Branch was auto-updated.

This commit is contained in:
pyth0n1c
2022-06-28 15:13:54 -07:00
committed by GitHub
11 changed files with 31 additions and 28 deletions
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 2
date: '2021-09-16'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
type: Hunting
datamodel: []
datamodel:
- Endpoint
description: The following analytic identifies the usage of `rclone.exe`, renamed,
being used to exfiltrate data to a remote destination. RClone has been used by multiple
ransomware groups to exfiltrate data. In many instances, it will be downloaded from
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 4
date: '2020-11-18'
author: David Dorsey, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
type: TTP
datamodel: []
datamodel:
- Endpoint
description: The search looks for modifications to registry keys that control the
enforcement of Windows User Account Control (UAC).
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 3
date: '2020-01-28'
author: Bhavin Patel, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
type: TTP
datamodel: []
datamodel:
- Endpoint
description: This search looks for registry activity associated with modifications
to the registry key `HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Print\Monitors`. In this
scenario, an attacker can load an arbitrary .dll into the print-monitor registry
@@ -1,10 +1,12 @@
name: Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports
id: d2c14d28-5c47-11ec-9892-acde48001122
version: 1
date: '2021-12-13'
author: Mauricio Velazco, Splunk
version: 2
date: '2022-06-28'
author: Mauricio Velazco, Lou Stella, Splunk
type: TTP
datamodel: []
datamodel:
- Endpoint
- Network_Traffic
description: A required step while exploiting the CVE-2021-44228-Log4j vulnerability
is that the victim server will perform outbound connections to attacker-controlled
infrastructure. This is required as part of the JNDI lookup as well as for retrieving
@@ -12,16 +14,7 @@ description: A required step while exploiting the CVE-2021-44228-Log4j vulnerabi
reaching out to default ports used by the LDAP and RMI protocols. This behavior
could represent successfull exploitation. Note that adversaries can easily decide
to use arbitrary ports for these protocols and potentially bypass this detection.
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
where (Processes.process_name="java.exe" OR Processes.process_name=javaw.exe OR
Processes.process_name=javaw.exe) by _time Processes.process_guid Processes.process_name
Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Ports
where (Ports.dest_port= 389 OR Ports.dest_port= 636 OR Ports.dest_port = 1389 OR
Ports.dest_port = 1099 ) by Ports.process_guid Ports.dest Ports.dest_port| `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)`
| rename dest as connection_to_CNC] | table _time dest parent_process_name process_name
process_path process connection_to_CNC dest_port | `outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports_filter`'
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="java.exe" OR Processes.process_name=javaw.exe OR Processes.process_name=javaw.exe) by _time Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | join process_id [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where (All_Traffic.dest_port= 389 OR All_Traffic.dest_port= 636 OR All_Traffic.dest_port = 1389 OR All_Traffic.dest_port = 1099 ) by All_Traffic.process_id All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | rename dest as connection_to_CNC] | table _time dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process connection_to_CNC dest_port| `outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports_filter`'
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
@@ -59,15 +52,15 @@ tags:
- Splunk Cloud
required_fields:
- _time
- Processes.process_guid
- Processes.process_id
- Processes.process_name
- Processes.dest
- Processes.process_path
- Processes.process
- Processes.parent_process_name
- Ports.process_guid
- Ports.dest
- Ports.dest_port
- All_Traffic.process_id
- All_Traffic.dest
- All_Traffic.dest_port
risk_score: 54
security_domain: endpoint
asset_type: Endpoint
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 4
date: '2020-01-28'
author: Bhavin Patel, Patrick Bareiss, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
type: TTP
datamodel: []
datamodel:
- Endpoint
description: This search looks for registry activity associated with application compatibility
shims, which can be leveraged by attackers for various nefarious purposes.
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 5
date: '2022-01-26'
author: David Dorsey, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
type: TTP
datamodel: []
datamodel:
- Endpoint
description: This search looks for modifications to registry keys that can be used
to elevate privileges. The registry keys under "Image File Execution Options" are
used to intercept calls to an executable and can be used to attach malicious binaries
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1
date: '2020-11-06'
author: Rod Soto, Jose Hernandez, Splunk
type: TTP
datamodel: []
datamodel:
- Endpoint
description: The search looks for files that contain the key word *Ryuk* under any
folder in the C drive, which is consistent with Ryuk propagation.
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 3
date: '2020-12-08'
author: David Dorsey, Splunk
type: TTP
datamodel: []
datamodel:
- Endpoint
description: This search looks for shim database files being written to default directories.
The sdbinst.exe application is used to install shim database files (.sdb). According
to Microsoft, a shim is a small library that transparently intercepts an API, changes
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 4
date: '2020-07-22'
author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
type: TTP
datamodel: []
datamodel:
- Endpoint
description: This search detects writes to the recycle bin by a process other than
explorer.exe.
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1
date: '2022-03-28'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
type: Anomaly
datamodel: []
datamodel:
- Endpoint
description: This analytic is to detect deletion of registry with suspicious process file path. This technique was seen in Double Zero wiper malware
where it will delete all the subkey in HKLM, HKCU and HKU registry hive as part of its destructive payload to the targeted hosts. This anomaly detections
can catch possible malware or advesaries deleting registry as part of defense evasion or even payload impact but can also catch for third party application
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ version: 1
date: '2020-11-06'
author: Rod Soto, Jose Hernandez, Splunk
type: TTP
datamodel: []
datamodel:
- Endpoint
description: The search looks for a Windows Security Account Manager (SAM) was stopped
via command-line. This is consistent with Ryuk infections across a fleet of endpoints.
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)