Branch was auto-updated.

detections/deprecated/uncommon_processes_on_endpoint.yml

@@ -26,7 +26,6 @@ tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Windows Privilege Escalation
   - Unusual Processes
-  - Cloud Federated Credential Abuse
   cis20:
   - CIS 2
   kill_chain_phases:

detections/endpoint/any_powershell_downloadfile.yml

@@ -6,18 +6,24 @@ author: Michael Haag, Splunk
 type: batch
 datamodel:
 - Endpoint
-description: The following analytic identifies the use of PowerShell downloading a file using `DownloadFile` method. This particular method is utilized in many different PowerShell frameworks to download files and output to disk. 
-  Identify the source (IP/domain) and destination file and triage appropriately. If AMSI logging or PowerShell transaction logs are available, review for further details of the implant.
+description: The following analytic identifies the use of PowerShell downloading a
+  file using `DownloadFile` method. This particular method is utilized in many different
+  PowerShell frameworks to download files and output to disk. Identify the source
+  (IP/domain) and destination file and triage appropriately. If AMSI logging or PowerShell
+  transaction logs are available, review for further details of the implant.
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
-  as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=PowerShell_ISE.exe)
-  Processes.process=*DownloadFile* by Processes.dest
-  Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process
-  Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
-  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `any_powershell_downloadfile_filter`'
+  as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=powershell.exe
+  OR Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=PowerShell_ISE.exe)
+  Processes.process=*DownloadFile* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process
+  Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id
+  | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|
+  `any_powershell_downloadfile_filter`'
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
   on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
   your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
-known_false_positives: False positives may be present and filtering will need to occur by parent process or command line argument. It may be required to modify this query to an EDR product for more granular coverage.
+known_false_positives: False positives may be present and filtering will need to occur
+  by parent process or command line argument. It may be required to modify this query
+  to an EDR product for more granular coverage.
 references:
 - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.net.webclient.downloadfile?view=net-5.0
 - https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2021/02/lazyscripter-from-empire-to-double-rat/
@@ -35,4 +41,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
-  

detections/endpoint/any_powershell_downloadstring.yml

@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Malicious PowerShell
   - HAFNIUM Group
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   dataset:
   - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
   kill_chain_phases:
@@ -42,4 +43,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
-  automated_detection_testing: passed

detections/endpoint/cobalt_strike_named_pipes.yml

@@ -2,6 +2,9 @@ name: Cobalt Strike Named Pipes
 id: 5876d429-0240-4709-8b93-ea8330b411b5
 version: 1
 date: '2021-02-22'
+author: Michael Haag, Splunk
+type: batch
+datamodel: []
 description: 'The following analytic identifies the use of default or publicly known
   named pipes used with Cobalt Strike. A named pipe is a named, one-way or duplex
   pipe for communication between the pipe server and one or more pipe clients. Cobalt
@@ -14,36 +17,38 @@ description: 'The following analytic identifies the use of default or publicly k
   It is possible it was injected into by another process. Review recent parallel processes
   to identify suspicious patterns or behaviors. A parallel process may have a network
   connection, review and follow the connection back to identify any file modifications.'
+search: '`sysmon` EventID=17 OR EventID=18 PipeName IN (\\msagent_*, \\wkssvc*, \\DserNamePipe*,
+  \\srvsvc_*, \\mojo.*, \\postex_*, \\status_*, \\MSSE-*, \\spoolss_*, \\win_svc*,
+  \\ntsvcs*, \\winsock*) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
+  by Computer, process_name, process_id process_path, PipeName | rename Computer as
+  dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
+  | `cobalt_strike_named_pipes_filter`'
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting
   logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your
   endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the
   Sysmon TA.
-type: batch
-datamodel: []
+known_false_positives: The idea of using named pipes with Cobalt Strike is to blend
+  in. Therefore, some of the named pipes identified and added may cause false positives.
+  Filter by process name or pipe name to reduce false positives.
 references:
 - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009/
 - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/ipc/named-pipes
 - https://www.cobaltstrike.com/help-smb-beacon
 - https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2021/02/09/learn-pipe-fitting-for-all-of-your-offense-projects/
 - https://gist.github.com/MHaggis/6c600e524045a6d49c35291a21e10752
-author: Michael Haag, Splunk
-search: '`sysmon` EventID=17 OR EventID=18 PipeName IN (\\msagent_*, \\wkssvc*, \\DserNamePipe*, \\srvsvc_*,
-  \\mojo.*, \\postex_*, \\status_*, \\MSSE-*, \\spoolss_*, \\win_svc*, \\ntsvcs*, \\winsock*)
-  | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, process_name, process_id
-  process_path, PipeName | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
-  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `cobalt_strike_named_pipes_filter`'
-known_false_positives: The idea of using named pipes with Cobalt Strike is to blend
-  in. Therefore, some of the named pipes identified and added may cause false positives.
-  Filter by process name or pipe name to reduce false positives.
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Cobalt Strike
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1055
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 8
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1055
   nist:
   - PR.PT
   - DE.CM
@@ -52,7 +57,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log
-  automated_detection_testing: passed

detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump.yml

@@ -17,10 +17,11 @@ description: 'Detect procdump.exe dumping the lsass process. This query looks fo
   the command line. Review other endpoint data sources for cross process (injection)
   into lsass.exe.'
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
-  as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=procdump.exe OR Processes.process_name=procdump64.exe
-  (Processes.process=*-ma* OR Processes.process=*-mm*) Processes.process=*lsass* by
-  Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
-  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `dump_lsass_via_procdump_filter`'
+  as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=procdump.exe
+  OR Processes.process_name=procdump64.exe (Processes.process=*-ma* OR Processes.process=*-mm*)
+  Processes.process=*lsass* by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process
+  Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
+  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `dump_lsass_via_procdump_filter`'
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
   on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
   your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.

detections/endpoint/eventvwr_uac_bypass.yml

@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ references:
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Windows Defense Evasion Tactics
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   dataset:
   - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
   kill_chain_phases:
@@ -40,4 +41,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
-  automated_detection_testing: passed

detections/endpoint/fodhelper_uac_bypass.yml

@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ description: 'Fodhelper.exe has a known UAC bypass as it attempts to look for sp
   1. `HKCU:\Software\Classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command\DelegateExecute`\
 
   1. `HKCU:\Software\Classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command\(default)`\
-  
+
   Upon triage, fodhelper.exe will have a child process and read access will occur
   on the registry keys. Isolate the endpoint and review parallel processes for additional
   behavior.'
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ references:
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Windows Defense Evasion Tactics
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   dataset:
   - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
   kill_chain_phases:
@@ -49,4 +50,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
-  automated_detection_testing: passed

detections/endpoint/nishang_powershelltcponeline.yml

@@ -9,16 +9,16 @@ datamodel:
 description: This query detects the Nishang Invoke-PowerShellTCPOneLine utility that
   spawns a call back to a remote command and control server. This is a powershell
   oneliner. In addition, this will capture on the command-line additional utilities
-  used by Nishang. Triage the endpoint and identify any parallel processes that look 
+  used by Nishang. Triage the endpoint and identify any parallel processes that look
   suspicious. Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain contacted by the powershell
   process.
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=powershell.exe
   OR Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=PowerShell_ISE.exe
-  (Processes.process=*Net.Sockets.TCPClient* AND Processes.process=*System.Text.ASCIIEncoding*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process
-  Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id
-  | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|
-  `nishang_powershelltcponeline_filter`'
+  (Processes.process=*Net.Sockets.TCPClient* AND Processes.process=*System.Text.ASCIIEncoding*)
+  by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name
+  Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
+  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `nishang_powershelltcponeline_filter`'
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
   on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
   your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ references:
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - HAFNIUM Group
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   dataset:
   - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
   kill_chain_phases:
@@ -42,4 +43,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
-  automated_detection_testing: passed

detections/endpoint/ryuk_wake_on_lan_command.yml

@@ -6,17 +6,25 @@ author: Michael Haag, Splunk
 type: batch
 datamodel:
 - Endpoint
-description: This Splunk query identifies the use of Wake-on-LAN utilized by Ryuk ransomware. The Ryuk Ransomware uses the Wake-on-Lan feature to turn on powered off devices on a compromised network to have greater success encrypting them. This is a high fidelity indicator of Ryuk ransomware executing on an endpoint.
-  Upon triage, isolate the endpoint. Additional file modification events will be within the users profile (\appdata\roaming) and in public directories (users\public\). Review all Scheduled Tasks on the isolated endpoint and across the fleet. Suspicious Scheduled Tasks will include a path to a unknown binary and those endpoints should be isolated until triaged.
+description: This Splunk query identifies the use of Wake-on-LAN utilized by Ryuk
+  ransomware. The Ryuk Ransomware uses the Wake-on-Lan feature to turn on powered
+  off devices on a compromised network to have greater success encrypting them. This
+  is a high fidelity indicator of Ryuk ransomware executing on an endpoint. Upon triage,
+  isolate the endpoint. Additional file modification events will be within the users
+  profile (\appdata\roaming) and in public directories (users\public\). Review all
+  Scheduled Tasks on the isolated endpoint and across the fleet. Suspicious Scheduled
+  Tasks will include a path to a unknown binary and those endpoints should be isolated
+  until triaged.
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
-  as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process="*8 LAN*" OR Processes.process="*9 REP*") by Processes.dest
-  Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process
-  Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
-  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `ryuk_wake_on_lan_command_filter`'
+  as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process="*8 LAN*"
+  OR Processes.process="*9 REP*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process
+  Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id
+  | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
+  | `ryuk_wake_on_lan_command_filter`'
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
   on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
   your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
-known_false_positives: Limited to no known false positives. 
+known_false_positives: Limited to no known false positives.
 references:
 - https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/ryuk-ransomware-uses-wake-on-lan-to-encrypt-offline-devices/
 - https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/ryuk-ransomware-now-self-spreads-to-other-windows-lan-devices/
@@ -35,4 +43,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
-  

detections/endpoint/ssa___applying_stolen_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml

@@ -29,10 +29,10 @@ tags:
   cis20:
   - CIS 16
   - CIS 20
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1555/applying_stolen_credentials/logAllMimikatzModules.log
   kill_chain_phases:
   - Actions on Objectives
-  dataset:
-  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1555/applying_stolen_credentials/logAllMimikatzModules.log 
   mitre_attack_id:
   - T1055
   - T1068

detections/endpoint/ssa___applying_stolen_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml

@@ -31,10 +31,10 @@ tags:
   cis20:
   - CIS 16
   - CIS 20
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
   dataset:
   - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1555/applying_stolen_credentials/logAllPowerSploitModulesWithOldNames.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
   mitre_attack_id:
   - T1055
   - T1068

detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_dsinternals_conversion_modules.yml

@@ -36,10 +36,10 @@ tags:
   asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
   - CIS 16
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
   dataset:
   - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003/credential_extraction/logAllDSInternalsModules.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
   mitre_attack_id:
   - T1003
   nist:

detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_dsinternals_modules.yml

@@ -37,10 +37,10 @@ tags:
   asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
   - CIS 16
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
   dataset:
   - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003/credential_extraction/logAllDSInternalsModules.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
   mitre_attack_id:
   - T1003
   nist:

detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_s_option.yml

@@ -33,10 +33,10 @@ tags:
   asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
   - CIS 16
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
   dataset:
   - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003/credential_extraction/logFgdump.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
   mitre_attack_id:
   - T1003
   nist:

detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_fgdump_cachedump_v_option.yml

@@ -31,10 +31,10 @@ tags:
   asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
   - CIS 16
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
   dataset:
   - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003/credential_extraction/logFgdump.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
   mitre_attack_id:
   - T1003
   nist:

detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_getaddbaccount_from_dump.yml

@@ -29,10 +29,10 @@ tags:
   asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
   - CIS 16
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
   dataset:
   - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003/credential_extraction/logPowerShellModule.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
   mitre_attack_id:
   - T1003
   nist:

detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_lazagne_command_options.yml

@@ -27,10 +27,10 @@ tags:
   asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
   - CIS 16
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
   dataset:
   - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003/credential_extraction/logLazagneCredDump.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
   mitre_attack_id:
   - T1003
   - T1555

detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_mimikatz_modules.yml

@@ -32,10 +32,10 @@ tags:
   asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
   - CIS 16
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
   dataset:
   - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003/credential_extraction/logAllMimikatzModules.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
   mitre_attack_id:
   - T1003
   nist:

detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_kernel_peek.yml

@@ -36,10 +36,10 @@ tags:
   asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
   - CIS 16
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
   dataset:
   - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003/credential_extraction/logLiveKDFullKernelDump.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
   mitre_attack_id:
   - T1003
   nist:

detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_ms_debuggers_z_option.yml

@@ -32,10 +32,10 @@ tags:
   asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
   - CIS 16
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
   dataset:
   - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003/credential_extraction/logLiveKDFullKernelDump.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
   mitre_attack_id:
   - T1003
   nist:

detections/endpoint/ssa___credential_extraction_powersploit_modules.yml

@@ -33,10 +33,10 @@ tags:
   asset_type: Windows
   cis20:
   - CIS 16
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
   dataset:
   - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003/credential_extraction/logAllPowerSploitModulesWithOldNames.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
   mitre_attack_id:
   - T1003
   nist:

detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_access_user_content_via_powersploit_modules.yml

@@ -31,10 +31,10 @@ tags:
   cis20:
   - CIS 16
   - CIS 20
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
   dataset:
   - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021/illegal_access_to_content/logAllPowerSploitModulesWithOldNames.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
   mitre_attack_id:
   - T1021
   - T1113

detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_account_creation_via_powersploit_modules.yml

@@ -26,10 +26,10 @@ tags:
   cis20:
   - CIS 16
   - CIS 20
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
   dataset:
   - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1585/illegal_account_creation/logAllPowerSploitModulesWithOldNames.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
   mitre_attack_id:
   - T1585
   nist:

detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_account_enable_disable_via_dsinternals_modules.yml

@@ -27,10 +27,10 @@ tags:
   cis20:
   - CIS 16
   - CIS 20
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
   dataset:
   - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1098/logAllDSInternalsModules.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
   mitre_attack_id:
   - T1078
   - T1098

detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_log_deletion_via_mimikatz_modules.yml

@@ -27,10 +27,10 @@ tags:
   cis20:
   - CIS 16
   - CIS 20
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
   dataset:
   - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070/illegal_log_deletion/logAllMimikatzModules.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
   mitre_attack_id:
   - T1070
   nist:

detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_management_AD_elements_and_policies_via_dsinternals_modules.yml

@@ -29,10 +29,10 @@ tags:
   cis20:
   - CIS 16
   - CIS 20
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
   dataset:
   - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1484/logAllDSInternalsModules.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
   mitre_attack_id:
   - T1098
   - T1207

detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_management_computers_and_AD_elements_via_powersploit_modules.yml

@@ -30,10 +30,10 @@ tags:
   cis20:
   - CIS 16
   - CIS 20
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
   dataset:
   - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1484/logAllPowerSploitModulesWithOldNames.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
   mitre_attack_id:
   - T1098
   - T1207

detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_privilege_elevation_and_persistence_via_powersploit_modules.yml

@@ -30,10 +30,10 @@ tags:
   cis20:
   - CIS 16
   - CIS 20
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
   dataset:
   - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548/logAllPowerSploitModulesWithOldNames.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
   mitre_attack_id:
   - T1053
   - T1134

detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_privilege_elevation_via_mimikatz_modules.yml

@@ -27,10 +27,10 @@ tags:
   cis20:
   - CIS 16
   - CIS 20
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
   dataset:
   - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548/logAllMimikatzModules.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
   mitre_attack_id:
   - T1134
   - T1548

detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_service_and_process_control_via_mimikatz_modules.yml

@@ -30,10 +30,10 @@ tags:
   cis20:
   - CIS 16
   - CIS 20
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
   dataset:
   - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1569/logAllMimikatzModules.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
   mitre_attack_id:
   - T1055
   - T1106

detections/endpoint/ssa___illegal_service_and_process_control_via_powersploit_modules.yml

@@ -38,10 +38,10 @@ tags:
   cis20:
   - CIS 16
   - CIS 20
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
   dataset:
   - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1569/logAllPowerSploitModulesWithOldNames.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
   mitre_attack_id:
   - T1055
   - T1106

detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_dsinternals_modules.yml

@@ -32,10 +32,10 @@ tags:
   cis20:
   - CIS 16
   - CIS 20
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
   dataset:
   - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1098/logAllDSInternalsModules.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
   mitre_attack_id:
   - T1068
   - T1078

detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml

@@ -27,10 +27,10 @@ tags:
   cis20:
   - CIS 16
   - CIS 20
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
   dataset:
   - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1098/logAllMimikatzModules.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
   mitre_attack_id:
   - T1068
   - T1078

detections/endpoint/ssa___setting_credentials_via_powersploit_modules.yml

@@ -26,10 +26,10 @@ tags:
   cis20:
   - CIS 16
   - CIS 20
-  kill_chain_phases:
-  - Actions on Objectives
   dataset:
   - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1098/logAllPowerSploitModulesWithOldNames.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
   mitre_attack_id:
   - T1068
   - T1078

detections/endpoint/suspicious_dllhost_no_command_line_arguments.yml

@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ references:
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Cobalt Strike
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   dataset:
   - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log
   kill_chain_phases:
@@ -38,4 +39,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
-  automated_detection_testing: passed

detections/endpoint/suspicious_gpupdate_no_command_line_arguments.yml

@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ references:
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Cobalt Strike
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   dataset:
   - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log
   kill_chain_phases:
@@ -38,4 +39,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
-  automated_detection_testing: passed

detections/endpoint/suspicious_scheduled_task_from_public_directory.yml

@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ tags:
   - Ransomware
   - Ryuk Ransomware
   - Windows Persistence Techniques
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   dataset:
   - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/schtasks/windows-sysmon.log
   kill_chain_phases:
@@ -42,4 +43,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
-  automated_detection_testing: passed

detections/endpoint/suspicious_searchprotocolhost_no_command_line_arguments.yml

@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ references:
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Cobalt Strike
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   dataset:
   - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log
   kill_chain_phases:
@@ -38,4 +39,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
-  automated_detection_testing: passed

detections/endpoint/windows_disableantispyware_reg.yml

@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ tags:
   - Ryuk Ransomware
   - Windows Defense Evasion Tactics
   asset_type: Endpoint
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
   cis20:
   - CIS 8
   dataset:
@@ -47,4 +48,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  automated_detection_testing: passed

detections/experimental/endpoint/suspicious_curl_network_connection.yml

@@ -2,36 +2,38 @@ name: Suspicious Curl Network Connection
 id: 3f613dc0-21f2-4063-93b1-5d3c15eef22f
 version: 1
 date: '2021-02-22'
-description: 'The following analytic identifies the use of a curl contacting suspicious remote domains to checkin to command and control servers or download further implants.
-  In the context of Silver Sparrow, curl is identified contacting s3.amazonaws.com. This particular behavior is common with MacOS adware-malicious software.'
-how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
-  on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
-  your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
+author: Michael Haag, Splunk
 type: batch
 datamodel:
 - Endpoint
+description: The following analytic identifies the use of a curl contacting suspicious
+  remote domains to checkin to command and control servers or download further implants.
+  In the context of Silver Sparrow, curl is identified contacting s3.amazonaws.com.
+  This particular behavior is common with MacOS adware-malicious software.
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
+  as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=curl
+  Processes.process=s3.amazonaws.com by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process
+  Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id
+  | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
+  | `suspicious_curl_network_connection_filter`'
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
+  on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
+  your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
+known_false_positives: Unknown. Filter as needed.
 references:
 - https://redcanary.com/blog/clipping-silver-sparrows-wings/
 - https://marcosantadev.com/manage-plist-files-plistbuddy/
-author: Michael Haag, Splunk
-search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
-  as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=curl
-  Processes.process=s3.amazonaws.com by Processes.dest
-  Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process
-  Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
-  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_curl_network_connection_filter`'
-known_false_positives: Unknown. Filter as needed.
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Silver Sparrow
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1105
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  dataset: []
   kill_chain_phases:
   - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1105
   product:
   - Splunk Enterprise
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
-  dataset: []

detections/experimental/endpoint/suspicious_plistbuddy_usage.yml

@@ -2,50 +2,60 @@ name: Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage
 id: c3194009-e0eb-4f84-87a9-4070f8688f00
 version: 1
 date: '2021-02-22'
-description: 'The following analytic identifies the use of a native MacOS utility, PlistBuddy, creating or modifying a properly list (.plist) file. In the instance of Silver Sparrow,
-  the following commands were executed:\
-   
-  - PlistBuddy -c "Add :Label string init_verx" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \
-
-  - PlistBuddy -c "Add :RunAtLoad bool true" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \
-
-  - PlistBuddy -c "Add :StartInterval integer 3600" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \
-
-  - PlistBuddy -c "Add :ProgramArguments array" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \
-
-  - PlistBuddy -c "Add :ProgramArguments:0 string /bin/sh" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \
-  
-  - PlistBuddy -c "Add :ProgramArguments:1 string -c" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \
-  
-  Upon triage, capture the property list file being written to disk and review for further indicators. Contain the endpoint and triage further.'
-how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
-  on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
-  your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
+author: Michael Haag, Splunk
 type: batch
 datamodel:
 - Endpoint
+description: 'The following analytic identifies the use of a native MacOS utility,
+  PlistBuddy, creating or modifying a properly list (.plist) file. In the instance
+  of Silver Sparrow, the following commands were executed:\
+
+  - PlistBuddy -c "Add :Label string init_verx" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist
+  \
+
+  - PlistBuddy -c "Add :RunAtLoad bool true" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist
+  \
+
+  - PlistBuddy -c "Add :StartInterval integer 3600" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist
+  \
+
+  - PlistBuddy -c "Add :ProgramArguments array" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist
+  \
+
+  - PlistBuddy -c "Add :ProgramArguments:0 string /bin/sh" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist
+  \
+
+  - PlistBuddy -c "Add :ProgramArguments:1 string -c" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist
+  \
+
+  Upon triage, capture the property list file being written to disk and review for
+  further indicators. Contain the endpoint and triage further.'
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
+  as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=PlistBuddy
+  (Processes.process=*LaunchAgents* OR Processes.process=*RunAtLoad* OR Processes.process=*true*)
+  by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name
+  Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
+  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |  `suspicious_plistbuddy_usage_filter`'
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
+  on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
+  your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
+known_false_positives: Some legitimate applications may use PlistBuddy to create or
+  modify property lists and possibly generate false positives. Review the property
+  list being modified or created to confirm.
 references:
 - https://redcanary.com/blog/clipping-silver-sparrows-wings/
 - https://marcosantadev.com/manage-plist-files-plistbuddy/
-author: Michael Haag, Splunk
-search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
-  as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=PlistBuddy
-  (Processes.process=*LaunchAgents* OR Processes.process=*RunAtLoad* OR Processes.process=*true*) by Processes.dest
-  Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process
-  Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
-  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |  `suspicious_plistbuddy_usage_filter`'
-known_false_positives: Some legitimate applications may use PlistBuddy to create or modify property lists and possibly generate false positives. Review the property list being modified or created to confirm.
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Silver Sparrow
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1543.001
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  dataset: []
   kill_chain_phases:
   - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1543.001
   product:
   - Splunk Enterprise
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
-  dataset: []

detections/experimental/endpoint/suspicious_plistbuddy_usage_via_osquery.yml

@@ -2,43 +2,55 @@ name: Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage via OSquery
 id: 20ba6c32-c733-4a32-b64e-2688cf231399
 version: 1
 date: '2021-02-22'
-description: 'The following analytic identifies the use of a native MacOS utility, PlistBuddy, creating or modifying a properly list (.plist) file. In the instance of Silver Sparrow,
-  the following commands were executed:\
-   
-  - PlistBuddy -c "Add :Label string init_verx" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \
-
-  - PlistBuddy -c "Add :RunAtLoad bool true" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \
-
-  - PlistBuddy -c "Add :StartInterval integer 3600" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \
-
-  - PlistBuddy -c "Add :ProgramArguments array" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \
-
-  - PlistBuddy -c "Add :ProgramArguments:0 string /bin/sh" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \
-  
-  - PlistBuddy -c "Add :ProgramArguments:1 string -c" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \
-  
-  Upon triage, capture the property list file being written to disk and review for further indicators. Contain the endpoint and triage further.'
-how_to_implement: OSQuery must be installed and configured to pick up process events (info
-  at https://osquery.io) as well as using the Splunk OSQuery Add-on https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/4402. Modify the macro and validate fields are correct.
+author: Michael Haag, Splunk
 type: batch
 datamodel: []
+description: 'The following analytic identifies the use of a native MacOS utility,
+  PlistBuddy, creating or modifying a properly list (.plist) file. In the instance
+  of Silver Sparrow, the following commands were executed:\
+
+  - PlistBuddy -c "Add :Label string init_verx" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist
+  \
+
+  - PlistBuddy -c "Add :RunAtLoad bool true" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist
+  \
+
+  - PlistBuddy -c "Add :StartInterval integer 3600" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist
+  \
+
+  - PlistBuddy -c "Add :ProgramArguments array" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist
+  \
+
+  - PlistBuddy -c "Add :ProgramArguments:0 string /bin/sh" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist
+  \
+
+  - PlistBuddy -c "Add :ProgramArguments:1 string -c" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist
+  \
+
+  Upon triage, capture the property list file being written to disk and review for
+  further indicators. Contain the endpoint and triage further.'
+search: '`osquery_process` "columns.cmdline"="*LaunchAgents*" OR "columns.cmdline"="*RunAtLoad*"
+  OR "columns.cmdline"="*true*" |  `suspicious_plistbuddy_usage_via_osquery_filter`'
+how_to_implement: OSQuery must be installed and configured to pick up process events
+  (info at https://osquery.io) as well as using the Splunk OSQuery Add-on https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/4402.
+  Modify the macro and validate fields are correct.
+known_false_positives: Some legitimate applications may use PlistBuddy to create or
+  modify property lists and possibly generate false positives. Review the property
+  list being modified or created to confirm.
 references:
 - https://redcanary.com/blog/clipping-silver-sparrows-wings/
 - https://marcosantadev.com/manage-plist-files-plistbuddy/
-author: Michael Haag, Splunk
-search: '`osquery_process` "columns.cmdline"="*LaunchAgents*" OR "columns.cmdline"="*RunAtLoad*" OR "columns.cmdline"="*true*" |  `suspicious_plistbuddy_usage_via_osquery_filter`'
-known_false_positives: Some legitimate applications may use PlistBuddy to create or modify property lists and possibly generate false positives. Review the property list being modified or created to confirm.
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Silver Sparrow
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1543.001
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  dataset: []
   kill_chain_phases:
   - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1543.001
   product:
   - Splunk Enterprise
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
-  dataset: []

detections/experimental/endpoint/suspicious_sqlite3_lsquarantine_behavior.yml

@@ -2,36 +2,38 @@ name: Suspicious SQLite3 LSQuarantine Behavior
 id: e1997b2e-655f-4561-82fd-aeba8e1c1a86
 version: 1
 date: '2021-02-22'
-description: 'The following analytic identifies the use of a SQLite3 querying the MacOS preferences to identify the original URL the pkg was downloaded from.
-  This particular behavior is common with MacOS adware-malicious software. Upon triage, review other processes in parallel for suspicious activity. Identify any recent package installations.'
-how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
-  on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
-  your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
+author: Michael Haag, Splunk
 type: batch
 datamodel:
 - Endpoint
+description: The following analytic identifies the use of a SQLite3 querying the MacOS
+  preferences to identify the original URL the pkg was downloaded from. This particular
+  behavior is common with MacOS adware-malicious software. Upon triage, review other
+  processes in parallel for suspicious activity. Identify any recent package installations.
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
+  as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=sqlite3
+  Processes.process=*LSQuarantine* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process
+  Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id
+  | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
+  | `suspicious_sqlite3_lsquarantine_behavior_filter`'
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
+  on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
+  your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
+known_false_positives: Unknown.
 references:
 - https://redcanary.com/blog/clipping-silver-sparrows-wings/
 - https://marcosantadev.com/manage-plist-files-plistbuddy/
-author: Michael Haag, Splunk
-search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
-  as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=sqlite3
-  Processes.process=*LSQuarantine* by Processes.dest
-  Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process
-  Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
-  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_sqlite3_lsquarantine_behavior_filter`'
-known_false_positives: Unknown.
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Silver Sparrow
-  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1074
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  dataset: []
   kill_chain_phases:
   - Actions on Objectives
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1074
   product:
   - Splunk Enterprise
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  asset_type: Endpoint
-  dataset: []

detections/experimental/endpoint/unified_messaging_service_spawning_a_process.yml

@@ -6,24 +6,28 @@ author: Michael Haag, Splunk
 type: batch
 datamodel:
 - Endpoint
-description: This detection identifies Microsoft Exchange Server's Unified Messaging services,
-  umworkerprocess.exe and umservice.exe, spawning a child process, indicating possible exploitation
-  of CVE-2021-26857 vulnerability. The query filters out werfault.exe and wermgr.exe mostly due to
-  potential false positives, however, if there is an excessive amount of "wermgr.exe" or "WerFault.exe"
-  failures, it may be due to the active exploitation.
-  During triage, identify any additional suspicious parallel processes. Identify any recent out of
-  place file modifications. Review Exchange logs following Microsofts guide. To contain, perform
-  egress filtering or restrict public access to Exchange. In final, patch the vulnerablity and monitor.
+description: This detection identifies Microsoft Exchange Server's Unified Messaging
+  services, umworkerprocess.exe and umservice.exe, spawning a child process, indicating
+  possible exploitation of CVE-2021-26857 vulnerability. The query filters out werfault.exe
+  and wermgr.exe mostly due to potential false positives, however, if there is an
+  excessive amount of "wermgr.exe" or "WerFault.exe" failures, it may be due to the
+  active exploitation. During triage, identify any additional suspicious parallel
+  processes. Identify any recent out of place file modifications. Review Exchange
+  logs following Microsofts guide. To contain, perform egress filtering or restrict
+  public access to Exchange. In final, patch the vulnerablity and monitor.
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
-  as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name="umworkerprocess.exe" OR Processes.parent_process_name="UMService.exe" (Processes.process_name!="wermgr.exe" OR Processes.process_name!="werfault.exe")
-  by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name
-  Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
-  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `unified_messaging_service_spawning_a_process_filter`'
+  as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name="umworkerprocess.exe"
+  OR Processes.parent_process_name="UMService.exe" (Processes.process_name!="wermgr.exe"
+  OR Processes.process_name!="werfault.exe") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process
+  Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id
+  | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
+  | `unified_messaging_service_spawning_a_process_filter`'
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting
   logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your
   endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the
-  Sysmon TA. 
-known_false_positives: Unknown. Tune out child processes as needed to limit volume of false positives.
+  Sysmon TA.
+known_false_positives: Unknown. Tune out child processes as needed to limit volume
+  of false positives.
 references:
 - https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/03/02/active-exploitation-of-microsoft-exchange-zero-day-vulnerabilities/
 - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/
@@ -40,4 +44,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
-  

detections/experimental/endpoint/w3wp_spawning_shell.yml

@@ -6,18 +6,26 @@ author: Michael Haag, Splunk
 type: batch
 datamodel:
 - Endpoint
-description: This query identifies a shell, PowerShell.exe or Cmd.exe, spawning from W3WP.exe, or IIS. In addition to IIS logs, this behavior with an EDR product will capture potential webshell activity, similar to the HAFNIUM Group abusing CVEs, on publicly available Exchange mail servers.
-  During triage, review the parent process and child process of the shell being spawned. Review the command-line arguments and any file modifications that may occur. Identify additional parallel process, child processes, that may highlight further commands executed. After triaging, work to contain the threat and patch the system that is vulnerable. 
+description: This query identifies a shell, PowerShell.exe or Cmd.exe, spawning from
+  W3WP.exe, or IIS. In addition to IIS logs, this behavior with an EDR product will
+  capture potential webshell activity, similar to the HAFNIUM Group abusing CVEs,
+  on publicly available Exchange mail servers. During triage, review the parent process
+  and child process of the shell being spawned. Review the command-line arguments
+  and any file modifications that may occur. Identify additional parallel process,
+  child processes, that may highlight further commands executed. After triaging, work
+  to contain the threat and patch the system that is vulnerable.
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name)
   as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=w3wp.exe
-  AND Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process
-  Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
+  AND Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe by Processes.dest
+  Processes.parent_process Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
   | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `w3wp_spawning_shell_filter`'
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
   on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
   your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
-known_false_positives: Baseline your environment before production. It is possible build systems using IIS will spawn cmd.exe to perform a software build. Filter as needed. 
+known_false_positives: Baseline your environment before production. It is possible
+  build systems using IIS will spawn cmd.exe to perform a software build. Filter as
+  needed.
 references:
 - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/02/04/ghost-in-the-shell-investigating-web-shell-attacks/
 tags:
@@ -32,4 +40,3 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
-  

docs/splunk_docs_categories.wiki

@@ -354,16 +354,28 @@ Cobalt Strike is threat emulation software. Red teams and penetration testers us
 <div class="mw-collapsible-content">
 
 ====Narrative====
-This Analytic Story supports you to detect Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) from Cobalt Strike. Cobalt Strike has many ways to be enhanced by using aggressor scripts, malleable C2 profiles, default attack packages, and much more. For endpoint behavior, Cobalt Strike is most commonly identified via named pipes, spawn to processes, and DLL function names. On the network, depending on the malleable C2 profile used, it is near infinite in the amount of ways to conceal the C2 traffic with Cobalt Strike.\
-In generating content for Cobalt Strike, the following is considered:\
-1. Is it normal for <spawnto_ value> to have no command line arguments? No command line arguments and a network connection?\
-1. What is the default, or normal, process lineage for <spawnto_ value>?\
-1. Does the <spawnto_ value> make network connections?\
-1. Is it normal for <spawnto_ value> to load jscript, vbscript, Amsi.dll, and clr.dll?.
+This Analytic Story supports you to detect Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) from Cobalt Strike. Cobalt Strike has many ways to be enhanced by using aggressor scripts, malleable C2 profiles, default attack packages, and much more. For endpoint behavior, Cobalt Strike is most commonly identified via named pipes, spawn to processes, and DLL function names. Many additional variables are provided for in memory operation of the beacon implant. On the network, depending on the malleable C2 profile used, it is near infinite in the amount of ways to conceal the C2 traffic with Cobalt Strike. Not every query may be specific to Cobalt Strike the tool, but the methodologies and techniques used by it.\
+Splunk Threat Research reviewed all publicly available instances of Malleabe C2 Profiles and generated a list of the most commonly used spawnto and pipenames.\
+`Spawnto_x86` and `spawnto_x64` is the process that Cobalt Strike will spawn and injects shellcode into.\
+Pipename sets the named pipe name used in Cobalt Strikes Beacon SMB C2 traffic.\
+With that, new detections were generated focused on these spawnto processes spawning without command line arguments. Similar, the named pipes most commonly used by Cobalt Strike added as a detection. In generating content for Cobalt Strike, the following is considered:\
+- Is it normal for spawnto_ value to have no command line arguments? No command line arguments and a network connection?\
+- What is the default, or normal, process lineage for spawnto_ value?\
+- Does the spawnto_ value make network connections?\
+- Is it normal for spawnto_ value to load jscript, vbscript, Amsi.dll, and clr.dll?\
+While investigating a detection related to this Analytic Story, keep in mind the parent process, process path, and any file modifications that may occur. Tuning may need to occur to remove any false positives.
 
 ====Detections====
+* Cobalt Strike Named Pipes
+* Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass
+* Suspicious DLLHost no Command Line Arguments
+* Suspicious GPUpdate no Command Line Arguments
+* Suspicious MSBuild Rename
 * Suspicious Rundll32 StartW
-* Suspicious Rundll32 no CommandLine Arguments
+* Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments
+* Suspicious SearchProtocolHost no Command Line Arguments
+* Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename
+* Suspicious msbuild path
 
 ====Data Models====
 * Endpoint
@@ -371,12 +383,19 @@ In generating content for Cobalt Strike, the following is considered:\
 ====Tags====
 
 =====ATT&CK=====
+* T1036.003
+* T1055
+* T1127, T1036.003
+* T1127.001
+* T1218.010
 * T1218.011
 
 =====Kill Chain Phases=====
 * Actions on Objectives
+* Exploitation
 
 =====CIS=====
+* CIS 16
 * CIS 8
 
 =====NIST=====
@@ -389,6 +408,8 @@ In generating content for Cobalt Strike, the following is considered:\
 * https://bluescreenofjeff.com/2017-01-24-how-to-write-malleable-c2-profiles-for-cobalt-strike/
 * https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2020/09/coverage-strikes-back-cobalt-strike-paper.html
 * https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/unauthorized-access-of-fireeye-red-team-tools.html
+* https://github.com/MichaelKoczwara/Awesome-CobaltStrike-Defence
+* https://github.com/zer0yu/Awesome-CobaltStrike
 
 date = 2021-02-16
 
@@ -589,7 +610,6 @@ The detection searches in this Analytic Story monitor access to the Local Securi
 * Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation
 * Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass
 * Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe
-* Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - SSA
 * Create Remote Thread into LSASS
 * Creation of Shadow Copy
 * Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell
@@ -597,12 +617,12 @@ The detection searches in this Analytic Story monitor access to the Local Securi
 * Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy
 * Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy
 * Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access
-* Detect Dump LSASS Memory using comsvcs - SSA
+* Detect Dump LSASS Memory using comsvcs
 * Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images
 * Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL
 * Dump LSASS via procdump
 * Dump LSASS via procdump Rename
-* Ntdsutil export ntds
+* Ntdsutil Export NTDS
 * Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS
 
 ====Data Models====
@@ -909,6 +929,83 @@ version = 1
 </div>
 </div>
 
+===HAFNIUM Group===
+
+HAFNIUM group was identified by Microsoft as exploiting 4 Microsoft Exchange CVEs in the wild - CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858 and CVE-2021-27065.
+
+<div class="toccolours mw-collapsible">
+<div class="mw-collapsible-content">
+
+====Narrative====
+On Tuesday, March 2, 2021, Microsoft released a set of security patches for its mail server, Microsoft Exchange. These patches respond to a group of vulnerabilities known to impact Exchange 2013, 2016, and 2019. It is important to note that an Exchange 2010 security update has also been issued, though the CVEs do not reference that version as being vulnerable.\
+While the CVEs do not shed much light on the specifics of the vulnerabilities or exploits, the first vulnerability (CVE-2021-26855) has a remote network attack vector that allows the attacker, a group Microsoft named HAFNIUM, to authenticate as the Exchange server. Three additional vulnerabilities (CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, and CVE-2021-27065) were also identified as part of this activity. When chained together along with CVE-2021-26855 for initial access, the attacker would have complete control over the Exchange server. This includes the ability to run code as SYSTEM and write to any path on the server.\
+The following Splunk detections assist with identifying the HAFNIUM groups tradecraft and methodology.
+
+====Detections====
+* Any Powershell DownloadString
+* Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass
+* Detect New Local Admin account
+* Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag
+* Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL
+* Dump LSASS via procdump
+* Dump LSASS via procdump Rename
+* Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts
+* Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window
+* Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass
+* Nishang PowershellTCPOneLine
+* Ntdsutil Export NTDS
+* Unified Messaging Service Spawning a Process
+* W3WP Spawning Shell
+
+====Data Models====
+* Endpoint
+* Network_Traffic
+
+====Tags====
+
+=====ATT&CK=====
+* T1003.001
+* T1003.003
+* T1021.002
+* T1059.001
+* T1114.002
+* T1136.001
+* T1190
+* T1505.003
+
+=====Kill Chain Phases=====
+* Actions on Objectives
+* Command and Control
+* Exploitation
+* Installation
+
+=====CIS=====
+* CIS 16
+* CIS 3
+* CIS 5
+* CIS 7
+* CIS 8
+
+=====NIST=====
+* DE.AE
+* DE.CM
+* PR.AC
+* PR.IP
+* PR.PT
+
+====References====
+* https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/detecting-hafnium-exchange-server-zero-day-activity-in-splunk.html
+* https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/03/02/active-exploitation-of-microsoft-exchange-zero-day-vulnerabilities/
+* https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/
+* https://blog.rapid7.com/2021/03/03/rapid7s-insightidr-enables-detection-and-response-to-microsoft-exchange-0-day/
+
+date = 2021-03-03
+
+version = 1
+
+</div>
+</div>
+
 ===Lateral Movement===
 
 Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures around how attackers move laterally within the enterprise. Because lateral movement can expose the adversary to detection, it should be an important focus for security analysts.
@@ -990,6 +1087,8 @@ It can also be very helpful to examine various behaviors of the process of inter
 In the event a system is suspected of having been compromised via a malicious website, we suggest reviewing the browsing activity from that system around the time of the event. If categories are given for the URLs visited, that can help you zero in on possible malicious sites.
 
 ====Detections====
+* Any Powershell DownloadFile
+* Any Powershell DownloadString
 * Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass
 * Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window
 * Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command
@@ -1008,6 +1107,7 @@ In the event a system is suspected of having been compromised via a malicious we
 =====Kill Chain Phases=====
 * Actions on Objectives
 * Command and Control
+* Exploitation
 * Installation
 
 =====CIS=====
@@ -1162,6 +1262,50 @@ version = 1
 </div>
 </div>
 
+===Silver Sparrow===
+
+Silver Sparrow, identified by Red Canary Intelligence, is a new forward looking MacOS (Intel and M1) malicious software downloader utilizing JavaScript for execution and a launchAgent to establish persistence.
+
+<div class="toccolours mw-collapsible">
+<div class="mw-collapsible-content">
+
+====Narrative====
+Silver Sparrow works is a dropper and uses typical persistence mechanisms on a Mac. It is cross platform, covering both Intel and Apple M1 architecture. To this date, no implant has been downloaded for malicious purposes. During installation of the update.pkg or updater.pkg file, the malicious software utilizes JavaScript to generate files and scripts on disk for persistence.These files later download a implant from an S3 bucket every hour. This analytic assists with identifying different types of macOS malware families establishing LaunchAgent persistence. Per SentinelOne source, it is predicted that Silver Sparrow is likely selling itself as a mechanism to 3rd party “affiliates” or pay-per-install (PPI) partners, typically seen as commodity adware/malware. Additional indicators and behaviors may be found within the references.
+
+====Detections====
+* Suspicious Curl Network Connection
+* Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage
+* Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage via OSquery
+* Suspicious SQLite3 LSQuarantine Behavior
+
+====Data Models====
+* Endpoint
+
+====Tags====
+
+=====ATT&CK=====
+* T1074
+* T1105
+* T1543.001
+
+=====Kill Chain Phases=====
+* Actions on Objectives
+
+=====CIS=====
+
+=====NIST=====
+
+====References====
+* https://redcanary.com/blog/clipping-silver-sparrows-wings/
+* https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/5-things-you-need-to-know-about-silver-sparrow/
+
+date = 2021-02-24
+
+version = 1
+
+</div>
+</div>
+
 ===SQL Injection===
 
 Use the searches in this Analytic Story to help you detect structured query language (SQL) injection attempts characterized by long URLs that contain malicious parameters.
@@ -1521,13 +1665,17 @@ Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe proce
 ====Narrative====
 One common adversary tactic is to bypass application control solutions via the mshta.exe process, which loads Microsoft HTML applications (mshtml.dll) with the .hta suffix. In these cases, attackers use the trusted Windows utility to proxy execution of malicious files, whether an .hta application, javascript, or VBScript.\
 The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an attacker is leveraging mshta.exe to execute malicious code.\
-Triage\ Validate execution \ 1. Determine if MSHTA.exe executed. Validate the OriginalFileName of MSHTA.exe and further PE metadata. If executed outside of c:\windows\system32 or c:\windows\syswow64, it should be highly suspect.\
+Triage\
+Validate execution \
+1. Determine if MSHTA.exe executed. Validate the OriginalFileName of MSHTA.exe and further PE metadata. If executed outside of c:\windows\system32 or c:\windows\syswow64, it should be highly suspect.\
 1. Determine if script code was executed with MSHTA.\
-Situational Awareness\ The objective of this step is meant to identify suspicious behavioral indicators related to executed of Script code by MSHTA.exe.\
+Situational Awareness\
+The objective of this step is meant to identify suspicious behavioral indicators related to executed of Script code by MSHTA.exe.\
 1. Parent process. Is the parent process a known LOLBin? Is the parent process an Office Application?\
 1. Module loads. Are the known MSHTA.exe modules being loaded by a non-standard application? Is MSHTA loading any suspicious .DLLs?\
 1. Network connections. Any network connections? Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain.\
-Retrieval of script code\ The objective of this step is to confirm the executed script code is benign or malicious.
+Retrieval of script code\
+The objective of this step is to confirm the executed script code is benign or malicious.
 
 ====Detections====
 * Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line
@@ -1729,7 +1877,7 @@ One common adversary tactic is to bypass application control solutions via the r
 * Suspicious Rundll32 Rename
 * Suspicious Rundll32 StartW
 * Suspicious Rundll32 dllregisterserver
-* Suspicious Rundll32 no CommandLine Arguments
+* Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments
 
 ====Data Models====
 * Endpoint
@@ -2050,10 +2198,13 @@ Defense evasion is a tactic--identified in the MITRE ATT&CK framework--that adve
 
 ====Detections====
 * Disabling Remote User Account Control
+* Eventvwr UAC Bypass
+* FodHelper UAC Bypass
 * Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe
 * Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys
 * Remote Registry Key modifications
 * Suspicious Reg exe Process
+* Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry
 
 ====Data Models====
 * Endpoint
@@ -2064,10 +2215,14 @@ Defense evasion is a tactic--identified in the MITRE ATT&CK framework--that adve
 * T1112
 * T1222.001
 * T1548.002
+* T1562.001
 * T1564.001
 
 =====Kill Chain Phases=====
 * Actions on Objectives
+* Delivery
+* Exploitation
+* Privilege Escalation
 
 =====CIS=====
 * CIS 8
@@ -2212,6 +2367,7 @@ Maintaining persistence is one of the first steps taken by attackers after the i
 * Schtasks used for forcing a reboot
 * Shim Database File Creation
 * Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters
+* Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory
 
 ====Data Models====
 * Endpoint
@@ -2231,7 +2387,9 @@ Maintaining persistence is one of the first steps taken by attackers after the i
 
 =====Kill Chain Phases=====
 * Actions on Objectives
+* Exploitation
 * Installation
+* Privilege Escalation
 
 =====CIS=====
 * CIS 3
@@ -4184,6 +4342,7 @@ Ransomware is an ever-present risk to the enterprise, wherein an infected host e
 * Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware
 * Schtasks used for forcing a reboot
 * Spike in File Writes
+* Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory
 * Suspicious wevtutil Usage
 * System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations
 * TOR Traffic
@@ -4216,6 +4375,8 @@ Ransomware is an ever-present risk to the enterprise, wherein an infected host e
 * Actions on Objectives
 * Command and Control
 * Delivery
+* Exploitation
+* Privilege Escalation
 
 =====CIS=====
 * CIS 10
@@ -4297,12 +4458,15 @@ Cybersecurity Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) released Alert (AA20-302A) o
 
 ====Detections====
 * BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification
+* Common Ransomware Extensions
 * Common Ransomware Notes
 * NLTest Domain Trust Discovery
 * Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce
 * Remote Desktop Network Traffic
 * Ryuk Test Files Detected
+* Ryuk Wake on LAN Command
 * Spike in File Writes
+* Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory
 * WBAdmin Delete System Backups
 * Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry
 * Windows Security Account Manager Stopped
@@ -4316,6 +4480,7 @@ Cybersecurity Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) released Alert (AA20-302A) o
 
 =====ATT&CK=====
 * T1021.001
+* T1053.005
 * T1059.003
 * T1482
 * T1485
@@ -4328,6 +4493,8 @@ Cybersecurity Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) released Alert (AA20-302A) o
 * Actions on Objectives
 * Delivery
 * Exploitation
+* Lateral Movement
+* Privilege Escalation
 * Reconnaissance
 
 =====CIS=====

docs/stories_categories.md

@@ -314,6 +314,8 @@ Another search detects incidents wherein a single password is used across multip
 
 * [F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902](#F5-TMUI-RCE-CVE-2020-5902)
 
+* [HAFNIUM Group](#HAFNIUM-Group)
+
 * [Lateral Movement](#Lateral-Movement)
 
 * [Malicious PowerShell](#Malicious-PowerShell)
@@ -322,6 +324,8 @@ Another search detects incidents wherein a single password is used across multip
 
 * [Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns](#Possible-Backdoor-Activity-Associated-With-MUDCARP-Espionage-Campaigns)
 
+* [Silver Sparrow](#Silver-Sparrow)
+
 * [SQL Injection](#SQL-Injection)
 
 * [Sunburst Malware](#Sunburst-Malware)
@@ -410,16 +414,28 @@ A non-privledged user is able to execute the sudoedit command to trigger a buffe
 Cobalt Strike is threat emulation software. Red teams and penetration testers use Cobalt Strike to demonstrate the risk of a breach and evaluate mature security programs. Most recently, Cobalt Strike has become the choice tool by threat groups due to its ease of use and extensibility.
 
 #### Narrative
-This Analytic Story supports you to detect Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) from Cobalt Strike. Cobalt Strike has many ways to be enhanced by using aggressor scripts, malleable C2 profiles, default attack packages, and much more. For endpoint behavior, Cobalt Strike is most commonly identified via named pipes, spawn to processes, and DLL function names. On the network, depending on the malleable C2 profile used, it is near infinite in the amount of ways to conceal the C2 traffic with Cobalt Strike.\
-In generating content for Cobalt Strike, the following is considered:\
-1. Is it normal for <spawnto_ value> to have no command line arguments? No command line arguments and a network connection?\
-1. What is the default, or normal, process lineage for <spawnto_ value>?\
-1. Does the <spawnto_ value> make network connections?\
-1. Is it normal for <spawnto_ value> to load jscript, vbscript, Amsi.dll, and clr.dll?.
+This Analytic Story supports you to detect Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) from Cobalt Strike. Cobalt Strike has many ways to be enhanced by using aggressor scripts, malleable C2 profiles, default attack packages, and much more. For endpoint behavior, Cobalt Strike is most commonly identified via named pipes, spawn to processes, and DLL function names. Many additional variables are provided for in memory operation of the beacon implant. On the network, depending on the malleable C2 profile used, it is near infinite in the amount of ways to conceal the C2 traffic with Cobalt Strike. Not every query may be specific to Cobalt Strike the tool, but the methodologies and techniques used by it.\
+Splunk Threat Research reviewed all publicly available instances of Malleabe C2 Profiles and generated a list of the most commonly used spawnto and pipenames.\
+`Spawnto_x86` and `spawnto_x64` is the process that Cobalt Strike will spawn and injects shellcode into.\
+Pipename sets the named pipe name used in Cobalt Strikes Beacon SMB C2 traffic.\
+With that, new detections were generated focused on these spawnto processes spawning without command line arguments. Similar, the named pipes most commonly used by Cobalt Strike added as a detection. In generating content for Cobalt Strike, the following is considered:\
+- Is it normal for spawnto_ value to have no command line arguments? No command line arguments and a network connection?\
+- What is the default, or normal, process lineage for spawnto_ value?\
+- Does the spawnto_ value make network connections?\
+- Is it normal for spawnto_ value to load jscript, vbscript, Amsi.dll, and clr.dll?\
+While investigating a detection related to this Analytic Story, keep in mind the parent process, process path, and any file modifications that may occur. Tuning may need to occur to remove any false positives.
 
 #### Detections
+* Cobalt Strike Named Pipes
+* Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass
+* Suspicious DLLHost no Command Line Arguments
+* Suspicious GPUpdate no Command Line Arguments
+* Suspicious MSBuild Rename
 * Suspicious Rundll32 StartW
-* Suspicious Rundll32 no CommandLine Arguments
+* Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments
+* Suspicious SearchProtocolHost no Command Line Arguments
+* Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename
+* Suspicious msbuild path
 
 #### Data Models
 * Endpoint
@@ -427,12 +443,19 @@ In generating content for Cobalt Strike, the following is considered:\
 #### Mappings
 
 ##### ATT&CK
+* T1036.003
+* T1055
+* T1127, T1036.003
+* T1127.001
+* T1218.010
 * T1218.011
 
 ##### Kill Chain Phases
 * Actions on Objectives
+* Exploitation
 
 ###### CIS
+* CIS 16
 * CIS 8
 
 ##### NIST
@@ -445,6 +468,8 @@ In generating content for Cobalt Strike, the following is considered:\
 * https://bluescreenofjeff.com/2017-01-24-how-to-write-malleable-c2-profiles-for-cobalt-strike/
 * https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2020/09/coverage-strikes-back-cobalt-strike-paper.html
 * https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/unauthorized-access-of-fireeye-red-team-tools.html
+* https://github.com/MichaelKoczwara/Awesome-CobaltStrike-Defence
+* https://github.com/zer0yu/Awesome-CobaltStrike
 
 ### Collection and Staging
 * id = 8e03c61e-13c4-4dcd-bfbe-5ce5a8dc031a
@@ -621,7 +646,6 @@ The detection searches in this Analytic Story monitor access to the Local Securi
 * Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation
 * Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass
 * Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe
-* Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - SSA
 * Create Remote Thread into LSASS
 * Creation of Shadow Copy
 * Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell
@@ -629,12 +653,12 @@ The detection searches in this Analytic Story monitor access to the Local Securi
 * Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy
 * Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy
 * Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access
-* Detect Dump LSASS Memory using comsvcs - SSA
+* Detect Dump LSASS Memory using comsvcs
 * Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images
 * Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL
 * Dump LSASS via procdump
 * Dump LSASS via procdump Rename
-* Ntdsutil export ntds
+* Ntdsutil Export NTDS
 * Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS
 
 #### Data Models
@@ -904,6 +928,77 @@ A client is able to perform a remote code execution on an exposed and vulnerable
 * https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K52145254
 * https://blog.cloudflare.com/cve-2020-5902-helping-to-protect-against-the-f5-tmui-rce-vulnerability/
 
+### HAFNIUM Group
+* id = beae2ab0-7c3f-11eb-8b63-acde48001122
+* date = 2021-03-03
+* version = 1
+
+#### Description
+HAFNIUM group was identified by Microsoft as exploiting 4 Microsoft Exchange CVEs in the wild - CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858 and CVE-2021-27065.
+
+#### Narrative
+On Tuesday, March 2, 2021, Microsoft released a set of security patches for its mail server, Microsoft Exchange. These patches respond to a group of vulnerabilities known to impact Exchange 2013, 2016, and 2019. It is important to note that an Exchange 2010 security update has also been issued, though the CVEs do not reference that version as being vulnerable.\
+While the CVEs do not shed much light on the specifics of the vulnerabilities or exploits, the first vulnerability (CVE-2021-26855) has a remote network attack vector that allows the attacker, a group Microsoft named HAFNIUM, to authenticate as the Exchange server. Three additional vulnerabilities (CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, and CVE-2021-27065) were also identified as part of this activity. When chained together along with CVE-2021-26855 for initial access, the attacker would have complete control over the Exchange server. This includes the ability to run code as SYSTEM and write to any path on the server.\
+The following Splunk detections assist with identifying the HAFNIUM groups tradecraft and methodology.
+
+#### Detections
+* Any Powershell DownloadString
+* Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass
+* Detect New Local Admin account
+* Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag
+* Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL
+* Dump LSASS via procdump
+* Dump LSASS via procdump Rename
+* Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts
+* Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window
+* Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass
+* Nishang PowershellTCPOneLine
+* Ntdsutil Export NTDS
+* Unified Messaging Service Spawning a Process
+* W3WP Spawning Shell
+
+#### Data Models
+* Endpoint
+* Network_Traffic
+
+#### Mappings
+
+##### ATT&CK
+* T1003.001
+* T1003.003
+* T1021.002
+* T1059.001
+* T1114.002
+* T1136.001
+* T1190
+* T1505.003
+
+##### Kill Chain Phases
+* Actions on Objectives
+* Command and Control
+* Exploitation
+* Installation
+
+###### CIS
+* CIS 16
+* CIS 3
+* CIS 5
+* CIS 7
+* CIS 8
+
+##### NIST
+* DE.AE
+* DE.CM
+* PR.AC
+* PR.IP
+* PR.PT
+
+##### References
+* https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/detecting-hafnium-exchange-server-zero-day-activity-in-splunk.html
+* https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/03/02/active-exploitation-of-microsoft-exchange-zero-day-vulnerabilities/
+* https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/
+* https://blog.rapid7.com/2021/03/03/rapid7s-insightidr-enables-detection-and-response-to-microsoft-exchange-0-day/
+
 ### Lateral Movement
 * id = 399d65dc-1f08-499b-a259-aad9051f38ad
 * date = 2020-02-04
@@ -980,6 +1075,8 @@ It can also be very helpful to examine various behaviors of the process of inter
 In the event a system is suspected of having been compromised via a malicious website, we suggest reviewing the browsing activity from that system around the time of the event. If categories are given for the URLs visited, that can help you zero in on possible malicious sites.
 
 #### Detections
+* Any Powershell DownloadFile
+* Any Powershell DownloadString
 * Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass
 * Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window
 * Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command
@@ -998,6 +1095,7 @@ In the event a system is suspected of having been compromised via a malicious we
 ##### Kill Chain Phases
 * Actions on Objectives
 * Command and Control
+* Exploitation
 * Installation
 
 ###### CIS
@@ -1133,6 +1231,44 @@ If behavioral searches included in this story yield positive hits, iDefense reco
 * https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/scope-of-mudcarp-attacks-highlight-1/
 * http://blog.amossys.fr/badflick-is-not-so-bad.html
 
+### Silver Sparrow
+* id = cb4f48fe-7699-11eb-af77-acde48001122
+* date = 2021-02-24
+* version = 1
+
+#### Description
+Silver Sparrow, identified by Red Canary Intelligence, is a new forward looking MacOS (Intel and M1) malicious software downloader utilizing JavaScript for execution and a launchAgent to establish persistence.
+
+#### Narrative
+Silver Sparrow works is a dropper and uses typical persistence mechanisms on a Mac. It is cross platform, covering both Intel and Apple M1 architecture. To this date, no implant has been downloaded for malicious purposes. During installation of the update.pkg or updater.pkg file, the malicious software utilizes JavaScript to generate files and scripts on disk for persistence.These files later download a implant from an S3 bucket every hour. This analytic assists with identifying different types of macOS malware families establishing LaunchAgent persistence. Per SentinelOne source, it is predicted that Silver Sparrow is likely selling itself as a mechanism to 3rd party “affiliates” or pay-per-install (PPI) partners, typically seen as commodity adware/malware. Additional indicators and behaviors may be found within the references.
+
+#### Detections
+* Suspicious Curl Network Connection
+* Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage
+* Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage via OSquery
+* Suspicious SQLite3 LSQuarantine Behavior
+
+#### Data Models
+* Endpoint
+
+#### Mappings
+
+##### ATT&CK
+* T1074
+* T1105
+* T1543.001
+
+##### Kill Chain Phases
+* Actions on Objectives
+
+###### CIS
+
+##### NIST
+
+##### References
+* https://redcanary.com/blog/clipping-silver-sparrows-wings/
+* https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/5-things-you-need-to-know-about-silver-sparrow/
+
 ### SQL Injection
 * id = 4f6632f5-449c-4686-80df-57625f59bab3
 * date = 2017-09-19
@@ -1457,13 +1593,17 @@ Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe proce
 #### Narrative
 One common adversary tactic is to bypass application control solutions via the mshta.exe process, which loads Microsoft HTML applications (mshtml.dll) with the .hta suffix. In these cases, attackers use the trusted Windows utility to proxy execution of malicious files, whether an .hta application, javascript, or VBScript.\
 The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an attacker is leveraging mshta.exe to execute malicious code.\
-Triage\ Validate execution \ 1. Determine if MSHTA.exe executed. Validate the OriginalFileName of MSHTA.exe and further PE metadata. If executed outside of c:\windows\system32 or c:\windows\syswow64, it should be highly suspect.\
+Triage\
+Validate execution \
+1. Determine if MSHTA.exe executed. Validate the OriginalFileName of MSHTA.exe and further PE metadata. If executed outside of c:\windows\system32 or c:\windows\syswow64, it should be highly suspect.\
 1. Determine if script code was executed with MSHTA.\
-Situational Awareness\ The objective of this step is meant to identify suspicious behavioral indicators related to executed of Script code by MSHTA.exe.\
+Situational Awareness\
+The objective of this step is meant to identify suspicious behavioral indicators related to executed of Script code by MSHTA.exe.\
 1. Parent process. Is the parent process a known LOLBin? Is the parent process an Office Application?\
 1. Module loads. Are the known MSHTA.exe modules being loaded by a non-standard application? Is MSHTA loading any suspicious .DLLs?\
 1. Network connections. Any network connections? Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain.\
-Retrieval of script code\ The objective of this step is to confirm the executed script code is benign or malicious.
+Retrieval of script code\
+The objective of this step is to confirm the executed script code is benign or malicious.
 
 #### Detections
 * Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line
@@ -1641,7 +1781,7 @@ One common adversary tactic is to bypass application control solutions via the r
 * Suspicious Rundll32 Rename
 * Suspicious Rundll32 StartW
 * Suspicious Rundll32 dllregisterserver
-* Suspicious Rundll32 no CommandLine Arguments
+* Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments
 
 #### Data Models
 * Endpoint
@@ -1926,10 +2066,13 @@ Defense evasion is a tactic--identified in the MITRE ATT&CK framework--that adve
 
 #### Detections
 * Disabling Remote User Account Control
+* Eventvwr UAC Bypass
+* FodHelper UAC Bypass
 * Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe
 * Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys
 * Remote Registry Key modifications
 * Suspicious Reg exe Process
+* Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry
 
 #### Data Models
 * Endpoint
@@ -1940,10 +2083,14 @@ Defense evasion is a tactic--identified in the MITRE ATT&CK framework--that adve
 * T1112
 * T1222.001
 * T1548.002
+* T1562.001
 * T1564.001
 
 ##### Kill Chain Phases
 * Actions on Objectives
+* Delivery
+* Exploitation
+* Privilege Escalation
 
 ###### CIS
 * CIS 8
@@ -2070,6 +2217,7 @@ Maintaining persistence is one of the first steps taken by attackers after the i
 * Schtasks used for forcing a reboot
 * Shim Database File Creation
 * Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters
+* Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory
 
 #### Data Models
 * Endpoint
@@ -2089,7 +2237,9 @@ Maintaining persistence is one of the first steps taken by attackers after the i
 
 ##### Kill Chain Phases
 * Actions on Objectives
+* Exploitation
 * Installation
+* Privilege Escalation
 
 ###### CIS
 * CIS 3
@@ -3896,6 +4046,7 @@ Ransomware is an ever-present risk to the enterprise, wherein an infected host e
 * Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware
 * Schtasks used for forcing a reboot
 * Spike in File Writes
+* Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory
 * Suspicious wevtutil Usage
 * System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations
 * TOR Traffic
@@ -3928,6 +4079,8 @@ Ransomware is an ever-present risk to the enterprise, wherein an infected host e
 * Actions on Objectives
 * Command and Control
 * Delivery
+* Exploitation
+* Privilege Escalation
 
 ###### CIS
 * CIS 10
@@ -3997,12 +4150,15 @@ Cybersecurity Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) released Alert (AA20-302A) o
 
 #### Detections
 * BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification
+* Common Ransomware Extensions
 * Common Ransomware Notes
 * NLTest Domain Trust Discovery
 * Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce
 * Remote Desktop Network Traffic
 * Ryuk Test Files Detected
+* Ryuk Wake on LAN Command
 * Spike in File Writes
+* Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory
 * WBAdmin Delete System Backups
 * Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry
 * Windows Security Account Manager Stopped
@@ -4016,6 +4172,7 @@ Cybersecurity Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) released Alert (AA20-302A) o
 
 ##### ATT&CK
 * T1021.001
+* T1053.005
 * T1059.003
 * T1482
 * T1485
@@ -4028,6 +4185,8 @@ Cybersecurity Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) released Alert (AA20-302A) o
 * Actions on Objectives
 * Delivery
 * Exploitation
+* Lateral Movement
+* Privilege Escalation
 * Reconnaissance
 
 ###### CIS

package/app.manifest

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
     "id": {
       "group": null, 
       "name": "DA-ESS-ContentUpdate", 
-      "version": "3.15.0"
+      "version": "3.16.0"
     }, 
     "author": [
       {

package/default/analytic_stories.conf

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
-# On Date: 2021-02-25T09:05:17 UTC
+# On Date: 2021-03-04T19:43:30 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Security Research
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
@@ -34,8 +34,8 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 12", "CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1535"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP", "ID.AM"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task"]
-support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Regions", "ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User", "ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Instance Types", "ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 AMIs"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User", "ESCU - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Regions", "ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 AMIs", "ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Instance Types"]
 data_models = []
 providing_technologies = none
 description = Monitor your AWS EC2 instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or EC2 instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior.
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ version = 2
 reference = ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonVPC/latest/UserGuide/VPC_Appendix_NACLs.html", "https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/how-to-help-prepare-for-ddos-attacks-by-reducing-your-attack-surface/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 11", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.007"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "DE.DP", "PR.AC"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
 support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of Network ACL Activity by ARN", "ESCU - Baseline of blocked outbound traffic from AWS"]
 data_models = []
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Region - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Country - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From City - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From City - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Region - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Country - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task"]
 support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources"]
 data_models = []
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://redlock.io/blog/cryptojacking-tesla"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect API activity from users without MFA - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS API Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Security Group Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new API calls from user roles - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "DE.DP", "ID.AM", "PR.AC"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
-support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of API Calls per User ARN", "ESCU - Baseline of Security Group Activity by ARN", "ESCU - Previously seen API call per user roles in CloudTrail", "ESCU - Create a list of approved AWS service accounts"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task"]
+support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously seen API call per user roles in CloudTrail", "ESCU - Baseline of Security Group Activity by ARN", "ESCU - Baseline of API Calls per User ARN", "ESCU - Create a list of approved AWS service accounts"]
 data_models = []
 providing_technologies = none
 description = Detect and investigate dormant user accounts for your AWS environment that have become active again. Because inactive and ad-hoc accounts are common attack targets, it's critical to enable governance within your environment.
@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs/blob/v3.2/dev/rules/REQUEST-944-APPLICATION-ATTACK-JAVA.conf"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Java Classes - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Content-Type Length - Rule", "ESCU - Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 18", "CIS 3", "CIS 4", "CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Delivery", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1082"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.RA", "PR.IP", "PR.MA", "PR.PT", "RS.MI"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate Suspicious Strings in HTTP Header - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Web POSTs From src - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate Web POSTs From src - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Suspicious Strings in HTTP Header - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/inventory-of-authorized-and-unauthorized-devices/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Delivery", "Reconnaissance"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get First Occurrence and Last Occurrence of a MAC Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get First Occurrence and Last Occurrence of a MAC Address - Response Task"]
 support_searches = ["ESCU - Count of assets by category"]
 data_models = ["Network_Sessions"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -182,7 +182,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://www.zerofox.com/blog/what-is-digital-risk-monitoring/", "https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/consumer/family-safety/what-is-typosquatting/", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2016/06/explained-typosquatting/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Delivery"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 support_searches = ["ESCU - DNSTwist Domain Names"]
 data_models = ["Email", "Network_Resolution", "Web"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -200,8 +200,8 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 12", "CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1535"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP", "ID.AM"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task"]
-support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Initial", "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Destroyed", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Initial", "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Update"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Update", "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Destroyed", "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Initial"]
 data_models = ["Change"]
 providing_technologies = none
 description = Monitor your cloud compute instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or compute instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior.
@@ -232,20 +232,24 @@ creation_date = 2021-02-16
 modification_date = 2021-02-16
 id = bcfd17e8-5461-400a-80a2-3b7d1459220c
 version = 1
-reference = ["https://www.cobaltstrike.com/", "https://www.infocyte.com/blog/2020/09/02/cobalt-strike-the-new-favorite-among-thieves/", "https://bluescreenofjeff.com/2017-01-24-how-to-write-malleable-c2-profiles-for-cobalt-strike/", "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2020/09/coverage-strikes-back-cobalt-strike-paper.html", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/unauthorized-access-of-fireeye-red-team-tools.html"]
-detection_searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 StartW - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 no CommandLine Arguments - Rule"]
-mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.011"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.PT"]}
+reference = ["https://www.cobaltstrike.com/", "https://www.infocyte.com/blog/2020/09/02/cobalt-strike-the-new-favorite-among-thieves/", "https://bluescreenofjeff.com/2017-01-24-how-to-write-malleable-c2-profiles-for-cobalt-strike/", "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2020/09/coverage-strikes-back-cobalt-strike-paper.html", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/unauthorized-access-of-fireeye-red-team-tools.html", "https://github.com/MichaelKoczwara/Awesome-CobaltStrike-Defence", "https://github.com/zer0yu/Awesome-CobaltStrike"]
+detection_searches = ["ESCU - Cobalt Strike Named Pipes - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious DLLHost no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious GPUpdate no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 StartW - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious SearchProtocolHost no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious msbuild path - Rule"]
+mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036.003", "T1055", "T1127, T1036.003", "T1127.001", "T1218.010", "T1218.011"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.PT"]}
 investigative_searches = []
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
 description = Cobalt Strike is threat emulation software. Red teams and penetration testers use Cobalt Strike to demonstrate the risk of a breach and evaluate mature security programs. Most recently, Cobalt Strike has become the choice tool by threat groups due to its ease of use and extensibility.
-narrative = This Analytic Story supports you to detect Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) from Cobalt Strike. Cobalt Strike has many ways to be enhanced by using aggressor scripts, malleable C2 profiles, default attack packages, and much more. For endpoint behavior, Cobalt Strike is most commonly identified via named pipes, spawn to processes, and DLL function names. On the network, depending on the malleable C2 profile used, it is near infinite in the amount of ways to conceal the C2 traffic with Cobalt Strike.\
-In generating content for Cobalt Strike, the following is considered:\
-1. Is it normal for <spawnto_ value> to have no command line arguments? No command line arguments and a network connection?\
-1. What is the default, or normal, process lineage for <spawnto_ value>?\
-1. Does the <spawnto_ value> make network connections?\
-1. Is it normal for <spawnto_ value> to load jscript, vbscript, Amsi.dll, and clr.dll?.
+narrative = This Analytic Story supports you to detect Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) from Cobalt Strike. Cobalt Strike has many ways to be enhanced by using aggressor scripts, malleable C2 profiles, default attack packages, and much more. For endpoint behavior, Cobalt Strike is most commonly identified via named pipes, spawn to processes, and DLL function names. Many additional variables are provided for in memory operation of the beacon implant. On the network, depending on the malleable C2 profile used, it is near infinite in the amount of ways to conceal the C2 traffic with Cobalt Strike. Not every query may be specific to Cobalt Strike the tool, but the methodologies and techniques used by it.\
+Splunk Threat Research reviewed all publicly available instances of Malleabe C2 Profiles and generated a list of the most commonly used spawnto and pipenames.\
+`Spawnto_x86` and `spawnto_x64` is the process that Cobalt Strike will spawn and injects shellcode into.\
+Pipename sets the named pipe name used in Cobalt Strikes Beacon SMB C2 traffic.\
+With that, new detections were generated focused on these spawnto processes spawning without command line arguments. Similar, the named pipes most commonly used by Cobalt Strike added as a detection. In generating content for Cobalt Strike, the following is considered:\
+- Is it normal for spawnto_ value to have no command line arguments? No command line arguments and a network connection?\
+- What is the default, or normal, process lineage for spawnto_ value?\
+- Does the spawnto_ value make network connections?\
+- Is it normal for spawnto_ value to load jscript, vbscript, Amsi.dll, and clr.dll?\
+While investigating a detection related to this Analytic Story, keep in mind the parent process, process path, and any file modifications that may occur. Tuning may need to occur to remove any false positives.
 
 [ColdRoot MacOS RAT]
 category =  Malware
@@ -256,7 +260,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://www.intego.com/mac-security-blog/osxcoldroot-and-the-rat-invasion/", "https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x2A.html", "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/coldroot-rat-still-undetectable-despite-being-uploaded-on-github-two-years-ago/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection - Rule", "ESCU - Processes Tapping Keyboard Events - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 4", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Installation"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "DE.DP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = []
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -274,7 +278,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Collection", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1074"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Email files written outside of the Outlook directory - Rule", "ESCU - Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts - Rule", "ESCU - Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious writes to System Volume Information - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036", "T1114.001", "T1114.002"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -292,7 +296,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Command_and_Control", "https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/feature/Command-and-control-servers-The-puppet-masters-that-govern-malware"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 11", "CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048", "T1048.003", "T1071.001", "T1071.004", "T1095", "T1189"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.AC", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
 support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK", "ESCU - Baseline of blocked outbound traffic from AWS"]
 data_models = ["Network_Resolution", "Network_Traffic"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -309,7 +313,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://github.com/kgretzky/evilginx2", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1192/", "https://breakdev.org/evilginx-advanced-phishing-with-two-factor-authentication-bypass/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect DNS requests to Phishing Sites leveraging EvilGinx2 - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.003"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.IP"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Certificate logs for a domain - Response Task", "ESCU - Domain Certificate Investigation - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Domain Certificate Investigation - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Certificate logs for a domain - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Network_Resolution"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -340,9 +344,9 @@ modification_date = 2020-02-04
 id = 854d78bf-d0e2-4f4e-b05c-640905f86d7a
 version = 3
 reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1003", "https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for.html"]
-detection_searches = ["ESCU - Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", "ESCU - Create Remote Thread into LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of lsass Dump with Taskmgr - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Ntdsutil export ntds - Rule", "ESCU - Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS - Rule"]
+detection_searches = ["ESCU - Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", "ESCU - Create Remote Thread into LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of lsass Dump with Taskmgr - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Ntdsutil Export NTDS - Rule", "ESCU - Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001", "T1003.002", "T1003.003", "T1059.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate Previous Unseen User - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Previous Unseen User - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -360,7 +364,7 @@ version = 2
 reference = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Create local admin accounts using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Single Letter Process On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 16", "CIS 2", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.002", "T1053.005", "T1059.001", "T1059.003", "T1071.002", "T1112", "T1136.001", "T1204.002", "T1543.003", "T1547.001", "T1562.004"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process File Activity - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process File Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
 support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments"]
 data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -396,7 +400,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/", "http://www.noip.com/blog/2014/07/11/dynamic-dns-can-use-2/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/08/04/detecting-dynamic-dns-domains-in-splunk.html"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS record changed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003", "T1071.004", "T1189"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - DNS Hijack Enrichment - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - DNS Hijack Enrichment - Response Task"]
 support_searches = ["ESCU - Discover DNS records"]
 data_models = ["Network_Resolution"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -436,7 +440,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/data-protection/", "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/dns/splunk-detect-dns-tunneling-37022", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect USB device insertion - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003", "T1189"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.DS", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Change_Analysis", "Network_Resolution"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -468,7 +472,7 @@ version = 2
 reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1089", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2015/11/vonteera-adware-uses-certificates-to-disable-anti-malware/", "https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Tools-Report.pdf"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Unload Sysmon Filter Driver - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112", "T1543.003", "T1553.004", "T1562.001", "T1562.004"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments"]
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -484,7 +488,7 @@ version = 2
 reference = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/", "http://www.noip.com/blog/2014/07/11/dynamic-dns-can-use-2/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/08/04/detecting-dynamic-dns-domains-in-splunk.html"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1071.001", "T1189"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "DE.DP", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Network_Resolution", "Web"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -500,7 +504,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-201A", "https://www.first.org/resources/papers/conf2017/Advanced-Incident-Detection-and-Threat-Hunting-using-Sysmon-and-Splunk.pdf", "https://www.vkremez.com/2017/05/emotet-banking-trojan-malware-analysis.html"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of tools built by NirSoft - Rule", "ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 2", "CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Delivery", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.002", "T1059.003", "T1072", "T1547.001", "T1566.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
 support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK"]
 data_models = ["Email", "Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -543,6 +547,24 @@ narrative = Google Cloud Platform (GCP) admins manage access to GCP resources an
 In between the time between when the temporary credentials are issued and when they expire is a period of opportunity, where a user could leverage the temporary credentials to wreak havoc-spin up or remove instances, create new users, elevate privileges, and other malicious activities-throughout the environment.\
 This Analytic Story includes searches that will help you monitor your GCP Audit logs logs for evidence of suspicious cross-account activity.  For example, while accessing multiple GCP accounts and roles may be perfectly valid behavior, it may be suspicious when an account requests privileges of an account it has not accessed in the past. After identifying suspicious activities, you can use the provided investigative searches to help you probe more deeply.
 
+[HAFNIUM Group]
+category =  Adversary Tactics
+creation_date = 2021-03-03
+modification_date = 2021-03-03
+id = beae2ab0-7c3f-11eb-8b63-acde48001122
+version = 1
+reference = ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/detecting-hafnium-exchange-server-zero-day-activity-in-splunk.html", "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/03/02/active-exploitation-of-microsoft-exchange-zero-day-vulnerabilities/", "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/", "https://blog.rapid7.com/2021/03/03/rapid7s-insightidr-enables-detection-and-response-to-microsoft-exchange-0-day/"]
+detection_searches = ["ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Nishang PowershellTCPOneLine - Rule", "ESCU - Ntdsutil Export NTDS - Rule", "ESCU - Unified Messaging Service Spawning a Process - Rule", "ESCU - W3WP Spawning Shell - Rule"]
+mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001", "T1003.003", "T1021.002", "T1059.001", "T1114.002", "T1136.001", "T1190", "T1505.003"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
+investigative_searches = []
+support_searches = []
+data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"]
+providing_technologies = none
+description = HAFNIUM group was identified by Microsoft as exploiting 4 Microsoft Exchange CVEs in the wild - CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858 and CVE-2021-27065.
+narrative = On Tuesday, March 2, 2021, Microsoft released a set of security patches for its mail server, Microsoft Exchange. These patches respond to a group of vulnerabilities known to impact Exchange 2013, 2016, and 2019. It is important to note that an Exchange 2010 security update has also been issued, though the CVEs do not reference that version as being vulnerable.\
+While the CVEs do not shed much light on the specifics of the vulnerabilities or exploits, the first vulnerability (CVE-2021-26855) has a remote network attack vector that allows the attacker, a group Microsoft named HAFNIUM, to authenticate as the Exchange server. Three additional vulnerabilities (CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, and CVE-2021-27065) were also identified as part of this activity. When chained together along with CVE-2021-26855 for initial access, the attacker would have complete control over the Exchange server. This includes the ability to run code as SYSTEM and write to any path on the server.\
+The following Splunk detections assist with identifying the HAFNIUM groups tradecraft and methodology.
+
 [Hidden Cobra Malware]
 category =  Malware
 creation_date = 2020-01-22
@@ -552,7 +574,7 @@ version = 2
 reference = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/HIDDEN-COBRA-North-Korean-Malicious-Cyber-Activity", "https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Destructive-Malware-Report.pdf"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious File Write - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 16", "CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001", "T1021.002", "T1048.003", "T1059.001", "T1059.003", "T1070.005", "T1071.002", "T1071.004"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Outbound Emails to Hidden Cobra Threat Actors - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Outbound Emails to Hidden Cobra Threat Actors - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
 support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", "ESCU - Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments"]
 data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Resolution", "Network_Traffic"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -571,7 +593,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2016/09/hosts-file-hijacks/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Windows hosts file modification - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003", "T1071.004"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.AC", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Network_Resolution"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -617,7 +639,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://github.com/splunk/cloud-datamodel-security-research"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint - Rule"]
 mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1526"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = []
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -665,7 +687,7 @@ version = 2
 reference = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/executive-perspective/2015/08/malware_lateral_move.html"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks - Rule", "ESCU - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001", "T1053.005", "T1550.002", "T1558.003"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -683,9 +705,9 @@ modification_date = 2017-08-23
 id = 2c8ff66e-0b57-42af-8ad7-912438a403fc
 version = 4
 reference = ["https://blogs.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/malware-employs-powershell-to-infect-systems/", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/"]
-detection_searches = ["ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Multiple Suspicious Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques - Rule"]
-mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1027", "T1059.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+detection_searches = ["ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadFile - Rule", "ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Multiple Suspicious Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques - Rule"]
+mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1027", "T1059.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -710,8 +732,8 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/03/04/tracking-locky-ransomware-using-carbon-black/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Extended Period Without Successful Netbackup Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Unsuccessful Netbackup backups - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - All backup logs for host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
-support_searches = ["ESCU - Monitor Unsuccessful Backups", "ESCU - Monitor Successful Backups"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - All backup logs for host - Response Task"]
+support_searches = ["ESCU - Monitor Successful Backups", "ESCU - Monitor Unsuccessful Backups"]
 data_models = []
 providing_technologies = none
 description = Address common concerns when monitoring your backup processes. These searches can help you reduce risks from ransomware, device theft, or denial of physical access to a host by backing up data on endpoints.
@@ -726,7 +748,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 2"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Installation"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -761,7 +783,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/tn-archive/bb490939(v=technet.10)", "https://htmlpreview.github.io/?https://github.com/MatthewDemaske/blogbackup/blob/master/netshell.html", "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Processes created by netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.004"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments"]
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -794,8 +816,8 @@ version = 2
 reference = ["https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/orangeworm-targets-healthcare-us-europe-asia", "https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/healthcare-targeted-by-hacker/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 2", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001", "T1059.003", "T1543.003", "T1569.002"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
-support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update", "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial", "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments", "ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update"]
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
 description = Detect activities and various techniques associated with the Orangeworm Attack Group, a group that frequently targets the healthcare industry.
@@ -836,7 +858,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/scope-of-mudcarp-attacks-highlight-1/", "http://blog.amossys.fr/badflick-is-not-so-bad.html"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001", "T1059.003", "T1547.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
 support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments", "ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK"]
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -879,7 +901,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["http://www.novetta.com/2015/02/advanced-methods-to-detect-advanced-cyber-attacks-protocol-abuse/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048", "T1048.003", "T1071.001", "T1189"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.DS", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Network_Resolution", "Network_Traffic"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -893,9 +915,9 @@ modification_date = 2020-02-04
 id = cf309d0d-d4aa-4fbb-963d-1e79febd3756
 version = 1
 reference = ["https://www.carbonblack.com/2017/06/28/carbon-black-threat-research-technical-analysis-petya-notpetya-ransomware/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2017/06/27/closing-the-detection-to-mitigation-gap-or-to-petya-or-notpetya-whocares-.html"]
-detection_searches = ["ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule"]
-mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 10", "CIS 12", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 6", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.002", "T1036.003", "T1047", "T1048", "T1053.005", "T1070", "T1070.001", "T1071.001", "T1485", "T1490", "T1547.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "DE.DP", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task"]
+detection_searches = ["ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule"]
+mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 10", "CIS 12", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 6", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Delivery", "Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.002", "T1036.003", "T1047", "T1048", "T1053.005", "T1070", "T1070.001", "T1071.001", "T1485", "T1490", "T1547.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "DE.DP", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
 support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", "ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK"]
 data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -942,8 +964,8 @@ modification_date = 2020-11-06
 id = 507edc74-13d5-4339-878e-b9744ded1f35
 version = 1
 reference = ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/detecting-ryuk-using-splunk-attack-range.html", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/big-game-hunting-with-ryuk-another-lucrative-targeted-ransomware/", "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-302a"]
-detection_searches = ["ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Ryuk Test Files Detected - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Security Account Manager Stopped - Rule", "ESCU - Windows connhost exe started forcefully - Rule"]
-mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 16", "CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Delivery", "Exploitation", "Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001", "T1059.003", "T1482", "T1485", "T1486", "T1489", "T1490", "T1562.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
+detection_searches = ["ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Ryuk Test Files Detected - Rule", "ESCU - Ryuk Wake on LAN Command - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Security Account Manager Stopped - Rule", "ESCU - Windows connhost exe started forcefully - Rule"]
+mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 16", "CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Delivery", "Exploitation", "Lateral Movement", "Privilege Escalation", "Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001", "T1053.005", "T1059.003", "T1482", "T1485", "T1486", "T1489", "T1490", "T1562.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
 investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"]
@@ -977,7 +999,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/an-in-depth-analysis-of-samsam-ransomware-and-boss-spider/", "https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2018/07/31/samsam-the-almost-6-million-ransomware/", "https://thehackernews.com/2018/07/samsam-ransomware-attacks.html"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Batch File Write to System32 - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - File with Samsam Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Samsam Test File Write - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 10", "CIS 12", "CIS 16", "CIS 18", "CIS 2", "CIS 3", "CIS 4", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Delivery", "Installation", "Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001", "T1021.002", "T1082", "T1204.002", "T1485", "T1486", "T1490"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "ID.RA", "PR.AC", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.MA", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic", "Web"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -989,6 +1011,22 @@ In a typical attack on one large healthcare organization in 2018, the company en
 According to Sophos, SamSam previously leveraged  RDP to gain access to targeted networks via brute force. SamSam is not spread automatically, like other malware. It requires skill because it forces the attacker to adapt their tactics to the individual environment. Next, the actors escalate their privileges to admin level. They scan the networks for worthy targets, using conventional tools, such as PsExec or PaExec, to deploy/execute, quickly encrypting files.\
 This Analytic Story includes searches designed to help detect and investigate signs of the SamSam ransomware, such as the creation of fileswrites to system32, writes with tell-tale extensions, batch files written to system32, and evidence of brute-force attacks via RDP.
 
+[Silver Sparrow]
+category =  Adversary Tactics
+creation_date = 2021-02-24
+modification_date = 2021-02-24
+id = cb4f48fe-7699-11eb-af77-acde48001122
+version = 1
+reference = ["https://redcanary.com/blog/clipping-silver-sparrows-wings/", "https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/5-things-you-need-to-know-about-silver-sparrow/"]
+detection_searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Curl Network Connection - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage via OSquery - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious SQLite3 LSQuarantine Behavior - Rule"]
+mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1074", "T1105", "T1543.001"]}
+investigative_searches = []
+support_searches = []
+data_models = ["Endpoint"]
+providing_technologies = none
+description = Silver Sparrow, identified by Red Canary Intelligence, is a new forward looking MacOS (Intel and M1) malicious software downloader utilizing JavaScript for execution and a launchAgent to establish persistence.
+narrative = Silver Sparrow works is a dropper and uses typical persistence mechanisms on a Mac. It is cross platform, covering both Intel and Apple M1 architecture. To this date, no implant has been downloaded for malicious purposes. During installation of the update.pkg or updater.pkg file, the malicious software utilizes JavaScript to generate files and scripts on disk for persistence.These files later download a implant from an S3 bucket every hour. This analytic assists with identifying different types of macOS malware families establishing LaunchAgent persistence. Per SentinelOne source, it is predicted that Silver Sparrow is likely selling itself as a mechanism to 3rd party “affiliates” or pay-per-install (PPI) partners, typically seen as commodity adware/malware. Additional indicators and behaviors may be found within the references.
+
 [Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities]
 category =  Vulnerability
 creation_date = 2018-01-08
@@ -1039,7 +1077,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-11409", "https://www.splunk.com/view/SP-CAAAP5E#VulnerabilityDescriptionsandRatings", "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44865/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 18", "CIS 3", "CIS 4"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "ID.RA", "PR.AC", "PR.IP", "PR.PT", "RS.MI"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = []
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -1074,8 +1112,8 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 12", "CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1535"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP", "ID.AM"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task"]
-support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User", "ESCU - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Regions", "ESCU - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User", "ESCU - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK", "ESCU - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Regions"]
 data_models = []
 providing_technologies = none
 description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS EC2 instances for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as EC2 instances that originate from unusual locations or those launched by previously unseen users (among others). Included investigative searches will help you probe more deeply, when the information warrants it.
@@ -1106,8 +1144,8 @@ version = 2
 reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/security-data-protection/cloud/public-aws-s3-buckets-writable/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Open S3 buckets - Rule", "ESCU - Detect S3 access from a new IP - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13", "CIS 14"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1530"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "DE.DP", "PR.AC", "PR.DS"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName - Response Task"]
-support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously seen S3 bucket access by remote IP", "ESCU - Baseline of S3 Bucket deletion activity by ARN"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of S3 Bucket deletion activity by ARN", "ESCU - Previously seen S3 bucket access by remote IP"]
 data_models = []
 providing_technologies = none
 description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS S3 buckets for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as detecting open S3 buckets and buckets being accessed from a new IP. The contextual and investigative searches will give you more information, when required.
@@ -1124,7 +1162,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/hiding-cloudcobalt-strike-beacon-c2-using-amazon-apis/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
 support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of blocked outbound traffic from AWS"]
 data_models = []
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -1143,8 +1181,8 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-cloudtrail-now-tracks-cross-account-activity-to-its-origin/", "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integration.html"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by New User - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP", "PR.AC", "PR.DS"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
-support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Users In CloudTrail - Update"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task"]
+support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Users In CloudTrail - Update"]
 data_models = ["Authentication"]
 providing_technologies = none
 description = Monitor your cloud authentication events. Searches within this Analytic Story leverage the recent cloud updates to the Authentication data model to help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious login activity. 
@@ -1160,8 +1198,8 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP", "ID.AM"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
-support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Update", "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Destroyed", "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Initial"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task"]
+support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Destroyed", "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Initial"]
 data_models = ["Change"]
 providing_technologies = none
 description = Monitor your cloud infrastructure provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your cloud environment.
@@ -1177,7 +1215,7 @@ reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.p
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]}
 investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
-support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update"]
+support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial"]
 data_models = ["Change"]
 providing_technologies = none
 description = Monitor your cloud infrastructure provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your cloud environment.
@@ -1194,7 +1232,7 @@ reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.p
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "DE.DP", "ID.AM", "PR.AC"]}
 investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
-support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls Per User", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Initial", "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Security Group API Calls Per User", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Update"]
+support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls Per User", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Update", "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Security Group API Calls Per User", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Initial"]
 data_models = ["Change"]
 providing_technologies = none
 description = Detect and investigate suspicious activities by users and roles in your cloud environments.
@@ -1210,7 +1248,7 @@ version = 2
 reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1059", "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/macro-malware", "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036.003", "T1059.001", "T1059.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments", "ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK"]
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -1245,7 +1283,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["http://blogs.splunk.com/2015/10/01/random-words-on-entropy-and-dns/", "http://www.darkreading.com/analytics/security-monitoring/got-malware-three-signs-revealed-in-dns-traffic/d/d-id/1139680", "https://live.paloaltonetworks.com/t5/Threat-Vulnerability-Articles/What-are-suspicious-DNS-queries/ta-p/71454"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003", "T1071.004", "T1189"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK"]
 data_models = ["Network_Resolution"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -1261,7 +1299,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/06/26/phishing-hits-a-new-level-of-quality/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 3", "CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.IP"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 support_searches = ["ESCU - DNSTwist Domain Names"]
 data_models = ["Email", "UEBA"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -1297,20 +1335,24 @@ version = 2
 reference = ["https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/", "https://redcanary.com/blog/windows-registry-attacks-threat-detection/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/005/", "https://medium.com/@mbromileyDFIR/malware-monday-aebb456356c5"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Detect mshta inline hta execution - Rule", "ESCU - Detect mshta renamed - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious mshta child process - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious mshta spawn - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.003", "T1218.005", "T1547.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments", "ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK"]
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
 description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe process to execute malicious code.
 narrative = One common adversary tactic is to bypass application control solutions via the mshta.exe process, which loads Microsoft HTML applications (mshtml.dll) with the .hta suffix. In these cases, attackers use the trusted Windows utility to proxy execution of malicious files, whether an .hta application, javascript, or VBScript.\
 The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an attacker is leveraging mshta.exe to execute malicious code.\
-Triage\ Validate execution \ 1. Determine if MSHTA.exe executed. Validate the OriginalFileName of MSHTA.exe and further PE metadata. If executed outside of c:\windows\system32 or c:\windows\syswow64, it should be highly suspect.\
+Triage\
+Validate execution \
+1. Determine if MSHTA.exe executed. Validate the OriginalFileName of MSHTA.exe and further PE metadata. If executed outside of c:\windows\system32 or c:\windows\syswow64, it should be highly suspect.\
 1. Determine if script code was executed with MSHTA.\
-Situational Awareness\ The objective of this step is meant to identify suspicious behavioral indicators related to executed of Script code by MSHTA.exe.\
+Situational Awareness\
+The objective of this step is meant to identify suspicious behavioral indicators related to executed of Script code by MSHTA.exe.\
 1. Parent process. Is the parent process a known LOLBin? Is the parent process an Office Application?\
 1. Module loads. Are the known MSHTA.exe modules being loaded by a non-standard application? Is MSHTA loading any suspicious .DLLs?\
 1. Network connections. Any network connections? Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain.\
-Retrieval of script code\ The objective of this step is to confirm the executed script code is benign or malicious.
+Retrieval of script code\
+The objective of this step is to confirm the executed script code is benign or malicious.
 
 [Suspicious Okta Activity]
 category =  Adversary Tactics
@@ -1321,7 +1363,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1078", "https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Credential_stuffing", "https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/answer/What-is-a-password-spraying-attack-and-how-does-it-work"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentials From The Same IP - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Account Lockout Events - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Failed SSO Attempts - Rule", "ESCU - Okta User Logins From Multiple Cities - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate User Activities In Okta - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by app - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by app - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate User Activities In Okta - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = []
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -1369,7 +1411,7 @@ modification_date = 2021-02-03
 id = 80a65487-854b-42f1-80a1-935e4c170694
 version = 1
 reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32"]
-detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - advpack - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - setupapi - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - syssetup - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 StartW - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 dllregisterserver - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 no CommandLine Arguments - Rule"]
+detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - advpack - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - setupapi - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - syssetup - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 StartW - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 dllregisterserver - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001", "T1036.003", "T1218.011"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.PT"]}
 investigative_searches = []
 support_searches = []
@@ -1387,7 +1429,7 @@ version = 2
 reference = ["https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Graeber-Abusing-Windows-Management-Instrumentation-WMI-To-Build-A-Persistent%20Asynchronous-And-Fileless-Backdoor-wp.pdf", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/wmimplant_a_wmi_ba.html"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Process Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - Script Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Temporary Event Subscription - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047", "T1546.003"], "nist": ["PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -1405,7 +1447,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://redcanary.com/blog/windows-registry-attacks-threat-detection/", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1112"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.001", "T1546.011", "T1546.012", "T1547.001", "T1547.010", "T1548.002", "T1564.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -1424,7 +1466,7 @@ reference = ["https://blog.rapid7.com/2020/04/02/dispelling-zoom-bugbears-what-y
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Child Process of Zoom - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.003", "T1068"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
 investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process File Activity - Response Task"]
-support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Update"]
+support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Initial"]
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
 description = Attackers are using Zoom as an vector to increase privileges on a sytems. This story detects new child processes of zoom and provides investigative actions for this detection.
@@ -1503,7 +1545,7 @@ version = 2
 reference = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/08/monitoring-windows-console-activity-part-two.html", "https://www.splunk.com/pdfs/technical-briefs/advanced-threat-detection-and-response-tech-brief.pdf", "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/logging/detecting-security-incidents-windows-workstation-event-logs-34262"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 2", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1016", "T1036.003", "T1204.002", "T1218.011"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK"]
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -1521,7 +1563,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://www.monkey.org/~dugsong/dsniff/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Protocols passing authentication in cleartext - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 14", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Reconnaissance"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.AC", "PR.DS", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Network_Traffic"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -1537,7 +1579,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://www.fbi.gov/scams-and-safety/common-fraud-schemes/internet-fraud", "https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2017-internet-crime-report-released-050718"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Web Fraud - Account Harvesting - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Anomalous User Clickspeed - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Password Sharing Across Accounts - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16", "CIS 6"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1136"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "DE.DP"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Web Session Information via session id - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Web Session Information via session id - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = []
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -1572,9 +1614,9 @@ modification_date = 2018-05-31
 id = 56e24a28-5003-4047-b2db-e8f3c4618064
 version = 1
 reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Defense_Evasion"]
-detection_searches = ["ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule"]
-mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112", "T1222.001", "T1548.002", "T1564.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+detection_searches = ["ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Eventvwr UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - FodHelper UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule"]
+mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Delivery", "Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112", "T1222.001", "T1548.002", "T1562.001", "T1564.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.PT"]}
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -1590,7 +1632,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2013/12/file-extensions-2/", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1042"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Execution of File with Multiple Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036.003", "T1546.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -1610,7 +1652,7 @@ version = 2
 reference = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/", "https://zeltser.com/security-incident-log-review-checklist/", "http://journeyintoir.blogspot.com/2013/01/re-introducing-usnjrnl.html"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 10", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070", "T1070.001", "T1490"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "DE.DP", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -1625,9 +1667,9 @@ modification_date = 2018-05-31
 id = 30874d4f-20a1-488f-85ec-5d52ef74e3f9
 version = 2
 reference = ["http://www.fuzzysecurity.com/tutorials/19.html", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2010/07/malware-persistence-windows-registry.html", "http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/common-malware-persistence-mechanisms/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/fin7-shim-databases-persistence.html", "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dq2Hv7J9fvk"]
-detection_searches = ["ESCU - Certutil exe certificate extraction - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters - Rule"]
-mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005", "T1222.001", "T1543.003", "T1546.011", "T1547.001", "T1547.010", "T1564.001", "T1574.009", "T1574.011"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+detection_searches = ["ESCU - Certutil exe certificate extraction - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule"]
+mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation", "Installation", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005", "T1222.001", "T1543.003", "T1546.011", "T1547.001", "T1547.010", "T1564.001", "T1574.009", "T1574.011"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -1643,7 +1685,7 @@ version = 2
 reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Child Processes of Spoolsv exe - Rule", "ESCU - Overwriting Accessibility Binaries - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 2", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068", "T1204.002", "T1546.008", "T1546.012"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.AC", "PR.DS", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -1659,7 +1701,7 @@ version = 3
 reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1050", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1031"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 2", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543.003", "T1569.002", "T1574.011"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update"]
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none

package/default/analyticstories.conf

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
-# On Date: 2021-02-18T18:09:13 UTC
+# On Date: 2021-03-04T19:43:30 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Security Research
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-cloudtrail-now-tracks-cross-account-activity-to-its-origin/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - aws detect role creation - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect sts get session token abuse - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect attach to role policy - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect permanent key creation - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect sts assume role abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - aws detect permanent key creation - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect attach to role policy - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect role creation - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect sts get session token abuse - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect sts assume role abuse - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Track when a user assumes an IAM role in another AWS account to obtain cross-account access to services and resources in that account. Accessing new roles could be an indication of malicious activity.
 narrative = Amazon Web Services (AWS) admins manage access to AWS resources and services across the enterprise using AWS's Identity and Access Management (IAM) functionality. IAM provides the ability to create and manage AWS users, groups, and roles-each with their own unique set of privileges and defined access to specific resources (such as EC2 instances, the AWS Management Console, API, or the command-line interface). Unlike conventional (human) users, IAM roles are assumable by anyone in the organization. They provide users with dynamically created temporary security credentials that expire within a set time period.\
 Herein lies the rub. In between the time between when the temporary credentials are issued and when they expire is a period of opportunity, where a user could leverage the temporary credentials to wreak havoc-spin up or remove instances, create new users, elevate privileges, and other malicious activities-throughout the environment.\
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor your AWS EC2 instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or EC2 instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior.
 narrative = Cryptomining is an intentionally difficult, resource-intensive business. Its complexity was designed into the process to ensure that the number of blocks mined each day would remain steady. So, it's par for the course that ambitious, but unscrupulous, miners make amassing the computing power of large enterprises--a practice known as cryptojacking--a top priority. \
 Cryptojacking has attracted an increasing amount of media attention since its explosion in popularity in the fall of 2017. The attacks have moved from in-browser exploits and mobile phones to enterprise cloud services, such as Amazon Web Services (AWS). It's difficult to determine exactly how widespread the practice has become, since bad actors continually evolve their ability to escape detection, including employing unlisted endpoints, moderating their CPU usage, and hiding the mining pool's IP address behind a free CDN. \
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonVPC/latest/UserGuide/VPC_Appendix_NACLs.html", "https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/how-to-help-prepare-for-ddos-attacks-by-reducing-your-attack-surface/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor your AWS network infrastructure for bad configurations and malicious activity. Investigative searches help you probe deeper, when the facts warrant it.
 narrative = AWS CloudTrail is an AWS service that helps you enable governance, compliance, and operational/risk auditing of your AWS account. Actions taken by a user, role, or an AWS service are recorded as events in CloudTrail. It is crucial for a company to monitor events and actions taken in the AWS Management Console, AWS Command Line Interface, and AWS SDKs and APIs to ensure that your servers are not vulnerable to attacks. This analytic story contains detection searches that leverage CloudTrail logs from AWS to check for bad configurations and malicious activity in your AWS network access controls.
 
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://aws.amazon.com/security-hub/features/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for User - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for User - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance - Rule", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
 description = This story is focused around detecting Security Hub alerts generated from AWS
 narrative = AWS Security Hub collects and consolidates findings from AWS security services enabled in your environment, such as intrusion detection findings from Amazon GuardDuty, vulnerability scans from Amazon Inspector, S3 bucket policy findings from Amazon Macie, publicly accessible and cross-account resources from IAM Access Analyzer, and resources lacking WAF coverage from AWS Firewall Manager.
 
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Country - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From City - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Region - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From City - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Region - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Country - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor your AWS provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your network.
 narrative = Because most enterprise AWS activities originate from familiar geographic locations, monitoring for activity from unknown or unusual regions is an important security measure. This indicator can be especially useful in environments where it is impossible to add specific IPs to an allow list because they vary. \
 This Analytic Story was designed to provide you with flexibility in the precision you employ in specifying legitimate geographic regions. It can be as specific as an IP address or a city, or as broad as a region (think state) or an entire country. By determining how precise you want your geographical locations to be and monitoring for new locations that haven't previously accessed your environment, you can detect adversaries as they begin to probe your environment. Since there are legitimate reasons for activities from unfamiliar locations, this is not a standalone indicator. Nevertheless, location can be a relevant piece of information that you may wish to investigate further.
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://redlock.io/blog/cryptojacking-tesla"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS API Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect API activity from users without MFA - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Security Group Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new API calls from user roles - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect new API calls from user roles - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS API Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Security Group Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect API activity from users without MFA - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task"]
 description = Detect and investigate dormant user accounts for your AWS environment that have become active again. Because inactive and ad-hoc accounts are common attack targets, it's critical to enable governance within your environment.
 narrative = It seems obvious that it is critical to monitor and control the users who have access to your cloud infrastructure. Nevertheless, it's all too common for enterprises to lose track of ad-hoc accounts, leaving their servers vulnerable to attack. In fact, this was the very oversight that led to Tesla's cryptojacking attack in February, 2018.\
 In addition to compromising the security of your data, when bad actors leverage your compute resources, it can incur monumental costs, since you will be billed for any new EC2 instances and increased bandwidth usage. \
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs/blob/v3.2/dev/rules/REQUEST-944-APPLICATION-ATTACK-JAVA.conf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Content-Type Length - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Java Classes - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Suspicious Strings in HTTP Header - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Web POSTs From src - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Unusually Long Content-Type Length - Rule", "ESCU - Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Java Classes - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Web POSTs From src - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Suspicious Strings in HTTP Header - Response Task"]
 description = Detect and investigate activities--such as unusually long `Content-Type` length, suspicious java classes and web servers executing suspicious processes--consistent with attempts to exploit Apache Struts vulnerabilities.
 narrative = In March of 2017, a remote code-execution vulnerability in the Jakarta Multipart parser in Apache Struts, a widely used open-source framework for creating Java web applications, was disclosed and assigned to CVE-2017-5638. About two months later, hackers exploited the flaw to carry out the world's <a href=https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2017/09/07/nations-biggest-hacks-and-data-breaches-millions/644311001/> 5th largest data breach</a>. The target, credit giant Equifax, <a href=https://money.cnn.com/2017/09/16/technology/equifax-breach-security-hole/index.html>told investigators</a> that it had become aware of the vulnerability two months before the attack. \
 The exploit involved manipulating the `Content-Type HTTP` header to execute commands embedded in the header.\
@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-research/2021/01/26/cve-2021-3156-heap-based-buffer-overflow-in-sudo-baron-samedit"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Shannon Davis"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 Segfault - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 via OSQuery - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 Segfault - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 via OSQuery - Rule"]
 description = Uncover activity consistent with CVE-2021-3156. Discovered by the Qualys Research Team, this vulnerability has been found to affect sudo across multiple Linux distributions (Ubuntu 20.04 and prior, Debian 10 and prior, Fedora 33 and prior). As this vulnerability was committed to code in July 2011, there will be many distributions affected. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability allows any unprivileged user to gain root privileges on the vulnerable host.
 narrative = A non-privledged user is able to execute the sudoedit command to trigger a buffer overflow. After the successful buffer overflow, they are then able to gain root privileges on the affected host. The conditions needed to be run are a trailing "\" along with shell and edit flags. Monitoring the /var/log directory on Linux hosts using the Splunk Universal Forwarder will allow you to pick up this behavior when using the provided detection.
 
@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.zerofox.com/blog/what-is-digital-risk-monitoring/", "https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/consumer/family-safety/what-is-typosquatting/", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2016/06/explained-typosquatting/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Detect and investigate activity that may indicate that an adversary is using faux domains to mislead users into interacting with malicious infrastructure. Monitor DNS, email, and web traffic for permutations of your brand name.
 narrative = While you can educate your users and customers about the risks and threats posed by typosquatting, phishing, and corporate espionage, human error is a persistent fact of life. Of course, your adversaries are all too aware of this reality and will happily leverage it for nefarious purposes whenever possible&#51;phishing with lookalike addresses, embedding faux command-and-control domains in malware, and hosting malicious content on domains that closely mimic your corporate servers. This is where brand monitoring comes in.\
 You can use our adaptation of `DNSTwist`, together with the support searches in this Analytic Story, to generate permutations of specified brands and external domains. Splunk can monitor email, DNS requests, and web traffic for these permutations and provide you with early warnings and situational awareness--powerful elements of an effective defense.\
@@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image - Rule", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor your cloud compute instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or compute instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior.
 narrative = Cryptomining is an intentionally difficult, resource-intensive business. Its complexity was designed into the process to ensure that the number of blocks mined each day would remain steady. So, it's par for the course that ambitious, but unscrupulous, miners make amassing the computing power of large enterprises--a practice known as cryptojacking--a top priority. \
 Cryptojacking has attracted an increasing amount of media attention since its explosion in popularity in the fall of 2017. The attacks have moved from in-browser exploits and mobile phones to enterprise cloud services, such as Amazon Web Services (AWS), Google Cloud Platform (GCP), and Azure. It's difficult to determine exactly how widespread the practice has become, since bad actors continually evolve their ability to escape detection, including employing unlisted endpoints, moderating their CPU usage, and hiding the mining pool's IP address behind a free CDN. \
@@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/golden-saml-newly-discovered-attack-technique-forges-authentication-to-cloud-apps", "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf", "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - AWS SAML Access by Provider User and Principal - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Added Service Principal - Rule", "ESCU - AWS SAML Update identity provider - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Via PowerShell And EventCode 4703 - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Excessive SSO logon errors - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - O365 New Federated Domain Added - Rule", "ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Certutil exe certificate extraction - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - O365 Added Service Principal - Rule", "ESCU - O365 New Federated Domain Added - Rule", "ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Via PowerShell And EventCode 4703 - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User - Rule", "ESCU - Certutil exe certificate extraction - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Excessive SSO logon errors - Rule", "ESCU - AWS SAML Update identity provider - Rule", "ESCU - AWS SAML Access by Provider User and Principal - Rule"]
 description = This analytical story addresses events that indicate abuse of cloud federated credentials. These credentials are usually extracted from endpoint desktop or servers specially those servers that provide federation services such as Windows Active Directory Federation Services. Identity Federation relies on objects such as Oauth2 tokens, cookies or SAML assertions in order to provide seamless access between cloud and perimeter environments. If these objects are either hijacked or forged then attackers will be able to pivot into victim's cloud environements.
 narrative = This story is composed of detection searches based on endpoint that addresses the use of Mimikatz, Escalation of Privileges and Abnormal processes that may indicate the extraction of Federated directory objects such as passwords, Oauth2 tokens, certificates and keys. Cloud environment (AWS, Azure) related events are also addressed in specific cloud environment detection searches.
 
@@ -170,17 +170,21 @@ narrative = This story is composed of detection searches based on endpoint that
 category = Adversary Tactics
 last_updated = 2021-02-16
 version = 1
-references = ["https://www.cobaltstrike.com/", "https://www.infocyte.com/blog/2020/09/02/cobalt-strike-the-new-favorite-among-thieves/", "https://bluescreenofjeff.com/2017-01-24-how-to-write-malleable-c2-profiles-for-cobalt-strike/", "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2020/09/coverage-strikes-back-cobalt-strike-paper.html", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/unauthorized-access-of-fireeye-red-team-tools.html"]
+references = ["https://www.cobaltstrike.com/", "https://www.infocyte.com/blog/2020/09/02/cobalt-strike-the-new-favorite-among-thieves/", "https://bluescreenofjeff.com/2017-01-24-how-to-write-malleable-c2-profiles-for-cobalt-strike/", "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2020/09/coverage-strikes-back-cobalt-strike-paper.html", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/unauthorized-access-of-fireeye-red-team-tools.html", "https://github.com/MichaelKoczwara/Awesome-CobaltStrike-Defence", "https://github.com/zer0yu/Awesome-CobaltStrike"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 StartW - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 no CommandLine Arguments - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious msbuild path - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious DLLHost no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Cobalt Strike Named Pipes - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious SearchProtocolHost no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 StartW - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious GPUpdate no Command Line Arguments - Rule"]
 description = Cobalt Strike is threat emulation software. Red teams and penetration testers use Cobalt Strike to demonstrate the risk of a breach and evaluate mature security programs. Most recently, Cobalt Strike has become the choice tool by threat groups due to its ease of use and extensibility.
-narrative = This Analytic Story supports you to detect Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) from Cobalt Strike. Cobalt Strike has many ways to be enhanced by using aggressor scripts, malleable C2 profiles, default attack packages, and much more. For endpoint behavior, Cobalt Strike is most commonly identified via named pipes, spawn to processes, and DLL function names. On the network, depending on the malleable C2 profile used, it is near infinite in the amount of ways to conceal the C2 traffic with Cobalt Strike.\
-In generating content for Cobalt Strike, the following is considered:\
-1. Is it normal for <spawnto_ value> to have no command line arguments? No command line arguments and a network connection?\
-1. What is the default, or normal, process lineage for <spawnto_ value>?\
-1. Does the <spawnto_ value> make network connections?\
-1. Is it normal for <spawnto_ value> to load jscript, vbscript, Amsi.dll, and clr.dll?.
+narrative = This Analytic Story supports you to detect Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) from Cobalt Strike. Cobalt Strike has many ways to be enhanced by using aggressor scripts, malleable C2 profiles, default attack packages, and much more. For endpoint behavior, Cobalt Strike is most commonly identified via named pipes, spawn to processes, and DLL function names. Many additional variables are provided for in memory operation of the beacon implant. On the network, depending on the malleable C2 profile used, it is near infinite in the amount of ways to conceal the C2 traffic with Cobalt Strike. Not every query may be specific to Cobalt Strike the tool, but the methodologies and techniques used by it.\
+Splunk Threat Research reviewed all publicly available instances of Malleabe C2 Profiles and generated a list of the most commonly used spawnto and pipenames.\
+`Spawnto_x86` and `spawnto_x64` is the process that Cobalt Strike will spawn and injects shellcode into.\
+Pipename sets the named pipe name used in Cobalt Strikes Beacon SMB C2 traffic.\
+With that, new detections were generated focused on these spawnto processes spawning without command line arguments. Similar, the named pipes most commonly used by Cobalt Strike added as a detection. In generating content for Cobalt Strike, the following is considered:\
+- Is it normal for spawnto_ value to have no command line arguments? No command line arguments and a network connection?\
+- What is the default, or normal, process lineage for spawnto_ value?\
+- Does the spawnto_ value make network connections?\
+- Is it normal for spawnto_ value to load jscript, vbscript, Amsi.dll, and clr.dll?\
+While investigating a detection related to this Analytic Story, keep in mind the parent process, process path, and any file modifications that may occur. Tuning may need to occur to remove any false positives.
 
 [analytic_story://ColdRoot MacOS RAT]
 category = Malware
@@ -189,7 +193,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.intego.com/mac-security-blog/osxcoldroot-and-the-rat-invasion/", "https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x2A.html", "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/coldroot-rat-still-undetectable-despite-being-uploaded-on-github-two-years-ago/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Jose Hernandez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection - Rule", "ESCU - Processes Tapping Keyboard Events - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Processes Tapping Keyboard Events - Rule", "ESCU - Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip - Response Task"]
 description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that relate to the ColdRoot Remote Access Trojan that affects MacOS. An example of some of these activities are changing sensative binaries in the MacOS sub-system, detecting process names and executables associated with the RAT, detecting when a keyboard tab is installed on a MacOS machine and more.
 narrative = Conventional wisdom holds that Apple's MacOS operating system is significantly less vulnerable to attack than Windows machines. While that point is debatable, it is true that attacks against MacOS systems are much less common. However, this fact does not mean that Macs are impervious to breaches. To the contrary, research has shown that that Mac malware is increasing at an alarming rate. According to AV-test, in 2018, there were 86,865 new MacOS malware variants, up from 27,338 the year before&#151;a 31% increase. In contrast, the independent research firm found that new Windows malware had increased from 65.17M to 76.86M during that same period, less than half the rate of growth. The bottom line is that while the numbers look a lot smaller than Windows, it's definitely time to take Mac security more seriously.\
 This Analytic Story addresses the ColdRoot remote access trojan (RAT), which was uploaded to Github in 2016, but was still escaping detection by the first quarter of 2018, when a new, more feature-rich variant was discovered masquerading as an Apple audio driver. Among other capabilities, the Pascal-based ColdRoot can heist passwords from users' keychains and remotely control infected machines without detection. In the initial report of his findings, Patrick Wardle, Chief Research Officer for Digita Security, explained that the new ColdRoot RAT could start and kill processes on the breached system, spawn new remote-desktop sessions, take screen captures and assemble them into a live stream of the victim's desktop, and more.\
@@ -202,7 +206,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Collection", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1074"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Email files written outside of the Outlook directory - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin - Rule", "ESCU - Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts - Rule", "ESCU - Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious writes to System Volume Information - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin - Rule", "ESCU - Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server - Rule", "ESCU - Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts - Rule", "ESCU - Email files written outside of the Outlook directory - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious writes to System Volume Information - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor for and investigate activities--such as suspicious writes to the Windows Recycling Bin or email servers sending high amounts of traffic to specific hosts, for example--that may indicate that an adversary is harvesting and exfiltrating sensitive data. 
 narrative = A common adversary goal is to identify and exfiltrate data of value from a target organization. This data may include email conversations and addresses, confidential company information, links to network design/infrastructure, important dates, and so on.\
  Attacks are composed of three activities: identification, collection, and staging data for exfiltration. Identification typically involves scanning systems and observing user activity. Collection can involve the transfer of large amounts of data from various repositories. Staging/preparation includes moving data to a central location and compressing (and optionally encoding and/or encrypting) it. All of these activities provide opportunities for defenders to identify their presence. \
@@ -215,7 +219,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Command_and_Control", "https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/feature/Command-and-control-servers-The-puppet-masters-that-govern-malware"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
 description = Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures leveraged by attackers to establish and operate command and control channels. Implants installed by attackers on compromised endpoints use these channels to receive instructions and send data back to the malicious operators.
 narrative = Threat actors typically architect and implement an infrastructure to use in various ways during the course of their attack campaigns. In some cases, they leverage this infrastructure for scanning and performing reconnaissance activities. In others, they may use this infrastructure to launch actual attacks. One of the most important functions of this infrastructure is to establish servers that will communicate with implants on compromised endpoints. These servers establish a command and control channel that is used to proxy data between the compromised endpoint and the attacker. These channels relay commands from the attacker to the compromised endpoint and the output of those commands back to the attacker.\
 Because this communication is so critical for an adversary, they often use techniques designed to hide the true nature of the communications. There are many different techniques used to establish and communicate over these channels. This Analytic Story provides searches that look for a variety of the techniques used for these channels, as well as indications that these channels are active, by examining logs associated with border control devices and network-access control lists.
@@ -227,7 +231,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://github.com/kgretzky/evilginx2", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1192/", "https://breakdev.org/evilginx-advanced-phishing-with-two-factor-authentication-bypass/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Splunk Research Team"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect DNS requests to Phishing Sites leveraging EvilGinx2 - Rule", "ESCU - Get Certificate logs for a domain - Response Task", "ESCU - Domain Certificate Investigation - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect DNS requests to Phishing Sites leveraging EvilGinx2 - Rule", "ESCU - Domain Certificate Investigation - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Certificate logs for a domain - Response Task"]
 description = Detect DNS and web requests to fake websites generated by the EvilGinx2 toolkit. These websites are designed to fool unwitting users who have clicked on a malicious link in a phishing email. 
 narrative = As most people know, these emails use fraudulent domains, [email scraping](https://www.cyberscoop.com/emotet-trojan-phishing-scraping-templates-cofense-geodo/), familiar contact names inserted as senders, and other tactics to lure targets into clicking a malicious link, opening an attachment with a [nefarious payload](https://www.cyberscoop.com/emotet-trojan-phishing-scraping-templates-cofense-geodo/), or entering sensitive personal information that perpetrators may intercept. This attack technique requires a relatively low level of skill and allows adversaries to easily cast a wide net. Because phishing is a technique that relies on human psychology, you will never be able to eliminate this vulnerability 100%. But you can use automated detection to significantly reduce the risks.\
 This Analytic Story focuses on detecting signs of MiTM attacks enabled by [EvilGinx2](https://github.com/kgretzky/evilginx2), a toolkit that sets up a transparent proxy between the targeted site and the user. In this way, the attacker is able to intercept credentials and two-factor identification tokens. It employs a proxy template to allow a registered domain to impersonate targeted sites, such as Linkedin, Amazon, Okta, Github, Twitter, Instagram, Reddit, Office 365, and others. It can even register SSL certificates and camouflage them via a URL shortener, making them difficult to detect. Searches in this story look for signs of MiTM attacks enabled by EvilGinx2.
@@ -250,7 +254,7 @@ version = 3
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1003", "https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Create Remote Thread into LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Ntdsutil export ntds - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of lsass Dump with Taskmgr - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Previous Unseen User - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Creation of lsass Dump with Taskmgr - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump - Rule", "ESCU - Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Ntdsutil Export NTDS - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Create Remote Thread into LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Previous Unseen User - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts - Response Task"]
 description = Uncover activity consistent with credential dumping, a technique wherein attackers compromise systems and attempt to obtain and exfiltrate passwords. The threat actors use these pilfered credentials to further escalate privileges and spread throughout a target environment. The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify attempts to credential dumping.
 narrative = Credential dumping&#151;gathering credentials from a target system, often hashed or encrypted&#151;is a common attack technique. Even though the credentials may not be in plain text, an attacker can still exfiltrate the data and set to cracking it offline, on their own systems. The threat actors target a variety of sources to extract them, including the Security Accounts Manager (SAM), Local Security Authority (LSA), NTDS from Domain Controllers, or the Group Policy Preference (GPP) files.\
 Once attackers obtain valid credentials, they use them to move throughout a target network with ease, discovering new systems and identifying assets of interest. Credentials obtained in this manner typically include those of privileged users, which may provide access to more sensitive information and system operations.\
@@ -263,7 +267,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Create local admin accounts using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Single Letter Process On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process File Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Single Letter Process On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Create local admin accounts using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process File Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor for suspicious activities associated with DHS Technical Alert US-CERT TA18-074A. Some of the activities that adversaries used in these compromises included spearfishing attacks, malware, watering-hole domains, many and more.
 narrative = The frequency of nation-state cyber attacks has increased significantly over the last decade. Employing numerous tactics and techniques, these attacks continue to escalate in complexity. \
 There is a wide range of motivations for these state-sponsored hacks, including stealing valuable corporate, military, or diplomatic data&#1151;all of which could confer advantages in various arenas. They may also target critical infrastructure. \
@@ -289,7 +293,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/", "http://www.noip.com/blog/2014/07/11/dynamic-dns-can-use-2/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/08/04/detecting-dynamic-dns-domains-in-splunk.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - DNS record changed - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Hijack Enrichment - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - DNS record changed - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - DNS Hijack Enrichment - Response Task"]
 description = Secure your environment against DNS hijacks with searches that help you detect and investigate unauthorized changes to DNS records.
 narrative = Dubbed the Achilles heel of the Internet (see https://www.f5.com/labs/articles/threat-intelligence/dns-is-still-the-achilles-heel-of-the-internet-25613), DNS plays a critical role in routing web traffic but is notoriously vulnerable to attack. One reason is its distributed nature. It relies on unstructured connections between millions of clients and servers over inherently insecure protocols.\
 The gravity and extent of the importance of securing DNS from attacks is undeniable. The fallout of compromised DNS can be disastrous. Not only can hackers bring down an entire business, they can intercept confidential information, emails, and login credentials, as well. \
@@ -319,7 +323,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/data-protection/", "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/dns/splunk-detect-dns-tunneling-37022", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect USB device insertion - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect USB device insertion - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Fortify your data-protection arsenal--while continuing to ensure data confidentiality and integrity--with searches that monitor for and help you investigate possible signs of data exfiltration.
 narrative = Attackers can leverage a variety of resources to compromise or exfiltrate enterprise data. Common exfiltration techniques include remote-access channels via low-risk, high-payoff active-collections operations and close-access operations using insiders and removable media. While this Analytic Story is not a comprehensive listing of all the methods by which attackers can exfiltrate data, it provides a useful starting point.
 
@@ -330,7 +334,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1003", "https://github.com/SecuraBV/CVE-2020-1472", "https://www.secura.com/blog/zero-logon", "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-1472"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Jose Hernandez, Stan Miskowicz, David Dorsey, Shannon Davis Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect Zerologon via Zeek - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Computer Changed with Anonymous Account - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Computer Changed with Anonymous Account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Zerologon via Zeek - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Uncover activity related to the execution of Zerologon CVE-2020-11472, a technique wherein attackers target a Microsoft Windows Domain Controller to reset its computer account password. The result from this attack is attackers can now provide themselves high privileges and take over Domain Controller. The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify attempts to reset Domain Controller Computer Account via exploit code remotely or via the use of tool Mimikatz as payload carrier.
 narrative = This attack is a privilege escalation technique, where attacker targets a Netlogon secure channel connection to a domain controller, using Netlogon Remote Protocol (MS-NRPC). This vulnerability exposes vulnerable Windows Domain Controllers to be targeted via unaunthenticated RPC calls which eventually reset Domain Contoller computer account ($) providing the attacker the opportunity to exfil domain controller credential secrets and assign themselve high privileges that can lead to domain controller and potentially complete network takeover. The detection searches in this Analytic Story use Windows Event viewer events and Sysmon events to detect attack execution, these searches monitor access to the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process which is an indicator of the use of Mimikatz tool which has bee updated to carry this attack payload.
 
@@ -341,7 +345,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1089", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2015/11/vonteera-adware-uses-certificates-to-disable-anti-malware/", "https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Tools-Report.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Unload Sysmon Filter Driver - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Unload Sysmon Filter Driver - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Looks for activities and techniques associated with the disabling of security tools on a Windows system, such as suspicious `reg.exe` processes, processes launching netsh, and many others.
 narrative = Attackers employ a variety of tactics in order to avoid detection and operate without barriers. This often involves modifying the configuration of security tools to get around them or explicitly disabling them to prevent them from running. This Analytic Story includes searches that look for activity consistent with attackers attempting to disable various security mechanisms. Such activity may involve monitoring for suspicious registry activity, as this is where much of the configuration for Windows and various other programs reside, or explicitly attempting to shut down security-related services. Other times, attackers attempt various tricks to prevent specific programs from running, such as adding the certificates with which the security tools are signed to a block list (which would prevent them from running).
 
@@ -352,7 +356,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/", "http://www.noip.com/blog/2014/07/11/dynamic-dns-can-use-2/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/08/04/detecting-dynamic-dns-domains-in-splunk.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Detect and investigate hosts in your environment that may be communicating with dynamic domain providers. Attackers may leverage these services to help them avoid firewall blocks and deny lists.
 narrative = Dynamic DNS services (DDNS) are legitimate low-cost or free services that allow users to rapidly update domain resolutions to IP infrastructure. While their usage can be benign, malicious actors can abuse DDNS to host harmful payloads or interactive-command-and-control infrastructure. These attackers will manually update or automate domain resolution changes by routing dynamic domains to IP addresses that circumvent firewall blocks and deny lists and frustrate a network defender's analytic and investigative processes. These searches will look for DNS queries made from within your infrastructure to suspicious dynamic domains and then investigate more deeply, when appropriate. While this list of top-level dynamic domains is not exhaustive, it can be dynamically updated as new suspicious dynamic domains are identified.
 
@@ -363,7 +367,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-201A", "https://www.first.org/resources/papers/conf2017/Advanced-Incident-Detection-and-Threat-Hunting-using-Sysmon-and-Splunk.pdf", "https://www.vkremez.com/2017/05/emotet-banking-trojan-malware-analysis.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of tools built by NirSoft - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of tools built by NirSoft - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
 description = Detect rarely used executables, specific registry paths that may confer malware survivability and persistence, instances where cmd.exe is used to launch script interpreters, and other indicators that the Emotet financial malware has compromised your environment.
 narrative = The trojan downloader known as Emotet first surfaced in 2014, when it was discovered targeting the banking industry to steal credentials. However, according to a joint technical alert (TA) issued by three government agencies (https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-201A), Emotet has evolved far beyond those beginnings to become what a ThreatPost article called a threat-delivery service(see https://threatpost.com/emotet-malware-evolves-beyond-banking-to-threat-delivery-service/134342/).  For example, in early 2018, Emotet was found to be using its loader function to spread the Quakbot and Ransomware variants. \
 According to the TA, the the malware continues to be among the most costly and destructive malware affecting the private and public sectors. Researchers have linked it to the threat group Mealybug, which has also been on the security communitys radar since 2014.\
@@ -387,12 +391,25 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/understanding-service-accounts"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - GCP Detect gcploit framework - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Detect high risk permissions by resource and account - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Detect accounts with high risk roles by project - Rule", "ESCU - gcp detect oauth token abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - gcp detect oauth token abuse - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Detect accounts with high risk roles by project - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Detect high risk permissions by resource and account - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Detect gcploit framework - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Track when a user assumes an IAM role in another GCP account to obtain cross-account access to services and resources in that account. Accessing new roles could be an indication of malicious activity.
 narrative = Google Cloud Platform (GCP) admins manage access to GCP resources and services across the enterprise using GCP Identity and Access Management (IAM) functionality. IAM provides the ability to create and manage GCP users, groups, and roles-each with their own unique set of privileges and defined access to specific resources (such as Compute instances, the GCP Management Console, API, or the command-line interface). Unlike conventional (human) users, IAM roles are potentially assumable by anyone in the organization. They provide users with dynamically created temporary security credentials that expire within a set time period.\
 In between the time between when the temporary credentials are issued and when they expire is a period of opportunity, where a user could leverage the temporary credentials to wreak havoc-spin up or remove instances, create new users, elevate privileges, and other malicious activities-throughout the environment.\
 This Analytic Story includes searches that will help you monitor your GCP Audit logs logs for evidence of suspicious cross-account activity.  For example, while accessing multiple GCP accounts and roles may be perfectly valid behavior, it may be suspicious when an account requests privileges of an account it has not accessed in the past. After identifying suspicious activities, you can use the provided investigative searches to help you probe more deeply.
 
+[analytic_story://HAFNIUM Group]
+category = Adversary Tactics
+last_updated = 2021-03-03
+version = 1
+references = ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/detecting-hafnium-exchange-server-zero-day-activity-in-splunk.html", "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/03/02/active-exploitation-of-microsoft-exchange-zero-day-vulnerabilities/", "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/", "https://blog.rapid7.com/2021/03/03/rapid7s-insightidr-enables-detection-and-response-to-microsoft-exchange-0-day/"]
+maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
+spec_version = 3
+searches = ["ESCU - Unified Messaging Service Spawning a Process - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump - Rule", "ESCU - Nishang PowershellTCPOneLine - Rule", "ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule", "ESCU - W3WP Spawning Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Ntdsutil Export NTDS - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule"]
+description = HAFNIUM group was identified by Microsoft as exploiting 4 Microsoft Exchange CVEs in the wild - CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858 and CVE-2021-27065.
+narrative = On Tuesday, March 2, 2021, Microsoft released a set of security patches for its mail server, Microsoft Exchange. These patches respond to a group of vulnerabilities known to impact Exchange 2013, 2016, and 2019. It is important to note that an Exchange 2010 security update has also been issued, though the CVEs do not reference that version as being vulnerable.\
+While the CVEs do not shed much light on the specifics of the vulnerabilities or exploits, the first vulnerability (CVE-2021-26855) has a remote network attack vector that allows the attacker, a group Microsoft named HAFNIUM, to authenticate as the Exchange server. Three additional vulnerabilities (CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, and CVE-2021-27065) were also identified as part of this activity. When chained together along with CVE-2021-26855 for initial access, the attacker would have complete control over the Exchange server. This includes the ability to run code as SYSTEM and write to any path on the server.\
+The following Splunk detections assist with identifying the HAFNIUM groups tradecraft and methodology.
+
 [analytic_story://Hidden Cobra Malware]
 category = Malware
 last_updated = 2020-01-22
@@ -400,7 +417,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/HIDDEN-COBRA-North-Korean-Malicious-Cyber-Activity", "https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Destructive-Malware-Report.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious File Write - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Outbound Emails to Hidden Cobra Threat Actors - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious File Write - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Outbound Emails to Hidden Cobra Threat Actors - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor for and investigate activities, including the creation or deletion of hidden shares and file writes, that may be evidence of infiltration by North Korean government-sponsored cybercriminals. Details of this activity were reported in DHS Report TA-18-149A.
 narrative = North Korea's government-sponsored "cyber army" has been slowly building momentum and gaining sophistication over the last 15 years or so. As a result, the group's activity, which the US government refers to as "Hidden Cobra," has surreptitiously crept onto the collective radar as a preeminent global threat.\
 These state-sponsored actors are thought to be responsible for everything from a hack on a South Korean nuclear plant to an attack on Sony in anticipation of its release of the movie "The Interview" at the end of 2014. They're also notorious for cyberespionage. In recent years, the group seems to be focused on financial crimes, such as cryptojacking.\
@@ -414,7 +431,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2016/09/hosts-file-hijacks/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Windows hosts file modification - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Windows hosts file modification - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Detect evidence of tactics used to redirect traffic from a host to a destination other than the one intended--potentially one that is part of an adversary's attack infrastructure. An example is redirecting communications regarding patches and updates or misleading users into visiting a malicious website.
 narrative = Attackers will often attempt to manipulate client communications for nefarious purposes. In some cases, an attacker may endeavor to modify a local host file to redirect communications with resources (such as antivirus or system-update services) to prevent clients from receiving patches or updates. In other cases, an attacker might use this tactic to have the client connect to a site that looks like the intended site, but instead installs malware or collects information from the victim. Additionally, an attacker may redirect a victim in order to execute a MITM attack and observe communications.
 
@@ -450,7 +467,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://github.com/splunk/cloud-datamodel-security-research"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task"]
 description = This story addresses detection against Kubernetes cluster fingerprint scan and attack by providing information on items such as source ip, user agent, cluster names.
 narrative = Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration platform contains sensitve information and management priviledges of production workloads, microservices and applications. These searches allow operator to detect suspicious unauthenticated requests from the internet to kubernetes cluster.
 
@@ -461,7 +478,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/approaching-kubernetes-security-detecting-kubernetes-scan-with-splunk.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = This story addresses detection and response of accounts acccesing Kubernetes cluster sensitive objects such as configmaps or secrets providing information on items such as user user, group. object, namespace and authorization reason.
 narrative = Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration platform contains sensitive objects within its architecture, specifically configmaps and secrets, if accessed by an attacker can lead to further compromise. These searches allow operator to detect suspicious requests against Kubernetes sensitive objects.
 
@@ -472,7 +489,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/approaching-kubernetes-security-detecting-kubernetes-scan-with-splunk.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect RBAC authorizations by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect most active service accounts by pod namespace - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect RBAC authorizations by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect most active service accounts by pod namespace - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = This story addresses detection and response around Sensitive Role usage within a Kubernetes clusters against cluster resources and namespaces.
 narrative = Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration platform contains sensitive roles within its architecture, specifically configmaps and secrets, if accessed by an attacker can lead to further compromise. These searches allow operator to detect suspicious requests against Kubernetes role activities
 
@@ -483,7 +500,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/executive-perspective/2015/08/malware_lateral_move.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks - Rule", "ESCU - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
 description = Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures around how attackers move laterally within the enterprise. Because lateral movement can expose the adversary to detection, it should be an important focus for security analysts.
 narrative = Once attackers gain a foothold within an enterprise, they will seek to expand their accesses and leverage techniques that facilitate lateral movement. Attackers will often spend quite a bit of time and effort moving laterally. Because lateral movement renders an attacker the most vulnerable to detection, it's an excellent focus for detection and investigation.\
 Indications of lateral movement can include the abuse of system utilities (such as `psexec.exe`), unauthorized use of remote desktop services, `file/admin$` shares, WMI, PowerShell, pass-the-hash, or the abuse of scheduled tasks. Organizations must be extra vigilant in detecting lateral movement techniques and look for suspicious activity in and around high-value strategic network assets, such as Active Directory, which are often considered the primary target or "crown jewels" to a persistent threat actor.\
@@ -498,7 +515,7 @@ version = 4
 references = ["https://blogs.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/malware-employs-powershell-to-infect-systems/", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Multiple Suspicious Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadFile - Rule", "ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Multiple Suspicious Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
 description = Attackers are finding stealthy ways "live off the land," leveraging utilities and tools that come standard on the endpoint--such as PowerShell--to achieve their goals without downloading binary files. These searches can help you detect and investigate PowerShell command-line options that may be indicative of malicious intent.
 narrative = The searches in this Analytic Story monitor for parameters often used for malicious purposes. It is helpful to understand how often the notable events generated by this story occur, as well as the commonalities between some of these events. These factors may provide clues about whether this is a common occurrence of minimal concern or a rare event that may require more extensive investigation. Likewise, it is important to determine whether the issue is restricted to a single user/system or is broader in scope.\
 The following factors may assist you in determining whether the event is malicious: \
@@ -518,7 +535,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/03/04/tracking-locky-ransomware-using-carbon-black/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Extended Period Without Successful Netbackup Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Unsuccessful Netbackup backups - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - All backup logs for host - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Unsuccessful Netbackup backups - Rule", "ESCU - Extended Period Without Successful Netbackup Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - All backup logs for host - Response Task"]
 description = Address common concerns when monitoring your backup processes. These searches can help you reduce risks from ransomware, device theft, or denial of physical access to a host by backing up data on endpoints.
 narrative = Having backups is a standard best practice that helps ensure continuity of business operations.  Having mature backup processes can also help you reduce the risks of many security-related incidents and streamline your response processes. The detection searches in this Analytic Story will help you identify systems that have backup failures, as well as systems that have not been backed up for an extended period of time. The story will also return the notable event history and all of the backup logs for an endpoint.
 
@@ -529,7 +546,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Identify and investigate prohibited/unauthorized software or processes that may be concealing malicious behavior within your environment. 
 narrative = It is critical to identify unauthorized software and processes running on enterprise endpoints and determine whether they are likely to be malicious. This Analytic Story requires the user to populate the Interesting Processes table within Enterprise Security with prohibited processes. An included support search will augment this data, adding information on processes thought to be malicious. This search requires data from endpoint detection-and-response solutions, endpoint data sources (such as Sysmon), or Windows Event Logs--assuming that the Active Directory administrator has enabled process tracking within the System Event Audit Logs.\
 It is important to investigate any software identified as suspicious, in order to understand how it was installed or executed. Analyzing authentication logs or any historic notable events might elicit additional investigative leads of interest. For best results, schedule the search to run every two weeks. 
@@ -554,7 +571,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/tn-archive/bb490939(v=technet.10)", "https://htmlpreview.github.io/?https://github.com/MatthewDemaske/blogbackup/blob/master/netshell.html", "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Processes created by netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Processes created by netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Detect activities and various techniques associated with the abuse of `netsh.exe`, which can disable local firewall settings or set up a remote connection to a host from an infected system.
 narrative = It is a common practice for attackers of all types to leverage native Windows tools and functionality to execute commands for malicious reasons. One such tool on Windows OS is `netsh.exe`,a command-line scripting utility that allows you to--either locally or remotely--display or modify the network configuration of a computer that is currently running. `Netsh.exe` can be used to discover and disable local firewall settings. It can also be used to set up a remote connection to a host from an infected system.\
 To get started, run the detection search to identify parent processes of `netsh.exe`.
@@ -566,7 +583,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://i.blackhat.com/USA-20/Thursday/us-20-Bienstock-My-Cloud-Is-APTs-Cloud-Investigating-And-Defending-Office-365.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Patrick Bareiss"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - O365 Excessive Authentication Failures Alert - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Bypass MFA via Trusted IP - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious Rights Delegation - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Disable MFA - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Added Service Principal - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Excessive SSO logon errors - Rule", "ESCU - O365 PST export alert - Rule", "ESCU - High Number of Login Failures from a single source - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding - Rule", "ESCU - O365 New Federated Domain Added - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - O365 Added Service Principal - Rule", "ESCU - O365 New Federated Domain Added - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Excessive Authentication Failures Alert - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious Rights Delegation - Rule", "ESCU - O365 PST export alert - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Excessive SSO logon errors - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Bypass MFA via Trusted IP - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Disable MFA - Rule", "ESCU - High Number of Login Failures from a single source - Rule"]
 description = This story is focused around detecting Office 365 Attacks.
 narrative = More and more companies are using Microsofts Office 365 cloud offering. Therefore, we see more and more attacks against Office 365. This story provides various detections for Office 365 attacks.
 
@@ -577,7 +594,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/orangeworm-targets-healthcare-us-europe-asia", "https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/healthcare-targeted-by-hacker/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
 description = Detect activities and various techniques associated with the Orangeworm Attack Group, a group that frequently targets the healthcare industry.
 narrative = In May of 2018, the attack group Orangeworm was implicated for installing a custom backdoor called Trojan.Kwampirs within large international healthcare corporations in the United States, Europe, and Asia. This malware provides the attackers with remote access to the target system, decrypting and extracting a copy of its main DLL payload from its resource section. Before writing the payload to disk, it inserts a randomly generated string into the middle of the decrypted payload in an attempt to evade hash-based detections.\
 Awareness of the Orangeworm group first surfaced in January, 2015. It has conducted targeted attacks against related industries, as well, such as pharmaceuticals and healthcare IT solution providers.\
@@ -591,7 +608,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/spear-phishing-campaign-targets-ukraine-government.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Splunk Research Team"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Oulook exe writing a  zip file - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Oulook exe writing a  zip file - Rule", "ESCU - Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
 description = Detect signs of malicious payloads that may indicate that your environment has been breached via a phishing attack.
 narrative = Despite its simplicity, phishing remains the most pervasive and dangerous cyberthreat. In fact, research shows that as many as [91% of all successful attacks](https://digitalguardian.com/blog/91-percent-cyber-attacks-start-phishing-email-heres-how-protect-against-phishing) are initiated via a phishing email. \
 As most people know, these emails use fraudulent domains, [email scraping](https://www.cyberscoop.com/emotet-trojan-phishing-scraping-templates-cofense-geodo/), familiar contact names inserted as senders, and other tactics to lure targets into clicking a malicious link, opening an attachment with a [nefarious payload](https://www.cyberscoop.com/emotet-trojan-phishing-scraping-templates-cofense-geodo/), or entering sensitive personal information that perpetrators may intercept. This attack technique requires a relatively low level of skill and allows adversaries to easily cast a wide net. Worse, because its success relies on the gullibility of humans, it's impossible to completely "automate" it out of your environment. However, you can use ES and ESCU to detect and investigate potentially malicious payloads injected into your environment subsequent to a phishing attack. \
@@ -609,7 +626,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/scope-of-mudcarp-attacks-highlight-1/", "http://blog.amossys.fr/badflick-is-not-so-bad.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "iDefense", "email": "-", "name": "iDefense Cyber Espionage Team"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor your environment for suspicious behaviors that resemble the techniques employed by the MUDCARP threat group.
 narrative = This story was created as a joint effort between iDefense and Splunk.\
 iDefense analysts have recently discovered a Windows executable file that, upon execution, spoofs a decryption tool and then drops a file that appears to be the custom-built javascript backdoor, "Orz," which is associated with the threat actors known as MUDCARP (as well as "temp.Periscope" and "Leviathan"). The file is executed using Wscript.\
@@ -647,7 +664,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["http://www.novetta.com/2015/02/advanced-methods-to-detect-advanced-cyber-attacks-protocol-abuse/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
 description = Detect instances of prohibited network traffic allowed in the environment, as well as protocols running on non-standard ports. Both of these types of behaviors typically violate policy and can be leveraged by attackers.
 narrative = A traditional security best practice is to control the ports, protocols, and services allowed within your environment. By limiting the services and protocols to those explicitly approved by policy, administrators can minimize the attack surface. The combined effect allows both network defenders and security controls to focus and not be mired in superfluous traffic or data types. Looking for deviations to policy can identify attacker activity that abuses services and protocols to run on alternate or non-standard ports in the attempt to avoid detection or frustrate forensic analysts.
 
@@ -658,7 +675,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.carbonblack.com/2017/06/28/carbon-black-threat-research-technical-analysis-petya-notpetya-ransomware/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2017/06/27/closing-the-detection-to-mitigation-gap-or-to-petya-or-notpetya-whocares-.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
 description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to ransomware--spikes in SMB traffic, suspicious wevtutil usage, the presence of common ransomware extensions, and system processes run from unexpected locations, and many others.
 narrative = Ransomware is an ever-present risk to the enterprise, wherein an infected host encrypts business-critical data, holding it hostage until the victim pays the attacker a ransom. There are many types and varieties of ransomware that can affect an enterprise. Attackers can deploy ransomware to enterprises through spearphishing campaigns and driveby downloads, as well as through traditional remote service-based exploitation. In the case of the WannaCry campaign, there was self-propagating wormable functionality that was used to maximize infection. Fortunately, organizations can apply several techniques--such as those in this Analytic Story--to detect and or mitigate the effects of ransomware.
 
@@ -680,7 +697,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/executive-perspective/2015/09/the_new_route_toper.html", "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/about/security-center/event-response/synful-knock.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect Port Security Violation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect ARP Poisoning - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Traffic Mirroring - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Login Attempts to Routers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect IPv6 Network Infrastructure Threats - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rogue DHCP Server - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Software Download To Network Device - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect New Login Attempts to Routers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rogue DHCP Server - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Port Security Violation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect ARP Poisoning - Rule", "ESCU - Detect IPv6 Network Infrastructure Threats - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Software Download To Network Device - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Traffic Mirroring - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Validate the security configuration of network infrastructure and verify that only authorized users and systems are accessing critical assets. Core routing and switching infrastructure are common strategic targets for attackers.
 narrative = Networking devices, such as routers and switches, are often overlooked as resources that attackers will leverage to subvert an enterprise. Advanced threats actors have shown a proclivity to target these critical assets as a means to siphon and redirect network traffic, flash backdoored operating systems, and implement cryptographic weakened algorithms to more easily decrypt network traffic.\
 This Analytic Story helps you gain a better understanding of how your network devices are interacting with your hosts. By compromising your network devices, attackers can obtain direct access to the company's internal infrastructure&#151; effectively increasing the attack surface and accessing private services/data.
@@ -692,7 +709,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/detecting-ryuk-using-splunk-attack-range.html", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/big-game-hunting-with-ryuk-another-lucrative-targeted-ransomware/", "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-302a"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Jose Hernandez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", "ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", "ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Windows connhost exe started forcefully - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Security Account Manager Stopped - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Ryuk Test Files Detected - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Ryuk Wake on LAN Command - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", "ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Security Account Manager Stopped - Rule", "ESCU - Ryuk Test Files Detected - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Windows connhost exe started forcefully - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", "ESCU - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the Ryuk ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with Ryuk, Stopping Security Access Manager, DisableAntiSpyware registry key modification, suspicious psexec use, and more.
 narrative = Cybersecurity Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) released Alert (AA20-302A) on October 28th called “Ransomware Activity Targeting the Healthcare and Public Health Sector.” This alert details TTPs associated with ongoing and possible imminent attacks against the Healthcare sector, and is a joint advisory in coordination with other U.S. Government agencies. The objective of these malicious campaigns is to infiltrate targets in named sectors and to drop ransomware payloads, which will likely cause disruption of service and increase risk of actual harm to the health and safety of patients at hospitals, even with the aggravant of an ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. This document specifically refers to several crimeware exploitation frameworks, emphasizing the use of Ryuk ransomware as payload. The Ryuk ransomware payload is not new. It has been well documented and identified in multiple variants. Payloads need a carrier, and for Ryuk it has often been exploitation frameworks such as Cobalt Strike, or popular crimeware frameworks such as Emotet or Trickbot.
 
@@ -715,7 +732,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/an-in-depth-analysis-of-samsam-ransomware-and-boss-spider/", "https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2018/07/31/samsam-the-almost-6-million-ransomware/", "https://thehackernews.com/2018/07/samsam-ransomware-attacks.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Batch File Write to System32 - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - File with Samsam Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Samsam Test File Write - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - File with Samsam Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - Samsam Test File Write - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Batch File Write to System32 - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
 description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the SamSam ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with SamSam, RDP brute force attacks, the presence of files with SamSam ransomware extensions, suspicious psexec use, and more.
 narrative = The first version of the SamSam ransomware (a.k.a. Samas or SamsamCrypt) was launched in 2015 by a group of Iranian threat actors. The malicious software has affected and continues to affect thousands of victims and has raised almost $6M in ransom.\
 Although categorized under the heading of ransomware, SamSam campaigns have some importance distinguishing characteristics. Most notable is the fact that conventional ransomware is a numbers game. Perpetrators use a "spray-and-pray" approach with phishing campaigns or other mechanisms, charging a small ransom (typically under $1,000). The goal is to find a large number of victims willing to pay these mini-ransoms, adding up to a lucrative payday. They use relatively simple methods for infecting systems.\
@@ -724,6 +741,17 @@ In a typical attack on one large healthcare organization in 2018, the company en
 According to Sophos, SamSam previously leveraged  RDP to gain access to targeted networks via brute force. SamSam is not spread automatically, like other malware. It requires skill because it forces the attacker to adapt their tactics to the individual environment. Next, the actors escalate their privileges to admin level. They scan the networks for worthy targets, using conventional tools, such as PsExec or PaExec, to deploy/execute, quickly encrypting files.\
 This Analytic Story includes searches designed to help detect and investigate signs of the SamSam ransomware, such as the creation of fileswrites to system32, writes with tell-tale extensions, batch files written to system32, and evidence of brute-force attacks via RDP.
 
+[analytic_story://Silver Sparrow]
+category = Adversary Tactics
+last_updated = 2021-02-24
+version = 1
+references = ["https://redcanary.com/blog/clipping-silver-sparrows-wings/", "https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/5-things-you-need-to-know-about-silver-sparrow/"]
+maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
+spec_version = 3
+searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage via OSquery - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious SQLite3 LSQuarantine Behavior - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Curl Network Connection - Rule"]
+description = Silver Sparrow, identified by Red Canary Intelligence, is a new forward looking MacOS (Intel and M1) malicious software downloader utilizing JavaScript for execution and a launchAgent to establish persistence.
+narrative = Silver Sparrow works is a dropper and uses typical persistence mechanisms on a Mac. It is cross platform, covering both Intel and Apple M1 architecture. To this date, no implant has been downloaded for malicious purposes. During installation of the update.pkg or updater.pkg file, the malicious software utilizes JavaScript to generate files and scripts on disk for persistence.These files later download a implant from an S3 bucket every hour. This analytic assists with identifying different types of macOS malware families establishing LaunchAgent persistence. Per SentinelOne source, it is predicted that Silver Sparrow is likely selling itself as a mechanism to 3rd party “affiliates” or pay-per-install (PPI) partners, typically seen as commodity adware/malware. Additional indicators and behaviors may be found within the references.
+
 [analytic_story://Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities]
 category = Vulnerability
 last_updated = 2018-01-08
@@ -776,7 +804,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor.html", "https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Patrick Bareiss"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AdFind Exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Supernova Webshell - Rule", "ESCU - Sunburst Correlation DLL and Network Event - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Sunburst Correlation DLL and Network Event - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Supernova Webshell - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AdFind Exe - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule"]
 description = Sunburst is a trojanized updates to SolarWinds Orion IT monitoring and management software. It was discovered by FireEye in December 2020. The actors behind this campaign gained access to numerous public and private organizations around the world.
 narrative = This Analytic Story supports you to detect Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) from the Sunburst malware. The threat actor behind sunburst compromised the SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll, is a SolarWinds digitally-signed component of the Orion software framework that contains a backdoor that communicates via HTTP to third party servers. The detections in this Analytic Story are focusing on the dll loading events, file create events and network events to detect This malware.
 
@@ -787,7 +815,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS EC2 instances for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as EC2 instances that originate from unusual locations or those launched by previously unseen users (among others). Included investigative searches will help you probe more deeply, when the information warrants it.
 narrative = AWS CloudTrail is an AWS service that helps you enable governance, compliance, and risk auditing within your AWS account. Actions taken by a user, role, or an AWS service are recorded as events in CloudTrail. It is crucial for a company to monitor events and actions taken in the AWS Console, AWS command-line interface, and AWS SDKs and APIs to ensure that your EC2 instances are not vulnerable to attacks. This Analytic Story identifies suspicious activities in your AWS EC2 instances and helps you respond and investigate those activities.
 
@@ -798,7 +826,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integration.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new user AWS Console Login - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new user AWS Console Login - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor your AWS authentication events using your CloudTrail logs. Searches within this Analytic Story will help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious logins. 
 narrative = It is important to monitor and control who has access to your AWS infrastructure. Detecting suspicious logins to your AWS infrastructure will provide good starting points for investigations. Abusive behaviors caused by compromised credentials can lead to direct monetary costs, as you will be billed for any EC2 instances created by the attacker.
 
@@ -809,7 +837,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/security-data-protection/cloud/public-aws-s3-buckets-writable/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI - Rule", "ESCU - Detect S3 access from a new IP - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Open S3 buckets - Rule", "ESCU - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect S3 access from a new IP - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Open S3 buckets - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS S3 buckets for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as detecting open S3 buckets and buckets being accessed from a new IP. The contextual and investigative searches will give you more information, when required.
 narrative = As cloud computing has exploded, so has the number of creative attacks on virtual environments. And as the number-two cloud-service provider, Amazon Web Services (AWS) has certainly had its share.\
 Amazon's "shared responsibility" model dictates that the company has responsibility for the environment outside of the VM and the customer is responsible for the security inside of the S3 container. As such, it's important to stay vigilant for activities that may belie suspicious behavior inside of your environment.\
@@ -822,7 +850,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/hiding-cloudcobalt-strike-beacon-c2-using-amazon-apis/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
 description = Leverage these searches to monitor your AWS network traffic for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as a spike in blocked outbound traffic in your virtual private cloud (VPC).
 narrative = A virtual private cloud (VPC) is an on-demand managed cloud-computing service that isolates computing resources for each client. Inside the VPC container, the environment resembles a physical network. \
 Amazon's VPC service enables you to launch EC2 instances and leverage other Amazon resources. The traffic that flows in and out of this VPC can be controlled via network access-control rules and security groups. Amazon also has a feature called VPC Flow Logs that enables you to log IP traffic going to and from the network interfaces in your VPC. This data is stored using Amazon CloudWatch Logs.\
@@ -836,7 +864,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-cloudtrail-now-tracks-cross-account-activity-to-its-origin/", "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integration.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by New User - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by New User - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor your cloud authentication events. Searches within this Analytic Story leverage the recent cloud updates to the Authentication data model to help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious login activity. 
 narrative = It is important to monitor and control who has access to your cloud infrastructure. Detecting suspicious logins will provide good starting points for investigations. Abusive behaviors caused by compromised credentials can lead to direct monetary costs, as you will be billed for any compute activity whether legitimate or otherwise.\
 This Analytic Story has data model versions of cloud searches leveraging Authentication data, including those looking for suspicious login activity, and cross-account activity for AWS.
@@ -848,7 +876,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed - Rule", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor your cloud infrastructure provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your cloud environment.
 narrative = Monitoring your cloud infrastructure logs allows you enable governance, compliance, and risk auditing. It is crucial for a company to monitor events and actions taken in the their cloud environments to ensure that your instances are not vulnerable to attacks. This Analytic Story identifies suspicious activities in your cloud compute instances and helps you respond and investigate those activities.
 
@@ -859,7 +887,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor your cloud infrastructure provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your cloud environment.
 narrative = Because most enterprise cloud infrastructure activities originate from familiar geographic locations, monitoring for activity from unknown or unusual regions is an important security measure. This indicator can be especially useful in environments where it is impossible to add specific IPs to an allow list because they vary.\
 This Analytic Story was designed to provide you with flexibility in the precision you employ in specifying legitimate geographic regions. It can be as specific as an IP address or a city, or as broad as a region (think state) or an entire country. By determining how precise you want your geographical locations to be and monitoring for new locations that haven't previously accessed your environment, you can detect adversaries as they begin to probe your environment. Since there are legitimate reasons for activities from unfamiliar locations, this is not a standalone indicator. Nevertheless, location can be a relevant piece of information that you may wish to investigate further.
@@ -883,7 +911,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1059", "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/macro-malware", "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Leveraging the Windows command-line interface (CLI) is one of the most common attack techniques--one that is also detailed in the MITRE ATT&CK framework. Use this Analytic Story to help you identify unusual or suspicious use of the CLI on Windows systems.
 narrative = The ability to execute arbitrary commands via the Windows CLI is a primary goal for the adversary. With access to the shell, an attacker can easily run scripts and interact with the target system. Often, attackers may only have limited access to the shell or may obtain access in unusual ways. In addition, malware may execute and interact with the CLI in ways that would be considered unusual and inconsistent with typical user activity. This provides defenders with opportunities to identify suspicious use and investigate, as appropriate. This Analytic Story contains various searches to help identify this suspicious activity, as well as others to aid you in deeper investigation.
 
@@ -894,7 +922,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/001/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/htmlhelp/nf-htmlhelp-htmlhelpa"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect HTML Help Spawn Child Process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect HTML Help Renamed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect HTML Help Using InfoTech Storage Handlers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect HTML Help URL in Command Line - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect HTML Help Using InfoTech Storage Handlers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect HTML Help URL in Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Detect HTML Help Renamed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect HTML Help Spawn Child Process - Rule"]
 description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe process to execute malicious code.
 narrative = Adversaries may abuse Compiled HTML files (.chm) to conceal malicious code. CHM files are commonly distributed as part of the Microsoft HTML Help system. CHM files are compressed compilations of various content such as HTML documents, images, and scripting/web related programming languages such VBA, JScript, Java, and ActiveX. CHM content is displayed using underlying components of the Internet Explorer browser loaded by the HTML Help executable program (hh.exe). \
 HH.exe relies upon hhctrl.ocx to load CHM topics.This will load upon execution of a chm file. \
@@ -908,7 +936,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["http://blogs.splunk.com/2015/10/01/random-words-on-entropy-and-dns/", "http://www.darkreading.com/analytics/security-monitoring/got-malware-three-signs-revealed-in-dns-traffic/d/d-id/1139680", "https://live.paloaltonetworks.com/t5/Threat-Vulnerability-Articles/What-are-suspicious-DNS-queries/ta-p/71454"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Attackers often attempt to hide within or otherwise abuse the domain name system (DNS). You can thwart attempts to manipulate this omnipresent protocol by monitoring for these types of abuses.
 narrative = Although DNS is one of the fundamental underlying protocols that make the Internet work, it is often ignored (perhaps because of its complexity and effectiveness).  However, attackers have discovered ways to abuse the protocol to meet their objectives. One potential abuse involves manipulating DNS to hijack traffic and redirect it to an IP address under the attacker's control. This could inadvertently send users intending to visit google.com, for example, to an unrelated malicious website. Another technique involves using the DNS protocol for command-and-control activities with the attacker's malicious code or to covertly exfiltrate data. The searches within this Analytic Story look for these types of abuses.
 
@@ -919,7 +947,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/06/26/phishing-hits-a-new-level-of-quality/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly - Rule", "ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Email remains one of the primary means for attackers to gain an initial foothold within the modern enterprise. Detect and investigate suspicious emails in your environment with the help of the searches in this Analytic Story.
 narrative = It is a common practice for attackers of all types to leverage targeted spearphishing campaigns and mass mailers to deliver weaponized email messages and attachments. Fortunately, there are a number of ways to monitor email data in Splunk to detect suspicious content.\
 Once a phishing message has been detected, the next steps are to answer the following questions: \
@@ -945,17 +973,21 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/", "https://redcanary.com/blog/windows-registry-attacks-threat-detection/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/005/", "https://medium.com/@mbromileyDFIR/malware-monday-aebb456356c5"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect mshta renamed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious mshta child process - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Detect mshta inline hta execution - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious mshta spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Detect mshta inline hta execution - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious mshta spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious mshta child process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Detect mshta renamed - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe process to execute malicious code.
 narrative = One common adversary tactic is to bypass application control solutions via the mshta.exe process, which loads Microsoft HTML applications (mshtml.dll) with the .hta suffix. In these cases, attackers use the trusted Windows utility to proxy execution of malicious files, whether an .hta application, javascript, or VBScript.\
 The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an attacker is leveraging mshta.exe to execute malicious code.\
-Triage\ Validate execution \ 1. Determine if MSHTA.exe executed. Validate the OriginalFileName of MSHTA.exe and further PE metadata. If executed outside of c:\windows\system32 or c:\windows\syswow64, it should be highly suspect.\
+Triage\
+Validate execution \
+1. Determine if MSHTA.exe executed. Validate the OriginalFileName of MSHTA.exe and further PE metadata. If executed outside of c:\windows\system32 or c:\windows\syswow64, it should be highly suspect.\
 1. Determine if script code was executed with MSHTA.\
-Situational Awareness\ The objective of this step is meant to identify suspicious behavioral indicators related to executed of Script code by MSHTA.exe.\
+Situational Awareness\
+The objective of this step is meant to identify suspicious behavioral indicators related to executed of Script code by MSHTA.exe.\
 1. Parent process. Is the parent process a known LOLBin? Is the parent process an Office Application?\
 1. Module loads. Are the known MSHTA.exe modules being loaded by a non-standard application? Is MSHTA loading any suspicious .DLLs?\
 1. Network connections. Any network connections? Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain.\
-Retrieval of script code\ The objective of this step is to confirm the executed script code is benign or malicious.
+Retrieval of script code\
+The objective of this step is to confirm the executed script code is benign or malicious.
 
 [analytic_story://Suspicious Okta Activity]
 category = Adversary Tactics
@@ -964,7 +996,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1078", "https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Credential_stuffing", "https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/answer/What-is-a-password-spraying-attack-and-how-does-it-work"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Okta Failed SSO Attempts - Rule", "ESCU - Okta User Logins From Multiple Cities - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Account Lockout Events - Rule", "ESCU - Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentials From The Same IP - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by app - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate User Activities In Okta - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Okta Account Lockout Events - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Failed SSO Attempts - Rule", "ESCU - Okta User Logins From Multiple Cities - Rule", "ESCU - Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentials From The Same IP - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by app - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate User Activities In Okta - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor your Okta environment for suspicious activities. Due to the Covid outbreak, many users are migrating over to leverage cloud services more and more. Okta is a popular tool to manage multiple users and the web-based applications they need to stay productive. The searches in this story will help monitor your Okta environment for suspicious activities and associated user behaviors.
 narrative = Okta is the leading single sign on (SSO) provider, allowing users to authenticate once to Okta, and from there access a variety of web-based applications. These applications are assigned to users and allow administrators to centrally manage which users are allowed to access which applications. It also provides centralized logging to help understand how the applications are used and by whom. \
 While SSO is a major convenience for users, it also provides attackers with an opportunity. If the attacker can gain access to Okta, they can access a variety of applications. As such monitoring the environment is important. \
@@ -977,7 +1009,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009/", "https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/blob/master/documentation/modules/evasion/windows/applocker_evasion_regasm_regsvcs.md", "https://oddvar.moe/2017/12/13/applocker-case-study-how-insecure-is-it-really-part-1/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect Regsvcs with Network Connection - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regsvcs Spawning a Process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regasm Spawning a Process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regasm with Network Connection - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regasm with no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regsvcs with No Command Line Arguments - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Regasm with no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regsvcs Spawning a Process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regsvcs with No Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regasm with Network Connection - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regasm Spawning a Process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regsvcs with Network Connection - Rule"]
 description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe process to execute malicious code.
 narrative =  Adversaries may abuse Regsvcs and Regasm to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. Regsvcs and Regasm are Windows command-line utilities that are used to register .NET Component Object Model (COM) assemblies. Both are digitally signed by Microsoft. The following queries assist with detecting suspicious and malicious usage of Regasm.exe and Regsvcs.exe. Upon reviewing usage of Regasm.exe Regsvcs.exe, review file modification events for possible script code written. Review parallel process events for csc.exe being utilized to compile script code.
 
@@ -999,7 +1031,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 no CommandLine Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 dllregisterserver - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 StartW - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - advpack - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - syssetup - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - setupapi - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 Rename - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - setupapi - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 StartW - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 dllregisterserver - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - advpack - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - syssetup - Rule"]
 description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage rundll32.exe to execute arbitrary malicious code.
 narrative = One common adversary tactic is to bypass application control solutions via the rundll32.exe process. Natively, rundll32.exe will load DLLs and is a great example of a Living off the Land Binary. Rundll32.exe may load malicious DLLs by ordinals, function names or directly. The queries in this story focus on loading default DLLs, syssetup.dll, ieadvpack.dll, advpack.dll and setupapi.dll from disk that may be abused by adversaries. Additionally, two analytics developed to assist with identifying DLLRegisterServer, Start and StartW functions being called. The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an adversary is leveraging rundll32.exe to execute malicious code.
 
@@ -1010,7 +1042,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Graeber-Abusing-Windows-Management-Instrumentation-WMI-To-Build-A-Persistent%20Asynchronous-And-Fileless-Backdoor-wp.pdf", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/wmimplant_a_wmi_ba.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Script Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - Process Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Temporary Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Process Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon - Rule", "ESCU - Script Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Temporary Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task"]
 description = Attackers are increasingly abusing Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI), a framework and associated utilities available on all modern Windows operating systems. Because WMI can be leveraged to manage both local and remote systems, it is important to identify the processes executed and the user context within which the activity occurred.
 narrative = WMI is a Microsoft infrastructure for management data and operations on Windows operating systems. It includes of a set of utilities that can be leveraged to manage both local and remote Windows systems. Attackers are increasingly turning to WMI abuse in their efforts to conduct nefarious tasks, such as reconnaissance, detection of antivirus and virtual machines, code execution, lateral movement, persistence, and data exfiltration. \
 The detection searches included in this Analytic Story are used to look for suspicious use of WMI commands that attackers may leverage to interact with remote systems. The searches specifically look for the use of WMI to run processes on remote systems.\
@@ -1023,7 +1055,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://redcanary.com/blog/windows-registry-attacks-threat-detection/", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1112"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor and detect registry changes initiated from remote locations, which can be a sign that an attacker has infiltrated your system.
 narrative = Attackers are developing increasingly sophisticated techniques for hijacking target servers, while evading detection. One such technique that has become progressively more common is registry modification.\
  The registry is a key component of the Windows operating system. It has a hierarchical database called "registry" that contains settings, options, and values for executables. Once the threat actor gains access to a machine, they can use reg.exe to modify their account to obtain administrator-level privileges, maintain persistence, and move laterally within the environment.\
@@ -1036,7 +1068,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://blog.rapid7.com/2020/04/02/dispelling-zoom-bugbears-what-you-need-to-know-about-the-latest-zoom-vulnerabilities/", "https://threatpost.com/two-zoom-zero-day-flaws-uncovered/154337/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Child Process of Zoom - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process File Activity - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - First Time Seen Child Process of Zoom - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process File Activity - Response Task"]
 description = Attackers are using Zoom as an vector to increase privileges on a sytems. This story detects new child processes of zoom and provides investigative actions for this detection.
 narrative = Zoom is a leader in modern enterprise video communications and its usage has increased dramatically with a large amount of the population under stay-at-home orders due to the COVID-19 pandemic. With increased usage has come increased scrutiny and several security flaws have been found with this application on both Windows and macOS systems.\
 Current detections focus on finding new child processes of this application on a per host basis. Investigative searches are included to gather information needed during an investigation.
@@ -1048,7 +1080,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218/T1218.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler usage - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler usage - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule"]
 description = Monitor and detect behaviors used by attackers who leverage trusted developer utilities to execute malicious code.
 narrative = Adversaries may take advantage of trusted developer utilities to proxy execution of malicious payloads. There are many utilities used for software development related tasks that can be used to execute code in various forms to assist in development, debugging, and reverse engineering. These utilities may often be signed with legitimate certificates that allow them to execute on a system and proxy execution of malicious code through a trusted process that effectively bypasses application control solutions.\
 The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an adversary is leveraging microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe to execute malicious code.
@@ -1084,7 +1116,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - EC2 Instance Modified With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - EC2 Instance Modified With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
 description = Identify unusual changes to your AWS EC2 instances that may indicate malicious activity. Modifications to your EC2 instances by previously unseen users is an example of an activity that may warrant further investigation.
 narrative = A common attack technique is to infiltrate a cloud instance and make modifications. The adversary can then secure access to your infrastructure or hide their activities. So it's important to stay alert to changes that may indicate that your environment has been compromised. \
  Searches within this Analytic Story can help you detect the presence of a threat by monitoring for EC2 instances that have been created or changed--either by users that have never previously performed these activities or by known users who modify or create instances in a way that have not been done before. This story also provides investigative searches that help you go deeper once you detect suspicious behavior.
@@ -1096,7 +1128,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/08/monitoring-windows-console-activity-part-two.html", "https://www.splunk.com/pdfs/technical-briefs/advanced-threat-detection-and-response-tech-brief.pdf", "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/logging/detecting-security-incidents-windows-workstation-event-logs-34262"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Quickly identify systems running new or unusual processes in your environment that could be indicators of suspicious activity. Processes run from unusual locations, those with conspicuously long command lines, and rare executables are all examples of activities that may warrant deeper investigation.
 narrative = Being able to profile a host's processes within your environment can help you more quickly identify processes that seem out of place when compared to the rest of the population of hosts or asset types.\
 This Analytic Story lets you identify processes that are either a) not typically seen running or b) have some sort of suspicious command-line arguments associated with them. This Analytic Story will also help you identify the user running these processes and the associated process activity on the host.\
@@ -1120,7 +1152,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.fbi.gov/scams-and-safety/common-fraud-schemes/internet-fraud", "https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2017-internet-crime-report-released-050718"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Jim Apger"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Web Fraud - Password Sharing Across Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Anomalous User Clickspeed - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Account Harvesting - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Web Session Information via session id - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Web Fraud - Password Sharing Across Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Anomalous User Clickspeed - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Account Harvesting - Rule", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Web Session Information via session id - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor your environment for activity consistent with common attack techniques bad actors use when attempting to compromise web servers or other web-related assets.
 narrative = The Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) defines Internet fraud as the use of Internet services or software with Internet access to defraud victims or to otherwise take advantage of them. According to the Bureau, Internet crime schemes are used to steal millions of dollars each year from victims and continue to plague the Internet through various methods. The agency includes phishing scams, data breaches, Denial of Service (DOS) attacks, email account compromise, malware, spoofing, and ransomware in this category.\
 These crimes are not the fraud itself, but rather the attack techniques commonly employed by fraudsters in their pursuit of data that enables them to commit malicious actssuch as obtaining and using stolen credit cards. They represent a serious problem that is steadily increasing and not likely to go away anytime soon.\
@@ -1136,7 +1168,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://research.checkpoint.com/2020/resolving-your-way-into-domain-admin-exploiting-a-17-year-old-bug-in-windows-dns-servers/", "https://support.microsoft.com/en-au/help/4569509/windows-dns-server-remote-code-execution-vulnerability"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Shannon Davis"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Splunk Stream - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Zeek - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Zeek - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Splunk Stream - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Uncover activity consistent with CVE-2020-1350, or SIGRed. Discovered by Checkpoint researchers, this vulnerability affects Windows 2003 to 2019, and is triggered by a malicious DNS response (only affects DNS over TCP). An attacker can use the malicious payload to cause a buffer overflow on the vulnerable system, leading to compromise.  The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify the large response payload for SIG and KEY DNS records which can be used for the exploit.
 narrative = When a client requests a DNS record for a particular domain, that request gets routed first through the client's locally configured DNS server, then to any DNS server(s) configured as forwarders, and then onto the target domain's own DNS server(s).  If a attacker wanted to, they could host a malicious DNS server that responds to the initial request with a specially crafted large response (~65KB).  This response would flow through to the client's local DNS server, which if not patched for CVE-2020-1350, would cause the buffer overflow. The detection searches in this Analytic Story use wire data to detect the malicious behavior. Searches for Splunk Stream and Zeek are included.  The Splunk Stream search correlates across stream:dns and stream:tcp, while the Zeek search correlates across bro:dns:json and bro:conn:json.  These correlations are required to pick up both the DNS record types (SIG and KEY) along with the payload size (>65KB).
 
@@ -1147,7 +1179,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Defense_Evasion"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Eventvwr UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - FodHelper UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Detect tactics used by malware to evade defenses on Windows endpoints. A few of these include suspicious `reg.exe` processes, files hidden with `attrib.exe` and disabling user-account control, among many others 
 narrative = Defense evasion is a tactic--identified in the MITRE ATT&CK framework--that adversaries employ in a variety of ways to bypass or defeat defensive security measures. There are many techniques enumerated by the MITRE ATT&CK framework that are applicable in this context. This Analytic Story includes searches designed to identify the use of such techniques on Windows platforms.
 
@@ -1158,7 +1190,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2013/12/file-extensions-2/", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1042"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule", "ESCU - Execution of File with Multiple Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule", "ESCU - Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Execution of File with Multiple Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Detect and investigate suspected abuse of file extensions and Windows file associations. Some of the malicious behaviors involved may include inserting spaces before file extensions or prepending the file extension with a different one, among other techniques.
 narrative = Attackers use a variety of techniques to entice users to run malicious code or to persist on an endpoint. One way to accomplish these goals is to leverage file extensions and the mechanism Windows uses to associate files with specific applications. \
  Since its earliest days, Windows has used extensions to identify file types. Users have become familiar with these extensions and their application associations. For example, if users see that a file ends in `.doc` or `.docx`, they will assume that it is a Microsoft Word document and expect that double-clicking will open it using `winword.exe`. The user will typically also presume that the `.docx` file is safe. \
@@ -1173,7 +1205,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/", "https://zeltser.com/security-incident-log-review-checklist/", "http://journeyintoir.blogspot.com/2013/01/re-introducing-usnjrnl.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Adversaries often try to cover their tracks by manipulating Windows logs. Use these searches to help you monitor for suspicious activity surrounding log files--an essential component of an effective defense.
 narrative = Because attackers often modify system logs to cover their tracks and/or to thwart the investigative process, log monitoring is an industry-recognized best practice. While there are legitimate reasons to manipulate system logs, it is still worthwhile to keep track of who manipulated the logs, when they manipulated them, and in what way they manipulated them (determining which accesses, tools, or utilities were employed). Even if no malicious activity is detected, the knowledge of an attempt to manipulate system logs may be indicative of a broader security risk that should be thoroughly investigated.\
 The Analytic Story gives users two different ways to detect manipulation of Windows Event Logs and one way to detect deletion of the Update Sequence Number (USN) Change Journal. The story helps determine the history of the host and the users who have accessed it. Finally, the story aides in investigation by retrieving all the information on the process that caused these events (if the process has been identified).
@@ -1185,7 +1217,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["http://www.fuzzysecurity.com/tutorials/19.html", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2010/07/malware-persistence-windows-registry.html", "http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/common-malware-persistence-mechanisms/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/fin7-shim-databases-persistence.html", "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dq2Hv7J9fvk"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Certutil exe certificate extraction - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Certutil exe certificate extraction - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor for activities and techniques associated with maintaining persistence on a Windows system--a sign that an adversary may have compromised your environment.
 narrative = Maintaining persistence is one of the first steps taken by attackers after the initial compromise. Attackers leverage various custom and built-in tools to ensure survivability and persistent access within a compromised enterprise. This Analytic Story provides searches to help you identify various behaviors used by attackers to maintain persistent access to a Windows environment.
 
@@ -1196,7 +1228,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Child Processes of Spoolsv exe - Rule", "ESCU - Overwriting Accessibility Binaries - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Overwriting Accessibility Binaries - Rule", "ESCU - Child Processes of Spoolsv exe - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor for and investigate activities that may be associated with a Windows privilege-escalation attack, including unusual processes running on endpoints, modified registry keys, and more.
 narrative = Privilege escalation is a "land-and-expand" technique, wherein an adversary gains an initial foothold on a host and then exploits its weaknesses to increase his privileges. The motivation is simple: certain actions on a Windows machine--such as installing software--may require higher-level privileges than those the attacker initially acquired. By increasing his privilege level, the attacker can gain the control required to carry out his malicious ends. This Analytic Story provides searches to detect and investigate behaviors that attackers may use to elevate their privileges in your environment.
 
@@ -1207,7 +1239,7 @@ version = 3
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1050", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1031"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Windows services are often used by attackers for persistence and the ability to load drivers or otherwise interact with the Windows kernel. This Analytic Story helps you monitor your environment for indications that Windows services are being modified or created in a suspicious manner.
 narrative = The Windows operating system uses a services architecture to allow for running code in the background, similar to a UNIX daemon. Attackers will often leverage Windows services for persistence, hiding in plain sight, seeking the ability to run privileged code that can interact with the kernel. In many cases, attackers will create a new service to host their malicious code. Attackers have also been observed modifying unnecessary or unused services to point to their own code, as opposed to what was intended. In these cases, attackers often use tools to create or modify services in ways that are not typical for most environments, providing opportunities for detection.
 
@@ -1449,6 +1481,26 @@ annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1526"
 known_false_positives = Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but frequency, UA and source IPs will provide context.
 providing_technologies = []
 
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadFile - Rule]
+type = detection
+asset_type = 
+confidence = medium
+explanation = The following analytic identifies the use of PowerShell downloading a file using `DownloadFile` method. This particular method is utilized in many different PowerShell frameworks to download files and output to disk. Identify the source (IP/domain) and destination file and triage appropriately. If AMSI logging or PowerShell transaction logs are available, review for further details of the implant.
+how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
+annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001"]}
+known_false_positives = False positives may be present and filtering will need to occur by parent process or command line argument. It may be required to modify this query to an EDR product for more granular coverage.
+providing_technologies = []
+
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule]
+type = detection
+asset_type = 
+confidence = medium
+explanation = The following analytic identifies the use of PowerShell downloading a file using `DownloadString` method. This particular method is utilized in many different PowerShell frameworks to download files and output to disk. Identify the source (IP/domain) and destination file and triage appropriately. If AMSI logging or PowerShell transaction logs are available, review for further details of the implant.
+how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
+annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001"]}
+known_false_positives = False positives may be present and filtering will need to occur by parent process or command line argument. It may be required to modify this query to an EDR product for more granular coverage.
+providing_technologies = []
+
 [savedsearch://ESCU - Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
@@ -1655,6 +1707,17 @@ known_false_positives = This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define "fals
  This search will fire any time a new IP address is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your country, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you.
 providing_technologies = []
 
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Cobalt Strike Named Pipes - Rule]
+type = detection
+asset_type = Endpoint
+confidence = medium
+explanation = The following analytic identifies the use of default or publicly known named pipes used with Cobalt Strike. A named pipe is a named, one-way or duplex pipe for communication between the pipe server and one or more pipe clients. Cobalt Strike uses named pipes in many ways and has default values used with the Artifact Kit and Malleable C2 Profiles. The following query assists with identifying these default named pipes. Each EDR product presents named pipes a little different. Consider taking the values and generating a query based on the product of choice. \
+Upon triage, review the process performing the named pipe. If it is explorer.exe, It is possible it was injected into by another process. Review recent parallel processes to identify suspicious patterns or behaviors. A parallel process may have a network connection, review and follow the connection back to identify any file modifications.
+how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.
+annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]}
+known_false_positives = The idea of using named pipes with Cobalt Strike is to blend in. Therefore, some of the named pipes identified and added may cause false positives. Filter by process name or pipe name to reduce false positives.
+providing_technologies = []
+
 [savedsearch://ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
@@ -2778,6 +2841,16 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"
 known_false_positives = The false-positive rate will vary based on how you set the deviation_threshold and data_samples values. Our recommendation is to adjust these values based on your network traffic to and from your email servers.
 providing_technologies = []
 
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Eventvwr UAC Bypass - Rule]
+type = detection
+asset_type = 
+confidence = medium
+explanation = The following search identifies Eventvwr bypass by identifying the registry modification into a specific path that eventvwr.msc looks to (but is not valid) upon execution. A successful attack will include a suspicious command to be executed upon eventvwr.msc loading. Upon triage, review the parallel processes that have executed. Identify any additional registry modifications on the endpoint that may look suspicious. Remediate as necessary.
+how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node.
+annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.002"]}
+known_false_positives = Some false positives may be present and will need to be filtered.
+providing_technologies = []
+
 [savedsearch://ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
@@ -2858,6 +2931,20 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and C
 known_false_positives = Legitimate programs can also use command-line arguments to execute. Please verify the command-line arguments to check what command/program is being executed. We recommend customizing the `first_time_seen_cmd_line_filter` macro to exclude legitimate parent_process_name
 providing_technologies = []
 
+[savedsearch://ESCU - FodHelper UAC Bypass - Rule]
+type = detection
+asset_type = 
+confidence = medium
+explanation = Fodhelper.exe has a known UAC bypass as it attempts to look for specific registry keys upon execution, that do not exist. Therefore, an attacker can write its malicious commands in these registry keys to be executed by fodhelper.exe with the highest privilege. \
+1. `HKCU:\Software\Classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command`\
+1. `HKCU:\Software\Classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command\DelegateExecute`\
+1. `HKCU:\Software\Classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command\(default)`\
+Upon triage, fodhelper.exe will have a child process and read access will occur on the registry keys. Isolate the endpoint and review parallel processes for additional behavior.
+how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
+annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112", "T1548.002"]}
+known_false_positives = Limited to no false positives are expected.
+providing_technologies = []
+
 [savedsearch://ESCU - GCP Detect accounts with high risk roles by project - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = GCP Account
@@ -3298,6 +3385,16 @@ annotations = {"mitre_attack": ["T1525"]}
 known_false_positives = Uploading container is a normal behavior from developers or users with access to container registry.
 providing_technologies = []
 
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Nishang PowershellTCPOneLine - Rule]
+type = detection
+asset_type = 
+confidence = medium
+explanation = This query detects the Nishang Invoke-PowerShellTCPOneLine utility that spawns a call back to a remote command and control server. This is a powershell oneliner. In addition, this will capture on the command-line additional utilities used by Nishang. Triage the endpoint and identify any parallel processes that look suspicious. Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain contacted by the powershell process.
+how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
+annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001"]}
+known_false_positives = Limited false positives may be present. Filter as needed based on initial analysis.
+providing_technologies = []
+
 [savedsearch://ESCU - No Windows Updates in a time frame - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
@@ -3308,7 +3405,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 18"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.MA"]}
 known_false_positives = None identified
 providing_technologies = []
 
-[savedsearch://ESCU - Ntdsutil export ntds - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Ntdsutil Export NTDS - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -3710,6 +3807,16 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_att
 known_false_positives = If there are files with this keywoord as file names it might trigger false possitives, please make use of our filters to tune out potential FPs.
 providing_technologies = []
 
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Ryuk Wake on LAN Command - Rule]
+type = detection
+asset_type = 
+confidence = medium
+explanation = This Splunk query identifies the use of Wake-on-LAN utilized by Ryuk ransomware. The Ryuk Ransomware uses the Wake-on-Lan feature to turn on powered off devices on a compromised network to have greater success encrypting them. This is a high fidelity indicator of Ryuk ransomware executing on an endpoint. Upon triage, isolate the endpoint. Additional file modification events will be within the users profile (\appdata\roaming) and in public directories (users\public\). Review all Scheduled Tasks on the isolated endpoint and across the fleet. Suspicious Scheduled Tasks will include a path to a unknown binary and those endpoints should be isolated until triaged.
+how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
+annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.003"]}
+known_false_positives = Limited to no known false positives.
+providing_technologies = []
+
 [savedsearch://ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
@@ -3913,6 +4020,26 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Ob
 known_false_positives = There may be other processes in your environment that users may legitimately use to modify file associations. If this is the case and you are finding false positives, you can modify the search to add those processes as exceptions.
 providing_technologies = []
 
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Curl Network Connection - Rule]
+type = detection
+asset_type = Endpoint
+confidence = medium
+explanation = The following analytic identifies the use of a curl contacting suspicious remote domains to checkin to command and control servers or download further implants. In the context of Silver Sparrow, curl is identified contacting s3.amazonaws.com. This particular behavior is common with MacOS adware-malicious software.
+how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
+annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1105"]}
+known_false_positives = Unknown. Filter as needed.
+providing_technologies = []
+
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious DLLHost no Command Line Arguments - Rule]
+type = detection
+asset_type = 
+confidence = medium
+explanation = The following analytic identifies DLLHost.exe with no command line arguments. It is unusual for DLLHost.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. DLLHost.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64.
+how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.
+annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"]}
+known_false_positives = Limited false positives may be present in small environments. Tuning may be required based on parent process.
+providing_technologies = []
+
 [savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
@@ -3945,6 +4072,16 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"
 known_false_positives = It's possible for a legitimate file to be created with the same name as one noted in the lookup file. Filenames listed in the lookup file should be unique enough that collisions are rare. Looking at the location of the file and the process responsible for the activity can help determine whether or not the activity is legitimate.
 providing_technologies = []
 
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious GPUpdate no Command Line Arguments - Rule]
+type = detection
+asset_type = 
+confidence = medium
+explanation = The following analytic identifies gpupdate.exe with no command line arguments. It is unusual for gpupdate.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. gpupdate.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64.
+how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.
+annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"]}
+known_false_positives = Limited false positives may be present in small environments. Tuning may be required based on parent process.
+providing_technologies = []
+
 [savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Java Classes - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
@@ -3975,6 +4112,40 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre
 known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit this behavior, triggering a false positive.
 providing_technologies = []
 
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage - Rule]
+type = detection
+asset_type = Endpoint
+confidence = medium
+explanation = The following analytic identifies the use of a native MacOS utility, PlistBuddy, creating or modifying a properly list (.plist) file. In the instance of Silver Sparrow, the following commands were executed:\
+- PlistBuddy -c "Add :Label string init_verx" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \
+- PlistBuddy -c "Add :RunAtLoad bool true" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \
+- PlistBuddy -c "Add :StartInterval integer 3600" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \
+- PlistBuddy -c "Add :ProgramArguments array" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \
+- PlistBuddy -c "Add :ProgramArguments:0 string /bin/sh" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \
+- PlistBuddy -c "Add :ProgramArguments:1 string -c" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \
+Upon triage, capture the property list file being written to disk and review for further indicators. Contain the endpoint and triage further.
+how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
+annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543.001"]}
+known_false_positives = Some legitimate applications may use PlistBuddy to create or modify property lists and possibly generate false positives. Review the property list being modified or created to confirm.
+providing_technologies = []
+
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage via OSquery - Rule]
+type = detection
+asset_type = Endpoint
+confidence = medium
+explanation = The following analytic identifies the use of a native MacOS utility, PlistBuddy, creating or modifying a properly list (.plist) file. In the instance of Silver Sparrow, the following commands were executed:\
+- PlistBuddy -c "Add :Label string init_verx" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \
+- PlistBuddy -c "Add :RunAtLoad bool true" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \
+- PlistBuddy -c "Add :StartInterval integer 3600" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \
+- PlistBuddy -c "Add :ProgramArguments array" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \
+- PlistBuddy -c "Add :ProgramArguments:0 string /bin/sh" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \
+- PlistBuddy -c "Add :ProgramArguments:1 string -c" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \
+Upon triage, capture the property list file being written to disk and review for further indicators. Contain the endpoint and triage further.
+how_to_implement = OSQuery must be installed and configured to pick up process events (info at https://osquery.io) as well as using the Splunk OSQuery Add-on https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/4402. Modify the macro and validate fields are correct.
+annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543.001"]}
+known_false_positives = Some legitimate applications may use PlistBuddy to create or modify property lists and possibly generate false positives. Review the property list being modified or created to confirm.
+providing_technologies = []
+
 [savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
@@ -4025,7 +4196,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"
 known_false_positives = This is likely to produce false positives and will require some filtering. Tune the query by adding command line paths to known good DLLs, or filtering based on parent process names.
 providing_technologies = []
 
-[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 no CommandLine Arguments - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -4035,6 +4206,36 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"
 known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of rundll32, triggering a false positive.
 providing_technologies = []
 
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious SQLite3 LSQuarantine Behavior - Rule]
+type = detection
+asset_type = Endpoint
+confidence = medium
+explanation = The following analytic identifies the use of a SQLite3 querying the MacOS preferences to identify the original URL the pkg was downloaded from. This particular behavior is common with MacOS adware-malicious software. Upon triage, review other processes in parallel for suspicious activity. Identify any recent package installations.
+how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
+annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1074"]}
+known_false_positives = Unknown.
+providing_technologies = []
+
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule]
+type = detection
+asset_type = 
+confidence = medium
+explanation = The following detection identifies Scheduled Tasks registering (creating a new task) a binary or script to run from a public directory which includes users\public, \programdata\ and \windows\temp. Upon triage, review the binary or script in the command line for legitimacy, whether an approved binary/script or not. In addition, capture the binary or script in question and analyze for further behaviors. Identify the source and contain the endpoint.
+how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
+annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005"]}
+known_false_positives = Limited false positives may be present. Filter as needed by parent process or command line argument.
+providing_technologies = []
+
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious SearchProtocolHost no Command Line Arguments - Rule]
+type = detection
+asset_type = 
+confidence = medium
+explanation = The following analytic identifies searchprotocolhost.exe with no command line arguments. It is unusual for searchprotocolhost.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. searchprotocolhost.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64.
+how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.
+annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"]}
+known_false_positives = Limited false positives may be present in small environments. Tuning may be required based on parent process.
+providing_technologies = []
+
 [savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
@@ -4165,6 +4366,16 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 2"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"
 known_false_positives = None identified
 providing_technologies = []
 
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Unified Messaging Service Spawning a Process - Rule]
+type = detection
+asset_type = 
+confidence = medium
+explanation = This detection identifies Microsoft Exchange Server's Unified Messaging services, umworkerprocess.exe and umservice.exe, spawning a child process, indicating possible exploitation of CVE-2021-26857 vulnerability. The query filters out werfault.exe and wermgr.exe mostly due to potential false positives, however, if there is an excessive amount of "wermgr.exe" or "WerFault.exe" failures, it may be due to the active exploitation. During triage, identify any additional suspicious parallel processes. Identify any recent out of place file modifications. Review Exchange logs following Microsofts guide. To contain, perform egress filtering or restrict public access to Exchange. In final, patch the vulnerablity and monitor.
+how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.
+annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"]}
+known_false_positives = Unknown. Tune out child processes as needed to limit volume of false positives.
+providing_technologies = []
+
 [savedsearch://ESCU - Unload Sysmon Filter Driver - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = 
@@ -4225,6 +4436,16 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 4", "CIS 18", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phas
 known_false_positives = Very few legitimate Content-Type fields will have a length greater than 100 characters.
 providing_technologies = []
 
+[savedsearch://ESCU - W3WP Spawning Shell - Rule]
+type = detection
+asset_type = 
+confidence = medium
+explanation = This query identifies a shell, PowerShell.exe or Cmd.exe, spawning from W3WP.exe, or IIS. In addition to IIS logs, this behavior with an EDR product will capture potential webshell activity, similar to the HAFNIUM Group abusing CVEs, on publicly available Exchange mail servers. During triage, review the parent process and child process of the shell being spawned. Review the command-line arguments and any file modifications that may occur. Identify additional parallel process, child processes, that may highlight further commands executed. After triaging, work to contain the threat and patch the system that is vulnerable.
+how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
+annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1505.003"]}
+known_false_positives = Baseline your environment before production. It is possible build systems using IIS will spawn cmd.exe to perform a software build. Filter as needed.
+providing_technologies = []
+
 [savedsearch://ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
@@ -4319,10 +4540,10 @@ providing_technologies = []
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
-explanation = The search looks for the Registry Key DisableAntiSpyware set to disable. This is consistent with Ryuk infections across a fleet of endpoints.
-how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records the process-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint Processes data-model object. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data.
+explanation = The search looks for the Registry Key DisableAntiSpyware set to disable. This is consistent with Ryuk infections across a fleet of endpoints. This particular behavior is typically executed when an ransomware actor gains access to an endpoint and beings to perform execution. Usually, a batch (.bat) will be executed and multiple registry and scheduled task modifications will occur. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further file modifications. Endpoint should be isolated.
+how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node.
 annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]}
-known_false_positives = It is unusual to turn this feature on a Windows system since it is a default security control, although it is not rare for some policies to disable it. Although no false positives have been identified, use the provided filter macro to tune the search.
+known_false_positives = It is unusual to turn this feature off a Windows system since it is a default security control, although it is not rare for some policies to disable it. Although no false positives have been identified, use the provided filter macro to tune the search.
 providing_technologies = []
 
 [savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule]

package/default/app.conf

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 is_configured = false
 state = enabled
 state_change_requires_restart = false
-build = 19704
+build = 21439
 
 [triggers]
 reload.analytic_stories = simple
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ reload.content-version = simple
 
 [launcher]
 author = Splunk
-version = 3.15.0
+version = 3.16.0
 description = Explore the Analytic Stories included with ES Content Updates.
 
 [ui]

package/default/collections.conf

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
-# On Date: 2021-02-25T09:05:17 UTC
+# On Date: 2021-03-04T19:43:29 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Security Research
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############

package/default/content-version.conf

@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
 [content-version]
-version = 3.15.0
+version = 3.16.0

package/default/es_investigations.conf

@@ -11,14 +11,14 @@ label = AWS Cryptomining
 description = Monitor your AWS EC2 instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or EC2 instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_aws_network_acl_activity]
 label = AWS Network ACL Activity
 description = Monitor your AWS network infrastructure for bad configurations and malicious activity. Investigative searches help you probe deeper, when the facts warrant it.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_aws_security_hub_alerts]
 label = AWS Security Hub Alerts
@@ -32,28 +32,28 @@ label = AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities
 description = Monitor your AWS provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your network.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_region___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_country___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_city___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_city___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_region___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_country___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_aws_user_monitoring]
 label = AWS User Monitoring
 description = Detect and investigate dormant user accounts for your AWS environment that have become active again. Because inactive and ad-hoc accounts are common attack targets, it's critical to enable governance within your environment.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_user_activities_by_user_field___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_user_activities_by_user_field___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_apache_struts_vulnerability]
 label = Apache Struts Vulnerability
 description = Detect and investigate activities--such as unusually long `Content-Type` length, suspicious java classes and web servers executing suspicious processes--consistent with attempts to exploit Apache Struts vulnerabilities.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_suspicious_strings_in_http_header___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_posts_from_src___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_posts_from_src___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_suspicious_strings_in_http_header___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_asset_tracking]
 label = Asset Tracking
 description = Keep a careful inventory of every asset on your network to make it easier to detect rogue devices. Unauthorized/unmanaged devices could be an indication of malicious behavior that should be investigated further.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_first_occurrence_and_last_occurrence_of_a_mac_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_first_occurrence_and_last_occurrence_of_a_mac_address___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156]
 label = Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156
@@ -67,14 +67,14 @@ label = Brand Monitoring
 description = Detect and investigate activity that may indicate that an adversary is using faux domains to mislead users into interacting with malicious infrastructure. Monitor DNS, email, and web traffic for permutations of your brand name.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_email_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_emails_from_specific_sender___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_emails_from_specific_sender___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_email_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_cloud_cryptomining]
 label = Cloud Cryptomining
 description = Monitor your cloud compute instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or compute instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_cloud_federated_credential_abuse]
 label = Cloud Federated Credential Abuse
@@ -95,28 +95,28 @@ label = ColdRoot MacOS RAT
 description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that relate to the ColdRoot Remote Access Trojan that affects MacOS. An example of some of these activities are changing sensative binaries in the MacOS sub-system, detecting process names and executables associated with the RAT, detecting when a keyboard tab is installed on a MacOS machine and more.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_network_traffic_from_src_ip___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_network_traffic_from_src_ip___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_collection_and_staging]
 label = Collection and Staging
 description = Monitor for and investigate activities--such as suspicious writes to the Windows Recycling Bin or email servers sending high amounts of traffic to specific hosts, for example--that may indicate that an adversary is harvesting and exfiltrating sensitive data. 
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_command_and_control]
 label = Command and Control
 description = Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures leveraged by attackers to establish and operate command and control channels. Implants installed by attackers on compromised endpoints use these channels to receive instructions and send data back to the malicious operators.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_common_phishing_frameworks]
 label = Common Phishing Frameworks
 description = Detect DNS and web requests to fake websites generated by the EvilGinx2 toolkit. These websites are designed to fool unwitting users who have clicked on a malicious link in a phishing email. 
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_certificate_logs_for_a_domain___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_domain_certificate_investigation___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_domain_certificate_investigation___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_certificate_logs_for_a_domain___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_container_implantation_monitoring_and_investigation]
 label = Container Implantation Monitoring and Investigation
@@ -130,14 +130,14 @@ label = Credential Dumping
 description = Uncover activity consistent with credential dumping, a technique wherein attackers compromise systems and attempt to obtain and exfiltrate passwords. The threat actors use these pilfered credentials to further escalate privileges and spread throughout a target environment. The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify attempts to credential dumping.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_previous_unseen_user___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_failed_logins_for_multiple_destinations___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_ticket_attempts___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_hash_attempts___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_failed_logins_for_multiple_destinations___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_hash_attempts___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_previous_unseen_user___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_ticket_attempts___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_dhs_report_ta18_074a]
 label = DHS Report TA18-074A
 description = Monitor for suspicious activities associated with DHS Technical Alert US-CERT TA18-074A. Some of the activities that adversaries used in these compromises included spearfishing attacks, malware, watering-hole domains, many and more.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_file_activity___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_file_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_dns_amplification_attacks]
 label = DNS Amplification Attacks
@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ label = DNS Hijacking
 description = Secure your environment against DNS hijacks with searches that help you detect and investigate unauthorized changes to DNS records.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_dns_hijack_enrichment___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_dns_hijack_enrichment___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_data_exfiltration]
 label = Data Exfiltration
@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ label = Data Protection
 description = Fortify your data-protection arsenal--while continuing to ensure data confidentiality and integrity--with searches that monitor for and help you investigate possible signs of data exfiltration.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_detect_zerologon_attack]
 label = Detect Zerologon Attack
@@ -179,21 +179,21 @@ label = Disabling Security Tools
 description = Looks for activities and techniques associated with the disabling of security tools on a Windows system, such as suspicious `reg.exe` processes, processes launching netsh, and many others.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_dynamic_dns]
 label = Dynamic DNS
 description = Detect and investigate hosts in your environment that may be communicating with dynamic domain providers. Attackers may leverage these services to help them avoid firewall blocks and deny lists.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_emotet_malware__dhs_report_ta18_201a_]
 label = Emotet Malware  DHS Report TA18-201A 
 description = Detect rarely used executables, specific registry paths that may confer malware survivability and persistence, instances where cmd.exe is used to launch script interpreters, and other indicators that the Emotet financial malware has compromised your environment.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_f5_tmui_rce_cve_2020_5902]
 label = F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902
@@ -209,19 +209,26 @@ disabled = 0
 
 panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
 
+[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_hafnium_group]
+label = HAFNIUM Group
+description = HAFNIUM group was identified by Microsoft as exploiting 4 Microsoft Exchange CVEs in the wild - CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858 and CVE-2021-27065.
+disabled = 0
+
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
+
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_hidden_cobra_malware]
 label = Hidden Cobra Malware
 description = Monitor for and investigate activities, including the creation or deletion of hidden shares and file writes, that may be evidence of infiltration by North Korean government-sponsored cybercriminals. Details of this activity were reported in DHS Report TA-18-149A.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_outbound_emails_to_hidden_cobra_threat_actors___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_outbound_emails_to_hidden_cobra_threat_actors___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_host_redirection]
 label = Host Redirection
 description = Detect evidence of tactics used to redirect traffic from a host to a destination other than the one intended--potentially one that is part of an adversary's attack infrastructure. An example is redirecting communications regarding patches and updates or misleading users into visiting a malicious website.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_jboss_vulnerability]
 label = JBoss Vulnerability
@@ -235,7 +242,7 @@ label = Kubernetes Scanning Activity
 description = This story addresses detection against Kubernetes cluster fingerprint scan and attack by providing information on items such as source ip, user agent, cluster names.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_gcp_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_amazon_eks_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_amazon_eks_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_gcp_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_kubernetes_sensitive_object_access_activity]
 label = Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity
@@ -256,28 +263,28 @@ label = Lateral Movement
 description = Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures around how attackers move laterally within the enterprise. Because lateral movement can expose the adversary to detection, it should be an important focus for security analysts.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_malicious_powershell]
 label = Malicious PowerShell
 description = Attackers are finding stealthy ways "live off the land," leveraging utilities and tools that come standard on the endpoint--such as PowerShell--to achieve their goals without downloading binary files. These searches can help you detect and investigate PowerShell command-line options that may be indicative of malicious intent.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_monitor_backup_solution]
 label = Monitor Backup Solution
 description = Address common concerns when monitoring your backup processes. These searches can help you reduce risks from ransomware, device theft, or denial of physical access to a host by backing up data on endpoints.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_all_backup_logs_for_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_all_backup_logs_for_host___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_monitor_for_unauthorized_software]
 label = Monitor for Unauthorized Software
 description = Identify and investigate prohibited/unauthorized software or processes that may be concealing malicious behavior within your environment. 
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_monitor_for_updates]
 label = Monitor for Updates
@@ -291,7 +298,7 @@ label = Netsh Abuse
 description = Detect activities and various techniques associated with the abuse of `netsh.exe`, which can disable local firewall settings or set up a remote connection to a host from an infected system.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_office_365_detections]
 label = Office 365 Detections
@@ -305,7 +312,7 @@ label = Orangeworm Attack Group
 description = Detect activities and various techniques associated with the Orangeworm Attack Group, a group that frequently targets the healthcare industry.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_phishing_payloads]
 label = Phishing Payloads
@@ -319,21 +326,21 @@ label = Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns
 description = Monitor your environment for suspicious behaviors that resemble the techniques employed by the MUDCARP threat group.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_prohibited_traffic_allowed_or_protocol_mismatch]
 label = Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch
 description = Detect instances of prohibited network traffic allowed in the environment, as well as protocols running on non-standard ports. Both of these types of behaviors typically violate policy and can be leveraged by attackers.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_ransomware]
 label = Ransomware
 description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to ransomware--spikes in SMB traffic, suspicious wevtutil usage, the presence of common ransomware extensions, and system processes run from unexpected locations, and many others.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_backup_logs_for_endpoint___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_sysmon_wmi_activity_for_host___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_backup_logs_for_endpoint___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_sysmon_wmi_activity_for_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_ransomware_cloud]
 label = Ransomware Cloud
@@ -368,7 +375,14 @@ label = SamSam Ransomware
 description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the SamSam ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with SamSam, RDP brute force attacks, the presence of files with SamSam ransomware extensions, suspicious psexec use, and more.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_backup_logs_for_endpoint___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_backup_logs_for_endpoint___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task"]
+
+[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_silver_sparrow]
+label = Silver Sparrow
+description = Silver Sparrow, identified by Red Canary Intelligence, is a new forward looking MacOS (Intel and M1) malicious software downloader utilizing JavaScript for execution and a launchAgent to establish persistence.
+disabled = 0
+
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerabilities]
 label = Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities
@@ -389,7 +403,7 @@ label = Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409
 description = Reduce the risk of CVE-2018-11409, an information disclosure vulnerability within some older versions of Splunk Enterprise, with searches designed to help ensure that your Splunk system does not leak information to authenticated users.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_network_traffic_from_src_ip___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_network_traffic_from_src_ip___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_sunburst_malware]
 label = Sunburst Malware
@@ -403,7 +417,7 @@ label = Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities
 description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS EC2 instances for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as EC2 instances that originate from unusual locations or those launched by previously unseen users (among others). Included investigative searches will help you probe more deeply, when the information warrants it.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_aws_login_activities]
 label = Suspicious AWS Login Activities
@@ -417,28 +431,28 @@ label = Suspicious AWS S3 Activities
 description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS S3 buckets for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as detecting open S3 buckets and buckets being accessed from a new IP. The contextual and investigative searches will give you more information, when required.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_s3_bucket_details_via_bucketname___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_s3_bucket_details_via_bucketname___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_aws_traffic]
 label = Suspicious AWS Traffic
 description = Leverage these searches to monitor your AWS network traffic for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as a spike in blocked outbound traffic in your virtual private cloud (VPC).
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_cloud_authentication_activities]
 label = Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities
 description = Monitor your cloud authentication events. Searches within this Analytic Story leverage the recent cloud updates to the Authentication data model to help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious login activity. 
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_user_activities_by_user_field___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_user_activities_by_user_field___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_cloud_instance_activities]
 label = Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities
 description = Monitor your cloud infrastructure provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your cloud environment.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_cloud_provisioning_activities]
 label = Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities
@@ -459,7 +473,7 @@ label = Suspicious Command-Line Executions
 description = Leveraging the Windows command-line interface (CLI) is one of the most common attack techniques--one that is also detailed in the MITRE ATT&CK framework. Use this Analytic Story to help you identify unusual or suspicious use of the CLI on Windows systems.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_compiled_html_activity]
 label = Suspicious Compiled HTML Activity
@@ -473,14 +487,14 @@ label = Suspicious DNS Traffic
 description = Attackers often attempt to hide within or otherwise abuse the domain name system (DNS). You can thwart attempts to manipulate this omnipresent protocol by monitoring for these types of abuses.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_emails]
 label = Suspicious Emails
 description = Email remains one of the primary means for attackers to gain an initial foothold within the modern enterprise. Detect and investigate suspicious emails in your environment with the help of the searches in this Analytic Story.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_email_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_emails_from_specific_sender___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_emails_from_specific_sender___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_email_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_gcp_storage_activities]
 label = Suspicious GCP Storage Activities
@@ -494,14 +508,14 @@ label = Suspicious MSHTA Activity
 description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe process to execute malicious code.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_okta_activity]
 label = Suspicious Okta Activity
 description = Monitor your Okta environment for suspicious activities. Due to the Covid outbreak, many users are migrating over to leverage cloud services more and more. Okta is a popular tool to manage multiple users and the web-based applications they need to stay productive. The searches in this story will help monitor your Okta environment for suspicious activities and associated user behaviors.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_user_activities_in_okta___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_okta_activity_by_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_okta_activity_by_app___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_okta_activity_by_app___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_user_activities_in_okta___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_okta_activity_by_ip_address___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_regsvcs_regasm_activity]
 label = Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity
@@ -529,14 +543,14 @@ label = Suspicious WMI Use
 description = Attackers are increasingly abusing Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI), a framework and associated utilities available on all modern Windows operating systems. Because WMI can be leveraged to manage both local and remote systems, it is important to identify the processes executed and the user context within which the activity occurred.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_sysmon_wmi_activity_for_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_sysmon_wmi_activity_for_host___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_windows_registry_activities]
 label = Suspicious Windows Registry Activities
 description = Monitor and detect registry changes initiated from remote locations, which can be a sign that an attacker has infiltrated your system.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_zoom_child_processes]
 label = Suspicious Zoom Child Processes
@@ -571,21 +585,21 @@ label = Unusual Processes
 description = Quickly identify systems running new or unusual processes in your environment that could be indicators of suspicious activity. Processes run from unusual locations, those with conspicuously long command lines, and rare executables are all examples of activities that may warrant deeper investigation.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_use_of_cleartext_protocols]
 label = Use of Cleartext Protocols
 description = Leverage searches that detect cleartext network protocols that may leak credentials or should otherwise be encrypted.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_web_fraud_detection]
 label = Web Fraud Detection
 description = Monitor your environment for activity consistent with common attack techniques bad actors use when attempting to compromise web servers or other web-related assets.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_web_session_information_via_session_id___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_emails_from_specific_sender___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_emails_from_specific_sender___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_web_session_information_via_session_id___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_windows_dns_sigred_cve_2020_1350]
 label = Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350
@@ -599,42 +613,42 @@ label = Windows Defense Evasion Tactics
 description = Detect tactics used by malware to evade defenses on Windows endpoints. A few of these include suspicious `reg.exe` processes, files hidden with `attrib.exe` and disabling user-account control, among many others 
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_windows_file_extension_and_association_abuse]
 label = Windows File Extension and Association Abuse
 description = Detect and investigate suspected abuse of file extensions and Windows file associations. Some of the malicious behaviors involved may include inserting spaces before file extensions or prepending the file extension with a different one, among other techniques.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_windows_log_manipulation]
 label = Windows Log Manipulation
 description = Adversaries often try to cover their tracks by manipulating Windows logs. Use these searches to help you monitor for suspicious activity surrounding log files--an essential component of an effective defense.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_windows_persistence_techniques]
 label = Windows Persistence Techniques
 description = Monitor for activities and techniques associated with maintaining persistence on a Windows system--a sign that an adversary may have compromised your environment.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_windows_privilege_escalation]
 label = Windows Privilege Escalation
 description = Monitor for and investigate activities that may be associated with a Windows privilege-escalation attack, including unusual processes running on endpoints, modified registry keys, and more.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
 
 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_windows_service_abuse]
 label = Windows Service Abuse
 description = Windows services are often used by attackers for persistence and the ability to load drivers or otherwise interact with the Windows kernel. This Analytic Story helps you monitor your environment for indications that Windows services are being modified or created in a suspicious manner.
 disabled = 0
 
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
 
 
 

package/default/macros.conf

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
-# On Date: 2021-02-25T09:05:17 UTC
+# On Date: 2021-03-04T19:43:30 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Security Research
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
@@ -383,6 +383,14 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
 definition = search *
 description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 
 
+[any_powershell_downloadfile_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 
+
+[any_powershell_downloadstring_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 
+
 [attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store_filter]
 definition = search *
 description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 
@@ -463,6 +471,10 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
 definition = search *
 description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 
 
+[cobalt_strike_named_pipes_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 
+
 [common_ransomware_extensions_filter]
 definition = search *
 description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 
@@ -891,6 +903,10 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
 definition = search *
 description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 
 
+[eventvwr_uac_bypass_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 
+
 [excessive_dns_failures_filter]
 definition = search *
 description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 
@@ -923,6 +939,10 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
 definition = search *
 description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 
 
+[fodhelper_uac_bypass_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 
+
 [gcp_detect_accounts_with_high_risk_roles_by_project_filter]
 definition = search *
 description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 
@@ -1099,6 +1119,10 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
 definition = search *
 description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 
 
+[nishang_powershelltcponeline_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 
+
 [no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame_filter]
 definition = search *
 description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 
@@ -1263,6 +1287,10 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
 definition = search *
 description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 
 
+[ryuk_wake_on_lan_command_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 
+
 [smb_traffic_spike_filter]
 definition = search *
 description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 
@@ -1343,6 +1371,14 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
 definition = search *
 description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 
 
+[suspicious_curl_network_connection_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 
+
+[suspicious_dllhost_no_command_line_arguments_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 
+
 [suspicious_email___uba_anomaly_filter]
 definition = search *
 description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 
@@ -1355,6 +1391,10 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
 definition = search *
 description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 
 
+[suspicious_gpupdate_no_command_line_arguments_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 
+
 [suspicious_java_classes_filter]
 definition = search *
 description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 
@@ -1367,6 +1407,14 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
 definition = search *
 description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 
 
+[suspicious_plistbuddy_usage_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 
+
+[suspicious_plistbuddy_usage_via_osquery_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 
+
 [suspicious_reg_exe_process_filter]
 definition = search *
 description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 
@@ -1387,7 +1435,19 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
 definition = search *
 description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 
 
-[suspicious_rundll32_no_commandline_arguments_filter]
+[suspicious_rundll32_no_command_line_arguments_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 
+
+[suspicious_sqlite3_lsquarantine_behavior_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 
+
+[suspicious_scheduled_task_from_public_directory_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 
+
+[suspicious_searchprotocolhost_no_command_line_arguments_filter]
 definition = search *
 description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 
 
@@ -1443,6 +1503,10 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
 definition = search *
 description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 
 
+[unified_messaging_service_spawning_a_process_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 
+
 [unload_sysmon_filter_driver_filter]
 definition = search *
 description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 
@@ -1467,6 +1531,10 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
 definition = search *
 description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 
 
+[w3wp_spawning_shell_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 
+
 [wbadmin_delete_system_backups_filter]
 definition = search *
 description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 

package/default/transforms.conf

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
-# On Date: 2021-02-25T09:05:17 UTC
+# On Date: 2021-03-04T19:43:29 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Security Research
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############

package/default/use_case_library.conf

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
-# On Date: 2021-02-25T09:05:17 UTC
+# On Date: 2021-03-04T19:43:30 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Security Research
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-cloudtrail-now-tracks-cross-account-activity-to-its-origin/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - aws detect permanent key creation - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect sts get session token abuse - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect attach to role policy - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect role creation - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect sts assume role abuse - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - aws detect permanent key creation - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect attach to role policy - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect role creation - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect sts get session token abuse - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect sts assume role abuse - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Track when a user assumes an IAM role in another AWS account to obtain cross-account access to services and resources in that account. Accessing new roles could be an indication of malicious activity.
 narrative = Amazon Web Services (AWS) admins manage access to AWS resources and services across the enterprise using AWS's Identity and Access Management (IAM) functionality. IAM provides the ability to create and manage AWS users, groups, and roles-each with their own unique set of privileges and defined access to specific resources (such as EC2 instances, the AWS Management Console, API, or the command-line interface). Unlike conventional (human) users, IAM roles are assumable by anyone in the organization. They provide users with dynamically created temporary security credentials that expire within a set time period.\
 Herein lies the rub. In between the time between when the temporary credentials are issued and when they expire is a period of opportunity, where a user could leverage the temporary credentials to wreak havoc-spin up or remove instances, create new users, elevate privileges, and other malicious activities-throughout the environment.\
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor your AWS EC2 instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or EC2 instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior.
 narrative = Cryptomining is an intentionally difficult, resource-intensive business. Its complexity was designed into the process to ensure that the number of blocks mined each day would remain steady. So, it's par for the course that ambitious, but unscrupulous, miners make amassing the computing power of large enterprises--a practice known as cryptojacking--a top priority. \
 Cryptojacking has attracted an increasing amount of media attention since its explosion in popularity in the fall of 2017. The attacks have moved from in-browser exploits and mobile phones to enterprise cloud services, such as Amazon Web Services (AWS). It's difficult to determine exactly how widespread the practice has become, since bad actors continually evolve their ability to escape detection, including employing unlisted endpoints, moderating their CPU usage, and hiding the mining pool's IP address behind a free CDN. \
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonVPC/latest/UserGuide/VPC_Appendix_NACLs.html", "https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/how-to-help-prepare-for-ddos-attacks-by-reducing-your-attack-surface/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor your AWS network infrastructure for bad configurations and malicious activity. Investigative searches help you probe deeper, when the facts warrant it.
 narrative = AWS CloudTrail is an AWS service that helps you enable governance, compliance, and operational/risk auditing of your AWS account. Actions taken by a user, role, or an AWS service are recorded as events in CloudTrail. It is crucial for a company to monitor events and actions taken in the AWS Management Console, AWS Command Line Interface, and AWS SDKs and APIs to ensure that your servers are not vulnerable to attacks. This analytic story contains detection searches that leverage CloudTrail logs from AWS to check for bad configurations and malicious activity in your AWS network access controls.
 
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Region - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Country - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From City - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From City - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Region - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Country - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor your AWS provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your network.
 narrative = Because most enterprise AWS activities originate from familiar geographic locations, monitoring for activity from unknown or unusual regions is an important security measure. This indicator can be especially useful in environments where it is impossible to add specific IPs to an allow list because they vary. \
 This Analytic Story was designed to provide you with flexibility in the precision you employ in specifying legitimate geographic regions. It can be as specific as an IP address or a city, or as broad as a region (think state) or an entire country. By determining how precise you want your geographical locations to be and monitoring for new locations that haven't previously accessed your environment, you can detect adversaries as they begin to probe your environment. Since there are legitimate reasons for activities from unfamiliar locations, this is not a standalone indicator. Nevertheless, location can be a relevant piece of information that you may wish to investigate further.
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://redlock.io/blog/cryptojacking-tesla"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Detect API activity from users without MFA - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Security Group Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new API calls from user roles - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS API Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect new API calls from user roles - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS API Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Security Group Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect API activity from users without MFA - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task"]
 description = Detect and investigate dormant user accounts for your AWS environment that have become active again. Because inactive and ad-hoc accounts are common attack targets, it's critical to enable governance within your environment.
 narrative = It seems obvious that it is critical to monitor and control the users who have access to your cloud infrastructure. Nevertheless, it's all too common for enterprises to lose track of ad-hoc accounts, leaving their servers vulnerable to attack. In fact, this was the very oversight that led to Tesla's cryptojacking attack in February, 2018.\
 In addition to compromising the security of your data, when bad actors leverage your compute resources, it can incur monumental costs, since you will be billed for any new EC2 instances and increased bandwidth usage. \
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs/blob/v3.2/dev/rules/REQUEST-944-APPLICATION-ATTACK-JAVA.conf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Unusually Long Content-Type Length - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Java Classes - Rule", "ESCU - Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Suspicious Strings in HTTP Header - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Web POSTs From src - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Unusually Long Content-Type Length - Rule", "ESCU - Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Java Classes - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Web POSTs From src - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Suspicious Strings in HTTP Header - Response Task"]
 description = Detect and investigate activities--such as unusually long `Content-Type` length, suspicious java classes and web servers executing suspicious processes--consistent with attempts to exploit Apache Struts vulnerabilities.
 narrative = In March of 2017, a remote code-execution vulnerability in the Jakarta Multipart parser in Apache Struts, a widely used open-source framework for creating Java web applications, was disclosed and assigned to CVE-2017-5638. About two months later, hackers exploited the flaw to carry out the world's <a href=https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2017/09/07/nations-biggest-hacks-and-data-breaches-millions/644311001/> 5th largest data breach</a>. The target, credit giant Equifax, <a href=https://money.cnn.com/2017/09/16/technology/equifax-breach-security-hole/index.html>told investigators</a> that it had become aware of the vulnerability two months before the attack. \
 The exploit involved manipulating the `Content-Type HTTP` header to execute commands embedded in the header.\
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/inventory-of-authorized-and-unauthorized-devices/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address - Rule", "ESCU - Get First Occurrence and Last Occurrence of a MAC Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get First Occurrence and Last Occurrence of a MAC Address - Response Task"]
 description = Keep a careful inventory of every asset on your network to make it easier to detect rogue devices. Unauthorized/unmanaged devices could be an indication of malicious behavior that should be investigated further.
 narrative = This Analytic Story is designed to help you develop a better understanding of what authorized and unauthorized devices are part of your enterprise. This story can help you better categorize and classify assets, providing critical business context and awareness of their assets during an incident. Information derived from this Analytic Story can be used to better inform and support other analytic stories. For successful detection, you will need to leverage the Assets and Identity Framework from Enterprise Security to populate your known assets.
 
@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.zerofox.com/blog/what-is-digital-risk-monitoring/", "https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/consumer/family-safety/what-is-typosquatting/", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2016/06/explained-typosquatting/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Detect and investigate activity that may indicate that an adversary is using faux domains to mislead users into interacting with malicious infrastructure. Monitor DNS, email, and web traffic for permutations of your brand name.
 narrative = While you can educate your users and customers about the risks and threats posed by typosquatting, phishing, and corporate espionage, human error is a persistent fact of life. Of course, your adversaries are all too aware of this reality and will happily leverage it for nefarious purposes whenever possible&#51;phishing with lookalike addresses, embedding faux command-and-control domains in malware, and hosting malicious content on domains that closely mimic your corporate servers. This is where brand monitoring comes in.\
 You can use our adaptation of `DNSTwist`, together with the support searches in this Analytic Story, to generate permutations of specified brands and external domains. Splunk can monitor email, DNS requests, and web traffic for these permutations and provide you with early warnings and situational awareness--powerful elements of an effective defense.\
@@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor your cloud compute instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or compute instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior.
 narrative = Cryptomining is an intentionally difficult, resource-intensive business. Its complexity was designed into the process to ensure that the number of blocks mined each day would remain steady. So, it's par for the course that ambitious, but unscrupulous, miners make amassing the computing power of large enterprises--a practice known as cryptojacking--a top priority. \
 Cryptojacking has attracted an increasing amount of media attention since its explosion in popularity in the fall of 2017. The attacks have moved from in-browser exploits and mobile phones to enterprise cloud services, such as Amazon Web Services (AWS), Google Cloud Platform (GCP), and Azure. It's difficult to determine exactly how widespread the practice has become, since bad actors continually evolve their ability to escape detection, including employing unlisted endpoints, moderating their CPU usage, and hiding the mining pool's IP address behind a free CDN. \
@@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/golden-saml-newly-discovered-attack-technique-forges-authentication-to-cloud-apps", "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf", "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - AWS SAML Access by Provider User and Principal - Rule", "ESCU - O365 New Federated Domain Added - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Excessive SSO logon errors - Rule", "ESCU - Certutil exe certificate extraction - Rule", "ESCU - AWS SAML Update identity provider - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Added Service Principal - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Via PowerShell And EventCode 4703 - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - O365 Added Service Principal - Rule", "ESCU - O365 New Federated Domain Added - Rule", "ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Via PowerShell And EventCode 4703 - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User - Rule", "ESCU - Certutil exe certificate extraction - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Excessive SSO logon errors - Rule", "ESCU - AWS SAML Update identity provider - Rule", "ESCU - AWS SAML Access by Provider User and Principal - Rule"]
 description = This analytical story addresses events that indicate abuse of cloud federated credentials. These credentials are usually extracted from endpoint desktop or servers specially those servers that provide federation services such as Windows Active Directory Federation Services. Identity Federation relies on objects such as Oauth2 tokens, cookies or SAML assertions in order to provide seamless access between cloud and perimeter environments. If these objects are either hijacked or forged then attackers will be able to pivot into victim's cloud environements.
 narrative = This story is composed of detection searches based on endpoint that addresses the use of Mimikatz, Escalation of Privileges and Abnormal processes that may indicate the extraction of Federated directory objects such as passwords, Oauth2 tokens, certificates and keys. Cloud environment (AWS, Azure) related events are also addressed in specific cloud environment detection searches.
 
@@ -170,17 +170,21 @@ narrative = This story is composed of detection searches based on endpoint that
 category = Adversary Tactics
 last_updated = 2021-02-16
 version = 1
-references = ["https://www.cobaltstrike.com/", "https://www.infocyte.com/blog/2020/09/02/cobalt-strike-the-new-favorite-among-thieves/", "https://bluescreenofjeff.com/2017-01-24-how-to-write-malleable-c2-profiles-for-cobalt-strike/", "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2020/09/coverage-strikes-back-cobalt-strike-paper.html", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/unauthorized-access-of-fireeye-red-team-tools.html"]
+references = ["https://www.cobaltstrike.com/", "https://www.infocyte.com/blog/2020/09/02/cobalt-strike-the-new-favorite-among-thieves/", "https://bluescreenofjeff.com/2017-01-24-how-to-write-malleable-c2-profiles-for-cobalt-strike/", "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2020/09/coverage-strikes-back-cobalt-strike-paper.html", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/unauthorized-access-of-fireeye-red-team-tools.html", "https://github.com/MichaelKoczwara/Awesome-CobaltStrike-Defence", "https://github.com/zer0yu/Awesome-CobaltStrike"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 no CommandLine Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 StartW - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious msbuild path - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious DLLHost no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Cobalt Strike Named Pipes - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious SearchProtocolHost no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 StartW - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious GPUpdate no Command Line Arguments - Rule"]
 description = Cobalt Strike is threat emulation software. Red teams and penetration testers use Cobalt Strike to demonstrate the risk of a breach and evaluate mature security programs. Most recently, Cobalt Strike has become the choice tool by threat groups due to its ease of use and extensibility.
-narrative = This Analytic Story supports you to detect Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) from Cobalt Strike. Cobalt Strike has many ways to be enhanced by using aggressor scripts, malleable C2 profiles, default attack packages, and much more. For endpoint behavior, Cobalt Strike is most commonly identified via named pipes, spawn to processes, and DLL function names. On the network, depending on the malleable C2 profile used, it is near infinite in the amount of ways to conceal the C2 traffic with Cobalt Strike.\
-In generating content for Cobalt Strike, the following is considered:\
-1. Is it normal for <spawnto_ value> to have no command line arguments? No command line arguments and a network connection?\
-1. What is the default, or normal, process lineage for <spawnto_ value>?\
-1. Does the <spawnto_ value> make network connections?\
-1. Is it normal for <spawnto_ value> to load jscript, vbscript, Amsi.dll, and clr.dll?.
+narrative = This Analytic Story supports you to detect Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) from Cobalt Strike. Cobalt Strike has many ways to be enhanced by using aggressor scripts, malleable C2 profiles, default attack packages, and much more. For endpoint behavior, Cobalt Strike is most commonly identified via named pipes, spawn to processes, and DLL function names. Many additional variables are provided for in memory operation of the beacon implant. On the network, depending on the malleable C2 profile used, it is near infinite in the amount of ways to conceal the C2 traffic with Cobalt Strike. Not every query may be specific to Cobalt Strike the tool, but the methodologies and techniques used by it.\
+Splunk Threat Research reviewed all publicly available instances of Malleabe C2 Profiles and generated a list of the most commonly used spawnto and pipenames.\
+`Spawnto_x86` and `spawnto_x64` is the process that Cobalt Strike will spawn and injects shellcode into.\
+Pipename sets the named pipe name used in Cobalt Strikes Beacon SMB C2 traffic.\
+With that, new detections were generated focused on these spawnto processes spawning without command line arguments. Similar, the named pipes most commonly used by Cobalt Strike added as a detection. In generating content for Cobalt Strike, the following is considered:\
+- Is it normal for spawnto_ value to have no command line arguments? No command line arguments and a network connection?\
+- What is the default, or normal, process lineage for spawnto_ value?\
+- Does the spawnto_ value make network connections?\
+- Is it normal for spawnto_ value to load jscript, vbscript, Amsi.dll, and clr.dll?\
+While investigating a detection related to this Analytic Story, keep in mind the parent process, process path, and any file modifications that may occur. Tuning may need to occur to remove any false positives.
 
 [analytic_story://ColdRoot MacOS RAT]
 category = Malware
@@ -189,7 +193,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.intego.com/mac-security-blog/osxcoldroot-and-the-rat-invasion/", "https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x2A.html", "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/coldroot-rat-still-undetectable-despite-being-uploaded-on-github-two-years-ago/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Jose Hernandez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Processes Tapping Keyboard Events - Rule", "ESCU - Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Processes Tapping Keyboard Events - Rule", "ESCU - Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip - Response Task"]
 description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that relate to the ColdRoot Remote Access Trojan that affects MacOS. An example of some of these activities are changing sensative binaries in the MacOS sub-system, detecting process names and executables associated with the RAT, detecting when a keyboard tab is installed on a MacOS machine and more.
 narrative = Conventional wisdom holds that Apple's MacOS operating system is significantly less vulnerable to attack than Windows machines. While that point is debatable, it is true that attacks against MacOS systems are much less common. However, this fact does not mean that Macs are impervious to breaches. To the contrary, research has shown that that Mac malware is increasing at an alarming rate. According to AV-test, in 2018, there were 86,865 new MacOS malware variants, up from 27,338 the year before&#151;a 31% increase. In contrast, the independent research firm found that new Windows malware had increased from 65.17M to 76.86M during that same period, less than half the rate of growth. The bottom line is that while the numbers look a lot smaller than Windows, it's definitely time to take Mac security more seriously.\
 This Analytic Story addresses the ColdRoot remote access trojan (RAT), which was uploaded to Github in 2016, but was still escaping detection by the first quarter of 2018, when a new, more feature-rich variant was discovered masquerading as an Apple audio driver. Among other capabilities, the Pascal-based ColdRoot can heist passwords from users' keychains and remotely control infected machines without detection. In the initial report of his findings, Patrick Wardle, Chief Research Officer for Digita Security, explained that the new ColdRoot RAT could start and kill processes on the breached system, spawn new remote-desktop sessions, take screen captures and assemble them into a live stream of the victim's desktop, and more.\
@@ -202,7 +206,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Collection", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1074"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin - Rule", "ESCU - Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious writes to System Volume Information - Rule", "ESCU - Email files written outside of the Outlook directory - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin - Rule", "ESCU - Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server - Rule", "ESCU - Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts - Rule", "ESCU - Email files written outside of the Outlook directory - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious writes to System Volume Information - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor for and investigate activities--such as suspicious writes to the Windows Recycling Bin or email servers sending high amounts of traffic to specific hosts, for example--that may indicate that an adversary is harvesting and exfiltrating sensitive data. 
 narrative = A common adversary goal is to identify and exfiltrate data of value from a target organization. This data may include email conversations and addresses, confidential company information, links to network design/infrastructure, important dates, and so on.\
  Attacks are composed of three activities: identification, collection, and staging data for exfiltration. Identification typically involves scanning systems and observing user activity. Collection can involve the transfer of large amounts of data from various repositories. Staging/preparation includes moving data to a central location and compressing (and optionally encoding and/or encrypting) it. All of these activities provide opportunities for defenders to identify their presence. \
@@ -215,7 +219,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Command_and_Control", "https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/feature/Command-and-control-servers-The-puppet-masters-that-govern-malware"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
 description = Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures leveraged by attackers to establish and operate command and control channels. Implants installed by attackers on compromised endpoints use these channels to receive instructions and send data back to the malicious operators.
 narrative = Threat actors typically architect and implement an infrastructure to use in various ways during the course of their attack campaigns. In some cases, they leverage this infrastructure for scanning and performing reconnaissance activities. In others, they may use this infrastructure to launch actual attacks. One of the most important functions of this infrastructure is to establish servers that will communicate with implants on compromised endpoints. These servers establish a command and control channel that is used to proxy data between the compromised endpoint and the attacker. These channels relay commands from the attacker to the compromised endpoint and the output of those commands back to the attacker.\
 Because this communication is so critical for an adversary, they often use techniques designed to hide the true nature of the communications. There are many different techniques used to establish and communicate over these channels. This Analytic Story provides searches that look for a variety of the techniques used for these channels, as well as indications that these channels are active, by examining logs associated with border control devices and network-access control lists.
@@ -227,7 +231,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://github.com/kgretzky/evilginx2", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1192/", "https://breakdev.org/evilginx-advanced-phishing-with-two-factor-authentication-bypass/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Splunk Research Team"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect DNS requests to Phishing Sites leveraging EvilGinx2 - Rule", "ESCU - Get Certificate logs for a domain - Response Task", "ESCU - Domain Certificate Investigation - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect DNS requests to Phishing Sites leveraging EvilGinx2 - Rule", "ESCU - Domain Certificate Investigation - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Certificate logs for a domain - Response Task"]
 description = Detect DNS and web requests to fake websites generated by the EvilGinx2 toolkit. These websites are designed to fool unwitting users who have clicked on a malicious link in a phishing email. 
 narrative = As most people know, these emails use fraudulent domains, [email scraping](https://www.cyberscoop.com/emotet-trojan-phishing-scraping-templates-cofense-geodo/), familiar contact names inserted as senders, and other tactics to lure targets into clicking a malicious link, opening an attachment with a [nefarious payload](https://www.cyberscoop.com/emotet-trojan-phishing-scraping-templates-cofense-geodo/), or entering sensitive personal information that perpetrators may intercept. This attack technique requires a relatively low level of skill and allows adversaries to easily cast a wide net. Because phishing is a technique that relies on human psychology, you will never be able to eliminate this vulnerability 100%. But you can use automated detection to significantly reduce the risks.\
 This Analytic Story focuses on detecting signs of MiTM attacks enabled by [EvilGinx2](https://github.com/kgretzky/evilginx2), a toolkit that sets up a transparent proxy between the targeted site and the user. In this way, the attacker is able to intercept credentials and two-factor identification tokens. It employs a proxy template to allow a registered domain to impersonate targeted sites, such as Linkedin, Amazon, Okta, Github, Twitter, Instagram, Reddit, Office 365, and others. It can even register SSL certificates and camouflage them via a URL shortener, making them difficult to detect. Searches in this story look for signs of MiTM attacks enabled by EvilGinx2.
@@ -250,7 +254,7 @@ version = 3
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1003", "https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Create Remote Thread into LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell - Rule", "ESCU - Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of lsass Dump with Taskmgr - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Ntdsutil export ntds - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Previous Unseen User - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Creation of lsass Dump with Taskmgr - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump - Rule", "ESCU - Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Ntdsutil Export NTDS - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Create Remote Thread into LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Previous Unseen User - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts - Response Task"]
 description = Uncover activity consistent with credential dumping, a technique wherein attackers compromise systems and attempt to obtain and exfiltrate passwords. The threat actors use these pilfered credentials to further escalate privileges and spread throughout a target environment. The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify attempts to credential dumping.
 narrative = Credential dumping&#151;gathering credentials from a target system, often hashed or encrypted&#151;is a common attack technique. Even though the credentials may not be in plain text, an attacker can still exfiltrate the data and set to cracking it offline, on their own systems. The threat actors target a variety of sources to extract them, including the Security Accounts Manager (SAM), Local Security Authority (LSA), NTDS from Domain Controllers, or the Group Policy Preference (GPP) files.\
 Once attackers obtain valid credentials, they use them to move throughout a target network with ease, discovering new systems and identifying assets of interest. Credentials obtained in this manner typically include those of privileged users, which may provide access to more sensitive information and system operations.\
@@ -263,7 +267,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Create local admin accounts using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule", "ESCU - Single Letter Process On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process File Activity - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Single Letter Process On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Create local admin accounts using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process File Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor for suspicious activities associated with DHS Technical Alert US-CERT TA18-074A. Some of the activities that adversaries used in these compromises included spearfishing attacks, malware, watering-hole domains, many and more.
 narrative = The frequency of nation-state cyber attacks has increased significantly over the last decade. Employing numerous tactics and techniques, these attacks continue to escalate in complexity. \
 There is a wide range of motivations for these state-sponsored hacks, including stealing valuable corporate, military, or diplomatic data&#1151;all of which could confer advantages in various arenas. They may also target critical infrastructure. \
@@ -289,7 +293,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/", "http://www.noip.com/blog/2014/07/11/dynamic-dns-can-use-2/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/08/04/detecting-dynamic-dns-domains-in-splunk.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS record changed - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Hijack Enrichment - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - DNS record changed - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - DNS Hijack Enrichment - Response Task"]
 description = Secure your environment against DNS hijacks with searches that help you detect and investigate unauthorized changes to DNS records.
 narrative = Dubbed the Achilles heel of the Internet (see https://www.f5.com/labs/articles/threat-intelligence/dns-is-still-the-achilles-heel-of-the-internet-25613), DNS plays a critical role in routing web traffic but is notoriously vulnerable to attack. One reason is its distributed nature. It relies on unstructured connections between millions of clients and servers over inherently insecure protocols.\
 The gravity and extent of the importance of securing DNS from attacks is undeniable. The fallout of compromised DNS can be disastrous. Not only can hackers bring down an entire business, they can intercept confidential information, emails, and login credentials, as well. \
@@ -319,7 +323,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/data-protection/", "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/dns/splunk-detect-dns-tunneling-37022", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect USB device insertion - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect USB device insertion - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Fortify your data-protection arsenal--while continuing to ensure data confidentiality and integrity--with searches that monitor for and help you investigate possible signs of data exfiltration.
 narrative = Attackers can leverage a variety of resources to compromise or exfiltrate enterprise data. Common exfiltration techniques include remote-access channels via low-risk, high-payoff active-collections operations and close-access operations using insiders and removable media. While this Analytic Story is not a comprehensive listing of all the methods by which attackers can exfiltrate data, it provides a useful starting point.
 
@@ -330,7 +334,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1003", "https://github.com/SecuraBV/CVE-2020-1472", "https://www.secura.com/blog/zero-logon", "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-1472"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Jose Hernandez, Stan Miskowicz, David Dorsey, Shannon Davis Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Zerologon via Zeek - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Computer Changed with Anonymous Account - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Computer Changed with Anonymous Account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Zerologon via Zeek - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Uncover activity related to the execution of Zerologon CVE-2020-11472, a technique wherein attackers target a Microsoft Windows Domain Controller to reset its computer account password. The result from this attack is attackers can now provide themselves high privileges and take over Domain Controller. The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify attempts to reset Domain Controller Computer Account via exploit code remotely or via the use of tool Mimikatz as payload carrier.
 narrative = This attack is a privilege escalation technique, where attacker targets a Netlogon secure channel connection to a domain controller, using Netlogon Remote Protocol (MS-NRPC). This vulnerability exposes vulnerable Windows Domain Controllers to be targeted via unaunthenticated RPC calls which eventually reset Domain Contoller computer account ($) providing the attacker the opportunity to exfil domain controller credential secrets and assign themselve high privileges that can lead to domain controller and potentially complete network takeover. The detection searches in this Analytic Story use Windows Event viewer events and Sysmon events to detect attack execution, these searches monitor access to the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process which is an indicator of the use of Mimikatz tool which has bee updated to carry this attack payload.
 
@@ -341,7 +345,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1089", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2015/11/vonteera-adware-uses-certificates-to-disable-anti-malware/", "https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Tools-Report.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Unload Sysmon Filter Driver - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Unload Sysmon Filter Driver - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Looks for activities and techniques associated with the disabling of security tools on a Windows system, such as suspicious `reg.exe` processes, processes launching netsh, and many others.
 narrative = Attackers employ a variety of tactics in order to avoid detection and operate without barriers. This often involves modifying the configuration of security tools to get around them or explicitly disabling them to prevent them from running. This Analytic Story includes searches that look for activity consistent with attackers attempting to disable various security mechanisms. Such activity may involve monitoring for suspicious registry activity, as this is where much of the configuration for Windows and various other programs reside, or explicitly attempting to shut down security-related services. Other times, attackers attempt various tricks to prevent specific programs from running, such as adding the certificates with which the security tools are signed to a block list (which would prevent them from running).
 
@@ -352,7 +356,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/", "http://www.noip.com/blog/2014/07/11/dynamic-dns-can-use-2/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/08/04/detecting-dynamic-dns-domains-in-splunk.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Detect and investigate hosts in your environment that may be communicating with dynamic domain providers. Attackers may leverage these services to help them avoid firewall blocks and deny lists.
 narrative = Dynamic DNS services (DDNS) are legitimate low-cost or free services that allow users to rapidly update domain resolutions to IP infrastructure. While their usage can be benign, malicious actors can abuse DDNS to host harmful payloads or interactive-command-and-control infrastructure. These attackers will manually update or automate domain resolution changes by routing dynamic domains to IP addresses that circumvent firewall blocks and deny lists and frustrate a network defender's analytic and investigative processes. These searches will look for DNS queries made from within your infrastructure to suspicious dynamic domains and then investigate more deeply, when appropriate. While this list of top-level dynamic domains is not exhaustive, it can be dynamically updated as new suspicious dynamic domains are identified.
 
@@ -363,7 +367,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-201A", "https://www.first.org/resources/papers/conf2017/Advanced-Incident-Detection-and-Threat-Hunting-using-Sysmon-and-Splunk.pdf", "https://www.vkremez.com/2017/05/emotet-banking-trojan-malware-analysis.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of tools built by NirSoft - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of tools built by NirSoft - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
 description = Detect rarely used executables, specific registry paths that may confer malware survivability and persistence, instances where cmd.exe is used to launch script interpreters, and other indicators that the Emotet financial malware has compromised your environment.
 narrative = The trojan downloader known as Emotet first surfaced in 2014, when it was discovered targeting the banking industry to steal credentials. However, according to a joint technical alert (TA) issued by three government agencies (https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-201A), Emotet has evolved far beyond those beginnings to become what a ThreatPost article called a threat-delivery service(see https://threatpost.com/emotet-malware-evolves-beyond-banking-to-threat-delivery-service/134342/).  For example, in early 2018, Emotet was found to be using its loader function to spread the Quakbot and Ransomware variants. \
 According to the TA, the the malware continues to be among the most costly and destructive malware affecting the private and public sectors. Researchers have linked it to the threat group Mealybug, which has also been on the security communitys radar since 2014.\
@@ -387,12 +391,25 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/understanding-service-accounts"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - GCP Detect high risk permissions by resource and account - Rule", "ESCU - gcp detect oauth token abuse - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Detect gcploit framework - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Detect accounts with high risk roles by project - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - gcp detect oauth token abuse - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Detect accounts with high risk roles by project - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Detect high risk permissions by resource and account - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Detect gcploit framework - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Track when a user assumes an IAM role in another GCP account to obtain cross-account access to services and resources in that account. Accessing new roles could be an indication of malicious activity.
 narrative = Google Cloud Platform (GCP) admins manage access to GCP resources and services across the enterprise using GCP Identity and Access Management (IAM) functionality. IAM provides the ability to create and manage GCP users, groups, and roles-each with their own unique set of privileges and defined access to specific resources (such as Compute instances, the GCP Management Console, API, or the command-line interface). Unlike conventional (human) users, IAM roles are potentially assumable by anyone in the organization. They provide users with dynamically created temporary security credentials that expire within a set time period.\
 In between the time between when the temporary credentials are issued and when they expire is a period of opportunity, where a user could leverage the temporary credentials to wreak havoc-spin up or remove instances, create new users, elevate privileges, and other malicious activities-throughout the environment.\
 This Analytic Story includes searches that will help you monitor your GCP Audit logs logs for evidence of suspicious cross-account activity.  For example, while accessing multiple GCP accounts and roles may be perfectly valid behavior, it may be suspicious when an account requests privileges of an account it has not accessed in the past. After identifying suspicious activities, you can use the provided investigative searches to help you probe more deeply.
 
+[analytic_story://HAFNIUM Group]
+category = Adversary Tactics
+last_updated = 2021-03-03
+version = 1
+references = ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/detecting-hafnium-exchange-server-zero-day-activity-in-splunk.html", "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/03/02/active-exploitation-of-microsoft-exchange-zero-day-vulnerabilities/", "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/", "https://blog.rapid7.com/2021/03/03/rapid7s-insightidr-enables-detection-and-response-to-microsoft-exchange-0-day/"]
+maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
+spec_version = 3
+searches = ["ESCU - Unified Messaging Service Spawning a Process - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump - Rule", "ESCU - Nishang PowershellTCPOneLine - Rule", "ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule", "ESCU - W3WP Spawning Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Ntdsutil Export NTDS - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule"]
+description = HAFNIUM group was identified by Microsoft as exploiting 4 Microsoft Exchange CVEs in the wild - CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858 and CVE-2021-27065.
+narrative = On Tuesday, March 2, 2021, Microsoft released a set of security patches for its mail server, Microsoft Exchange. These patches respond to a group of vulnerabilities known to impact Exchange 2013, 2016, and 2019. It is important to note that an Exchange 2010 security update has also been issued, though the CVEs do not reference that version as being vulnerable.\
+While the CVEs do not shed much light on the specifics of the vulnerabilities or exploits, the first vulnerability (CVE-2021-26855) has a remote network attack vector that allows the attacker, a group Microsoft named HAFNIUM, to authenticate as the Exchange server. Three additional vulnerabilities (CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, and CVE-2021-27065) were also identified as part of this activity. When chained together along with CVE-2021-26855 for initial access, the attacker would have complete control over the Exchange server. This includes the ability to run code as SYSTEM and write to any path on the server.\
+The following Splunk detections assist with identifying the HAFNIUM groups tradecraft and methodology.
+
 [analytic_story://Hidden Cobra Malware]
 category = Malware
 last_updated = 2020-01-22
@@ -400,7 +417,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/HIDDEN-COBRA-North-Korean-Malicious-Cyber-Activity", "https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Destructive-Malware-Report.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious File Write - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Outbound Emails to Hidden Cobra Threat Actors - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious File Write - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Outbound Emails to Hidden Cobra Threat Actors - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor for and investigate activities, including the creation or deletion of hidden shares and file writes, that may be evidence of infiltration by North Korean government-sponsored cybercriminals. Details of this activity were reported in DHS Report TA-18-149A.
 narrative = North Korea's government-sponsored "cyber army" has been slowly building momentum and gaining sophistication over the last 15 years or so. As a result, the group's activity, which the US government refers to as "Hidden Cobra," has surreptitiously crept onto the collective radar as a preeminent global threat.\
 These state-sponsored actors are thought to be responsible for everything from a hack on a South Korean nuclear plant to an attack on Sony in anticipation of its release of the movie "The Interview" at the end of 2014. They're also notorious for cyberespionage. In recent years, the group seems to be focused on financial crimes, such as cryptojacking.\
@@ -414,7 +431,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2016/09/hosts-file-hijacks/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Windows hosts file modification - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Windows hosts file modification - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Detect evidence of tactics used to redirect traffic from a host to a destination other than the one intended--potentially one that is part of an adversary's attack infrastructure. An example is redirecting communications regarding patches and updates or misleading users into visiting a malicious website.
 narrative = Attackers will often attempt to manipulate client communications for nefarious purposes. In some cases, an attacker may endeavor to modify a local host file to redirect communications with resources (such as antivirus or system-update services) to prevent clients from receiving patches or updates. In other cases, an attacker might use this tactic to have the client connect to a site that looks like the intended site, but instead installs malware or collects information from the victim. Additionally, an attacker may redirect a victim in order to execute a MITM attack and observe communications.
 
@@ -425,7 +442,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["http://www.deependresearch.org/2016/04/jboss-exploits-view-from-victim.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = In March of 2016, adversaries were seen using JexBoss--an open-source utility used for testing and exploiting JBoss application servers. These searches help detect evidence of these attacks, such as network connections to external resources or web services spawning atypical child processes, among others.
 narrative = This Analytic Story looks for probing and exploitation attempts targeting JBoss application servers. While the vulnerabilities associated with this story are rather dated, they were leveraged in a spring 2016 campaign in connection with the Samsam ransomware variant. Incidents involving this ransomware are unique, in that they begin with attacks against vulnerable services, rather than the phishing or drive-by attacks more common with ransomware. In this case, vulnerable JBoss applications appear to be the target of choice.\
 It is helpful to understand how often a notable event generated by this story occurs, as well as the commonalities between some of these events, both of which may provide clues about whether this is a common occurrence of minimal concern or a rare event that may require more extensive investigation. It may also help to understand whether the issue is restricted to a single user/system or whether it is broader in scope.\
@@ -450,7 +467,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://github.com/splunk/cloud-datamodel-security-research"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task"]
 description = This story addresses detection against Kubernetes cluster fingerprint scan and attack by providing information on items such as source ip, user agent, cluster names.
 narrative = Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration platform contains sensitve information and management priviledges of production workloads, microservices and applications. These searches allow operator to detect suspicious unauthenticated requests from the internet to kubernetes cluster.
 
@@ -461,7 +478,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/approaching-kubernetes-security-detecting-kubernetes-scan-with-splunk.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = This story addresses detection and response of accounts acccesing Kubernetes cluster sensitive objects such as configmaps or secrets providing information on items such as user user, group. object, namespace and authorization reason.
 narrative = Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration platform contains sensitive objects within its architecture, specifically configmaps and secrets, if accessed by an attacker can lead to further compromise. These searches allow operator to detect suspicious requests against Kubernetes sensitive objects.
 
@@ -472,7 +489,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/approaching-kubernetes-security-detecting-kubernetes-scan-with-splunk.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect most active service accounts by pod namespace - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect RBAC authorizations by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect RBAC authorizations by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect most active service accounts by pod namespace - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = This story addresses detection and response around Sensitive Role usage within a Kubernetes clusters against cluster resources and namespaces.
 narrative = Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration platform contains sensitive roles within its architecture, specifically configmaps and secrets, if accessed by an attacker can lead to further compromise. These searches allow operator to detect suspicious requests against Kubernetes role activities
 
@@ -483,7 +500,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/executive-perspective/2015/08/malware_lateral_move.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ESCU - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
 description = Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures around how attackers move laterally within the enterprise. Because lateral movement can expose the adversary to detection, it should be an important focus for security analysts.
 narrative = Once attackers gain a foothold within an enterprise, they will seek to expand their accesses and leverage techniques that facilitate lateral movement. Attackers will often spend quite a bit of time and effort moving laterally. Because lateral movement renders an attacker the most vulnerable to detection, it's an excellent focus for detection and investigation.\
 Indications of lateral movement can include the abuse of system utilities (such as `psexec.exe`), unauthorized use of remote desktop services, `file/admin$` shares, WMI, PowerShell, pass-the-hash, or the abuse of scheduled tasks. Organizations must be extra vigilant in detecting lateral movement techniques and look for suspicious activity in and around high-value strategic network assets, such as Active Directory, which are often considered the primary target or "crown jewels" to a persistent threat actor.\
@@ -498,7 +515,7 @@ version = 4
 references = ["https://blogs.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/malware-employs-powershell-to-infect-systems/", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Multiple Suspicious Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadFile - Rule", "ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Multiple Suspicious Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
 description = Attackers are finding stealthy ways "live off the land," leveraging utilities and tools that come standard on the endpoint--such as PowerShell--to achieve their goals without downloading binary files. These searches can help you detect and investigate PowerShell command-line options that may be indicative of malicious intent.
 narrative = The searches in this Analytic Story monitor for parameters often used for malicious purposes. It is helpful to understand how often the notable events generated by this story occur, as well as the commonalities between some of these events. These factors may provide clues about whether this is a common occurrence of minimal concern or a rare event that may require more extensive investigation. Likewise, it is important to determine whether the issue is restricted to a single user/system or is broader in scope.\
 The following factors may assist you in determining whether the event is malicious: \
@@ -518,7 +535,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/03/04/tracking-locky-ransomware-using-carbon-black/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Unsuccessful Netbackup backups - Rule", "ESCU - Extended Period Without Successful Netbackup Backups - Rule", "ESCU - All backup logs for host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Unsuccessful Netbackup backups - Rule", "ESCU - Extended Period Without Successful Netbackup Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - All backup logs for host - Response Task"]
 description = Address common concerns when monitoring your backup processes. These searches can help you reduce risks from ransomware, device theft, or denial of physical access to a host by backing up data on endpoints.
 narrative = Having backups is a standard best practice that helps ensure continuity of business operations.  Having mature backup processes can also help you reduce the risks of many security-related incidents and streamline your response processes. The detection searches in this Analytic Story will help you identify systems that have backup failures, as well as systems that have not been backed up for an extended period of time. The story will also return the notable event history and all of the backup logs for an endpoint.
 
@@ -529,7 +546,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Identify and investigate prohibited/unauthorized software or processes that may be concealing malicious behavior within your environment. 
 narrative = It is critical to identify unauthorized software and processes running on enterprise endpoints and determine whether they are likely to be malicious. This Analytic Story requires the user to populate the Interesting Processes table within Enterprise Security with prohibited processes. An included support search will augment this data, adding information on processes thought to be malicious. This search requires data from endpoint detection-and-response solutions, endpoint data sources (such as Sysmon), or Windows Event Logs--assuming that the Active Directory administrator has enabled process tracking within the System Event Audit Logs.\
 It is important to investigate any software identified as suspicious, in order to understand how it was installed or executed. Analyzing authentication logs or any historic notable events might elicit additional investigative leads of interest. For best results, schedule the search to run every two weeks. 
@@ -554,7 +571,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/tn-archive/bb490939(v=technet.10)", "https://htmlpreview.github.io/?https://github.com/MatthewDemaske/blogbackup/blob/master/netshell.html", "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Processes created by netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Processes created by netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Detect activities and various techniques associated with the abuse of `netsh.exe`, which can disable local firewall settings or set up a remote connection to a host from an infected system.
 narrative = It is a common practice for attackers of all types to leverage native Windows tools and functionality to execute commands for malicious reasons. One such tool on Windows OS is `netsh.exe`,a command-line scripting utility that allows you to--either locally or remotely--display or modify the network configuration of a computer that is currently running. `Netsh.exe` can be used to discover and disable local firewall settings. It can also be used to set up a remote connection to a host from an infected system.\
 To get started, run the detection search to identify parent processes of `netsh.exe`.
@@ -566,7 +583,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://i.blackhat.com/USA-20/Thursday/us-20-Bienstock-My-Cloud-Is-APTs-Cloud-Investigating-And-Defending-Office-365.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Patrick Bareiss"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - High Number of Login Failures from a single source - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Disable MFA - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious Rights Delegation - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Bypass MFA via Trusted IP - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Excessive Authentication Failures Alert - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Excessive SSO logon errors - Rule", "ESCU - O365 PST export alert - Rule", "ESCU - O365 New Federated Domain Added - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Added Service Principal - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - O365 Added Service Principal - Rule", "ESCU - O365 New Federated Domain Added - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Excessive Authentication Failures Alert - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious Rights Delegation - Rule", "ESCU - O365 PST export alert - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Excessive SSO logon errors - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Bypass MFA via Trusted IP - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Disable MFA - Rule", "ESCU - High Number of Login Failures from a single source - Rule"]
 description = This story is focused around detecting Office 365 Attacks.
 narrative = More and more companies are using Microsofts Office 365 cloud offering. Therefore, we see more and more attacks against Office 365. This story provides various detections for Office 365 attacks.
 
@@ -577,7 +594,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/orangeworm-targets-healthcare-us-europe-asia", "https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/healthcare-targeted-by-hacker/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
 description = Detect activities and various techniques associated with the Orangeworm Attack Group, a group that frequently targets the healthcare industry.
 narrative = In May of 2018, the attack group Orangeworm was implicated for installing a custom backdoor called Trojan.Kwampirs within large international healthcare corporations in the United States, Europe, and Asia. This malware provides the attackers with remote access to the target system, decrypting and extracting a copy of its main DLL payload from its resource section. Before writing the payload to disk, it inserts a randomly generated string into the middle of the decrypted payload in an attempt to evade hash-based detections.\
 Awareness of the Orangeworm group first surfaced in January, 2015. It has conducted targeted attacks against related industries, as well, such as pharmaceuticals and healthcare IT solution providers.\
@@ -609,7 +626,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/scope-of-mudcarp-attacks-highlight-1/", "http://blog.amossys.fr/badflick-is-not-so-bad.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "iDefense", "email": "-", "name": "iDefense Cyber Espionage Team"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor your environment for suspicious behaviors that resemble the techniques employed by the MUDCARP threat group.
 narrative = This story was created as a joint effort between iDefense and Splunk.\
 iDefense analysts have recently discovered a Windows executable file that, upon execution, spoofs a decryption tool and then drops a file that appears to be the custom-built javascript backdoor, "Orz," which is associated with the threat actors known as MUDCARP (as well as "temp.Periscope" and "Leviathan"). The file is executed using Wscript.\
@@ -647,7 +664,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["http://www.novetta.com/2015/02/advanced-methods-to-detect-advanced-cyber-attacks-protocol-abuse/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
 description = Detect instances of prohibited network traffic allowed in the environment, as well as protocols running on non-standard ports. Both of these types of behaviors typically violate policy and can be leveraged by attackers.
 narrative = A traditional security best practice is to control the ports, protocols, and services allowed within your environment. By limiting the services and protocols to those explicitly approved by policy, administrators can minimize the attack surface. The combined effect allows both network defenders and security controls to focus and not be mired in superfluous traffic or data types. Looking for deviations to policy can identify attacker activity that abuses services and protocols to run on alternate or non-standard ports in the attempt to avoid detection or frustrate forensic analysts.
 
@@ -658,7 +675,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.carbonblack.com/2017/06/28/carbon-black-threat-research-technical-analysis-petya-notpetya-ransomware/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2017/06/27/closing-the-detection-to-mitigation-gap-or-to-petya-or-notpetya-whocares-.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
 description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to ransomware--spikes in SMB traffic, suspicious wevtutil usage, the presence of common ransomware extensions, and system processes run from unexpected locations, and many others.
 narrative = Ransomware is an ever-present risk to the enterprise, wherein an infected host encrypts business-critical data, holding it hostage until the victim pays the attacker a ransom. There are many types and varieties of ransomware that can affect an enterprise. Attackers can deploy ransomware to enterprises through spearphishing campaigns and driveby downloads, as well as through traditional remote service-based exploitation. In the case of the WannaCry campaign, there was self-propagating wormable functionality that was used to maximize infection. Fortunately, organizations can apply several techniques--such as those in this Analytic Story--to detect and or mitigate the effects of ransomware.
 
@@ -680,7 +697,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/executive-perspective/2015/09/the_new_route_toper.html", "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/about/security-center/event-response/synful-knock.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect ARP Poisoning - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Software Download To Network Device - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Login Attempts to Routers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Port Security Violation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rogue DHCP Server - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Traffic Mirroring - Rule", "ESCU - Detect IPv6 Network Infrastructure Threats - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect New Login Attempts to Routers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rogue DHCP Server - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Port Security Violation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect ARP Poisoning - Rule", "ESCU - Detect IPv6 Network Infrastructure Threats - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Software Download To Network Device - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Traffic Mirroring - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Validate the security configuration of network infrastructure and verify that only authorized users and systems are accessing critical assets. Core routing and switching infrastructure are common strategic targets for attackers.
 narrative = Networking devices, such as routers and switches, are often overlooked as resources that attackers will leverage to subvert an enterprise. Advanced threats actors have shown a proclivity to target these critical assets as a means to siphon and redirect network traffic, flash backdoored operating systems, and implement cryptographic weakened algorithms to more easily decrypt network traffic.\
 This Analytic Story helps you gain a better understanding of how your network devices are interacting with your hosts. By compromising your network devices, attackers can obtain direct access to the company's internal infrastructure&#151; effectively increasing the attack surface and accessing private services/data.
@@ -692,7 +709,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/detecting-ryuk-using-splunk-attack-range.html", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/big-game-hunting-with-ryuk-another-lucrative-targeted-ransomware/", "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-302a"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Jose Hernandez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Windows connhost exe started forcefully - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Security Account Manager Stopped - Rule", "ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", "ESCU - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Ryuk Test Files Detected - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Ryuk Wake on LAN Command - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", "ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Security Account Manager Stopped - Rule", "ESCU - Ryuk Test Files Detected - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Windows connhost exe started forcefully - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", "ESCU - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the Ryuk ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with Ryuk, Stopping Security Access Manager, DisableAntiSpyware registry key modification, suspicious psexec use, and more.
 narrative = Cybersecurity Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) released Alert (AA20-302A) on October 28th called “Ransomware Activity Targeting the Healthcare and Public Health Sector.” This alert details TTPs associated with ongoing and possible imminent attacks against the Healthcare sector, and is a joint advisory in coordination with other U.S. Government agencies. The objective of these malicious campaigns is to infiltrate targets in named sectors and to drop ransomware payloads, which will likely cause disruption of service and increase risk of actual harm to the health and safety of patients at hospitals, even with the aggravant of an ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. This document specifically refers to several crimeware exploitation frameworks, emphasizing the use of Ryuk ransomware as payload. The Ryuk ransomware payload is not new. It has been well documented and identified in multiple variants. Payloads need a carrier, and for Ryuk it has often been exploitation frameworks such as Cobalt Strike, or popular crimeware frameworks such as Emotet or Trickbot.
 
@@ -715,7 +732,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/an-in-depth-analysis-of-samsam-ransomware-and-boss-spider/", "https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2018/07/31/samsam-the-almost-6-million-ransomware/", "https://thehackernews.com/2018/07/samsam-ransomware-attacks.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Batch File Write to System32 - Rule", "ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Samsam Test File Write - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - File with Samsam Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - File with Samsam Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - Samsam Test File Write - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Batch File Write to System32 - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
 description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the SamSam ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with SamSam, RDP brute force attacks, the presence of files with SamSam ransomware extensions, suspicious psexec use, and more.
 narrative = The first version of the SamSam ransomware (a.k.a. Samas or SamsamCrypt) was launched in 2015 by a group of Iranian threat actors. The malicious software has affected and continues to affect thousands of victims and has raised almost $6M in ransom.\
 Although categorized under the heading of ransomware, SamSam campaigns have some importance distinguishing characteristics. Most notable is the fact that conventional ransomware is a numbers game. Perpetrators use a "spray-and-pray" approach with phishing campaigns or other mechanisms, charging a small ransom (typically under $1,000). The goal is to find a large number of victims willing to pay these mini-ransoms, adding up to a lucrative payday. They use relatively simple methods for infecting systems.\
@@ -724,6 +741,17 @@ In a typical attack on one large healthcare organization in 2018, the company en
 According to Sophos, SamSam previously leveraged  RDP to gain access to targeted networks via brute force. SamSam is not spread automatically, like other malware. It requires skill because it forces the attacker to adapt their tactics to the individual environment. Next, the actors escalate their privileges to admin level. They scan the networks for worthy targets, using conventional tools, such as PsExec or PaExec, to deploy/execute, quickly encrypting files.\
 This Analytic Story includes searches designed to help detect and investigate signs of the SamSam ransomware, such as the creation of fileswrites to system32, writes with tell-tale extensions, batch files written to system32, and evidence of brute-force attacks via RDP.
 
+[analytic_story://Silver Sparrow]
+category = Adversary Tactics
+last_updated = 2021-02-24
+version = 1
+references = ["https://redcanary.com/blog/clipping-silver-sparrows-wings/", "https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/5-things-you-need-to-know-about-silver-sparrow/"]
+maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
+spec_version = 3
+searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage via OSquery - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious SQLite3 LSQuarantine Behavior - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Curl Network Connection - Rule"]
+description = Silver Sparrow, identified by Red Canary Intelligence, is a new forward looking MacOS (Intel and M1) malicious software downloader utilizing JavaScript for execution and a launchAgent to establish persistence.
+narrative = Silver Sparrow works is a dropper and uses typical persistence mechanisms on a Mac. It is cross platform, covering both Intel and Apple M1 architecture. To this date, no implant has been downloaded for malicious purposes. During installation of the update.pkg or updater.pkg file, the malicious software utilizes JavaScript to generate files and scripts on disk for persistence.These files later download a implant from an S3 bucket every hour. This analytic assists with identifying different types of macOS malware families establishing LaunchAgent persistence. Per SentinelOne source, it is predicted that Silver Sparrow is likely selling itself as a mechanism to 3rd party “affiliates” or pay-per-install (PPI) partners, typically seen as commodity adware/malware. Additional indicators and behaviors may be found within the references.
+
 [analytic_story://Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities]
 category = Vulnerability
 last_updated = 2018-01-08
@@ -762,7 +790,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-11409", "https://www.splunk.com/view/SP-CAAAP5E#VulnerabilityDescriptionsandRatings", "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44865/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip - Response Task"]
 description = Reduce the risk of CVE-2018-11409, an information disclosure vulnerability within some older versions of Splunk Enterprise, with searches designed to help ensure that your Splunk system does not leak information to authenticated users.
 narrative = Although there have been no reports of it being exploited, Splunk Enterprise versions through 7.0.1 reportedly have a vulnerability that may expose information through a REST endpoint (read more here: https://www.splunk.com/view/SP-CAAAP5E#VulnerabilityDescriptionsandRatings). NIST has included it in its vulnerability database (read more here: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-11409). The REST endpoint that exposes system information is also necessary for the proper operation of Splunk clustering and instrumentation. Customers should upgrade to the latest version to reduce the risk of this vulnerability.\
 Splunk Enterprise exposes partial information about the host operating system, hardware, and Splunk license. Splunk Enterprise before 6.6.0 exposes this information without authentication. Splunk Enterprise 6.6.0 and later exposes this information only to authenticated Splunk users. Based on the information exposure, Splunk characterizes this issue as a low severity impact.\
@@ -776,7 +804,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor.html", "https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Patrick Bareiss"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Supernova Webshell - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Sunburst Correlation DLL and Network Event - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AdFind Exe - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Sunburst Correlation DLL and Network Event - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Supernova Webshell - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AdFind Exe - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule"]
 description = Sunburst is a trojanized updates to SolarWinds Orion IT monitoring and management software. It was discovered by FireEye in December 2020. The actors behind this campaign gained access to numerous public and private organizations around the world.
 narrative = This Analytic Story supports you to detect Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) from the Sunburst malware. The threat actor behind sunburst compromised the SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll, is a SolarWinds digitally-signed component of the Orion software framework that contains a backdoor that communicates via HTTP to third party servers. The detections in this Analytic Story are focusing on the dll loading events, file create events and network events to detect This malware.
 
@@ -787,7 +815,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS EC2 instances for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as EC2 instances that originate from unusual locations or those launched by previously unseen users (among others). Included investigative searches will help you probe more deeply, when the information warrants it.
 narrative = AWS CloudTrail is an AWS service that helps you enable governance, compliance, and risk auditing within your AWS account. Actions taken by a user, role, or an AWS service are recorded as events in CloudTrail. It is crucial for a company to monitor events and actions taken in the AWS Console, AWS command-line interface, and AWS SDKs and APIs to ensure that your EC2 instances are not vulnerable to attacks. This Analytic Story identifies suspicious activities in your AWS EC2 instances and helps you respond and investigate those activities.
 
@@ -798,7 +826,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integration.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new user AWS Console Login - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new user AWS Console Login - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor your AWS authentication events using your CloudTrail logs. Searches within this Analytic Story will help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious logins. 
 narrative = It is important to monitor and control who has access to your AWS infrastructure. Detecting suspicious logins to your AWS infrastructure will provide good starting points for investigations. Abusive behaviors caused by compromised credentials can lead to direct monetary costs, as you will be billed for any EC2 instances created by the attacker.
 
@@ -809,7 +837,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/security-data-protection/cloud/public-aws-s3-buckets-writable/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect S3 access from a new IP - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Open S3 buckets - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect S3 access from a new IP - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Open S3 buckets - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS S3 buckets for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as detecting open S3 buckets and buckets being accessed from a new IP. The contextual and investigative searches will give you more information, when required.
 narrative = As cloud computing has exploded, so has the number of creative attacks on virtual environments. And as the number-two cloud-service provider, Amazon Web Services (AWS) has certainly had its share.\
 Amazon's "shared responsibility" model dictates that the company has responsibility for the environment outside of the VM and the customer is responsible for the security inside of the S3 container. As such, it's important to stay vigilant for activities that may belie suspicious behavior inside of your environment.\
@@ -822,7 +850,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/hiding-cloudcobalt-strike-beacon-c2-using-amazon-apis/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
 description = Leverage these searches to monitor your AWS network traffic for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as a spike in blocked outbound traffic in your virtual private cloud (VPC).
 narrative = A virtual private cloud (VPC) is an on-demand managed cloud-computing service that isolates computing resources for each client. Inside the VPC container, the environment resembles a physical network. \
 Amazon's VPC service enables you to launch EC2 instances and leverage other Amazon resources. The traffic that flows in and out of this VPC can be controlled via network access-control rules and security groups. Amazon also has a feature called VPC Flow Logs that enables you to log IP traffic going to and from the network interfaces in your VPC. This data is stored using Amazon CloudWatch Logs.\
@@ -836,7 +864,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-cloudtrail-now-tracks-cross-account-activity-to-its-origin/", "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integration.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by New User - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by New User - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor your cloud authentication events. Searches within this Analytic Story leverage the recent cloud updates to the Authentication data model to help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious login activity. 
 narrative = It is important to monitor and control who has access to your cloud infrastructure. Detecting suspicious logins will provide good starting points for investigations. Abusive behaviors caused by compromised credentials can lead to direct monetary costs, as you will be billed for any compute activity whether legitimate or otherwise.\
 This Analytic Story has data model versions of cloud searches leveraging Authentication data, including those looking for suspicious login activity, and cross-account activity for AWS.
@@ -848,7 +876,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor your cloud infrastructure provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your cloud environment.
 narrative = Monitoring your cloud infrastructure logs allows you enable governance, compliance, and risk auditing. It is crucial for a company to monitor events and actions taken in the their cloud environments to ensure that your instances are not vulnerable to attacks. This Analytic Story identifies suspicious activities in your cloud compute instances and helps you respond and investigate those activities.
 
@@ -859,7 +887,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor your cloud infrastructure provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your cloud environment.
 narrative = Because most enterprise cloud infrastructure activities originate from familiar geographic locations, monitoring for activity from unknown or unusual regions is an important security measure. This indicator can be especially useful in environments where it is impossible to add specific IPs to an allow list because they vary.\
 This Analytic Story was designed to provide you with flexibility in the precision you employ in specifying legitimate geographic regions. It can be as specific as an IP address or a city, or as broad as a region (think state) or an entire country. By determining how precise you want your geographical locations to be and monitoring for new locations that haven't previously accessed your environment, you can detect adversaries as they begin to probe your environment. Since there are legitimate reasons for activities from unfamiliar locations, this is not a standalone indicator. Nevertheless, location can be a relevant piece of information that you may wish to investigate further.
@@ -883,7 +911,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1059", "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/macro-malware", "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Leveraging the Windows command-line interface (CLI) is one of the most common attack techniques--one that is also detailed in the MITRE ATT&CK framework. Use this Analytic Story to help you identify unusual or suspicious use of the CLI on Windows systems.
 narrative = The ability to execute arbitrary commands via the Windows CLI is a primary goal for the adversary. With access to the shell, an attacker can easily run scripts and interact with the target system. Often, attackers may only have limited access to the shell or may obtain access in unusual ways. In addition, malware may execute and interact with the CLI in ways that would be considered unusual and inconsistent with typical user activity. This provides defenders with opportunities to identify suspicious use and investigate, as appropriate. This Analytic Story contains various searches to help identify this suspicious activity, as well as others to aid you in deeper investigation.
 
@@ -894,7 +922,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/001/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/htmlhelp/nf-htmlhelp-htmlhelpa"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect HTML Help URL in Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Detect HTML Help Using InfoTech Storage Handlers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect HTML Help Renamed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect HTML Help Spawn Child Process - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect HTML Help Using InfoTech Storage Handlers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect HTML Help URL in Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Detect HTML Help Renamed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect HTML Help Spawn Child Process - Rule"]
 description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe process to execute malicious code.
 narrative = Adversaries may abuse Compiled HTML files (.chm) to conceal malicious code. CHM files are commonly distributed as part of the Microsoft HTML Help system. CHM files are compressed compilations of various content such as HTML documents, images, and scripting/web related programming languages such VBA, JScript, Java, and ActiveX. CHM content is displayed using underlying components of the Internet Explorer browser loaded by the HTML Help executable program (hh.exe). \
 HH.exe relies upon hhctrl.ocx to load CHM topics.This will load upon execution of a chm file. \
@@ -908,7 +936,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["http://blogs.splunk.com/2015/10/01/random-words-on-entropy-and-dns/", "http://www.darkreading.com/analytics/security-monitoring/got-malware-three-signs-revealed-in-dns-traffic/d/d-id/1139680", "https://live.paloaltonetworks.com/t5/Threat-Vulnerability-Articles/What-are-suspicious-DNS-queries/ta-p/71454"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Attackers often attempt to hide within or otherwise abuse the domain name system (DNS). You can thwart attempts to manipulate this omnipresent protocol by monitoring for these types of abuses.
 narrative = Although DNS is one of the fundamental underlying protocols that make the Internet work, it is often ignored (perhaps because of its complexity and effectiveness).  However, attackers have discovered ways to abuse the protocol to meet their objectives. One potential abuse involves manipulating DNS to hijack traffic and redirect it to an IP address under the attacker's control. This could inadvertently send users intending to visit google.com, for example, to an unrelated malicious website. Another technique involves using the DNS protocol for command-and-control activities with the attacker's malicious code or to covertly exfiltrate data. The searches within this Analytic Story look for these types of abuses.
 
@@ -919,7 +947,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/06/26/phishing-hits-a-new-level-of-quality/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Email remains one of the primary means for attackers to gain an initial foothold within the modern enterprise. Detect and investigate suspicious emails in your environment with the help of the searches in this Analytic Story.
 narrative = It is a common practice for attackers of all types to leverage targeted spearphishing campaigns and mass mailers to deliver weaponized email messages and attachments. Fortunately, there are a number of ways to monitor email data in Splunk to detect suspicious content.\
 Once a phishing message has been detected, the next steps are to answer the following questions: \
@@ -945,17 +973,21 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/", "https://redcanary.com/blog/windows-registry-attacks-threat-detection/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/005/", "https://medium.com/@mbromileyDFIR/malware-monday-aebb456356c5"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious mshta spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious mshta child process - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Detect mshta renamed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect mshta inline hta execution - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Detect mshta inline hta execution - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious mshta spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious mshta child process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Detect mshta renamed - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe process to execute malicious code.
 narrative = One common adversary tactic is to bypass application control solutions via the mshta.exe process, which loads Microsoft HTML applications (mshtml.dll) with the .hta suffix. In these cases, attackers use the trusted Windows utility to proxy execution of malicious files, whether an .hta application, javascript, or VBScript.\
 The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an attacker is leveraging mshta.exe to execute malicious code.\
-Triage\ Validate execution \ 1. Determine if MSHTA.exe executed. Validate the OriginalFileName of MSHTA.exe and further PE metadata. If executed outside of c:\windows\system32 or c:\windows\syswow64, it should be highly suspect.\
+Triage\
+Validate execution \
+1. Determine if MSHTA.exe executed. Validate the OriginalFileName of MSHTA.exe and further PE metadata. If executed outside of c:\windows\system32 or c:\windows\syswow64, it should be highly suspect.\
 1. Determine if script code was executed with MSHTA.\
-Situational Awareness\ The objective of this step is meant to identify suspicious behavioral indicators related to executed of Script code by MSHTA.exe.\
+Situational Awareness\
+The objective of this step is meant to identify suspicious behavioral indicators related to executed of Script code by MSHTA.exe.\
 1. Parent process. Is the parent process a known LOLBin? Is the parent process an Office Application?\
 1. Module loads. Are the known MSHTA.exe modules being loaded by a non-standard application? Is MSHTA loading any suspicious .DLLs?\
 1. Network connections. Any network connections? Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain.\
-Retrieval of script code\ The objective of this step is to confirm the executed script code is benign or malicious.
+Retrieval of script code\
+The objective of this step is to confirm the executed script code is benign or malicious.
 
 [analytic_story://Suspicious Okta Activity]
 category = Adversary Tactics
@@ -964,7 +996,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1078", "https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Credential_stuffing", "https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/answer/What-is-a-password-spraying-attack-and-how-does-it-work"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Okta Failed SSO Attempts - Rule", "ESCU - Okta User Logins From Multiple Cities - Rule", "ESCU - Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentials From The Same IP - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Account Lockout Events - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate User Activities In Okta - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by app - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Okta Account Lockout Events - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Failed SSO Attempts - Rule", "ESCU - Okta User Logins From Multiple Cities - Rule", "ESCU - Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentials From The Same IP - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by app - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate User Activities In Okta - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor your Okta environment for suspicious activities. Due to the Covid outbreak, many users are migrating over to leverage cloud services more and more. Okta is a popular tool to manage multiple users and the web-based applications they need to stay productive. The searches in this story will help monitor your Okta environment for suspicious activities and associated user behaviors.
 narrative = Okta is the leading single sign on (SSO) provider, allowing users to authenticate once to Okta, and from there access a variety of web-based applications. These applications are assigned to users and allow administrators to centrally manage which users are allowed to access which applications. It also provides centralized logging to help understand how the applications are used and by whom. \
 While SSO is a major convenience for users, it also provides attackers with an opportunity. If the attacker can gain access to Okta, they can access a variety of applications. As such monitoring the environment is important. \
@@ -977,7 +1009,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009/", "https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/blob/master/documentation/modules/evasion/windows/applocker_evasion_regasm_regsvcs.md", "https://oddvar.moe/2017/12/13/applocker-case-study-how-insecure-is-it-really-part-1/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect Regsvcs with Network Connection - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regasm Spawning a Process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regsvcs Spawning a Process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regasm with Network Connection - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regsvcs with No Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regasm with no Command Line Arguments - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Regasm with no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regsvcs Spawning a Process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regsvcs with No Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regasm with Network Connection - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regasm Spawning a Process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regsvcs with Network Connection - Rule"]
 description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe process to execute malicious code.
 narrative =  Adversaries may abuse Regsvcs and Regasm to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. Regsvcs and Regasm are Windows command-line utilities that are used to register .NET Component Object Model (COM) assemblies. Both are digitally signed by Microsoft. The following queries assist with detecting suspicious and malicious usage of Regasm.exe and Regsvcs.exe. Upon reviewing usage of Regasm.exe Regsvcs.exe, review file modification events for possible script code written. Review parallel process events for csc.exe being utilized to compile script code.
 
@@ -988,7 +1020,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.010/T1218.010.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvr32/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Regsvr32 Register Suspicious Path - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Regsvr32 Register Suspicious Path - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass - Rule"]
 description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the regsvr32.exe process to execute malicious code.
 narrative = One common adversary tactic is to bypass application control solutions via the regsvr32.exe process. This particular bypass was popularized with "SquiblyDoo" using the "scrobj.dll" dll to load .sct scriptlets. This technique is still widely used by adversaries to bypass detection and prevention controls. The file extension of the DLL is irrelevant (it may load a .txt file extension for example). The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an adversary is leveraging regsvr32.exe to execute malicious code. Validate execution Determine if regsvr32.exe executed. Validate the OriginalFileName of regsvr32.exe and further PE metadata. If executed outside of c:\windows\system32 or c:\windows\syswow64, it should be highly suspect. Determine if script code was executed with regsvr32. Situational Awareness - The objective of this step is meant to identify suspicious behavioral indicators related to executed of Script code by regsvr32.exe. Parent process. Is the parent process a known LOLBin? Is the parent process an Office Application? Module loads.  Is regsvr32 loading any suspicious .DLLs? Unsigned or signed from non-standard paths. Network connections. Any network connections? Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain. Retrieval of Script Code - confirm the executed script code is benign or malicious.
 
@@ -999,7 +1031,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 no CommandLine Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 dllregisterserver - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - syssetup - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - setupapi - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - advpack - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 StartW - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 Rename - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - setupapi - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 StartW - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 dllregisterserver - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - advpack - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - syssetup - Rule"]
 description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage rundll32.exe to execute arbitrary malicious code.
 narrative = One common adversary tactic is to bypass application control solutions via the rundll32.exe process. Natively, rundll32.exe will load DLLs and is a great example of a Living off the Land Binary. Rundll32.exe may load malicious DLLs by ordinals, function names or directly. The queries in this story focus on loading default DLLs, syssetup.dll, ieadvpack.dll, advpack.dll and setupapi.dll from disk that may be abused by adversaries. Additionally, two analytics developed to assist with identifying DLLRegisterServer, Start and StartW functions being called. The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an adversary is leveraging rundll32.exe to execute malicious code.
 
@@ -1010,7 +1042,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Graeber-Abusing-Windows-Management-Instrumentation-WMI-To-Build-A-Persistent%20Asynchronous-And-Fileless-Backdoor-wp.pdf", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/wmimplant_a_wmi_ba.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Temporary Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Process Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - Script Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Process Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon - Rule", "ESCU - Script Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Temporary Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task"]
 description = Attackers are increasingly abusing Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI), a framework and associated utilities available on all modern Windows operating systems. Because WMI can be leveraged to manage both local and remote systems, it is important to identify the processes executed and the user context within which the activity occurred.
 narrative = WMI is a Microsoft infrastructure for management data and operations on Windows operating systems. It includes of a set of utilities that can be leveraged to manage both local and remote Windows systems. Attackers are increasingly turning to WMI abuse in their efforts to conduct nefarious tasks, such as reconnaissance, detection of antivirus and virtual machines, code execution, lateral movement, persistence, and data exfiltration. \
 The detection searches included in this Analytic Story are used to look for suspicious use of WMI commands that attackers may leverage to interact with remote systems. The searches specifically look for the use of WMI to run processes on remote systems.\
@@ -1023,7 +1055,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://redcanary.com/blog/windows-registry-attacks-threat-detection/", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1112"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor and detect registry changes initiated from remote locations, which can be a sign that an attacker has infiltrated your system.
 narrative = Attackers are developing increasingly sophisticated techniques for hijacking target servers, while evading detection. One such technique that has become progressively more common is registry modification.\
  The registry is a key component of the Windows operating system. It has a hierarchical database called "registry" that contains settings, options, and values for executables. Once the threat actor gains access to a machine, they can use reg.exe to modify their account to obtain administrator-level privileges, maintain persistence, and move laterally within the environment.\
@@ -1048,7 +1080,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218/T1218.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler usage - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler usage - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule"]
 description = Monitor and detect behaviors used by attackers who leverage trusted developer utilities to execute malicious code.
 narrative = Adversaries may take advantage of trusted developer utilities to proxy execution of malicious payloads. There are many utilities used for software development related tasks that can be used to execute code in various forms to assist in development, debugging, and reverse engineering. These utilities may often be signed with legitimate certificates that allow them to execute on a system and proxy execution of malicious code through a trusted process that effectively bypasses application control solutions.\
 The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an adversary is leveraging microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe to execute malicious code.
@@ -1060,7 +1092,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/001/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1127.001/T1127.001.md", "https://github.com/infosecn1nja/MaliciousMacroMSBuild", "https://github.com/xorrior/RandomPS-Scripts/blob/master/Invoke-ExecuteMSBuild.ps1", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/", "https://github.com/MHaggis/CBR-Queries/blob/master/msbuild.md"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious msbuild path - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Spawn - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious msbuild path - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule"]
 description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the msbuild.exe process to execute malicious code.
 narrative = Adversaries may use MSBuild to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. MSBuild.exe (Microsoft Build Engine) is a software build platform used by Visual Studio and is native to Windows. It handles XML formatted project files that define requirements for loading and building various platforms and configurations.\
 The inline task capability of MSBuild that was introduced in .NET version 4 allows for C# code to be inserted into an XML project file. MSBuild will compile and execute the inline task. MSBuild.exe is a signed Microsoft binary, so when it is used this way it can execute arbitrary code and bypass application control defenses that are configured to allow MSBuild.exe execution.\
@@ -1096,7 +1128,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/08/monitoring-windows-console-activity-part-two.html", "https://www.splunk.com/pdfs/technical-briefs/advanced-threat-detection-and-response-tech-brief.pdf", "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/logging/detecting-security-incidents-windows-workstation-event-logs-34262"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Quickly identify systems running new or unusual processes in your environment that could be indicators of suspicious activity. Processes run from unusual locations, those with conspicuously long command lines, and rare executables are all examples of activities that may warrant deeper investigation.
 narrative = Being able to profile a host's processes within your environment can help you more quickly identify processes that seem out of place when compared to the rest of the population of hosts or asset types.\
 This Analytic Story lets you identify processes that are either a) not typically seen running or b) have some sort of suspicious command-line arguments associated with them. This Analytic Story will also help you identify the user running these processes and the associated process activity on the host.\
@@ -1109,7 +1141,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.monkey.org/~dugsong/dsniff/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Protocols passing authentication in cleartext - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Protocols passing authentication in cleartext - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
 description = Leverage searches that detect cleartext network protocols that may leak credentials or should otherwise be encrypted.
 narrative = Various legacy protocols operate by default in the clear, without the protections of encryption. This potentially leaks sensitive information that can be exploited by passively sniffing network traffic. Depending on the protocol, this information could be highly sensitive, or could allow for session hijacking. In addition, these protocols send authentication information, which would allow for the harvesting of usernames and passwords that could potentially be used to authenticate and compromise secondary systems.
 
@@ -1120,7 +1152,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.fbi.gov/scams-and-safety/common-fraud-schemes/internet-fraud", "https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2017-internet-crime-report-released-050718"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Jim Apger"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Web Fraud - Account Harvesting - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Anomalous User Clickspeed - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Password Sharing Across Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Get Web Session Information via session id - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Web Fraud - Password Sharing Across Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Anomalous User Clickspeed - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Account Harvesting - Rule", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Web Session Information via session id - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor your environment for activity consistent with common attack techniques bad actors use when attempting to compromise web servers or other web-related assets.
 narrative = The Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) defines Internet fraud as the use of Internet services or software with Internet access to defraud victims or to otherwise take advantage of them. According to the Bureau, Internet crime schemes are used to steal millions of dollars each year from victims and continue to plague the Internet through various methods. The agency includes phishing scams, data breaches, Denial of Service (DOS) attacks, email account compromise, malware, spoofing, and ransomware in this category.\
 These crimes are not the fraud itself, but rather the attack techniques commonly employed by fraudsters in their pursuit of data that enables them to commit malicious actssuch as obtaining and using stolen credit cards. They represent a serious problem that is steadily increasing and not likely to go away anytime soon.\
@@ -1147,7 +1179,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Defense_Evasion"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Eventvwr UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - FodHelper UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Detect tactics used by malware to evade defenses on Windows endpoints. A few of these include suspicious `reg.exe` processes, files hidden with `attrib.exe` and disabling user-account control, among many others 
 narrative = Defense evasion is a tactic--identified in the MITRE ATT&CK framework--that adversaries employ in a variety of ways to bypass or defeat defensive security measures. There are many techniques enumerated by the MITRE ATT&CK framework that are applicable in this context. This Analytic Story includes searches designed to identify the use of such techniques on Windows platforms.
 
@@ -1158,7 +1190,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2013/12/file-extensions-2/", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1042"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule", "ESCU - Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Execution of File with Multiple Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule", "ESCU - Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Execution of File with Multiple Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Detect and investigate suspected abuse of file extensions and Windows file associations. Some of the malicious behaviors involved may include inserting spaces before file extensions or prepending the file extension with a different one, among other techniques.
 narrative = Attackers use a variety of techniques to entice users to run malicious code or to persist on an endpoint. One way to accomplish these goals is to leverage file extensions and the mechanism Windows uses to associate files with specific applications. \
  Since its earliest days, Windows has used extensions to identify file types. Users have become familiar with these extensions and their application associations. For example, if users see that a file ends in `.doc` or `.docx`, they will assume that it is a Microsoft Word document and expect that double-clicking will open it using `winword.exe`. The user will typically also presume that the `.docx` file is safe. \
@@ -1173,7 +1205,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/", "https://zeltser.com/security-incident-log-review-checklist/", "http://journeyintoir.blogspot.com/2013/01/re-introducing-usnjrnl.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Adversaries often try to cover their tracks by manipulating Windows logs. Use these searches to help you monitor for suspicious activity surrounding log files--an essential component of an effective defense.
 narrative = Because attackers often modify system logs to cover their tracks and/or to thwart the investigative process, log monitoring is an industry-recognized best practice. While there are legitimate reasons to manipulate system logs, it is still worthwhile to keep track of who manipulated the logs, when they manipulated them, and in what way they manipulated them (determining which accesses, tools, or utilities were employed). Even if no malicious activity is detected, the knowledge of an attempt to manipulate system logs may be indicative of a broader security risk that should be thoroughly investigated.\
 The Analytic Story gives users two different ways to detect manipulation of Windows Event Logs and one way to detect deletion of the Update Sequence Number (USN) Change Journal. The story helps determine the history of the host and the users who have accessed it. Finally, the story aides in investigation by retrieving all the information on the process that caused these events (if the process has been identified).
@@ -1185,7 +1217,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["http://www.fuzzysecurity.com/tutorials/19.html", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2010/07/malware-persistence-windows-registry.html", "http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/common-malware-persistence-mechanisms/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/fin7-shim-databases-persistence.html", "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dq2Hv7J9fvk"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Certutil exe certificate extraction - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Certutil exe certificate extraction - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor for activities and techniques associated with maintaining persistence on a Windows system--a sign that an adversary may have compromised your environment.
 narrative = Maintaining persistence is one of the first steps taken by attackers after the initial compromise. Attackers leverage various custom and built-in tools to ensure survivability and persistent access within a compromised enterprise. This Analytic Story provides searches to help you identify various behaviors used by attackers to maintain persistent access to a Windows environment.
 
@@ -1196,7 +1228,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Child Processes of Spoolsv exe - Rule", "ESCU - Overwriting Accessibility Binaries - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Overwriting Accessibility Binaries - Rule", "ESCU - Child Processes of Spoolsv exe - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor for and investigate activities that may be associated with a Windows privilege-escalation attack, including unusual processes running on endpoints, modified registry keys, and more.
 narrative = Privilege escalation is a "land-and-expand" technique, wherein an adversary gains an initial foothold on a host and then exploits its weaknesses to increase his privileges. The motivation is simple: certain actions on a Windows machine--such as installing software--may require higher-level privileges than those the attacker initially acquired. By increasing his privilege level, the attacker can gain the control required to carry out his malicious ends. This Analytic Story provides searches to detect and investigate behaviors that attackers may use to elevate their privileges in your environment.
 
@@ -1207,7 +1239,7 @@ version = 3
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1050", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1031"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Windows services are often used by attackers for persistence and the ability to load drivers or otherwise interact with the Windows kernel. This Analytic Story helps you monitor your environment for indications that Windows services are being modified or created in a suspicious manner.
 narrative = The Windows operating system uses a services architecture to allow for running code in the background, similar to a UNIX daemon. Attackers will often leverage Windows services for persistence, hiding in plain sight, seeking the ability to run privileged code that can interact with the kernel. In many cases, attackers will create a new service to host their malicious code. Attackers have also been observed modifying unnecessary or unused services to point to their own code, as opposed to what was intended. In these cases, attackers often use tools to create or modify services in ways that are not typical for most environments, providing opportunities for detection.
 
@@ -1449,6 +1481,26 @@ annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1526"
 known_false_positives = Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but frequency, UA and source IPs will provide context.
 providing_technologies = []
 
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadFile - Rule]
+type = detection
+asset_type = 
+confidence = medium
+explanation = The following analytic identifies the use of PowerShell downloading a file using `DownloadFile` method. This particular method is utilized in many different PowerShell frameworks to download files and output to disk. Identify the source (IP/domain) and destination file and triage appropriately. If AMSI logging or PowerShell transaction logs are available, review for further details of the implant.
+how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
+annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001"]}
+known_false_positives = False positives may be present and filtering will need to occur by parent process or command line argument. It may be required to modify this query to an EDR product for more granular coverage.
+providing_technologies = []
+
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule]
+type = detection
+asset_type = 
+confidence = medium
+explanation = The following analytic identifies the use of PowerShell downloading a file using `DownloadString` method. This particular method is utilized in many different PowerShell frameworks to download files and output to disk. Identify the source (IP/domain) and destination file and triage appropriately. If AMSI logging or PowerShell transaction logs are available, review for further details of the implant.
+how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
+annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001"]}
+known_false_positives = False positives may be present and filtering will need to occur by parent process or command line argument. It may be required to modify this query to an EDR product for more granular coverage.
+providing_technologies = []
+
 [savedsearch://ESCU - Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
@@ -1655,6 +1707,17 @@ known_false_positives = This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define "fals
  This search will fire any time a new IP address is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your country, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you.
 providing_technologies = []
 
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Cobalt Strike Named Pipes - Rule]
+type = detection
+asset_type = Endpoint
+confidence = medium
+explanation = The following analytic identifies the use of default or publicly known named pipes used with Cobalt Strike. A named pipe is a named, one-way or duplex pipe for communication between the pipe server and one or more pipe clients. Cobalt Strike uses named pipes in many ways and has default values used with the Artifact Kit and Malleable C2 Profiles. The following query assists with identifying these default named pipes. Each EDR product presents named pipes a little different. Consider taking the values and generating a query based on the product of choice. \
+Upon triage, review the process performing the named pipe. If it is explorer.exe, It is possible it was injected into by another process. Review recent parallel processes to identify suspicious patterns or behaviors. A parallel process may have a network connection, review and follow the connection back to identify any file modifications.
+how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.
+annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]}
+known_false_positives = The idea of using named pipes with Cobalt Strike is to blend in. Therefore, some of the named pipes identified and added may cause false positives. Filter by process name or pipe name to reduce false positives.
+providing_technologies = []
+
 [savedsearch://ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
@@ -2778,6 +2841,16 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"
 known_false_positives = The false-positive rate will vary based on how you set the deviation_threshold and data_samples values. Our recommendation is to adjust these values based on your network traffic to and from your email servers.
 providing_technologies = []
 
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Eventvwr UAC Bypass - Rule]
+type = detection
+asset_type = 
+confidence = medium
+explanation = The following search identifies Eventvwr bypass by identifying the registry modification into a specific path that eventvwr.msc looks to (but is not valid) upon execution. A successful attack will include a suspicious command to be executed upon eventvwr.msc loading. Upon triage, review the parallel processes that have executed. Identify any additional registry modifications on the endpoint that may look suspicious. Remediate as necessary.
+how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node.
+annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.002"]}
+known_false_positives = Some false positives may be present and will need to be filtered.
+providing_technologies = []
+
 [savedsearch://ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
@@ -2858,6 +2931,20 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and C
 known_false_positives = Legitimate programs can also use command-line arguments to execute. Please verify the command-line arguments to check what command/program is being executed. We recommend customizing the `first_time_seen_cmd_line_filter` macro to exclude legitimate parent_process_name
 providing_technologies = []
 
+[savedsearch://ESCU - FodHelper UAC Bypass - Rule]
+type = detection
+asset_type = 
+confidence = medium
+explanation = Fodhelper.exe has a known UAC bypass as it attempts to look for specific registry keys upon execution, that do not exist. Therefore, an attacker can write its malicious commands in these registry keys to be executed by fodhelper.exe with the highest privilege. \
+1. `HKCU:\Software\Classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command`\
+1. `HKCU:\Software\Classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command\DelegateExecute`\
+1. `HKCU:\Software\Classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command\(default)`\
+Upon triage, fodhelper.exe will have a child process and read access will occur on the registry keys. Isolate the endpoint and review parallel processes for additional behavior.
+how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
+annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112", "T1548.002"]}
+known_false_positives = Limited to no false positives are expected.
+providing_technologies = []
+
 [savedsearch://ESCU - GCP Detect accounts with high risk roles by project - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = GCP Account
@@ -3298,6 +3385,16 @@ annotations = {"mitre_attack": ["T1525"]}
 known_false_positives = Uploading container is a normal behavior from developers or users with access to container registry.
 providing_technologies = []
 
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Nishang PowershellTCPOneLine - Rule]
+type = detection
+asset_type = 
+confidence = medium
+explanation = This query detects the Nishang Invoke-PowerShellTCPOneLine utility that spawns a call back to a remote command and control server. This is a powershell oneliner. In addition, this will capture on the command-line additional utilities used by Nishang. Triage the endpoint and identify any parallel processes that look suspicious. Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain contacted by the powershell process.
+how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
+annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001"]}
+known_false_positives = Limited false positives may be present. Filter as needed based on initial analysis.
+providing_technologies = []
+
 [savedsearch://ESCU - No Windows Updates in a time frame - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
@@ -3308,7 +3405,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 18"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.MA"]}
 known_false_positives = None identified
 providing_technologies = []
 
-[savedsearch://ESCU - Ntdsutil export ntds - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Ntdsutil Export NTDS - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -3710,6 +3807,16 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_att
 known_false_positives = If there are files with this keywoord as file names it might trigger false possitives, please make use of our filters to tune out potential FPs.
 providing_technologies = []
 
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Ryuk Wake on LAN Command - Rule]
+type = detection
+asset_type = 
+confidence = medium
+explanation = This Splunk query identifies the use of Wake-on-LAN utilized by Ryuk ransomware. The Ryuk Ransomware uses the Wake-on-Lan feature to turn on powered off devices on a compromised network to have greater success encrypting them. This is a high fidelity indicator of Ryuk ransomware executing on an endpoint. Upon triage, isolate the endpoint. Additional file modification events will be within the users profile (\appdata\roaming) and in public directories (users\public\). Review all Scheduled Tasks on the isolated endpoint and across the fleet. Suspicious Scheduled Tasks will include a path to a unknown binary and those endpoints should be isolated until triaged.
+how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
+annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.003"]}
+known_false_positives = Limited to no known false positives.
+providing_technologies = []
+
 [savedsearch://ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
@@ -3913,6 +4020,26 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Ob
 known_false_positives = There may be other processes in your environment that users may legitimately use to modify file associations. If this is the case and you are finding false positives, you can modify the search to add those processes as exceptions.
 providing_technologies = []
 
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Curl Network Connection - Rule]
+type = detection
+asset_type = Endpoint
+confidence = medium
+explanation = The following analytic identifies the use of a curl contacting suspicious remote domains to checkin to command and control servers or download further implants. In the context of Silver Sparrow, curl is identified contacting s3.amazonaws.com. This particular behavior is common with MacOS adware-malicious software.
+how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
+annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1105"]}
+known_false_positives = Unknown. Filter as needed.
+providing_technologies = []
+
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious DLLHost no Command Line Arguments - Rule]
+type = detection
+asset_type = 
+confidence = medium
+explanation = The following analytic identifies DLLHost.exe with no command line arguments. It is unusual for DLLHost.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. DLLHost.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64.
+how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.
+annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"]}
+known_false_positives = Limited false positives may be present in small environments. Tuning may be required based on parent process.
+providing_technologies = []
+
 [savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
@@ -3945,6 +4072,16 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"
 known_false_positives = It's possible for a legitimate file to be created with the same name as one noted in the lookup file. Filenames listed in the lookup file should be unique enough that collisions are rare. Looking at the location of the file and the process responsible for the activity can help determine whether or not the activity is legitimate.
 providing_technologies = []
 
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious GPUpdate no Command Line Arguments - Rule]
+type = detection
+asset_type = 
+confidence = medium
+explanation = The following analytic identifies gpupdate.exe with no command line arguments. It is unusual for gpupdate.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. gpupdate.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64.
+how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.
+annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"]}
+known_false_positives = Limited false positives may be present in small environments. Tuning may be required based on parent process.
+providing_technologies = []
+
 [savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Java Classes - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
@@ -3975,6 +4112,40 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre
 known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit this behavior, triggering a false positive.
 providing_technologies = []
 
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage - Rule]
+type = detection
+asset_type = Endpoint
+confidence = medium
+explanation = The following analytic identifies the use of a native MacOS utility, PlistBuddy, creating or modifying a properly list (.plist) file. In the instance of Silver Sparrow, the following commands were executed:\
+- PlistBuddy -c "Add :Label string init_verx" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \
+- PlistBuddy -c "Add :RunAtLoad bool true" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \
+- PlistBuddy -c "Add :StartInterval integer 3600" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \
+- PlistBuddy -c "Add :ProgramArguments array" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \
+- PlistBuddy -c "Add :ProgramArguments:0 string /bin/sh" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \
+- PlistBuddy -c "Add :ProgramArguments:1 string -c" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \
+Upon triage, capture the property list file being written to disk and review for further indicators. Contain the endpoint and triage further.
+how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
+annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543.001"]}
+known_false_positives = Some legitimate applications may use PlistBuddy to create or modify property lists and possibly generate false positives. Review the property list being modified or created to confirm.
+providing_technologies = []
+
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage via OSquery - Rule]
+type = detection
+asset_type = Endpoint
+confidence = medium
+explanation = The following analytic identifies the use of a native MacOS utility, PlistBuddy, creating or modifying a properly list (.plist) file. In the instance of Silver Sparrow, the following commands were executed:\
+- PlistBuddy -c "Add :Label string init_verx" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \
+- PlistBuddy -c "Add :RunAtLoad bool true" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \
+- PlistBuddy -c "Add :StartInterval integer 3600" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \
+- PlistBuddy -c "Add :ProgramArguments array" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \
+- PlistBuddy -c "Add :ProgramArguments:0 string /bin/sh" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \
+- PlistBuddy -c "Add :ProgramArguments:1 string -c" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \
+Upon triage, capture the property list file being written to disk and review for further indicators. Contain the endpoint and triage further.
+how_to_implement = OSQuery must be installed and configured to pick up process events (info at https://osquery.io) as well as using the Splunk OSQuery Add-on https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/4402. Modify the macro and validate fields are correct.
+annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543.001"]}
+known_false_positives = Some legitimate applications may use PlistBuddy to create or modify property lists and possibly generate false positives. Review the property list being modified or created to confirm.
+providing_technologies = []
+
 [savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
@@ -4025,7 +4196,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"
 known_false_positives = This is likely to produce false positives and will require some filtering. Tune the query by adding command line paths to known good DLLs, or filtering based on parent process names.
 providing_technologies = []
 
-[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 no CommandLine Arguments - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -4035,6 +4206,36 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"
 known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of rundll32, triggering a false positive.
 providing_technologies = []
 
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious SQLite3 LSQuarantine Behavior - Rule]
+type = detection
+asset_type = Endpoint
+confidence = medium
+explanation = The following analytic identifies the use of a SQLite3 querying the MacOS preferences to identify the original URL the pkg was downloaded from. This particular behavior is common with MacOS adware-malicious software. Upon triage, review other processes in parallel for suspicious activity. Identify any recent package installations.
+how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
+annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1074"]}
+known_false_positives = Unknown.
+providing_technologies = []
+
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule]
+type = detection
+asset_type = 
+confidence = medium
+explanation = The following detection identifies Scheduled Tasks registering (creating a new task) a binary or script to run from a public directory which includes users\public, \programdata\ and \windows\temp. Upon triage, review the binary or script in the command line for legitimacy, whether an approved binary/script or not. In addition, capture the binary or script in question and analyze for further behaviors. Identify the source and contain the endpoint.
+how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
+annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005"]}
+known_false_positives = Limited false positives may be present. Filter as needed by parent process or command line argument.
+providing_technologies = []
+
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious SearchProtocolHost no Command Line Arguments - Rule]
+type = detection
+asset_type = 
+confidence = medium
+explanation = The following analytic identifies searchprotocolhost.exe with no command line arguments. It is unusual for searchprotocolhost.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. searchprotocolhost.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64.
+how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.
+annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"]}
+known_false_positives = Limited false positives may be present in small environments. Tuning may be required based on parent process.
+providing_technologies = []
+
 [savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
@@ -4165,6 +4366,16 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 2"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"
 known_false_positives = None identified
 providing_technologies = []
 
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Unified Messaging Service Spawning a Process - Rule]
+type = detection
+asset_type = 
+confidence = medium
+explanation = This detection identifies Microsoft Exchange Server's Unified Messaging services, umworkerprocess.exe and umservice.exe, spawning a child process, indicating possible exploitation of CVE-2021-26857 vulnerability. The query filters out werfault.exe and wermgr.exe mostly due to potential false positives, however, if there is an excessive amount of "wermgr.exe" or "WerFault.exe" failures, it may be due to the active exploitation. During triage, identify any additional suspicious parallel processes. Identify any recent out of place file modifications. Review Exchange logs following Microsofts guide. To contain, perform egress filtering or restrict public access to Exchange. In final, patch the vulnerablity and monitor.
+how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.
+annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"]}
+known_false_positives = Unknown. Tune out child processes as needed to limit volume of false positives.
+providing_technologies = []
+
 [savedsearch://ESCU - Unload Sysmon Filter Driver - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = 
@@ -4225,6 +4436,16 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 4", "CIS 18", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phas
 known_false_positives = Very few legitimate Content-Type fields will have a length greater than 100 characters.
 providing_technologies = []
 
+[savedsearch://ESCU - W3WP Spawning Shell - Rule]
+type = detection
+asset_type = 
+confidence = medium
+explanation = This query identifies a shell, PowerShell.exe or Cmd.exe, spawning from W3WP.exe, or IIS. In addition to IIS logs, this behavior with an EDR product will capture potential webshell activity, similar to the HAFNIUM Group abusing CVEs, on publicly available Exchange mail servers. During triage, review the parent process and child process of the shell being spawned. Review the command-line arguments and any file modifications that may occur. Identify additional parallel process, child processes, that may highlight further commands executed. After triaging, work to contain the threat and patch the system that is vulnerable.
+how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
+annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1505.003"]}
+known_false_positives = Baseline your environment before production. It is possible build systems using IIS will spawn cmd.exe to perform a software build. Filter as needed.
+providing_technologies = []
+
 [savedsearch://ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
@@ -4319,10 +4540,10 @@ providing_technologies = []
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
-explanation = The search looks for the Registry Key DisableAntiSpyware set to disable. This is consistent with Ryuk infections across a fleet of endpoints.
-how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records the process-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint Processes data-model object. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data.
+explanation = The search looks for the Registry Key DisableAntiSpyware set to disable. This is consistent with Ryuk infections across a fleet of endpoints. This particular behavior is typically executed when an ransomware actor gains access to an endpoint and beings to perform execution. Usually, a batch (.bat) will be executed and multiple registry and scheduled task modifications will occur. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further file modifications. Endpoint should be isolated.
+how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node.
 annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]}
-known_false_positives = It is unusual to turn this feature on a Windows system since it is a default security control, although it is not rare for some policies to disable it. Although no false positives have been identified, use the provided filter macro to tune the search.
+known_false_positives = It is unusual to turn this feature off a Windows system since it is a default security control, although it is not rare for some policies to disable it. Although no false positives have been identified, use the provided filter macro to tune the search.
 providing_technologies = []
 
 [savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule]

package/lookups/mitre_enrichment.csv

@@ -1,107 +1,5 @@
 mitre_id,technique,tactics,groups
-T1484.002,Domain Trust Modification,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,UNC2452
-T1484.001,Group Policy Modification,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
-T1606.002,SAML Tokens,Credential Access,UNC2452
-T1606.001,Web Cookies,Credential Access,UNC2452
-T1606,Forge Web Credentials,Credential Access,no
-T1059.008,Network Device CLI,Execution,no
-T1602.002,Network Device Configuration Dump,Collection,no
-T1542.005,TFTP Boot,Defense Evasion|Persistence,no
-T1542.004,ROMMONkit,Defense Evasion|Persistence,no
-T1602.001,SNMP (MIB Dump),Collection,no
-T1602,Data from Configuration Repository,Collection,no
-T1601.002,Downgrade System Image,Defense Evasion,no
-T1601.001,Patch System Image,Defense Evasion,no
-T1601,Modify System Image,Defense Evasion,no
-T1600.002,Disable Crypto Hardware,Defense Evasion,no
-T1600.001,Reduce Key Space,Defense Evasion,no
-T1600,Weaken Encryption,Defense Evasion,no
-T1556.004,Network Device Authentication,Credential Access|Defense Evasion,no
-T1599.001,Network Address Translation Traversal,Defense Evasion,no
-T1599,Network Boundary Bridging,Defense Evasion,no
-T1020.001,Traffic Duplication,Exfiltration,no
-T1557.002,ARP Cache Poisoning,Credential Access|Collection,Cleaver
-T1588.006,Vulnerabilities,Resource Development,no
-T1053.006,Systemd Timers,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
-T1562.008,Disable Cloud Logs,Defense Evasion,no
-T1547.012,Print Processors,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
-T1598.003,Spearphishing Link,Reconnaissance,no
-T1598.002,Spearphishing Attachment,Reconnaissance,no
-T1598.001,Spearphishing Service,Reconnaissance,no
-T1598,Phishing for Information,Reconnaissance,no
-T1597.002,Purchase Technical Data,Reconnaissance,no
-T1597.001,Threat Intel Vendors,Reconnaissance,no
-T1597,Search Closed Sources,Reconnaissance,no
-T1596.005,Scan Databases,Reconnaissance,no
-T1596.004,CDNs,Reconnaissance,no
-T1596.003,Digital Certificates,Reconnaissance,no
-T1596.001,DNS/Passive DNS,Reconnaissance,no
-T1596.002,WHOIS,Reconnaissance,no
-T1596,Search Open Technical Databases,Reconnaissance,no
-T1595.002,Vulnerability Scanning,Reconnaissance,no
-T1595.001,Scanning IP Blocks,Reconnaissance,no
-T1595,Active Scanning,Reconnaissance,no
-T1594,Search Victim-Owned Websites,Reconnaissance,no
-T1593.002,Search Engines,Reconnaissance,no
-T1593.001,Social Media,Reconnaissance,no
-T1593,Search Open Websites/Domains,Reconnaissance,no
-T1592.004,Client Configurations,Reconnaissance,no
-T1592.003,Firmware,Reconnaissance,no
-T1592.002,Software,Reconnaissance,no
-T1592.001,Hardware,Reconnaissance,no
-T1592,Gather Victim Host Information,Reconnaissance,no
-T1591.004,Identify Roles,Reconnaissance,no
-T1591.003,Identify Business Tempo,Reconnaissance,no
-T1591.001,Determine Physical Locations,Reconnaissance,no
-T1591.002,Business Relationships,Reconnaissance,no
-T1591,Gather Victim Org Information,Reconnaissance,no
-T1590.006,Network Security Appliances,Reconnaissance,no
-T1590.005,IP Addresses,Reconnaissance,no
-T1590.004,Network Topology,Reconnaissance,no
-T1590.003,Network Trust Dependencies,Reconnaissance,no
-T1590.002,DNS,Reconnaissance,no
-T1590.001,Domain Properties,Reconnaissance,no
-T1590,Gather Victim Network Information,Reconnaissance,no
-T1589.003,Employee Names,Reconnaissance,no
-T1589.002,Email Addresses,Reconnaissance,no
-T1589.001,Credentials,Reconnaissance,no
-T1589,Gather Victim Identity Information,Reconnaissance,no
-T1588.005,Exploits,Resource Development,no
-T1588.004,Digital Certificates,Resource Development,no
-T1588.003,Code Signing Certificates,Resource Development,Wizard Spider
-T1588.002,Tool,Resource Development,no
-T1588.001,Malware,Resource Development,Turla|APT1
-T1588,Obtain Capabilities,Resource Development,no
-T1587.004,Exploits,Resource Development,no
-T1587.003,Digital Certificates,Resource Development,APT29|PROMETHIUM
-T1587.002,Code Signing Certificates,Resource Development,PROMETHIUM|Patchwork
-T1587.001,Malware,Resource Development,UNC2452|Turla|FIN7|Night Dragon|Cleaver
-T1587,Develop Capabilities,Resource Development,no
-T1586.002,Email Accounts,Resource Development,no
-T1586.001,Social Media Accounts,Resource Development,no
-T1586,Compromise Accounts,Resource Development,no
-T1585.002,Email Accounts,Resource Development,APT1
-T1585.001,Social Media Accounts,Resource Development,Cleaver
-T1585,Establish Accounts,Resource Development,APT17
-T1584.006,Web Services,Resource Development,Turla
-T1584.005,Botnet,Resource Development,no
-T1584.004,Server,Resource Development,Turla|APT16
-T1584.003,Virtual Private Server,Resource Development,Turla
-T1584.002,DNS Server,Resource Development,no
-T1584.001,Domains,Resource Development,APT1
-T1583.006,Web Services,Resource Development,APT17|APT29
-T1583.005,Botnet,Resource Development,no
-T1583.004,Server,Resource Development,no
-T1583.003,Virtual Private Server,Resource Development,TEMP.Veles
-T1583.002,DNS Server,Resource Development,no
-T1584,Compromise Infrastructure,Resource Development,no
-T1583.001,Domains,Resource Development,APT1|APT28
-T1583,Acquire Infrastructure,Resource Development,no
-T1564.007,VBA Stomping,Defense Evasion,no
-T1558.004,AS-REP Roasting,Credential Access,no
-T1580,Cloud Infrastructure Discovery,Discovery,no
-T1218.012,Verclsid,Defense Evasion,no
-T1205.001,Port Knocking,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Command And Control,PROMETHIUM
+T1205.001,Port Knocking,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Command And Control,no
 T1564.006,Run Virtual Instance,Defense Evasion,no
 T1564.005,Hidden File System,Defense Evasion,Strider|Equation
 T1556.003,Pluggable Authentication Modules,Credential Access|Defense Evasion,no
@@ -109,7 +7,7 @@ T1574.012,COR_PROFILER,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,Blue Moc
 T1562.007,Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall,Defense Evasion,no
 T1098.004,SSH Authorized Keys,Persistence,no
 T1480.001,Environmental Keying,Defense Evasion,APT41|Equation
-T1059.007,JavaScript/JScript,Execution,FIN6|APT32|FIN7|Cobalt Group|Molerats|TA505|Silence|Leafminer
+T1059.007,JavaScript/JScript,Execution,APT32|FIN7|Cobalt Group|Molerats|TA505|Silence|Leafminer
 T1578.004,Revert Cloud Instance,Defense Evasion,no
 T1578.003,Delete Cloud Instance,Defense Evasion,no
 T1578.001,Create Snapshot,Defense Evasion,no
@@ -126,35 +24,35 @@ T1546.015,Component Object Model Hijacking,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,APT2
 T1071.004,DNS,Command And Control,APT39|Tropic Trooper|OilRig|Ke3chang|Cobalt Group|APT18|APT41|FIN7
 T1071.003,Mail Protocols,Command And Control,APT32|SilverTerrier|APT28
 T1071.002,File Transfer Protocols,Command And Control,APT41|SilverTerrier|Machete|Honeybee
-T1071.001,Web Protocols,Command And Control,UNC2452|Sandworm Team|TA505|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Inception|APT41|SilverTerrier|Machete|APT28|WIRTE|APT33|FIN4|Night Dragon|APT18|APT38|Threat Group-3390|Cobalt Group|APT37|Turla|APT19|Rancor|Orangeworm|Dark Caracal|Ke3chang|Lazarus Group|APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|OilRig|Magic Hound|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon
+T1071.001,Web Protocols,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|TA505|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Inception|APT41|SilverTerrier|Machete|APT28|WIRTE|APT33|FIN4|Night Dragon|APT18|APT38|Cobalt Group|APT19|Threat Group-3390|Rancor|Orangeworm|APT37|Ke3chang|Dark Caracal|Turla|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|OilRig|Magic Hound|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon
 T1572,Protocol Tunneling,Command And Control,OilRig|Cobalt Group|FIN6
-T1048.003,Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol,Exfiltration,Wizard Spider|FIN6|APT32|APT33|Thrip|FIN8|OilRig|Lazarus Group
-T1048.002,Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol,Exfiltration,UNC2452
+T1048.003,Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol,Exfiltration,APT32|APT33|Thrip|FIN8|OilRig|Lazarus Group
+T1048.002,Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol,Exfiltration,no
 T1048.001,Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol,Exfiltration,no
 T1001.003,Protocol Impersonation,Command And Control,Lazarus Group
-T1001.002,Steganography,Command And Control,APT29|Axiom
+T1001.002,Steganography,Command And Control,Axiom
 T1001.001,Junk Data,Command And Control,APT28
 T1132.002,Non-Standard Encoding,Command And Control,no
 T1132.001,Standard Encoding,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|APT33|APT19|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork
 T1090.004,Domain Fronting,Command And Control,APT29
 T1090.003,Multi-hop Proxy,Command And Control,Inception|FIN4|APT29
 T1090.002,External Proxy,Command And Control,APT39|Silence|Soft Cell|MuddyWater|APT3|FIN5|Lazarus Group|menuPass|APT28
-T1090.001,Internal Proxy,Command And Control,UNC2452|APT39|Strider
+T1090.001,Internal Proxy,Command And Control,APT39|Strider
 T1102.003,One-Way Communication,Command And Control,Leviathan
-T1102.002,Bidirectional Communication,Command And Control,APT29|Sandworm Team|APT39|APT12|Turla|FIN7|APT37|Magic Hound|Carbanak
+T1102.002,Bidirectional Communication,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|APT39|APT12|Turla|FIN7|APT37|Magic Hound|Carbanak
 T1102.001,Dead Drop Resolver,Command And Control,Rocke|APT41|BRONZE BUTLER|RTM|Patchwork
 T1571,Non-Standard Port,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|Rocke|DarkVishnya|Silence|APT-C-36|Magic Hound|APT33|APT32|TEMP.Veles|Lazarus Group|FIN7
-T1074.002,Remote Data Staging,Collection,UNC2452|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|FIN6|Night Dragon|FIN8
-T1074.001,Local Data Staging,Collection,Machete|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|Patchwork|Honeybee|Dragonfly 2.0|Leviathan|FIN5|APT3|menuPass|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28
+T1074.002,Remote Data Staging,Collection,Threat Group-3390|menuPass|FIN6|Night Dragon|FIN8
+T1074.001,Local Data Staging,Collection,Machete|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|Patchwork|Dragonfly 2.0|Honeybee|Leviathan|APT3|FIN5|menuPass|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28
 T1078.004,Cloud Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,APT33
 T1564.004,NTFS File Attributes,Defense Evasion,APT32
 T1564.003,Hidden Window,Defense Evasion,Gorgon Group|Deep Panda|DarkHydrus|CopyKittens|APT19|APT32|APT28|APT3|Magic Hound
-T1078.003,Local Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,PROMETHIUM|Tropic Trooper|FIN10|Stolen Pencil|APT32
-T1078.002,Domain Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,Wizard Spider|APT29|TA505|APT3|Threat Group-1314
+T1078.003,Local Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,Tropic Trooper|FIN10|Stolen Pencil|APT32
+T1078.002,Domain Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,TA505|APT3|Threat Group-1314
 T1078.001,Default Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,no
 T1564.002,Hidden Users,Defense Evasion,no
 T1574.006,LD_PRELOAD,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,Rocke
-T1574.002,DLL Side-Loading,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,BRONZE BUTLER|Naikon|APT41|Soft Cell|Tropic Trooper|APT19|Patchwork|APT32|APT3|menuPass|Threat Group-3390
+T1574.002,DLL Side-Loading,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,BRONZE BUTLER|Naikon|APT41|Soft Cell|Tropic Trooper|Patchwork|APT19|APT32|APT3|menuPass|Threat Group-3390
 T1574.001,DLL Search Order Hijacking,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,Whitefly|RTM|Threat Group-3390|menuPass
 T1574.008,Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
 T1574.007,Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
@@ -166,37 +64,37 @@ T1574,Hijack Execution Flow,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
 T1069.001,Local Groups,Discovery,Turla|OilRig|admin@338
 T1570,Lateral Tool Transfer,Lateral Movement,APT32|Wizard Spider|Turla|FIN10
 T1568.003,DNS Calculation,Command And Control,APT12
-T1204.002,Malicious File,Execution,FIN6|PROMETHIUM|APT30|Magic Hound|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|RTM|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|Machete|admin@338|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|Cobalt Group|BRONZE BUTLER|DarkHydrus|APT32|Dark Caracal|FIN7|Gorgon Group|OilRig|MuddyWater|Lazarus Group|Patchwork|Rancor|TA459|APT28|FIN8|APT37|APT29|menuPass|Elderwood|Leviathan|PLATINUM
-T1204.001,Malicious Link,Execution,Wizard Spider|Patchwork|Windshift|APT32|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|TA505|OilRig|Machete|Leviathan|FIN8|FIN4|Elderwood|Dragonfly 2.0|Cobalt Group|APT39|Night Dragon|APT33|Turla
+T1204.002,Malicious File,Execution,Magic Hound|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|RTM|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|Machete|admin@338|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|BRONZE BUTLER|Cobalt Group|DarkHydrus|Gorgon Group|Patchwork|OilRig|Dark Caracal|MuddyWater|Lazarus Group|FIN7|APT32|Rancor|APT37|FIN8|APT28|Elderwood|TA459|APT29|Leviathan|menuPass|PLATINUM
+T1204.001,Malicious Link,Execution,Patchwork|Windshift|APT32|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|TA505|OilRig|Machete|Leviathan|FIN8|FIN4|Elderwood|Dragonfly 2.0|Cobalt Group|APT39|Night Dragon|APT33|Turla
 T1195.003,Compromise Hardware Supply Chain,Initial Access,no
-T1195.002,Compromise Software Supply Chain,Initial Access,UNC2452|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Dragonfly|Sandworm Team|APT41
+T1195.002,Compromise Software Supply Chain,Initial Access,Sandworm Team|APT41
 T1195.001,Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools,Initial Access,no
-T1568.001,Fast Flux DNS,Command And Control,Machete|TA505
+T1568.001,Fast Flux DNS,Command And Control,TA505
 T1052.001,Exfiltration over USB,Exfiltration,Tropic Trooper
-T1569.002,Service Execution,Execution,Wizard Spider|Blue Mockingbird|APT39|APT41|Silence|FIN6|APT32|Honeybee|Ke3chang
+T1569.002,Service Execution,Execution,Blue Mockingbird|APT39|APT41|Silence|FIN6|APT32|Honeybee|Ke3chang
 T1569.001,Launchctl,Execution,no
 T1569,System Services,Execution,no
 T1568.002,Domain Generation Algorithms,Command And Control,APT41
-T1568,Dynamic Resolution,Command And Control,UNC2452
+T1568,Dynamic Resolution,Command And Control,no
 T1011.001,Exfiltration Over Bluetooth,Exfiltration,no
 T1567.002,Exfiltration to Cloud Storage,Exfiltration,Leviathan|Turla
 T1567.001,Exfiltration to Code Repository,Exfiltration,no
-T1059.006,Python,Execution,APT29|Rocke|BRONZE BUTLER|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|Machete
-T1059.005,Visual Basic,Execution,Lazarus Group|APT33|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|Rancor|Patchwork|MuddyWater|Honeybee|FIN7|APT37|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|Turla|TA505|Silence|WIRTE|FIN4|Cobalt Group|Gorgon Group|TA459|Leviathan|Magic Hound
+T1059.006,Python,Execution,Rocke|BRONZE BUTLER|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|Machete
+T1059.005,Visual Basic,Execution,APT33|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|Rancor|Patchwork|MuddyWater|Honeybee|FIN7|APT37|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|Turla|TA505|Silence|WIRTE|FIN4|Cobalt Group|Gorgon Group|Leviathan|TA459|Magic Hound
 T1059.004,Unix Shell,Execution,Rocke|APT41
-T1059.003,Windows Command Shell,Execution,UNC2452|Wizard Spider|FIN6|TA505|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|OilRig|Lazarus Group|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|FIN7|APT41|Soft Cell|Turla|Silence|APT32|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Gorgon Group|Dark Caracal|Ke3chang|Dragonfly 2.0|Rancor|APT37|Leviathan|FIN8|APT28|Sowbug|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|FIN10|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Suckfly|Threat Group-1314|APT3|admin@338|APT1
+T1059.003,Windows Command Shell,Execution,TA505|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|OilRig|Lazarus Group|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|FIN7|APT41|Soft Cell|Turla|Silence|APT32|APT39|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Dark Caracal|Gorgon Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Rancor|Ke3chang|APT37|Leviathan|FIN8|APT28|Magic Hound|Sowbug|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN10|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Gamaredon Group|Suckfly|Patchwork|Threat Group-1314|APT3|admin@338|APT1
 T1059.002,AppleScript,Execution,no
-T1059.001,PowerShell,Execution,UNC2452|Lazarus Group|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|APT39|DarkVishnya|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Inception|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|Soft Cell|TA505|WIRTE|TEMP.Veles|APT33|Gallmaker|Turla|Gorgon Group|APT19|DarkHydrus|APT28|Dragonfly 2.0|Thrip|Cobalt Group|Leviathan|TA459|MuddyWater|FIN8|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|CopyKittens|OilRig|FIN10|APT32|FIN7|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Poseidon Group|APT3|APT29|Deep Panda
+T1059.001,PowerShell,Execution,Blue Mockingbird|APT39|DarkVishnya|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Inception|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|Soft Cell|TA505|WIRTE|TEMP.Veles|APT33|Gallmaker|Turla|APT19|DarkHydrus|APT28|Thrip|Gorgon Group|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Leviathan|TA459|FIN8|MuddyWater|Magic Hound|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|CopyKittens|APT32|FIN7|FIN10|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Poseidon Group|APT3|APT29|Deep Panda
 T1567,Exfiltration Over Web Service,Exfiltration,no
 T1497.003,Time Based Evasion,Defense Evasion|Discovery,no
 T1497.002,User Activity Based Checks,Defense Evasion|Discovery,FIN7
 T1497.001,System Checks,Defense Evasion|Discovery,Frankenstein
 T1498.002,Reflection Amplification,Impact,no
 T1498.001,Direct Network Flood,Impact,no
-T1566.003,Spearphishing via Service,Initial Access,Lazarus Group|Magic Hound|Windshift|FIN6|OilRig|Dark Caracal
-T1566.002,Spearphishing Link,Initial Access,Wizard Spider|APT1|Windshift|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|Machete|Kimsuky|TA505|Stolen Pencil|APT39|FIN4|APT32|Night Dragon|OilRig|Turla|APT28|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|APT33|Elderwood|APT29|Leviathan|Patchwork|Magic Hound|FIN8
-T1566.001,Spearphishing Attachment,Initial Access,APT1|FIN6|APT30|Magic Hound|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Mofang|Wizard Spider|RTM|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|APT41|Machete|admin@338|Kimsuky|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|Tropic Trooper|Turla|Cobalt Group|FIN7|OilRig|Gorgon Group|Rancor|DarkHydrus|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|Lazarus Group|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|MuddyWater|TA459|APT28|PLATINUM|Patchwork|Elderwood|APT29|Leviathan|APT37|menuPass
-T1566,Phishing,Initial Access,GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Dragonfly
+T1566.003,Spearphishing via Service,Initial Access,Magic Hound|Windshift|FIN6|OilRig|Dark Caracal
+T1566.002,Spearphishing Link,Initial Access,Windshift|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|Machete|Kimsuky|TA505|Stolen Pencil|APT39|FIN4|APT32|Night Dragon|Turla|APT28|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|APT33|Elderwood|Leviathan|Magic Hound|Patchwork|APT29|FIN8
+T1566.001,Spearphishing Attachment,Initial Access,Magic Hound|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Mofang|Wizard Spider|RTM|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|APT41|Machete|admin@338|Kimsuky|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|Tropic Trooper|Turla|Gorgon Group|Rancor|DarkHydrus|Cobalt Group|FIN7|OilRig|Lazarus Group|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|FIN8|MuddyWater|APT28|TA459|Leviathan|Patchwork|PLATINUM|Elderwood|APT29|APT37|menuPass
+T1566,Phishing,Initial Access,no
 T1565.003,Runtime Data Manipulation,Impact,APT38
 T1565.002,Transmitted Data Manipulation,Impact,APT38
 T1565.001,Stored Data Manipulation,Impact,FIN4|APT38
@@ -206,18 +104,18 @@ T1564,Hide Artifacts,Defense Evasion,no
 T1563.002,RDP Hijacking,Lateral Movement,no
 T1563.001,SSH Hijacking,Lateral Movement,no
 T1563,Remote Service Session Hijacking,Lateral Movement,no
-T1518.001,Security Software Discovery,Discovery,Wizard Spider|Turla|Rocke|Frankenstein|The White Company|Cobalt Group|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|Tropic Trooper|FIN8|Patchwork|Naikon
+T1518.001,Security Software Discovery,Discovery,Turla|Rocke|Frankenstein|The White Company|Cobalt Group|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|Tropic Trooper|FIN8|Patchwork|Naikon
 T1069.003,Cloud Groups,Discovery,no
 T1069.002,Domain Groups,Discovery,Turla|Wizard Spider|Inception|OilRig|FIN6|Dragonfly 2.0|Ke3chang
 T1087.004,Cloud Account,Discovery,no
 T1087.003,Email Account,Discovery,Sandworm Team|TA505
-T1087.002,Domain Account,Discovery,Wizard Spider|Chimera|Turla|Sandworm Team|Dragonfly 2.0|BRONZE BUTLER|OilRig|menuPass|FIN6|Poseidon Group|Ke3chang
+T1087.002,Domain Account,Discovery,Turla|Sandworm Team|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN6|Poseidon Group|Ke3chang
 T1087.001,Local Account,Discovery,Turla|Poseidon Group|OilRig|Ke3chang|APT32|APT1|Threat Group-3390|APT3|admin@338
 T1553.004,Install Root Certificate,Defense Evasion,no
-T1562.004,Disable or Modify System Firewall,Defense Evasion,UNC2452|Rocke|Lazarus Group|Kimsuky|Dragonfly 2.0|Carbanak
-T1562.003,Impair Command History Logging,Defense Evasion,no
-T1562.002,Disable Windows Event Logging,Defense Evasion,UNC2452|Threat Group-3390
-T1562.001,Disable or Modify Tools,Defense Evasion,UNC2452|Wizard Spider|FIN6|Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Rocke|Kimsuky|Turla|Night Dragon|Gorgon Group|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda
+T1562.004,Disable or Modify System Firewall,Defense Evasion,Rocke|Lazarus Group|Kimsuky|Dragonfly 2.0|Carbanak
+T1562.003,HISTCONTROL,Defense Evasion,no
+T1562.002,Disable Windows Event Logging,Defense Evasion,Threat Group-3390
+T1562.001,Disable or Modify Tools,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Rocke|Kimsuky|Turla|Night Dragon|Gorgon Group|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda
 T1562,Impair Defenses,Defense Evasion,no
 T1003.004,LSA Secrets,Credential Access,OilRig|MuddyWater|menuPass|Leafminer|Ke3chang|Dragonfly 2.0|APT33|Threat Group-3390
 T1003.005,Cached Domain Credentials,Credential Access,OilRig|MuddyWater|Leafminer|APT33
@@ -226,8 +124,8 @@ T1561.001,Disk Content Wipe,Impact,Lazarus Group
 T1561,Disk Wipe,Impact,no
 T1560.003,Archive via Custom Method,Collection,Lazarus Group|Kimsuky|CopyKittens|FIN6
 T1560.002,Archive via Library,Collection,Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390
-T1560.001,Archive via Utility,Collection,UNC2452|Chimera|APT41|Soft Cell|Turla|Gallmaker|APT33|APT39|MuddyWater|Magic Hound|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|CopyKittens|APT3|Sowbug|menuPass|APT1|Ke3chang
-T1560,Archive Collected Data,Collection,menuPass|APT32|Patchwork|Honeybee|APT28|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Ke3chang
+T1560.001,Archive via Utility,Collection,APT41|Soft Cell|Turla|Gallmaker|APT33|APT39|MuddyWater|Magic Hound|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|CopyKittens|APT3|Sowbug|menuPass|APT1|Ke3chang
+T1560,Archive Collected Data,Collection,menuPass|APT32|Honeybee|Patchwork|APT28|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Ke3chang
 T1499.004,Application or System Exploitation,Impact,no
 T1499.003,Application Exhaustion Flood,Impact,no
 T1499.002,Service Exhaustion Flood,Impact,no
@@ -235,7 +133,7 @@ T1499.001,OS Exhaustion Flood,Impact,no
 T1491.002,External Defacement,Impact,no
 T1491.001,Internal Defacement,Impact,Lazarus Group
 T1114.003,Email Forwarding Rule,Collection,no
-T1114.002,Remote Email Collection,Collection,UNC2452|APT1|FIN4|APT28|Dragonfly 2.0|Ke3chang|Leafminer
+T1114.002,Remote Email Collection,Collection,APT1|FIN4|APT28|Dragonfly 2.0|Ke3chang|Leafminer
 T1114.001,Local Email Collection,Collection,Magic Hound|APT1
 T1134.005,SID-History Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
 T1134.004,Parent PID Spoofing,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
@@ -244,93 +142,93 @@ T1134.002,Create Process with Token,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Turla|L
 T1134.001,Token Impersonation/Theft,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,APT28
 T1213.002,Sharepoint,Collection,Ke3chang|APT28
 T1213.001,Confluence,Collection,no
-T1555.003,Credentials from Web Browsers,Credential Access,FIN6|Magic Hound|Sandworm Team|Inception|Stealth Falcon|OilRig|Leafminer|APT33|APT3|Kimsuky|TA505|Stolen Pencil|MuddyWater|APT37|Patchwork|Molerats
+T1555.003,Credentials from Web Browsers,Credential Access,Magic Hound|Sandworm Team|Inception|Stealth Falcon|OilRig|Leafminer|APT33|APT3|Kimsuky|TA505|Stolen Pencil|MuddyWater|APT37|Patchwork|Molerats
 T1555.002,Securityd Memory,Credential Access,no
 T1555.001,Keychain,Credential Access,no
-T1559.002,Dynamic Data Exchange,Execution,Sharpshooter|TA505|MuddyWater|Gallmaker|Patchwork|Cobalt Group|APT37|FIN7|APT28
+T1559.002,Dynamic Data Exchange,Execution,Sharpshooter|TA505|MuddyWater|Gallmaker|Patchwork|Cobalt Group|APT37|APT28|FIN7
 T1559.001,Component Object Model,Execution,Gamaredon Group|MuddyWater
 T1559,Inter-Process Communication,Execution,no
 T1558.002,Silver Ticket,Credential Access,no
 T1558.001,Golden Ticket,Credential Access,Ke3chang
 T1558,Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets,Credential Access,no
-T1557.001,LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay,Credential Access|Collection,Wizard Spider
+T1557.001,LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay,Credential Access|Collection,no
 T1557,Man-in-the-Middle,Credential Access|Collection,no
 T1556.002,Password Filter DLL,Credential Access|Defense Evasion,Strider
-T1556.001,Domain Controller Authentication,Credential Access|Defense Evasion,Chimera
+T1556.001,Domain Controller Authentication,Credential Access|Defense Evasion,no
 T1556,Modify Authentication Process,Credential Access|Defense Evasion,no
 T1056.004,Credential API Hooking,Collection|Credential Access,PLATINUM
 T1056.003,Web Portal Capture,Collection|Credential Access,no
 T1056.002,GUI Input Capture,Collection|Credential Access,FIN4
-T1056.001,Keylogging,Collection|Credential Access,APT32|Sandworm Team|APT39|APT41|Kimsuky|menuPass|Stolen Pencil|FIN4|APT38|Ke3chang|OilRig|PLATINUM|Magic Hound|Sowbug|Group5|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT3|Darkhotel|APT28
-T1555,Credentials from Password Stores,Credential Access,UNC2452|FIN6|APT39|OilRig|MuddyWater|Leafminer|APT33|Turla|Stealth Falcon
+T1056.001,Keylogging,Collection|Credential Access,APT32|Sandworm Team|APT39|APT41|Kimsuky|menuPass|Stolen Pencil|FIN4|APT38|Ke3chang|OilRig|PLATINUM|Sowbug|Magic Hound|Group5|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT3|Darkhotel|APT28
+T1555,Credentials from Password Stores,Credential Access,APT39|OilRig|MuddyWater|Leafminer|APT33|Turla|Stealth Falcon
 T1552.005,Cloud Instance Metadata API,Credential Access,no
 T1003.008,/etc/passwd and /etc/shadow,Credential Access,no
 T1003.007,Proc Filesystem,Credential Access,no
-T1003.006,DCSync,Credential Access,UNC2452
-T1558.003,Kerberoasting,Credential Access,UNC2452|Wizard Spider
+T1003.006,DCSync,Credential Access,no
+T1558.003,Kerberoasting,Credential Access,no
 T1552.006,Group Policy Preferences,Credential Access,APT33
-T1003.003,NTDS,Credential Access,Wizard Spider|Chimera|FIN6|Dragonfly 2.0
-T1003.002,Security Account Manager,Credential Access,Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390|Ke3chang|Soft Cell|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|menuPass
-T1003.001,LSASS Memory,Credential Access,Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Blue Mockingbird|Silence|Threat Group-3390|Leviathan|APT41|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|Stolen Pencil|APT32|Lazarus Group|Magic Hound|Leafminer|MuddyWater|FIN8|PLATINUM|BRONZE BUTLER|OilRig|FIN6|APT3|APT28|APT1|Ke3chang|Cleaver
+T1003.003,NTDS,Credential Access,FIN6|Dragonfly 2.0
+T1003.002,Security Account Manager,Credential Access,Threat Group-3390|Ke3chang|Soft Cell|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|menuPass
+T1003.001,LSASS Memory,Credential Access,Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Blue Mockingbird|Silence|Threat Group-3390|Leviathan|APT41|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|Stolen Pencil|APT32|Lazarus Group|Leafminer|Magic Hound|MuddyWater|PLATINUM|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|OilRig|FIN6|APT3|APT28|APT1|Ke3chang|Cleaver
 T1110.004,Credential Stuffing,Credential Access,no
-T1110.003,Password Spraying,Credential Access,APT28|APT33|Leafminer|Lazarus Group
-T1110.002,Password Cracking,Credential Access,FIN6|APT41|Dragonfly 2.0|APT3
-T1110.001,Password Guessing,Credential Access,APT28
-T1021.006,Windows Remote Management,Lateral Movement,UNC2452|Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390
+T1110.003,Password Spraying,Credential Access,APT33|Leafminer|Lazarus Group
+T1110.002,Password Cracking,Credential Access,APT41|Dragonfly 2.0|APT3
+T1110.001,Password Guessing,Credential Access,no
+T1021.006,Windows Remote Management,Lateral Movement,Threat Group-3390
 T1021.005,VNC,Lateral Movement,GCMAN
 T1021.004,SSH,Lateral Movement,Rocke|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|OilRig|menuPass|GCMAN
 T1021.003,Distributed Component Object Model,Lateral Movement,no
-T1021.002,SMB/Windows Admin Shares,Lateral Movement,Wizard Spider|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|APT39|APT32|Orangeworm|FIN8|APT3|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-1314|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang
-T1021.001,Remote Desktop Protocol,Lateral Movement,Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Stolen Pencil|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|APT3|OilRig|menuPass|FIN10|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|APT1|Axiom
+T1021.002,SMB/Windows Admin Shares,Lateral Movement,Blue Mockingbird|APT39|APT32|Orangeworm|FIN8|APT3|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-1314|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang
+T1021.001,Remote Desktop Protocol,Lateral Movement,Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Stolen Pencil|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|APT3|OilRig|menuPass|FIN10|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|APT1|Axiom
 T1554,Compromise Client Software Binary,Persistence,no
 T1036.006,Space after Filename,Defense Evasion,no
-T1036.005,Match Legitimate Name or Location,Defense Evasion,UNC2452|Chimera|PROMETHIUM|Rocke|Sandworm Team|APT39|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Silence|APT41|menuPass|TEMP.Veles|MuddyWater|BRONZE BUTLER|Sowbug|APT32|Patchwork|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Carbanak|APT1
-T1036.004,Masquerade Task or Service,Defense Evasion,UNC2452|Lazarus Group|PROMETHIUM|Wizard Spider|APT-C-36|Carbanak|APT32|FIN6|FIN7
+T1036.005,Match Legitimate Name or Location,Defense Evasion,Rocke|Sandworm Team|APT39|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Silence|APT41|menuPass|TEMP.Veles|MuddyWater|BRONZE BUTLER|Sowbug|APT32|Patchwork|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Carbanak|APT1
+T1036.004,Masquerade Task or Service,Defense Evasion,Wizard Spider|APT-C-36|Carbanak|APT32|FIN6|FIN7
 T1036.003,Rename System Utilities,Defense Evasion,menuPass|APT32|Soft Cell|PLATINUM
 T1036.002,Right-to-Left Override,Defense Evasion,BRONZE BUTLER|BlackTech|Ke3chang|Scarlet Mimic
-T1036.001,Invalid Code Signature,Defense Evasion,Windshift|APT37
+T1036.001,Invalid Code Signature,Defense Evasion,Windshift
 T1553.003,SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking,Defense Evasion,no
-T1553.002,Code Signing,Defense Evasion,UNC2452|Wizard Spider|PROMETHIUM|Patchwork|Silence|APT41|FIN6|TA505|FIN7|Honeybee|Leviathan|CopyKittens|Winnti Group|Suckfly|Molerats|Darkhotel
+T1553.002,Code Signing,Defense Evasion,Patchwork|Silence|APT41|FIN6|TA505|FIN7|Honeybee|Leviathan|APT37|CopyKittens|Winnti Group|Suckfly|Molerats|Darkhotel
 T1553.001,Gatekeeper Bypass,Defense Evasion,no
 T1553,Subvert Trust Controls,Defense Evasion,no
 T1027.003,Steganography,Defense Evasion,BRONZE BUTLER|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|APT37
-T1027.002,Software Packing,Defense Evasion,Lazarus Group|TA505|Rocke|Soft Cell|The White Company|APT39|APT38|Dark Caracal|Elderwood|APT3|Patchwork|APT29|Night Dragon
-T1027.001,Binary Padding,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|APT32|Patchwork|Leviathan|BRONZE BUTLER|Moafee
+T1027.002,Software Packing,Defense Evasion,TA505|Rocke|Soft Cell|The White Company|APT39|APT38|Dark Caracal|Elderwood|APT3|Patchwork|APT29|Night Dragon
+T1027.001,Binary Padding,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|APT32|Leviathan|BRONZE BUTLER|Moafee
 T1222.002,Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification,Defense Evasion,Rocke|APT32
-T1222.001,Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification,Defense Evasion,Wizard Spider
-T1552.004,Private Keys,Credential Access,UNC2452|Rocke
+T1222.001,Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification,Defense Evasion,no
+T1552.004,Private Keys,Credential Access,Rocke
 T1552.003,Bash History,Credential Access,no
 T1552.002,Credentials in Registry,Credential Access,APT32
 T1552.001,Credentials In Files,Credential Access,Leafminer|APT33|OilRig|TA505|Stolen Pencil|MuddyWater|APT3
 T1552,Unsecured Credentials,Credential Access,no
 T1216.001,PubPrn,Defense Evasion,APT32
-T1070.006,Timestomp,Defense Evasion,UNC2452|Rocke|TEMP.Veles|APT32|Lazarus Group|APT28
+T1070.006,Timestomp,Defense Evasion,Rocke|TEMP.Veles|APT32|Lazarus Group|APT28
 T1070.005,Network Share Connection Removal,Defense Evasion,Threat Group-3390
-T1070.004,File Deletion,Defense Evasion,UNC2452|FIN6|Sandworm Team|Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Wizard Spider|APT41|Kimsuky|Silence|The White Company|TEMP.Veles|APT32|APT38|menuPass|Patchwork|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|OilRig|Magic Hound|FIN5|APT3|FIN10|Threat Group-3390|APT28|Group5|Lazarus Group|APT18|APT29
+T1070.004,File Deletion,Defense Evasion,Sandworm Team|Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Wizard Spider|APT41|Kimsuky|Silence|The White Company|TEMP.Veles|APT32|APT38|Patchwork|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|menuPass|FIN8|OilRig|FIN5|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|APT3|FIN10|APT28|Threat Group-3390|Group5|Lazarus Group|APT18|APT29
 T1070.003,Clear Command History,Defense Evasion,APT41
-T1550.004,Web Session Cookie,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,UNC2452
+T1550.004,Web Session Cookie,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,no
 T1550.001,Application Access Token,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,APT28
 T1550.003,Pass the Ticket,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|APT29
 T1550.002,Pass the Hash,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,Soft Cell|APT32|Night Dragon|APT28|APT1
-T1550,Use Alternate Authentication Material,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,UNC2452
+T1550,Use Alternate Authentication Material,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,no
 T1548.004,Elevated Execution with Prompt,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
 T1548.003,Sudo and Sudo Caching,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
-T1548.002,Bypass User Account Control,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,APT37|MuddyWater|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|Threat Group-3390|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork|APT29
+T1548.002,Bypass User Access Control,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,APT37|MuddyWater|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|Threat Group-3390|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork|APT29
 T1548.001,Setuid and Setgid,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
 T1548,Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
 T1136.003,Cloud Account,Persistence,no
 T1070.002,Clear Linux or Mac System Logs,Defense Evasion,Rocke
-T1070.001,Clear Windows Event Logs,Defense Evasion,APT41|APT38|APT32|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|FIN5|APT28
+T1070.001,Clear Windows Event Logs,Defense Evasion,APT41|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|APT32|FIN8|FIN5|APT28
 T1136.002,Domain Account,Persistence,Soft Cell
-T1136.001,Local Account,Persistence,APT39|APT41|Leafminer|Dragonfly 2.0|APT3
+T1136.001,Local Account,Persistence,APT39|APT41|Dragonfly 2.0|Leafminer|APT3
 T1547.011,Plist Modification,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
 T1547.010,Port Monitors,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
 T1547.009,Shortcut Modification,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,APT39|Darkhotel|APT29|Gorgon Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Leviathan|Lazarus Group
 T1547.008,LSASS Driver,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
 T1547.007,Re-opened Applications,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
 T1547.006,Kernel Modules and Extensions,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
-T1547.005,Security Support Provider,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Lazarus Group
-T1547.004,Winlogon Helper DLL,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Wizard Spider|Tropic Trooper|Turla
+T1547.005,Security Support Provider,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
+T1547.004,Winlogon Helper DLL,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Tropic Trooper|Turla
 T1547.003,Time Providers,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
 T1546.014,Emond,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
 T1546.013,PowerShell Profile,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,Turla
@@ -346,25 +244,25 @@ T1546.007,Netsh Helper DLL,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
 T1546.006,LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
 T1546.005,Trap,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
 T1546.004,.bash_profile and .bashrc,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
-T1546.003,Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,UNC2452|APT33|Blue Mockingbird|Turla|Leviathan|APT29
+T1546.003,Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,APT33|Blue Mockingbird|Turla|Leviathan|APT29
 T1546.002,Screensaver,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
 T1546.001,Change Default File Association,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,Kimsuky
-T1547.001,Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Wizard Spider|PROMETHIUM|Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Silence|RTM|Inception|APT41|Machete|Kimsuky|APT33|APT39|APT32|APT18|Turla|Threat Group-3390|Dragonfly 2.0|Gorgon Group|Dark Caracal|Cobalt Group|Honeybee|APT19|Ke3chang|Leviathan|MuddyWater|APT37|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|APT3|FIN10|FIN7|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT29|Darkhotel
+T1547.001,Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Silence|RTM|Inception|APT41|Machete|Kimsuky|APT33|APT39|APT32|APT18|Turla|Dark Caracal|Cobalt Group|Honeybee|Threat Group-3390|Dragonfly 2.0|Gorgon Group|Ke3chang|APT19|Leviathan|MuddyWater|APT37|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|APT3|FIN10|FIN7|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT29|Darkhotel
 T1218.002,Control Panel,Defense Evasion,no
 T1218.010,Regsvr32,Defense Evasion,Blue Mockingbird|Inception|WIRTE|Cobalt Group|APT19|Leviathan|APT32|Deep Panda
 T1218.009,Regsvcs/Regasm,Defense Evasion,no
-T1218.005,Mshta,Defense Evasion,Lazarus Group|Inception|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|FIN7
-T1218.004,InstallUtil,Defense Evasion,menuPass
+T1218.005,Mshta,Defense Evasion,Inception|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|FIN7
+T1218.004,InstallUtil,Defense Evasion,no
 T1218.001,Compiled HTML File,Defense Evasion,APT41|Silence|Lazarus Group|Dark Caracal|OilRig
 T1218.003,CMSTP,Defense Evasion,Cobalt Group|MuddyWater
-T1218.011,Rundll32,Defense Evasion,UNC2452|Gamaredon Group|APT32|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|TA505|MuddyWater|APT29|APT19|CopyKittens|APT3|Carbanak|APT28
+T1218.011,Rundll32,Defense Evasion,APT32|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|TA505|MuddyWater|APT29|APT19|CopyKittens|APT3|Carbanak|APT28
 T1547,Boot or Logon Autostart Execution,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
 T1546,Event Triggered Execution,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
 T1098.003,Add Office 365 Global Administrator Role,Persistence,no
-T1098.002,Exchange Email Delegate Permissions,Persistence,UNC2452|Magic Hound
-T1098.001,Additional Cloud Credentials,Persistence,UNC2452
+T1098.002,Exchange Email Delegate Permissions,Persistence,Magic Hound
+T1098.001,Additional Azure Service Principal Credentials,Persistence,no
 T1543.004,Launch Daemon,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
-T1543.003,Windows Service,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,PROMETHIUM|Blue Mockingbird|DarkVishnya|Wizard Spider|APT32|APT41|Kimsuky|Tropic Trooper|Ke3chang|Cobalt Group|Honeybee|Threat Group-3390|FIN7|APT19|APT3|Lazarus Group|Carbanak
+T1543.003,Windows Service,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Blue Mockingbird|DarkVishnya|Wizard Spider|APT32|APT41|Kimsuky|Tropic Trooper|Cobalt Group|Ke3chang|Honeybee|FIN7|Threat Group-3390|APT19|APT3|Lazarus Group|Carbanak
 T1543.002,Systemd Service,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Rocke
 T1543.001,Launch Agent,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
 T1037.005,Startup Items,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
@@ -379,7 +277,7 @@ T1055.005,Thread Local Storage,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
 T1055.004,Asynchronous Procedure Call,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
 T1055.003,Thread Execution Hijacking,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
 T1055.002,Portable Executable Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Rocke|Gorgon Group
-T1055.001,Dynamic-link Library Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Wizard Spider|TA505|Turla|Tropic Trooper|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda
+T1055.001,Dynamic-link Library Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,TA505|Turla|Tropic Trooper|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda
 T1037.003,Network Logon Script,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
 T1543,Create or Modify System Process,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
 T1037.002,Logon Script (Mac),Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
@@ -387,13 +285,13 @@ T1037.001,Logon Script (Windows),Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Cobalt Group|A
 T1542.003,Bootkit,Persistence|Defense Evasion,APT41|Lazarus Group|APT28
 T1542.002,Component Firmware,Persistence|Defense Evasion,Equation
 T1542.001,System Firmware,Persistence|Defense Evasion,no
-T1505.003,Web Shell,Persistence,Tropic Trooper|Soft Cell|Threat Group-3390|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|APT32|Deep Panda
+T1505.003,Web Shell,Persistence,Tropic Trooper|Soft Cell|Threat Group-3390|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|APT32|OilRig|Deep Panda
 T1505.002,Transport Agent,Persistence,no
 T1505.001,SQL Stored Procedures,Persistence,no
 T1053.003,Cron,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Rocke
 T1053.004,Launchd,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
 T1053.001,At (Linux),Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
-T1053.005,Scheduled Task,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,UNC2452|Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT-C-36|BRONZE BUTLER|APT41|Machete|Soft Cell|Silence|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|OilRig|Rancor|Dragonfly 2.0|Cobalt Group|Patchwork|FIN8|FIN10|menuPass|APT32|FIN7|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|APT3|APT29
+T1053.005,Scheduled Task,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT-C-36|BRONZE BUTLER|APT41|Machete|Soft Cell|Silence|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|Patchwork|OilRig|Rancor|Cobalt Group|FIN8|menuPass|FIN10|APT32|FIN7|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|APT3|APT29
 T1053.002,At (Windows),Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,BRONZE BUTLER|Threat Group-3390|APT18
 T1542,Pre-OS Boot,Defense Evasion|Persistence,no
 T1137.001,Office Template Macros,Persistence,MuddyWater
@@ -418,52 +316,52 @@ T1526,Cloud Service Discovery,Discovery,no
 T1505,Server Software Component,Persistence,no
 T1499,Endpoint Denial of Service,Impact,no
 T1497,Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion,Defense Evasion|Discovery,no
-T1498,Network Denial of Service,Impact,APT28
+T1498,Network Denial of Service,Impact,no
 T1496,Resource Hijacking,Impact,Blue Mockingbird|Rocke|APT41|Lazarus Group
 T1495,Firmware Corruption,Impact,no
 T1491,Defacement,Impact,no
 T1490,Inhibit System Recovery,Impact,no
-T1489,Service Stop,Impact,Wizard Spider|Lazarus Group
+T1489,Service Stop,Impact,Lazarus Group
 T1486,Data Encrypted for Impact,Impact,APT41|TA505|APT38
 T1485,Data Destruction,Impact,Sandworm Team|Lazarus Group|APT38
 T1484,Group Policy Modification,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
-T1482,Domain Trust Discovery,Discovery,UNC2452|Wizard Spider
+T1482,Domain Trust Discovery,Discovery,Wizard Spider
 T1480,Execution Guardrails,Defense Evasion,no
 T1222,File and Directory Permissions Modification,Defense Evasion,no
 T1221,Template Injection,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|Frankenstein|Inception|APT28|Tropic Trooper|Dragonfly 2.0|DarkHydrus
 T1220,XSL Script Processing,Defense Evasion,Cobalt Group
-T1189,Drive-by Compromise,Initial Access,Dragonfly|PROMETHIUM|Turla|Windshift|RTM|Darkhotel|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|BRONZE BUTLER|Leafminer|APT32|Lazarus Group|APT19|Dark Caracal|Threat Group-3390|Elderwood|APT37|Patchwork|PLATINUM
-T1212,Exploitation for Credential Access,Credential Access,no
-T1217,Browser Bookmark Discovery,Discovery,no
-T1190,Exploit Public-Facing Application,Initial Access,UNC2452|APT28|APT29|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Blue Mockingbird|Rocke|APT39|BlackTech|APT41|Soft Cell|Night Dragon|Axiom
-T1210,Exploitation of Remote Services,Lateral Movement,Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390|APT28
-T1203,Exploitation for Client Execution,Execution,Sandworm Team|MuddyWater|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT41|admin@338|Threat Group-3390|APT12|The White Company|APT33|APT32|APT28|Tropic Trooper|Lazarus Group|Cobalt Group|BRONZE BUTLER|APT37|Patchwork|Leviathan|APT29|Elderwood|TA459
-T1200,Hardware Additions,Initial Access,DarkVishnya
-T1202,Indirect Command Execution,Defense Evasion,no
-T1207,Rogue Domain Controller,Defense Evasion,no
 T1197,BITS Jobs,Defense Evasion|Persistence,Patchwork|APT41|Leviathan
+T1217,Browser Bookmark Discovery,Discovery,no
+T1213,Data from Information Repositories,Collection,Turla
+T1189,Drive-by Compromise,Initial Access,Turla|Windshift|RTM|Darkhotel|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|BRONZE BUTLER|Leafminer|Dark Caracal|APT19|APT32|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|Elderwood|APT37|Patchwork|PLATINUM
+T1203,Exploitation for Client Execution,Execution,Sandworm Team|MuddyWater|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT41|admin@338|Threat Group-3390|APT12|The White Company|APT33|APT32|APT28|Tropic Trooper|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Cobalt Group|APT37|Patchwork|Leviathan|Elderwood|TA459|APT29
+T1212,Exploitation for Credential Access,Credential Access,no
 T1211,Exploitation for Defense Evasion,Defense Evasion,APT28
-T1219,Remote Access Software,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|DarkVishnya|RTM|Kimsuky|Night Dragon|Thrip|Cobalt Group|Carbanak
-T1218,Signed Binary Proxy Execution,Defense Evasion,no
-T1213,Data from Information Repositories,Collection,FIN6|Turla
-T1216,Signed Script Proxy Execution,Defense Evasion,no
+T1190,Exploit Public-Facing Application,Initial Access,Blue Mockingbird|Rocke|APT39|BlackTech|APT41|Soft Cell|Night Dragon|Axiom
+T1210,Exploitation of Remote Services,Lateral Movement,Threat Group-3390|APT28
+T1202,Indirect Command Execution,Defense Evasion,no
+T1200,Hardware Additions,Initial Access,DarkVishnya
 T1201,Password Policy Discovery,Discovery,Turla|OilRig
+T1219,Remote Access Software,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|DarkVishnya|RTM|Kimsuky|Night Dragon|Thrip|Cobalt Group|Carbanak
+T1207,Rogue Domain Controller,Defense Evasion,no
+T1199,Trusted Relationship,Initial Access,APT28|menuPass
+T1218,Signed Binary Proxy Execution,Defense Evasion,no
 T1204,User Execution,Execution,no
+T1216,Signed Script Proxy Execution,Defense Evasion,no
 T1195,Supply Chain Compromise,Initial Access,Elderwood
 T1205,Traffic Signaling,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Command And Control,no
-T1199,Trusted Relationship,Initial Access,GOLD SOUTHFIELD|APT28|menuPass
 T1176,Browser Extensions,Persistence,Kimsuky|Stolen Pencil
 T1175,Component Object Model and Distributed COM,Lateral Movement|Execution,no
 T1187,Forced Authentication,Credential Access,DarkHydrus|Dragonfly 2.0
 T1185,Man in the Browser,Collection,no
-T1140,Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information,Defense Evasion,UNC2452|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Molerats|Frankenstein|Turla|WIRTE|Darkhotel|Tropic Trooper|menuPass|Honeybee|Gorgon Group|APT19|Threat Group-3390|Leviathan|APT28|MuddyWater|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER
-T1134,Access Token Manipulation,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,FIN6|Blue Mockingbird
+T1134,Access Token Manipulation,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Blue Mockingbird
 T1136,Create Account,Persistence,no
+T1140,Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information,Defense Evasion,Rocke|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Molerats|Frankenstein|Turla|WIRTE|Darkhotel|Tropic Trooper|menuPass|Honeybee|Threat Group-3390|APT19|Gorgon Group|Leviathan|MuddyWater|APT28|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER
 T1149,LC_MAIN Hijacking,Defense Evasion,no
+T1135,Network Share Discovery,Discovery,APT32|APT39|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT1|Dragonfly 2.0|Sowbug
 T1137,Office Application Startup,Persistence,Gamaredon Group|APT32
 T1153,Source,Execution,no
-T1135,Network Share Discovery,Discovery,Wizard Spider|APT32|APT39|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT1|Dragonfly 2.0|Sowbug
-T1133,External Remote Services,Persistence|Initial Access,Wizard Spider|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Chimera|Sandworm Team|APT41|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|Night Dragon|OilRig|Ke3chang|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|APT18
+T1133,External Remote Services,Persistence|Initial Access,Sandworm Team|APT41|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|Night Dragon|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|Ke3chang|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|APT18
 T1132,Data Encoding,Command And Control,no
 T1129,Shared Modules,Execution,no
 T1127,Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution,Defense Evasion,no
@@ -471,65 +369,65 @@ T1125,Video Capture,Collection,Silence|FIN7
 T1124,System Time Discovery,Discovery,The White Company|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Turla
 T1123,Audio Capture,Collection,APT37
 T1120,Peripheral Device Discovery,Discovery,Turla|APT37|Gamaredon Group|Equation|APT28
-T1119,Automated Collection,Collection,Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT1|APT28|Patchwork|OilRig|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|FIN6
+T1119,Automated Collection,Collection,Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT1|APT28|Patchwork|OilRig|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|FIN6
 T1115,Clipboard Data,Collection,APT39|APT38
 T1114,Email Collection,Collection,no
 T1113,Screen Capture,Collection,Gamaredon Group|APT39|Silence|MuddyWater|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|Dark Caracal|FIN7|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|Group5|APT28
-T1112,Modify Registry,Defense Evasion,Lazarus Group|Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|Turla|APT32|APT38|Patchwork|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|Threat Group-3390|Honeybee|Gorgon Group|FIN8
+T1112,Modify Registry,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|Turla|APT32|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|Threat Group-3390|Honeybee|Patchwork|Gorgon Group|FIN8
 T1111,Two-Factor Authentication Interception,Credential Access,no
 T1110,Brute Force,Credential Access,DarkVishnya|APT39|OilRig|FIN5|Turla
 T1108,Redundant Access,Defense Evasion|Persistence,no
-T1106,Native API,Execution,Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Turla|Silence|Gorgon Group|APT37
-T1105,Ingress Tool Transfer,Command And Control,UNC2452|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Silence|APT-C-36|APT41|Soft Cell|TA505|WIRTE|APT33|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Rancor|Cobalt Group|Turla|Gorgon Group|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|APT37|FIN8|Leviathan|Elderwood|PLATINUM|APT3|Magic Hound|APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN7|menuPass|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28
+T1106,Native API,Execution,Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Turla|Silence|Gorgon Group|APT37
+T1105,Ingress Tool Transfer,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Silence|APT-C-36|APT41|Soft Cell|TA505|WIRTE|APT33|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Rancor|Cobalt Group|Turla|Gorgon Group|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|APT37|FIN8|PLATINUM|Leviathan|Elderwood|Magic Hound|APT3|APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN7|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28
 T1104,Multi-Stage Channels,Command And Control,APT41|MuddyWater|APT3
-T1102,Web Service,Command And Control,Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Inception|FIN6
-T1098,Account Manipulation,Persistence,Dragonfly 2.0|APT3|Lazarus Group
-T1095,Non-Application Layer Protocol,Command And Control,FIN6|APT29|PLATINUM|APT3
+T1102,Web Service,Command And Control,Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Inception|FIN6
+T1098,Account Manipulation,Persistence,APT3|Dragonfly 2.0|Lazarus Group
+T1095,Non-Application Layer Protocol,Command And Control,APT29|PLATINUM|APT3
 T1092,Communication Through Removable Media,Command And Control,APT28
 T1091,Replication Through Removable Media,Lateral Movement|Initial Access,Tropic Trooper|Darkhotel|APT28
-T1090,Proxy,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|APT41|Turla
-T1087,Account Discovery,Discovery,UNC2452
-T1083,File and Directory Discovery,Discovery,UNC2452|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Inception|APT41|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|APT18|Leafminer|Honeybee|Dragonfly 2.0|Dark Caracal|APT3|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|Sowbug|APT28|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
-T1082,System Information Discovery,Discovery,UNC2452|Wizard Spider|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|APT19|APT32|Honeybee|APT37|Sowbug|OilRig|Magic Hound|APT3|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
-T1080,Taint Shared Content,Lateral Movement,Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Darkhotel
-T1078,Valid Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,UNC2452|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|APT39|FIN4|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|Leviathan|APT33|OilRig|FIN5|APT28|menuPass|FIN10|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390|APT18|PittyTiger|Carbanak
+T1090,Proxy,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|APT41|Turla
+T1087,Account Discovery,Discovery,no
+T1083,File and Directory Discovery,Discovery,Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Inception|APT41|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|APT18|Leafminer|Honeybee|Dark Caracal|Dragonfly 2.0|Magic Hound|Sowbug|BRONZE BUTLER|APT3|APT28|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
+T1082,System Information Discovery,Discovery,Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|Honeybee|APT19|APT37|APT32|Magic Hound|OilRig|APT3|Sowbug|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
+T1080,Taint Shared Content,Lateral Movement,BRONZE BUTLER|Darkhotel
+T1078,Valid Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|APT39|FIN4|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|Leviathan|APT33|OilRig|FIN5|menuPass|APT28|FIN10|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390|APT18|PittyTiger|Carbanak
 T1074,Data Staged,Collection,Wizard Spider
 T1072,Software Deployment Tools,Execution|Lateral Movement,Silence|APT32|Threat Group-1314
 T1071,Application Layer Protocol,Command And Control,Rocke|Magic Hound|Dragonfly 2.0
-T1070,Indicator Removal on Host,Defense Evasion,UNC2452
-T1069,Permission Groups Discovery,Discovery,UNC2452|TA505|APT3
+T1070,Indicator Removal on Host,Defense Evasion,no
+T1069,Permission Groups Discovery,Discovery,TA505|APT3
 T1068,Exploitation for Privilege Escalation,Privilege Escalation,Whitefly|APT33|Cobalt Group|PLATINUM|FIN8|APT32|Threat Group-3390|FIN6|APT28
 T1064,Scripting,Defense Evasion|Execution,no
 T1062,Hypervisor,Persistence,no
 T1061,Graphical User Interface,Execution,no
-T1059,Command and Scripting Interpreter,Execution,APT32|Molerats|Whitefly|APT39|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN7|OilRig|FIN5|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Ke3chang
-T1057,Process Discovery,Discovery,UNC2452|Rocke|Frankenstein|Inception|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|APT38|Tropic Trooper|APT37|Honeybee|OilRig|APT3|Magic Hound|APT28|Winnti Group|Stealth Falcon|Poseidon Group|Lazarus Group|Molerats|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang
+T1059,Command and Scripting Interpreter,Execution,APT32|Molerats|Whitefly|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|FIN7|OilRig|FIN5|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Ke3chang
+T1057,Process Discovery,Discovery,Rocke|Frankenstein|Inception|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|APT38|Tropic Trooper|APT37|Honeybee|OilRig|APT3|Magic Hound|APT28|Winnti Group|Stealth Falcon|Poseidon Group|Lazarus Group|Molerats|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang
 T1056,Input Capture,Collection|Credential Access,no
-T1055,Process Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,APT32|Sharpshooter|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|Cobalt Group|APT37|Honeybee|Turla|PLATINUM
+T1055,Process Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,APT32|Sharpshooter|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|Turla|Cobalt Group|APT37|Honeybee|PLATINUM
 T1053,Scheduled Task/Job,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
 T1052,Exfiltration Over Physical Medium,Exfiltration,no
 T1051,Shared Webroot,Lateral Movement,no
 T1049,System Network Connections Discovery,Discovery,Tropic Trooper|APT41|APT38|Soft Cell|APT32|APT1|OilRig|APT3|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
 T1048,Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol,Exfiltration,no
-T1047,Windows Management Instrumentation,Execution,UNC2452|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT41|FIN6|Soft Cell|APT32|MuddyWater|OilRig|Threat Group-3390|Leviathan|FIN8|menuPass|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT29|Deep Panda
-T1046,Network Service Scanning,Discovery,Rocke|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT39|APT32|Cobalt Group|Leafminer|OilRig|menuPass|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390
-T1043,Commonly Used Port,Command And Control,OilRig|APT28|TEMP.Veles|Night Dragon|APT29|APT18|APT19|FIN7|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|APT37|Magic Hound|APT3|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390
+T1047,Windows Management Instrumentation,Execution,Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT41|FIN6|Soft Cell|APT32|MuddyWater|OilRig|Threat Group-3390|FIN8|Leviathan|menuPass|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT29|Deep Panda
+T1046,Network Service Scanning,Discovery,Rocke|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT39|APT32|Leafminer|OilRig|Cobalt Group|menuPass|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390
+T1043,Commonly Used Port,Command And Control,Machete|OilRig|APT28|TEMP.Veles|Night Dragon|APT29|APT18|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN7|FIN8|APT37|Magic Hound|APT3|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390
 T1041,Exfiltration Over C2 Channel,Exfiltration,Sandworm Team|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Kimsuky|Soft Cell|APT32|APT3|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Ke3chang
 T1040,Network Sniffing,Credential Access|Discovery,Sandworm Team|DarkVishnya|APT33|Stolen Pencil|APT28
-T1039,Data from Network Shared Drive,Collection,Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Sowbug|menuPass
+T1039,Data from Network Shared Drive,Collection,Sowbug|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass
 T1037,Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Rocke
-T1036,Masquerading,Defense Evasion,UNC2452|Windshift|APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|Dragonfly 2.0
+T1036,Masquerading,Defense Evasion,Windshift|APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|Dragonfly 2.0
 T1034,Path Interception,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
-T1033,System Owner/User Discovery,Discovery,Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT41|Soft Cell|Tropic Trooper|APT39|MuddyWater|APT32|APT37|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|Magic Hound|FIN10|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3
+T1033,System Owner/User Discovery,Discovery,Frankenstein|APT41|Soft Cell|Tropic Trooper|APT39|MuddyWater|APT32|APT37|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|Magic Hound|FIN10|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3
 T1030,Data Transfer Size Limits,Exfiltration,Threat Group-3390
 T1029,Scheduled Transfer,Exfiltration,no
-T1027,Obfuscated Files or Information,Defense Evasion,UNC2452|FIN6|Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|APT41|Machete|Soft Cell|Turla|TA505|Silence|APT33|Night Dragon|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|APT29|APT18|Tropic Trooper|Honeybee|Leafminer|APT37|Dark Caracal|Patchwork|Threat Group-3390|APT19|menuPass|Cobalt Group|BlackOasis|Elderwood|FIN8|Leviathan|MuddyWater|FIN7|OilRig|Magic Hound|APT3|APT32|Group5|Dust Storm|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT28
+T1027,Obfuscated Files or Information,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|APT41|Machete|Soft Cell|Turla|TA505|Silence|APT33|Night Dragon|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|APT29|APT18|Tropic Trooper|Cobalt Group|Patchwork|Leafminer|APT37|Threat Group-3390|Honeybee|Dark Caracal|menuPass|APT19|BlackOasis|FIN8|Leviathan|Elderwood|MuddyWater|FIN7|Magic Hound|OilRig|APT3|APT32|Group5|Dust Storm|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT28
 T1026,Multiband Communication,Command And Control,Lazarus Group
 T1025,Data from Removable Media,Collection,Machete|Turla|Gamaredon Group|APT28
 T1021,Remote Services,Lateral Movement,no
-T1020,Automated Exfiltration,Exfiltration,Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Honeybee
-T1018,Remote System Discovery,Discovery,UNC2452|Sandworm Team|Rocke|Wizard Spider|Silence|Soft Cell|APT39|APT32|Deep Panda|Threat Group-3390|Dragonfly 2.0|Ke3chang|Leafminer|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN5|APT3|menuPass|FIN6|Turla
-T1016,System Network Configuration Discovery,Discovery,Wizard Spider|Sandworm Team|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT41|Soft Cell|APT32|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|Magic Hound|OilRig|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3|Naikon|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
+T1020,Automated Exfiltration,Exfiltration,Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Honeybee
+T1018,Remote System Discovery,Discovery,Sandworm Team|Rocke|Wizard Spider|Silence|Soft Cell|APT39|APT32|Deep Panda|Threat Group-3390|Dragonfly 2.0|Leafminer|Ke3chang|FIN8|APT3|FIN5|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN6|Turla
+T1016,System Network Configuration Discovery,Discovery,Sandworm Team|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT41|Soft Cell|APT32|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|Magic Hound|OilRig|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3|Naikon|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
 T1014,Rootkit,Defense Evasion,Rocke|APT41|APT28|Winnti Group
 T1012,Query Registry,Discovery,APT32|Dragonfly 2.0|Threat Group-3390|OilRig|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Turla
 T1011,Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium,Exfiltration,no
@@ -537,6 +435,6 @@ T1010,Application Window Discovery,Discovery,Lazarus Group
 T1008,Fallback Channels,Command And Control,APT41|OilRig|Lazarus Group
 T1007,System Service Discovery,Discovery,BRONZE BUTLER|APT1|OilRig|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
 T1006,Direct Volume Access,Defense Evasion,no
-T1005,Data from Local System,Collection,UNC2452|FIN6|Gamaredon Group|APT39|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|Soft Cell|Turla|menuPass|Dark Caracal|Honeybee|Dragonfly 2.0|APT37|APT28|BRONZE BUTLER|APT3|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|Threat Group-3390|APT1|Ke3chang
+T1005,Data from Local System,Collection,Gamaredon Group|APT39|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|Soft Cell|Turla|menuPass|Dark Caracal|Dragonfly 2.0|Honeybee|APT37|APT28|APT3|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|Threat Group-3390|APT1|Ke3chang
 T1003,OS Credential Dumping,Credential Access,APT39|Frankenstein|APT32|APT28|Leviathan|Sowbug|Suckfly|Poseidon Group|Axiom
 T1001,Data Obfuscation,Command And Control,Axiom