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@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ tags:
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analytic_story:
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- Suspicious Compiled HTML Activity
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- Living Off The Land
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- AgentTesla
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asset_type: Endpoint
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cis20:
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- CIS 8
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@@ -96,3 +97,4 @@ tags:
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security_domain: endpoint
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supported_tas:
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- Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon
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@@ -22,10 +22,12 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingestin
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known_false_positives: Unknown. Filter as needed.
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references:
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- https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/
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- https://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/702680/0/html
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tags:
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analytic_story:
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- XMRig
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- Azorult
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- AgentTesla
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confidence: 70
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context:
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- Source:Endpoint
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@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ type: TTP
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datamodel:
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- Endpoint
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description: This analytic will identify suspicious executable or scripts (known file
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extensions) in list of suspicious file path in Windows. This technique is used by
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extensions) in a list of suspicious file paths in Windows. This technique is used by
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adversaries to evade detection. The suspicious file path are known paths used in
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the wild and are not common to have executable or scripts.
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search: '|tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Filesystem.file_path) as
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@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ tags:
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- Azorult
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- DarkCrystal RAT
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- Brute Ratel C4
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- AgentTesla
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automated_detection_testing: passed
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confidence: 70
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context:
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@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
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type: Anomaly
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datamodel:
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- Endpoint
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description: This search is to detect an anomaly event of non-chrome process accessing
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description: This search is to detect an anomaly event of a non-chrome process accessing
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the files in chrome user default folder. This folder contains all the sqlite database
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of the chrome browser related to users login, history, cookies and etc. Most of
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the RAT, trojan spy as well as FIN7 jssloader try to parse the those sqlite database
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@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ tags:
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analytic_story:
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- FIN7
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- Remcos
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- AgentTesla
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confidence: 70
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context:
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- Source:Endpoint
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@@ -6,8 +6,8 @@ author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
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type: Anomaly
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datamodel:
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- Endpoint
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description: This search is to detect an anomaly event of non-firefox process accessing
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the files in profile folder. This folder contains all the sqlite database of the
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description: This search is to detect an anomaly event of a non-firefox process accessing
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the files in the profile folder. This folder contains all the sqlite database of the
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firefox browser related to users login, history, cookies and etc. Most of the RAT,
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trojan spy as well as FIN7 jssloader try to parse the those sqlite database to collect
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information on the compromised host. This SACL Event (4663) need to be enabled to
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@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ tags:
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- FIN7
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- Remcos
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- Azorult
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- AgentTesla
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confidence: 70
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context:
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- Source:Endpoint
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@@ -6,8 +6,8 @@ author: Teoderick Contreras, Michael Haag Splunk
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type: TTP
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datamodel:
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- Endpoint
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description: This search is to detect a suspicious MS office application that drop
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or create executables or script in the host. This behavior is commonly seen in spear
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description: This search is to detect a suspicious MS office application that drops
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or creates executables or scripts in a Windows Operating System. This behavior is commonly seen in spear
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phishing office attachment where it drop malicious files or script to compromised
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the host. It might be some normal macro may drop script or tools as part of automation
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but still this behavior is reallly suspicious and not commonly seen in normal office
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@@ -33,9 +33,11 @@ known_false_positives: office macro for automation may do this behavior
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references:
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- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/fin7-pursuing-an-enigmatic-and-evasive-global-criminal-operation
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- https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046/
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- https://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/702680/0/html
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tags:
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analytic_story:
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- FIN7
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- AgentTesla
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confidence: 80
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context:
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- Source:Endpoint
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@@ -6,10 +6,9 @@ author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
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type: TTP
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datamodel:
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- Endpoint
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description: this detection was designed to identifies suspicious spawned process
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of known MS office application due to macro or malicious code. this technique can
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be seen in so many malware like trickbot that used MS office as its weapon or attack
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vector to initially infect the machines.
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description: This detection was designed to identify suspicious spawned processes of known MS office
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applications due to macro or malicious code. this technique can be seen in so many malware
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like trickbot that used MS office as its weapon or attack vector to initially infect the machines.
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search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
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as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name
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= "winword.exe" OR Processes.parent_process_name = "excel.exe" OR Processes.parent_process_name
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@@ -26,11 +25,13 @@ known_false_positives: unknown
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references:
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- https://any.run/malware-trends/trickbot
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- https://any.run/report/47561b4e949041eff0a0f4693c59c81726591779fe21183ae9185b5eb6a69847/aba3722a-b373-4dae-8273-8730fb40cdbe
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- https://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/702680/0/html
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tags:
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analytic_story:
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- Spearphishing Attachments
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- Trickbot
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- IcedID
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- AgentTesla
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confidence: 90
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context:
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- Source:Endpoint
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@@ -25,12 +25,14 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingestin
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known_false_positives: Normal Office Document macro use for automation
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references:
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- https://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/386500/0/html
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- https://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/702680/0/html
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tags:
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analytic_story:
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- Spearphishing Attachments
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- Trickbot
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- IcedID
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- DarkCrystal RAT
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- AgentTesla
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confidence: 50
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context:
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- Source:Endpoint
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@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ tags:
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- Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns
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- HAFNIUM Group
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- Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228
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- AgentTesla
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asset_type: Endpoint
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cis20:
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- CIS 3
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@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ known_false_positives: It is possible scripts or administrators may trigger this
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Filter as needed based on parent process, application.
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references:
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- https://thedfirreport.com/2022/02/21/qbot-and-zerologon-lead-to-full-domain-compromise/
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- https://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/691823/0/html
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tags:
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analytic_story:
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- DHS Report TA18-074A
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@@ -34,6 +35,7 @@ tags:
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- Azorult
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- DarkCrystal RAT
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- CISA AA22-257A
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- AgentTesla
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asset_type: Endpoint
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cis20:
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- CIS 3
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@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ tags:
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- Industroyer2
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- DarkCrystal RAT
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- Brute Ratel C4
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- AgentTesla
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automated_detection_testing: passed
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confidence: 50
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context:
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@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
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name: AgentTesla
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id: 9bb6077a-843e-418b-b134-c57ef997103c
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version: 1
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date: '2022-04-12'
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author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
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description: Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities
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that might relate to the AgentTesla malware including .chm application child process, ftp/smtp connection, persistence and many more.
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AgentTesla is one of the advanced remote access trojans (RAT) that are capable of stealing sensitive information from the infected or targeted host machine.
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It can collect various types of data, including browser profile information, keystrokes, capture screenshots and vpn credentials.
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AgentTesla has been active malware since 2014 and often delivered as a malicious attachment in phishing emails.It is also the top malware in 2021 based on the CISA report.
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narrative: Adversaries or threat actor may use this malware to maximize the impact of infection on the target organization in operations where network wide availability interruption
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is the goal.
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references:
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- https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.agent_tesla
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- https://cert.gov.ua/article/861292
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- https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-216a
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- https://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/702680/0/html
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tags:
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analytic_story: AgentTesla
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category:
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- Malware
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product:
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- Splunk Enterprise
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- Splunk Enterprise Security
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- Splunk Cloud
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usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
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