Branch was auto-updated.

2026-06-08 17:32:49 +00:00 · 2022-06-01 13:10:08 -07:00
parent b22699be1b 5eb91f7deb
commit 936f371e63
598 changed files with 1548 additions and 768 deletions
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 name: Unload Sysmon Filter Driver
 id: e5928ff3-23eb-4d8b-b8a4-dcbc844fdfbe
-version: 3
-date: '2020-07-22'
+version: 4
+date: '2022-06-01'
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 type: TTP
 datamodel:
@@ -22,12 +22,13 @@ how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from
  The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data
  model. This search is also shipped with `unload_sysmon_filter_driver_filter` macro,
  update this macro to filter out false positives.
-known_false_positives: ''
-references: []
+known_false_positives: 'Unknown at the moment'
+references: 
+  - https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/defense-evasion/unloading-sysmon-driver
 tags:
  analytic_story:
  - Disabling Security Tools
-  asset_type: ''
+  asset_type: Endpoint
  cis20:
  - CIS 8
  confidence: 90
@@ -35,7 +36,7 @@ tags:
  - Source:Endpoint
  - Stage:Defense Evasion
  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/unload_sysmon/windows-sysmon.log
  impact: 50
  kill_chain_phases:
  - Actions on Objectives
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
    "id": {
      "group": null, 
      "name": "DA-ESS-ContentUpdate", 
-      "version": "3.40.0"
+      "version": "3.41.0"
    }, 
    "author": [
      {
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
-# On Date: 2022-05-23T20:35:38 UTC
+# On Date: 2022-05-31T17:59:08 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Security Research
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
@@ -4150,7 +4150,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
 explanation = The following analytic identifies a suspicious process creation of At application. This process can be used by malware, adversaries and red teamers to create persistence entry to the targeted or compromised host with their malicious code. This anomaly detection can be a good indicator to investigate the event before and after this process execution, when it was executed and what schedule task it will execute.
 how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.
-annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.001", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
+annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.002", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
 known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can use this application for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.
 providing_technologies = []

@@ -4430,7 +4430,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
 explanation = This analytic looks for suspicious commandline that may use to append user entry to /etc/at.allow or /etc/at.deny. These 2 files are commonly abused by malware, adversaries or red teamers to persist on the targeted or compromised host. These config file can restrict user that can only execute at application (another schedule task application in linux). attacker can create a user or add the compromised username to that config file to execute at to schedule it malicious code. This anomaly detection can be a good indicator to investigate further the entry in created config file and who created it to verify if it is a false positive.
 how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.
-annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.001", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
+annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.002", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
 known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can use this commandline for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.
 providing_technologies = []

@@ -4660,7 +4660,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
 explanation = Detect usage of plutil to modify plist files. Adversaries can modiy plist files to executed binaries or add command line arguments. Plist files in auto-run locations are executed upon user logon or system startup.
 how_to_implement = This detection uses osquery and endpoint security on MacOS. Follow the link in references, which describes how to setup process auditing in MacOS with endpoint security and osquery.
-annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.011"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
+annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1647"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
 known_false_positives = Administrators using plutil to change plist files.
 providing_technologies = []

@@ -6976,6 +6976,16 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre
 known_false_positives = administrators rarely use adfind, usually not used for legitimate reasons
 providing_technologies = []

+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Command and Scripting Interpreter Path Traversal Exec - Rule]
+type = detection
+asset_type = Endpoint
+confidence = medium
+explanation = The following analytic identifies path traversal commandline execution. This technique was seen in malicious document that execute malicious code using msdt.exe and path traversal technique that serve as defense evasion. This TTP is a good pivot to look for more suspicious process and commandline that runs before and after this execution. This may help you to find possible downloaded malware or other lolbin execution.
+how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product
+annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
+known_false_positives = Not known at this moment.
+providing_technologies = []
+
 [savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Computer Account Created by Computer Account - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
@@ -7235,6 +7245,16 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exp
 known_false_positives = Unknown
 providing_technologies = []

+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Execute Arbitrary Commands with MSDT - Rule]
+type = detection
+asset_type = Endpoint
+confidence = medium
+explanation = The following analytic identifies a recently disclosed arbitraty command execution using Windows msdt.exe - a Diagnostics Troubleshooting Wizard. The sample identified will use the ms-msdt:/ protocol handler to load msdt.exe to retrieve a remote payload. During triage, review file modifications for html. Identify parallel process execution that may be related, including an Office Product.
+how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.
+annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1202"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
+known_false_positives = False positives may be present, filter as needed.
+providing_technologies = []
+
 [savedsearch://ESCU - Windows File Without Extension In Critical Folder - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
@@ -7485,6 +7505,16 @@ annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": [
 known_false_positives = False positives will occur based on legitimate application requests, filter based on source image as needed.
 providing_technologies = []

+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Office Product Spawning MSDT - Rule]
+type = detection
+asset_type = Endpoint
+confidence = medium
+explanation = The following analytic identifies a Microsoft Office product spawning the Windows msdt.exe process. MSDT is a Diagnostics Troubleshooting Wizard native to Windows. This behavior is related to a recently identified sample utilizing protocol handlers to evade preventative controls, including if macros are disabled in the document. During triage, review file modifications for html. In addition, parallel processes including PowerShell and CertUtil.
+how_to_implement = how To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.
+annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
+known_false_positives = False positives should be limited, however filter as needed.
+providing_technologies = []
+
 [savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Possible Credential Dumping - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
@@ -10089,6 +10119,17 @@ description = CVE-2021-40444 is a remote code execution vulnerability in MSHTML,
 narrative = Microsoft is aware of targeted attacks that attempt to exploit this vulnerability, CVE-2021-40444 by using specially-crafted Microsoft Office documents. MSHTML is a software component used to render web pages on Windows. Although it is 2019s most commonly associated with Internet Explorer, it is also used in other software.  CVE-2021-40444 received a CVSS score of 8.8 out of 10. MSHTML is the beating heart of Internet Explorer, the vulnerability also exists in that browser. Although given its limited use, there is little risk of infection by that vector. Microsoft Office applications use the MSHTML component to display web content in Office documents. The attack depends on MSHTML loading a specially crafted ActiveX control when the target opens a malicious Office document. The loaded ActiveX control can then run arbitrary code to infect the system with more malware. At the moment all supported Windows versions are vulnerable. Since there is no patch available yet, Microsoft proposes a few methods to block these attacks. \
 1. Disable the installation of all ActiveX controls in Internet Explorer via the registry. Previously-installed ActiveX controls will still run, but no new ones will be added, including malicious ones. Open documents from the Internet in Protected View or Application Guard for Office, both of which prevent the current attack. This is a default setting but it may have been changed.

+[analytic_story://Microsoft Support Diagnostic Tool Vulnerability CVE-2022-30190]
+category = Adversary Tactics
+last_updated = 2022-05-31
+version = 1
+references = ["https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2022/05/30/guidance-for-cve-2022-30190-microsoft-support-diagnostic-tool-vulnerability/", "https://isc.sans.edu/diary/rss/28694", "https://doublepulsar.com/follina-a-microsoft-office-code-execution-vulnerability-1a47fce5629e", "https://twitter.com/nao_sec/status/1530196847679401984?s=20\u0026t=ZiXYI4dQuA-0_dzQzSUb3A", "https://app.any.run/tasks/713f05d2-fe78-4b9d-a744-f7c133e3fafb/", "https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/4a24048f81afbe9fb62e7a6a49adbd1faf41f266b5f9feecdceb567aec096784/detection", "https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/msdt.exe-152D4C9F63EFB332CCB134C6953C0104.html"]
+maintainers = [{"company": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
+spec_version = 3
+searches = ["ESCU - Windows Command and Scripting Interpreter Path Traversal Exec - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Execute Arbitrary Commands with MSDT - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Office Product Spawning MSDT - Rule"]
+description = On Monday May 30, 2022, Microsoft issued CVE-2022-30190 regarding the Microsoft Support Diagnostic Tool (MSDT) in Windows vulnerability.
+narrative = A remote code execution vulnerability exists when MSDT is called using the URL protocol from a calling application such as Word. An attacker who successfully exploits this vulnerability can run arbitrary code with the privileges of the calling application. The attacker can then install programs, view, change, or delete data, or create new accounts in the context allowed by the user''s rights.
+
 [analytic_story://Monitor for Updates]
 category = Best Practices
 last_updated = 2017-09-15
@@ -10397,7 +10438,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/spear-phishing-campaign-targets-ukraine-government.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Splunk Research Team"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Excel Spawning PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Excel Spawning Windows Script Host - Rule", "ESCU - MSHTML Module Load in Office Product - Rule", "ESCU - Office Application Spawn rundll32 process - Rule", "ESCU - Office Document Creating Schedule Task - Rule", "ESCU - Office Document Executing Macro Code - Rule", "ESCU - Office Document Spawned Child Process To Download - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning BITSAdmin - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning CertUtil - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning MSHTA - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning Rundll32 with no DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning Wmic - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Writing cab or inf - Rule", "ESCU - Office Spawning Control - Rule", "ESCU - Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location - Rule", "ESCU - Windows ISO LNK File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Winword Spawning Cmd - Rule", "ESCU - Winword Spawning PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Gdrive suspicious file sharing - Rule", "ESCU - Gsuite suspicious calendar invite - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outlook exe writing a zip file - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Excel Spawning PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Excel Spawning Windows Script Host - Rule", "ESCU - MSHTML Module Load in Office Product - Rule", "ESCU - Office Application Spawn rundll32 process - Rule", "ESCU - Office Document Creating Schedule Task - Rule", "ESCU - Office Document Executing Macro Code - Rule", "ESCU - Office Document Spawned Child Process To Download - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning BITSAdmin - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning CertUtil - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning MSHTA - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning Rundll32 with no DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning Wmic - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Writing cab or inf - Rule", "ESCU - Office Spawning Control - Rule", "ESCU - Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location - Rule", "ESCU - Windows ISO LNK File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Office Product Spawning MSDT - Rule", "ESCU - Winword Spawning Cmd - Rule", "ESCU - Winword Spawning PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Gdrive suspicious file sharing - Rule", "ESCU - Gsuite suspicious calendar invite - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outlook exe writing a zip file - Rule"]
 description = Detect signs of malicious payloads that may indicate that your environment has been breached via a phishing attack.
 narrative = Despite its simplicity, phishing remains the most pervasive and dangerous cyberthreat. In fact, research shows that as many as [91% of all successful attacks](https://digitalguardian.com/blog/91-percent-cyber-attacks-start-phishing-email-heres-how-protect-against-phishing) are initiated via a phishing email. \
 As most people know, these emails use fraudulent domains, [email scraping](https://www.cyberscoop.com/emotet-trojan-phishing-scraping-templates-cofense-geodo/), familiar contact names inserted as senders, and other tactics to lure targets into clicking a malicious link, opening an attachment with a [nefarious payload](https://www.cyberscoop.com/emotet-trojan-phishing-scraping-templates-cofense-geodo/), or entering sensitive personal information that perpetrators may intercept. This attack technique requires a relatively low level of skill and allows adversaries to easily cast a wide net. Worse, because its success relies on the gullibility of humans, it's impossible to completely "automate" it out of your environment. However, you can use ES and ESCU to detect and investigate potentially malicious payloads injected into your environment subsequent to a phishing attack. \
@@ -10800,7 +10841,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Defense_Evasion"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion - Rule", "ESCU - CSC Net On The Fly Compilation - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Registry Tool - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Security Logs Using MiniNt Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Show Hidden Files - Rule", "ESCU - Disable UAC Remote Restriction - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Windows SmartScreen Protection - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling CMD Application - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling ControlPanel - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Firewall with Netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling FolderOptions Windows Feature - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling NoRun Windows App - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling SystemRestore In Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Task Manager - Rule", "ESCU - Eventvwr UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive number of service control start as disabled - Rule", "ESCU - Firewall Allowed Program Enable - Rule", "ESCU - FodHelper UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - NET Profiler UAC bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands - Rule", "ESCU - Sdclt UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - SilentCleanup UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - SLUI RunAs Elevated - Rule", "ESCU - SLUI Spawning a Process - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - UAC Bypass MMC Load Unsigned Dll - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Defender Exclusion Registry Entry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Change Password Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Lock Workstation Feature Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Notification Center - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Windows Group Policy Features Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DISM Remove Defender - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event For Service Disabled - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Excessive Disabled Services Event - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Hide Notification Features Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Show Compress Color And Info Tip Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Process With NamedPipe CommandLine - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Rasautou DLL Execution - Rule", "ESCU - WSReset UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion - Rule", "ESCU - CSC Net On The Fly Compilation - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Registry Tool - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Security Logs Using MiniNt Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Show Hidden Files - Rule", "ESCU - Disable UAC Remote Restriction - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Windows SmartScreen Protection - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling CMD Application - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling ControlPanel - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Firewall with Netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling FolderOptions Windows Feature - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling NoRun Windows App - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling SystemRestore In Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Task Manager - Rule", "ESCU - Eventvwr UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive number of service control start as disabled - Rule", "ESCU - Firewall Allowed Program Enable - Rule", "ESCU - FodHelper UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - NET Profiler UAC bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands - Rule", "ESCU - Sdclt UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - SilentCleanup UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - SLUI RunAs Elevated - Rule", "ESCU - SLUI Spawning a Process - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - UAC Bypass MMC Load Unsigned Dll - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Command and Scripting Interpreter Path Traversal Exec - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Defender Exclusion Registry Entry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Change Password Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Lock Workstation Feature Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Notification Center - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Windows Group Policy Features Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DISM Remove Defender - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event For Service Disabled - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Excessive Disabled Services Event - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Hide Notification Features Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Show Compress Color And Info Tip Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Process With NamedPipe CommandLine - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Rasautou DLL Execution - Rule", "ESCU - WSReset UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
 description = Detect tactics used by malware to evade defenses on Windows endpoints. A few of these include suspicious `reg.exe` processes, files hidden with `attrib.exe` and disabling user-account control, among many others 
 narrative = Defense evasion is a tactic--identified in the MITRE ATT&CK framework--that adversaries employ in a variety of ways to bypass or defeat defensive security measures. There are many techniques enumerated by the MITRE ATT&CK framework that are applicable in this context. This Analytic Story includes searches designed to identify the use of such techniques on Windows platforms.

@@ -10827,7 +10868,7 @@ description = Uncover activity consistent with CVE-2020-1350, or SIGRed. Discove
 narrative = When a client requests a DNS record for a particular domain, that request gets routed first through the client's locally configured DNS server, then to any DNS server(s) configured as forwarders, and then onto the target domain's own DNS server(s).  If a attacker wanted to, they could host a malicious DNS server that responds to the initial request with a specially crafted large response (~65KB).  This response would flow through to the client's local DNS server, which if not patched for CVE-2020-1350, would cause the buffer overflow. The detection searches in this Analytic Story use wire data to detect the malicious behavior. Searches for Splunk Stream and Zeek are included.  The Splunk Stream search correlates across stream:dns and stream:tcp, while the Zeek search correlates across bro:dns:json and bro:conn:json.  These correlations are required to pick up both the DNS record types (SIG and KEY) along with the payload size (>65KB).

 [analytic_story://Windows Drivers]
-category = 
+category = Adversary Tactics
 last_updated = 2022-03-30
 version = 1
 references = ["https://redcanary.com/blog/tracking-driver-inventory-to-expose-rootkits/", "https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/22/e/avoslocker-ransomware-variant-abuses-driver-file-to-disable-anti-Virus-scans-log4shell.html", "https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/daxin-backdoor-espionage", "https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/08064459/Equation_group_questions_and_answers.pdf", "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2022/01/11/signed-kernel-drivers-unguarded-gateway-windows-core/"]
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 is_configured = false
 state = enabled
 state_change_requires_restart = false
-build = 7910
+build = 8031

 [triggers]
 reload.analytic_stories = simple
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ reload.es_investigations = simple

 [launcher]
 author = Splunk
-version = 3.40.0
+version = 3.41.0
 description = Explore the Analytic Stories included with ES Content Updates.

 [ui]
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
-# On Date: 2022-05-23T20:35:38 UTC
+# On Date: 2022-05-31T17:59:08 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Security Research
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
 [content-version]
-version = 3.40.0
+version = 3.41.0
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
-# On Date: 2022-05-23T20:35:38 UTC
+# On Date: 2022-05-31T17:59:08 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Security Research
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
-# On Date: 2022-05-23T20:35:38 UTC
+# On Date: 2022-05-31T17:59:08 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Security Research
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
@@ -2733,6 +2733,10 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
 definition = search *
 description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.

+[windows_command_and_scripting_interpreter_path_traversal_exec_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
 [windows_computer_account_created_by_computer_account_filter]
 definition = search *
 description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
@@ -2833,6 +2837,10 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
 definition = search *
 description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.

+[windows_execute_arbitrary_commands_with_msdt_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
 [windows_file_without_extension_in_critical_folder_filter]
 definition = search *
 description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
@@ -2925,6 +2933,10 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
 definition = search *
 description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.

+[windows_office_product_spawning_msdt_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
 [windows_possible_credential_dumping_filter]
 definition = search *
 description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
-# On Date: 2022-05-23T20:35:38 UTC
+# On Date: 2022-05-31T17:59:08 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Security Research
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
@@ -17782,13 +17782,13 @@ search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a suspicious process creation of At application. This process can be used by malware, adversaries and red teamers to create persistence entry to the targeted or compromised host with their malicious code. This anomaly detection can be a good indicator to investigate the event before and after this process execution, when it was executed and what schedule task it will execute.
-action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.001", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
+action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.002", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
 action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies a suspicious process creation of At application. This process can be used by malware, adversaries and red teamers to create persistence entry to the targeted or compromised host with their malicious code. This anomaly detection can be a good indicator to investigate the event before and after this process execution, when it was executed and what schedule task it will execute.
 action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.
 action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can use this application for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.
-action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-17
-action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-17
+action.escu.creation_date = 2022-05-26
+action.escu.modification_date = 2022-05-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux At Application Execution - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
@@ -17805,7 +17805,7 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux At Application Execution - Rule
-action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.001", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]}
+action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.002", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]}
 schedule_window = auto
 alert.digest_mode = 1
 disabled = true
@@ -18950,13 +18950,13 @@ search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic looks for suspicious commandline that may use to append user entry to /etc/at.allow or /etc/at.deny. These 2 files are commonly abused by malware, adversaries or red teamers to persist on the targeted or compromised host. These config file can restrict user that can only execute at application (another schedule task application in linux). attacker can create a user or add the compromised username to that config file to execute at to schedule it malicious code. This anomaly detection can be a good indicator to investigate further the entry in created config file and who created it to verify if it is a false positive.
-action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.001", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
+action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.002", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
 action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for suspicious commandline that may use to append user entry to /etc/at.allow or /etc/at.deny. These 2 files are commonly abused by malware, adversaries or red teamers to persist on the targeted or compromised host. These config file can restrict user that can only execute at application (another schedule task application in linux). attacker can create a user or add the compromised username to that config file to execute at to schedule it malicious code. This anomaly detection can be a good indicator to investigate further the entry in created config file and who created it to verify if it is a false positive.
 action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.
 action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can use this commandline for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.
-action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-17
-action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-17
+action.escu.creation_date = 2022-05-26
+action.escu.modification_date = 2022-05-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Possible Append Command To At Allow Config File - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
@@ -18973,7 +18973,7 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Possible Append Command To At Allow Config File - Rule
-action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.001", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]}
+action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.002", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]}
 schedule_window = auto
 alert.digest_mode = 1
 disabled = true
@@ -19912,13 +19912,13 @@ search = `osquery` name=es_process_events columns.cmdline IN ("find*", "crontab*
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = Detect usage of plutil to modify plist files. Adversaries can modiy plist files to executed binaries or add command line arguments. Plist files in auto-run locations are executed upon user logon or system startup.
-action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.011"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
+action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1647"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
 action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 action.escu.eli5 = Detect usage of plutil to modify plist files. Adversaries can modiy plist files to executed binaries or add command line arguments. Plist files in auto-run locations are executed upon user logon or system startup.
 action.escu.how_to_implement = This detection uses osquery and endpoint security on MacOS. Follow the link in references, which describes how to setup process auditing in MacOS with endpoint security and osquery.
 action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators using plutil to change plist files.
-action.escu.creation_date = 2022-03-29
-action.escu.modification_date = 2022-03-29
+action.escu.creation_date = 2022-05-26
+action.escu.modification_date = 2022-05-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - MacOS plutil - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
@@ -19935,7 +19935,7 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - MacOS plutil - Rule
-action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Living Off The Land"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.011"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "process", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]}
+action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Living Off The Land"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1647"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "process", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]}
 schedule_window = auto
 action.notable = 1
 action.notable.param.nes_fields = user,dest
@@ -30182,6 +30182,52 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process="* -f *" OR Processes.process="* -b *") AND (Processes.process=*objectcategory* OR Processes.process="* -gcb *" OR Processes.process="* -sc *") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_adfind_exe_filter`

+[ESCU - Windows Command and Scripting Interpreter Path Traversal Exec - Rule]
+action.escu = 0
+action.escu.enabled = 1
+description = The following analytic identifies path traversal commandline execution. This technique was seen in malicious document that execute malicious code using msdt.exe and path traversal technique that serve as defense evasion. This TTP is a good pivot to look for more suspicious process and commandline that runs before and after this execution. This may help you to find possible downloaded malware or other lolbin execution.
+action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
+action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"]
+action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies path traversal commandline execution. This technique was seen in malicious document that execute malicious code using msdt.exe and path traversal technique that serve as defense evasion. This TTP is a good pivot to look for more suspicious process and commandline that runs before and after this execution. This may help you to find possible downloaded malware or other lolbin execution.
+action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product
+action.escu.known_false_positives = Not known at this moment.
+action.escu.creation_date = 2022-05-30
+action.escu.modification_date = 2022-05-30
+action.escu.confidence = high
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Command and Scripting Interpreter Path Traversal Exec - Rule
+action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
+action.escu.providing_technologies = []
+action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Microsoft Support Diagnostic Tool Vulnerability CVE-2022-30190"]
+action.risk = 1
+action.risk.param._risk_message = A parent process $parent_process_name$ has spawned a child $process_name$ with path traversal commandline $process$ in $dest$
+action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 90}]
+action.risk.param._risk_score = 0
+action.risk.param.verbose = 0
+cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
+dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
+dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
+action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Command and Scripting Interpreter Path Traversal Exec - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Microsoft Support Diagnostic Tool Vulnerability CVE-2022-30190"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]}
+schedule_window = auto
+action.notable = 1
+action.notable.param.nes_fields = user,dest
+action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies path traversal commandline execution. This technique was seen in malicious document that execute malicious code using msdt.exe and path traversal technique that serve as defense evasion. This TTP is a good pivot to look for more suspicious process and commandline that runs before and after this execution. This may help you to find possible downloaded malware or other lolbin execution.
+action.notable.param.rule_title = Windows Command and Scripting Interpreter Path Traversal Exec
+action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint
+action.notable.param.severity = high
+alert.digest_mode = 1
+disabled = true
+enableSched = 1
+allow_skew = 100%
+counttype = number of events
+relation = greater than
+quantity = 0
+realtime_schedule = 0
+is_visible = false
+search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where  Processes.process="*\/..\/..\/..\/..\/..\/..\/..\/..\/..\/*"  by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_hash | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_command_and_scripting_interpreter_path_traversal_exec_filter`
+
 [ESCU - Windows Computer Account Created by Computer Account - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
@@ -31290,6 +31336,52 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `wineventlog_system` EventCode=7040 Message = "*service was changed from demand start to disabled." | stats count values(Message) as MessageList dc(Message) as MessageCount min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by ComputerName EventCode  User Sid | where MessageCount >=10 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_excessive_disabled_services_event_filter`

+[ESCU - Windows Execute Arbitrary Commands with MSDT - Rule]
+action.escu = 0
+action.escu.enabled = 1
+description = The following analytic identifies a recently disclosed arbitraty command execution using Windows msdt.exe - a Diagnostics Troubleshooting Wizard. The sample identified will use the ms-msdt:/ protocol handler to load msdt.exe to retrieve a remote payload. During triage, review file modifications for html. Identify parallel process execution that may be related, including an Office Product.
+action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1202"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
+action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"]
+action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies a recently disclosed arbitraty command execution using Windows msdt.exe - a Diagnostics Troubleshooting Wizard. The sample identified will use the ms-msdt:/ protocol handler to load msdt.exe to retrieve a remote payload. During triage, review file modifications for html. Identify parallel process execution that may be related, including an Office Product.
+action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.
+action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present, filter as needed.
+action.escu.creation_date = 2022-05-30
+action.escu.modification_date = 2022-05-30
+action.escu.confidence = high
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Execute Arbitrary Commands with MSDT - Rule
+action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
+action.escu.providing_technologies = []
+action.escu.analytic_story = ["Microsoft Support Diagnostic Tool Vulnerability CVE-2022-30190"]
+action.risk = 1
+action.risk.param._risk_message = A parent process $parent_process_name$ has spawned a child process $process_name$ on host $dest$ possibly indicative of indirect command execution.
+action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 100}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 100}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}]
+action.risk.param._risk_score = 0
+action.risk.param.verbose = 0
+cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
+dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
+dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
+action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Execute Arbitrary Commands with MSDT - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Microsoft Support Diagnostic Tool Vulnerability CVE-2022-30190"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "cve": ["CVE-2022-30190"], "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1202"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]}
+schedule_window = auto
+action.notable = 1
+action.notable.param.nes_fields = user,dest
+action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies a recently disclosed arbitraty command execution using Windows msdt.exe - a Diagnostics Troubleshooting Wizard. The sample identified will use the ms-msdt:/ protocol handler to load msdt.exe to retrieve a remote payload. During triage, review file modifications for html. Identify parallel process execution that may be related, including an Office Product.
+action.notable.param.rule_title = Windows Execute Arbitrary Commands with MSDT
+action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint
+action.notable.param.severity = high
+alert.digest_mode = 1
+disabled = true
+enableSched = 1
+allow_skew = 100%
+counttype = number of events
+relation = greater than
+quantity = 0
+realtime_schedule = 0
+is_visible = false
+search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=msdt.exe Processes.process="*ms-msdt:/id*" Processes.process="*IT_BrowseForFile=*" Processes.process="*IT_RebrowseForFile=*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_execute_arbitrary_commands_with_msdt_filter`
+
 [ESCU - Windows File Without Extension In Critical Folder - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
@@ -32363,6 +32455,52 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=*lsass.exe SourceUser!="NT AUTHORITY\\*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, TargetImage, GrantedAccess, SourceImage, SourceProcessId, SourceUser, TargetUser | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_non_system_account_targeting_lsass_filter`

+[ESCU - Windows Office Product Spawning MSDT - Rule]
+action.escu = 0
+action.escu.enabled = 1
+description = The following analytic identifies a Microsoft Office product spawning the Windows msdt.exe process. MSDT is a Diagnostics Troubleshooting Wizard native to Windows. This behavior is related to a recently identified sample utilizing protocol handlers to evade preventative controls, including if macros are disabled in the document. During triage, review file modifications for html. In addition, parallel processes including PowerShell and CertUtil.
+action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
+action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"]
+action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies a Microsoft Office product spawning the Windows msdt.exe process. MSDT is a Diagnostics Troubleshooting Wizard native to Windows. This behavior is related to a recently identified sample utilizing protocol handlers to evade preventative controls, including if macros are disabled in the document. During triage, review file modifications for html. In addition, parallel processes including PowerShell and CertUtil.
+action.escu.how_to_implement = how To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.
+action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives should be limited, however filter as needed.
+action.escu.creation_date = 2022-05-30
+action.escu.modification_date = 2022-05-30
+action.escu.confidence = high
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Office Product Spawning MSDT - Rule
+action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
+action.escu.providing_technologies = []
+action.escu.analytic_story = ["Spearphishing Attachments", "Microsoft Support Diagnostic Tool Vulnerability CVE-2022-30190"]
+action.risk = 1
+action.risk.param._risk_message = Office parent process $parent_process_name$ has spawned a child process $process_name$ on host $dest$.
+action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 100}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 100}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}]
+action.risk.param._risk_score = 0
+action.risk.param.verbose = 0
+cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
+dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
+dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
+action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Office Product Spawning MSDT - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments", "Microsoft Support Diagnostic Tool Vulnerability CVE-2022-30190"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "cve": ["CVE-2022-30190"], "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]}
+schedule_window = auto
+action.notable = 1
+action.notable.param.nes_fields = user,dest
+action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies a Microsoft Office product spawning the Windows msdt.exe process. MSDT is a Diagnostics Troubleshooting Wizard native to Windows. This behavior is related to a recently identified sample utilizing protocol handlers to evade preventative controls, including if macros are disabled in the document. During triage, review file modifications for html. In addition, parallel processes including PowerShell and CertUtil.
+action.notable.param.rule_title = Windows Office Product Spawning MSDT
+action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint
+action.notable.param.severity = high
+alert.digest_mode = 1
+disabled = true
+enableSched = 1
+allow_skew = 100%
+counttype = number of events
+relation = greater than
+quantity = 0
+realtime_schedule = 0
+is_visible = false
+search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","outlook.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe") Processes.process_name=msdt.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_office_product_spawning_msdt_filter`
+
 [ESCU - Windows Possible Credential Dumping - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
-# On Date: 2022-05-23T20:35:38 UTC
+# On Date: 2022-05-31T17:59:08 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Security Research
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
-# On Date: 2022-05-23T20:35:38 UTC
+# On Date: 2022-05-31T17:59:08 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Security Research
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
@@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ T1584.002,DNS Server,Resource Development,no
 T1584.001,Domains,Resource Development,Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|Transparent Tribe|Magic Hound|APT29|APT1
 T1583.006,Web Services,Resource Development,APT28|Confucius|LazyScripter|Kimsuky|Magic Hound|IndigoZebra|ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|HAFNIUM|Lazarus Group|Turla|APT32|APT17|APT29
 T1583.005,Botnet,Resource Development,no
-T1583.004,Server,Resource Development,Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|Gelsemium|GALLIUM|Sandworm Team
+T1583.004,Server,Resource Development,Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|GALLIUM|Sandworm Team
 T1583.003,Virtual Private Server,Resource Development,Axiom|Dragonfly|HAFNIUM|TEMP.Veles
 T1583.002,DNS Server,Resource Development,Axiom
 T1584,Compromise Infrastructure,Resource Development,no
@@ -174,9 +174,9 @@ T1546.015,Component Object Model Hijacking,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,APT2
 T1071.004,DNS,Command And Control,LazyScripter|Chimera|APT39|Tropic Trooper|OilRig|Ke3chang|Cobalt Group|APT18|APT41|FIN7
 T1071.003,Mail Protocols,Command And Control,Turla|Kimsuky|APT32|SilverTerrier|APT28
 T1071.002,File Transfer Protocols,Command And Control,Kimsuky|APT41|SilverTerrier|Honeybee
-T1071.001,Web Protocols,Command And Control,Kimsuky|Confucius|TeamTNT|FIN8|APT29|Mustang Panda|Windshift|TA551|Higaisa|HAFNIUM|Sidewinder|Chimera|Sandworm Team|TA505|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Inception|APT41|SilverTerrier|APT28|WIRTE|APT33|FIN4|Night Dragon|APT18|APT38|Rancor|Ke3chang|Orangeworm|APT37|APT19|Cobalt Group|Threat Group-3390|Dark Caracal|Turla|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|APT32|OilRig|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon
+T1071.001,Web Protocols,Command And Control,Kimsuky|Confucius|TeamTNT|FIN8|APT29|Mustang Panda|Windshift|TA551|Higaisa|HAFNIUM|Sidewinder|Chimera|Sandworm Team|TA505|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Inception|APT41|SilverTerrier|APT28|WIRTE|APT33|FIN4|Night Dragon|APT18|APT38|Dark Caracal|Cobalt Group|Orangeworm|Rancor|Threat Group-3390|Turla|APT19|APT37|Ke3chang|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|OilRig|APT32|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon
 T1572,Protocol Tunneling,Command And Control,Leviathan|CostaRicto|Chimera|Fox Kitten|OilRig|Cobalt Group|FIN6
-T1048.003,Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol,Exfiltration,Wizard Spider|FIN6|APT32|APT33|Thrip|FIN8|OilRig|Lazarus Group
+T1048.003,Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol,Exfiltration,Wizard Spider|FIN6|APT32|APT33|Thrip|FIN8|OilRig|Lazarus Group
 T1048.002,Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol,Exfiltration,APT28|APT29
 T1048.001,Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol,Exfiltration,no
 T1001.003,Protocol Impersonation,Command And Control,Higaisa|Lazarus Group
@@ -189,18 +189,18 @@ T1090.003,Multi-hop Proxy,Command And Control,Leviathan|CostaRicto|APT28|Operati
 T1090.002,External Proxy,Command And Control,Tonto Team|APT39|Silence|GALLIUM|MuddyWater|APT3|FIN5|Lazarus Group|menuPass|APT28
 T1090.001,Internal Proxy,Command And Control,Lazarus Group|Turla|APT29|Higaisa|Operation Wocao|APT39|Strider
 T1102.003,One-Way Communication,Command And Control,Leviathan
-T1102.002,Bidirectional Communication,Command And Control,Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|APT28|APT29|Sandworm Team|APT39|APT12|Turla|FIN7|APT37|Magic Hound|Carbanak
+T1102.002,Bidirectional Communication,Command And Control,Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|APT28|APT29|Sandworm Team|APT39|APT12|FIN7|Turla|APT37|Magic Hound|Carbanak
 T1102.001,Dead Drop Resolver,Command And Control,Rocke|APT41|BRONZE BUTLER|RTM|Patchwork
 T1571,Non-Standard Port,Command And Control,WIRTE|Sandworm Team|Rocke|DarkVishnya|Silence|APT-C-36|Magic Hound|APT33|APT32|TEMP.Veles|Lazarus Group|FIN7
 T1074.002,Remote Data Staging,Collection,Leviathan|APT28|APT29|Chimera|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|FIN6|Night Dragon|FIN8
-T1074.001,Local Data Staging,Collection,Dragonfly|Indrik Spider|BackdoorDiplomacy|Mustang Panda|Sidewinder|Chimera|Kimsuky|APT39|Operation Wocao|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|Patchwork|Honeybee|Dragonfly 2.0|Leviathan|APT3|FIN5|menuPass|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28
+T1074.001,Local Data Staging,Collection,Dragonfly|Indrik Spider|BackdoorDiplomacy|Mustang Panda|Sidewinder|Chimera|Kimsuky|APT39|Operation Wocao|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|Honeybee|Patchwork|Leviathan|APT3|FIN5|menuPass|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28
 T1078.004,Cloud Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,Ke3chang|APT29|APT28|APT33
 T1564.004,NTFS File Attributes,Defense Evasion,APT32
 T1564.003,Hidden Window,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|Kimsuky|Nomadic Octopus|Higaisa|Gorgon Group|Deep Panda|DarkHydrus|CopyKittens|APT19|APT32|APT28|APT3|Magic Hound
 T1078.003,Local Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,APT29|Kimsuky|HAFNIUM|Turla|Operation Wocao|PROMETHIUM|Tropic Trooper|FIN10|APT32
 T1078.002,Domain Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,Naikon|Indrik Spider|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|APT29|TA505|APT3|Threat Group-1314
 T1078.001,Default Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,no
-T1564.002,Hidden Users,Defense Evasion,Kimsuky|Dragonfly|Dragonfly 2.0
+T1564.002,Hidden Users,Defense Evasion,Kimsuky|Dragonfly
 T1574.006,Dynamic Linker Hijacking,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,APT41|Rocke
 T1574.002,DLL Side-Loading,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,Lazarus Group|Mustang Panda|Higaisa|BlackTech|Sidewinder|Chimera|BRONZE BUTLER|Naikon|APT41|GALLIUM|Tropic Trooper|APT19|Patchwork|APT32|APT3|menuPass|Threat Group-3390
 T1574.001,DLL Search Order Hijacking,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,Aquatic Panda|BackdoorDiplomacy|Tonto Team|Evilnum|APT41|Whitefly|RTM|Threat Group-3390|menuPass
@@ -214,10 +214,10 @@ T1574,Hijack Execution Flow,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
 T1069.001,Local Groups,Discovery,Tonto Team|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Turla|OilRig|admin@338
 T1570,Lateral Tool Transfer,Lateral Movement,Sandworm Team|Chimera|GALLIUM|Operation Wocao|APT32|Wizard Spider|Turla|FIN10
 T1568.003,DNS Calculation,Command And Control,APT12
-T1204.002,Malicious File,Execution,LazyScripter|WIRTE|Confucius|Dragonfly|Threat Group-3390|Nomadic Octopus|Indrik Spider|APT38|Andariel|Ferocious Kitten|IndigoZebra|Transparent Tribe|Tonto Team|Magic Hound|Ajax Security Team|Mustang Panda|TA551|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Kimsuky|FIN6|PROMETHIUM|APT30|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|RTM|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|Machete|admin@338|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN7|BRONZE BUTLER|Gorgon Group|OilRig|Dark Caracal|Cobalt Group|DarkHydrus|Rancor|Patchwork|APT32|APT19|MuddyWater|Lazarus Group|menuPass|APT37|Leviathan|TA459|APT29|APT28|FIN8|PLATINUM|Elderwood
-T1204.001,Malicious Link,Execution,LazyScripter|Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|Confucius|FIN7|Transparent Tribe|APT3|Magic Hound|APT28|APT29|Mustang Panda|Sidewinder|ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|Evilnum|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|Patchwork|Windshift|APT32|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|TA505|OilRig|Machete|Leviathan|FIN8|FIN4|Elderwood|Dragonfly 2.0|Cobalt Group|APT39|Night Dragon|Turla|APT33
+T1204.002,Malicious File,Execution,LazyScripter|WIRTE|Confucius|Dragonfly|Threat Group-3390|Nomadic Octopus|Indrik Spider|APT38|Andariel|Ferocious Kitten|IndigoZebra|Transparent Tribe|Tonto Team|Magic Hound|Ajax Security Team|Mustang Panda|TA551|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Kimsuky|FIN6|PROMETHIUM|APT30|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|RTM|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|Machete|admin@338|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|MuddyWater|Rancor|Gorgon Group|OilRig|FIN7|APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|Cobalt Group|APT19|DarkHydrus|Dark Caracal|PLATINUM|menuPass|Leviathan|APT28|APT29|TA459|APT37|Elderwood|FIN8
+T1204.001,Malicious Link,Execution,LazyScripter|Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|Confucius|FIN7|Transparent Tribe|APT3|Magic Hound|APT28|APT29|Mustang Panda|Sidewinder|ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|Evilnum|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|Patchwork|Windshift|APT32|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|TA505|OilRig|Machete|Leviathan|FIN8|FIN4|Elderwood|Cobalt Group|APT39|Night Dragon|APT33|Turla
 T1195.003,Compromise Hardware Supply Chain,Initial Access,no
-T1195.002,Compromise Software Supply Chain,Initial Access,Gelsemium|Threat Group-3390|APT29|Cobalt Group|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Dragonfly|Sandworm Team|APT41
+T1195.002,Compromise Software Supply Chain,Initial Access,Threat Group-3390|APT29|Cobalt Group|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Dragonfly|Sandworm Team|APT41
 T1195.001,Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools,Initial Access,no
 T1568.001,Fast Flux DNS,Command And Control,menuPass|TA505
 T1052.001,Exfiltration over USB,Exfiltration,Mustang Panda|Tropic Trooper
@@ -225,16 +225,16 @@ T1569.002,Service Execution,Execution,APT38|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spide
 T1569.001,Launchctl,Execution,no
 T1569,System Services,Execution,no
 T1568.002,Domain Generation Algorithms,Command And Control,TA551|APT41
-T1568,Dynamic Resolution,Command And Control,Gamaredon Group|Gelsemium|Transparent Tribe|APT29
+T1568,Dynamic Resolution,Command And Control,Gamaredon Group|Transparent Tribe|APT29
 T1011.001,Exfiltration Over Bluetooth,Exfiltration,no
 T1567.002,Exfiltration to Cloud Storage,Exfiltration,Kimsuky|Threat Group-3390|Confucius|Lazarus Group|FIN7|ZIRCONIUM|HAFNIUM|Chimera|Leviathan|Turla
 T1567.001,Exfiltration to Code Repository,Exfiltration,no
-T1059.006,Python,Execution,Dragonfly|Tonto Team|APT37|ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|Turla|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|APT29|Rocke|BRONZE BUTLER|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|Machete
-T1059.005,Visual Basic,Execution,Confucius|Lazarus Group|LazyScripter|OilRig|APT38|Transparent Tribe|APT29|Mustang Panda|Windshift|Higaisa|Sidewinder|APT39|Machete|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|APT33|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|Rancor|Patchwork|MuddyWater|Honeybee|FIN7|APT37|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|Turla|TA505|Silence|WIRTE|FIN4|Cobalt Group|Gorgon Group|Leviathan|TA459|Magic Hound
+T1059.006,Python,Execution,Dragonfly|Tonto Team|APT37|ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|Turla|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|APT29|Rocke|BRONZE BUTLER|APT39|Machete
+T1059.005,Visual Basic,Execution,Confucius|Lazarus Group|LazyScripter|OilRig|APT38|Transparent Tribe|APT29|Mustang Panda|Windshift|Higaisa|Sidewinder|APT39|Machete|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|APT33|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|Rancor|Patchwork|MuddyWater|Honeybee|FIN7|APT37|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|Turla|TA505|Silence|WIRTE|FIN4|Gorgon Group|Cobalt Group|Leviathan|TA459|Magic Hound
 T1059.004,Unix Shell,Execution,TeamTNT|Rocke|APT41
-T1059.003,Windows Command Shell,Execution,Kimsuky|Aquatic Panda|Dragonfly|LazyScripter|Sandworm Team|Nomadic Octopus|TeamTNT|APT29|Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|TA551|Higaisa|Indrik Spider|Chimera|Fox Kitten|Machete|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|FIN6|TA505|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|OilRig|Lazarus Group|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|FIN7|APT41|GALLIUM|Turla|Silence|APT32|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Gorgon Group|Dark Caracal|Ke3chang|Dragonfly 2.0|Rancor|FIN8|APT28|APT37|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|Sowbug|menuPass|FIN10|Threat Group-3390|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Suckfly|Threat Group-1314|APT3|admin@338|APT1
+T1059.003,Windows Command Shell,Execution,Kimsuky|Aquatic Panda|Dragonfly|LazyScripter|Sandworm Team|Nomadic Octopus|TeamTNT|APT29|Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|TA551|Higaisa|Indrik Spider|Chimera|Fox Kitten|Machete|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|FIN6|TA505|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|OilRig|Lazarus Group|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|FIN7|APT41|GALLIUM|Turla|Silence|APT32|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Dark Caracal|Ke3chang|Gorgon Group|Rancor|FIN8|APT28|APT37|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|Sowbug|menuPass|FIN10|Threat Group-3390|Gamaredon Group|Suckfly|Patchwork|Threat Group-1314|APT3|admin@338|APT1
 T1059.002,AppleScript,Execution,no
-T1059.001,PowerShell,Execution,Gamaredon Group|Lazarus Group|Aquatic Panda|Confucius|Dragonfly|LazyScripter|Nomadic Octopus|TeamTNT|APT38|Tonto Team|Mustang Panda|Indrik Spider|HAFNIUM|Sidewinder|Fox Kitten|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|APT39|DarkVishnya|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Inception|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|GALLIUM|TA505|WIRTE|TEMP.Veles|APT33|Gallmaker|Turla|Thrip|Cobalt Group|APT28|DarkHydrus|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|Gorgon Group|TA459|Leviathan|MuddyWater|FIN8|CopyKittens|OilRig|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN7|APT32|menuPass|FIN10|Threat Group-3390|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Poseidon Group|APT3|APT29|Deep Panda
+T1059.001,PowerShell,Execution,Gamaredon Group|Lazarus Group|Aquatic Panda|Confucius|Dragonfly|LazyScripter|Nomadic Octopus|TeamTNT|APT38|Tonto Team|Mustang Panda|Indrik Spider|HAFNIUM|Sidewinder|Fox Kitten|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|APT39|DarkVishnya|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Inception|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|GALLIUM|TA505|WIRTE|TEMP.Veles|APT33|Gallmaker|APT19|DarkHydrus|APT28|Turla|Gorgon Group|Thrip|Cobalt Group|Leviathan|MuddyWater|FIN8|TA459|CopyKittens|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|Threat Group-3390|FIN10|APT32|FIN7|menuPass|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Poseidon Group|APT3|APT29|Deep Panda
 T1567,Exfiltration Over Web Service,Exfiltration,APT28
 T1497.003,Time Based Evasion,Defense Evasion|Discovery,no
 T1497.002,User Activity Based Checks,Defense Evasion|Discovery,Darkhotel|FIN7
@@ -242,40 +242,40 @@ T1497.001,System Checks,Defense Evasion|Discovery,Lazarus Group|OilRig|Darkhotel
 T1498.002,Reflection Amplification,Impact,no
 T1498.001,Direct Network Flood,Impact,no
 T1566.003,Spearphishing via Service,Initial Access,Lazarus Group|APT29|Ajax Security Team|Magic Hound|Windshift|FIN6|OilRig|Dark Caracal
-T1566.002,Spearphishing Link,Initial Access,Lazarus Group|Confucius|LazyScripter|Transparent Tribe|FIN7|APT3|Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|Sidewinder|Evilnum|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|APT1|Windshift|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|Machete|Kimsuky|TA505|APT39|FIN4|APT32|Night Dragon|APT28|Cobalt Group|Turla|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|Elderwood|APT33|APT29|Leviathan|FIN8|Patchwork|Magic Hound
-T1566.001,Spearphishing Attachment,Initial Access,WIRTE|Confucius|Dragonfly|LazyScripter|Threat Group-3390|APT38|Andariel|Ferocious Kitten|IndigoZebra|Transparent Tribe|Nomadic Octopus|Tonto Team|Ajax Security Team|Mustang Panda|TA551|Higaisa|Sidewinder|APT1|FIN6|APT30|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Mofang|Wizard Spider|RTM|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|APT41|Machete|admin@338|Kimsuky|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|Tropic Trooper|DarkHydrus|Lazarus Group|Gorgon Group|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|APT19|APT32|Cobalt Group|Rancor|FIN7|Dragonfly 2.0|MuddyWater|APT28|TA459|APT29|APT37|Leviathan|FIN8|Patchwork|menuPass|Elderwood|PLATINUM
-T1566,Phishing,Initial Access,Axiom|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Dragonfly
+T1566.002,Spearphishing Link,Initial Access,Lazarus Group|Confucius|LazyScripter|Transparent Tribe|FIN7|APT3|Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|Sidewinder|Evilnum|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|APT1|Windshift|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|Machete|Kimsuky|TA505|APT39|FIN4|APT32|Night Dragon|Cobalt Group|APT28|Turla|OilRig|APT33|Patchwork|Magic Hound|APT29|FIN8|Elderwood|Leviathan
+T1566.001,Spearphishing Attachment,Initial Access,WIRTE|Confucius|Dragonfly|LazyScripter|Threat Group-3390|APT38|Andariel|Ferocious Kitten|IndigoZebra|Transparent Tribe|Nomadic Octopus|Tonto Team|Ajax Security Team|Mustang Panda|TA551|Higaisa|Sidewinder|APT1|FIN6|APT30|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Mofang|Wizard Spider|RTM|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|APT41|Machete|admin@338|Kimsuky|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|Tropic Trooper|APT19|Gorgon Group|Cobalt Group|FIN7|Rancor|APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|OilRig|Lazarus Group|DarkHydrus|Patchwork|APT28|Leviathan|menuPass|APT29|FIN8|PLATINUM|Elderwood|APT37|TA459|MuddyWater
+T1566,Phishing,Initial Access,Axiom|GOLD SOUTHFIELD
 T1565.003,Runtime Data Manipulation,Impact,APT38
 T1565.002,Transmitted Data Manipulation,Impact,APT38
 T1565.001,Stored Data Manipulation,Impact,APT38
 T1565,Data Manipulation,Impact,no
-T1564.001,Hidden Files and Directories,Defense Evasion,Transparent Tribe|Mustang Panda|Rocke|APT32|Tropic Trooper|APT28|Lazarus Group
+T1564.001,Hidden Files and Directories,Defense Evasion,Transparent Tribe|Mustang Panda|Rocke|APT32|Tropic Trooper|Lazarus Group|APT28
 T1564,Hide Artifacts,Defense Evasion,no
 T1563.002,RDP Hijacking,Lateral Movement,Axiom
 T1563.001,SSH Hijacking,Lateral Movement,no
 T1563,Remote Service Session Hijacking,Lateral Movement,no
 T1518.001,Security Software Discovery,Discovery,Kimsuky|Aquatic Panda|TeamTNT|APT38|Windshift|Sidewinder|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Turla|Rocke|Frankenstein|The White Company|Cobalt Group|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|Tropic Trooper|FIN8|Patchwork|Naikon
 T1069.003,Cloud Groups,Discovery,no
-T1069.002,Domain Groups,Discovery,APT29|Dragonfly|Turla|Inception|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|Ke3chang
+T1069.002,Domain Groups,Discovery,APT29|Dragonfly|Turla|Inception|OilRig|Ke3chang
 T1087.004,Cloud Account,Discovery,APT29
 T1087.003,Email Account,Discovery,Sandworm Team|TA505
-T1087.002,Domain Account,Discovery,APT29|Lazarus Group|Dragonfly|MuddyWater|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Chimera|Turla|Sandworm Team|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN6|Poseidon Group|Ke3chang
+T1087.002,Domain Account,Discovery,APT29|Lazarus Group|Dragonfly|MuddyWater|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Chimera|Turla|Sandworm Team|BRONZE BUTLER|OilRig|menuPass|FIN6|Poseidon Group|Ke3chang
 T1087.001,Local Account,Discovery,Chimera|Fox Kitten|Turla|Poseidon Group|OilRig|Ke3chang|APT32|APT1|Threat Group-3390|APT3|admin@338
 T1553.004,Install Root Certificate,Defense Evasion,no
-T1562.004,Disable or Modify System Firewall,Defense Evasion,Dragonfly|TeamTNT|APT38|APT29|Operation Wocao|Rocke|Lazarus Group|Kimsuky|Dragonfly 2.0|Carbanak
+T1562.004,Disable or Modify System Firewall,Defense Evasion,Dragonfly|TeamTNT|APT38|APT29|Operation Wocao|Rocke|Lazarus Group|Kimsuky|Carbanak
 T1562.003,Impair Command History Logging,Defense Evasion,APT38
 T1562.002,Disable Windows Event Logging,Defense Evasion,Sandworm Team|APT29|Threat Group-3390
 T1562.001,Disable or Modify Tools,Defense Evasion,Aquatic Panda|TeamTNT|Indrik Spider|APT29|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|FIN6|Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Rocke|Kimsuky|Turla|Night Dragon|Gorgon Group|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda
 T1562,Impair Defenses,Defense Evasion,no
-T1003.004,LSA Secrets,Credential Access,Dragonfly|OilRig|MuddyWater|menuPass|Leafminer|Ke3chang|Dragonfly 2.0|APT33|Threat Group-3390
+T1003.004,LSA Secrets,Credential Access,Dragonfly|OilRig|MuddyWater|menuPass|Leafminer|Ke3chang|APT33|Threat Group-3390
 T1003.005,Cached Domain Credentials,Credential Access,OilRig|MuddyWater|Leafminer|APT33
 T1561.002,Disk Structure Wipe,Impact,Sandworm Team|Lazarus Group|APT38|APT37
 T1561.001,Disk Content Wipe,Impact,Lazarus Group
 T1561,Disk Wipe,Impact,no
 T1560.003,Archive via Custom Method,Collection,Mustang Panda|Lazarus Group|Kimsuky|CopyKittens|FIN6
 T1560.002,Archive via Library,Collection,Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390
-T1560.001,Archive via Utility,Collection,Kimsuky|Aquatic Panda|APT28|APT29|Mustang Panda|HAFNIUM|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Chimera|APT41|GALLIUM|Turla|Gallmaker|APT33|APT39|MuddyWater|Magic Hound|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|CopyKittens|Sowbug|APT3|menuPass|APT1|Ke3chang
-T1560,Archive Collected Data,Collection,Axiom|Dragonfly|Leviathan|menuPass|APT32|Honeybee|Patchwork|APT28|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Ke3chang
+T1560.001,Archive via Utility,Collection,Kimsuky|Aquatic Panda|APT28|APT29|Mustang Panda|HAFNIUM|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Chimera|APT41|GALLIUM|Turla|Gallmaker|APT33|APT39|MuddyWater|Magic Hound|FIN8|Sowbug|CopyKittens|APT3|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|APT1|Ke3chang
+T1560,Archive Collected Data,Collection,Axiom|Dragonfly|Leviathan|menuPass|APT32|APT28|Patchwork|Honeybee|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Ke3chang
 T1499.004,Application or System Exploitation,Impact,no
 T1499.003,Application Exhaustion Flood,Impact,no
 T1499.002,Service Exhaustion Flood,Impact,no
@@ -283,7 +283,7 @@ T1499.001,OS Exhaustion Flood,Impact,no
 T1491.002,External Defacement,Impact,Sandworm Team
 T1491.001,Internal Defacement,Impact,Gamaredon Group|Lazarus Group
 T1114.003,Email Forwarding Rule,Collection,Silent Librarian|Kimsuky
-T1114.002,Remote Email Collection,Collection,Kimsuky|Dragonfly|APT29|HAFNIUM|Chimera|APT1|FIN4|Ke3chang|Leafminer|Dragonfly 2.0|APT28
+T1114.002,Remote Email Collection,Collection,Kimsuky|Dragonfly|APT29|HAFNIUM|Chimera|APT1|FIN4|Leafminer|Ke3chang|APT28
 T1114.001,Local Email Collection,Collection,Chimera|Magic Hound|APT1
 T1134.005,SID-History Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
 T1134.004,Parent PID Spoofing,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
@@ -295,7 +295,7 @@ T1213.001,Confluence,Collection,no
 T1555.003,Credentials from Web Browsers,Credential Access,APT29|Ajax Security Team|ZIRCONIUM|FIN6|Sandworm Team|Inception|Stealth Falcon|OilRig|Leafminer|APT33|APT3|Kimsuky|TA505|MuddyWater|APT37|Patchwork|Molerats
 T1555.002,Securityd Memory,Credential Access,no
 T1555.001,Keychain,Credential Access,no
-T1559.002,Dynamic Data Exchange,Execution,Leviathan|Sidewinder|Sharpshooter|TA505|MuddyWater|Gallmaker|Patchwork|Cobalt Group|APT37|FIN7|APT28
+T1559.002,Dynamic Data Exchange,Execution,Leviathan|Sidewinder|Sharpshooter|TA505|MuddyWater|Gallmaker|Cobalt Group|Patchwork|APT37|FIN7|APT28
 T1559.001,Component Object Model,Execution,Gamaredon Group|MuddyWater
 T1559,Inter-Process Communication,Execution,no
 T1558.002,Silver Ticket,Credential Access,no
@@ -309,7 +309,7 @@ T1556,Modify Authentication Process,Credential Access|Defense Evasion|Persistenc
 T1056.004,Credential API Hooking,Collection|Credential Access,PLATINUM
 T1056.003,Web Portal Capture,Collection|Credential Access,no
 T1056.002,GUI Input Capture,Collection|Credential Access,FIN4
-T1056.001,Keylogging,Collection|Credential Access,Tonto Team|Ajax Security Team|Operation Wocao|APT32|Sandworm Team|APT39|APT41|Kimsuky|menuPass|FIN4|APT38|OilRig|Ke3chang|PLATINUM|Sowbug|Magic Hound|Group5|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT3|Darkhotel|APT28
+T1056.001,Keylogging,Collection|Credential Access,Tonto Team|Ajax Security Team|Operation Wocao|APT32|Sandworm Team|APT39|APT41|Kimsuky|menuPass|FIN4|APT38|Ke3chang|OilRig|PLATINUM|Sowbug|Magic Hound|Group5|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT3|Darkhotel|APT28
 T1555,Credentials from Password Stores,Credential Access,APT29|Evilnum|FIN6|APT39|OilRig|MuddyWater|Leafminer|APT33|Stealth Falcon
 T1552.005,Cloud Instance Metadata API,Credential Access,TeamTNT
 T1003.008,/etc/passwd and /etc/shadow,Credential Access,no
@@ -317,19 +317,19 @@ T1003.007,Proc Filesystem,Credential Access,no
 T1003.006,DCSync,Credential Access,APT29|Operation Wocao
 T1558.003,Kerberoasting,Credential Access,FIN7|APT29|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider
 T1552.006,Group Policy Preferences,Credential Access,APT33
-T1003.003,NTDS,Credential Access,Ke3chang|Dragonfly|APT28|Mustang Panda|HAFNIUM|Fox Kitten|menuPass|Wizard Spider|Chimera|FIN6|Dragonfly 2.0
-T1003.002,Security Account Manager,Credential Access,Dragonfly|Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390|Ke3chang|GALLIUM|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|menuPass
-T1003.001,LSASS Memory,Credential Access,Aquatic Panda|Indrik Spider|HAFNIUM|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Blue Mockingbird|Silence|Threat Group-3390|Leviathan|APT41|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|APT32|Leafminer|Magic Hound|FIN8|PLATINUM|MuddyWater|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN6|APT3|APT28|APT1|Ke3chang|Cleaver
+T1003.003,NTDS,Credential Access,Ke3chang|Dragonfly|APT28|Mustang Panda|HAFNIUM|Fox Kitten|menuPass|Wizard Spider|Chimera|FIN6
+T1003.002,Security Account Manager,Credential Access,Dragonfly|Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390|Ke3chang|GALLIUM|Night Dragon|menuPass
+T1003.001,LSASS Memory,Credential Access,Aquatic Panda|Indrik Spider|HAFNIUM|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Blue Mockingbird|Silence|Threat Group-3390|Leviathan|APT41|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|APT32|Leafminer|Magic Hound|FIN8|MuddyWater|PLATINUM|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN6|APT3|APT28|APT1|Ke3chang|Cleaver
 T1110.004,Credential Stuffing,Credential Access,Chimera
 T1110.003,Password Spraying,Credential Access,Sandworm Team|APT29|Silent Librarian|Chimera|APT28|APT33|Leafminer|Lazarus Group
-T1110.002,Password Cracking,Credential Access,Dragonfly|FIN6|APT41|Dragonfly 2.0|APT3
+T1110.002,Password Cracking,Credential Access,Dragonfly|FIN6|APT41|APT3
 T1110.001,Password Guessing,Credential Access,APT28
 T1021.006,Windows Remote Management,Lateral Movement,APT29|Chimera|Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390
 T1021.005,VNC,Lateral Movement,Gamaredon Group|FIN7|Fox Kitten|GCMAN
 T1021.004,SSH,Lateral Movement,BlackTech|Lazarus Group|TeamTNT|FIN7|Fox Kitten|Rocke|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|OilRig|menuPass|GCMAN
 T1021.003,Distributed Component Object Model,Lateral Movement,no
 T1021.002,SMB/Windows Admin Shares,Lateral Movement,APT29|Sandworm Team|APT28|Fox Kitten|APT41|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|APT39|APT32|Orangeworm|FIN8|APT3|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-1314|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang
-T1021.001,Remote Desktop Protocol,Lateral Movement,APT29|Dragonfly|Kimsuky|FIN7|Fox Kitten|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|APT3|OilRig|FIN10|menuPass|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|APT1|Axiom
+T1021.001,Remote Desktop Protocol,Lateral Movement,APT29|Dragonfly|Kimsuky|FIN7|Fox Kitten|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Cobalt Group|FIN8|OilRig|APT3|menuPass|FIN10|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|APT1|Axiom
 T1554,Compromise Client Software Binary,Persistence,no
 T1036.006,Space after Filename,Defense Evasion,no
 T1036.005,Match Legitimate Name or Location,Defense Evasion,Ke3chang|Kimsuky|Gamaredon Group|WIRTE|APT28|Ferocious Kitten|FIN7|BackdoorDiplomacy|Transparent Tribe|Naikon|APT29|Mustang Panda|Sidewinder|Darkhotel|Lazarus Group|Indrik Spider|Fox Kitten|Machete|Chimera|PROMETHIUM|Rocke|Sandworm Team|APT39|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Silence|APT41|menuPass|TEMP.Veles|MuddyWater|Sowbug|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|Patchwork|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Carbanak|APT1
@@ -338,12 +338,12 @@ T1036.003,Rename System Utilities,Defense Evasion,Lazarus Group|menuPass|APT32|G
 T1036.002,Right-to-Left Override,Defense Evasion,Ferocious Kitten|BRONZE BUTLER|BlackTech|Ke3chang|Scarlet Mimic
 T1036.001,Invalid Code Signature,Defense Evasion,Windshift|APT37
 T1553.003,SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking,Defense Evasion,no
-T1553.002,Code Signing,Defense Evasion,Lazarus Group|menuPass|APT29|GALLIUM|Wizard Spider|Kimsuky|PROMETHIUM|Patchwork|Silence|APT41|FIN6|TA505|FIN7|Honeybee|Leviathan|CopyKittens|Winnti Group|Suckfly|Molerats|Darkhotel
+T1553.002,Code Signing,Defense Evasion,Lazarus Group|menuPass|APT29|GALLIUM|Wizard Spider|Kimsuky|PROMETHIUM|Patchwork|Silence|APT41|FIN6|TA505|Honeybee|FIN7|Leviathan|CopyKittens|Winnti Group|Suckfly|Molerats|Darkhotel
 T1553.001,Gatekeeper Bypass,Defense Evasion,no
 T1553,Subvert Trust Controls,Defense Evasion,Axiom
 T1027.003,Steganography,Defense Evasion,Andariel|Leviathan|TA551|BRONZE BUTLER|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|APT37
 T1027.002,Software Packing,Defense Evasion,Threat Group-3390|Lazarus Group|Sandworm Team|Kimsuky|TeamTNT|ZIRCONIUM|TA505|Rocke|GALLIUM|The White Company|APT39|APT38|Dark Caracal|Elderwood|APT3|Patchwork|APT29|Night Dragon
-T1027.001,Binary Padding,Defense Evasion,APT29|Mustang Panda|Higaisa|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|APT32|Leviathan|BRONZE BUTLER|Moafee
+T1027.001,Binary Padding,Defense Evasion,APT29|Mustang Panda|Higaisa|Gamaredon Group|APT32|Patchwork|Leviathan|BRONZE BUTLER|Moafee
 T1222.002,Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification,Defense Evasion,TeamTNT|Rocke|APT32
 T1222.001,Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification,Defense Evasion,Wizard Spider
 T1552.004,Private Keys,Credential Access,TeamTNT|APT29|Operation Wocao|Rocke
@@ -354,7 +354,7 @@ T1552,Unsecured Credentials,Credential Access,no
 T1216.001,PubPrn,Defense Evasion,APT32
 T1070.006,Timestomp,Defense Evasion,APT38|APT29|Chimera|Kimsuky|Rocke|TEMP.Veles|APT32|Lazarus Group|APT28
 T1070.005,Network Share Connection Removal,Defense Evasion,Threat Group-3390
-T1070.004,File Deletion,Defense Evasion,Aquatic Panda|Dragonfly|TeamTNT|APT39|Mustang Panda|Chimera|Evilnum|Operation Wocao|FIN6|Sandworm Team|Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Wizard Spider|APT41|Kimsuky|Silence|The White Company|TEMP.Veles|APT32|APT38|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Honeybee|Patchwork|menuPass|FIN8|OilRig|FIN5|BRONZE BUTLER|APT3|Magic Hound|Threat Group-3390|APT28|FIN10|Group5|Lazarus Group|APT18|APT29
+T1070.004,File Deletion,Defense Evasion,Aquatic Panda|Dragonfly|TeamTNT|APT39|Mustang Panda|Chimera|Evilnum|Operation Wocao|FIN6|Sandworm Team|Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Wizard Spider|APT41|Kimsuky|Silence|The White Company|TEMP.Veles|APT32|APT38|Patchwork|Honeybee|menuPass|Cobalt Group|FIN8|Magic Hound|FIN5|BRONZE BUTLER|APT3|OilRig|APT28|Threat Group-3390|FIN10|Group5|Lazarus Group|APT18|APT29
 T1070.003,Clear Command History,Defense Evasion,Lazarus Group|TeamTNT|menuPass|APT41
 T1550.004,Web Session Cookie,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,APT29
 T1550.001,Application Access Token,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,APT29|APT28
@@ -363,17 +363,16 @@ T1550.002,Pass the Hash,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,Chimera|Kimsuky|GALLIUM
 T1550,Use Alternate Authentication Material,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,APT29
 T1548.004,Elevated Execution with Prompt,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
 T1548.003,Sudo and Sudo Caching,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
-T1548.002,Bypass User Account Control,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,Evilnum|APT37|MuddyWater|Threat Group-3390|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork|APT29
+T1548.002,Bypass User Account Control,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,Evilnum|APT37|MuddyWater|Threat Group-3390|Cobalt Group|Honeybee|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork|APT29
 T1548.001,Setuid and Setgid,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
 T1548,Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
 T1136.003,Cloud Account,Persistence,APT29
 T1070.002,Clear Linux or Mac System Logs,Defense Evasion,TeamTNT|Rocke
-T1070.001,Clear Windows Event Logs,Defense Evasion,Dragonfly|Indrik Spider|Chimera|Operation Wocao|APT41|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|APT32|FIN8|FIN5|APT28
+T1070.001,Clear Windows Event Logs,Defense Evasion,Dragonfly|Indrik Spider|Chimera|Operation Wocao|APT41|APT38|APT32|FIN8|FIN5|APT28
 T1136.002,Domain Account,Persistence,Sandworm Team|HAFNIUM|GALLIUM
-T1136.001,Local Account,Persistence,Kimsuky|Dragonfly|TeamTNT|Fox Kitten|APT39|APT41|Leafminer|Dragonfly 2.0|APT3
-T1547.011,Plist Modification,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
+T1136.001,Local Account,Persistence,Kimsuky|Dragonfly|TeamTNT|Fox Kitten|APT39|APT41|Leafminer|APT3
 T1547.010,Port Monitors,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
-T1547.009,Shortcut Modification,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Dragonfly|APT39|Darkhotel|APT29|Gorgon Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Lazarus Group|Leviathan
+T1547.009,Shortcut Modification,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Dragonfly|APT39|Darkhotel|APT29|Gorgon Group|Lazarus Group|Leviathan
 T1547.008,LSASS Driver,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
 T1547.007,Re-opened Applications,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
 T1547.006,Kernel Modules and Extensions,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
@@ -397,27 +396,27 @@ T1546.004,Unix Shell Configuration Modification,Privilege Escalation|Persistence
 T1546.003,Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,FIN8|Mustang Panda|APT33|Blue Mockingbird|Turla|Leviathan|APT29
 T1546.002,Screensaver,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
 T1546.001,Change Default File Association,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,Kimsuky
-T1547.001,Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Confucius|Dragonfly|LazyScripter|TeamTNT|Naikon|Windshift|Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Sidewinder|APT28|Wizard Spider|PROMETHIUM|Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Silence|RTM|Inception|APT41|Kimsuky|APT33|APT39|APT32|APT18|Dark Caracal|Threat Group-3390|Honeybee|Turla|Cobalt Group|Ke3chang|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|Gorgon Group|MuddyWater|APT37|Leviathan|BRONZE BUTLER|APT3|Magic Hound|FIN10|FIN7|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT29|Darkhotel
+T1547.001,Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Confucius|Dragonfly|LazyScripter|TeamTNT|Naikon|Windshift|Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Sidewinder|APT28|Wizard Spider|PROMETHIUM|Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Silence|RTM|Inception|APT41|Kimsuky|APT33|APT39|APT32|APT18|Dark Caracal|Gorgon Group|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|Threat Group-3390|Turla|Ke3chang|APT19|MuddyWater|APT37|Leviathan|Magic Hound|APT3|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN7|FIN10|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT29|Darkhotel
 T1218.002,Control Panel,Defense Evasion,no
 T1218.010,Regsvr32,Defense Evasion,Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|TA551|Blue Mockingbird|Inception|WIRTE|Cobalt Group|APT19|Leviathan|APT32|Deep Panda
 T1218.009,Regsvcs/Regasm,Defense Evasion,no
 T1218.005,Mshta,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|Confucius|Lazarus Group|APT29|LazyScripter|Mustang Panda|TA551|Sidewinder|Inception|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|FIN7
 T1218.004,InstallUtil,Defense Evasion,Mustang Panda|menuPass
-T1218.001,Compiled HTML File,Defense Evasion,APT38|APT41|Silence|Dark Caracal|OilRig|Lazarus Group
+T1218.001,Compiled HTML File,Defense Evasion,APT38|APT41|Silence|OilRig|Dark Caracal
 T1218.003,CMSTP,Defense Evasion,Cobalt Group|MuddyWater
 T1218.011,Rundll32,Defense Evasion,Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|LazyScripter|APT38|HAFNIUM|TA551|APT41|Gamaredon Group|APT32|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|TA505|MuddyWater|APT29|APT19|CopyKittens|APT3|Carbanak|APT28
 T1547,Boot or Logon Autostart Execution,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
 T1546,Event Triggered Execution,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
-T1098.003,Add Office 365 Global Administrator Role,Persistence,APT29
-T1098.002,Exchange Email Delegate Permissions,Persistence,APT28|APT29|Magic Hound
+T1098.003,Additional Cloud Roles,Persistence,APT29
+T1098.002,Additional Email Delegate Permissions,Persistence,APT28|APT29|Magic Hound
 T1098.001,Additional Cloud Credentials,Persistence,APT29
 T1543.004,Launch Daemon,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
-T1543.003,Windows Service,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,TeamTNT|APT38|PROMETHIUM|Blue Mockingbird|DarkVishnya|Wizard Spider|APT32|APT41|Kimsuky|Tropic Trooper|Cobalt Group|Ke3chang|FIN7|APT19|Threat Group-3390|Honeybee|APT3|Lazarus Group|Carbanak
+T1543.003,Windows Service,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,TeamTNT|APT38|PROMETHIUM|Blue Mockingbird|DarkVishnya|Wizard Spider|APT32|APT41|Kimsuky|Tropic Trooper|Threat Group-3390|Ke3chang|Cobalt Group|Honeybee|APT19|FIN7|APT3|Lazarus Group|Carbanak
 T1543.002,Systemd Service,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,TeamTNT|Rocke
 T1543.001,Launch Agent,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
 T1037.005,Startup Items,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
 T1037.004,RC Scripts,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
-T1055.012,Process Hollowing,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Kimsuky|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Gorgon Group|Patchwork
+T1055.012,Process Hollowing,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Kimsuky|Threat Group-3390|Gorgon Group|menuPass|Patchwork
 T1055.013,Process Doppelgänging,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Leafminer
 T1055.011,Extra Window Memory Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
 T1055.014,VDSO Hijacking,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
@@ -430,18 +429,17 @@ T1055.002,Portable Executable Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Roc
 T1055.001,Dynamic-link Library Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,BackdoorDiplomacy|Leviathan|Wizard Spider|TA505|Turla|Tropic Trooper|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda
 T1037.003,Network Logon Script,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
 T1543,Create or Modify System Process,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
-T1037.002,Logon Script (Mac),Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
+T1037.002,Login Hook,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
 T1037.001,Logon Script (Windows),Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Cobalt Group|APT28
 T1542.003,Bootkit,Persistence|Defense Evasion,APT41|Lazarus Group|APT28
 T1542.002,Component Firmware,Persistence|Defense Evasion,Equation
 T1542.001,System Firmware,Persistence|Defense Evasion,no
-T1505.003,Web Shell,Persistence,Dragonfly|BackdoorDiplomacy|APT38|APT29|APT28|Tonto Team|Sandworm Team|HAFNIUM|Volatile Cedar|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|Tropic Trooper|GALLIUM|Threat Group-3390|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|APT32|OilRig|Deep Panda
+T1505.003,Web Shell,Persistence,Dragonfly|BackdoorDiplomacy|APT38|APT29|APT28|Tonto Team|Sandworm Team|HAFNIUM|Volatile Cedar|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|Tropic Trooper|GALLIUM|Threat Group-3390|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|OilRig|APT32|Deep Panda
 T1505.002,Transport Agent,Persistence,no
 T1505.001,SQL Stored Procedures,Persistence,Sandworm Team
 T1053.003,Cron,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,APT38|Rocke
-T1053.001,At (Linux),Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
-T1053.005,Scheduled Task,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|Confucius|Dragonfly|APT37|APT38|Naikon|CostaRicto|Mustang Panda|Higaisa|Fox Kitten|Molerats|Machete|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT-C-36|BRONZE BUTLER|APT41|GALLIUM|Silence|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|Rancor|OilRig|Patchwork|Dragonfly 2.0|Cobalt Group|FIN8|menuPass|FIN10|FIN7|APT32|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|APT3|APT29
-T1053.002,At (Windows),Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,BRONZE BUTLER|Threat Group-3390|APT18
+T1053.005,Scheduled Task,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|Confucius|Dragonfly|APT37|APT38|Naikon|CostaRicto|Mustang Panda|Higaisa|Fox Kitten|Molerats|Machete|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT-C-36|BRONZE BUTLER|APT41|GALLIUM|Silence|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|OilRig|Rancor|Cobalt Group|Patchwork|FIN8|FIN10|menuPass|APT32|FIN7|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|APT3|APT29
+T1053.002,At,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,BRONZE BUTLER|Threat Group-3390|APT18
 T1542,Pre-OS Boot,Defense Evasion|Persistence,no
 T1137.001,Office Template Macros,Persistence,MuddyWater
 T1137.004,Outlook Home Page,Persistence,OilRig
@@ -477,38 +475,38 @@ T1485,Data Destruction,Impact,Gamaredon Group|Sandworm Team|Lazarus Group|APT38
 T1484,Domain Policy Modification,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
 T1482,Domain Trust Discovery,Discovery,FIN8|APT29|Chimera
 T1480,Execution Guardrails,Defense Evasion,no
-T1221,Template Injection,Defense Evasion,Lazarus Group|Confucius|Dragonfly|Gamaredon Group|Frankenstein|Inception|APT28|Tropic Trooper|DarkHydrus|Dragonfly 2.0
-T1222,File and Directory Permissions Modification,Defense Evasion,no
+T1221,Template Injection,Defense Evasion,Lazarus Group|Confucius|Dragonfly|Gamaredon Group|Frankenstein|Inception|APT28|Tropic Trooper|DarkHydrus
 T1220,XSL Script Processing,Defense Evasion,Lazarus Group|Higaisa|Cobalt Group
-T1217,Browser Bookmark Discovery,Discovery,APT38|Chimera|Fox Kitten
-T1212,Exploitation for Credential Access,Credential Access,no
-T1189,Drive-by Compromise,Initial Access,Magic Hound|APT28|Axiom|Transparent Tribe|Andariel|Leviathan|Machete|Windigo|Dragonfly|PROMETHIUM|Turla|Windshift|RTM|Darkhotel|APT38|APT19|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|Dark Caracal|Dragonfly 2.0|Leafminer|Patchwork|APT37|Elderwood|PLATINUM
-T1211,Exploitation for Defense Evasion,Defense Evasion,APT28
-T1197,BITS Jobs,Defense Evasion|Persistence,APT39|Patchwork|APT41|Leviathan
-T1203,Exploitation for Client Execution,Execution,Axiom|Confucius|Dragonfly|Andariel|Transparent Tribe|APT3|Tonto Team|Mustang Panda|Darkhotel|Higaisa|HAFNIUM|Sidewinder|Sandworm Team|MuddyWater|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT41|admin@338|Threat Group-3390|APT12|The White Company|APT33|APT32|APT28|Tropic Trooper|BRONZE BUTLER|Cobalt Group|Lazarus Group|Patchwork|Elderwood|APT29|TA459|APT37|Leviathan
-T1201,Password Policy Discovery,Discovery,Chimera|Turla|OilRig
-T1195,Supply Chain Compromise,Initial Access,no
-T1199,Trusted Relationship,Initial Access,Threat Group-3390|APT29|Sandworm Team|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|APT28|menuPass
-T1218,Signed Binary Proxy Execution,Defense Evasion,Lazarus Group
-T1204,User Execution,Execution,no
-T1213,Data from Information Repositories,Collection,APT29|APT28|Fox Kitten|FIN6|Turla
-T1190,Exploit Public-Facing Application,Initial Access,Threat Group-3390|Ke3chang|Kimsuky|Magic Hound|Dragonfly|BackdoorDiplomacy|menuPass|Volatile Cedar|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|APT28|APT29|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Blue Mockingbird|Rocke|APT39|BlackTech|APT41|GALLIUM|Night Dragon|Axiom
-T1210,Exploitation of Remote Services,Lateral Movement,Dragonfly|Tonto Team|FIN7|Fox Kitten|menuPass|Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390|APT28
-T1200,Hardware Additions,Initial Access,DarkVishnya
+T1222,File and Directory Permissions Modification,Defense Evasion,no
 T1202,Indirect Command Execution,Defense Evasion,Lazarus Group
+T1195,Supply Chain Compromise,Initial Access,no
 T1219,Remote Access Software,Command And Control,TeamTNT|Mustang Panda|MuddyWater|Evilnum|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Sandworm Team|DarkVishnya|RTM|Kimsuky|Night Dragon|Cobalt Group|Thrip|Carbanak
+T1213,Data from Information Repositories,Collection,APT29|APT28|Fox Kitten|FIN6|Turla
+T1200,Hardware Additions,Initial Access,DarkVishnya
+T1216,System Script Proxy Execution,Defense Evasion,no
+T1190,Exploit Public-Facing Application,Initial Access,Threat Group-3390|Ke3chang|Kimsuky|Magic Hound|Dragonfly|BackdoorDiplomacy|menuPass|HAFNIUM|Volatile Cedar|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|APT28|APT29|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Blue Mockingbird|Rocke|APT39|BlackTech|APT41|GALLIUM|Night Dragon|Axiom
+T1201,Password Policy Discovery,Discovery,Chimera|Turla|OilRig
+T1218,System Binary Proxy Execution,Defense Evasion,Lazarus Group
 T1207,Rogue Domain Controller,Defense Evasion,no
-T1216,Signed Script Proxy Execution,Defense Evasion,no
+T1199,Trusted Relationship,Initial Access,Threat Group-3390|APT29|Sandworm Team|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|APT28|menuPass
 T1205,Traffic Signaling,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Command And Control,no
+T1217,Browser Bookmark Discovery,Discovery,APT38|Chimera|Fox Kitten
+T1204,User Execution,Execution,no
+T1210,Exploitation of Remote Services,Lateral Movement,Dragonfly|Tonto Team|FIN7|Fox Kitten|menuPass|Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390|APT28
+T1189,Drive-by Compromise,Initial Access,Magic Hound|APT28|Axiom|Transparent Tribe|Andariel|Leviathan|Machete|Windigo|Dragonfly|PROMETHIUM|Turla|Windshift|RTM|Darkhotel|APT38|BRONZE BUTLER|Dark Caracal|Leafminer|APT32|APT19|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|Patchwork|Elderwood|APT37|PLATINUM
+T1211,Exploitation for Defense Evasion,Defense Evasion,APT28
+T1212,Exploitation for Credential Access,Credential Access,no
+T1203,Exploitation for Client Execution,Execution,Axiom|Confucius|Dragonfly|Andariel|Transparent Tribe|APT3|Tonto Team|Mustang Panda|Darkhotel|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Sandworm Team|MuddyWater|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT41|admin@338|Threat Group-3390|APT12|The White Company|APT33|APT32|APT28|Tropic Trooper|Lazarus Group|Cobalt Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Elderwood|APT37|Leviathan|Patchwork|TA459|APT29
+T1197,BITS Jobs,Defense Evasion|Persistence,APT39|Patchwork|APT41|Leviathan
 T1176,Browser Extensions,Persistence,Kimsuky
-T1187,Forced Authentication,Credential Access,Dragonfly|DarkHydrus|Dragonfly 2.0
 T1185,Browser Session Hijacking,Collection,no
-T1140,Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information,Defense Evasion,Lazarus Group|Ke3chang|Kimsuky|APT39|APT29|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Molerats|Frankenstein|Turla|WIRTE|Darkhotel|Tropic Trooper|Honeybee|Gorgon Group|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|APT19|Leviathan|MuddyWater|APT28|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER
+T1187,Forced Authentication,Credential Access,Dragonfly|DarkHydrus
+T1140,Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information,Defense Evasion,Lazarus Group|Ke3chang|Kimsuky|APT39|APT29|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Molerats|Frankenstein|Turla|WIRTE|Darkhotel|Tropic Trooper|menuPass|Gorgon Group|Threat Group-3390|APT19|Honeybee|Leviathan|MuddyWater|APT28|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER
+T1137,Office Application Startup,Persistence,Gamaredon Group|APT32
 T1134,Access Token Manipulation,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,FIN6|Blue Mockingbird
 T1136,Create Account,Persistence,Sandworm Team|Indrik Spider
-T1135,Network Share Discovery,Discovery,Dragonfly|Tonto Team|APT38|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|APT32|APT39|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT1|Dragonfly 2.0|Sowbug
-T1137,Office Application Startup,Persistence,Gamaredon Group|APT32
-T1133,External Remote Services,Persistence|Initial Access,Dragonfly|TeamTNT|Leviathan|APT28|APT29|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Kimsuky|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Chimera|Sandworm Team|APT41|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|Night Dragon|Ke3chang|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|APT18
+T1135,Network Share Discovery,Discovery,Dragonfly|Tonto Team|APT38|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|APT32|APT39|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT1|Sowbug
+T1133,External Remote Services,Persistence|Initial Access,Dragonfly|TeamTNT|Leviathan|APT28|APT29|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Kimsuky|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Chimera|Sandworm Team|APT41|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|Night Dragon|Ke3chang|OilRig|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|APT18
 T1132,Data Encoding,Command And Control,no
 T1129,Shared Modules,Execution,no
 T1127,Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution,Defense Evasion,no
@@ -516,64 +514,64 @@ T1125,Video Capture,Collection,Silence|FIN7
 T1124,System Time Discovery,Discovery,Darkhotel|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Chimera|Operation Wocao|The White Company|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Turla
 T1123,Audio Capture,Collection,APT37
 T1120,Peripheral Device Discovery,Discovery,OilRig|BackdoorDiplomacy|Operation Wocao|Turla|APT37|Gamaredon Group|Equation|APT28
-T1119,Automated Collection,Collection,Ke3chang|Confucius|Mustang Panda|Sidewinder|Chimera|menuPass|Operation Wocao|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT1|APT28|Patchwork|OilRig|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|FIN6
+T1119,Automated Collection,Collection,Ke3chang|Confucius|Mustang Panda|Sidewinder|Chimera|menuPass|Operation Wocao|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT1|Patchwork|APT28|FIN5|OilRig|Threat Group-3390|FIN6
 T1115,Clipboard Data,Collection,Operation Wocao|APT39|APT38
 T1114,Email Collection,Collection,Magic Hound|Silent Librarian
-T1113,Screen Capture,Collection,Dragonfly|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Gamaredon Group|APT39|Silence|MuddyWater|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|Dark Caracal|FIN7|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|Group5|APT28
-T1112,Modify Registry,Defense Evasion,Dragonfly|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|Turla|APT32|APT38|Patchwork|Gorgon Group|Threat Group-3390|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|Honeybee|FIN8
-T1111,Two-Factor Authentication Interception,Credential Access,Kimsuky|Chimera|Operation Wocao
+T1113,Screen Capture,Collection,Dragonfly|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Gamaredon Group|APT39|Silence|MuddyWater|FIN7|OilRig|Dark Caracal|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|Group5|APT28
+T1112,Modify Registry,Defense Evasion,Dragonfly|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|Turla|APT32|APT38|APT19|Threat Group-3390|Patchwork|Honeybee|Gorgon Group|FIN8
+T1111,Multi-Factor Authentication Interception,Credential Access,Kimsuky|Chimera|Operation Wocao
 T1110,Brute Force,Credential Access,Lazarus Group|Dragonfly|APT38|APT28|Fox Kitten|DarkVishnya|APT39|OilRig|FIN5|Turla
 T1106,Native API,Execution,BlackTech|Lazarus Group|APT38|Higaisa|menuPass|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Turla|Silence|APT37|Gorgon Group
-T1105,Ingress Tool Transfer,Command And Control,LazyScripter|Ke3chang|Aquatic Panda|Winnti Group|Confucius|Dragonfly|TeamTNT|Nomadic Octopus|IndigoZebra|Andariel|BackdoorDiplomacy|Tonto Team|HAFNIUM|APT29|Ajax Security Team|Mustang Panda|Windshift|Darkhotel|ZIRCONIUM|TA551|Volatile Cedar|Indrik Spider|Evilnum|Sidewinder|Fox Kitten|Kimsuky|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Silence|APT-C-36|APT41|GALLIUM|TA505|WIRTE|APT33|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Rancor|Gorgon Group|OilRig|Turla|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|PLATINUM|APT37|Elderwood|Leviathan|APT32|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|APT3|menuPass|FIN7|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28
+T1105,Ingress Tool Transfer,Command And Control,LazyScripter|Ke3chang|Aquatic Panda|Winnti Group|Confucius|Dragonfly|TeamTNT|Nomadic Octopus|IndigoZebra|Andariel|BackdoorDiplomacy|Tonto Team|HAFNIUM|APT29|Ajax Security Team|Mustang Panda|Windshift|Darkhotel|ZIRCONIUM|TA551|Volatile Cedar|Indrik Spider|Evilnum|Sidewinder|Fox Kitten|Kimsuky|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Silence|APT-C-36|APT41|GALLIUM|TA505|WIRTE|APT33|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Gorgon Group|Turla|Cobalt Group|Rancor|OilRig|Leviathan|Elderwood|APT37|PLATINUM|FIN8|APT32|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|APT3|menuPass|FIN7|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28
 T1104,Multi-Stage Channels,Command And Control,Lazarus Group|APT41|MuddyWater|APT3
 T1102,Web Service,Command And Control,Mustang Panda|LazyScripter|TeamTNT|FIN8|Fox Kitten|Turla|APT32|Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Inception|FIN6
-T1098,Account Manipulation,Persistence,Kimsuky|Dragonfly|Sandworm Team|APT3|Dragonfly 2.0|Lazarus Group
+T1098,Account Manipulation,Persistence,Kimsuky|Dragonfly|Sandworm Team|APT3|Lazarus Group
 T1095,Non-Application Layer Protocol,Command And Control,BackdoorDiplomacy|HAFNIUM|Operation Wocao|FIN6|APT29|PLATINUM|APT3
 T1092,Communication Through Removable Media,Command And Control,APT28
 T1091,Replication Through Removable Media,Lateral Movement|Initial Access,FIN7|Mustang Panda|Tropic Trooper|Darkhotel|APT28
 T1090,Proxy,Command And Control,Windigo|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|APT41|Turla
 T1087,Account Discovery,Discovery,APT29
-T1083,File and Directory Discovery,Discovery,Winnti Group|Confucius|Dragonfly|APT38|APT29|Mustang Panda|Darkhotel|Windigo|Sidewinder|Chimera|Fox Kitten|menuPass|APT39|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Inception|APT41|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|APT18|Leafminer|Honeybee|Dark Caracal|Dragonfly 2.0|APT3|Sowbug|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|APT28|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
-T1082,System Information Discovery,Discovery,Aquatic Panda|Confucius|TeamTNT|APT38|APT29|Mustang Panda|Windshift|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Windigo|Sidewinder|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|APT32|APT37|Honeybee|APT19|Magic Hound|Sowbug|OilRig|APT3|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
+T1083,File and Directory Discovery,Discovery,Winnti Group|Confucius|Dragonfly|APT38|APT29|Mustang Panda|Darkhotel|Windigo|Sidewinder|Chimera|Fox Kitten|menuPass|APT39|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Inception|APT41|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|APT18|Dark Caracal|Leafminer|Honeybee|BRONZE BUTLER|Sowbug|Magic Hound|APT3|APT28|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
+T1082,System Information Discovery,Discovery,Aquatic Panda|Confucius|TeamTNT|APT38|APT29|Mustang Panda|Windshift|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Windigo|Sidewinder|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|APT19|APT32|Honeybee|APT37|APT3|OilRig|Sowbug|Magic Hound|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
 T1080,Taint Shared Content,Lateral Movement,Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Darkhotel
-T1078,Valid Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,Ke3chang|Lazarus Group|Axiom|Dragonfly|FIN7|Leviathan|APT29|Silent Librarian|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|APT39|FIN4|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|APT33|FIN5|OilRig|APT28|menuPass|FIN10|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390|APT18|PittyTiger|Carbanak
+T1078,Valid Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,Ke3chang|Lazarus Group|Axiom|Dragonfly|FIN7|Leviathan|APT29|Silent Librarian|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|APT39|FIN4|Night Dragon|FIN8|APT33|OilRig|FIN5|FIN10|APT28|menuPass|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390|APT18|PittyTiger|Carbanak
 T1074,Data Staged,Collection,Wizard Spider
 T1072,Software Deployment Tools,Execution|Lateral Movement,Silence|APT32|Threat Group-1314
-T1071,Application Layer Protocol,Command And Control,Dragonfly|TeamTNT|Rocke|Magic Hound|Dragonfly 2.0
+T1071,Application Layer Protocol,Command And Control,Dragonfly|TeamTNT|Rocke|Magic Hound
 T1070,Indicator Removal on Host,Defense Evasion,Lazarus Group|APT29
 T1069,Permission Groups Discovery,Discovery,APT29|TA505|APT3
-T1068,Exploitation for Privilege Escalation,Privilege Escalation,APT29|Tonto Team|ZIRCONIUM|Turla|Whitefly|APT33|Cobalt Group|PLATINUM|FIN8|APT32|Threat Group-3390|FIN6|APT28
-T1059,Command and Scripting Interpreter,Execution,Dragonfly|APT37|Windigo|Fox Kitten|APT32|Whitefly|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN7|APT19|OilRig|FIN5|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Ke3chang
-T1057,Process Discovery,Discovery,Gamaredon Group|Kimsuky|TeamTNT|Andariel|APT29|Mustang Panda|Windshift|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Rocke|Frankenstein|Inception|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|APT38|Tropic Trooper|APT37|Honeybee|OilRig|APT3|Magic Hound|APT28|Winnti Group|Stealth Falcon|Poseidon Group|Lazarus Group|Molerats|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang
+T1068,Exploitation for Privilege Escalation,Privilege Escalation,APT29|Tonto Team|ZIRCONIUM|Turla|Whitefly|APT33|Cobalt Group|PLATINUM|FIN8|Threat Group-3390|APT32|FIN6|APT28
+T1059,Command and Scripting Interpreter,Execution,Dragonfly|APT37|Windigo|Fox Kitten|APT32|Whitefly|APT39|APT19|FIN7|OilRig|FIN5|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Ke3chang
+T1057,Process Discovery,Discovery,Gamaredon Group|Kimsuky|TeamTNT|Andariel|APT29|Mustang Panda|Windshift|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Rocke|Frankenstein|Inception|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|APT38|Tropic Trooper|APT37|Honeybee|Magic Hound|APT3|OilRig|APT28|Winnti Group|Stealth Falcon|Poseidon Group|Lazarus Group|Molerats|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang
 T1056,Input Capture,Collection|Credential Access,APT39
-T1055,Process Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Operation Wocao|APT32|Sharpshooter|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|Cobalt Group|Turla|APT37|Honeybee|PLATINUM
+T1055,Process Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Operation Wocao|APT32|Sharpshooter|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|Cobalt Group|APT37|Turla|Honeybee|PLATINUM
 T1053,Scheduled Task/Job,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
 T1052,Exfiltration Over Physical Medium,Exfiltration,no
-T1049,System Network Connections Discovery,Discovery,Lazarus Group|TeamTNT|Andariel|BackdoorDiplomacy|Mustang Panda|MuddyWater|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Tropic Trooper|APT41|APT38|GALLIUM|APT32|APT1|OilRig|APT3|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
+T1049,System Network Connections Discovery,Discovery,Lazarus Group|TeamTNT|Andariel|BackdoorDiplomacy|Mustang Panda|MuddyWater|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Tropic Trooper|APT41|APT38|GALLIUM|APT32|APT1|OilRig|APT3|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
 T1048,Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol,Exfiltration,no
-T1047,Windows Management Instrumentation,Execution,Gamaredon Group|Sandworm Team|FIN7|Indrik Spider|Naikon|Mustang Panda|Windshift|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT41|FIN6|GALLIUM|APT32|MuddyWater|Threat Group-3390|OilRig|FIN8|Leviathan|menuPass|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT29|Deep Panda
-T1046,Network Service Scanning,Discovery,BlackTech|Lazarus Group|TeamTNT|BackdoorDiplomacy|Naikon|CostaRicto|Chimera|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Rocke|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT39|APT32|OilRig|Cobalt Group|Leafminer|menuPass|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390
+T1047,Windows Management Instrumentation,Execution,Gamaredon Group|Sandworm Team|FIN7|Indrik Spider|Naikon|Mustang Panda|Windshift|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT41|FIN6|GALLIUM|APT32|MuddyWater|OilRig|Threat Group-3390|Leviathan|FIN8|menuPass|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT29|Deep Panda
+T1046,Network Service Discovery,Discovery,BlackTech|Lazarus Group|TeamTNT|BackdoorDiplomacy|Naikon|CostaRicto|Chimera|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Rocke|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT39|APT32|Leafminer|Cobalt Group|OilRig|menuPass|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390
 T1041,Exfiltration Over C2 Channel,Exfiltration,Confucius|Leviathan|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Chimera|APT39|Operation Wocao|Sandworm Team|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Kimsuky|GALLIUM|APT32|APT3|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Ke3chang
 T1040,Network Sniffing,Credential Access|Discovery,Kimsuky|Sandworm Team|DarkVishnya|APT33|APT28
 T1039,Data from Network Shared Drive,Collection,APT28|Chimera|Fox Kitten|Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Sowbug|menuPass
 T1037,Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Rocke
-T1036,Masquerading,Defense Evasion,Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|Dragonfly|LazyScripter|APT28|Nomadic Octopus|OilRig|APT29|ZIRCONIUM|TA551|Windshift|APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|PLATINUM|Dragonfly 2.0
-T1033,System Owner/User Discovery,Discovery,Threat Group-3390|Ke3chang|Dragonfly|APT38|Windshift|ZIRCONIUM|Sidewinder|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT41|GALLIUM|Tropic Trooper|APT39|MuddyWater|APT37|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|APT32|Magic Hound|OilRig|FIN10|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3
+T1036,Masquerading,Defense Evasion,Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|Dragonfly|LazyScripter|APT28|Nomadic Octopus|OilRig|APT29|ZIRCONIUM|TA551|Windshift|APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|PLATINUM
+T1033,System Owner/User Discovery,Discovery,Threat Group-3390|Ke3chang|Dragonfly|APT38|Windshift|ZIRCONIUM|Sidewinder|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT41|GALLIUM|Tropic Trooper|APT39|MuddyWater|APT32|APT37|APT19|OilRig|Magic Hound|FIN10|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3
 T1030,Data Transfer Size Limits,Exfiltration,APT28|Threat Group-3390
 T1029,Scheduled Transfer,Exfiltration,Higaisa
-T1027,Obfuscated Files or Information,Defense Evasion,Aquatic Panda|Ke3chang|LazyScripter|TeamTNT|BackdoorDiplomacy|Transparent Tribe|APT39|Mustang Panda|Windshift|TA551|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Fox Kitten|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|FIN6|Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|APT41|GALLIUM|Turla|TA505|Silence|APT33|Night Dragon|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|APT29|APT18|Tropic Trooper|Patchwork|menuPass|APT37|Threat Group-3390|Cobalt Group|Dark Caracal|Leafminer|Honeybee|APT19|BlackOasis|Leviathan|FIN8|MuddyWater|FIN7|Elderwood|OilRig|Magic Hound|APT3|APT32|Group5|Dust Storm|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT28
+T1027,Obfuscated Files or Information,Defense Evasion,Aquatic Panda|Ke3chang|LazyScripter|TeamTNT|BackdoorDiplomacy|Transparent Tribe|APT39|Mustang Panda|Windshift|TA551|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Fox Kitten|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|FIN6|Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|APT41|GALLIUM|Turla|TA505|Silence|APT33|Night Dragon|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|APT29|APT18|Tropic Trooper|APT37|Cobalt Group|Dark Caracal|menuPass|Leafminer|Honeybee|APT19|Threat Group-3390|Patchwork|Elderwood|MuddyWater|Leviathan|FIN7|BlackOasis|FIN8|OilRig|APT3|Magic Hound|APT32|Group5|Dust Storm|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT28
 T1025,Data from Removable Media,Collection,Turla|Gamaredon Group|APT28
 T1021,Remote Services,Lateral Movement,no
 T1020,Automated Exfiltration,Exfiltration,Ke3chang|Sidewinder|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Honeybee
-T1018,Remote System Discovery,Discovery,Dragonfly|Indrik Spider|Naikon|APT29|Chimera|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Sandworm Team|Rocke|Wizard Spider|Silence|GALLIUM|APT39|APT32|Deep Panda|Ke3chang|Threat Group-3390|Dragonfly 2.0|Leafminer|FIN8|FIN5|APT3|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN6|Turla
-T1016,System Network Configuration Discovery,Discovery,Kimsuky|Dragonfly|TeamTNT|ZIRCONIUM|Mustang Panda|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Sandworm Team|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT41|GALLIUM|APT32|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|Magic Hound|OilRig|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3|Naikon|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
+T1018,Remote System Discovery,Discovery,Dragonfly|Indrik Spider|Naikon|APT29|Chimera|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Sandworm Team|Rocke|Wizard Spider|Silence|GALLIUM|APT39|APT32|Leafminer|Ke3chang|Threat Group-3390|Deep Panda|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN5|APT3|menuPass|FIN6|Turla
+T1016,System Network Configuration Discovery,Discovery,Kimsuky|Dragonfly|TeamTNT|ZIRCONIUM|Mustang Panda|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Sandworm Team|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT41|GALLIUM|APT32|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|APT19|Magic Hound|OilRig|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3|Naikon|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
 T1014,Rootkit,Defense Evasion,TeamTNT|Rocke|APT41|APT28|Winnti Group
-T1012,Query Registry,Discovery,Kimsuky|Dragonfly|ZIRCONIUM|Chimera|Fox Kitten|APT39|Operation Wocao|APT32|Dragonfly 2.0|Threat Group-3390|OilRig|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Turla
+T1012,Query Registry,Discovery,Kimsuky|Dragonfly|ZIRCONIUM|Chimera|Fox Kitten|APT39|Operation Wocao|APT32|Threat Group-3390|OilRig|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Turla
 T1011,Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium,Exfiltration,no
 T1010,Application Window Discovery,Discovery,Lazarus Group
 T1008,Fallback Channels,Command And Control,FIN7|APT41|OilRig|Lazarus Group
 T1007,System Service Discovery,Discovery,Kimsuky|Aquatic Panda|Indrik Spider|Chimera|Operation Wocao|BRONZE BUTLER|APT1|OilRig|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
 T1006,Direct Volume Access,Defense Evasion,no
-T1005,Data from Local System,Collection,Axiom|Dragonfly|FIN7|APT41|APT38|Andariel|APT29|Windigo|Fox Kitten|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|FIN6|Gamaredon Group|APT39|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|GALLIUM|Turla|menuPass|Dark Caracal|Dragonfly 2.0|Honeybee|APT37|APT28|APT3|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|Threat Group-3390|APT1|Ke3chang
+T1005,Data from Local System,Collection,Axiom|Dragonfly|FIN7|APT41|APT38|Andariel|APT29|Windigo|Fox Kitten|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|FIN6|Gamaredon Group|APT39|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|GALLIUM|Turla|menuPass|Honeybee|Dark Caracal|APT37|APT28|BRONZE BUTLER|APT3|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|Threat Group-3390|APT1|Ke3chang
 T1003,OS Credential Dumping,Credential Access,Tonto Team|APT39|Frankenstein|APT32|APT28|Leviathan|Sowbug|Suckfly|Poseidon Group|Axiom
-T1001,Data Obfuscation,Command And Control,Operation Wocao|Axiom
+T1001,Data Obfuscation,Command And Control,Operation Wocao
@@ -805,6 +805,7 @@ sidebar:
 | [WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started](/endpoint/winevent_windows_task_scheduler_event_action_started/) | [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task) | [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
 | [WinRM Spawning a Process](/endpoint/winrm_spawning_a_process/) | [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
 | [Windows AdFind Exe](/endpoint/windows_adfind_exe/) | [Remote System Discovery](/tags/#remote-system-discovery) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
+| [Windows Command and Scripting Interpreter Path Traversal Exec](/endpoint/windows_command_and_scripting_interpreter_path_traversal_exec/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
 | [Windows Computer Account Created by Computer Account](/endpoint/windows_computer_account_created_by_computer_account/) | [Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets](/tags/#steal-or-forge-kerberos-tickets) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
 | [Windows Computer Account Requesting Kerberos Ticket](/endpoint/windows_computer_account_requesting_kerberos_ticket/) | [Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets](/tags/#steal-or-forge-kerberos-tickets) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
 | [Windows Computer Account With SPN](/endpoint/windows_computer_account_with_spn/) | [Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets](/tags/#steal-or-forge-kerberos-tickets) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
@@ -830,6 +831,7 @@ sidebar:
 | [Windows Event For Service Disabled](/endpoint/windows_event_for_service_disabled/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
 | [Windows Event Log Cleared](/endpoint/windows_event_log_cleared/) | [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host), [Clear Windows Event Logs](/tags/#clear-windows-event-logs) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
 | [Windows Excessive Disabled Services Event](/endpoint/windows_excessive_disabled_services_event/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
+| [Windows Execute Arbitrary Commands with MSDT](/endpoint/windows_execute_arbitrary_commands_with_msdt/) | [Indirect Command Execution](/tags/#indirect-command-execution) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
 | [Windows File Without Extension In Critical Folder](/endpoint/windows_file_without_extension_in_critical_folder/) | [Data Destruction](/tags/#data-destruction) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
 | [Windows Get-AdComputer Unconstrained Delegation Discovery](/endpoint/windows_get-adcomputer_unconstrained_delegation_discovery/) | [Remote System Discovery](/tags/#remote-system-discovery) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
 | [Windows Hidden Schedule Task Settings](/endpoint/windows_hidden_schedule_task_settings/) | [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
@@ -854,6 +856,7 @@ sidebar:
 | [Windows NirSoft AdvancedRun](/endpoint/windows_nirsoft_advancedrun/) | [Tool](/tags/#tool) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
 | [Windows NirSoft Utilities](/endpoint/windows_nirsoft_utilities/) | [Tool](/tags/#tool) | [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
 | [Windows Non-System Account Targeting Lsass](/endpoint/windows_non-system_account_targeting_lsass/) | [LSASS Memory](/tags/#lsass-memory), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
+| [Windows Office Product Spawning MSDT](/endpoint/windows_office_product_spawning_msdt/) | [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
 | [Windows Possible Credential Dumping](/endpoint/windows_possible_credential_dumping/) | [LSASS Memory](/tags/#lsass-memory), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
 | [Windows PowerView Constrained Delegation Discovery](/endpoint/windows_powerview_constrained_delegation_discovery/) | [Remote System Discovery](/tags/#remote-system-discovery) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
 | [Windows PowerView Unconstrained Delegation Discovery](/endpoint/windows_powerview_unconstrained_delegation_discovery/) | [Remote System Discovery](/tags/#remote-system-discovery) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
@@ -82,6 +82,7 @@ sidebar:
 | [Masquerading - Rename System Utilities](masquerading_-_rename_system_utilities) | [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities), [System Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#system-binary-proxy-execution), [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32), [Data Destruction](/tags/#data-destruction), [File Deletion](/tags/#file-deletion), [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host), [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](/tags/#trusted-developer-utilities-proxy-execution), [MSBuild](/tags/#msbuild), [InstallUtil](/tags/#installutil) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Impact](/tags/#impact) |
 | [Meterpreter](meterpreter) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter) | [Execution](/tags/#execution) |
 | [Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444](microsoft_mshtml_remote_code_execution_cve-2021-40444) | [System Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#system-binary-proxy-execution), [Control Panel](/tags/#control-panel), [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access) |
+| [Microsoft Support Diagnostic Tool Vulnerability CVE-2022-30190](microsoft_support_diagnostic_tool_vulnerability_cve-2022-30190) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [Indirect Command Execution](/tags/#indirect-command-execution), [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access) |
 | [Monitor Backup Solution](monitor_backup_solution) | None | None |
 | [Monitor for Unauthorized Software](monitor_for_unauthorized_software) | [Match Legitimate Name or Location](/tags/#match-legitimate-name-or-location), [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping), [Active Scanning](/tags/#active-scanning) | [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access), [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Reconnaissance](/tags/#reconnaissance) |
 | [Monitor for Updates](monitor_for_updates) | None | None |
@@ -140,7 +141,7 @@ sidebar:
 | [Web Fraud Detection](web_fraud_detection) | [Create Account](/tags/#create-account), [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) |
 | [WhisperGate](whispergate) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses), [Windows Command Shell](/tags/#windows-command-shell), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [Data Destruction](/tags/#data-destruction), [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](/tags/#smb/windows-admin-shares), [Distributed Component Object Model](/tags/#distributed-component-object-model), [Windows Management Instrumentation](/tags/#windows-management-instrumentation), [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service), [Obfuscated Files or Information](/tags/#obfuscated-files-or-information), [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](/tags/#virtualization/sandbox-evasion), [Time Based Evasion](/tags/#time-based-evasion), [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host), [Visual Basic](/tags/#visual-basic), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities), [System Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#system-binary-proxy-execution), [InstallUtil](/tags/#installutil), [Tool](/tags/#tool), [Disk Structure Wipe](/tags/#disk-structure-wipe), [Disk Wipe](/tags/#disk-wipe), [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection), [Parent PID Spoofing](/tags/#parent-pid-spoofing), [Access Token Manipulation](/tags/#access-token-manipulation) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Discovery](/tags/#discovery), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Impact](/tags/#impact), [Lateral Movement](/tags/#lateral-movement), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation), [Resource Development](/tags/#resource-development) |
 | [Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350](windows_dns_sigred_cve-2020-1350) | [Exploitation for Client Execution](/tags/#exploitation-for-client-execution) | [Execution](/tags/#execution) |
-| [Windows Defense Evasion Tactics](windows_defense_evasion_tactics) | [Hidden Files and Directories](/tags/#hidden-files-and-directories), [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses), [Compile After Delivery](/tags/#compile-after-delivery), [Obfuscated Files or Information](/tags/#obfuscated-files-or-information), [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry), [Hide Artifacts](/tags/#hide-artifacts), [Bypass User Account Control](/tags/#bypass-user-account-control), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism), [Inhibit System Recovery](/tags/#inhibit-system-recovery), [Disable or Modify System Firewall](/tags/#disable-or-modify-system-firewall), [File and Directory Permissions Modification](/tags/#file-and-directory-permissions-modification), [Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification](/tags/#windows-file-and-directory-permissions-modification), [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection), [Dynamic-link Library Injection](/tags/#dynamic-link-library-injection), [System Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#system-binary-proxy-execution) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Impact](/tags/#impact), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) |
+| [Windows Defense Evasion Tactics](windows_defense_evasion_tactics) | [Hidden Files and Directories](/tags/#hidden-files-and-directories), [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses), [Compile After Delivery](/tags/#compile-after-delivery), [Obfuscated Files or Information](/tags/#obfuscated-files-or-information), [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry), [Hide Artifacts](/tags/#hide-artifacts), [Bypass User Account Control](/tags/#bypass-user-account-control), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism), [Inhibit System Recovery](/tags/#inhibit-system-recovery), [Disable or Modify System Firewall](/tags/#disable-or-modify-system-firewall), [File and Directory Permissions Modification](/tags/#file-and-directory-permissions-modification), [Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification](/tags/#windows-file-and-directory-permissions-modification), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection), [Dynamic-link Library Injection](/tags/#dynamic-link-library-injection), [System Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#system-binary-proxy-execution) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Impact](/tags/#impact), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) |
 | [Windows Discovery Techniques](windows_discovery_techniques) | [Permission Groups Discovery](/tags/#permission-groups-discovery), [Local Groups](/tags/#local-groups) | [Discovery](/tags/#discovery) |
 | [Windows Drivers](windows_drivers) | [Rootkit](/tags/#rootkit), [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](/tags/#exploitation-for-privilege-escalation), [Install Root Certificate](/tags/#install-root-certificate), [Subvert Trust Controls](/tags/#subvert-trust-controls), [Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder](/tags/#registry-run-keys-/-startup-folder), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution), [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) |
 | [Windows File Extension and Association Abuse](windows_file_extension_and_association_abuse) | [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities), [Change Default File Association](/tags/#change-default-file-association), [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) |
@@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ The search is used to detect systems that are still vulnerable to the Spectre an

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -104,8 +104,8 @@ The search queries the authentication logs for assets that are categorized as ro

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ This search looks for Windows endpoints that have not generated an event indicat

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -103,8 +103,8 @@ Attackers often use spaces as a means to obfuscate an attachment's file extensio

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -104,8 +104,8 @@ This search looks for specific GET or HEAD requests to web servers that are indi

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -109,8 +109,8 @@ This search is used to detect malicious HTTP requests crafted to exploit jmx-con

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -95,9 +95,9 @@ This search looks for DNS requests for faux domains similar to the domains that

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [brand_abuse_dns](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/brand_abuse_dns.yml)
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
+* [brand_abuse_dns](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/brand_abuse_dns.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -100,9 +100,9 @@ This search looks for Web requests to faux domains similar to the one that you w

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
 * [brand_abuse_web](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/brand_abuse_web.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -100,8 +100,8 @@ The search is used to detect hosts that generate Windows Event ID 4663 for succe

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **detect_usb_device_insertion_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -105,8 +105,8 @@ This search looks for emails claiming to be sent from a domain similar to one th

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **monitor_email_for_brand_abuse_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -110,8 +110,8 @@ This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where an instance is started in a pa

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml)
 * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
+* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ This search looks for EC2 instances being created with previously unseen AMIs.

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml)
 * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
+* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_ami_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -117,8 +117,8 @@ This search detects new API calls that have either never been seen before or tha

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml)
 * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
+* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -124,8 +124,8 @@ This search will detect users creating spikes in API activity related to securit

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml)
 * [security_group_api_calls](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_group_api_calls.yml)
+* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **detect_spike_in_security_group_activity_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -101,8 +101,8 @@ This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user logged into the AWS acc

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml)
 * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
+* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -122,8 +122,8 @@ This search will detect users creating spikes in API activity related to network

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml)
 * [network_acl_events](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/network_acl_events.yml)
+* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -110,8 +110,8 @@ This search looks for outbound ICMP packets with a packet size larger than 1,000

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -114,8 +114,8 @@ This search looks for the creation of WMI permanent event subscriptions.

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [wmi](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wmi.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **wmi_permanent_event_subscription_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -113,8 +113,8 @@ This search looks for the creation of WMI temporary event subscriptions.

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [wmi](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wmi.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **wmi_temporary_event_subscription_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -104,8 +104,8 @@ The search looks for modifications to the hosts file on all Windows endpoints ac

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **windows_hosts_file_modification_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -110,9 +110,9 @@ The following analytic identifies usage of `wmic.exe` spawning a local or remote

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
-* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
 * [process_wmic](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_wmic.yml)
+* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **remote_wmi_command_attempt_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -113,8 +113,8 @@ The fsutil.exe application is a legitimate Windows utility used to perform tasks

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **usn_journal_deletion_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ This search looks for suspicious Java classes that are often used to exploit rem

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [stream_http](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/stream_http.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **suspicious_java_classes_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -101,8 +101,8 @@ The search looks for file writes with extensions consistent with a SamSam ransom

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **file_with_samsam_extension_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ The search looks for a file named "test.txt" written to the windows system direc

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **samsam_test_file_write_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -112,8 +112,8 @@ This search looks for PowerShell requesting privileges consistent with credentia

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [wineventlog_security](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_security.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ The search looks for command-line arguments used to hide a file or directory usi

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ This search looks for suspicious processes on all systems labeled as web servers

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -99,9 +99,9 @@ The search looks for files created with names that have been linked to malicious

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
-* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
 * [suspicious_writes](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/suspicious_writes.yml)
+* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **suspicious_file_write_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ Command lines that are extremely long may be indicative of malicious activity on

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **unusually_long_command_line_-_mltk_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -102,9 +102,9 @@ This search looks for applications on the endpoint that you have marked as prohi

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [prohibited_softwares](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/prohibited_softwares.yml)
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
+* [prohibited_softwares](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/prohibited_softwares.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **prohibited_software_on_endpoint_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -112,8 +112,8 @@ Monitor for signs that Vssadmin or Wmic has been used to create a shadow copy.

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **creation_of_shadow_copy_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -123,8 +123,8 @@ This search allows you to identify DNS requests that are unusually large for the

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **dns_query_length_outliers_-_mltk_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ This search looks for EC2 instances being created with previously unseen instanc

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml)
 * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
+* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_instance_type_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ This search looks for processes referencing the plist files that determine which

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **macos_-_re-opened_applications_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -113,9 +113,9 @@ Detect the usage of comsvcs.dll for dumping the lsass process.

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
-* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
 * [process_rundll32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_rundll32.yml)
+* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -98,8 +98,8 @@ This search monitors for remote modifications to registry keys.

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **remote_registry_key_modifications_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -116,8 +116,8 @@ This search looks for child processes of spoolsv.exe. This activity is associate

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -113,8 +113,8 @@ This search will return a table of rare processes, the names of the systems runn

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [filter_rare_process_allow_list](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/filter_rare_process_allow_list.yml)

 > :information_source:
@@ -110,8 +110,8 @@ The following analytic identifies `WmiPrvSE.exe` spawning a process. This typica

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **process_execution_via_wmi_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -110,8 +110,8 @@ This search looks for scripts launched via WMI.

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **script_execution_via_wmi_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via user agent, and

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [google_gcp_pubsub_message](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/google_gcp_pubsub_message.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **gcp_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -113,9 +113,9 @@ This search looks for child processes spawned by zoom.exe or zoom.us that has no

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_window](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_window.yml)
 * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_window](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_window.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -123,8 +123,8 @@ The detection Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe is detecting t

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -114,8 +114,8 @@ This search detects accounts that were created and deleted in a short time perio

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **short_lived_windows_accounts_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -115,9 +115,9 @@ The following analytic utilizes Windows Security Event ID 1102 or System log eve

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [wineventlog_system](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_system.yml)
 * [wineventlog_security](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_security.yml)
 * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
+* [wineventlog_system](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_system.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **windows_event_log_cleared_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -117,8 +117,8 @@ This search looks for network traffic on TCP/3389, the default port used by remo

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **remote_desktop_network_traffic_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -113,8 +113,8 @@ This search looks for newly created accounts that have been elevated to local ad

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [wineventlog_security](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_security.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **detect_new_local_admin_account_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -118,9 +118,9 @@ This search looks for attempts to stop security-related services on the endpoint

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
 * [process_net](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_net.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **attempt_to_stop_security_service_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -118,8 +118,8 @@ This search looks for successful AWS CloudTrail activity by user accounts that a

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml)
 * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
+* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -123,13 +123,13 @@ This search looks for DNS requests for phishing domains that are leveraging Evil

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
+* [evilginx_phishlets_aws](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/evilginx_phishlets_aws.yml)
 * [evilginx_phishlets_amazon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/evilginx_phishlets_amazon.yml)
 * [evilginx_phishlets_0365](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/evilginx_phishlets_0365.yml)
-* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
-* [evilginx_phishlets_google](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/evilginx_phishlets_google.yml)
 * [evilginx_phishlets_github](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/evilginx_phishlets_github.yml)
+* [evilginx_phishlets_google](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/evilginx_phishlets_google.yml)
 * [evilginx_phishlets_outlook](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/evilginx_phishlets_outlook.yml)
-* [evilginx_phishlets_aws](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/evilginx_phishlets_aws.yml)
+* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
 * [evilginx_phishlets_facebook](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/evilginx_phishlets_facebook.yml)

 > :information_source:
@@ -119,8 +119,8 @@ This search detects user accounts that have been locked out a relatively high nu

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -115,8 +115,8 @@ This search is used to detect attempts to use DNS tunneling, by calculating the

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **detect_long_dns_txt_record_response_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -113,8 +113,8 @@ This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a u

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml)
 * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
+* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **detect_new_user_aws_console_login_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -114,8 +114,8 @@ This search looks for outbound SMB connections made by hosts within your network

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **detect_outbound_smb_traffic_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -126,8 +126,8 @@ This search looks for execution of process `outlook.exe` where the process is wr

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **detect_outlook_exe_writing_a_zip_file_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -112,8 +112,8 @@ This search looks for the execution of the cscript.exe or wscript.exe processes,

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -109,9 +109,9 @@ This search looks for web connections to dynamic DNS providers.

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
-* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
 * [dynamic_dns_web_traffic](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/dynamic_dns_web_traffic.yml)
+* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -110,8 +110,8 @@ This search looks for specific command-line arguments that may indicate the exec

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -118,8 +118,8 @@ This search looks for EC2 instances being modified by users who have not previou

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml)
 * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
+* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml)
 * [ec2_modification_api_calls](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/ec2_modification_api_calls.yml)

 > :information_source:
@@ -117,8 +117,8 @@ This search looks for EC2 instances being created by users who have not created

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml)
 * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
+* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -111,8 +111,8 @@ The search looks at the change-analysis data model and detects email files creat

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -126,8 +126,8 @@ This search looks for command-line arguments that use a `/c` parameter to execut

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **first_time_seen_command_line_argument_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -118,8 +118,8 @@ This search looks for the first and last time a Windows service is seen running

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [wineventlog_system](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_system.yml)
 * [previously_seen_windows_services_window](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/previously_seen_windows_services_window.yml)
+* [wineventlog_system](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_system.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **first_time_seen_running_windows_service_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -111,8 +111,8 @@ Attackers leverage an existing Windows binary, attrib.exe, to mark specific as h

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -116,9 +116,9 @@ This search looks for PowerShell processes started with parameters used to bypas

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
 * [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **malicious_powershell_process_-_execution_policy_bypass_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -119,8 +119,8 @@ This search detects Okta login failures due to bad credentials for multiple user

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [okta](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/okta.yml)
 * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
+* [okta](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/okta.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentials_from_the_same_ip_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -117,8 +117,8 @@ Detect failed Okta SSO events

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [okta](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/okta.yml)
 * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
+* [okta](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/okta.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **okta_failed_sso_attempts_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -118,8 +118,8 @@ This search detects logins from the same user from different cities in a 24 hour

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [okta](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/okta.yml)
 * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
+* [okta](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/okta.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -114,8 +114,8 @@ Microsoft Windows contains accessibility features that can be launched with a ke

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **overwriting_accessibility_binaries_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -113,8 +113,8 @@ This search looks for network traffic defined by port and transport layer protoc

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **prohibited_network_traffic_allowed_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -115,8 +115,8 @@ This search looks for network traffic on common ports where a higher layer proto

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **protocol_or_port_mismatch_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -117,8 +117,8 @@ This search looks for the remote desktop process mstsc.exe running on systems up

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **remote_desktop_process_running_on_system_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -119,8 +119,8 @@ This search looks for arguments to sc.exe indicating the creation or modificatio

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -109,8 +109,8 @@ This search looks for flags passed to schtasks.exe on the command-line that indi

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **scheduled_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -113,8 +113,8 @@ This search looks for changes to registry values that control Windows file assoc

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **suspicious_changes_to_file_associations_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ This detection looks for emails that are suspicious because of their sender, dom

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **suspicious_email_-_uba_anomaly_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -117,9 +117,9 @@ This search looks for emails that have attachments with suspicious file extensio

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
 * [suspicious_email_attachments](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/suspicious_email_attachments.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **suspicious_email_attachment_extensions_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -114,8 +114,8 @@ This search looks for reg.exe being launched from a command prompt not started b

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **suspicious_reg_exe_process_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -114,8 +114,8 @@ This search looks for network traffic identified as The Onion Router (TOR), a be

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **tor_traffic_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -108,9 +108,9 @@ This search looks for applications on the endpoint that you have marked as uncom

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
 * [uncommon_processes](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/uncommon_processes.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **uncommon_processes_on_endpoint_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -112,8 +112,8 @@ Attackers often disable security tools to avoid detection. This search looks for

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **unload_sysmon_filter_driver_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -122,8 +122,8 @@ This search looks for cloud instances being modified by users who have not previ

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **cloud_instance_modified_by_previously_unseen_user_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -98,8 +98,8 @@ Enforcing network-access controls is one of the defensive mechanisms used by clo

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml)
 * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
+* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -113,9 +113,9 @@ This search looks for the creation or deletion of hidden shares using net.exe.

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
 * [process_net](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_net.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
@@ -117,8 +117,8 @@ This search looks for specific authentication events from the Windows Security E

 #### Macros
 The SPL above uses the following Macros:
-* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
 * [wineventlog_security](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_security.yml)
+* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)

 > :information_source:
 > **detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
--- a/Show More
+++ b/Show More