Added detection testing service results inNon Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir

This commit is contained in:
root
2021-09-15 16:00:56 +00:00
parent 50c9e38337
commit b23dbeed08
@@ -6,23 +6,24 @@ author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
type: Anomaly
datamodel:
- Endpoint
description: This search is to detect an anomaly event of non-firefox process accessing the files in profile folder.
This folder contains all the sqlite database of the firefox browser related to users login, history, cookies and etc.
Most of the RAT, trojan spy as well as FIN7 jssloader try to parse the those sqlite database to collect information on the compromised host.
This SACL Event (4663) need to be enabled to tthe firefox profile directory to be eable to use this.
Since you monitoring this access to the folder a noise coming from firefox need to be filter and also sqlite db browser and explorer .exe to make this
detection more stable.
search: '`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4663
NOT (process_name IN ("*\\firefox.exe", "*\\explorer.exe", "*sql*")) Object_Name="*\\AppData\\Roaming\\Mozilla\\Firefox\\Profiles*"
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
by Object_Name Object_Type process_name Access_Mask Accesses process_id EventCode dest user
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `non_firefox_process_access_firefox_profile_dir_filter`'
description: This search is to detect an anomaly event of non-firefox process accessing
the files in profile folder. This folder contains all the sqlite database of the
firefox browser related to users login, history, cookies and etc. Most of the RAT,
trojan spy as well as FIN7 jssloader try to parse the those sqlite database to collect
information on the compromised host. This SACL Event (4663) need to be enabled to
tthe firefox profile directory to be eable to use this. Since you monitoring this
access to the folder a noise coming from firefox need to be filter and also sqlite
db browser and explorer .exe to make this detection more stable.
search: '`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4663 NOT (process_name IN ("*\\firefox.exe",
"*\\explorer.exe", "*sql*")) Object_Name="*\\AppData\\Roaming\\Mozilla\\Firefox\\Profiles*"
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Object_Name Object_Type
process_name Access_Mask Accesses process_id EventCode dest user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `non_firefox_process_access_firefox_profile_dir_filter`'
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must ingest Windows Security
Event logs and track event code 4663. For 4663, enable "Audit Object Access" in
Group Policy. Then check the two boxes listed for both "Success" and "Failure."
known_false_positives: other browser not listed related to firefox may catch by this rule.
known_false_positives: other browser not listed related to firefox may catch by this
rule.
eferences:
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/08/fin7-pursuing-an-enigmatic-and-evasive-global-criminal-operation.html
- https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046/
@@ -53,7 +54,6 @@ tags:
security_domain: endpoint
impact: 50
confidence: 70
# (impact * confidence)/100
risk_score: 35
context:
- Source:Endpoint
@@ -67,4 +67,5 @@ tags:
- name: user
type: User
role:
- Victim
- Victim
automated_detection_testing: passed