Merge pull request #2382 from splunk/story_name_fix

Throw Some D's
This commit is contained in:
Jose Enrique Hernandez
2022-09-22 17:01:23 -04:00
committed by GitHub
13 changed files with 34 additions and 34 deletions
@@ -6,9 +6,9 @@ author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
type: TTP
datamodel:
- Endpoint
description: This particular behavior is typically executed when an adversaries or
malware gains access to an endpoint and beings to perform execution and to evade
detections. Usually, a batch (.bat) will be executed and multiple registry and scheduled
description: This particular behavior is typically executed when an adversary or
malware gains access to an endpoint and begins to perform execution and to evade
detections. Usually, a batch (.bat) file will be executed and multiple registry and scheduled
task modifications will occur. During triage, review parallel processes and identify
any further file modifications. Endpoint should be isolated.
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ references:
- https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/
tags:
analytic_story:
- IceID
- IcedID
- Windows Registry Abuse
confidence: 70
context:
@@ -6,10 +6,10 @@ author: Teoderick Contreras
type: TTP
datamodel:
- Endpoint
description: This analytic is to detect a suspicious modification of registry to disable
windows defender feature. This technique is to bypassed or evade detection from
Windows Defender AV product specially the BlockAtFirstSeen feature where it block
suspicious file first seen in the host.
description: This analytic is intended to detect a suspicious modification of the Windows registry to disable
a Windows Defender feature. This technique is intended to bypass or evade detection from
Windows Defender AV, specifically the BlockAtFirstSeen feature where it blocks
suspicious files the first time seen on the host.
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry
where Registry.registry_path = "*\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\SpyNet*" Registry.registry_value_name
= DisableBlockAtFirstSeen Registry.registry_value_data = 0x00000001 by _time span=1h
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ references:
- https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/
tags:
analytic_story:
- IceID
- IcedID
- Windows Registry Abuse
- Azorult
confidence: 70
@@ -6,10 +6,10 @@ author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
type: TTP
datamodel:
- Endpoint
description: This analytic is to detect a suspicious modification of registry to disable
windows defender feature. This technique is to bypassed or evade detection from
Windows Defender AV product specially the Enhanced Notification feature wher user
or admin set to show or display alerts.
description: This analytic is intended to detect a suspicious modification of registry to disable
windows defender features. This technique attempts to bypass or evade detection from
Windows Defender AV, specifically the Enhanced Notification feature where a user
or admin would receive alerts.
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry
where Registry.registry_path = "*Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Reporting*" Registry.registry_value_name
= DisableEnhancedNotifications Registry.registry_value_data = 0x00000001 by _time
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ references:
- https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/
tags:
analytic_story:
- IceID
- IcedID
- Windows Registry Abuse
- Azorult
confidence: 70
@@ -6,9 +6,9 @@ author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
type: TTP
datamodel:
- Endpoint
description: This particular behavior is typically executed when an adversaries or
malware gains access to an endpoint and beings to perform execution and to evade
detections. Usually, a batch (.bat) will be executed and multiple registry and scheduled
description: This particular behavior is typically executed when an adversary or
malware gains access to an endpoint and begins to perform execution and to evade
detections. Usually, a batch (.bat) file will be executed and multiple registry and scheduled
task modifications will occur. During triage, review parallel processes and identify
any further file modifications. Endpoint should be isolated.
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ references:
- https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/
tags:
analytic_story:
- IceID
- IcedID
- Windows Registry Abuse
confidence: 70
context:
@@ -6,9 +6,9 @@ author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
type: TTP
datamodel:
- Endpoint
description: This analytic is to detect a suspicious modification of registry to disable
windows defender feature. This technique is to bypassed or evade detection from
Windows Defender AV product specially the spynet reporting for its telemetry.
description: This analytic is intended to detect a suspicious modification of registry to disable
Windows Defender feature. This technique is intended to bypass or evade detection from
Windows Defender AV product, specifically the spynet reporting for Defender telemetry.
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry
where Registry.registry_path = "*\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\SpyNet*" Registry.registry_value_name
= SpynetReporting Registry.registry_value_data = 0x00000000 by _time span=1h Registry.dest
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ references:
- https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/
tags:
analytic_story:
- IceID
- IcedID
- Windows Registry Abuse
- Azorult
confidence: 70
@@ -6,9 +6,9 @@ author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
type: TTP
datamodel:
- Endpoint
description: This analytic is to detect a suspicious modification of registry to disable
windows defender feature. This technique is to bypassed or evade detection from
Windows Defender AV product specially the submit samples feature for further analysis..
description: This analytic is intended to detect a suspicious modification of the Windows registry to disable
a Windows Defender feature. This technique is intended to bypass or evade detection from
Windows Defender AV, specifically the feature that submits samples for further analysis.
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry
where Registry.registry_path = "*\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\SpyNet*" Registry.registry_value_name
= SubmitSamplesConsent Registry.registry_value_data = 0x00000000 by _time span=1h
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ references:
- https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/
tags:
analytic_story:
- IceID
- IcedID
- Windows Registry Abuse
- Azorult
confidence: 70
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ type: TTP
datamodel:
- Endpoint
description: This analytic is to detect a suspicious commandline to disable existing
schedule task. This technique is used by adversaries or commodity malware like IceID
schedule task. This technique is used by adversaries or commodity malware like IcedID
to disable security application (AV products) in the targetted host to evade detections.
This TTP is a good pivot to check further why and what other process run before
and after this detection. check which process execute the commandline and what task
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ references:
- https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/
tags:
analytic_story:
- IceID
- IcedID
- Windows Registry Abuse
confidence: 70
context:
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ references:
tags:
analytic_story:
- Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity
- Iceid
- Icedid
- Living Off The Land
asset_type: Endpoint
cis20:
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ type: TTP
datamodel:
- Endpoint
description: This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32.exe process with plugininit
parameter. This technique is commonly seen in IceID malware to execute its initial
parameter. This technique is commonly seen in IcedID malware to execute its initial
dll stager to download another payload to the compromised machine.
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*PluginInit*
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1105/T1105.md
tags:
analytic_story:
- IceID
- IcedID
- Ingress Tool Transfer
confidence: 100
context:
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ type: Hunting
datamodel:
- Endpoint
description: This analytic indentifies WMIC command-line attempting to uninstall
application non-interactively. This technique was seen in IceID to uninstall AV
application non-interactively. This technique was seen in IcedID to uninstall AV
products on the compromised host to evade detection. This Hunting
query maybe a good indicator that some process tries to uninstall application using
wmic which is not a common behavior. This approach may seen in some script or third
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ references:
- https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/
tags:
analytic_story:
- IceID
- IcedID
- Azorult
confidence: 50
context:
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ references:
- https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/
tags:
analytic_story:
- IceID
- IcedID
automated_detection_testing: passed
confidence: 70
context: