Added detection testing service results inOffice Product Spawning BITSAdmin

This commit is contained in:
root
2021-04-27 13:07:53 +00:00
parent f8b712c04e
commit aa4fed6f4d
@@ -7,28 +7,33 @@ type: batch
datamodel:
- Endpoint
description: The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by different
malware families (including TA551, IcedID). This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `bitsadmin.exe`. In malicious instances, the command-line of `bitsadmin.exe`
will contain a URL to a remote destination or similar command-line arguments as `/transfer /Download /priority Foreground`. In addition, Threat
Research has released a detections identifying suspicious use of `bitsadmin.exe`. In this instance, we narrow our detection down
to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications.
Capture and analyze any artifacts on disk. The Office Product, or `bitsadmin.exe` will
have reached out to a remote destination, capture and block the IPs or domain. Review
additional parallel processes for further activity.
malware families (including TA551, IcedID). This detection identifies any Windows
Office Product spawning `bitsadmin.exe`. In malicious instances, the command-line
of `bitsadmin.exe` will contain a URL to a remote destination or similar command-line
arguments as `/transfer /Download /priority Foreground`. In addition, Threat Research
has released a detections identifying suspicious use of `bitsadmin.exe`. In this
instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process.
During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze any artifacts
on disk. The Office Product, or `bitsadmin.exe` will have reached out to a remote
destination, capture and block the IPs or domain. Review additional parallel processes
for further activity.
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name
IN ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe") Processes.process_name=bitsadmin.exe
by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_product_spawning_bitsadmin_filter`'
by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name
Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_product_spawning_bitsadmin_filter`'
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
known_false_positives: No false positives known. Filter as needed.
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1197/T1197.md
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1197/T1197.md
tags:
analytic_story:
- Spearphishing Attachments
dataset: []
dataset:
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_macros.log
kill_chain_phases:
- Exploitation
mitre_attack_id:
@@ -45,4 +50,5 @@ tags:
- dest
- user
- parent_process_id
security_domain: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
automated_detection_testing: passed