Branch was auto-updated.

detections/endpoint/possible_lateral_movement_powershell_spawn.yml

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 name: Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn
 id: cb909b3e-512b-11ec-aa31-3e22fbd008af
-version: 5
-date: '2024-06-18'
+version: 6
+date: '2024-10-07'
 author: Mauricio Velazco, Michael Haag, Splunk
 status: production
 type: TTP
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ tags:
   - Hermetic Wiper
   - Data Destruction
   - Scheduled Tasks
+  - CISA AA24-241A
   asset_type: Endpoint
   confidence: 50
   impact: 90

detections/endpoint/windows_identify_powershell_web_access_iis_pool.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+name: Windows Identify PowerShell Web Access IIS Pool
+id: d8419343-f0f8-4d8e-91cc-18bb531df87d
+version: 1
+date: '2024-09-09'
+author: Michael Haag, Splunk
+data_sources:
+- Windows Event Log Security 4648
+type: Hunting
+status: production
+description: This analytic detects and analyzes PowerShell Web Access (PSWA) usage in Windows environments. It tracks both connection attempts (EventID 4648) and successful logons (EventID 4624) associated with PSWA, providing a comprehensive view of access patterns. The analytic identifies PSWA's operational status, host servers, processes, and connection metrics. It highlights unique target accounts, domains accessed, and verifies logon types. This information is crucial for detecting potential misuse, such as lateral movement, brute force attempts, or unusual access patterns. By offering insights into PSWA activity, it enables security teams to quickly assess and investigate potential security incidents involving this powerful administrative tool.
+search: '`wineventlog_security` (EventCode=4648 OR EventCode=4624 OR EventCode=4625) SubjectUserName="pswa_pool"
+  | fields EventCode, SubjectUserName, TargetUserName, Computer, TargetDomainName, ProcessName, LogonType
+  | rename Computer as dest
+  | stats 
+      count(eval(EventCode=4648)) as "Connection Attempts",
+      count(eval(EventCode=4624)) as "Successful Logons",
+      count(eval(EventCode=4625)) as "Unsuccessful Logons",
+      dc(TargetUserName) as "Unique Target Accounts",
+      values(dest) as "PSWA Host",
+      dc(TargetDomainName) as "Unique Target Domains",
+      values(ProcessName) as "PSWA Process",
+      values(TargetUserName) as "Target Users List",
+      values(TargetServerName) as "Target Servers List",
+      values(LogonType) as "Logon Types"
+  | eval 
+      PSWA_Running = "Yes",
+      "PSWA Process" = mvindex(split(mvindex("PSWA Process", 0), "\\"), -1)
+  | fields PSWA_Running, "PSWA Host", "PSWA Process", "Connection Attempts", "Successful Logons","Unsuccessful Logons", "Unique Target Accounts", "Unique Target Domains", "Target Users List","Target Servers List", "Logon Types"
+  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` 
+  |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
+  | `windows_identify_powershell_web_access_iis_pool_filter`'
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Security Event logs, specifically Event ID 4648 (A logon was attempted using explicit credentials). Ensure that your Windows systems are configured to audit logon events and that these logs are being forwarded to your SIEM or log management solution. You may need to enable advanced audit policy settings in Windows to capture these events. Additionally, make sure that your environment is set up to capture the necessary fields such as SubjectUserName, TargetUserName, Computer, TargetServerName, and ProcessName from these events. If you're using Splunk, ensure that you have the appropriate Windows TA installed and configured to collect these security logs.
+known_false_positives: False positives may occur if legitimate PSWA processes are used for administrative tasks. Careful review of the logs is recommended to distinguish between legitimate and malicious activity.
+references:
+- https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa24-241a
+- https://gist.github.com/MHaggis/7e67b659af9148fa593cf2402edebb41
+tags:
+  analytic_story:
+  - CISA AA24-241A
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  confidence: 80
+  impact: 80
+  message: PowerShell Web Access (PSWA) IIS Application Pool activity detected on $PSWA Host$.
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1190
+  observable:
+  - name: PSWA Host
+    type: Hostname
+    role:
+    - Victim
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  required_fields:
+  - _time
+  - EventCode
+  - SubjectUserName
+  - TargetUserName
+  - dest
+  - TargetServerName
+  - ProcessName
+  risk_score: 64
+  security_domain: endpoint
+  cve: []
+tests:
+- name: True Positive Test
+  attack_data:
+  - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/pswa/4648_4624_pswa_pool.log
+    sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
+    source: XmlWinEventLog:Security

detections/web/windows_iis_server_pswa_console_access.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+name: Windows IIS Server PSWA Console Access
+id: 914ab191-fa8a-48cb-83a6-0565e061f934
+version: 1
+date: '2024-09-30'
+author: Michael Haag, Splunk
+data_sources:
+- Windows IIS
+type: Hunting
+status: production
+description: This analytic detects access attempts to the PowerShell Web Access (PSWA) console on Windows IIS servers. It monitors web traffic for requests to PSWA-related URIs, which could indicate legitimate administrative activity or potential unauthorized access attempts. By tracking source IP, HTTP status, URI path, and HTTP method, it helps identify suspicious patterns or brute-force attacks targeting PSWA. This detection is crucial for maintaining the security of remote PowerShell management interfaces and preventing potential exploitation of this powerful administrative tool.
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
+  as lastTime from datamodel=Web where Web.dest IN ("/pswa/*")
+    by Web.src Web.status Web.uri_path Web.dest Web.http_method 
+  Web.uri_query | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")`| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
+  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
+  | `windows_iis_server_pswa_console_access_filter`'
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
+  on Web traffic, Exchange OR IIS logs, mapped to `Web` datamodel in the `Web` node.
+  In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed.
+known_false_positives: False positives may occur if legitimate PSWA processes are used for administrative tasks. Careful review of the logs is recommended to distinguish between legitimate and malicious activity.
+references:
+- https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa24-241a
+tags:
+  analytic_story:
+  - CISA AA24-241A
+  asset_type: Web Server
+  confidence: 80
+  impact: 40
+  message: Access to the PowerShell Web Access (PSWA) console detected from $src$.
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1190
+  observable:
+  - name: src
+    type: IP Address
+    role:
+    - Attacker
+  - name: dest
+    type: Hostname
+    role:
+    - Victim
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  required_fields:
+  - _time
+  - Web.src
+  - Web.status
+  - Web.uri_path
+  - Web.dest
+  - Web.http_method
+  - Web.uri_query
+  risk_score: 32
+  security_domain: network
+  cve: []
+tests:
+- name: True Positive Test
+  attack_data:
+  - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/pswa/iis_pswaaccess.log
+    sourcetype: ms:iis:splunk
+    source: ms:iis:splunk

stories/cisa_aa24_241a.yml

@@ -1,13 +1,16 @@
 name: CISA AA24-241A
 id: f075adb6-76a6-4476-b24a-ce9d471a1bdc
-version: 1
-date: '2024-09-03'
+version: 2
+date: '2024-10-07'
 author: Michael Haag, Splunk
 description: This story covers the tactics of Iran-based cyber actors exploiting U.S. and foreign organizations across multiple sectors, as detailed in CISA Alert AA24-241A. It focuses on their methods of gaining initial access, establishing persistence, and enabling ransomware attacks through vulnerabilities in public-facing networking devices.
 narrative: As of August 2024, Iran-based cyber actors continue to exploit organizations across several U.S. sectors and other countries. The FBI assesses that a significant percentage of these operations aim to obtain network access for collaboration with ransomware affiliates. The actors typically use Shodan to identify vulnerable devices, then exploit public-facing networking equipment such as Citrix Netscaler, F5 BIG-IP, and various VPNs. They deploy webshells, create local accounts, and manipulate existing ones to maintain access. Post-exploitation, they repurpose credentials, disable security software, and use remote access tools. The group collaborates with ransomware affiliates like NoEscape, Ransomhouse, and ALPHV, actively participating in network lockdowns and extortion strategies. Defenders should prioritize patching public-facing devices, monitoring for unauthorized accounts and suspicious PowerShell activity, implementing strong access controls, and regularly reviewing logs for signs of compromise.
 references:
   - https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa24-241a
   - https://gist.github.com/MHaggis/7e67b659af9148fa593cf2402edebb41
+  - https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/core-infrastructure-and-security/want-remote-powershell-management-from-your-browser-see-how-pswa/ba-p/255764
+  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/powershellwebaccess/?view=winserver2012r2-ps
+  - https://arz101.medium.com/hackthebox-acute-ee0308b9b443
 tags:
   category:
   - Adversary Tactics
@@ -22,4 +25,4 @@ tags:
   - CVE-2019-19781
   - CVE-2023-3519
   - CVE-2022-1388
-  - CVE-2024-21887
+  - CVE-2024-21887