mirror of
https://github.com/splunk/security_content
synced 2026-06-08 17:32:49 +00:00
@@ -6,9 +6,9 @@ author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
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type: TTP
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datamodel:
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- Endpoint
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description: This particular behavior is typically executed when an adversaries or
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malware gains access to an endpoint and beings to perform execution and to evade
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detections. Usually, a batch (.bat) will be executed and multiple registry and scheduled
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description: This particular behavior is typically executed when an adversary or
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malware gains access to an endpoint and begins to perform execution and to evade
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detections. Usually, a batch (.bat) file will be executed and multiple registry and scheduled
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task modifications will occur. During triage, review parallel processes and identify
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any further file modifications. Endpoint should be isolated.
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search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry
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@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ references:
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- https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/
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tags:
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analytic_story:
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- IceID
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- IcedID
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- Windows Registry Abuse
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confidence: 70
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context:
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@@ -6,10 +6,10 @@ author: Teoderick Contreras
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type: TTP
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datamodel:
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- Endpoint
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description: This analytic is to detect a suspicious modification of registry to disable
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windows defender feature. This technique is to bypassed or evade detection from
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Windows Defender AV product specially the BlockAtFirstSeen feature where it block
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suspicious file first seen in the host.
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description: This analytic is intended to detect a suspicious modification of the Windows registry to disable
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a Windows Defender feature. This technique is intended to bypass or evade detection from
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Windows Defender AV, specifically the BlockAtFirstSeen feature where it blocks
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suspicious files the first time seen on the host.
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search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry
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where Registry.registry_path = "*\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\SpyNet*" Registry.registry_value_name
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= DisableBlockAtFirstSeen Registry.registry_value_data = 0x00000001 by _time span=1h
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@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ references:
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- https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/
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tags:
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analytic_story:
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- IceID
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- IcedID
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- Windows Registry Abuse
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- Azorult
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confidence: 70
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@@ -6,10 +6,10 @@ author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
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type: TTP
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datamodel:
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- Endpoint
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description: This analytic is to detect a suspicious modification of registry to disable
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windows defender feature. This technique is to bypassed or evade detection from
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Windows Defender AV product specially the Enhanced Notification feature wher user
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or admin set to show or display alerts.
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description: This analytic is intended to detect a suspicious modification of registry to disable
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windows defender features. This technique attempts to bypass or evade detection from
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Windows Defender AV, specifically the Enhanced Notification feature where a user
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or admin would receive alerts.
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search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry
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where Registry.registry_path = "*Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Reporting*" Registry.registry_value_name
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= DisableEnhancedNotifications Registry.registry_value_data = 0x00000001 by _time
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@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ references:
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- https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/
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tags:
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analytic_story:
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- IceID
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- IcedID
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- Windows Registry Abuse
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- Azorult
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confidence: 70
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@@ -6,9 +6,9 @@ author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
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type: TTP
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datamodel:
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- Endpoint
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description: This particular behavior is typically executed when an adversaries or
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malware gains access to an endpoint and beings to perform execution and to evade
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detections. Usually, a batch (.bat) will be executed and multiple registry and scheduled
|
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description: This particular behavior is typically executed when an adversary or
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malware gains access to an endpoint and begins to perform execution and to evade
|
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detections. Usually, a batch (.bat) file will be executed and multiple registry and scheduled
|
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task modifications will occur. During triage, review parallel processes and identify
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any further file modifications. Endpoint should be isolated.
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search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry
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@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ references:
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- https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/
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tags:
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analytic_story:
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- IceID
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- IcedID
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- Windows Registry Abuse
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confidence: 70
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context:
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@@ -6,9 +6,9 @@ author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
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type: TTP
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datamodel:
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- Endpoint
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description: This analytic is to detect a suspicious modification of registry to disable
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windows defender feature. This technique is to bypassed or evade detection from
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Windows Defender AV product specially the spynet reporting for its telemetry.
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description: This analytic is intended to detect a suspicious modification of registry to disable
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Windows Defender feature. This technique is intended to bypass or evade detection from
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Windows Defender AV product, specifically the spynet reporting for Defender telemetry.
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search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry
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where Registry.registry_path = "*\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\SpyNet*" Registry.registry_value_name
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= SpynetReporting Registry.registry_value_data = 0x00000000 by _time span=1h Registry.dest
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@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ references:
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- https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/
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tags:
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analytic_story:
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- IceID
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- IcedID
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- Windows Registry Abuse
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- Azorult
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confidence: 70
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@@ -6,9 +6,9 @@ author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
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type: TTP
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datamodel:
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- Endpoint
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description: This analytic is to detect a suspicious modification of registry to disable
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windows defender feature. This technique is to bypassed or evade detection from
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Windows Defender AV product specially the submit samples feature for further analysis..
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description: This analytic is intended to detect a suspicious modification of the Windows registry to disable
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a Windows Defender feature. This technique is intended to bypass or evade detection from
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Windows Defender AV, specifically the feature that submits samples for further analysis.
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search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry
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where Registry.registry_path = "*\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\SpyNet*" Registry.registry_value_name
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= SubmitSamplesConsent Registry.registry_value_data = 0x00000000 by _time span=1h
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@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ references:
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- https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/
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tags:
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analytic_story:
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- IceID
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- IcedID
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- Windows Registry Abuse
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- Azorult
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confidence: 70
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@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ type: TTP
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datamodel:
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- Endpoint
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description: This analytic is to detect a suspicious commandline to disable existing
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schedule task. This technique is used by adversaries or commodity malware like IceID
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schedule task. This technique is used by adversaries or commodity malware like IcedID
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to disable security application (AV products) in the targetted host to evade detections.
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This TTP is a good pivot to check further why and what other process run before
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and after this detection. check which process execute the commandline and what task
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@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ references:
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- https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/
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tags:
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analytic_story:
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- IceID
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- IcedID
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- Windows Registry Abuse
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confidence: 70
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context:
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@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ references:
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tags:
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analytic_story:
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- Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity
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- Iceid
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- Icedid
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- Living Off The Land
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asset_type: Endpoint
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cis20:
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@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ type: TTP
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datamodel:
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- Endpoint
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description: This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32.exe process with plugininit
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parameter. This technique is commonly seen in IceID malware to execute its initial
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parameter. This technique is commonly seen in IcedID malware to execute its initial
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dll stager to download another payload to the compromised machine.
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search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
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as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*PluginInit*
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@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ references:
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- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1105/T1105.md
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tags:
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analytic_story:
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- IceID
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- IcedID
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- Ingress Tool Transfer
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confidence: 100
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context:
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@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ type: Hunting
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datamodel:
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- Endpoint
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description: This analytic indentifies WMIC command-line attempting to uninstall
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application non-interactively. This technique was seen in IceID to uninstall AV
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application non-interactively. This technique was seen in IcedID to uninstall AV
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products on the compromised host to evade detection. This Hunting
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query maybe a good indicator that some process tries to uninstall application using
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wmic which is not a common behavior. This approach may seen in some script or third
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@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ references:
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- https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/
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tags:
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analytic_story:
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- IceID
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- IcedID
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- Azorult
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confidence: 50
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context:
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@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ references:
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- https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/
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tags:
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analytic_story:
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- IceID
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- IcedID
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automated_detection_testing: passed
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confidence: 70
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context:
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