
61 T1589.002 Email Addresses Reconnaissance no
62 T1589.001 Credentials Reconnaissance no
63 T1589 Gather Victim Identity Information Reconnaissance no
64 T1588.005 Exploits Resource Development no
65 T1588.004 Digital Certificates Resource Development no
66 T1588.003 Code Signing Certificates Resource Development Wizard Spider
67 T1588.002 Tool Resource Development no
68 T1588.001 Malware Resource Development Turla|APT1
69 T1588 Obtain Capabilities Resource Development no
70 T1587.004 Exploits Resource Development no
71 T1587.003 Digital Certificates Resource Development APT29|PROMETHIUM
72 T1587.002 Code Signing Certificates Resource Development PROMETHIUM|Patchwork
73 T1587.001 Malware Resource Development Turla|FIN7|Night Dragon|Cleaver
74 T1587 Develop Capabilities Resource Development no
75 T1586.002 Email Accounts Resource Development no
76 T1586.001 Social Media Accounts Resource Development no
77 T1586 Compromise Accounts Resource Development no
78 T1585.002 Email Accounts Resource Development APT1
79 T1585.001 Social Media Accounts Resource Development Cleaver
80 T1585 Establish Accounts Resource Development APT17
81 T1584.006 Web Services Resource Development Turla
82 T1584.005 Botnet Resource Development no
83 T1584.004 Server Resource Development Turla|APT16
84 T1584.003 Virtual Private Server Resource Development Turla
85 T1584.002 DNS Server Resource Development no
86 T1584.001 Domains Resource Development APT1
87 T1583.006 Web Services Resource Development APT17|APT29
88 T1583.005 Botnet Resource Development no
89 T1583.004 Server Resource Development no
90 T1583.003 Virtual Private Server Resource Development TEMP.Veles
91 T1583.002 DNS Server Resource Development no
92 T1584 Compromise Infrastructure Resource Development no
93 T1583.001 Domains Resource Development APT1|APT28
94 T1583 Acquire Infrastructure Resource Development no
95 T1564.007 VBA Stomping Defense Evasion no
96 T1558.004 AS-REP Roasting Credential Access no
97 T1580 Cloud Infrastructure Discovery Discovery no
98 T1218.012 Verclsid Defense Evasion no
99 T1205.001 Port Knocking Defense Evasion|Persistence|Command And Control PROMETHIUM
100 T1564.006 Run Virtual Instance Defense Evasion no
101 T1564.005 Hidden File System Defense Evasion Strider|Equation
102 T1556.003 Pluggable Authentication Modules Credential Access|Defense Evasion no
104 T1562.007 Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall Defense Evasion no
105 T1098.004 SSH Authorized Keys Persistence no
106 T1480.001 Environmental Keying Defense Evasion APT41|Equation
107 T1059.007 JavaScript/JScript Execution APT32|FIN7|Cobalt Group|Molerats|TA505|Silence|Leafminer FIN6|APT32|FIN7|Cobalt Group|Molerats|TA505|Silence|Leafminer
108 T1578.004 Revert Cloud Instance Defense Evasion no
109 T1578.003 Delete Cloud Instance Defense Evasion no
110 T1578.001 Create Snapshot Defense Evasion no
121 T1071.004 DNS Command And Control APT39|Tropic Trooper|OilRig|Ke3chang|Cobalt Group|APT18|APT41|FIN7
122 T1071.003 Mail Protocols Command And Control APT32|SilverTerrier|APT28
123 T1071.002 File Transfer Protocols Command And Control APT41|SilverTerrier|Machete|Honeybee
124 T1071.001 Web Protocols Command And Control Sandworm Team|TA505|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Inception|APT41|SilverTerrier|Machete|APT28|WIRTE|APT33|FIN4|Night Dragon|APT18|APT38|Cobalt Group|APT19|Threat Group-3390|Rancor|Orangeworm|APT37|Ke3chang|Dark Caracal|Turla|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|OilRig|Magic Hound|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon Sandworm Team|TA505|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Inception|APT41|SilverTerrier|Machete|APT28|WIRTE|APT33|FIN4|Night Dragon|APT18|APT38|Threat Group-3390|Cobalt Group|APT37|Turla|APT19|Rancor|Orangeworm|Dark Caracal|Ke3chang|Lazarus Group|APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|OilRig|Magic Hound|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon
125 T1572 Protocol Tunneling Command And Control OilRig|Cobalt Group|FIN6
126 T1048.003 Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol Exfiltration APT32|APT33|Thrip|FIN8|OilRig|Lazarus Group Wizard Spider|FIN6|APT32|APT33|Thrip|FIN8|OilRig|Lazarus Group
127 T1048.002 Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol Exfiltration no
128 T1048.001 Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol Exfiltration no
129 T1001.003 Protocol Impersonation Command And Control Lazarus Group
130 T1001.002 Steganography Command And Control Axiom APT29|Axiom
131 T1001.001 Junk Data Command And Control APT28
132 T1132.002 Non-Standard Encoding Command And Control no
133 T1132.001 Standard Encoding Command And Control Sandworm Team|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|APT33|APT19|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork
136 T1090.002 External Proxy Command And Control APT39|Silence|Soft Cell|MuddyWater|APT3|FIN5|Lazarus Group|menuPass|APT28
137 T1090.001 Internal Proxy Command And Control APT39|Strider
138 T1102.003 One-Way Communication Command And Control Leviathan
139 T1102.002 Bidirectional Communication Command And Control Sandworm Team|APT39|APT12|Turla|FIN7|APT37|Magic Hound|Carbanak APT29|Sandworm Team|APT39|APT12|Turla|FIN7|APT37|Magic Hound|Carbanak
140 T1102.001 Dead Drop Resolver Command And Control Rocke|APT41|BRONZE BUTLER|RTM|Patchwork
141 T1571 Non-Standard Port Command And Control Sandworm Team|Rocke|DarkVishnya|Silence|APT-C-36|Magic Hound|APT33|APT32|TEMP.Veles|Lazarus Group|FIN7
142 T1074.002 Remote Data Staging Collection Threat Group-3390|menuPass|FIN6|Night Dragon|FIN8
143 T1074.001 Local Data Staging Collection Machete|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|Patchwork|Dragonfly 2.0|Honeybee|Leviathan|APT3|FIN5|menuPass|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28 Machete|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|Patchwork|Honeybee|Dragonfly 2.0|Leviathan|FIN5|APT3|menuPass|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28
144 T1078.004 Cloud Accounts Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access APT33
145 T1564.004 NTFS File Attributes Defense Evasion APT32
146 T1564.003 Hidden Window Defense Evasion Gorgon Group|Deep Panda|DarkHydrus|CopyKittens|APT19|APT32|APT28|APT3|Magic Hound
147 T1078.003 Local Accounts Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access Tropic Trooper|FIN10|Stolen Pencil|APT32 PROMETHIUM|Tropic Trooper|FIN10|Stolen Pencil|APT32
148 T1078.002 Domain Accounts Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access TA505|APT3|Threat Group-1314 Wizard Spider|APT29|TA505|APT3|Threat Group-1314
149 T1078.001 Default Accounts Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access no
150 T1564.002 Hidden Users Defense Evasion no
151 T1574.006 LD_PRELOAD Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion Rocke
152 T1574.002 DLL Side-Loading Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion BRONZE BUTLER|Naikon|APT41|Soft Cell|Tropic Trooper|Patchwork|APT19|APT32|APT3|menuPass|Threat Group-3390 BRONZE BUTLER|Naikon|APT41|Soft Cell|Tropic Trooper|APT19|Patchwork|APT32|APT3|menuPass|Threat Group-3390
153 T1574.001 DLL Search Order Hijacking Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion Whitefly|RTM|Threat Group-3390|menuPass
154 T1574.008 Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion no
155 T1574.007 Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion no
161 T1069.001 Local Groups Discovery Turla|OilRig|admin@338
162 T1570 Lateral Tool Transfer Lateral Movement APT32|Wizard Spider|Turla|FIN10
163 T1568.003 DNS Calculation Command And Control APT12
164 T1204.002 Malicious File Execution Magic Hound|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|RTM|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|Machete|admin@338|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|BRONZE BUTLER|Cobalt Group|DarkHydrus|Gorgon Group|Patchwork|OilRig|Dark Caracal|MuddyWater|Lazarus Group|FIN7|APT32|Rancor|APT37|FIN8|APT28|Elderwood|TA459|APT29|Leviathan|menuPass|PLATINUM FIN6|PROMETHIUM|APT30|Magic Hound|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|RTM|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|Machete|admin@338|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|Cobalt Group|BRONZE BUTLER|DarkHydrus|APT32|Dark Caracal|FIN7|Gorgon Group|OilRig|MuddyWater|Lazarus Group|Patchwork|Rancor|TA459|APT28|FIN8|APT37|APT29|menuPass|Elderwood|Leviathan|PLATINUM
165 T1204.001 Malicious Link Execution Patchwork|Windshift|APT32|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|TA505|OilRig|Machete|Leviathan|FIN8|FIN4|Elderwood|Dragonfly 2.0|Cobalt Group|APT39|Night Dragon|APT33|Turla Wizard Spider|Patchwork|Windshift|APT32|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|TA505|OilRig|Machete|Leviathan|FIN8|FIN4|Elderwood|Dragonfly 2.0|Cobalt Group|APT39|Night Dragon|APT33|Turla
166 T1195.003 Compromise Hardware Supply Chain Initial Access no
167 T1195.002 Compromise Software Supply Chain Initial Access Sandworm Team|APT41 GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Dragonfly|Sandworm Team|APT41
168 T1195.001 Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools Initial Access no
169 T1568.001 Fast Flux DNS Command And Control TA505 Machete|TA505
170 T1052.001 Exfiltration over USB Exfiltration Tropic Trooper
171 T1569.002 Service Execution Execution Blue Mockingbird|APT39|APT41|Silence|FIN6|APT32|Honeybee|Ke3chang Wizard Spider|Blue Mockingbird|APT39|APT41|Silence|FIN6|APT32|Honeybee|Ke3chang
172 T1569.001 Launchctl Execution no
173 T1569 System Services Execution no
174 T1568.002 Domain Generation Algorithms Command And Control APT41
176 T1011.001 Exfiltration Over Bluetooth Exfiltration no
177 T1567.002 Exfiltration to Cloud Storage Exfiltration Leviathan|Turla
178 T1567.001 Exfiltration to Code Repository Exfiltration no
179 T1059.006 Python Execution Rocke|BRONZE BUTLER|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|Machete APT29|Rocke|BRONZE BUTLER|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|Machete
180 T1059.005 Visual Basic Execution APT33|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|Rancor|Patchwork|MuddyWater|Honeybee|FIN7|APT37|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|Turla|TA505|Silence|WIRTE|FIN4|Cobalt Group|Gorgon Group|Leviathan|TA459|Magic Hound Lazarus Group|APT33|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|Rancor|Patchwork|MuddyWater|Honeybee|FIN7|APT37|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|Turla|TA505|Silence|WIRTE|FIN4|Cobalt Group|Gorgon Group|TA459|Leviathan|Magic Hound
181 T1059.004 Unix Shell Execution Rocke|APT41
182 T1059.003 Windows Command Shell Execution TA505|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|OilRig|Lazarus Group|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|FIN7|APT41|Soft Cell|Turla|Silence|APT32|APT39|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Dark Caracal|Gorgon Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Rancor|Ke3chang|APT37|Leviathan|FIN8|APT28|Magic Hound|Sowbug|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN10|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Gamaredon Group|Suckfly|Patchwork|Threat Group-1314|APT3|admin@338|APT1 Wizard Spider|FIN6|TA505|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|OilRig|Lazarus Group|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|FIN7|APT41|Soft Cell|Turla|Silence|APT32|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Gorgon Group|Dark Caracal|Ke3chang|Dragonfly 2.0|Rancor|APT37|Leviathan|FIN8|APT28|Sowbug|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|FIN10|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Suckfly|Threat Group-1314|APT3|admin@338|APT1
183 T1059.002 AppleScript Execution no
184 T1059.001 PowerShell Execution Blue Mockingbird|APT39|DarkVishnya|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Inception|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|Soft Cell|TA505|WIRTE|TEMP.Veles|APT33|Gallmaker|Turla|APT19|DarkHydrus|APT28|Thrip|Gorgon Group|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Leviathan|TA459|FIN8|MuddyWater|Magic Hound|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|CopyKittens|APT32|FIN7|FIN10|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Poseidon Group|APT3|APT29|Deep Panda Lazarus Group|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|APT39|DarkVishnya|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Inception|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|Soft Cell|TA505|WIRTE|TEMP.Veles|APT33|Gallmaker|Turla|Gorgon Group|APT19|DarkHydrus|APT28|Dragonfly 2.0|Thrip|Cobalt Group|Leviathan|TA459|MuddyWater|FIN8|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|CopyKittens|OilRig|FIN10|APT32|FIN7|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Poseidon Group|APT3|APT29|Deep Panda
185 T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service Exfiltration no
186 T1497.003 Time Based Evasion Defense Evasion|Discovery no
187 T1497.002 User Activity Based Checks Defense Evasion|Discovery FIN7
188 T1497.001 System Checks Defense Evasion|Discovery Frankenstein
189 T1498.002 Reflection Amplification Impact no
190 T1498.001 Direct Network Flood Impact no
191 T1566.003 Spearphishing via Service Initial Access Magic Hound|Windshift|FIN6|OilRig|Dark Caracal Lazarus Group|Magic Hound|Windshift|FIN6|OilRig|Dark Caracal
192 T1566.002 Spearphishing Link Initial Access Windshift|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|Machete|Kimsuky|TA505|Stolen Pencil|APT39|FIN4|APT32|Night Dragon|Turla|APT28|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|APT33|Elderwood|Leviathan|Magic Hound|Patchwork|APT29|FIN8 Wizard Spider|APT1|Windshift|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|Machete|Kimsuky|TA505|Stolen Pencil|APT39|FIN4|APT32|Night Dragon|OilRig|Turla|APT28|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|APT33|Elderwood|APT29|Leviathan|Patchwork|Magic Hound|FIN8
193 T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment Initial Access Magic Hound|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Mofang|Wizard Spider|RTM|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|APT41|Machete|admin@338|Kimsuky|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|Tropic Trooper|Turla|Gorgon Group|Rancor|DarkHydrus|Cobalt Group|FIN7|OilRig|Lazarus Group|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|FIN8|MuddyWater|APT28|TA459|Leviathan|Patchwork|PLATINUM|Elderwood|APT29|APT37|menuPass APT1|FIN6|APT30|Magic Hound|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Mofang|Wizard Spider|RTM|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|APT41|Machete|admin@338|Kimsuky|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|Tropic Trooper|Turla|Cobalt Group|FIN7|OilRig|Gorgon Group|Rancor|DarkHydrus|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|Lazarus Group|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|MuddyWater|TA459|APT28|PLATINUM|Patchwork|Elderwood|APT29|Leviathan|APT37|menuPass
194 T1566 Phishing Initial Access no GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Dragonfly
195 T1565.003 Runtime Data Manipulation Impact APT38
196 T1565.002 Transmitted Data Manipulation Impact APT38
197 T1565.001 Stored Data Manipulation Impact FIN4|APT38
201 T1563.002 RDP Hijacking Lateral Movement no
202 T1563.001 SSH Hijacking Lateral Movement no
203 T1563 Remote Service Session Hijacking Lateral Movement no
204 T1518.001 Security Software Discovery Discovery Turla|Rocke|Frankenstein|The White Company|Cobalt Group|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|Tropic Trooper|FIN8|Patchwork|Naikon Wizard Spider|Turla|Rocke|Frankenstein|The White Company|Cobalt Group|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|Tropic Trooper|FIN8|Patchwork|Naikon
205 T1069.003 Cloud Groups Discovery no
206 T1069.002 Domain Groups Discovery Turla|Wizard Spider|Inception|OilRig|FIN6|Dragonfly 2.0|Ke3chang
207 T1087.004 Cloud Account Discovery no
208 T1087.003 Email Account Discovery Sandworm Team|TA505
209 T1087.002 Domain Account Discovery Turla|Sandworm Team|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN6|Poseidon Group|Ke3chang Wizard Spider|Chimera|Turla|Sandworm Team|Dragonfly 2.0|BRONZE BUTLER|OilRig|menuPass|FIN6|Poseidon Group|Ke3chang
210 T1087.001 Local Account Discovery Turla|Poseidon Group|OilRig|Ke3chang|APT32|APT1|Threat Group-3390|APT3|admin@338
211 T1553.004 Install Root Certificate Defense Evasion no
212 T1562.004 Disable or Modify System Firewall Defense Evasion Rocke|Lazarus Group|Kimsuky|Dragonfly 2.0|Carbanak
213 T1562.003 HISTCONTROL Impair Command History Logging Defense Evasion no
214 T1562.002 Disable Windows Event Logging Defense Evasion Threat Group-3390
215 T1562.001 Disable or Modify Tools Defense Evasion Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Rocke|Kimsuky|Turla|Night Dragon|Gorgon Group|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda Wizard Spider|FIN6|Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Rocke|Kimsuky|Turla|Night Dragon|Gorgon Group|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda
216 T1562 Impair Defenses Defense Evasion no
217 T1003.004 LSA Secrets Credential Access OilRig|MuddyWater|menuPass|Leafminer|Ke3chang|Dragonfly 2.0|APT33|Threat Group-3390
218 T1003.005 Cached Domain Credentials Credential Access OilRig|MuddyWater|Leafminer|APT33
221 T1561 Disk Wipe Impact no
222 T1560.003 Archive via Custom Method Collection Lazarus Group|Kimsuky|CopyKittens|FIN6
223 T1560.002 Archive via Library Collection Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390
224 T1560.001 Archive via Utility Collection APT41|Soft Cell|Turla|Gallmaker|APT33|APT39|MuddyWater|Magic Hound|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|CopyKittens|APT3|Sowbug|menuPass|APT1|Ke3chang Chimera|APT41|Soft Cell|Turla|Gallmaker|APT33|APT39|MuddyWater|Magic Hound|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|CopyKittens|APT3|Sowbug|menuPass|APT1|Ke3chang
225 T1560 Archive Collected Data Collection menuPass|APT32|Honeybee|Patchwork|APT28|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Ke3chang menuPass|APT32|Patchwork|Honeybee|APT28|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Ke3chang
226 T1499.004 Application or System Exploitation Impact no
227 T1499.003 Application Exhaustion Flood Impact no
228 T1499.002 Service Exhaustion Flood Impact no
239 T1134.001 Token Impersonation/Theft Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation APT28
240 T1213.002 Sharepoint Collection Ke3chang|APT28
241 T1213.001 Confluence Collection no
242 T1555.003 Credentials from Web Browsers Credential Access Magic Hound|Sandworm Team|Inception|Stealth Falcon|OilRig|Leafminer|APT33|APT3|Kimsuky|TA505|Stolen Pencil|MuddyWater|APT37|Patchwork|Molerats FIN6|Magic Hound|Sandworm Team|Inception|Stealth Falcon|OilRig|Leafminer|APT33|APT3|Kimsuky|TA505|Stolen Pencil|MuddyWater|APT37|Patchwork|Molerats
243 T1555.002 Securityd Memory Credential Access no
244 T1555.001 Keychain Credential Access no
245 T1559.002 Dynamic Data Exchange Execution Sharpshooter|TA505|MuddyWater|Gallmaker|Patchwork|Cobalt Group|APT37|APT28|FIN7 Sharpshooter|TA505|MuddyWater|Gallmaker|Patchwork|Cobalt Group|APT37|FIN7|APT28
246 T1559.001 Component Object Model Execution Gamaredon Group|MuddyWater
247 T1559 Inter-Process Communication Execution no
248 T1558.002 Silver Ticket Credential Access no
249 T1558.001 Golden Ticket Credential Access Ke3chang
250 T1558 Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets Credential Access no
251 T1557.001 LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay Credential Access|Collection no Wizard Spider
252 T1557 Man-in-the-Middle Credential Access|Collection no
253 T1556.002 Password Filter DLL Credential Access|Defense Evasion Strider
254 T1556.001 Domain Controller Authentication Credential Access|Defense Evasion no Chimera
255 T1556 Modify Authentication Process Credential Access|Defense Evasion no
256 T1056.004 Credential API Hooking Collection|Credential Access PLATINUM
257 T1056.003 Web Portal Capture Collection|Credential Access no
258 T1056.002 GUI Input Capture Collection|Credential Access FIN4
259 T1056.001 Keylogging Collection|Credential Access APT32|Sandworm Team|APT39|APT41|Kimsuky|menuPass|Stolen Pencil|FIN4|APT38|Ke3chang|OilRig|PLATINUM|Sowbug|Magic Hound|Group5|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT3|Darkhotel|APT28 APT32|Sandworm Team|APT39|APT41|Kimsuky|menuPass|Stolen Pencil|FIN4|APT38|Ke3chang|OilRig|PLATINUM|Magic Hound|Sowbug|Group5|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT3|Darkhotel|APT28
260 T1555 Credentials from Password Stores Credential Access APT39|OilRig|MuddyWater|Leafminer|APT33|Turla|Stealth Falcon FIN6|APT39|OilRig|MuddyWater|Leafminer|APT33|Turla|Stealth Falcon
261 T1552.005 Cloud Instance Metadata API Credential Access no
262 T1003.008 /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow Credential Access no
263 T1003.007 Proc Filesystem Credential Access no
264 T1003.006 DCSync Credential Access no
265 T1558.003 Kerberoasting Credential Access no Wizard Spider
266 T1552.006 Group Policy Preferences Credential Access APT33
267 T1003.003 NTDS Credential Access FIN6|Dragonfly 2.0 Wizard Spider|Chimera|FIN6|Dragonfly 2.0
268 T1003.002 Security Account Manager Credential Access Threat Group-3390|Ke3chang|Soft Cell|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|menuPass Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390|Ke3chang|Soft Cell|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|menuPass
269 T1003.001 LSASS Memory Credential Access Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Blue Mockingbird|Silence|Threat Group-3390|Leviathan|APT41|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|Stolen Pencil|APT32|Lazarus Group|Leafminer|Magic Hound|MuddyWater|PLATINUM|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|OilRig|FIN6|APT3|APT28|APT1|Ke3chang|Cleaver Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Blue Mockingbird|Silence|Threat Group-3390|Leviathan|APT41|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|Stolen Pencil|APT32|Lazarus Group|Magic Hound|Leafminer|MuddyWater|FIN8|PLATINUM|BRONZE BUTLER|OilRig|FIN6|APT3|APT28|APT1|Ke3chang|Cleaver
270 T1110.004 Credential Stuffing Credential Access no
271 T1110.003 Password Spraying Credential Access APT33|Leafminer|Lazarus Group APT28|APT33|Leafminer|Lazarus Group
272 T1110.002 Password Cracking Credential Access APT41|Dragonfly 2.0|APT3 FIN6|APT41|Dragonfly 2.0|APT3
273 T1110.001 Password Guessing Credential Access no APT28
274 T1021.006 Windows Remote Management Lateral Movement Threat Group-3390 Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390
275 T1021.005 VNC Lateral Movement GCMAN
276 T1021.004 SSH Lateral Movement Rocke|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|OilRig|menuPass|GCMAN
277 T1021.003 Distributed Component Object Model Lateral Movement no
278 T1021.002 SMB/Windows Admin Shares Lateral Movement Blue Mockingbird|APT39|APT32|Orangeworm|FIN8|APT3|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-1314|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang Wizard Spider|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|APT39|APT32|Orangeworm|FIN8|APT3|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-1314|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang
279 T1021.001 Remote Desktop Protocol Lateral Movement Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Stolen Pencil|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|APT3|OilRig|menuPass|FIN10|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|APT1|Axiom Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Stolen Pencil|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|APT3|OilRig|menuPass|FIN10|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|APT1|Axiom
280 T1554 Compromise Client Software Binary Persistence no
281 T1036.006 Space after Filename Defense Evasion no
282 T1036.005 Match Legitimate Name or Location Defense Evasion Rocke|Sandworm Team|APT39|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Silence|APT41|menuPass|TEMP.Veles|MuddyWater|BRONZE BUTLER|Sowbug|APT32|Patchwork|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Carbanak|APT1 Chimera|PROMETHIUM|Rocke|Sandworm Team|APT39|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Silence|APT41|menuPass|TEMP.Veles|MuddyWater|BRONZE BUTLER|Sowbug|APT32|Patchwork|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Carbanak|APT1
283 T1036.004 Masquerade Task or Service Defense Evasion Wizard Spider|APT-C-36|Carbanak|APT32|FIN6|FIN7 Lazarus Group|PROMETHIUM|Wizard Spider|APT-C-36|Carbanak|APT32|FIN6|FIN7
284 T1036.003 Rename System Utilities Defense Evasion menuPass|APT32|Soft Cell|PLATINUM
285 T1036.002 Right-to-Left Override Defense Evasion BRONZE BUTLER|BlackTech|Ke3chang|Scarlet Mimic
286 T1036.001 Invalid Code Signature Defense Evasion Windshift Windshift|APT37
287 T1553.003 SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking Defense Evasion no
288 T1553.002 Code Signing Defense Evasion Patchwork|Silence|APT41|FIN6|TA505|FIN7|Honeybee|Leviathan|APT37|CopyKittens|Winnti Group|Suckfly|Molerats|Darkhotel Wizard Spider|PROMETHIUM|Patchwork|Silence|APT41|FIN6|TA505|FIN7|Honeybee|Leviathan|CopyKittens|Winnti Group|Suckfly|Molerats|Darkhotel
289 T1553.001 Gatekeeper Bypass Defense Evasion no
290 T1553 Subvert Trust Controls Defense Evasion no
291 T1027.003 Steganography Defense Evasion BRONZE BUTLER|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|APT37
292 T1027.002 Software Packing Defense Evasion TA505|Rocke|Soft Cell|The White Company|APT39|APT38|Dark Caracal|Elderwood|APT3|Patchwork|APT29|Night Dragon Lazarus Group|TA505|Rocke|Soft Cell|The White Company|APT39|APT38|Dark Caracal|Elderwood|APT3|Patchwork|APT29|Night Dragon
293 T1027.001 Binary Padding Defense Evasion Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|APT32|Leviathan|BRONZE BUTLER|Moafee Gamaredon Group|APT32|Patchwork|Leviathan|BRONZE BUTLER|Moafee
294 T1222.002 Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification Defense Evasion Rocke|APT32
295 T1222.001 Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification Defense Evasion no Wizard Spider
296 T1552.004 Private Keys Credential Access Rocke
297 T1552.003 Bash History Credential Access no
298 T1552.002 Credentials in Registry Credential Access APT32
301 T1216.001 PubPrn Defense Evasion APT32
302 T1070.006 Timestomp Defense Evasion Rocke|TEMP.Veles|APT32|Lazarus Group|APT28
303 T1070.005 Network Share Connection Removal Defense Evasion Threat Group-3390
304 T1070.004 File Deletion Defense Evasion Sandworm Team|Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Wizard Spider|APT41|Kimsuky|Silence|The White Company|TEMP.Veles|APT32|APT38|Patchwork|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|menuPass|FIN8|OilRig|FIN5|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|APT3|FIN10|APT28|Threat Group-3390|Group5|Lazarus Group|APT18|APT29 FIN6|Sandworm Team|Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Wizard Spider|APT41|Kimsuky|Silence|The White Company|TEMP.Veles|APT32|APT38|menuPass|Patchwork|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|OilRig|Magic Hound|FIN5|APT3|FIN10|Threat Group-3390|APT28|Group5|Lazarus Group|APT18|APT29
305 T1070.003 Clear Command History Defense Evasion APT41
306 T1550.004 Web Session Cookie Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement no
307 T1550.001 Application Access Token Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement APT28
310 T1550 Use Alternate Authentication Material Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement no
311 T1548.004 Elevated Execution with Prompt Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion no
312 T1548.003 Sudo and Sudo Caching Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion no
313 T1548.002 Bypass User Access Control Bypass User Account Control Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion APT37|MuddyWater|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|Threat Group-3390|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork|APT29
314 T1548.001 Setuid and Setgid Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion no
315 T1548 Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion no
316 T1136.003 Cloud Account Persistence no
317 T1070.002 Clear Linux or Mac System Logs Defense Evasion Rocke
318 T1070.001 Clear Windows Event Logs Defense Evasion APT41|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|APT32|FIN8|FIN5|APT28 APT41|APT38|APT32|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|FIN5|APT28
319 T1136.002 Domain Account Persistence Soft Cell
320 T1136.001 Local Account Persistence APT39|APT41|Dragonfly 2.0|Leafminer|APT3 APT39|APT41|Leafminer|Dragonfly 2.0|APT3
321 T1547.011 Plist Modification Persistence|Privilege Escalation no
322 T1547.010 Port Monitors Persistence|Privilege Escalation no
323 T1547.009 Shortcut Modification Persistence|Privilege Escalation APT39|Darkhotel|APT29|Gorgon Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Leviathan|Lazarus Group
324 T1547.008 LSASS Driver Persistence|Privilege Escalation no
325 T1547.007 Re-opened Applications Persistence|Privilege Escalation no
326 T1547.006 Kernel Modules and Extensions Persistence|Privilege Escalation no
327 T1547.005 Security Support Provider Persistence|Privilege Escalation no Lazarus Group
328 T1547.004 Winlogon Helper DLL Persistence|Privilege Escalation Tropic Trooper|Turla Wizard Spider|Tropic Trooper|Turla
329 T1547.003 Time Providers Persistence|Privilege Escalation no
330 T1546.014 Emond Privilege Escalation|Persistence no
331 T1546.013 PowerShell Profile Privilege Escalation|Persistence Turla
344 T1546.003 Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription Privilege Escalation|Persistence APT33|Blue Mockingbird|Turla|Leviathan|APT29
345 T1546.002 Screensaver Privilege Escalation|Persistence no
346 T1546.001 Change Default File Association Privilege Escalation|Persistence Kimsuky
347 T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder Persistence|Privilege Escalation Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Silence|RTM|Inception|APT41|Machete|Kimsuky|APT33|APT39|APT32|APT18|Turla|Dark Caracal|Cobalt Group|Honeybee|Threat Group-3390|Dragonfly 2.0|Gorgon Group|Ke3chang|APT19|Leviathan|MuddyWater|APT37|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|APT3|FIN10|FIN7|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT29|Darkhotel Wizard Spider|PROMETHIUM|Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Silence|RTM|Inception|APT41|Machete|Kimsuky|APT33|APT39|APT32|APT18|Turla|Threat Group-3390|Dragonfly 2.0|Gorgon Group|Dark Caracal|Cobalt Group|Honeybee|APT19|Ke3chang|Leviathan|MuddyWater|APT37|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|APT3|FIN10|FIN7|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT29|Darkhotel
348 T1218.002 Control Panel Defense Evasion no
349 T1218.010 Regsvr32 Defense Evasion Blue Mockingbird|Inception|WIRTE|Cobalt Group|APT19|Leviathan|APT32|Deep Panda
350 T1218.009 Regsvcs/Regasm Defense Evasion no
351 T1218.005 Mshta Defense Evasion Inception|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|FIN7 Lazarus Group|Inception|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|FIN7
352 T1218.004 InstallUtil Defense Evasion no menuPass
353 T1218.001 Compiled HTML File Defense Evasion APT41|Silence|Lazarus Group|Dark Caracal|OilRig
354 T1218.003 CMSTP Defense Evasion Cobalt Group|MuddyWater
355 T1218.011 Rundll32 Defense Evasion APT32|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|TA505|MuddyWater|APT29|APT19|CopyKittens|APT3|Carbanak|APT28 Gamaredon Group|APT32|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|TA505|MuddyWater|APT29|APT19|CopyKittens|APT3|Carbanak|APT28
356 T1547 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution Persistence|Privilege Escalation no
357 T1546 Event Triggered Execution Privilege Escalation|Persistence no
358 T1098.003 Add Office 365 Global Administrator Role Persistence no
359 T1098.002 Exchange Email Delegate Permissions Persistence Magic Hound
360 T1098.001 Additional Azure Service Principal Credentials Additional Cloud Credentials Persistence no
361 T1543.004 Launch Daemon Persistence|Privilege Escalation no
362 T1543.003 Windows Service Persistence|Privilege Escalation Blue Mockingbird|DarkVishnya|Wizard Spider|APT32|APT41|Kimsuky|Tropic Trooper|Cobalt Group|Ke3chang|Honeybee|FIN7|Threat Group-3390|APT19|APT3|Lazarus Group|Carbanak PROMETHIUM|Blue Mockingbird|DarkVishnya|Wizard Spider|APT32|APT41|Kimsuky|Tropic Trooper|Ke3chang|Cobalt Group|Honeybee|Threat Group-3390|FIN7|APT19|APT3|Lazarus Group|Carbanak
363 T1543.002 Systemd Service Persistence|Privilege Escalation Rocke
364 T1543.001 Launch Agent Persistence|Privilege Escalation no
365 T1037.005 Startup Items Persistence|Privilege Escalation no
374 T1055.004 Asynchronous Procedure Call Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation no
375 T1055.003 Thread Execution Hijacking Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation no
376 T1055.002 Portable Executable Injection Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation Rocke|Gorgon Group
377 T1055.001 Dynamic-link Library Injection Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation TA505|Turla|Tropic Trooper|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda Wizard Spider|TA505|Turla|Tropic Trooper|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda
378 T1037.003 Network Logon Script Persistence|Privilege Escalation no
379 T1543 Create or Modify System Process Persistence|Privilege Escalation no
380 T1037.002 Logon Script (Mac) Persistence|Privilege Escalation no
382 T1542.003 Bootkit Persistence|Defense Evasion APT41|Lazarus Group|APT28
383 T1542.002 Component Firmware Persistence|Defense Evasion Equation
384 T1542.001 System Firmware Persistence|Defense Evasion no
385 T1505.003 Web Shell Persistence Tropic Trooper|Soft Cell|Threat Group-3390|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|APT32|OilRig|Deep Panda Tropic Trooper|Soft Cell|Threat Group-3390|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|APT32|Deep Panda
386 T1505.002 Transport Agent Persistence no
387 T1505.001 SQL Stored Procedures Persistence no
388 T1053.003 Cron Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation Rocke
389 T1053.004 Launchd Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation no
390 T1053.001 At (Linux) Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation no
391 T1053.005 Scheduled Task Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT-C-36|BRONZE BUTLER|APT41|Machete|Soft Cell|Silence|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|Patchwork|OilRig|Rancor|Cobalt Group|FIN8|menuPass|FIN10|APT32|FIN7|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|APT3|APT29 Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT-C-36|BRONZE BUTLER|APT41|Machete|Soft Cell|Silence|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|OilRig|Rancor|Dragonfly 2.0|Cobalt Group|Patchwork|FIN8|FIN10|menuPass|APT32|FIN7|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|APT3|APT29
392 T1053.002 At (Windows) Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation BRONZE BUTLER|Threat Group-3390|APT18
393 T1542 Pre-OS Boot Defense Evasion|Persistence no
394 T1137.001 Office Template Macros Persistence MuddyWater
413 T1505 Server Software Component Persistence no
414 T1499 Endpoint Denial of Service Impact no
415 T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion Defense Evasion|Discovery no
416 T1498 Network Denial of Service Impact no APT28
417 T1496 Resource Hijacking Impact Blue Mockingbird|Rocke|APT41|Lazarus Group
418 T1495 Firmware Corruption Impact no
419 T1491 Defacement Impact no
420 T1490 Inhibit System Recovery Impact no
421 T1489 Service Stop Impact Lazarus Group Wizard Spider|Lazarus Group
422 T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact Impact APT41|TA505|APT38
423 T1485 Data Destruction Impact Sandworm Team|Lazarus Group|APT38
424 T1484 Group Policy Modification Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation no
427 T1222 File and Directory Permissions Modification Defense Evasion no
428 T1221 Template Injection Defense Evasion Gamaredon Group|Frankenstein|Inception|APT28|Tropic Trooper|Dragonfly 2.0|DarkHydrus
429 T1220 XSL Script Processing Defense Evasion Cobalt Group
430 T1197 T1189 BITS Jobs Drive-by Compromise Defense Evasion|Persistence Initial Access Patchwork|APT41|Leviathan Dragonfly|PROMETHIUM|Turla|Windshift|RTM|Darkhotel|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|BRONZE BUTLER|Leafminer|APT32|Lazarus Group|APT19|Dark Caracal|Threat Group-3390|Elderwood|APT37|Patchwork|PLATINUM
T1217 Browser Bookmark Discovery Discovery no
T1213 Data from Information Repositories Collection Turla
T1189 Drive-by Compromise Initial Access Turla|Windshift|RTM|Darkhotel|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|BRONZE BUTLER|Leafminer|Dark Caracal|APT19|APT32|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|Elderwood|APT37|Patchwork|PLATINUM
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution Execution Sandworm Team|MuddyWater|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT41|admin@338|Threat Group-3390|APT12|The White Company|APT33|APT32|APT28|Tropic Trooper|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Cobalt Group|APT37|Patchwork|Leviathan|Elderwood|TA459|APT29
431 T1212 Exploitation for Credential Access Credential Access no
432 T1211 T1217 Exploitation for Defense Evasion Browser Bookmark Discovery Defense Evasion Discovery APT28 no
433 T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application Initial Access Blue Mockingbird|Rocke|APT39|BlackTech|APT41|Soft Cell|Night Dragon|Axiom APT28|APT29|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Blue Mockingbird|Rocke|APT39|BlackTech|APT41|Soft Cell|Night Dragon|Axiom
434 T1210 Exploitation of Remote Services Lateral Movement Threat Group-3390|APT28 Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390|APT28
435 T1202 T1203 Indirect Command Execution Exploitation for Client Execution Defense Evasion Execution no Sandworm Team|MuddyWater|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT41|admin@338|Threat Group-3390|APT12|The White Company|APT33|APT32|APT28|Tropic Trooper|Lazarus Group|Cobalt Group|BRONZE BUTLER|APT37|Patchwork|Leviathan|APT29|Elderwood|TA459
436 T1200 Hardware Additions Initial Access DarkVishnya
437 T1201 T1202 Password Policy Discovery Indirect Command Execution Discovery Defense Evasion Turla|OilRig no
T1219 Remote Access Software Command And Control Sandworm Team|DarkVishnya|RTM|Kimsuky|Night Dragon|Thrip|Cobalt Group|Carbanak
438 T1207 Rogue Domain Controller Defense Evasion no
439 T1199 T1197 Trusted Relationship BITS Jobs Initial Access Defense Evasion|Persistence APT28|menuPass Patchwork|APT41|Leviathan
440 T1211 Exploitation for Defense Evasion Defense Evasion APT28
441 T1219 Remote Access Software Command And Control Sandworm Team|DarkVishnya|RTM|Kimsuky|Night Dragon|Thrip|Cobalt Group|Carbanak
442 T1218 Signed Binary Proxy Execution Defense Evasion no
443 T1204 T1213 User Execution Data from Information Repositories Execution Collection no FIN6|Turla
444 T1216 Signed Script Proxy Execution Defense Evasion no
445 T1201 Password Policy Discovery Discovery Turla|OilRig
446 T1204 User Execution Execution no
447 T1195 Supply Chain Compromise Initial Access Elderwood
448 T1205 Traffic Signaling Defense Evasion|Persistence|Command And Control no
449 T1199 Trusted Relationship Initial Access GOLD SOUTHFIELD|APT28|menuPass
450 T1176 Browser Extensions Persistence Kimsuky|Stolen Pencil
451 T1175 Component Object Model and Distributed COM Lateral Movement|Execution no
452 T1187 Forced Authentication Credential Access DarkHydrus|Dragonfly 2.0
453 T1185 Man in the Browser Collection no
454 T1134 T1140 Access Token Manipulation Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation Defense Evasion Blue Mockingbird Rocke|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Molerats|Frankenstein|Turla|WIRTE|Darkhotel|Tropic Trooper|menuPass|Honeybee|Gorgon Group|APT19|Threat Group-3390|Leviathan|APT28|MuddyWater|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER
455 T1134 Access Token Manipulation Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation FIN6|Blue Mockingbird
456 T1136 Create Account Persistence no
T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information Defense Evasion Rocke|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Molerats|Frankenstein|Turla|WIRTE|Darkhotel|Tropic Trooper|menuPass|Honeybee|Threat Group-3390|APT19|Gorgon Group|Leviathan|MuddyWater|APT28|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER
457 T1149 LC_MAIN Hijacking Defense Evasion no
T1135 Network Share Discovery Discovery APT32|APT39|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT1|Dragonfly 2.0|Sowbug
458 T1137 Office Application Startup Persistence Gamaredon Group|APT32
459 T1153 Source Execution no
460 T1133 T1135 External Remote Services Network Share Discovery Persistence|Initial Access Discovery Sandworm Team|APT41|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|Night Dragon|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|Ke3chang|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|APT18 Wizard Spider|APT32|APT39|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT1|Dragonfly 2.0|Sowbug
461 T1133 External Remote Services Persistence|Initial Access Wizard Spider|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Chimera|Sandworm Team|APT41|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|Night Dragon|OilRig|Ke3chang|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|APT18
462 T1132 Data Encoding Command And Control no
463 T1129 Shared Modules Execution no
464 T1127 Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution Defense Evasion no
466 T1124 System Time Discovery Discovery The White Company|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Turla
467 T1123 Audio Capture Collection APT37
468 T1120 Peripheral Device Discovery Discovery Turla|APT37|Gamaredon Group|Equation|APT28
469 T1119 Automated Collection Collection Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT1|APT28|Patchwork|OilRig|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|FIN6 Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT1|APT28|Patchwork|OilRig|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|FIN6
470 T1115 Clipboard Data Collection APT39|APT38
471 T1114 Email Collection Collection no
472 T1113 Screen Capture Collection Gamaredon Group|APT39|Silence|MuddyWater|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|Dark Caracal|FIN7|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|Group5|APT28
473 T1112 Modify Registry Defense Evasion Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|Turla|APT32|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|Threat Group-3390|Honeybee|Patchwork|Gorgon Group|FIN8 Lazarus Group|Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|Turla|APT32|APT38|Patchwork|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|Threat Group-3390|Honeybee|Gorgon Group|FIN8
474 T1111 Two-Factor Authentication Interception Credential Access no
475 T1110 Brute Force Credential Access DarkVishnya|APT39|OilRig|FIN5|Turla
476 T1108 Redundant Access Defense Evasion|Persistence no
477 T1106 Native API Execution Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Turla|Silence|Gorgon Group|APT37 Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Turla|Silence|Gorgon Group|APT37
478 T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer Command And Control Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Silence|APT-C-36|APT41|Soft Cell|TA505|WIRTE|APT33|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Rancor|Cobalt Group|Turla|Gorgon Group|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|APT37|FIN8|PLATINUM|Leviathan|Elderwood|Magic Hound|APT3|APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN7|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28 Chimera|Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Silence|APT-C-36|APT41|Soft Cell|TA505|WIRTE|APT33|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Rancor|Cobalt Group|Turla|Gorgon Group|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|APT37|FIN8|Leviathan|Elderwood|PLATINUM|APT3|Magic Hound|APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN7|menuPass|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28
479 T1104 Multi-Stage Channels Command And Control APT41|MuddyWater|APT3
480 T1102 Web Service Command And Control Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Inception|FIN6 Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Inception|FIN6
481 T1098 Account Manipulation Persistence APT3|Dragonfly 2.0|Lazarus Group Dragonfly 2.0|APT3|Lazarus Group
482 T1095 Non-Application Layer Protocol Command And Control APT29|PLATINUM|APT3 FIN6|APT29|PLATINUM|APT3
483 T1092 Communication Through Removable Media Command And Control APT28
484 T1091 Replication Through Removable Media Lateral Movement|Initial Access Tropic Trooper|Darkhotel|APT28
485 T1090 Proxy Command And Control Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|APT41|Turla Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|APT41|Turla
486 T1087 Account Discovery Discovery no
487 T1083 File and Directory Discovery Discovery Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Inception|APT41|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|APT18|Leafminer|Honeybee|Dark Caracal|Dragonfly 2.0|Magic Hound|Sowbug|BRONZE BUTLER|APT3|APT28|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Inception|APT41|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|APT18|Leafminer|Honeybee|Dragonfly 2.0|Dark Caracal|APT3|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|Sowbug|APT28|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
488 T1082 System Information Discovery Discovery Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|Honeybee|APT19|APT37|APT32|Magic Hound|OilRig|APT3|Sowbug|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang Wizard Spider|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|APT19|APT32|Honeybee|APT37|Sowbug|OilRig|Magic Hound|APT3|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
489 T1080 Taint Shared Content Lateral Movement BRONZE BUTLER|Darkhotel Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Darkhotel
490 T1078 Valid Accounts Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|APT39|FIN4|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|Leviathan|APT33|OilRig|FIN5|menuPass|APT28|FIN10|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390|APT18|PittyTiger|Carbanak Chimera|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|APT39|FIN4|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|Leviathan|APT33|OilRig|FIN5|APT28|menuPass|FIN10|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390|APT18|PittyTiger|Carbanak
491 T1074 Data Staged Collection Wizard Spider
492 T1072 Software Deployment Tools Execution|Lateral Movement Silence|APT32|Threat Group-1314
493 T1071 Application Layer Protocol Command And Control Rocke|Magic Hound|Dragonfly 2.0
497 T1064 Scripting Defense Evasion|Execution no
498 T1062 Hypervisor Persistence no
499 T1061 Graphical User Interface Execution no
500 T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter Execution APT32|Molerats|Whitefly|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|FIN7|OilRig|FIN5|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Ke3chang APT32|Molerats|Whitefly|APT39|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN7|OilRig|FIN5|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Ke3chang
501 T1057 Process Discovery Discovery Rocke|Frankenstein|Inception|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|APT38|Tropic Trooper|APT37|Honeybee|OilRig|APT3|Magic Hound|APT28|Winnti Group|Stealth Falcon|Poseidon Group|Lazarus Group|Molerats|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang
502 T1056 Input Capture Collection|Credential Access no
503 T1055 Process Injection Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation APT32|Sharpshooter|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|Turla|Cobalt Group|APT37|Honeybee|PLATINUM APT32|Sharpshooter|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|Cobalt Group|APT37|Honeybee|Turla|PLATINUM
504 T1053 Scheduled Task/Job Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation no
505 T1052 Exfiltration Over Physical Medium Exfiltration no
506 T1051 Shared Webroot Lateral Movement no
507 T1049 System Network Connections Discovery Discovery Tropic Trooper|APT41|APT38|Soft Cell|APT32|APT1|OilRig|APT3|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
508 T1048 Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol Exfiltration no
509 T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation Execution Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT41|FIN6|Soft Cell|APT32|MuddyWater|OilRig|Threat Group-3390|FIN8|Leviathan|menuPass|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT29|Deep Panda Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT41|FIN6|Soft Cell|APT32|MuddyWater|OilRig|Threat Group-3390|Leviathan|FIN8|menuPass|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT29|Deep Panda
510 T1046 Network Service Scanning Discovery Rocke|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT39|APT32|Leafminer|OilRig|Cobalt Group|menuPass|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390 Rocke|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT39|APT32|Cobalt Group|Leafminer|OilRig|menuPass|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390
511 T1043 Commonly Used Port Command And Control Machete|OilRig|APT28|TEMP.Veles|Night Dragon|APT29|APT18|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN7|FIN8|APT37|Magic Hound|APT3|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390 OilRig|APT28|TEMP.Veles|Night Dragon|APT29|APT18|APT19|FIN7|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|APT37|Magic Hound|APT3|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390
512 T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel Exfiltration Sandworm Team|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Kimsuky|Soft Cell|APT32|APT3|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Ke3chang
513 T1040 Network Sniffing Credential Access|Discovery Sandworm Team|DarkVishnya|APT33|Stolen Pencil|APT28
514 T1039 Data from Network Shared Drive Collection Sowbug|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Sowbug|menuPass
515 T1037 Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts Persistence|Privilege Escalation Rocke
516 T1036 Masquerading Defense Evasion Windshift|APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|Dragonfly 2.0
517 T1034 Path Interception Persistence|Privilege Escalation no
518 T1033 System Owner/User Discovery Discovery Frankenstein|APT41|Soft Cell|Tropic Trooper|APT39|MuddyWater|APT32|APT37|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|Magic Hound|FIN10|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3 Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT41|Soft Cell|Tropic Trooper|APT39|MuddyWater|APT32|APT37|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|Magic Hound|FIN10|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3
519 T1030 Data Transfer Size Limits Exfiltration Threat Group-3390
520 T1029 Scheduled Transfer Exfiltration no
521 T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information Defense Evasion Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|APT41|Machete|Soft Cell|Turla|TA505|Silence|APT33|Night Dragon|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|APT29|APT18|Tropic Trooper|Cobalt Group|Patchwork|Leafminer|APT37|Threat Group-3390|Honeybee|Dark Caracal|menuPass|APT19|BlackOasis|FIN8|Leviathan|Elderwood|MuddyWater|FIN7|Magic Hound|OilRig|APT3|APT32|Group5|Dust Storm|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT28 FIN6|Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|APT41|Machete|Soft Cell|Turla|TA505|Silence|APT33|Night Dragon|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|APT29|APT18|Tropic Trooper|Honeybee|Leafminer|APT37|Dark Caracal|Patchwork|Threat Group-3390|APT19|menuPass|Cobalt Group|BlackOasis|Elderwood|FIN8|Leviathan|MuddyWater|FIN7|OilRig|Magic Hound|APT3|APT32|Group5|Dust Storm|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT28
522 T1026 Multiband Communication Command And Control Lazarus Group
523 T1025 Data from Removable Media Collection Machete|Turla|Gamaredon Group|APT28
524 T1021 Remote Services Lateral Movement no
525 T1020 Automated Exfiltration Exfiltration Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Honeybee Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Honeybee
526 T1018 Remote System Discovery Discovery Sandworm Team|Rocke|Wizard Spider|Silence|Soft Cell|APT39|APT32|Deep Panda|Threat Group-3390|Dragonfly 2.0|Leafminer|Ke3chang|FIN8|APT3|FIN5|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN6|Turla Sandworm Team|Rocke|Wizard Spider|Silence|Soft Cell|APT39|APT32|Deep Panda|Threat Group-3390|Dragonfly 2.0|Ke3chang|Leafminer|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN5|APT3|menuPass|FIN6|Turla
527 T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery Discovery Sandworm Team|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT41|Soft Cell|APT32|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|Magic Hound|OilRig|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3|Naikon|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang Wizard Spider|Sandworm Team|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT41|Soft Cell|APT32|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|Magic Hound|OilRig|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3|Naikon|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
528 T1014 Rootkit Defense Evasion Rocke|APT41|APT28|Winnti Group
529 T1012 Query Registry Discovery APT32|Dragonfly 2.0|Threat Group-3390|OilRig|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Turla
530 T1011 Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium Exfiltration no
532 T1008 Fallback Channels Command And Control APT41|OilRig|Lazarus Group
533 T1007 System Service Discovery Discovery BRONZE BUTLER|APT1|OilRig|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
534 T1006 Direct Volume Access Defense Evasion no
535 T1005 Data from Local System Collection Gamaredon Group|APT39|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|Soft Cell|Turla|menuPass|Dark Caracal|Dragonfly 2.0|Honeybee|APT37|APT28|APT3|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|Threat Group-3390|APT1|Ke3chang FIN6|Gamaredon Group|APT39|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|Soft Cell|Turla|menuPass|Dark Caracal|Honeybee|Dragonfly 2.0|APT37|APT28|BRONZE BUTLER|APT3|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|Threat Group-3390|APT1|Ke3chang
536 T1003 OS Credential Dumping Credential Access APT39|Frankenstein|APT32|APT28|Leviathan|Sowbug|Suckfly|Poseidon Group|Axiom
537 T1001 Data Obfuscation Command And Control Axiom