mirror of
https://github.com/splunk/security_content
synced 2026-06-08 17:32:49 +00:00
small improvements ssa generate
This commit is contained in:
@@ -146,6 +146,7 @@ jobs:
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- name: Run Generate
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run: |
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source venv/bin/activate
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rm -rf dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/*.xml
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python3 contentctl.py --path . generate --product ESCU --output dist/escu
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python3 contentctl.py --path . generate --product SSA --output dist/ssa
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@@ -287,8 +287,8 @@ jobs:
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name: DetectionFailureManifest
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path: |
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bin/docker_detection_tester/detection_failure_manifest.json
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#Always clean these up, they make the output messy
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- name: Clean up intermediate Files
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uses: geekyeggo/delete-artifact@v1
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@@ -305,7 +305,39 @@ jobs:
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config_tests_7.json.results
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config_tests_8.json.results
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config_tests_9.json.results
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- name: Log in to S3 for Artifact Uploads
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if: ${{ github.event_name == 'schedule' }}
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uses: aws-actions/configure-aws-credentials@v1
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with:
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aws-access-key-id: ${{ secrets.AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID }}
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aws-secret-access-key: ${{ secrets.AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY }}
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aws-region: us-west-2
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- name: Upload S3 Badge and Summary Artifacts for Nightly Scheduled Run
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if: ${{ github.event_name == 'schedule' }}
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run: |
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cd bin/docker_detection_tester
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python generate_detection_coverage_badge.py --input_summary_file summary_test_results.json --output_badge_file detection_coverage.svg --badge_string "Pass Rate"
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#Upload artifact (summary test results)
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aws s3 cp summary_test_results.json s3://security-content/reporting/summary_test_results.json
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#Since these reside in a public bucket, no need to explicitly mark as public
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# make the file public since it is not by default
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#aws s3api put-object-acl --bucket security-content --key reporting/summary_test_results.json --acl public-read
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#Upload artifact (test results coverage badge)
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aws s3 cp detection_coverage.svg s3://security-content/reporting/detection_coverage.svg
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#Since these reside in a public bucket, no need to explicitly mark as public
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# make the file public since it is not by default
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#aws s3api put-object-acl --bucket security-content --key reporting/detection_coverage.svg --acl public-read
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@@ -129,3 +129,4 @@ distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
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WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
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See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
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limitations under the License.
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@@ -1,17 +1,18 @@
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import os
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import uuid
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import questionary
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from dataclasses import dataclass
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from datetime import datetime
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from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.enums.enums import SecurityContentType
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from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.domain.entities.enums.enums import SecurityContentProduct
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from bin.contentctl_project.contentctl_core.application.factory.utils.new_content_questions import NewContentQuestions
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@dataclass(frozen=True)
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class NewContentFactoryInputDto:
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type: SecurityContentType
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type: SecurityContentProduct
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@dataclass(frozen=True)
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@@ -37,9 +38,15 @@ class NewContentFactory():
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self.output_dto.obj['author'] = answers['detection_author']
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self.output_dto.obj['type'] = answers['detection_type']
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self.output_dto.obj['datamodel'] = answers['datamodels']
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self.output_dto.obj['description'] = 'UPDATE_DESCRIPTION'
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file_name = self.output_dto.obj['name'].replace(' ', '_').replace('-','_').replace('.','_').replace('/','_').lower()
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self.output_dto.obj['search'] = answers['detection_search'] + ' | `' + file_name + '_filter`'
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if answers['detection_product'] == 'SSA':
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answers['datamodels'] = [d.replace(' (SSA)', '') for d in answers['datamodels']]
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self.output_dto.obj['datamodel'] = answers['datamodels']
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if answers['detection_product'] == 'ESCU':
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self.output_dto.obj['datamodel'] = answers['datamodels']
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self.output_dto.obj['description'] = 'UPDATE_DESCRIPTION'
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if answers['detection_product'] == 'ESCU':
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file_name = self.output_dto.obj['name'].replace(' ', '_').replace('-','_').replace('.','_').replace('/','_').lower()
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self.output_dto.obj['search'] = answers['detection_search'] + ' | `' + file_name + '_filter`'
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self.output_dto.obj['how_to_implement'] = 'UPDATE_HOW_TO_IMPLEMENT'
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self.output_dto.obj['known_false_positives'] = 'UPDATE_KNOWN_FALSE_POSITIVES'
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self.output_dto.obj['references'] = ['REFERENCE']
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@@ -56,11 +63,17 @@ class NewContentFactory():
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self.output_dto.obj['tags']['mitre_attack_id'] = [x.strip() for x in answers['mitre_attack_ids'].split(',')]
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self.output_dto.obj['tags']['nist'] = ['DE.CM']
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self.output_dto.obj['tags']['observable'] = [{'name': 'UPDATE', 'type': 'UPDATE', 'role': ['UPDATE']}]
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self.output_dto.obj['tags']['product'] = ['Splunk Enterprise','Splunk Enterprise Security','Splunk Cloud']
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if answers['detection_product'] == 'SSA':
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self.output_dto.obj['tags']['risk_severity'] = 'UPDATE: <low>, <medium>, <high>'
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if answers['detection_product'] == 'ESCU':
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self.output_dto.obj['tags']['product'] = ['Splunk Enterprise','Splunk Enterprise Security','Splunk Cloud']
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if answers['detection_product'] == 'SSA':
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self.output_dto.obj['tags']['product'] = ['Splunk Behavioral Analytics']
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self.output_dto.obj['tags']['required_fields'] = ['UPDATE']
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self.output_dto.obj['tags']['risk_score'] = 'UPDATE (impact * confidence)/100'
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self.output_dto.obj['tags']['security_domain'] = answers['security_domain']
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self.output_dto.obj['source'] = answers['detection_kind']
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elif input_dto.type == SecurityContentType.stories:
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questions = NewContentQuestions.get_questions_story()
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+18
@@ -5,6 +5,16 @@ class NewContentQuestions():
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@classmethod
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def get_questions_detection(self) -> list:
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questions = [
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{
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'type': 'select',
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'message': 'what product is this for',
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'name': 'detection_product',
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'choices': [
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'ESCU',
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'SSA'
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],
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'default': 'ESCU'
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},
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{
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'type': 'select',
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'message': 'what kind of detection is this',
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@@ -50,6 +60,12 @@ class NewContentQuestions():
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'name': 'datamodels',
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'choices': [
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'Endpoint',
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'Endpoint_Processes (SSA)',
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'Endpoint_Registry (SSA)',
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'Endpoint_Filesystem (SSA)',
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'Endpoint_ResourceAccess (SSA)',
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'Endpoint_AccountManagement (SSA)',
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'Intrusion_Detection (SSA)',
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'Authentication',
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'Change',
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'Email',
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@@ -61,6 +77,7 @@ class NewContentQuestions():
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'Web',
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'Risk'
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],
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'default': 'Endpoint'
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},
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{
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'type': 'text',
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@@ -88,6 +105,7 @@ class NewContentQuestions():
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'Actions on Objectives',
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'Denial of Service'
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],
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'default': 'Exploitation'
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},
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{
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'type': 'select',
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@@ -113,6 +113,13 @@ class Detection(BaseModel, SecurityContentObject):
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raise ValueError('Use source macro instead of eventtype, sourcetype, source or index in detection: ' + values["name"])
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return values
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@root_validator
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def search_validation_ssa(cls, values):
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if 'ssa_' in values['file_path']:
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if not '--body--' in values['search']:
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raise ValueError('finding report object placeholder --body-- missing in: ' + values["name"])
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return values
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@root_validator
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def name_max_length(cls, values):
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# Check max length only for ESCU searches, SSA does not have that constraint
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@@ -20,6 +20,12 @@ class ConfWriter():
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f.write(output)
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@staticmethod
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def writeConfFileHeaderEmpty(output_path : str) -> None:
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with open(output_path, 'w') as f:
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f.write('')
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@staticmethod
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def writeConfFile(template_name : str, output_path : str, objects : list) -> None:
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@@ -7,4 +7,4 @@ class JsonWriter():
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def writeJsonObject(file_path : str, obj) -> None:
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with open(file_path, 'w') as outfile:
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json.dump(obj, outfile, ensure_ascii=False, indent=4)
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json.dump(obj, outfile, ensure_ascii=False)
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@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ class ObjToConfAdapter(Adapter):
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workbench_panels.append(investigation)
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investigation.search = investigation.search.replace(">",">")
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investigation.search = investigation.search.replace("<","<")
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ConfWriter.writeConfFileHeader(os.path.join(output_path,
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ConfWriter.writeConfFileHeaderEmpty(os.path.join(output_path,
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'default/data/ui/panels/', str("workbench_panel_" + response_file_name_xml)))
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ConfWriter.writeConfFile('panel.j2',
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os.path.join(output_path,
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@@ -28,14 +28,20 @@ class ObjToJsonAdapter(Adapter):
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}
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))
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JsonWriter.writeJsonObject(os.path.join(output_path, 'detections.json'), obj_array)
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JsonWriter.writeJsonObject(os.path.join(output_path, 'detections.json'), {'detections': obj_array })
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elif type == SecurityContentType.stories:
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obj_array = []
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for story in objects:
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obj_array.append(story.dict(exclude_none=True))
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obj_array.append(story.dict(exclude_none=True,
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exclude =
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{
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"detections": True,
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"investigations": True
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}
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))
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JsonWriter.writeJsonObject(os.path.join(output_path, 'stories.json'), obj_array)
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JsonWriter.writeJsonObject(os.path.join(output_path, 'stories.json'), {'stories': obj_array })
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elif type == SecurityContentType.baselines:
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obj_array = []
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@@ -47,33 +53,33 @@ class ObjToJsonAdapter(Adapter):
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}
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))
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JsonWriter.writeJsonObject(os.path.join(output_path, 'baselines.json'), obj_array)
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JsonWriter.writeJsonObject(os.path.join(output_path, 'baselines.json'), {'baselines': obj_array })
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elif type == SecurityContentType.investigations:
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obj_array = []
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for investigation in objects:
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obj_array.append(investigation.dict(exclude_none=True))
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JsonWriter.writeJsonObject(os.path.join(output_path, 'response_tasks.json'), obj_array)
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JsonWriter.writeJsonObject(os.path.join(output_path, 'response_tasks.json'), {'response_tasks': obj_array })
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elif type == SecurityContentType.lookups:
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obj_array = []
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for lookup in objects:
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obj_array.append(lookup.dict(exclude_none=True))
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JsonWriter.writeJsonObject(os.path.join(output_path, 'lookups.json'), obj_array)
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JsonWriter.writeJsonObject(os.path.join(output_path, 'lookups.json'), {'lookups': obj_array })
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elif type == SecurityContentType.macros:
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obj_array = []
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for macro in objects:
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obj_array.append(macro.dict(exclude_none=True))
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JsonWriter.writeJsonObject(os.path.join(output_path, 'macros.json'), obj_array)
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JsonWriter.writeJsonObject(os.path.join(output_path, 'macros.json'), {'macros': obj_array })
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elif type == SecurityContentType.deployments:
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obj_array = []
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for deployment in objects:
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obj_array.append(deployment.dict(exclude_none=True))
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JsonWriter.writeJsonObject(os.path.join(output_path, 'deployments.json'), obj_array)
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JsonWriter.writeJsonObject(os.path.join(output_path, 'deployments.json'), {'deployments': obj_array })
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@@ -18,8 +18,8 @@ class ObjToYmlAdapter(Adapter):
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def writeObjects(self, objects: list, output_path: str, type: SecurityContentType = None) -> None:
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for obj in objects:
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file_name = "ssa___" + self.convertNameToFileName(obj.name)
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for obj in objects:
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file_name = "ssa___" + self.convertNameToFileName(obj.name, obj.tags)
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if self.isComplexBARule(obj.search):
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file_path = os.path.join(output_path, 'complex', file_name)
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else:
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@@ -85,13 +85,13 @@ class ObjToYmlAdapter(Adapter):
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def writeObjectNewContent(self, object: dict, type: SecurityContentType) -> None:
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if type == SecurityContentType.detections:
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file_path = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), '../../../../detections', object['source'], self.convertNameToFileName(object['name']))
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file_path = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), '../../../../detections', object['source'], self.convertNameToFileName(object['name'],object['tags']['product']))
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test_obj = {}
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test_obj['name'] = object['name'] + ' Unit Test'
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test_obj['tests'] = [
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{
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'name': object['name'],
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'file': object['source'] + '/' + self.convertNameToFileName(object['name']),
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'file': object['source'] + '/' + self.convertNameToFileName(object['name'],object['tags']['product']),
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'pass_condition': '| stats count | where count > 0',
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'earliest_time': '-24h',
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'latest_time': 'now',
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@@ -105,23 +105,40 @@ class ObjToYmlAdapter(Adapter):
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]
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}
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]
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file_path_test = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), '../../../../tests', object['source'], self.convertNameToFileName(object['name']))
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file_path_test = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), '../../../../tests', object['source'], self.convertNameToTestFileName(object['name'],object['tags']['product']))
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YmlWriter.writeYmlFile(file_path_test, test_obj)
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object.pop('source')
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elif type == SecurityContentType.stories:
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file_path = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), '../../../../stories', self.convertNameToFileName(object['name']))
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file_path = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), '../../../../stories', self.convertNameToFileName(object['name'],object['tags']['product']))
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YmlWriter.writeYmlFile(file_path, object)
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def convertNameToFileName(self, name: str):
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def convertNameToFileName(self, name: str, product: list):
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file_name = name \
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.replace(' ', '_') \
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.replace('-','_') \
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.replace('.','_') \
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.replace('/','_') \
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.lower()
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file_name = file_name + '.yml'
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if 'Splunk Behavioral Analytics' in product:
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file_name = 'ssa___' + file_name + '.yml'
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else:
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file_name = file_name + '.yml'
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return file_name
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def convertNameToTestFileName(self, name: str, product: list):
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file_name = name \
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.replace(' ', '_') \
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.replace('-','_') \
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.replace('.','_') \
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.replace('/','_') \
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.lower()
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if 'Splunk Behavioral Analytics' in product:
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file_name = 'ssa___' + file_name + '.test.yml'
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else:
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file_name = file_name + '.test.yml'
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return file_name
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+2
-2
@@ -12,8 +12,8 @@ sidebar:
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| -------------- | --------------- | --------------- |
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{%- for detection in objects -%}
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{% if detection.tags.mitre_attack_enrichments %}
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| [{{ detection.name }}](/{{ detection.source }}/{{ detection.name | lower | replace(' ', '_') }}/) | {% for attack in detection.tags.mitre_attack_enrichments -%} [{{ attack.mitre_attack_technique }}](/tags/#{{ attack.mitre_attack_technique | lower | replace(" ", "-") }}){% if not loop.last -%}, {% endif -%}{%- endfor %} | {{ detection.type }} |
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| [{{ detection.name }}](/{{ detection.source }}/{{ detection.name | lower | replace(' ', '_') }}/) | {% for attack in detection.tags.mitre_attack_enrichments -%} [{{ attack.mitre_attack_technique }}](/tags/#{{ attack.mitre_attack_technique | lower | replace(" ", "-") }}){% if not loop.last -%}, {% endif -%}{%- endfor %} | [{{ detection.type }}](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
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{%- else %}
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| [{{ detection.name }}]() | None | {{ detection.type }} |
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| [{{ detection.name }}]() | None | [{{ detection.type }}](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
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{%- endif -%}
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{%- endfor -%}
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+73
-21
@@ -44,17 +44,23 @@ We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use
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{{ object.description }}
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|
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- **Type**: [{{ object.type }}](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types)
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- **Type**: [{{ object.type }}](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types)
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- **Product**: {{ object.tags.product|join(', ') }}
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{% if object.datamodel -%}- **Datamodel**: {% for datamodel in object.datamodel %}[{{ datamodel }}](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/{{ datamodel|replace("_", "")}}){% if not loop.last %}, {% endif %}{%-endfor %}{% endif %}
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{% if object.splunk_app_enrichment -%}- **Datasource**: {% for splunk_app in object.splunk_app_enrichment %}[{{ splunk_app.name }}]({{splunk_app.url}}){% if not loop.last %}, {% endif %}{%-endfor %}{% endif %}
|
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{%- if object.splunk_app_enrichment %}- **Datasource**: {% for splunk_app in object.splunk_app_enrichment %}[{{ splunk_app.name }}]({{splunk_app.url}}){% if not loop.last %}, {% endif %}{%-endfor %}{% endif %}
|
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- **Last Updated**: {{ object.date }}
|
||||
- **Author**: {{object.author}}
|
||||
- **ID**: {{ object.id }}
|
||||
|
||||
{% if object.tags.mitre_attack_id %}
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#### [ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/)
|
||||
|
||||
#### Annotations
|
||||
|
||||
<details>
|
||||
<summary>ATT&CK</summary>
|
||||
|
||||
<div markdown="1">
|
||||
|
||||
{% if object.tags.mitre_attack_id %}
|
||||
| ID | Technique | Tactic |
|
||||
| -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- |
|
||||
{%- for attack in object.tags.mitre_attack_enrichments %}
|
||||
@@ -68,6 +74,66 @@ We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use
|
||||
{% endfor %}
|
||||
{% endif -%}
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
</details>
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
<details>
|
||||
<summary>Kill Chain Phase</summary>
|
||||
|
||||
<div markdown="1">
|
||||
|
||||
{% for phase in object.annotations.kill_chain_phases -%}
|
||||
* {{ phase }}
|
||||
{% endfor %}
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
</details>
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
<details>
|
||||
<summary>NIST</summary>
|
||||
|
||||
<div markdown="1">
|
||||
|
||||
{% if object.annotations.nist -%}
|
||||
{% for nist in object.annotations.nist -%}
|
||||
* {{ nist }}
|
||||
{% endfor %}
|
||||
{% endif %}
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
</details>
|
||||
|
||||
<details>
|
||||
<summary>CIS20</summary>
|
||||
|
||||
<div markdown="1">
|
||||
|
||||
{% if object.annotations.cis20 -%}
|
||||
{% for cis in object.annotations.cis20 -%}
|
||||
* {{ cis }}
|
||||
{% endfor %}
|
||||
{% endif %}
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
</details>
|
||||
|
||||
<details>
|
||||
<summary>CVE</summary>
|
||||
|
||||
<div markdown="1">
|
||||
{% if object.cve_enrichment -%}
|
||||
| ID | Summary | [CVSS](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss) |
|
||||
| ----------- | ----------- | -------------- |
|
||||
{% for cve in object.cve_enrichment -%}
|
||||
| [{{ cve.id }}](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/{{cve.id}}) | {{ cve.summary }} | {{ cve.cvss }} |
|
||||
{% endfor %}
|
||||
{% endif %}
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
</details>
|
||||
|
||||
#### Search
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
@@ -84,7 +150,7 @@ The SPL above uses the following Macros:
|
||||
{% endfor %}
|
||||
{% endif -%}
|
||||
|
||||
Note that `{{object.name | lower | replace(" ", "_") }}_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
|
||||
Note that **{{object.name | lower | replace(" ", "_") }}_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
|
||||
|
||||
{% if object.lookups -%}
|
||||
#### Lookups
|
||||
@@ -111,10 +177,6 @@ The SPL above uses the following Lookups:
|
||||
* [{{ story }}](/stories/{{story|lower|replace(" ", "_")}})
|
||||
{% endfor %}
|
||||
|
||||
#### Kill Chain Phase
|
||||
{% for phase in object.tags.kill_chain_phases -%}
|
||||
* {{ phase }}
|
||||
{% endfor %}
|
||||
|
||||
{% if object.tags.observable %}
|
||||
#### RBA
|
||||
@@ -124,16 +186,6 @@ The SPL above uses the following Lookups:
|
||||
| {{(object.tags.impact * object.tags.confidence)/100}} | {{ object.tags.impact }} | {{ object.tags.confidence }} | {{object.tags.message}} |
|
||||
{% endif %}
|
||||
|
||||
{% if object.cve_enrichment -%}
|
||||
#### CVE
|
||||
|
||||
| ID | Summary | [CVSS](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss) |
|
||||
| ----------- | ----------- | -------------- |
|
||||
{% for cve in object.cve_enrichment -%}
|
||||
| [{{ cve.id }}](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/{{cve.id}}) | {{ cve.summary }} | {{ cve.cvss }} |
|
||||
{% endfor %}
|
||||
{% endif %}
|
||||
|
||||
#### Reference
|
||||
{% if object.references %}
|
||||
{% for reference in object.references -%}
|
||||
@@ -142,7 +194,7 @@ The SPL above uses the following Lookups:
|
||||
{% endif %}
|
||||
|
||||
#### Test Dataset
|
||||
Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui).
|
||||
Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [replay.py](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui).
|
||||
Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server)
|
||||
|
||||
{% if object.tags.dataset %}
|
||||
@@ -151,4 +203,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith
|
||||
{% endfor %}
|
||||
{% endif %}
|
||||
|
||||
[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/{% if object.experimental is sameas true -%}experimental/{%- endif -%}{{object.source}}/{{ object.name | lower | replace (" ", "_") }}.yml) \| *version*: **{{object.version}}**
|
||||
[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/{% if object.experimental is sameas true -%}experimental/{%- endif -%}{{object.source}}/{{ object.name | lower | replace (" ", "_") }}.yml) \| *version*: **{{object.version}}**
|
||||
+7
-5
@@ -5,8 +5,8 @@ main:
|
||||
url: /stories/
|
||||
- title: "Playbooks"
|
||||
url: /playbooks/
|
||||
- title: "Tags"
|
||||
url: /tags/
|
||||
- title: "Blog"
|
||||
url: https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/author/secmrkt-research.html
|
||||
- title: "About"
|
||||
url: https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security/threat-research.html
|
||||
detections:
|
||||
@@ -24,12 +24,14 @@ detections:
|
||||
{%- endfor %}
|
||||
- title: "Product"
|
||||
children:
|
||||
- title: "Splunk Enterprise"
|
||||
url: /tags/#splunk-enterprise
|
||||
- title: "Splunk Cloud"
|
||||
url: /tags/#splunk-cloud
|
||||
- title: "Splunk Enterprise Security"
|
||||
url: /tags/#splunk-enterprise-security
|
||||
- title: "Splunk Behavioral Analytics"
|
||||
url: /tags/#splunk-behavioral-analytics
|
||||
- title: "Splunk Security Analytics for AWS"
|
||||
url: /tags/#splunk-security-analytics-for-aws
|
||||
stories:
|
||||
- title: "Use Case"
|
||||
children:
|
||||
@@ -43,4 +45,4 @@ playbooks:
|
||||
- title: "Response"
|
||||
url: /tags/#response/
|
||||
- title: "Investigation"
|
||||
url: /tags/#investigation/
|
||||
url: /tags/#investigation/
|
||||
@@ -1,4 +1,9 @@
|
||||
|
||||
import csv
|
||||
import os
|
||||
from posixpath import split
|
||||
from typing import Optional
|
||||
|
||||
from attackcti import attack_client
|
||||
|
||||
import logging
|
||||
@@ -8,9 +13,10 @@ logging.getLogger('taxii2client').setLevel(logging.CRITICAL)
|
||||
class AttackEnrichment():
|
||||
|
||||
@classmethod
|
||||
def get_attack_lookup(self) -> dict:
|
||||
def get_attack_lookup(self, store_csv = None) -> dict:
|
||||
attack_lookup = dict()
|
||||
|
||||
file_path = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), '../../../../lookups/mitre_enrichment.csv')
|
||||
|
||||
try:
|
||||
lift = attack_client()
|
||||
all_enterprise = lift.get_enterprise(stix_format=False)
|
||||
@@ -32,9 +38,33 @@ class AttackEnrichment():
|
||||
|
||||
if not ('revoked' in technique):
|
||||
attack_lookup[technique['technique_id']] = {'technique': technique['technique'], 'tactics': tactics, 'groups': apt_groups}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
if store_csv:
|
||||
f = open(file_path, 'w')
|
||||
writer = csv.writer(f)
|
||||
writer.writerow(['mitre_id', 'technique', 'tactics' ,'groups'])
|
||||
for key in attack_lookup.keys():
|
||||
if len(attack_lookup[key]['groups']) == 0:
|
||||
groups = 'no'
|
||||
else:
|
||||
groups = '|'.join(attack_lookup[key]['groups'])
|
||||
|
||||
writer.writerow([
|
||||
key,
|
||||
attack_lookup[key]['technique'],
|
||||
'|'.join(attack_lookup[key]['tactics']),
|
||||
groups
|
||||
])
|
||||
|
||||
f.close()
|
||||
|
||||
except Exception as err:
|
||||
print('Warning: ' + str(err))
|
||||
|
||||
print('Use local copy lookups/mitre_enrichment.csv')
|
||||
dict_from_csv = {}
|
||||
with open(file_path, mode='r') as inp:
|
||||
reader = csv.reader(inp)
|
||||
attack_lookup = {rows[0]:{'technique': rows[1], 'tactics': rows[2].split('|'), 'groups': rows[3].split('|')} for rows in reader}
|
||||
attack_lookup.pop('mitre_id')
|
||||
|
||||
return attack_lookup
|
||||
@@ -8,10 +8,16 @@ class CveEnrichment():
|
||||
|
||||
@classmethod
|
||||
def enrich_cve(self, cve_id: str) -> dict:
|
||||
cve = CVESearch(CVESSEARCH_API_URL)
|
||||
result = cve.id(cve_id)
|
||||
cve_enriched = dict()
|
||||
cve_enriched['id'] = cve_id
|
||||
cve_enriched['cvss'] = result['cvss']
|
||||
cve_enriched['summary'] = result['summary']
|
||||
try:
|
||||
cve = CVESearch(CVESSEARCH_API_URL)
|
||||
result = cve.id(cve_id)
|
||||
cve_enriched['id'] = cve_id
|
||||
cve_enriched['cvss'] = result['cvss']
|
||||
cve_enriched['summary'] = result['summary']
|
||||
except TypeError as TypeErr:
|
||||
# there was a error calling the circl api lets just empty the object
|
||||
print("WARNING, issue enriching {0}, with error: {1}".format(cve_id, str(TypeErr)))
|
||||
cve_enriched = dict()
|
||||
|
||||
return cve_enriched
|
||||
+1
@@ -178,6 +178,7 @@ class SecurityContentDetectionBuilder(DetectionBuilder):
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.security_content_obj.tags.mitre_attack_enrichments.append(mitre_attack_enrichment)
|
||||
else:
|
||||
#print("mitre_attack_id " + mitre_attack_id + " doesn't exist for detecction " + self.security_content_obj.name)
|
||||
raise ValueError("mitre_attack_id " + mitre_attack_id + " doesn't exist for detecction " + self.security_content_obj.name)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
-6
@@ -1,9 +1,3 @@
|
||||
#############
|
||||
# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
|
||||
# On Date: 2020-12-25T17:05:55 UTC
|
||||
# Author: Splunk Security Research
|
||||
# Contact: research@splunk.com
|
||||
#############
|
||||
<panel>
|
||||
<table>
|
||||
<search>
|
||||
|
||||
-6
@@ -1,9 +1,3 @@
|
||||
#############
|
||||
# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
|
||||
# On Date: 2020-12-25T17:05:55 UTC
|
||||
# Author: Splunk Security Research
|
||||
# Contact: research@splunk.com
|
||||
#############
|
||||
<panel>
|
||||
<table>
|
||||
<search>
|
||||
|
||||
+371
-244
@@ -1,59 +1,197 @@
|
||||
mitre_id,technique,tactics,groups
|
||||
T1205.001,Port Knocking,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Command And Control,no
|
||||
T1564.009,Resource Forking,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1562.010,Downgrade Attack,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1547.015,Login Items,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1620,Reflective Code Loading,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1619,Cloud Storage Object Discovery,Discovery,no
|
||||
T1218.014,MMC,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1218.013,Mavinject,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1614.001,System Language Discovery,Discovery,no
|
||||
T1615,Group Policy Discovery,Discovery,Turla
|
||||
T1036.007,Double File Extension,Defense Evasion,Mustang Panda
|
||||
T1562.009,Safe Mode Boot,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1564.008,Email Hiding Rules,Defense Evasion,FIN4
|
||||
T1505.004,IIS Components,Persistence,no
|
||||
T1027.006,HTML Smuggling,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1213.003,Code Repositories,Collection,APT29
|
||||
T1553.006,Code Signing Policy Modification,Defense Evasion,Turla|APT39
|
||||
T1614,System Location Discovery,Discovery,no
|
||||
T1613,Container and Resource Discovery,Discovery,TeamTNT
|
||||
T1552.007,Container API,Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1612,Build Image on Host,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1611,Escape to Host,Privilege Escalation,TeamTNT
|
||||
T1204.003,Malicious Image,Execution,TeamTNT
|
||||
T1053.007,Container Orchestration Job,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1610,Deploy Container,Defense Evasion|Execution,TeamTNT
|
||||
T1609,Container Administration Command,Execution,TeamTNT
|
||||
T1608.005,Link Target,Resource Development,Silent Librarian
|
||||
T1608.004,Drive-by Target,Resource Development,Transparent Tribe|APT32|Threat Group-3390
|
||||
T1608.003,Install Digital Certificate,Resource Development,no
|
||||
T1608.002,Upload Tool,Resource Development,Threat Group-3390
|
||||
T1608.001,Upload Malware,Resource Development,TeamTNT|APT32
|
||||
T1608,Stage Capabilities,Resource Development,no
|
||||
T1016.001,Internet Connection Discovery,Discovery,APT29|Turla
|
||||
T1553.005,Mark-of-the-Web Bypass,Defense Evasion,TA505
|
||||
T1555.005,Password Managers,Credential Access,Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao
|
||||
T1484.002,Domain Trust Modification,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,APT29
|
||||
T1484.001,Group Policy Modification,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Indrik Spider
|
||||
T1547.014,Active Setup,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1606.002,SAML Tokens,Credential Access,APT29
|
||||
T1606.001,Web Cookies,Credential Access,APT29
|
||||
T1606,Forge Web Credentials,Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1555.004,Windows Credential Manager,Credential Access,Stealth Falcon|OilRig|Turla
|
||||
T1059.008,Network Device CLI,Execution,no
|
||||
T1602.002,Network Device Configuration Dump,Collection,no
|
||||
T1542.005,TFTP Boot,Defense Evasion|Persistence,no
|
||||
T1542.004,ROMMONkit,Defense Evasion|Persistence,no
|
||||
T1602.001,SNMP (MIB Dump),Collection,no
|
||||
T1602,Data from Configuration Repository,Collection,no
|
||||
T1601.002,Downgrade System Image,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1601.001,Patch System Image,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1601,Modify System Image,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1600.002,Disable Crypto Hardware,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1600.001,Reduce Key Space,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1600,Weaken Encryption,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1556.004,Network Device Authentication,Credential Access|Defense Evasion|Persistence,no
|
||||
T1599.001,Network Address Translation Traversal,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1599,Network Boundary Bridging,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1020.001,Traffic Duplication,Exfiltration,no
|
||||
T1557.002,ARP Cache Poisoning,Credential Access|Collection,Cleaver
|
||||
T1588.006,Vulnerabilities,Resource Development,Sandworm Team
|
||||
T1053.006,Systemd Timers,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1562.008,Disable Cloud Logs,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1547.012,Print Processors,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1598.003,Spearphishing Link,Reconnaissance,Magic Hound|Silent Librarian|Sidewinder|Sandworm Team|APT32|Kimsuky
|
||||
T1598.002,Spearphishing Attachment,Reconnaissance,Sidewinder
|
||||
T1598.001,Spearphishing Service,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1598,Phishing for Information,Reconnaissance,ZIRCONIUM|APT28
|
||||
T1597.002,Purchase Technical Data,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1597.001,Threat Intel Vendors,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1597,Search Closed Sources,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1596.005,Scan Databases,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1596.004,CDNs,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1596.003,Digital Certificates,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1596.001,DNS/Passive DNS,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1596.002,WHOIS,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1596,Search Open Technical Databases,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1595.002,Vulnerability Scanning,Reconnaissance,TeamTNT|APT29|Volatile Cedar|APT28|Sandworm Team
|
||||
T1595.001,Scanning IP Blocks,Reconnaissance,TeamTNT
|
||||
T1595,Active Scanning,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1594,Search Victim-Owned Websites,Reconnaissance,Silent Librarian|Sandworm Team
|
||||
T1593.002,Search Engines,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1593.001,Social Media,Reconnaissance,Kimsuky
|
||||
T1593,Search Open Websites/Domains,Reconnaissance,Sandworm Team
|
||||
T1592.004,Client Configurations,Reconnaissance,HAFNIUM
|
||||
T1592.003,Firmware,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1592.002,Software,Reconnaissance,Andariel|Sandworm Team
|
||||
T1592.001,Hardware,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1592,Gather Victim Host Information,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1591.004,Identify Roles,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1591.003,Identify Business Tempo,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1591.001,Determine Physical Locations,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1591.002,Business Relationships,Reconnaissance,Sandworm Team
|
||||
T1591,Gather Victim Org Information,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1590.006,Network Security Appliances,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1590.005,IP Addresses,Reconnaissance,Andariel|HAFNIUM
|
||||
T1590.004,Network Topology,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1590.003,Network Trust Dependencies,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1590.002,DNS,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1590.001,Domain Properties,Reconnaissance,Sandworm Team
|
||||
T1590,Gather Victim Network Information,Reconnaissance,HAFNIUM
|
||||
T1589.003,Employee Names,Reconnaissance,Silent Librarian|Sandworm Team
|
||||
T1589.002,Email Addresses,Reconnaissance,Kimsuky|Magic Hound|TA551|MuddyWater|HAFNIUM|APT32|Silent Librarian|Sandworm Team
|
||||
T1589.001,Credentials,Reconnaissance,Leviathan|APT28|Magic Hound|Chimera
|
||||
T1589,Gather Victim Identity Information,Reconnaissance,Magic Hound|APT32
|
||||
T1588.005,Exploits,Resource Development,no
|
||||
T1588.004,Digital Certificates,Resource Development,Lazarus Group|Silent Librarian
|
||||
T1588.003,Code Signing Certificates,Resource Development,Wizard Spider
|
||||
T1588.002,Tool,Resource Development,CostaRicto|Night Dragon|DarkVishnya|FIN5|Gorgon Group|Patchwork|Chimera|Dragonfly|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|APT41|FIN6|TEMP.Veles|Kimsuky|PittyTiger|Cobalt Group|APT29|Thrip|Ke3chang|DarkHydrus|APT32|APT38|BRONZE BUTLER|Carbanak|Cleaver|Inception|Leafminer|Threat Group-3390|Ferocious Kitten|IndigoZebra|BackdoorDiplomacy|menuPass|APT-C-36|Magic Hound|APT28|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Silence|WIRTE|Turla|APT33|APT19|FIN10|CopyKittens|APT39|APT1|MuddyWater|Silent Librarian|GALLIUM|Sandworm Team
|
||||
T1588.001,Malware,Resource Development,Andariel|BackdoorDiplomacy|Turla|APT1
|
||||
T1588,Obtain Capabilities,Resource Development,no
|
||||
T1587.004,Exploits,Resource Development,no
|
||||
T1587.003,Digital Certificates,Resource Development,APT29|PROMETHIUM
|
||||
T1587.002,Code Signing Certificates,Resource Development,PROMETHIUM|Patchwork
|
||||
T1587.001,Malware,Resource Development,TeamTNT|APT29|Lazarus Group|Sandworm Team|Turla|FIN7|Night Dragon|Cleaver
|
||||
T1587,Develop Capabilities,Resource Development,Kimsuky
|
||||
T1586.002,Email Accounts,Resource Development,IndigoZebra|Leviathan|Magic Hound|Kimsuky
|
||||
T1586.001,Social Media Accounts,Resource Development,Leviathan
|
||||
T1586,Compromise Accounts,Resource Development,no
|
||||
T1585.002,Email Accounts,Resource Development,Leviathan|Magic Hound|Silent Librarian|Sandworm Team|APT1
|
||||
T1585.001,Social Media Accounts,Resource Development,Leviathan|Magic Hound|Fox Kitten|Sandworm Team|APT32|Cleaver
|
||||
T1585,Establish Accounts,Resource Development,Fox Kitten|APT17
|
||||
T1584.006,Web Services,Resource Development,Turla
|
||||
T1584.005,Botnet,Resource Development,no
|
||||
T1584.004,Server,Resource Development,Indrik Spider|Turla|APT16
|
||||
T1584.003,Virtual Private Server,Resource Development,Turla
|
||||
T1584.002,DNS Server,Resource Development,no
|
||||
T1584.001,Domains,Resource Development,Transparent Tribe|Magic Hound|APT29|APT1
|
||||
T1583.006,Web Services,Resource Development,IndigoZebra|ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|HAFNIUM|Lazarus Group|Turla|APT32|APT17|APT29
|
||||
T1583.005,Botnet,Resource Development,no
|
||||
T1583.004,Server,Resource Development,GALLIUM|Sandworm Team
|
||||
T1583.003,Virtual Private Server,Resource Development,HAFNIUM|TEMP.Veles
|
||||
T1583.002,DNS Server,Resource Development,no
|
||||
T1584,Compromise Infrastructure,Resource Development,no
|
||||
T1583.001,Domains,Resource Development,IndigoZebra|TeamTNT|Ferocious Kitten|FIN7|Transparent Tribe|Leviathan|Magic Hound|APT29|Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|Lazarus Group|Silent Librarian|menuPass|Sandworm Team|APT32|Kimsuky|APT1|APT28
|
||||
T1583,Acquire Infrastructure,Resource Development,no
|
||||
T1564.007,VBA Stomping,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1558.004,AS-REP Roasting,Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1580,Cloud Infrastructure Discovery,Discovery,no
|
||||
T1218.012,Verclsid,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1205.001,Port Knocking,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Command And Control,PROMETHIUM
|
||||
T1564.006,Run Virtual Instance,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1564.005,Hidden File System,Defense Evasion,Strider|Equation
|
||||
T1556.003,Pluggable Authentication Modules,Credential Access|Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1556.003,Pluggable Authentication Modules,Credential Access|Defense Evasion|Persistence,no
|
||||
T1574.012,COR_PROFILER,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,Blue Mockingbird
|
||||
T1562.007,Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1098.004,SSH Authorized Keys,Persistence,no
|
||||
T1098.004,SSH Authorized Keys,Persistence,TeamTNT
|
||||
T1480.001,Environmental Keying,Defense Evasion,APT41|Equation
|
||||
T1059.007,JavaScript/JScript,Execution,APT32|FIN7|Cobalt Group|Molerats|TA505|Silence|Leafminer
|
||||
T1059.007,JavaScript,Execution,Indrik Spider|MuddyWater|Turla|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Evilnum|Kimsuky|FIN6|APT32|FIN7|Cobalt Group|Molerats|TA505|Silence|Leafminer
|
||||
T1578.004,Revert Cloud Instance,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1578.003,Delete Cloud Instance,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1578.001,Create Snapshot,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1578.002,Create Cloud Instance,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1127.001,MSBuild,Defense Evasion,Frankenstein
|
||||
T1027.005,Indicator Removal from Tools,Defense Evasion,Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|Patchwork|APT3|Turla|OilRig|Deep Panda
|
||||
T1027.005,Indicator Removal from Tools,Defense Evasion,Operation Wocao|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|Patchwork|APT3|Turla|OilRig|Deep Panda
|
||||
T1562.006,Indicator Blocking,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1573.002,Asymmetric Cryptography,Command And Control,Tropic Trooper|Cobalt Group|OilRig|FIN8|FIN6
|
||||
T1573.001,Symmetric Cryptography,Command And Control,Frankenstein|Inception|APT28|APT33|BRONZE BUTLER|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1573.002,Asymmetric Cryptography,Command And Control,Operation Wocao|Tropic Trooper|Cobalt Group|OilRig|FIN8|FIN6
|
||||
T1573.001,Symmetric Cryptography,Command And Control,Mustang Panda|Darkhotel|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Frankenstein|Inception|APT28|APT33|BRONZE BUTLER|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1573,Encrypted Channel,Command And Control,Tropic Trooper
|
||||
T1027.004,Compile After Delivery,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|Rocke|MuddyWater
|
||||
T1574.004,Dylib Hijacking,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1546.015,Component Object Model Hijacking,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,APT28
|
||||
T1071.004,DNS,Command And Control,APT39|Tropic Trooper|OilRig|Ke3chang|Cobalt Group|APT18|APT41|FIN7
|
||||
T1071.003,Mail Protocols,Command And Control,APT32|SilverTerrier|APT28
|
||||
T1071.002,File Transfer Protocols,Command And Control,APT41|SilverTerrier|Machete|Honeybee
|
||||
T1071.001,Web Protocols,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|TA505|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Inception|APT41|SilverTerrier|Machete|APT28|WIRTE|APT33|FIN4|Night Dragon|APT18|APT38|Cobalt Group|APT19|Threat Group-3390|Rancor|Orangeworm|APT37|Ke3chang|Dark Caracal|Turla|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|OilRig|Magic Hound|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon
|
||||
T1572,Protocol Tunneling,Command And Control,OilRig|Cobalt Group|FIN6
|
||||
T1048.003,Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol,Exfiltration,APT32|APT33|Thrip|FIN8|OilRig|Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1048.002,Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol,Exfiltration,no
|
||||
T1071.004,DNS,Command And Control,Chimera|APT39|Tropic Trooper|OilRig|Ke3chang|Cobalt Group|APT18|APT41|FIN7
|
||||
T1071.003,Mail Protocols,Command And Control,Turla|Kimsuky|APT32|SilverTerrier|APT28
|
||||
T1071.002,File Transfer Protocols,Command And Control,Kimsuky|APT41|SilverTerrier|Honeybee
|
||||
T1071.001,Web Protocols,Command And Control,TeamTNT|FIN8|APT29|Mustang Panda|Windshift|TA551|Higaisa|HAFNIUM|Sidewinder|Chimera|Sandworm Team|TA505|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Inception|APT41|SilverTerrier|APT28|WIRTE|APT33|FIN4|Night Dragon|APT18|APT38|Rancor|Ke3chang|Orangeworm|APT37|APT19|Cobalt Group|Threat Group-3390|Dark Caracal|Turla|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|APT32|OilRig|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon
|
||||
T1572,Protocol Tunneling,Command And Control,Leviathan|CostaRicto|Chimera|Fox Kitten|OilRig|Cobalt Group|FIN6
|
||||
T1048.003,Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol,Exfiltration,Wizard Spider|FIN6|APT32|APT33|Thrip|FIN8|OilRig|Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1048.002,Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol,Exfiltration,APT28|APT29
|
||||
T1048.001,Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol,Exfiltration,no
|
||||
T1001.003,Protocol Impersonation,Command And Control,Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1001.002,Steganography,Command And Control,Axiom
|
||||
T1001.003,Protocol Impersonation,Command And Control,Higaisa|Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1001.002,Steganography,Command And Control,APT29|Axiom
|
||||
T1001.001,Junk Data,Command And Control,APT28
|
||||
T1132.002,Non-Standard Encoding,Command And Control,no
|
||||
T1132.001,Standard Encoding,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|APT33|APT19|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork
|
||||
T1132.001,Standard Encoding,Command And Control,HAFNIUM|TA551|Sandworm Team|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|APT33|APT19|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork
|
||||
T1090.004,Domain Fronting,Command And Control,APT29
|
||||
T1090.003,Multi-hop Proxy,Command And Control,Inception|FIN4|APT29
|
||||
T1090.002,External Proxy,Command And Control,APT39|Silence|Soft Cell|MuddyWater|APT3|FIN5|Lazarus Group|menuPass|APT28
|
||||
T1090.001,Internal Proxy,Command And Control,APT39|Strider
|
||||
T1090.003,Multi-hop Proxy,Command And Control,Leviathan|CostaRicto|APT28|Operation Wocao|Inception|FIN4|APT29
|
||||
T1090.002,External Proxy,Command And Control,Tonto Team|APT39|Silence|GALLIUM|MuddyWater|APT3|FIN5|Lazarus Group|menuPass|APT28
|
||||
T1090.001,Internal Proxy,Command And Control,APT29|Higaisa|Operation Wocao|APT39|Strider
|
||||
T1102.003,One-Way Communication,Command And Control,Leviathan
|
||||
T1102.002,Bidirectional Communication,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|APT39|APT12|Turla|FIN7|APT37|Magic Hound|Carbanak
|
||||
T1102.002,Bidirectional Communication,Command And Control,ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|APT28|APT29|Sandworm Team|APT39|APT12|Turla|FIN7|APT37|Magic Hound|Carbanak
|
||||
T1102.001,Dead Drop Resolver,Command And Control,Rocke|APT41|BRONZE BUTLER|RTM|Patchwork
|
||||
T1571,Non-Standard Port,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|Rocke|DarkVishnya|Silence|APT-C-36|Magic Hound|APT33|APT32|TEMP.Veles|Lazarus Group|FIN7
|
||||
T1074.002,Remote Data Staging,Collection,Threat Group-3390|menuPass|FIN6|Night Dragon|FIN8
|
||||
T1074.001,Local Data Staging,Collection,Machete|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|Patchwork|Dragonfly 2.0|Honeybee|Leviathan|APT3|FIN5|menuPass|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28
|
||||
T1078.004,Cloud Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,APT33
|
||||
T1074.002,Remote Data Staging,Collection,Leviathan|APT28|APT29|Chimera|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|FIN6|Night Dragon|FIN8
|
||||
T1074.001,Local Data Staging,Collection,Indrik Spider|BackdoorDiplomacy|Mustang Panda|Sidewinder|Chimera|Kimsuky|APT39|Operation Wocao|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|Patchwork|Honeybee|Dragonfly 2.0|Leviathan|APT3|FIN5|menuPass|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28
|
||||
T1078.004,Cloud Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,APT28|APT33
|
||||
T1564.004,NTFS File Attributes,Defense Evasion,APT32
|
||||
T1564.003,Hidden Window,Defense Evasion,Gorgon Group|Deep Panda|DarkHydrus|CopyKittens|APT19|APT32|APT28|APT3|Magic Hound
|
||||
T1078.003,Local Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,Tropic Trooper|FIN10|Stolen Pencil|APT32
|
||||
T1078.002,Domain Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,TA505|APT3|Threat Group-1314
|
||||
T1564.003,Hidden Window,Defense Evasion,Nomadic Octopus|Higaisa|Gorgon Group|Deep Panda|DarkHydrus|CopyKittens|APT19|APT32|APT28|APT3|Magic Hound
|
||||
T1078.003,Local Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,Kimsuky|HAFNIUM|Turla|Operation Wocao|PROMETHIUM|Tropic Trooper|FIN10|APT32
|
||||
T1078.002,Domain Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,Naikon|Indrik Spider|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|APT29|TA505|APT3|Threat Group-1314
|
||||
T1078.001,Default Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,no
|
||||
T1564.002,Hidden Users,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1574.006,LD_PRELOAD,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,Rocke
|
||||
T1574.002,DLL Side-Loading,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,BRONZE BUTLER|Naikon|APT41|Soft Cell|Tropic Trooper|Patchwork|APT19|APT32|APT3|menuPass|Threat Group-3390
|
||||
T1574.001,DLL Search Order Hijacking,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,Whitefly|RTM|Threat Group-3390|menuPass
|
||||
T1564.002,Hidden Users,Defense Evasion,Dragonfly 2.0
|
||||
T1574.006,Dynamic Linker Hijacking,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,APT41|Rocke
|
||||
T1574.002,DLL Side-Loading,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,Mustang Panda|Higaisa|BlackTech|Sidewinder|Chimera|BRONZE BUTLER|Naikon|APT41|GALLIUM|Tropic Trooper|APT19|Patchwork|APT32|APT3|menuPass|Threat Group-3390
|
||||
T1574.001,DLL Search Order Hijacking,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,BackdoorDiplomacy|Tonto Team|Evilnum|APT41|Whitefly|RTM|Threat Group-3390|menuPass
|
||||
T1574.008,Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1574.007,Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1574.009,Path Interception by Unquoted Path,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
@@ -61,174 +199,174 @@ T1574.011,Services Registry Permissions Weakness,Persistence|Privilege Escalatio
|
||||
T1574.005,Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1574.010,Services File Permissions Weakness,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1574,Hijack Execution Flow,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1069.001,Local Groups,Discovery,Turla|OilRig|admin@338
|
||||
T1570,Lateral Tool Transfer,Lateral Movement,APT32|Wizard Spider|Turla|FIN10
|
||||
T1069.001,Local Groups,Discovery,Tonto Team|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Turla|OilRig|admin@338
|
||||
T1570,Lateral Tool Transfer,Lateral Movement,Sandworm Team|Chimera|GALLIUM|Operation Wocao|APT32|Wizard Spider|Turla|FIN10
|
||||
T1568.003,DNS Calculation,Command And Control,APT12
|
||||
T1204.002,Malicious File,Execution,Magic Hound|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|RTM|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|Machete|admin@338|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|BRONZE BUTLER|Cobalt Group|DarkHydrus|Gorgon Group|Patchwork|OilRig|Dark Caracal|MuddyWater|Lazarus Group|FIN7|APT32|Rancor|APT37|FIN8|APT28|Elderwood|TA459|APT29|Leviathan|menuPass|PLATINUM
|
||||
T1204.001,Malicious Link,Execution,Patchwork|Windshift|APT32|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|TA505|OilRig|Machete|Leviathan|FIN8|FIN4|Elderwood|Dragonfly 2.0|Cobalt Group|APT39|Night Dragon|APT33|Turla
|
||||
T1204.002,Malicious File,Execution,Nomadic Octopus|Indrik Spider|APT38|Andariel|Ferocious Kitten|IndigoZebra|Transparent Tribe|Tonto Team|Magic Hound|Ajax Security Team|Mustang Panda|TA551|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Kimsuky|FIN6|PROMETHIUM|APT30|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|RTM|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|Machete|admin@338|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN7|BRONZE BUTLER|Gorgon Group|OilRig|Dark Caracal|Cobalt Group|DarkHydrus|Rancor|Patchwork|APT32|APT19|MuddyWater|Lazarus Group|menuPass|APT37|Leviathan|TA459|APT29|APT28|FIN8|PLATINUM|Elderwood
|
||||
T1204.001,Malicious Link,Execution,FIN7|Transparent Tribe|APT3|Magic Hound|APT28|APT29|Mustang Panda|Sidewinder|ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|Evilnum|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|Patchwork|Windshift|APT32|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|TA505|OilRig|Machete|Leviathan|FIN8|FIN4|Elderwood|Dragonfly 2.0|Cobalt Group|APT39|Night Dragon|Turla|APT33
|
||||
T1195.003,Compromise Hardware Supply Chain,Initial Access,no
|
||||
T1195.002,Compromise Software Supply Chain,Initial Access,Sandworm Team|APT41
|
||||
T1195.002,Compromise Software Supply Chain,Initial Access,APT29|Cobalt Group|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Dragonfly|Sandworm Team|APT41
|
||||
T1195.001,Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools,Initial Access,no
|
||||
T1568.001,Fast Flux DNS,Command And Control,TA505
|
||||
T1052.001,Exfiltration over USB,Exfiltration,Tropic Trooper
|
||||
T1569.002,Service Execution,Execution,Blue Mockingbird|APT39|APT41|Silence|FIN6|APT32|Honeybee|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1568.001,Fast Flux DNS,Command And Control,menuPass|TA505
|
||||
T1052.001,Exfiltration over USB,Exfiltration,Mustang Panda|Tropic Trooper
|
||||
T1569.002,Service Execution,Execution,APT38|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Blue Mockingbird|APT39|APT41|Silence|FIN6|APT32|Honeybee|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1569.001,Launchctl,Execution,no
|
||||
T1569,System Services,Execution,no
|
||||
T1568.002,Domain Generation Algorithms,Command And Control,APT41
|
||||
T1568,Dynamic Resolution,Command And Control,no
|
||||
T1568.002,Domain Generation Algorithms,Command And Control,TA551|APT41
|
||||
T1568,Dynamic Resolution,Command And Control,Transparent Tribe|APT29
|
||||
T1011.001,Exfiltration Over Bluetooth,Exfiltration,no
|
||||
T1567.002,Exfiltration to Cloud Storage,Exfiltration,Leviathan|Turla
|
||||
T1567.002,Exfiltration to Cloud Storage,Exfiltration,FIN7|ZIRCONIUM|HAFNIUM|Chimera|Leviathan|Turla
|
||||
T1567.001,Exfiltration to Code Repository,Exfiltration,no
|
||||
T1059.006,Python,Execution,Rocke|BRONZE BUTLER|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|Machete
|
||||
T1059.005,Visual Basic,Execution,APT33|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|Rancor|Patchwork|MuddyWater|Honeybee|FIN7|APT37|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|Turla|TA505|Silence|WIRTE|FIN4|Cobalt Group|Gorgon Group|Leviathan|TA459|Magic Hound
|
||||
T1059.004,Unix Shell,Execution,Rocke|APT41
|
||||
T1059.003,Windows Command Shell,Execution,TA505|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|OilRig|Lazarus Group|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|FIN7|APT41|Soft Cell|Turla|Silence|APT32|APT39|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Dark Caracal|Gorgon Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Rancor|Ke3chang|APT37|Leviathan|FIN8|APT28|Magic Hound|Sowbug|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN10|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Gamaredon Group|Suckfly|Patchwork|Threat Group-1314|APT3|admin@338|APT1
|
||||
T1059.006,Python,Execution,Tonto Team|APT37|ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|Turla|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|APT29|Rocke|BRONZE BUTLER|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|Machete
|
||||
T1059.005,Visual Basic,Execution,OilRig|APT38|Transparent Tribe|APT29|Mustang Panda|Windshift|Higaisa|Sidewinder|APT39|Machete|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|APT33|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|Rancor|Patchwork|MuddyWater|Honeybee|FIN7|APT37|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|Turla|TA505|Silence|WIRTE|FIN4|Cobalt Group|Gorgon Group|Leviathan|TA459|Magic Hound
|
||||
T1059.004,Unix Shell,Execution,TeamTNT|Rocke|APT41
|
||||
T1059.003,Windows Command Shell,Execution,Sandworm Team|Nomadic Octopus|TeamTNT|APT29|Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|TA551|Higaisa|Indrik Spider|Chimera|Fox Kitten|Machete|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|FIN6|TA505|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|OilRig|Lazarus Group|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|FIN7|APT41|GALLIUM|Turla|Silence|APT32|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Gorgon Group|Dark Caracal|Ke3chang|Dragonfly 2.0|Rancor|FIN8|APT28|APT37|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|Sowbug|menuPass|FIN10|Threat Group-3390|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Suckfly|Threat Group-1314|APT3|admin@338|APT1
|
||||
T1059.002,AppleScript,Execution,no
|
||||
T1059.001,PowerShell,Execution,Blue Mockingbird|APT39|DarkVishnya|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Inception|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|Soft Cell|TA505|WIRTE|TEMP.Veles|APT33|Gallmaker|Turla|APT19|DarkHydrus|APT28|Thrip|Gorgon Group|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Leviathan|TA459|FIN8|MuddyWater|Magic Hound|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|CopyKittens|APT32|FIN7|FIN10|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Poseidon Group|APT3|APT29|Deep Panda
|
||||
T1567,Exfiltration Over Web Service,Exfiltration,no
|
||||
T1059.001,PowerShell,Execution,Nomadic Octopus|TeamTNT|APT38|Tonto Team|Mustang Panda|Indrik Spider|HAFNIUM|Sidewinder|Fox Kitten|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|APT39|DarkVishnya|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Inception|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|GALLIUM|TA505|WIRTE|TEMP.Veles|APT33|Gallmaker|Turla|Thrip|Cobalt Group|APT28|DarkHydrus|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|Gorgon Group|TA459|Leviathan|MuddyWater|FIN8|CopyKittens|OilRig|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN7|APT32|menuPass|FIN10|Threat Group-3390|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Poseidon Group|APT3|APT29|Deep Panda
|
||||
T1567,Exfiltration Over Web Service,Exfiltration,APT28
|
||||
T1497.003,Time Based Evasion,Defense Evasion|Discovery,no
|
||||
T1497.002,User Activity Based Checks,Defense Evasion|Discovery,FIN7
|
||||
T1497.001,System Checks,Defense Evasion|Discovery,Frankenstein
|
||||
T1497.002,User Activity Based Checks,Defense Evasion|Discovery,Darkhotel|FIN7
|
||||
T1497.001,System Checks,Defense Evasion|Discovery,OilRig|Darkhotel|Evilnum|Frankenstein
|
||||
T1498.002,Reflection Amplification,Impact,no
|
||||
T1498.001,Direct Network Flood,Impact,no
|
||||
T1566.003,Spearphishing via Service,Initial Access,Magic Hound|Windshift|FIN6|OilRig|Dark Caracal
|
||||
T1566.002,Spearphishing Link,Initial Access,Windshift|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|Machete|Kimsuky|TA505|Stolen Pencil|APT39|FIN4|APT32|Night Dragon|Turla|APT28|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|APT33|Elderwood|Leviathan|Magic Hound|Patchwork|APT29|FIN8
|
||||
T1566.001,Spearphishing Attachment,Initial Access,Magic Hound|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Mofang|Wizard Spider|RTM|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|APT41|Machete|admin@338|Kimsuky|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|Tropic Trooper|Turla|Gorgon Group|Rancor|DarkHydrus|Cobalt Group|FIN7|OilRig|Lazarus Group|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|FIN8|MuddyWater|APT28|TA459|Leviathan|Patchwork|PLATINUM|Elderwood|APT29|APT37|menuPass
|
||||
T1566,Phishing,Initial Access,no
|
||||
T1566.003,Spearphishing via Service,Initial Access,APT29|Ajax Security Team|Magic Hound|Windshift|FIN6|OilRig|Dark Caracal
|
||||
T1566.002,Spearphishing Link,Initial Access,Transparent Tribe|FIN7|APT3|Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|Sidewinder|Evilnum|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|APT1|Windshift|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|Machete|Kimsuky|TA505|APT39|FIN4|APT32|Night Dragon|APT28|Cobalt Group|Turla|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|Elderwood|APT33|APT29|Leviathan|FIN8|Patchwork|Magic Hound
|
||||
T1566.001,Spearphishing Attachment,Initial Access,APT38|Andariel|Ferocious Kitten|IndigoZebra|Transparent Tribe|Nomadic Octopus|Tonto Team|Ajax Security Team|Mustang Panda|TA551|Higaisa|Sidewinder|APT1|FIN6|APT30|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Mofang|Wizard Spider|RTM|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|APT41|Machete|admin@338|Kimsuky|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|Tropic Trooper|DarkHydrus|Lazarus Group|Gorgon Group|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|APT19|APT32|Cobalt Group|Rancor|FIN7|Dragonfly 2.0|MuddyWater|APT28|TA459|APT29|APT37|Leviathan|FIN8|Patchwork|menuPass|Elderwood|PLATINUM
|
||||
T1566,Phishing,Initial Access,GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Dragonfly
|
||||
T1565.003,Runtime Data Manipulation,Impact,APT38
|
||||
T1565.002,Transmitted Data Manipulation,Impact,APT38
|
||||
T1565.001,Stored Data Manipulation,Impact,FIN4|APT38
|
||||
T1565.001,Stored Data Manipulation,Impact,APT38
|
||||
T1565,Data Manipulation,Impact,no
|
||||
T1564.001,Hidden Files and Directories,Defense Evasion,Rocke|APT32|Tropic Trooper|APT28|Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1564.001,Hidden Files and Directories,Defense Evasion,Transparent Tribe|Mustang Panda|Rocke|APT32|Tropic Trooper|APT28|Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1564,Hide Artifacts,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1563.002,RDP Hijacking,Lateral Movement,no
|
||||
T1563.001,SSH Hijacking,Lateral Movement,no
|
||||
T1563,Remote Service Session Hijacking,Lateral Movement,no
|
||||
T1518.001,Security Software Discovery,Discovery,Turla|Rocke|Frankenstein|The White Company|Cobalt Group|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|Tropic Trooper|FIN8|Patchwork|Naikon
|
||||
T1518.001,Security Software Discovery,Discovery,TeamTNT|APT38|Windshift|Sidewinder|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Turla|Rocke|Frankenstein|The White Company|Cobalt Group|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|Tropic Trooper|FIN8|Patchwork|Naikon
|
||||
T1069.003,Cloud Groups,Discovery,no
|
||||
T1069.002,Domain Groups,Discovery,Turla|Wizard Spider|Inception|OilRig|FIN6|Dragonfly 2.0|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1069.002,Domain Groups,Discovery,Turla|Inception|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1087.004,Cloud Account,Discovery,no
|
||||
T1087.003,Email Account,Discovery,Sandworm Team|TA505
|
||||
T1087.002,Domain Account,Discovery,Turla|Sandworm Team|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN6|Poseidon Group|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1087.001,Local Account,Discovery,Turla|Poseidon Group|OilRig|Ke3chang|APT32|APT1|Threat Group-3390|APT3|admin@338
|
||||
T1087.002,Domain Account,Discovery,MuddyWater|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Chimera|Turla|Sandworm Team|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN6|Poseidon Group|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1087.001,Local Account,Discovery,Chimera|Fox Kitten|Turla|Poseidon Group|OilRig|Ke3chang|APT32|APT1|Threat Group-3390|APT3|admin@338
|
||||
T1553.004,Install Root Certificate,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1562.004,Disable or Modify System Firewall,Defense Evasion,Rocke|Lazarus Group|Kimsuky|Dragonfly 2.0|Carbanak
|
||||
T1562.003,HISTCONTROL,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1562.002,Disable Windows Event Logging,Defense Evasion,Threat Group-3390
|
||||
T1562.001,Disable or Modify Tools,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Rocke|Kimsuky|Turla|Night Dragon|Gorgon Group|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda
|
||||
T1562.004,Disable or Modify System Firewall,Defense Evasion,TeamTNT|APT38|APT29|Operation Wocao|Rocke|Lazarus Group|Kimsuky|Dragonfly 2.0|Carbanak
|
||||
T1562.003,Impair Command History Logging,Defense Evasion,APT38
|
||||
T1562.002,Disable Windows Event Logging,Defense Evasion,Sandworm Team|APT29|Threat Group-3390
|
||||
T1562.001,Disable or Modify Tools,Defense Evasion,TeamTNT|Indrik Spider|APT29|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|FIN6|Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Rocke|Kimsuky|Turla|Night Dragon|Gorgon Group|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda
|
||||
T1562,Impair Defenses,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1003.004,LSA Secrets,Credential Access,OilRig|MuddyWater|menuPass|Leafminer|Ke3chang|Dragonfly 2.0|APT33|Threat Group-3390
|
||||
T1003.005,Cached Domain Credentials,Credential Access,OilRig|MuddyWater|Leafminer|APT33
|
||||
T1561.002,Disk Structure Wipe,Impact,Sandworm Team|Lazarus Group|APT38|APT37
|
||||
T1561.001,Disk Content Wipe,Impact,Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1561,Disk Wipe,Impact,no
|
||||
T1560.003,Archive via Custom Method,Collection,Lazarus Group|Kimsuky|CopyKittens|FIN6
|
||||
T1560.003,Archive via Custom Method,Collection,Mustang Panda|Lazarus Group|Kimsuky|CopyKittens|FIN6
|
||||
T1560.002,Archive via Library,Collection,Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390
|
||||
T1560.001,Archive via Utility,Collection,APT41|Soft Cell|Turla|Gallmaker|APT33|APT39|MuddyWater|Magic Hound|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|CopyKittens|APT3|Sowbug|menuPass|APT1|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1560,Archive Collected Data,Collection,menuPass|APT32|Honeybee|Patchwork|APT28|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1560.001,Archive via Utility,Collection,APT28|APT29|Mustang Panda|HAFNIUM|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Chimera|APT41|GALLIUM|Turla|Gallmaker|APT33|APT39|MuddyWater|Magic Hound|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|CopyKittens|Sowbug|APT3|menuPass|APT1|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1560,Archive Collected Data,Collection,Leviathan|menuPass|APT32|Honeybee|Patchwork|APT28|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1499.004,Application or System Exploitation,Impact,no
|
||||
T1499.003,Application Exhaustion Flood,Impact,no
|
||||
T1499.002,Service Exhaustion Flood,Impact,no
|
||||
T1499.001,OS Exhaustion Flood,Impact,no
|
||||
T1491.002,External Defacement,Impact,no
|
||||
T1491.002,External Defacement,Impact,Sandworm Team
|
||||
T1491.001,Internal Defacement,Impact,Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1114.003,Email Forwarding Rule,Collection,no
|
||||
T1114.002,Remote Email Collection,Collection,APT1|FIN4|APT28|Dragonfly 2.0|Ke3chang|Leafminer
|
||||
T1114.001,Local Email Collection,Collection,Magic Hound|APT1
|
||||
T1114.003,Email Forwarding Rule,Collection,Silent Librarian|Kimsuky
|
||||
T1114.002,Remote Email Collection,Collection,APT29|HAFNIUM|Chimera|APT1|FIN4|Ke3chang|Leafminer|Dragonfly 2.0|APT28
|
||||
T1114.001,Local Email Collection,Collection,Chimera|Magic Hound|APT1
|
||||
T1134.005,SID-History Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1134.004,Parent PID Spoofing,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1134.003,Make and Impersonate Token,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1134.002,Create Process with Token,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Turla|Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1134.001,Token Impersonation/Theft,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,APT28
|
||||
T1213.002,Sharepoint,Collection,Ke3chang|APT28
|
||||
T1134.001,Token Impersonation/Theft,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,FIN8|APT28
|
||||
T1213.002,Sharepoint,Collection,Chimera|Ke3chang|APT28
|
||||
T1213.001,Confluence,Collection,no
|
||||
T1555.003,Credentials from Web Browsers,Credential Access,Magic Hound|Sandworm Team|Inception|Stealth Falcon|OilRig|Leafminer|APT33|APT3|Kimsuky|TA505|Stolen Pencil|MuddyWater|APT37|Patchwork|Molerats
|
||||
T1555.003,Credentials from Web Browsers,Credential Access,Ajax Security Team|ZIRCONIUM|FIN6|Sandworm Team|Inception|Stealth Falcon|OilRig|Leafminer|APT33|APT3|Kimsuky|TA505|MuddyWater|APT37|Patchwork|Molerats
|
||||
T1555.002,Securityd Memory,Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1555.001,Keychain,Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1559.002,Dynamic Data Exchange,Execution,Sharpshooter|TA505|MuddyWater|Gallmaker|Patchwork|Cobalt Group|APT37|APT28|FIN7
|
||||
T1559.002,Dynamic Data Exchange,Execution,Leviathan|Sidewinder|Sharpshooter|TA505|MuddyWater|Gallmaker|Patchwork|Cobalt Group|APT37|FIN7|APT28
|
||||
T1559.001,Component Object Model,Execution,Gamaredon Group|MuddyWater
|
||||
T1559,Inter-Process Communication,Execution,no
|
||||
T1558.002,Silver Ticket,Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1558.001,Golden Ticket,Credential Access,Ke3chang
|
||||
T1558,Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets,Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1557.001,LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay,Credential Access|Collection,no
|
||||
T1557,Man-in-the-Middle,Credential Access|Collection,no
|
||||
T1556.002,Password Filter DLL,Credential Access|Defense Evasion,Strider
|
||||
T1556.001,Domain Controller Authentication,Credential Access|Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1556,Modify Authentication Process,Credential Access|Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1557.001,LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay,Credential Access|Collection,Wizard Spider
|
||||
T1557,Adversary-in-the-Middle,Credential Access|Collection,Kimsuky
|
||||
T1556.002,Password Filter DLL,Credential Access|Defense Evasion|Persistence,Strider
|
||||
T1556.001,Domain Controller Authentication,Credential Access|Defense Evasion|Persistence,Chimera
|
||||
T1556,Modify Authentication Process,Credential Access|Defense Evasion|Persistence,no
|
||||
T1056.004,Credential API Hooking,Collection|Credential Access,PLATINUM
|
||||
T1056.003,Web Portal Capture,Collection|Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1056.002,GUI Input Capture,Collection|Credential Access,FIN4
|
||||
T1056.001,Keylogging,Collection|Credential Access,APT32|Sandworm Team|APT39|APT41|Kimsuky|menuPass|Stolen Pencil|FIN4|APT38|Ke3chang|OilRig|PLATINUM|Sowbug|Magic Hound|Group5|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT3|Darkhotel|APT28
|
||||
T1555,Credentials from Password Stores,Credential Access,APT39|OilRig|MuddyWater|Leafminer|APT33|Turla|Stealth Falcon
|
||||
T1552.005,Cloud Instance Metadata API,Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1056.001,Keylogging,Collection|Credential Access,Tonto Team|Ajax Security Team|Operation Wocao|APT32|Sandworm Team|APT39|APT41|Kimsuky|menuPass|FIN4|APT38|OilRig|Ke3chang|PLATINUM|Sowbug|Magic Hound|Group5|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT3|Darkhotel|APT28
|
||||
T1555,Credentials from Password Stores,Credential Access,APT29|Evilnum|FIN6|APT39|OilRig|MuddyWater|Leafminer|APT33|Stealth Falcon
|
||||
T1552.005,Cloud Instance Metadata API,Credential Access,TeamTNT
|
||||
T1003.008,/etc/passwd and /etc/shadow,Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1003.007,Proc Filesystem,Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1003.006,DCSync,Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1558.003,Kerberoasting,Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1003.006,DCSync,Credential Access,APT29|Operation Wocao
|
||||
T1558.003,Kerberoasting,Credential Access,FIN7|APT29|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider
|
||||
T1552.006,Group Policy Preferences,Credential Access,APT33
|
||||
T1003.003,NTDS,Credential Access,FIN6|Dragonfly 2.0
|
||||
T1003.002,Security Account Manager,Credential Access,Threat Group-3390|Ke3chang|Soft Cell|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|menuPass
|
||||
T1003.001,LSASS Memory,Credential Access,Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Blue Mockingbird|Silence|Threat Group-3390|Leviathan|APT41|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|Stolen Pencil|APT32|Lazarus Group|Leafminer|Magic Hound|MuddyWater|PLATINUM|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|OilRig|FIN6|APT3|APT28|APT1|Ke3chang|Cleaver
|
||||
T1110.004,Credential Stuffing,Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1110.003,Password Spraying,Credential Access,APT33|Leafminer|Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1110.002,Password Cracking,Credential Access,APT41|Dragonfly 2.0|APT3
|
||||
T1110.001,Password Guessing,Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1021.006,Windows Remote Management,Lateral Movement,Threat Group-3390
|
||||
T1021.005,VNC,Lateral Movement,GCMAN
|
||||
T1021.004,SSH,Lateral Movement,Rocke|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|OilRig|menuPass|GCMAN
|
||||
T1003.003,NTDS,Credential Access,APT28|Mustang Panda|HAFNIUM|Fox Kitten|menuPass|Wizard Spider|Chimera|FIN6|Dragonfly 2.0
|
||||
T1003.002,Security Account Manager,Credential Access,Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390|Ke3chang|GALLIUM|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|menuPass
|
||||
T1003.001,LSASS Memory,Credential Access,Indrik Spider|HAFNIUM|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Blue Mockingbird|Silence|Threat Group-3390|Leviathan|APT41|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|APT32|Leafminer|Magic Hound|FIN8|PLATINUM|MuddyWater|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN6|APT3|APT28|APT1|Ke3chang|Cleaver
|
||||
T1110.004,Credential Stuffing,Credential Access,Chimera
|
||||
T1110.003,Password Spraying,Credential Access,Sandworm Team|APT29|Silent Librarian|Chimera|APT28|APT33|Leafminer|Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1110.002,Password Cracking,Credential Access,FIN6|APT41|Dragonfly 2.0|APT3
|
||||
T1110.001,Password Guessing,Credential Access,APT28
|
||||
T1021.006,Windows Remote Management,Lateral Movement,APT29|Chimera|Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390
|
||||
T1021.005,VNC,Lateral Movement,FIN7|Fox Kitten|GCMAN
|
||||
T1021.004,SSH,Lateral Movement,TeamTNT|FIN7|Fox Kitten|Rocke|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|OilRig|menuPass|GCMAN
|
||||
T1021.003,Distributed Component Object Model,Lateral Movement,no
|
||||
T1021.002,SMB/Windows Admin Shares,Lateral Movement,Blue Mockingbird|APT39|APT32|Orangeworm|FIN8|APT3|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-1314|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1021.001,Remote Desktop Protocol,Lateral Movement,Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Stolen Pencil|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|APT3|OilRig|menuPass|FIN10|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|APT1|Axiom
|
||||
T1021.002,SMB/Windows Admin Shares,Lateral Movement,Sandworm Team|APT28|Fox Kitten|APT41|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|APT39|APT32|Orangeworm|FIN8|APT3|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-1314|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1021.001,Remote Desktop Protocol,Lateral Movement,Kimsuky|FIN7|Fox Kitten|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|APT3|OilRig|FIN10|menuPass|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|APT1|Axiom
|
||||
T1554,Compromise Client Software Binary,Persistence,no
|
||||
T1036.006,Space after Filename,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1036.005,Match Legitimate Name or Location,Defense Evasion,Rocke|Sandworm Team|APT39|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Silence|APT41|menuPass|TEMP.Veles|MuddyWater|BRONZE BUTLER|Sowbug|APT32|Patchwork|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Carbanak|APT1
|
||||
T1036.004,Masquerade Task or Service,Defense Evasion,Wizard Spider|APT-C-36|Carbanak|APT32|FIN6|FIN7
|
||||
T1036.003,Rename System Utilities,Defense Evasion,menuPass|APT32|Soft Cell|PLATINUM
|
||||
T1036.002,Right-to-Left Override,Defense Evasion,BRONZE BUTLER|BlackTech|Ke3chang|Scarlet Mimic
|
||||
T1036.001,Invalid Code Signature,Defense Evasion,Windshift
|
||||
T1036.005,Match Legitimate Name or Location,Defense Evasion,APT28|Ferocious Kitten|FIN7|BackdoorDiplomacy|Transparent Tribe|Naikon|APT29|Mustang Panda|Sidewinder|Darkhotel|Lazarus Group|Indrik Spider|Fox Kitten|Machete|Chimera|PROMETHIUM|Rocke|Sandworm Team|APT39|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Silence|APT41|menuPass|TEMP.Veles|MuddyWater|Sowbug|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|Patchwork|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Carbanak|APT1
|
||||
T1036.004,Masquerade Task or Service,Defense Evasion,BackdoorDiplomacy|APT41|Naikon|ZIRCONIUM|APT29|Higaisa|Fox Kitten|Kimsuky|PROMETHIUM|Wizard Spider|APT-C-36|Carbanak|APT32|FIN6|FIN7
|
||||
T1036.003,Rename System Utilities,Defense Evasion,menuPass|APT32|GALLIUM
|
||||
T1036.002,Right-to-Left Override,Defense Evasion,Ferocious Kitten|BRONZE BUTLER|BlackTech|Ke3chang|Scarlet Mimic
|
||||
T1036.001,Invalid Code Signature,Defense Evasion,Windshift|APT37
|
||||
T1553.003,SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1553.002,Code Signing,Defense Evasion,Patchwork|Silence|APT41|FIN6|TA505|FIN7|Honeybee|Leviathan|APT37|CopyKittens|Winnti Group|Suckfly|Molerats|Darkhotel
|
||||
T1553.002,Code Signing,Defense Evasion,menuPass|APT29|GALLIUM|Wizard Spider|Kimsuky|PROMETHIUM|Patchwork|Silence|APT41|FIN6|TA505|FIN7|Honeybee|Leviathan|CopyKittens|Winnti Group|Suckfly|Molerats|Darkhotel
|
||||
T1553.001,Gatekeeper Bypass,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1553,Subvert Trust Controls,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1027.003,Steganography,Defense Evasion,BRONZE BUTLER|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|APT37
|
||||
T1027.002,Software Packing,Defense Evasion,TA505|Rocke|Soft Cell|The White Company|APT39|APT38|Dark Caracal|Elderwood|APT3|Patchwork|APT29|Night Dragon
|
||||
T1027.001,Binary Padding,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|APT32|Leviathan|BRONZE BUTLER|Moafee
|
||||
T1222.002,Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification,Defense Evasion,Rocke|APT32
|
||||
T1222.001,Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1552.004,Private Keys,Credential Access,Rocke
|
||||
T1027.003,Steganography,Defense Evasion,Andariel|Leviathan|TA551|BRONZE BUTLER|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|APT37
|
||||
T1027.002,Software Packing,Defense Evasion,Sandworm Team|Kimsuky|TeamTNT|ZIRCONIUM|TA505|Rocke|GALLIUM|The White Company|APT39|APT38|Dark Caracal|Elderwood|APT3|Patchwork|APT29|Night Dragon
|
||||
T1027.001,Binary Padding,Defense Evasion,APT29|Mustang Panda|Higaisa|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|APT32|Leviathan|BRONZE BUTLER|Moafee
|
||||
T1222.002,Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification,Defense Evasion,TeamTNT|Rocke|APT32
|
||||
T1222.001,Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification,Defense Evasion,Wizard Spider
|
||||
T1552.004,Private Keys,Credential Access,TeamTNT|APT29|Operation Wocao|Rocke
|
||||
T1552.003,Bash History,Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1552.002,Credentials in Registry,Credential Access,APT32
|
||||
T1552.001,Credentials In Files,Credential Access,Leafminer|APT33|OilRig|TA505|Stolen Pencil|MuddyWater|APT3
|
||||
T1552.001,Credentials In Files,Credential Access,TeamTNT|Kimsuky|Fox Kitten|Leafminer|APT33|OilRig|TA505|MuddyWater|APT3
|
||||
T1552,Unsecured Credentials,Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1216.001,PubPrn,Defense Evasion,APT32
|
||||
T1070.006,Timestomp,Defense Evasion,Rocke|TEMP.Veles|APT32|Lazarus Group|APT28
|
||||
T1070.006,Timestomp,Defense Evasion,APT38|APT29|Chimera|Kimsuky|Rocke|TEMP.Veles|APT32|Lazarus Group|APT28
|
||||
T1070.005,Network Share Connection Removal,Defense Evasion,Threat Group-3390
|
||||
T1070.004,File Deletion,Defense Evasion,Sandworm Team|Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Wizard Spider|APT41|Kimsuky|Silence|The White Company|TEMP.Veles|APT32|APT38|Patchwork|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|menuPass|FIN8|OilRig|FIN5|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|APT3|FIN10|APT28|Threat Group-3390|Group5|Lazarus Group|APT18|APT29
|
||||
T1070.003,Clear Command History,Defense Evasion,APT41
|
||||
T1550.004,Web Session Cookie,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,no
|
||||
T1070.004,File Deletion,Defense Evasion,TeamTNT|APT39|Mustang Panda|Chimera|Evilnum|Operation Wocao|FIN6|Sandworm Team|Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Wizard Spider|APT41|Kimsuky|Silence|The White Company|TEMP.Veles|APT32|APT38|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Honeybee|Patchwork|menuPass|FIN8|OilRig|FIN5|BRONZE BUTLER|APT3|Magic Hound|Threat Group-3390|APT28|FIN10|Group5|Lazarus Group|APT18|APT29
|
||||
T1070.003,Clear Command History,Defense Evasion,TeamTNT|menuPass|APT41
|
||||
T1550.004,Web Session Cookie,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,APT29
|
||||
T1550.001,Application Access Token,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,APT28
|
||||
T1550.003,Pass the Ticket,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|APT29
|
||||
T1550.002,Pass the Hash,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,Soft Cell|APT32|Night Dragon|APT28|APT1
|
||||
T1550,Use Alternate Authentication Material,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,no
|
||||
T1550.002,Pass the Hash,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,Chimera|Kimsuky|GALLIUM|APT32|Night Dragon|APT28|APT1
|
||||
T1550,Use Alternate Authentication Material,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,APT29
|
||||
T1548.004,Elevated Execution with Prompt,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1548.003,Sudo and Sudo Caching,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1548.002,Bypass User Access Control,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,APT37|MuddyWater|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|Threat Group-3390|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork|APT29
|
||||
T1548.002,Bypass User Account Control,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,Evilnum|APT37|MuddyWater|Threat Group-3390|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork|APT29
|
||||
T1548.001,Setuid and Setgid,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1548,Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1136.003,Cloud Account,Persistence,no
|
||||
T1070.002,Clear Linux or Mac System Logs,Defense Evasion,Rocke
|
||||
T1070.001,Clear Windows Event Logs,Defense Evasion,APT41|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|APT32|FIN8|FIN5|APT28
|
||||
T1136.002,Domain Account,Persistence,Soft Cell
|
||||
T1136.001,Local Account,Persistence,APT39|APT41|Dragonfly 2.0|Leafminer|APT3
|
||||
T1070.002,Clear Linux or Mac System Logs,Defense Evasion,TeamTNT|Rocke
|
||||
T1070.001,Clear Windows Event Logs,Defense Evasion,Indrik Spider|Chimera|Operation Wocao|APT41|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|APT32|FIN8|FIN5|APT28
|
||||
T1136.002,Domain Account,Persistence,Sandworm Team|HAFNIUM|GALLIUM
|
||||
T1136.001,Local Account,Persistence,TeamTNT|Fox Kitten|APT39|APT41|Leafminer|Dragonfly 2.0|APT3
|
||||
T1547.011,Plist Modification,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1547.010,Port Monitors,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1547.009,Shortcut Modification,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,APT39|Darkhotel|APT29|Gorgon Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Leviathan|Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1547.009,Shortcut Modification,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,APT39|Darkhotel|APT29|Gorgon Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Lazarus Group|Leviathan
|
||||
T1547.008,LSASS Driver,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1547.007,Re-opened Applications,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1547.006,Kernel Modules and Extensions,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1547.005,Security Support Provider,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1547.004,Winlogon Helper DLL,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Tropic Trooper|Turla
|
||||
T1547.004,Winlogon Helper DLL,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Wizard Spider|Tropic Trooper|Turla
|
||||
T1547.003,Time Providers,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1546.014,Emond,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
|
||||
T1546.013,PowerShell Profile,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,Turla
|
||||
@@ -236,37 +374,37 @@ T1546.012,Image File Execution Options Injection,Privilege Escalation|Persistenc
|
||||
T1218.008,Odbcconf,Defense Evasion,Cobalt Group
|
||||
T1546.011,Application Shimming,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,FIN7
|
||||
T1547.002,Authentication Package,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1546.010,AppInit DLLs,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
|
||||
T1546.010,AppInit DLLs,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,APT39
|
||||
T1546.009,AppCert DLLs,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,Honeybee
|
||||
T1218.007,Msiexec,Defense Evasion,TA505|Rancor
|
||||
T1546.008,Accessibility Features,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,APT41|APT3|APT29|Deep Panda|Axiom
|
||||
T1218.007,Msiexec,Defense Evasion,ZIRCONIUM|Molerats|Machete|TA505|Rancor
|
||||
T1546.008,Accessibility Features,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,Fox Kitten|APT41|APT3|APT29|Deep Panda|Axiom
|
||||
T1546.007,Netsh Helper DLL,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
|
||||
T1546.006,LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
|
||||
T1546.005,Trap,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
|
||||
T1546.004,.bash_profile and .bashrc,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
|
||||
T1546.003,Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,APT33|Blue Mockingbird|Turla|Leviathan|APT29
|
||||
T1546.004,Unix Shell Configuration Modification,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
|
||||
T1546.003,Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,FIN8|Mustang Panda|APT33|Blue Mockingbird|Turla|Leviathan|APT29
|
||||
T1546.002,Screensaver,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
|
||||
T1546.001,Change Default File Association,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,Kimsuky
|
||||
T1547.001,Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Silence|RTM|Inception|APT41|Machete|Kimsuky|APT33|APT39|APT32|APT18|Turla|Dark Caracal|Cobalt Group|Honeybee|Threat Group-3390|Dragonfly 2.0|Gorgon Group|Ke3chang|APT19|Leviathan|MuddyWater|APT37|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|APT3|FIN10|FIN7|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT29|Darkhotel
|
||||
T1547.001,Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,TeamTNT|Naikon|Windshift|Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Sidewinder|APT28|Wizard Spider|PROMETHIUM|Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Silence|RTM|Inception|APT41|Kimsuky|APT33|APT39|APT32|APT18|Dark Caracal|Threat Group-3390|Honeybee|Turla|Cobalt Group|Ke3chang|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|Gorgon Group|MuddyWater|APT37|Leviathan|BRONZE BUTLER|APT3|Magic Hound|FIN10|FIN7|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT29|Darkhotel
|
||||
T1218.002,Control Panel,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1218.010,Regsvr32,Defense Evasion,Blue Mockingbird|Inception|WIRTE|Cobalt Group|APT19|Leviathan|APT32|Deep Panda
|
||||
T1218.010,Regsvr32,Defense Evasion,TA551|Blue Mockingbird|Inception|WIRTE|Cobalt Group|APT19|Leviathan|APT32|Deep Panda
|
||||
T1218.009,Regsvcs/Regasm,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1218.005,Mshta,Defense Evasion,Inception|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|FIN7
|
||||
T1218.004,InstallUtil,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1218.001,Compiled HTML File,Defense Evasion,APT41|Silence|Lazarus Group|Dark Caracal|OilRig
|
||||
T1218.005,Mshta,Defense Evasion,Mustang Panda|TA551|Sidewinder|Inception|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|FIN7
|
||||
T1218.004,InstallUtil,Defense Evasion,Mustang Panda|menuPass
|
||||
T1218.001,Compiled HTML File,Defense Evasion,APT41|Silence|Dark Caracal|OilRig|Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1218.003,CMSTP,Defense Evasion,Cobalt Group|MuddyWater
|
||||
T1218.011,Rundll32,Defense Evasion,APT32|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|TA505|MuddyWater|APT29|APT19|CopyKittens|APT3|Carbanak|APT28
|
||||
T1218.011,Rundll32,Defense Evasion,APT38|HAFNIUM|TA551|APT41|Gamaredon Group|APT32|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|TA505|MuddyWater|APT29|APT19|CopyKittens|APT3|Carbanak|APT28
|
||||
T1547,Boot or Logon Autostart Execution,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1546,Event Triggered Execution,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
|
||||
T1098.003,Add Office 365 Global Administrator Role,Persistence,no
|
||||
T1098.002,Exchange Email Delegate Permissions,Persistence,Magic Hound
|
||||
T1098.001,Additional Azure Service Principal Credentials,Persistence,no
|
||||
T1098.002,Exchange Email Delegate Permissions,Persistence,APT28|APT29|Magic Hound
|
||||
T1098.001,Additional Cloud Credentials,Persistence,APT29
|
||||
T1543.004,Launch Daemon,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1543.003,Windows Service,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Blue Mockingbird|DarkVishnya|Wizard Spider|APT32|APT41|Kimsuky|Tropic Trooper|Cobalt Group|Ke3chang|Honeybee|FIN7|Threat Group-3390|APT19|APT3|Lazarus Group|Carbanak
|
||||
T1543.002,Systemd Service,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Rocke
|
||||
T1543.003,Windows Service,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,TeamTNT|APT38|PROMETHIUM|Blue Mockingbird|DarkVishnya|Wizard Spider|APT32|APT41|Kimsuky|Tropic Trooper|Cobalt Group|Ke3chang|FIN7|APT19|Threat Group-3390|Honeybee|APT3|Lazarus Group|Carbanak
|
||||
T1543.002,Systemd Service,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,TeamTNT|Rocke
|
||||
T1543.001,Launch Agent,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1037.005,Startup Items,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1037.004,Rc.common,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1037.004,RC Scripts,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1055.012,Process Hollowing,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Gorgon Group|Patchwork
|
||||
T1055.013,Process Doppelgänging,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Leafminer
|
||||
T1055.011,Extra Window Memory Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
@@ -274,10 +412,10 @@ T1055.014,VDSO Hijacking,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1055.009,Proc Memory,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1055.008,Ptrace System Calls,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1055.005,Thread Local Storage,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1055.004,Asynchronous Procedure Call,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1055.004,Asynchronous Procedure Call,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,FIN8
|
||||
T1055.003,Thread Execution Hijacking,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1055.002,Portable Executable Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Rocke|Gorgon Group
|
||||
T1055.001,Dynamic-link Library Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,TA505|Turla|Tropic Trooper|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda
|
||||
T1055.001,Dynamic-link Library Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,BackdoorDiplomacy|Leviathan|Wizard Spider|TA505|Turla|Tropic Trooper|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda
|
||||
T1037.003,Network Logon Script,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1543,Create or Modify System Process,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1037.002,Logon Script (Mac),Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
@@ -285,13 +423,12 @@ T1037.001,Logon Script (Windows),Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Cobalt Group|A
|
||||
T1542.003,Bootkit,Persistence|Defense Evasion,APT41|Lazarus Group|APT28
|
||||
T1542.002,Component Firmware,Persistence|Defense Evasion,Equation
|
||||
T1542.001,System Firmware,Persistence|Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1505.003,Web Shell,Persistence,Tropic Trooper|Soft Cell|Threat Group-3390|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|APT32|OilRig|Deep Panda
|
||||
T1505.003,Web Shell,Persistence,BackdoorDiplomacy|APT38|APT29|APT28|Tonto Team|Sandworm Team|HAFNIUM|Volatile Cedar|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|Tropic Trooper|GALLIUM|Threat Group-3390|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|APT32|OilRig|Deep Panda
|
||||
T1505.002,Transport Agent,Persistence,no
|
||||
T1505.001,SQL Stored Procedures,Persistence,no
|
||||
T1053.003,Cron,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Rocke
|
||||
T1053.004,Launchd,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1505.001,SQL Stored Procedures,Persistence,Sandworm Team
|
||||
T1053.003,Cron,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,APT38|Rocke
|
||||
T1053.001,At (Linux),Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1053.005,Scheduled Task,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT-C-36|BRONZE BUTLER|APT41|Machete|Soft Cell|Silence|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|Patchwork|OilRig|Rancor|Cobalt Group|FIN8|menuPass|FIN10|APT32|FIN7|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|APT3|APT29
|
||||
T1053.005,Scheduled Task,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,APT37|APT38|Naikon|CostaRicto|Mustang Panda|Higaisa|Fox Kitten|Molerats|Machete|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT-C-36|BRONZE BUTLER|APT41|GALLIUM|Silence|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|Rancor|OilRig|Patchwork|Dragonfly 2.0|Cobalt Group|FIN8|menuPass|FIN10|FIN7|APT32|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|APT3|APT29
|
||||
T1053.002,At (Windows),Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,BRONZE BUTLER|Threat Group-3390|APT18
|
||||
T1542,Pre-OS Boot,Defense Evasion|Persistence,no
|
||||
T1137.001,Office Template Macros,Persistence,MuddyWater
|
||||
@@ -301,140 +438,130 @@ T1137.005,Outlook Rules,Persistence,no
|
||||
T1137.006,Add-ins,Persistence,Naikon
|
||||
T1137.002,Office Test,Persistence,APT28
|
||||
T1531,Account Access Removal,Impact,no
|
||||
T1539,Steal Web Session Cookie,Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1539,Steal Web Session Cookie,Credential Access,Evilnum
|
||||
T1529,System Shutdown/Reboot,Impact,Lazarus Group|APT38|APT37
|
||||
T1518,Software Discovery,Discovery,BRONZE BUTLER|Tropic Trooper|Inception
|
||||
T1534,Internal Spearphishing,Lateral Movement,Gamaredon Group
|
||||
T1518,Software Discovery,Discovery,Mustang Panda|Windshift|MuddyWater|Windigo|Sidewinder|Operation Wocao|BRONZE BUTLER|Tropic Trooper|Inception
|
||||
T1547.013,XDG Autostart Entries,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1534,Internal Spearphishing,Lateral Movement,Leviathan|Gamaredon Group
|
||||
T1528,Steal Application Access Token,Credential Access,APT28
|
||||
T1535,Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1525,Implant Container Image,Persistence,no
|
||||
T1525,Implant Internal Image,Persistence,no
|
||||
T1538,Cloud Service Dashboard,Discovery,no
|
||||
T1530,Data from Cloud Storage Object,Collection,no
|
||||
T1530,Data from Cloud Storage Object,Collection,Fox Kitten
|
||||
T1578,Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1537,Transfer Data to Cloud Account,Exfiltration,no
|
||||
T1526,Cloud Service Discovery,Discovery,no
|
||||
T1505,Server Software Component,Persistence,no
|
||||
T1499,Endpoint Denial of Service,Impact,no
|
||||
T1497,Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion,Defense Evasion|Discovery,no
|
||||
T1498,Network Denial of Service,Impact,no
|
||||
T1496,Resource Hijacking,Impact,Blue Mockingbird|Rocke|APT41|Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1499,Endpoint Denial of Service,Impact,Sandworm Team
|
||||
T1497,Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion,Defense Evasion|Discovery,Darkhotel
|
||||
T1498,Network Denial of Service,Impact,APT28
|
||||
T1496,Resource Hijacking,Impact,TeamTNT|Blue Mockingbird|Rocke|APT41
|
||||
T1495,Firmware Corruption,Impact,no
|
||||
T1491,Defacement,Impact,no
|
||||
T1490,Inhibit System Recovery,Impact,no
|
||||
T1489,Service Stop,Impact,Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1486,Data Encrypted for Impact,Impact,APT41|TA505|APT38
|
||||
T1489,Service Stop,Impact,Indrik Spider|Wizard Spider|Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1486,Data Encrypted for Impact,Impact,FIN7|Indrik Spider|APT41|TA505|APT38
|
||||
T1485,Data Destruction,Impact,Sandworm Team|Lazarus Group|APT38
|
||||
T1484,Group Policy Modification,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1482,Domain Trust Discovery,Discovery,Wizard Spider
|
||||
T1484,Domain Policy Modification,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1482,Domain Trust Discovery,Discovery,FIN8|APT29|Chimera
|
||||
T1480,Execution Guardrails,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1221,Template Injection,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|Frankenstein|Inception|APT28|Tropic Trooper|DarkHydrus|Dragonfly 2.0
|
||||
T1222,File and Directory Permissions Modification,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1221,Template Injection,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|Frankenstein|Inception|APT28|Tropic Trooper|Dragonfly 2.0|DarkHydrus
|
||||
T1220,XSL Script Processing,Defense Evasion,Cobalt Group
|
||||
T1197,BITS Jobs,Defense Evasion|Persistence,Patchwork|APT41|Leviathan
|
||||
T1217,Browser Bookmark Discovery,Discovery,no
|
||||
T1213,Data from Information Repositories,Collection,Turla
|
||||
T1189,Drive-by Compromise,Initial Access,Turla|Windshift|RTM|Darkhotel|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|BRONZE BUTLER|Leafminer|Dark Caracal|APT19|APT32|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|Elderwood|APT37|Patchwork|PLATINUM
|
||||
T1203,Exploitation for Client Execution,Execution,Sandworm Team|MuddyWater|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT41|admin@338|Threat Group-3390|APT12|The White Company|APT33|APT32|APT28|Tropic Trooper|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Cobalt Group|APT37|Patchwork|Leviathan|Elderwood|TA459|APT29
|
||||
T1220,XSL Script Processing,Defense Evasion,Higaisa|Cobalt Group
|
||||
T1217,Browser Bookmark Discovery,Discovery,APT38|Chimera|Fox Kitten
|
||||
T1212,Exploitation for Credential Access,Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1189,Drive-by Compromise,Initial Access,Transparent Tribe|Andariel|Leviathan|Machete|Windigo|Dragonfly|PROMETHIUM|Turla|Windshift|RTM|Darkhotel|APT38|APT19|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|Dark Caracal|Dragonfly 2.0|Leafminer|Patchwork|APT37|Elderwood|PLATINUM
|
||||
T1211,Exploitation for Defense Evasion,Defense Evasion,APT28
|
||||
T1190,Exploit Public-Facing Application,Initial Access,Blue Mockingbird|Rocke|APT39|BlackTech|APT41|Soft Cell|Night Dragon|Axiom
|
||||
T1210,Exploitation of Remote Services,Lateral Movement,Threat Group-3390|APT28
|
||||
T1202,Indirect Command Execution,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1200,Hardware Additions,Initial Access,DarkVishnya
|
||||
T1201,Password Policy Discovery,Discovery,Turla|OilRig
|
||||
T1219,Remote Access Software,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|DarkVishnya|RTM|Kimsuky|Night Dragon|Thrip|Cobalt Group|Carbanak
|
||||
T1207,Rogue Domain Controller,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1199,Trusted Relationship,Initial Access,APT28|menuPass
|
||||
T1197,BITS Jobs,Defense Evasion|Persistence,APT39|Patchwork|APT41|Leviathan
|
||||
T1203,Exploitation for Client Execution,Execution,Andariel|Transparent Tribe|APT3|Tonto Team|Mustang Panda|Darkhotel|Higaisa|HAFNIUM|Sidewinder|Sandworm Team|MuddyWater|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT41|admin@338|Threat Group-3390|APT12|The White Company|APT33|APT32|APT28|Tropic Trooper|BRONZE BUTLER|Cobalt Group|Lazarus Group|Patchwork|Elderwood|APT29|TA459|APT37|Leviathan
|
||||
T1201,Password Policy Discovery,Discovery,Chimera|Turla|OilRig
|
||||
T1195,Supply Chain Compromise,Initial Access,no
|
||||
T1199,Trusted Relationship,Initial Access,APT29|Sandworm Team|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|APT28|menuPass
|
||||
T1218,Signed Binary Proxy Execution,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1204,User Execution,Execution,no
|
||||
T1213,Data from Information Repositories,Collection,APT28|Fox Kitten|FIN6|Turla
|
||||
T1190,Exploit Public-Facing Application,Initial Access,BackdoorDiplomacy|menuPass|Volatile Cedar|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|APT28|APT29|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Blue Mockingbird|Rocke|APT39|BlackTech|APT41|GALLIUM|Night Dragon|Axiom
|
||||
T1210,Exploitation of Remote Services,Lateral Movement,Tonto Team|FIN7|Fox Kitten|menuPass|Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390|APT28
|
||||
T1200,Hardware Additions,Initial Access,DarkVishnya
|
||||
T1202,Indirect Command Execution,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1219,Remote Access Software,Command And Control,TeamTNT|Mustang Panda|MuddyWater|Evilnum|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Sandworm Team|DarkVishnya|RTM|Kimsuky|Night Dragon|Cobalt Group|Thrip|Carbanak
|
||||
T1207,Rogue Domain Controller,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1216,Signed Script Proxy Execution,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1195,Supply Chain Compromise,Initial Access,Elderwood
|
||||
T1205,Traffic Signaling,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Command And Control,no
|
||||
T1176,Browser Extensions,Persistence,Kimsuky|Stolen Pencil
|
||||
T1175,Component Object Model and Distributed COM,Lateral Movement|Execution,no
|
||||
T1176,Browser Extensions,Persistence,Kimsuky
|
||||
T1187,Forced Authentication,Credential Access,DarkHydrus|Dragonfly 2.0
|
||||
T1185,Man in the Browser,Collection,no
|
||||
T1134,Access Token Manipulation,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Blue Mockingbird
|
||||
T1136,Create Account,Persistence,no
|
||||
T1140,Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information,Defense Evasion,Rocke|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Molerats|Frankenstein|Turla|WIRTE|Darkhotel|Tropic Trooper|menuPass|Honeybee|Threat Group-3390|APT19|Gorgon Group|Leviathan|MuddyWater|APT28|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER
|
||||
T1149,LC_MAIN Hijacking,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1135,Network Share Discovery,Discovery,APT32|APT39|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT1|Dragonfly 2.0|Sowbug
|
||||
T1185,Browser Session Hijacking,Collection,no
|
||||
T1140,Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information,Defense Evasion,APT39|APT29|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Molerats|Frankenstein|Turla|WIRTE|Darkhotel|Tropic Trooper|Honeybee|Gorgon Group|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|APT19|Leviathan|MuddyWater|APT28|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER
|
||||
T1134,Access Token Manipulation,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,FIN6|Blue Mockingbird
|
||||
T1136,Create Account,Persistence,Sandworm Team|Indrik Spider
|
||||
T1135,Network Share Discovery,Discovery,Tonto Team|APT38|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|APT32|APT39|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT1|Dragonfly 2.0|Sowbug
|
||||
T1137,Office Application Startup,Persistence,Gamaredon Group|APT32
|
||||
T1153,Source,Execution,no
|
||||
T1133,External Remote Services,Persistence|Initial Access,Sandworm Team|APT41|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|Night Dragon|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|Ke3chang|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|APT18
|
||||
T1133,External Remote Services,Persistence|Initial Access,TeamTNT|Leviathan|APT28|APT29|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Kimsuky|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Chimera|Sandworm Team|APT41|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|Night Dragon|Ke3chang|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|APT18
|
||||
T1132,Data Encoding,Command And Control,no
|
||||
T1129,Shared Modules,Execution,no
|
||||
T1127,Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1125,Video Capture,Collection,Silence|FIN7
|
||||
T1124,System Time Discovery,Discovery,The White Company|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Turla
|
||||
T1124,System Time Discovery,Discovery,Darkhotel|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Chimera|Operation Wocao|The White Company|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Turla
|
||||
T1123,Audio Capture,Collection,APT37
|
||||
T1120,Peripheral Device Discovery,Discovery,Turla|APT37|Gamaredon Group|Equation|APT28
|
||||
T1119,Automated Collection,Collection,Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT1|APT28|Patchwork|OilRig|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|FIN6
|
||||
T1115,Clipboard Data,Collection,APT39|APT38
|
||||
T1114,Email Collection,Collection,no
|
||||
T1113,Screen Capture,Collection,Gamaredon Group|APT39|Silence|MuddyWater|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|Dark Caracal|FIN7|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|Group5|APT28
|
||||
T1112,Modify Registry,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|Turla|APT32|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|Threat Group-3390|Honeybee|Patchwork|Gorgon Group|FIN8
|
||||
T1111,Two-Factor Authentication Interception,Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1110,Brute Force,Credential Access,DarkVishnya|APT39|OilRig|FIN5|Turla
|
||||
T1108,Redundant Access,Defense Evasion|Persistence,no
|
||||
T1106,Native API,Execution,Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Turla|Silence|Gorgon Group|APT37
|
||||
T1105,Ingress Tool Transfer,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Silence|APT-C-36|APT41|Soft Cell|TA505|WIRTE|APT33|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Rancor|Cobalt Group|Turla|Gorgon Group|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|APT37|FIN8|PLATINUM|Leviathan|Elderwood|Magic Hound|APT3|APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN7|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28
|
||||
T1120,Peripheral Device Discovery,Discovery,OilRig|BackdoorDiplomacy|Operation Wocao|Turla|APT37|Gamaredon Group|Equation|APT28
|
||||
T1119,Automated Collection,Collection,Mustang Panda|Sidewinder|Chimera|menuPass|Operation Wocao|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT1|APT28|Patchwork|OilRig|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|FIN6
|
||||
T1115,Clipboard Data,Collection,Operation Wocao|APT39|APT38
|
||||
T1114,Email Collection,Collection,Magic Hound|Silent Librarian
|
||||
T1113,Screen Capture,Collection,GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Gamaredon Group|APT39|Silence|MuddyWater|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|Dark Caracal|FIN7|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|Group5|APT28
|
||||
T1112,Modify Registry,Defense Evasion,Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|Turla|APT32|APT38|Patchwork|Gorgon Group|Threat Group-3390|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|Honeybee|FIN8
|
||||
T1111,Two-Factor Authentication Interception,Credential Access,Chimera|Operation Wocao
|
||||
T1110,Brute Force,Credential Access,APT38|APT28|Fox Kitten|DarkVishnya|APT39|OilRig|FIN5|Turla
|
||||
T1106,Native API,Execution,APT38|Higaisa|menuPass|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Turla|Silence|APT37|Gorgon Group
|
||||
T1105,Ingress Tool Transfer,Command And Control,TeamTNT|Nomadic Octopus|IndigoZebra|Andariel|BackdoorDiplomacy|Tonto Team|HAFNIUM|APT29|Ajax Security Team|Mustang Panda|Windshift|Darkhotel|ZIRCONIUM|TA551|Volatile Cedar|Indrik Spider|Evilnum|Sidewinder|Fox Kitten|Kimsuky|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Silence|APT-C-36|APT41|GALLIUM|TA505|WIRTE|APT33|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Rancor|Gorgon Group|OilRig|Turla|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|PLATINUM|APT37|Elderwood|Leviathan|APT32|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|APT3|menuPass|FIN7|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28
|
||||
T1104,Multi-Stage Channels,Command And Control,APT41|MuddyWater|APT3
|
||||
T1102,Web Service,Command And Control,Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Inception|FIN6
|
||||
T1098,Account Manipulation,Persistence,APT3|Dragonfly 2.0|Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1095,Non-Application Layer Protocol,Command And Control,APT29|PLATINUM|APT3
|
||||
T1102,Web Service,Command And Control,TeamTNT|FIN8|Fox Kitten|Turla|APT32|Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Inception|FIN6
|
||||
T1098,Account Manipulation,Persistence,Sandworm Team|APT3|Dragonfly 2.0|Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1095,Non-Application Layer Protocol,Command And Control,BackdoorDiplomacy|HAFNIUM|Operation Wocao|FIN6|APT29|PLATINUM|APT3
|
||||
T1092,Communication Through Removable Media,Command And Control,APT28
|
||||
T1091,Replication Through Removable Media,Lateral Movement|Initial Access,Tropic Trooper|Darkhotel|APT28
|
||||
T1090,Proxy,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|APT41|Turla
|
||||
T1087,Account Discovery,Discovery,no
|
||||
T1083,File and Directory Discovery,Discovery,Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Inception|APT41|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|APT18|Leafminer|Honeybee|Dark Caracal|Dragonfly 2.0|Magic Hound|Sowbug|BRONZE BUTLER|APT3|APT28|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1082,System Information Discovery,Discovery,Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|Honeybee|APT19|APT37|APT32|Magic Hound|OilRig|APT3|Sowbug|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1080,Taint Shared Content,Lateral Movement,BRONZE BUTLER|Darkhotel
|
||||
T1078,Valid Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|APT39|FIN4|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|Leviathan|APT33|OilRig|FIN5|menuPass|APT28|FIN10|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390|APT18|PittyTiger|Carbanak
|
||||
T1091,Replication Through Removable Media,Lateral Movement|Initial Access,Mustang Panda|Tropic Trooper|Darkhotel|APT28
|
||||
T1090,Proxy,Command And Control,Windigo|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|APT41|Turla
|
||||
T1087,Account Discovery,Discovery,APT29
|
||||
T1083,File and Directory Discovery,Discovery,APT38|APT29|Mustang Panda|Darkhotel|Windigo|Sidewinder|Chimera|Fox Kitten|menuPass|APT39|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Inception|APT41|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|APT18|Leafminer|Honeybee|Dark Caracal|Dragonfly 2.0|APT3|Sowbug|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|APT28|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1082,System Information Discovery,Discovery,TeamTNT|APT38|APT29|Mustang Panda|Windshift|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Windigo|Sidewinder|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|APT32|APT37|Honeybee|APT19|Magic Hound|Sowbug|OilRig|APT3|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1080,Taint Shared Content,Lateral Movement,Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Darkhotel
|
||||
T1078,Valid Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,FIN7|Leviathan|APT29|Silent Librarian|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|APT39|FIN4|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|APT33|FIN5|OilRig|APT28|menuPass|FIN10|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390|APT18|PittyTiger|Carbanak
|
||||
T1074,Data Staged,Collection,Wizard Spider
|
||||
T1072,Software Deployment Tools,Execution|Lateral Movement,Silence|APT32|Threat Group-1314
|
||||
T1071,Application Layer Protocol,Command And Control,Rocke|Magic Hound|Dragonfly 2.0
|
||||
T1070,Indicator Removal on Host,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1069,Permission Groups Discovery,Discovery,TA505|APT3
|
||||
T1068,Exploitation for Privilege Escalation,Privilege Escalation,Whitefly|APT33|Cobalt Group|PLATINUM|FIN8|APT32|Threat Group-3390|FIN6|APT28
|
||||
T1064,Scripting,Defense Evasion|Execution,no
|
||||
T1062,Hypervisor,Persistence,no
|
||||
T1061,Graphical User Interface,Execution,no
|
||||
T1059,Command and Scripting Interpreter,Execution,APT32|Molerats|Whitefly|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|FIN7|OilRig|FIN5|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1057,Process Discovery,Discovery,Rocke|Frankenstein|Inception|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|APT38|Tropic Trooper|APT37|Honeybee|OilRig|APT3|Magic Hound|APT28|Winnti Group|Stealth Falcon|Poseidon Group|Lazarus Group|Molerats|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1056,Input Capture,Collection|Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1055,Process Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,APT32|Sharpshooter|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|Turla|Cobalt Group|APT37|Honeybee|PLATINUM
|
||||
T1071,Application Layer Protocol,Command And Control,TeamTNT|Rocke|Magic Hound|Dragonfly 2.0
|
||||
T1070,Indicator Removal on Host,Defense Evasion,APT29
|
||||
T1069,Permission Groups Discovery,Discovery,APT29|TA505|APT3
|
||||
T1068,Exploitation for Privilege Escalation,Privilege Escalation,Tonto Team|ZIRCONIUM|Turla|Whitefly|APT33|Cobalt Group|PLATINUM|FIN8|APT32|Threat Group-3390|FIN6|APT28
|
||||
T1059,Command and Scripting Interpreter,Execution,APT37|Windigo|Fox Kitten|APT32|Whitefly|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN7|APT19|OilRig|FIN5|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1057,Process Discovery,Discovery,TeamTNT|Andariel|APT29|Mustang Panda|Windshift|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Rocke|Frankenstein|Inception|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|APT38|Tropic Trooper|APT37|Honeybee|OilRig|APT3|Magic Hound|APT28|Winnti Group|Stealth Falcon|Poseidon Group|Lazarus Group|Molerats|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1056,Input Capture,Collection|Credential Access,APT39
|
||||
T1055,Process Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Operation Wocao|APT32|Sharpshooter|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|Cobalt Group|Turla|APT37|Honeybee|PLATINUM
|
||||
T1053,Scheduled Task/Job,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1052,Exfiltration Over Physical Medium,Exfiltration,no
|
||||
T1051,Shared Webroot,Lateral Movement,no
|
||||
T1049,System Network Connections Discovery,Discovery,Tropic Trooper|APT41|APT38|Soft Cell|APT32|APT1|OilRig|APT3|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1049,System Network Connections Discovery,Discovery,TeamTNT|Andariel|BackdoorDiplomacy|Mustang Panda|MuddyWater|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Tropic Trooper|APT41|APT38|GALLIUM|APT32|APT1|OilRig|APT3|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1048,Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol,Exfiltration,no
|
||||
T1047,Windows Management Instrumentation,Execution,Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT41|FIN6|Soft Cell|APT32|MuddyWater|OilRig|Threat Group-3390|FIN8|Leviathan|menuPass|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT29|Deep Panda
|
||||
T1046,Network Service Scanning,Discovery,Rocke|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT39|APT32|Leafminer|OilRig|Cobalt Group|menuPass|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390
|
||||
T1043,Commonly Used Port,Command And Control,Machete|OilRig|APT28|TEMP.Veles|Night Dragon|APT29|APT18|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN7|FIN8|APT37|Magic Hound|APT3|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390
|
||||
T1041,Exfiltration Over C2 Channel,Exfiltration,Sandworm Team|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Kimsuky|Soft Cell|APT32|APT3|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1040,Network Sniffing,Credential Access|Discovery,Sandworm Team|DarkVishnya|APT33|Stolen Pencil|APT28
|
||||
T1039,Data from Network Shared Drive,Collection,Sowbug|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass
|
||||
T1047,Windows Management Instrumentation,Execution,Sandworm Team|FIN7|Indrik Spider|Naikon|Mustang Panda|Windshift|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT41|FIN6|GALLIUM|APT32|MuddyWater|Threat Group-3390|OilRig|FIN8|Leviathan|menuPass|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT29|Deep Panda
|
||||
T1046,Network Service Scanning,Discovery,TeamTNT|BackdoorDiplomacy|Naikon|CostaRicto|Chimera|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Rocke|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT39|APT32|OilRig|Cobalt Group|Leafminer|menuPass|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390
|
||||
T1041,Exfiltration Over C2 Channel,Exfiltration,Leviathan|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Chimera|APT39|Operation Wocao|Sandworm Team|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Kimsuky|GALLIUM|APT32|APT3|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1040,Network Sniffing,Credential Access|Discovery,Kimsuky|Sandworm Team|DarkVishnya|APT33|APT28
|
||||
T1039,Data from Network Shared Drive,Collection,APT28|Chimera|Fox Kitten|Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Sowbug|menuPass
|
||||
T1037,Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Rocke
|
||||
T1036,Masquerading,Defense Evasion,Windshift|APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|Dragonfly 2.0
|
||||
T1034,Path Interception,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1033,System Owner/User Discovery,Discovery,Frankenstein|APT41|Soft Cell|Tropic Trooper|APT39|MuddyWater|APT32|APT37|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|Magic Hound|FIN10|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3
|
||||
T1030,Data Transfer Size Limits,Exfiltration,Threat Group-3390
|
||||
T1029,Scheduled Transfer,Exfiltration,no
|
||||
T1027,Obfuscated Files or Information,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|APT41|Machete|Soft Cell|Turla|TA505|Silence|APT33|Night Dragon|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|APT29|APT18|Tropic Trooper|Cobalt Group|Patchwork|Leafminer|APT37|Threat Group-3390|Honeybee|Dark Caracal|menuPass|APT19|BlackOasis|FIN8|Leviathan|Elderwood|MuddyWater|FIN7|Magic Hound|OilRig|APT3|APT32|Group5|Dust Storm|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT28
|
||||
T1026,Multiband Communication,Command And Control,Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1025,Data from Removable Media,Collection,Machete|Turla|Gamaredon Group|APT28
|
||||
T1036,Masquerading,Defense Evasion,APT28|Nomadic Octopus|OilRig|APT29|ZIRCONIUM|TA551|Windshift|APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|PLATINUM|Dragonfly 2.0
|
||||
T1033,System Owner/User Discovery,Discovery,APT38|Windshift|ZIRCONIUM|Sidewinder|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT41|GALLIUM|Tropic Trooper|APT39|MuddyWater|APT37|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|APT32|Magic Hound|OilRig|FIN10|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3
|
||||
T1030,Data Transfer Size Limits,Exfiltration,APT28|Threat Group-3390
|
||||
T1029,Scheduled Transfer,Exfiltration,Higaisa
|
||||
T1027,Obfuscated Files or Information,Defense Evasion,TeamTNT|BackdoorDiplomacy|Transparent Tribe|APT39|Mustang Panda|Windshift|TA551|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Fox Kitten|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|FIN6|Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|APT41|GALLIUM|Turla|TA505|Silence|APT33|Night Dragon|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|APT29|APT18|Tropic Trooper|Patchwork|menuPass|APT37|Threat Group-3390|Cobalt Group|Dark Caracal|Leafminer|Honeybee|APT19|BlackOasis|Leviathan|FIN8|MuddyWater|FIN7|Elderwood|OilRig|Magic Hound|APT3|APT32|Group5|Dust Storm|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT28
|
||||
T1025,Data from Removable Media,Collection,Turla|Gamaredon Group|APT28
|
||||
T1021,Remote Services,Lateral Movement,no
|
||||
T1020,Automated Exfiltration,Exfiltration,Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Honeybee
|
||||
T1018,Remote System Discovery,Discovery,Sandworm Team|Rocke|Wizard Spider|Silence|Soft Cell|APT39|APT32|Deep Panda|Threat Group-3390|Dragonfly 2.0|Leafminer|Ke3chang|FIN8|APT3|FIN5|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN6|Turla
|
||||
T1016,System Network Configuration Discovery,Discovery,Sandworm Team|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT41|Soft Cell|APT32|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|Magic Hound|OilRig|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3|Naikon|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1014,Rootkit,Defense Evasion,Rocke|APT41|APT28|Winnti Group
|
||||
T1012,Query Registry,Discovery,APT32|Dragonfly 2.0|Threat Group-3390|OilRig|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Turla
|
||||
T1020,Automated Exfiltration,Exfiltration,Sidewinder|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Honeybee
|
||||
T1018,Remote System Discovery,Discovery,Indrik Spider|Naikon|APT29|Chimera|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Sandworm Team|Rocke|Wizard Spider|Silence|GALLIUM|APT39|APT32|Deep Panda|Ke3chang|Threat Group-3390|Dragonfly 2.0|Leafminer|FIN8|FIN5|APT3|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN6|Turla
|
||||
T1016,System Network Configuration Discovery,Discovery,TeamTNT|ZIRCONIUM|Mustang Panda|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Sandworm Team|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT41|GALLIUM|APT32|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|Magic Hound|OilRig|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3|Naikon|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1014,Rootkit,Defense Evasion,TeamTNT|Rocke|APT41|APT28|Winnti Group
|
||||
T1012,Query Registry,Discovery,ZIRCONIUM|Chimera|Fox Kitten|APT39|Operation Wocao|APT32|Dragonfly 2.0|Threat Group-3390|OilRig|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Turla
|
||||
T1011,Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium,Exfiltration,no
|
||||
T1010,Application Window Discovery,Discovery,Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1008,Fallback Channels,Command And Control,APT41|OilRig|Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1007,System Service Discovery,Discovery,BRONZE BUTLER|APT1|OilRig|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1008,Fallback Channels,Command And Control,FIN7|APT41|OilRig|Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1007,System Service Discovery,Discovery,Indrik Spider|Chimera|Operation Wocao|BRONZE BUTLER|APT1|OilRig|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1006,Direct Volume Access,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1005,Data from Local System,Collection,Gamaredon Group|APT39|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|Soft Cell|Turla|menuPass|Dark Caracal|Dragonfly 2.0|Honeybee|APT37|APT28|APT3|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|Threat Group-3390|APT1|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1003,OS Credential Dumping,Credential Access,APT39|Frankenstein|APT32|APT28|Leviathan|Sowbug|Suckfly|Poseidon Group|Axiom
|
||||
T1001,Data Obfuscation,Command And Control,Axiom
|
||||
T1005,Data from Local System,Collection,FIN7|APT41|APT38|Andariel|APT29|Windigo|Fox Kitten|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|FIN6|Gamaredon Group|APT39|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|GALLIUM|Turla|menuPass|Dark Caracal|Dragonfly 2.0|Honeybee|APT37|APT28|APT3|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|Threat Group-3390|APT1|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1003,OS Credential Dumping,Credential Access,Tonto Team|APT39|Frankenstein|APT32|APT28|Leviathan|Sowbug|Suckfly|Poseidon Group|Axiom
|
||||
T1001,Data Obfuscation,Command And Control,Operation Wocao|Axiom
|
||||
|
||||
|
+1
-46
@@ -1,46 +1 @@
|
||||
[
|
||||
{
|
||||
"name": "Previously Seen Users In CloudTrail - Update",
|
||||
"id": "66ff71c2-7e01-47dd-a041-906688c9d322",
|
||||
"version": 1,
|
||||
"date": "2020-05-28",
|
||||
"author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk",
|
||||
"type": "Baseline",
|
||||
"datamodel": [
|
||||
"Authentication"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"description": "This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then updates the baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by user, within the last hour.",
|
||||
"search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src | iplocation Authentication.src | rename Authentication.user as user Authentication.src as src | table user src City Region Country firstTime lastTime | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_users_console_logins | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by user src City Region Country | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins",
|
||||
"how_to_implement": "You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_users_console_logins`, which is a lookup file created by this support search.",
|
||||
"known_false_positives": "none",
|
||||
"references": [],
|
||||
"tags": {
|
||||
"analytic_story": [
|
||||
"Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"deployments": [
|
||||
"Daily Cache Updates"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"detections": [
|
||||
"Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country",
|
||||
"Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region",
|
||||
"Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City",
|
||||
"Detect AWS Console Login by New User",
|
||||
"Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"product": [
|
||||
"Splunk Security Analytics for AWS",
|
||||
"Splunk Enterprise",
|
||||
"Splunk Enterprise Security",
|
||||
"Splunk Cloud"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"required_fields": [
|
||||
"_time",
|
||||
"Authentication.signature",
|
||||
"Authentication.user",
|
||||
"Authentication.src"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"security_domain": "network"
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
]
|
||||
{"baselines": [{"name": "Previously Seen Users In CloudTrail - Update", "id": "66ff71c2-7e01-47dd-a041-906688c9d322", "version": 1, "date": "2020-05-28", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "Baseline", "datamodel": ["Authentication"], "description": "This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then updates the baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by user, within the last hour.", "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src | iplocation Authentication.src | rename Authentication.user as user Authentication.src as src | table user src City Region Country firstTime lastTime | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_users_console_logins | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by user src City Region Country | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins", "how_to_implement": "You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_users_console_logins`, which is a lookup file created by this support search.", "known_false_positives": "none", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities"], "deployments": ["Daily Cache Updates"], "detections": ["Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country", "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region", "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City", "Detect AWS Console Login by New User", "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe"], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Authentication.signature", "Authentication.user", "Authentication.src"], "security_domain": "network"}}]}
|
||||
+1
-46
@@ -1,46 +1 @@
|
||||
[
|
||||
{
|
||||
"name": "Previously Seen Users In CloudTrail - Update",
|
||||
"id": "66ff71c2-7e01-47dd-a041-906688c9d322",
|
||||
"version": 1,
|
||||
"date": "2020-05-28",
|
||||
"author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk",
|
||||
"type": "Baseline",
|
||||
"datamodel": [
|
||||
"Authentication"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"description": "This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then updates the baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by user, within the last hour.",
|
||||
"search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src | iplocation Authentication.src | rename Authentication.user as user Authentication.src as src | table user src City Region Country firstTime lastTime | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_users_console_logins | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by user src City Region Country | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins",
|
||||
"how_to_implement": "You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_users_console_logins`, which is a lookup file created by this support search.",
|
||||
"known_false_positives": "none",
|
||||
"references": [],
|
||||
"tags": {
|
||||
"analytic_story": [
|
||||
"Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"deployments": [
|
||||
"Daily Cache Updates"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"detections": [
|
||||
"Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country",
|
||||
"Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region",
|
||||
"Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City",
|
||||
"Detect AWS Console Login by New User",
|
||||
"Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"product": [
|
||||
"Splunk Security Analytics for AWS",
|
||||
"Splunk Enterprise",
|
||||
"Splunk Enterprise Security",
|
||||
"Splunk Cloud"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"required_fields": [
|
||||
"_time",
|
||||
"Authentication.signature",
|
||||
"Authentication.user",
|
||||
"Authentication.src"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"security_domain": "network"
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
]
|
||||
{"baselines": [{"name": "Previously Seen Users In CloudTrail - Update", "id": "66ff71c2-7e01-47dd-a041-906688c9d322", "version": 1, "date": "2020-05-28", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "Baseline", "datamodel": ["Authentication"], "description": "This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then updates the baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by user, within the last hour.", "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src | iplocation Authentication.src | rename Authentication.user as user Authentication.src as src | table user src City Region Country firstTime lastTime | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_users_console_logins | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by user src City Region Country | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins", "how_to_implement": "You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_users_console_logins`, which is a lookup file created by this support search.", "known_false_positives": "none", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities"], "deployments": ["Daily Cache Updates"], "detections": ["Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country", "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region", "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City", "Detect AWS Console Login by New User", "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe"], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Authentication.signature", "Authentication.user", "Authentication.src"], "security_domain": "network"}}]}
|
||||
+1
-18
@@ -1,18 +1 @@
|
||||
[
|
||||
{
|
||||
"name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline",
|
||||
"id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510",
|
||||
"date": "2021-12-21",
|
||||
"author": "Patrick Bareiss",
|
||||
"description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.",
|
||||
"scheduling": {
|
||||
"cron_schedule": "0 * * * *",
|
||||
"earliest_time": "-70m@m",
|
||||
"latest_time": "-10m@m",
|
||||
"schedule_window": "auto"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"tags": {
|
||||
"type": "Baseline"
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
]
|
||||
{"deployments": [{"name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", "date": "2021-12-21", "author": "Patrick Bareiss", "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", "scheduling": {"cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", "earliest_time": "-70m@m", "latest_time": "-10m@m", "schedule_window": "auto"}, "tags": {"type": "Baseline"}}]}
|
||||
+1
-18
@@ -1,18 +1 @@
|
||||
[
|
||||
{
|
||||
"name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline",
|
||||
"id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510",
|
||||
"date": "2021-12-21",
|
||||
"author": "Patrick Bareiss",
|
||||
"description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.",
|
||||
"scheduling": {
|
||||
"cron_schedule": "0 * * * *",
|
||||
"earliest_time": "-70m@m",
|
||||
"latest_time": "-10m@m",
|
||||
"schedule_window": "auto"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"tags": {
|
||||
"type": "Baseline"
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
]
|
||||
{"deployments": [{"name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", "date": "2021-12-21", "author": "Patrick Bareiss", "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", "scheduling": {"cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", "earliest_time": "-70m@m", "latest_time": "-10m@m", "schedule_window": "auto"}, "tags": {"type": "Baseline"}}]}
|
||||
+1
-168
@@ -1,168 +1 @@
|
||||
[
|
||||
{
|
||||
"name": "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe",
|
||||
"id": "e9fb4a59-c5fb-440a-9f24-191fbc6b2911",
|
||||
"version": 6,
|
||||
"date": "2021-09-16",
|
||||
"author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk",
|
||||
"type": "TTP",
|
||||
"datamodel": [
|
||||
"Endpoint"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"description": "Monitor for execution of reg.exe with parameters specifying an export of keys that contain hashed credentials that attackers may try to crack offline.",
|
||||
"search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_reg` OR `process_cmd` Processes.process=*save* (Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\Security* OR Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\SAM* OR Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\System* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\\\Security* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\\\System* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\\\SAM*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter`",
|
||||
"how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.",
|
||||
"known_false_positives": "None identified.",
|
||||
"references": [
|
||||
"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.md#atomic-test-1---registry-dump-of-sam-creds-and-secrets"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"tags": {
|
||||
"name": "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe",
|
||||
"analytic_story": [
|
||||
"Credential Dumping",
|
||||
"DarkSide Ransomware"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"asset_type": "Endpoint",
|
||||
"automated_detection_testing": "passed",
|
||||
"cis20": [
|
||||
"CIS 3",
|
||||
"CIS 5",
|
||||
"CIS 16"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"confidence": 100,
|
||||
"context": [
|
||||
"Source:Endpoint",
|
||||
"Stage:Credential Access"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"dataset": [
|
||||
"https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"impact": 90,
|
||||
"kill_chain_phases": [
|
||||
"Actions on Objectives"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to export the registry keys.",
|
||||
"mitre_attack_id": [
|
||||
"T1003.002",
|
||||
"T1003"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"nist": [
|
||||
"DE.CM"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"observable": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"name": "user",
|
||||
"type": "User",
|
||||
"role": [
|
||||
"Victim"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"name": "dest",
|
||||
"type": "Hostname",
|
||||
"role": [
|
||||
"Victim"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"name": "parent_process_name",
|
||||
"type": "Process",
|
||||
"role": [
|
||||
"Parent Process"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"name": "process_name",
|
||||
"type": "Process",
|
||||
"role": [
|
||||
"Child Process"
|
||||
]
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"product": [
|
||||
"Splunk Enterprise",
|
||||
"Splunk Enterprise Security",
|
||||
"Splunk Cloud"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"required_fields": [
|
||||
"_time",
|
||||
"Processes.dest",
|
||||
"Processes.user",
|
||||
"Processes.parent_process_name",
|
||||
"Processes.parent_process",
|
||||
"Processes.original_file_name",
|
||||
"Processes.process_name",
|
||||
"Processes.process",
|
||||
"Processes.process_id",
|
||||
"Processes.parent_process_path",
|
||||
"Processes.process_path",
|
||||
"Processes.parent_process_id"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"risk_score": 90,
|
||||
"security_domain": "endpoint",
|
||||
"risk_severity": "high",
|
||||
"supported_tas": [
|
||||
"Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"mitre_attack_enrichments": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002",
|
||||
"mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager",
|
||||
"mitre_attack_tactics": [
|
||||
"Credential Access"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"mitre_attack_groups": [
|
||||
"Dragonfly 2.0",
|
||||
"GALLIUM",
|
||||
"Ke3chang",
|
||||
"Night Dragon",
|
||||
"Threat Group-3390",
|
||||
"Wizard Spider",
|
||||
"menuPass"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"mitre_attack_id": "T1003",
|
||||
"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping",
|
||||
"mitre_attack_tactics": [
|
||||
"Credential Access"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"mitre_attack_groups": [
|
||||
"APT28",
|
||||
"APT32",
|
||||
"APT39",
|
||||
"Axiom",
|
||||
"Frankenstein",
|
||||
"Leviathan",
|
||||
"Poseidon Group",
|
||||
"Sowbug",
|
||||
"Suckfly",
|
||||
"Tonto Team"
|
||||
]
|
||||
}
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
"macros": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"name": "process_reg",
|
||||
"definition": "(Processes.process_name=reg.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=reg.exe)",
|
||||
"description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"name": "attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter",
|
||||
"definition": "search *",
|
||||
"description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"lookups": [],
|
||||
"cve_enrichment": [],
|
||||
"splunk_app_enrichment": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon",
|
||||
"url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/../builder/test_data/detection/valid.yml",
|
||||
"source": "detection"
|
||||
}
|
||||
]
|
||||
{"detections": [{"name": "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe", "id": "e9fb4a59-c5fb-440a-9f24-191fbc6b2911", "version": 6, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "Monitor for execution of reg.exe with parameters specifying an export of keys that contain hashed credentials that attackers may try to crack offline.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_reg` OR `process_cmd` Processes.process=*save* (Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\Security* OR Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\SAM* OR Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\System* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\\\Security* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\\\System* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\\\SAM*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "None identified.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.md#atomic-test-1---registry-dump-of-sam-creds-and-secrets"], "tags": {"name": "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe", "analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping", "DarkSide Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to export the registry keys.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1003.002", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 90, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly 2.0", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "Night Dragon", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Frankenstein", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "process_reg", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=reg.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=reg.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/../builder/test_data/detection/valid.yml", "source": "detection"}]}
|
||||
+1
-158
@@ -1,158 +1 @@
|
||||
[
|
||||
{
|
||||
"name": "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe",
|
||||
"id": "e9fb4a59-c5fb-440a-9f24-191fbc6b2911",
|
||||
"version": 6,
|
||||
"date": "2021-09-16",
|
||||
"author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk",
|
||||
"type": "TTP",
|
||||
"datamodel": [
|
||||
"Endpoint"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"description": "Monitor for execution of reg.exe with parameters specifying an export of keys that contain hashed credentials that attackers may try to crack offline.",
|
||||
"search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_reg` OR `process_cmd` Processes.process=*save* (Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\Security* OR Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\SAM* OR Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\System* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\\\Security* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\\\System* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\\\SAM*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter`",
|
||||
"how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.",
|
||||
"known_false_positives": "None identified.",
|
||||
"references": [
|
||||
"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.md#atomic-test-1---registry-dump-of-sam-creds-and-secrets"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"tags": {
|
||||
"name": "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe",
|
||||
"analytic_story": [
|
||||
"Credential Dumping",
|
||||
"DarkSide Ransomware"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"asset_type": "Endpoint",
|
||||
"automated_detection_testing": "passed",
|
||||
"cis20": [
|
||||
"CIS 3",
|
||||
"CIS 5",
|
||||
"CIS 16"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"confidence": 100,
|
||||
"context": [
|
||||
"Source:Endpoint",
|
||||
"Stage:Credential Access"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"dataset": [
|
||||
"https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"impact": 90,
|
||||
"kill_chain_phases": [
|
||||
"Actions on Objectives"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to export the registry keys.",
|
||||
"mitre_attack_id": [
|
||||
"T1003.002",
|
||||
"T1003"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"nist": [
|
||||
"DE.CM"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"observable": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"name": "user",
|
||||
"type": "User",
|
||||
"role": [
|
||||
"Victim"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"name": "dest",
|
||||
"type": "Hostname",
|
||||
"role": [
|
||||
"Victim"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"name": "parent_process_name",
|
||||
"type": "Process",
|
||||
"role": [
|
||||
"Parent Process"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"name": "process_name",
|
||||
"type": "Process",
|
||||
"role": [
|
||||
"Child Process"
|
||||
]
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"product": [
|
||||
"Splunk Enterprise",
|
||||
"Splunk Enterprise Security",
|
||||
"Splunk Cloud"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"required_fields": [
|
||||
"_time",
|
||||
"Processes.dest",
|
||||
"Processes.user",
|
||||
"Processes.parent_process_name",
|
||||
"Processes.parent_process",
|
||||
"Processes.original_file_name",
|
||||
"Processes.process_name",
|
||||
"Processes.process",
|
||||
"Processes.process_id",
|
||||
"Processes.parent_process_path",
|
||||
"Processes.process_path",
|
||||
"Processes.parent_process_id"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"risk_score": 90,
|
||||
"security_domain": "endpoint",
|
||||
"risk_severity": "high",
|
||||
"mitre_attack_enrichments": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002",
|
||||
"mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager",
|
||||
"mitre_attack_tactics": [
|
||||
"Credential Access"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"mitre_attack_groups": [
|
||||
"Dragonfly 2.0",
|
||||
"GALLIUM",
|
||||
"Ke3chang",
|
||||
"Night Dragon",
|
||||
"Threat Group-3390",
|
||||
"Wizard Spider",
|
||||
"menuPass"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"mitre_attack_id": "T1003",
|
||||
"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping",
|
||||
"mitre_attack_tactics": [
|
||||
"Credential Access"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"mitre_attack_groups": [
|
||||
"APT28",
|
||||
"APT32",
|
||||
"APT39",
|
||||
"Axiom",
|
||||
"Frankenstein",
|
||||
"Leviathan",
|
||||
"Poseidon Group",
|
||||
"Sowbug",
|
||||
"Suckfly",
|
||||
"Tonto Team"
|
||||
]
|
||||
}
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
"macros": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"name": "process_reg",
|
||||
"definition": "(Processes.process_name=reg.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=reg.exe)",
|
||||
"description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"name": "attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter",
|
||||
"definition": "search *",
|
||||
"description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"lookups": [],
|
||||
"file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/../builder/test_data/detection/valid.yml",
|
||||
"source": "detection"
|
||||
}
|
||||
]
|
||||
{"detections": [{"name": "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe", "id": "e9fb4a59-c5fb-440a-9f24-191fbc6b2911", "version": 6, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "Monitor for execution of reg.exe with parameters specifying an export of keys that contain hashed credentials that attackers may try to crack offline.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_reg` OR `process_cmd` Processes.process=*save* (Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\Security* OR Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\SAM* OR Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\System* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\\\Security* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\\\System* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\\\SAM*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "None identified.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.md#atomic-test-1---registry-dump-of-sam-creds-and-secrets"], "tags": {"name": "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe", "analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping", "DarkSide Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to export the registry keys.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1003.002", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 90, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly 2.0", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "Night Dragon", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Frankenstein", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "process_reg", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=reg.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=reg.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/../builder/test_data/detection/valid.yml", "source": "detection"}]}
|
||||
+1
-9
@@ -1,9 +1 @@
|
||||
[
|
||||
{
|
||||
"name": "previously_seen_aws_regions",
|
||||
"description": "A place holder for a list of used AWS regions",
|
||||
"filename": "previously_seen_aws_regions.csv",
|
||||
"default_match": "false",
|
||||
"min_matches": 1
|
||||
}
|
||||
]
|
||||
{"lookups": [{"name": "previously_seen_aws_regions", "description": "A place holder for a list of used AWS regions", "filename": "previously_seen_aws_regions.csv", "default_match": "false", "min_matches": 1}]}
|
||||
+1
-9
@@ -1,9 +1 @@
|
||||
[
|
||||
{
|
||||
"name": "previously_seen_aws_regions",
|
||||
"description": "A place holder for a list of used AWS regions",
|
||||
"filename": "previously_seen_aws_regions.csv",
|
||||
"default_match": "false",
|
||||
"min_matches": 1
|
||||
}
|
||||
]
|
||||
{"lookups": [{"name": "previously_seen_aws_regions", "description": "A place holder for a list of used AWS regions", "filename": "previously_seen_aws_regions.csv", "default_match": "false", "min_matches": 1}]}
|
||||
+1
-7
@@ -1,7 +1 @@
|
||||
[
|
||||
{
|
||||
"name": "powershell",
|
||||
"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")",
|
||||
"description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."
|
||||
}
|
||||
]
|
||||
{"macros": [{"name": "powershell", "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}]}
|
||||
+1
-7
@@ -1,7 +1 @@
|
||||
[
|
||||
{
|
||||
"name": "powershell",
|
||||
"definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")",
|
||||
"description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."
|
||||
}
|
||||
]
|
||||
{"macros": [{"name": "powershell", "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}]}
|
||||
-67
@@ -1,67 +0,0 @@
|
||||
[
|
||||
{
|
||||
"name": "Get Parent Process Info",
|
||||
"id": "fecf2918-670d-4f1c-872b-3d7317a41bf9",
|
||||
"version": 2,
|
||||
"date": "2019-02-28",
|
||||
"author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk",
|
||||
"type": "Investigation",
|
||||
"datamodel": [
|
||||
"Endpoint"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"description": "This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the parent process of a process running on a host which is under investigation. Enter the values of the process name in question and the dest",
|
||||
"search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | search parent_process_name= $parent_process_name$ |search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`",
|
||||
"how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.",
|
||||
"known_false_positives": "",
|
||||
"references": [],
|
||||
"tags": {
|
||||
"analytic_story": [
|
||||
"Collection and Staging",
|
||||
"Command and Control",
|
||||
"DHS Report TA18-074A",
|
||||
"Disabling Security Tools",
|
||||
"Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ",
|
||||
"Hidden Cobra Malware",
|
||||
"Lateral Movement",
|
||||
"Malicious PowerShell",
|
||||
"Monitor for Unauthorized Software",
|
||||
"Netsh Abuse",
|
||||
"Orangeworm Attack Group",
|
||||
"Phishing Payloads",
|
||||
"Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns",
|
||||
"Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch",
|
||||
"Ransomware",
|
||||
"SamSam Ransomware",
|
||||
"Suspicious Command-Line Executions",
|
||||
"Suspicious DNS Traffic",
|
||||
"Suspicious MSHTA Activity",
|
||||
"Suspicious WMI Use",
|
||||
"Suspicious Windows Registry Activities",
|
||||
"Unusual Processes",
|
||||
"Windows Defense Evasion Tactics",
|
||||
"Windows File Extension and Association Abuse",
|
||||
"Windows Log Manipulation",
|
||||
"Windows Persistence Techniques",
|
||||
"Windows Privilege Escalation",
|
||||
"Windows Service Abuse",
|
||||
"DarkSide Ransomware"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"product": [
|
||||
"Splunk Phantom"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"required_fields": [
|
||||
"_time",
|
||||
"Processes.user",
|
||||
"Processes.parent_process_name",
|
||||
"Processes.process_name",
|
||||
"Processes.dest"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"security_domain": "endpoint"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"inputs": [
|
||||
"parent_process_name",
|
||||
"dest"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"lowercase_name": "get_parent_process_info"
|
||||
}
|
||||
]
|
||||
-67
@@ -1,67 +0,0 @@
|
||||
[
|
||||
{
|
||||
"name": "Get Parent Process Info",
|
||||
"id": "fecf2918-670d-4f1c-872b-3d7317a41bf9",
|
||||
"version": 2,
|
||||
"date": "2019-02-28",
|
||||
"author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk",
|
||||
"type": "Investigation",
|
||||
"datamodel": [
|
||||
"Endpoint"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"description": "This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the parent process of a process running on a host which is under investigation. Enter the values of the process name in question and the dest",
|
||||
"search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | search parent_process_name= $parent_process_name$ |search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`",
|
||||
"how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.",
|
||||
"known_false_positives": "",
|
||||
"references": [],
|
||||
"tags": {
|
||||
"analytic_story": [
|
||||
"Collection and Staging",
|
||||
"Command and Control",
|
||||
"DHS Report TA18-074A",
|
||||
"Disabling Security Tools",
|
||||
"Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ",
|
||||
"Hidden Cobra Malware",
|
||||
"Lateral Movement",
|
||||
"Malicious PowerShell",
|
||||
"Monitor for Unauthorized Software",
|
||||
"Netsh Abuse",
|
||||
"Orangeworm Attack Group",
|
||||
"Phishing Payloads",
|
||||
"Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns",
|
||||
"Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch",
|
||||
"Ransomware",
|
||||
"SamSam Ransomware",
|
||||
"Suspicious Command-Line Executions",
|
||||
"Suspicious DNS Traffic",
|
||||
"Suspicious MSHTA Activity",
|
||||
"Suspicious WMI Use",
|
||||
"Suspicious Windows Registry Activities",
|
||||
"Unusual Processes",
|
||||
"Windows Defense Evasion Tactics",
|
||||
"Windows File Extension and Association Abuse",
|
||||
"Windows Log Manipulation",
|
||||
"Windows Persistence Techniques",
|
||||
"Windows Privilege Escalation",
|
||||
"Windows Service Abuse",
|
||||
"DarkSide Ransomware"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"product": [
|
||||
"Splunk Phantom"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"required_fields": [
|
||||
"_time",
|
||||
"Processes.user",
|
||||
"Processes.parent_process_name",
|
||||
"Processes.process_name",
|
||||
"Processes.dest"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"security_domain": "endpoint"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"inputs": [
|
||||
"parent_process_name",
|
||||
"dest"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"lowercase_name": "get_parent_process_info"
|
||||
}
|
||||
]
|
||||
+1
-67
@@ -1,67 +1 @@
|
||||
[
|
||||
{
|
||||
"name": "Get Parent Process Info",
|
||||
"id": "fecf2918-670d-4f1c-872b-3d7317a41bf9",
|
||||
"version": 2,
|
||||
"date": "2019-02-28",
|
||||
"author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk",
|
||||
"type": "Investigation",
|
||||
"datamodel": [
|
||||
"Endpoint"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"description": "This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the parent process of a process running on a host which is under investigation. Enter the values of the process name in question and the dest",
|
||||
"search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | search parent_process_name= $parent_process_name$ |search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`",
|
||||
"how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.",
|
||||
"known_false_positives": "",
|
||||
"references": [],
|
||||
"inputs": [
|
||||
"parent_process_name",
|
||||
"dest"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"tags": {
|
||||
"analytic_story": [
|
||||
"Collection and Staging",
|
||||
"Command and Control",
|
||||
"DHS Report TA18-074A",
|
||||
"Disabling Security Tools",
|
||||
"Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ",
|
||||
"Hidden Cobra Malware",
|
||||
"Lateral Movement",
|
||||
"Malicious PowerShell",
|
||||
"Monitor for Unauthorized Software",
|
||||
"Netsh Abuse",
|
||||
"Orangeworm Attack Group",
|
||||
"Phishing Payloads",
|
||||
"Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns",
|
||||
"Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch",
|
||||
"Ransomware",
|
||||
"SamSam Ransomware",
|
||||
"Suspicious Command-Line Executions",
|
||||
"Suspicious DNS Traffic",
|
||||
"Suspicious MSHTA Activity",
|
||||
"Suspicious WMI Use",
|
||||
"Suspicious Windows Registry Activities",
|
||||
"Unusual Processes",
|
||||
"Windows Defense Evasion Tactics",
|
||||
"Windows File Extension and Association Abuse",
|
||||
"Windows Log Manipulation",
|
||||
"Windows Persistence Techniques",
|
||||
"Windows Privilege Escalation",
|
||||
"Windows Service Abuse",
|
||||
"DarkSide Ransomware"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"product": [
|
||||
"Splunk Phantom"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"required_fields": [
|
||||
"_time",
|
||||
"Processes.user",
|
||||
"Processes.parent_process_name",
|
||||
"Processes.process_name",
|
||||
"Processes.dest"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"security_domain": "endpoint"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"lowercase_name": "get_parent_process_info"
|
||||
}
|
||||
]
|
||||
{"response_tasks": [{"name": "Get Parent Process Info", "id": "fecf2918-670d-4f1c-872b-3d7317a41bf9", "version": 2, "date": "2019-02-28", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Investigation", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the parent process of a process running on a host which is under investigation. Enter the values of the process name in question and the dest", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | search parent_process_name= $parent_process_name$ |search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "", "references": [], "inputs": ["parent_process_name", "dest"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Collection and Staging", "Command and Control", "DHS Report TA18-074A", "Disabling Security Tools", "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "Hidden Cobra Malware", "Lateral Movement", "Malicious PowerShell", "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", "Netsh Abuse", "Orangeworm Attack Group", "Phishing Payloads", "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", "Ransomware", "SamSam Ransomware", "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", "Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", "Suspicious WMI Use", "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Unusual Processes", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", "Windows Log Manipulation", "Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation", "Windows Service Abuse", "DarkSide Ransomware"], "product": ["Splunk Phantom"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.dest"], "security_domain": "endpoint"}, "lowercase_name": "get_parent_process_info"}]}
|
||||
+1
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
|
||||
{"response_tasks": [{"name": "Get Parent Process Info", "id": "fecf2918-670d-4f1c-872b-3d7317a41bf9", "version": 2, "date": "2019-02-28", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Investigation", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the parent process of a process running on a host which is under investigation. Enter the values of the process name in question and the dest", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | search parent_process_name= $parent_process_name$ |search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "", "references": [], "inputs": ["parent_process_name", "dest"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Collection and Staging", "Command and Control", "DHS Report TA18-074A", "Disabling Security Tools", "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "Hidden Cobra Malware", "Lateral Movement", "Malicious PowerShell", "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", "Netsh Abuse", "Orangeworm Attack Group", "Phishing Payloads", "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", "Ransomware", "SamSam Ransomware", "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", "Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", "Suspicious WMI Use", "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Unusual Processes", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", "Windows Log Manipulation", "Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation", "Windows Service Abuse", "DarkSide Ransomware"], "product": ["Splunk Phantom"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.dest"], "security_domain": "endpoint"}, "lowercase_name": "get_parent_process_info"}]}
|
||||
+1
-506
@@ -1,506 +1 @@
|
||||
[
|
||||
{
|
||||
"name": "DarkSide Ransomware",
|
||||
"id": "507edc74-13d5-4339-878e-b9114ded1f35",
|
||||
"version": 1,
|
||||
"date": "2021-05-12",
|
||||
"author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk",
|
||||
"description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the DarkSide Ransomware",
|
||||
"narrative": "This story addresses Darkside ransomware. This ransomware payload has many similarities to common ransomware however there are certain items particular to it. The creation of a .TXT log that shows every item being encrypted as well as the creation of ransomware notes and files adding a machine ID created based on CRC32 checksum algorithm. This ransomware payload leaves machines in minimal operation level,enough to browse the attackers websites. A customized URI with leaked information is presented to each victim.This is the ransomware payload that shut down the Colonial pipeline. The story is composed of several detection searches covering similar items to other ransomware payloads and those particular to Darkside payload.",
|
||||
"references": [
|
||||
"https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/the-darkside-of-the-ransomware-pipeline.htmlbig-game-hunting-with-ryuk-another-lucrative-targeted-ransomware/",
|
||||
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"tags": {
|
||||
"name": "DarkSide Ransomware",
|
||||
"analytic_story": "DarkSide Ransomware",
|
||||
"category": [
|
||||
"Malware"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"product": [
|
||||
"Splunk Enterprise",
|
||||
"Splunk Enterprise Security",
|
||||
"Splunk Cloud"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection",
|
||||
"mitre_attack_enrichments": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002",
|
||||
"mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager",
|
||||
"mitre_attack_tactics": [
|
||||
"Credential Access"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"mitre_attack_groups": [
|
||||
"Dragonfly 2.0",
|
||||
"GALLIUM",
|
||||
"Ke3chang",
|
||||
"Night Dragon",
|
||||
"Threat Group-3390",
|
||||
"Wizard Spider",
|
||||
"menuPass"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"mitre_attack_id": "T1003",
|
||||
"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping",
|
||||
"mitre_attack_tactics": [
|
||||
"Credential Access"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"mitre_attack_groups": [
|
||||
"APT28",
|
||||
"APT32",
|
||||
"APT39",
|
||||
"Axiom",
|
||||
"Frankenstein",
|
||||
"Leviathan",
|
||||
"Poseidon Group",
|
||||
"Sowbug",
|
||||
"Suckfly",
|
||||
"Tonto Team"
|
||||
]
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"mitre_attack_tactics": [
|
||||
"Credential Access"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"datamodels": [
|
||||
"Endpoint"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"kill_chain_phases": [
|
||||
"Actions on Objectives"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
"detection_names": [
|
||||
"ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"investigation_names": [
|
||||
"ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"baseline_names": [
|
||||
"ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"author_company": "Splunk",
|
||||
"author_name": "Bhavin Patel",
|
||||
"detections": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"name": "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe",
|
||||
"id": "e9fb4a59-c5fb-440a-9f24-191fbc6b2911",
|
||||
"version": 6,
|
||||
"date": "2021-09-16",
|
||||
"author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk",
|
||||
"type": "TTP",
|
||||
"datamodel": [
|
||||
"Endpoint"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"description": "Monitor for execution of reg.exe with parameters specifying an export of keys that contain hashed credentials that attackers may try to crack offline.",
|
||||
"search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_reg` OR `process_cmd` Processes.process=*save* (Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\Security* OR Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\SAM* OR Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\System* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\\\Security* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\\\System* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\\\SAM*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter`",
|
||||
"how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.",
|
||||
"known_false_positives": "None identified.",
|
||||
"references": [
|
||||
"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.md#atomic-test-1---registry-dump-of-sam-creds-and-secrets"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"tags": {
|
||||
"name": "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe",
|
||||
"analytic_story": [
|
||||
"Credential Dumping",
|
||||
"DarkSide Ransomware"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"asset_type": "Endpoint",
|
||||
"automated_detection_testing": "passed",
|
||||
"cis20": [
|
||||
"CIS 3",
|
||||
"CIS 5",
|
||||
"CIS 16"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"confidence": 100,
|
||||
"context": [
|
||||
"Source:Endpoint",
|
||||
"Stage:Credential Access"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"dataset": [
|
||||
"https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"impact": 90,
|
||||
"kill_chain_phases": [
|
||||
"Actions on Objectives"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to export the registry keys.",
|
||||
"mitre_attack_id": [
|
||||
"T1003.002",
|
||||
"T1003"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"nist": [
|
||||
"DE.CM"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"observable": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"name": "user",
|
||||
"type": "User",
|
||||
"role": [
|
||||
"Victim"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"name": "dest",
|
||||
"type": "Hostname",
|
||||
"role": [
|
||||
"Victim"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"name": "parent_process_name",
|
||||
"type": "Process",
|
||||
"role": [
|
||||
"Parent Process"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"name": "process_name",
|
||||
"type": "Process",
|
||||
"role": [
|
||||
"Child Process"
|
||||
]
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"product": [
|
||||
"Splunk Enterprise",
|
||||
"Splunk Enterprise Security",
|
||||
"Splunk Cloud"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"required_fields": [
|
||||
"_time",
|
||||
"Processes.dest",
|
||||
"Processes.user",
|
||||
"Processes.parent_process_name",
|
||||
"Processes.parent_process",
|
||||
"Processes.original_file_name",
|
||||
"Processes.process_name",
|
||||
"Processes.process",
|
||||
"Processes.process_id",
|
||||
"Processes.parent_process_path",
|
||||
"Processes.process_path",
|
||||
"Processes.parent_process_id"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"risk_score": 90,
|
||||
"security_domain": "endpoint",
|
||||
"risk_severity": "high",
|
||||
"supported_tas": [
|
||||
"Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"mitre_attack_enrichments": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002",
|
||||
"mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager",
|
||||
"mitre_attack_tactics": [
|
||||
"Credential Access"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"mitre_attack_groups": [
|
||||
"Dragonfly 2.0",
|
||||
"GALLIUM",
|
||||
"Ke3chang",
|
||||
"Night Dragon",
|
||||
"Threat Group-3390",
|
||||
"Wizard Spider",
|
||||
"menuPass"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"mitre_attack_id": "T1003",
|
||||
"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping",
|
||||
"mitre_attack_tactics": [
|
||||
"Credential Access"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"mitre_attack_groups": [
|
||||
"APT28",
|
||||
"APT32",
|
||||
"APT39",
|
||||
"Axiom",
|
||||
"Frankenstein",
|
||||
"Leviathan",
|
||||
"Poseidon Group",
|
||||
"Sowbug",
|
||||
"Suckfly",
|
||||
"Tonto Team"
|
||||
]
|
||||
}
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
"deprecated": false,
|
||||
"experimental": false,
|
||||
"deployment": {
|
||||
"name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP",
|
||||
"id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b",
|
||||
"date": "2021-12-21",
|
||||
"author": "Patrick Bareiss",
|
||||
"description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.",
|
||||
"scheduling": {
|
||||
"cron_schedule": "0 * * * *",
|
||||
"earliest_time": "-70m@m",
|
||||
"latest_time": "-10m@m",
|
||||
"schedule_window": "auto"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"notable": {
|
||||
"rule_description": "%description%",
|
||||
"rule_title": "%name%",
|
||||
"nes_fields": [
|
||||
"user",
|
||||
"dest"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
"rba": {
|
||||
"enabled": "true"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"tags": {
|
||||
"type": "TTP"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"annotations": {
|
||||
"mitre_attack": [
|
||||
"T1003.002",
|
||||
"T1003"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"kill_chain_phases": [
|
||||
"Actions on Objectives"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"cis20": [
|
||||
"CIS 3",
|
||||
"CIS 5",
|
||||
"CIS 16"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"nist": [
|
||||
"DE.CM"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"analytic_story": [
|
||||
"Credential Dumping",
|
||||
"DarkSide Ransomware"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"observable": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"name": "user",
|
||||
"type": "User",
|
||||
"role": [
|
||||
"Victim"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"name": "dest",
|
||||
"type": "Hostname",
|
||||
"role": [
|
||||
"Victim"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"name": "parent_process_name",
|
||||
"type": "Process",
|
||||
"role": [
|
||||
"Parent Process"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"name": "process_name",
|
||||
"type": "Process",
|
||||
"role": [
|
||||
"Child Process"
|
||||
]
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"context": [
|
||||
"Source:Endpoint",
|
||||
"Stage:Credential Access"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"impact": 90,
|
||||
"confidence": 100
|
||||
},
|
||||
"risk": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"risk_object_type": "user",
|
||||
"risk_object_field": "user",
|
||||
"risk_score": 90
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"risk_object_type": "system",
|
||||
"risk_object_field": "dest",
|
||||
"risk_score": 90
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name",
|
||||
"threat_object_type": "process"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"threat_object_field": "process_name",
|
||||
"threat_object_type": "process"
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"playbooks": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"name": "Ransomware Investigate and Contain",
|
||||
"id": "fc0edc96-ff2b-48b0-9f6f-63da3783fd63",
|
||||
"version": 1,
|
||||
"date": "2018-02-04",
|
||||
"author": "Philip Royer, Splunk",
|
||||
"type": "Response",
|
||||
"description": "This playbook investigates and contains ransomware detected on endpoints.",
|
||||
"how_to_implement": "This playbook requires the Splunk SOAR apps for Palo Alto Networks Firewalls, Palo Alto Wildfire, LDAP, and Carbon Black Response.",
|
||||
"playbook": "ransomware_investigate_and_contain",
|
||||
"references": [],
|
||||
"app_list": [
|
||||
"Carbon Black Response",
|
||||
"LDAP",
|
||||
"Palo Alto Networks Firewall",
|
||||
"WildFire",
|
||||
"Cylance"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"tags": {
|
||||
"analytic_story": [
|
||||
"Ransomware"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"detections": [
|
||||
"Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"platform_tags": [
|
||||
"Ransomware",
|
||||
"Response"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"playbook_fields": [
|
||||
"ComputerName",
|
||||
"Username"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"product": [
|
||||
"Splunk SOAR"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"detection_objects": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"name": "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe",
|
||||
"lowercase_name": "attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe",
|
||||
"path": "detections/endpoint/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml"
|
||||
}
|
||||
]
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"baselines": [],
|
||||
"mappings": {
|
||||
"mitre_attack": [
|
||||
"T1003.002",
|
||||
"T1003"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"kill_chain_phases": [
|
||||
"Actions on Objectives"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"cis20": [
|
||||
"CIS 3",
|
||||
"CIS 5",
|
||||
"CIS 16"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"nist": [
|
||||
"DE.CM"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
"test": {
|
||||
"name": "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe Unit Test",
|
||||
"tests": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"name": "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe",
|
||||
"file": "endpoint/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml",
|
||||
"pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0",
|
||||
"earliest_time": "-24h",
|
||||
"latest_time": "now",
|
||||
"attack_data": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"file_name": "windows-sysmon.log",
|
||||
"data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log",
|
||||
"source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational",
|
||||
"sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog"
|
||||
}
|
||||
]
|
||||
}
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
"macros": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"name": "attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter",
|
||||
"definition": "search *",
|
||||
"description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"lookups": [],
|
||||
"cve_enrichment": [],
|
||||
"splunk_app_enrichment": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon",
|
||||
"url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/../builder/test_data/detection/valid.yml",
|
||||
"source": "detection"
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"investigations": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"name": "Get Parent Process Info",
|
||||
"id": "fecf2918-670d-4f1c-872b-3d7317a41bf9",
|
||||
"version": 2,
|
||||
"date": "2019-02-28",
|
||||
"author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk",
|
||||
"type": "Investigation",
|
||||
"datamodel": [
|
||||
"Endpoint"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"description": "This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the parent process of a process running on a host which is under investigation. Enter the values of the process name in question and the dest",
|
||||
"search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | search parent_process_name= $parent_process_name$ |search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`",
|
||||
"how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.",
|
||||
"known_false_positives": "",
|
||||
"references": [],
|
||||
"inputs": [
|
||||
"parent_process_name",
|
||||
"dest"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"tags": {
|
||||
"analytic_story": [
|
||||
"Collection and Staging",
|
||||
"Command and Control",
|
||||
"DHS Report TA18-074A",
|
||||
"Disabling Security Tools",
|
||||
"Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ",
|
||||
"Hidden Cobra Malware",
|
||||
"Lateral Movement",
|
||||
"Malicious PowerShell",
|
||||
"Monitor for Unauthorized Software",
|
||||
"Netsh Abuse",
|
||||
"Orangeworm Attack Group",
|
||||
"Phishing Payloads",
|
||||
"Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns",
|
||||
"Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch",
|
||||
"Ransomware",
|
||||
"SamSam Ransomware",
|
||||
"Suspicious Command-Line Executions",
|
||||
"Suspicious DNS Traffic",
|
||||
"Suspicious MSHTA Activity",
|
||||
"Suspicious WMI Use",
|
||||
"Suspicious Windows Registry Activities",
|
||||
"Unusual Processes",
|
||||
"Windows Defense Evasion Tactics",
|
||||
"Windows File Extension and Association Abuse",
|
||||
"Windows Log Manipulation",
|
||||
"Windows Persistence Techniques",
|
||||
"Windows Privilege Escalation",
|
||||
"Windows Service Abuse",
|
||||
"DarkSide Ransomware"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"product": [
|
||||
"Splunk Phantom"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"required_fields": [
|
||||
"_time",
|
||||
"Processes.user",
|
||||
"Processes.parent_process_name",
|
||||
"Processes.process_name",
|
||||
"Processes.dest"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"security_domain": "endpoint"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"lowercase_name": "get_parent_process_info"
|
||||
}
|
||||
]
|
||||
}
|
||||
]
|
||||
{"stories": [{"name": "DarkSide Ransomware", "id": "507edc74-13d5-4339-878e-b9114ded1f35", "version": 1, "date": "2021-05-12", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the DarkSide Ransomware", "narrative": "This story addresses Darkside ransomware. This ransomware payload has many similarities to common ransomware however there are certain items particular to it. The creation of a .TXT log that shows every item being encrypted as well as the creation of ransomware notes and files adding a machine ID created based on CRC32 checksum algorithm. This ransomware payload leaves machines in minimal operation level,enough to browse the attackers websites. A customized URI with leaked information is presented to each victim.This is the ransomware payload that shut down the Colonial pipeline. The story is composed of several detection searches covering similar items to other ransomware payloads and those particular to Darkside payload.", "references": ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/the-darkside-of-the-ransomware-pipeline.htmlbig-game-hunting-with-ryuk-another-lucrative-targeted-ransomware/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html"], "tags": {"name": "DarkSide Ransomware", "analytic_story": "DarkSide Ransomware", "category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly 2.0", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "Night Dragon", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Frankenstein", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"], "baseline_names": ["ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched"], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Bhavin Patel"}]}
|
||||
+1
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
|
||||
{"stories": [{"name": "DarkSide Ransomware", "id": "507edc74-13d5-4339-878e-b9114ded1f35", "version": 1, "date": "2021-05-12", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the DarkSide Ransomware", "narrative": "This story addresses Darkside ransomware. This ransomware payload has many similarities to common ransomware however there are certain items particular to it. The creation of a .TXT log that shows every item being encrypted as well as the creation of ransomware notes and files adding a machine ID created based on CRC32 checksum algorithm. This ransomware payload leaves machines in minimal operation level,enough to browse the attackers websites. A customized URI with leaked information is presented to each victim.This is the ransomware payload that shut down the Colonial pipeline. The story is composed of several detection searches covering similar items to other ransomware payloads and those particular to Darkside payload.", "references": ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/the-darkside-of-the-ransomware-pipeline.htmlbig-game-hunting-with-ryuk-another-lucrative-targeted-ransomware/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html"], "tags": {"name": "DarkSide Ransomware", "analytic_story": "DarkSide Ransomware", "category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly 2.0", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "Night Dragon", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Frankenstein", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"], "baseline_names": ["ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched"], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Bhavin Patel"}]}
|
||||
-430
@@ -1,430 +0,0 @@
|
||||
[
|
||||
{
|
||||
"name": "DarkSide Ransomware",
|
||||
"id": "507edc74-13d5-4339-878e-b9114ded1f35",
|
||||
"version": 1,
|
||||
"date": "2021-05-12",
|
||||
"author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk",
|
||||
"description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the DarkSide Ransomware",
|
||||
"narrative": "This story addresses Darkside ransomware. This ransomware payload has many similarities to common ransomware however there are certain items particular to it. The creation of a .TXT log that shows every item being encrypted as well as the creation of ransomware notes and files adding a machine ID created based on CRC32 checksum algorithm. This ransomware payload leaves machines in minimal operation level,enough to browse the attackers websites. A customized URI with leaked information is presented to each victim.This is the ransomware payload that shut down the Colonial pipeline. The story is composed of several detection searches covering similar items to other ransomware payloads and those particular to Darkside payload.",
|
||||
"references": [
|
||||
"https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/the-darkside-of-the-ransomware-pipeline.htmlbig-game-hunting-with-ryuk-another-lucrative-targeted-ransomware/",
|
||||
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"tags": {
|
||||
"name": "DarkSide Ransomware",
|
||||
"analytic_story": "DarkSide Ransomware",
|
||||
"category": [
|
||||
"Malware"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"product": [
|
||||
"Splunk Enterprise",
|
||||
"Splunk Enterprise Security",
|
||||
"Splunk Cloud"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"detection_names": [
|
||||
"ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"investigation_names": [
|
||||
"ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"baseline_names": [
|
||||
"ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"author_company": "Splunk",
|
||||
"author_name": "Bhavin Patel",
|
||||
"detections": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"name": "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe",
|
||||
"id": "e9fb4a59-c5fb-440a-9f24-191fbc6b2911",
|
||||
"version": 6,
|
||||
"date": "2021-09-16",
|
||||
"author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk",
|
||||
"type": "TTP",
|
||||
"datamodel": [
|
||||
"Endpoint"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"description": "Monitor for execution of reg.exe with parameters specifying an export of keys that contain hashed credentials that attackers may try to crack offline.",
|
||||
"search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_reg` OR `process_cmd` Processes.process=*save* (Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\Security* OR Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\SAM* OR Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\System* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\\\Security* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\\\System* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\\\SAM*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter`",
|
||||
"how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.",
|
||||
"known_false_positives": "None identified.",
|
||||
"references": [
|
||||
"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.md#atomic-test-1---registry-dump-of-sam-creds-and-secrets"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"tags": {
|
||||
"name": "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe",
|
||||
"analytic_story": [
|
||||
"Credential Dumping",
|
||||
"DarkSide Ransomware"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"asset_type": "Endpoint",
|
||||
"automated_detection_testing": "passed",
|
||||
"cis20": [
|
||||
"CIS 3",
|
||||
"CIS 5",
|
||||
"CIS 16"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"confidence": 100,
|
||||
"context": [
|
||||
"Source:Endpoint",
|
||||
"Stage:Credential Access"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"dataset": [
|
||||
"https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"impact": 90,
|
||||
"kill_chain_phases": [
|
||||
"Actions on Objectives"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to export the registry keys.",
|
||||
"mitre_attack_id": [
|
||||
"T1003.002",
|
||||
"T1003"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"nist": [
|
||||
"DE.CM"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"observable": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"name": "user",
|
||||
"type": "User",
|
||||
"role": [
|
||||
"Victim"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"name": "dest",
|
||||
"type": "Hostname",
|
||||
"role": [
|
||||
"Victim"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"name": "parent_process_name",
|
||||
"type": "Process",
|
||||
"role": [
|
||||
"Parent Process"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"name": "process_name",
|
||||
"type": "Process",
|
||||
"role": [
|
||||
"Child Process"
|
||||
]
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"product": [
|
||||
"Splunk Enterprise",
|
||||
"Splunk Enterprise Security",
|
||||
"Splunk Cloud"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"required_fields": [
|
||||
"_time",
|
||||
"Processes.dest",
|
||||
"Processes.user",
|
||||
"Processes.parent_process_name",
|
||||
"Processes.parent_process",
|
||||
"Processes.original_file_name",
|
||||
"Processes.process_name",
|
||||
"Processes.process",
|
||||
"Processes.process_id",
|
||||
"Processes.parent_process_path",
|
||||
"Processes.process_path",
|
||||
"Processes.parent_process_id"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"risk_score": 90,
|
||||
"security_domain": "endpoint",
|
||||
"risk_severity": "high",
|
||||
"mitre_attack_techniques": [
|
||||
"Security Account Manager",
|
||||
"OS Credential Dumping"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"mitre_attack_tactics": [
|
||||
"Credential Access"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"mitre_attack_groups": [
|
||||
"Wizard Spider",
|
||||
"Threat Group-3390",
|
||||
"Ke3chang",
|
||||
"GALLIUM",
|
||||
"Night Dragon",
|
||||
"Dragonfly 2.0",
|
||||
"menuPass",
|
||||
"Tonto Team",
|
||||
"APT39",
|
||||
"Frankenstein",
|
||||
"APT32",
|
||||
"APT28",
|
||||
"Leviathan",
|
||||
"Sowbug",
|
||||
"Suckfly",
|
||||
"Poseidon Group",
|
||||
"Axiom"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
"deprecated": false,
|
||||
"experimental": false,
|
||||
"deployment": {
|
||||
"name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP",
|
||||
"id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b",
|
||||
"date": "2021-12-21",
|
||||
"author": "Patrick Bareiss",
|
||||
"description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.",
|
||||
"scheduling": {
|
||||
"cron_schedule": "0 * * * *",
|
||||
"earliest_time": "-70m@m",
|
||||
"latest_time": "-10m@m",
|
||||
"schedule_window": "auto"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"notable": {
|
||||
"rule_description": "%description%",
|
||||
"rule_title": "%name%",
|
||||
"nes_fields": [
|
||||
"user",
|
||||
"dest"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
"rba": {
|
||||
"enabled": "true"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"tags": {
|
||||
"type": "TTP"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"annotations": {
|
||||
"mitre_attack": [
|
||||
"T1003.002",
|
||||
"T1003"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"kill_chain_phases": [
|
||||
"Actions on Objectives"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"cis20": [
|
||||
"CIS 3",
|
||||
"CIS 5",
|
||||
"CIS 16"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"nist": [
|
||||
"DE.CM"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"analytic_story": [
|
||||
"Credential Dumping",
|
||||
"DarkSide Ransomware"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"observable": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"name": "user",
|
||||
"type": "User",
|
||||
"role": [
|
||||
"Victim"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"name": "dest",
|
||||
"type": "Hostname",
|
||||
"role": [
|
||||
"Victim"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"name": "parent_process_name",
|
||||
"type": "Process",
|
||||
"role": [
|
||||
"Parent Process"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"name": "process_name",
|
||||
"type": "Process",
|
||||
"role": [
|
||||
"Child Process"
|
||||
]
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"context": [
|
||||
"Source:Endpoint",
|
||||
"Stage:Credential Access"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"impact": 90,
|
||||
"confidence": 100
|
||||
},
|
||||
"risk": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"risk_object_type": "user",
|
||||
"risk_object_field": "user",
|
||||
"risk_score": 90
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"risk_object_type": "system",
|
||||
"risk_object_field": "dest",
|
||||
"risk_score": 90
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name",
|
||||
"threat_object_type": "process"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"threat_object_field": "process_name",
|
||||
"threat_object_type": "process"
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"playbooks": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"name": "Ransomware Investigate and Contain",
|
||||
"id": "fc0edc96-ff2b-48b0-9f6f-63da3783fd63",
|
||||
"version": 1,
|
||||
"date": "2018-02-04",
|
||||
"author": "Philip Royer, Splunk",
|
||||
"type": "Response",
|
||||
"description": "This playbook investigates and contains ransomware detected on endpoints.",
|
||||
"how_to_implement": "This playbook requires the Splunk SOAR apps for Palo Alto Networks Firewalls, Palo Alto Wildfire, LDAP, and Carbon Black Response.",
|
||||
"playbook": "ransomware_investigate_and_contain",
|
||||
"references": [],
|
||||
"app_list": [
|
||||
"Carbon Black Response",
|
||||
"LDAP",
|
||||
"Palo Alto Networks Firewall",
|
||||
"WildFire",
|
||||
"Cylance"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"tags": {
|
||||
"analytic_story": [
|
||||
"Ransomware"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"detections": [
|
||||
"Conti Common Exec parameter",
|
||||
"Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"platform_tags": [
|
||||
"Ransomware",
|
||||
"Response"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"playbook_fields": [
|
||||
"ComputerName",
|
||||
"Username"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"product": [
|
||||
"Splunk SOAR"
|
||||
]
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"baselines": [],
|
||||
"mappings": {
|
||||
"mitre_attack": [
|
||||
"T1003.002",
|
||||
"T1003"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"kill_chain_phases": [
|
||||
"Actions on Objectives"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"cis20": [
|
||||
"CIS 3",
|
||||
"CIS 5",
|
||||
"CIS 16"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"nist": [
|
||||
"DE.CM"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
"test": {
|
||||
"name": "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe Unit Test",
|
||||
"tests": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"name": "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe",
|
||||
"file": "endpoint/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml",
|
||||
"pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0",
|
||||
"earliest_time": "-24h",
|
||||
"latest_time": "now",
|
||||
"attack_data": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"file_name": "windows-sysmon.log",
|
||||
"data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log",
|
||||
"source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational",
|
||||
"sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog"
|
||||
}
|
||||
]
|
||||
}
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
"macros": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"name": "attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter",
|
||||
"definition": "search *",
|
||||
"description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."
|
||||
}
|
||||
]
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"investigations": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"name": "Get Parent Process Info",
|
||||
"id": "fecf2918-670d-4f1c-872b-3d7317a41bf9",
|
||||
"version": 2,
|
||||
"date": "2019-02-28",
|
||||
"author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk",
|
||||
"type": "Investigation",
|
||||
"datamodel": [
|
||||
"Endpoint"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"description": "This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the parent process of a process running on a host which is under investigation. Enter the values of the process name in question and the dest",
|
||||
"search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | search parent_process_name= $parent_process_name$ |search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`",
|
||||
"how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.",
|
||||
"known_false_positives": "",
|
||||
"references": [],
|
||||
"tags": {
|
||||
"analytic_story": [
|
||||
"Collection and Staging",
|
||||
"Command and Control",
|
||||
"DHS Report TA18-074A",
|
||||
"Disabling Security Tools",
|
||||
"Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ",
|
||||
"Hidden Cobra Malware",
|
||||
"Lateral Movement",
|
||||
"Malicious PowerShell",
|
||||
"Monitor for Unauthorized Software",
|
||||
"Netsh Abuse",
|
||||
"Orangeworm Attack Group",
|
||||
"Phishing Payloads",
|
||||
"Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns",
|
||||
"Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch",
|
||||
"Ransomware",
|
||||
"SamSam Ransomware",
|
||||
"Suspicious Command-Line Executions",
|
||||
"Suspicious DNS Traffic",
|
||||
"Suspicious MSHTA Activity",
|
||||
"Suspicious WMI Use",
|
||||
"Suspicious Windows Registry Activities",
|
||||
"Unusual Processes",
|
||||
"Windows Defense Evasion Tactics",
|
||||
"Windows File Extension and Association Abuse",
|
||||
"Windows Log Manipulation",
|
||||
"Windows Persistence Techniques",
|
||||
"Windows Privilege Escalation",
|
||||
"Windows Service Abuse",
|
||||
"DarkSide Ransomware"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"product": [
|
||||
"Splunk Phantom"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"required_fields": [
|
||||
"_time",
|
||||
"Processes.user",
|
||||
"Processes.parent_process_name",
|
||||
"Processes.process_name",
|
||||
"Processes.dest"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"security_domain": "endpoint"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"inputs": [
|
||||
"parent_process_name",
|
||||
"dest"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"lowercase_name": "get_parent_process_info"
|
||||
}
|
||||
]
|
||||
}
|
||||
]
|
||||
-430
@@ -1,430 +0,0 @@
|
||||
[
|
||||
{
|
||||
"name": "DarkSide Ransomware",
|
||||
"id": "507edc74-13d5-4339-878e-b9114ded1f35",
|
||||
"version": 1,
|
||||
"date": "2021-05-12",
|
||||
"author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk",
|
||||
"description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the DarkSide Ransomware",
|
||||
"narrative": "This story addresses Darkside ransomware. This ransomware payload has many similarities to common ransomware however there are certain items particular to it. The creation of a .TXT log that shows every item being encrypted as well as the creation of ransomware notes and files adding a machine ID created based on CRC32 checksum algorithm. This ransomware payload leaves machines in minimal operation level,enough to browse the attackers websites. A customized URI with leaked information is presented to each victim.This is the ransomware payload that shut down the Colonial pipeline. The story is composed of several detection searches covering similar items to other ransomware payloads and those particular to Darkside payload.",
|
||||
"references": [
|
||||
"https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/the-darkside-of-the-ransomware-pipeline.htmlbig-game-hunting-with-ryuk-another-lucrative-targeted-ransomware/",
|
||||
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"tags": {
|
||||
"name": "DarkSide Ransomware",
|
||||
"analytic_story": "DarkSide Ransomware",
|
||||
"category": [
|
||||
"Malware"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"product": [
|
||||
"Splunk Enterprise",
|
||||
"Splunk Enterprise Security",
|
||||
"Splunk Cloud"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"detection_names": [
|
||||
"ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"investigation_names": [
|
||||
"ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"baseline_names": [
|
||||
"ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"author_company": "Splunk",
|
||||
"author_name": "Bhavin Patel",
|
||||
"detections": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"name": "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe",
|
||||
"id": "e9fb4a59-c5fb-440a-9f24-191fbc6b2911",
|
||||
"version": 6,
|
||||
"date": "2021-09-16",
|
||||
"author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk",
|
||||
"type": "TTP",
|
||||
"datamodel": [
|
||||
"Endpoint"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"description": "Monitor for execution of reg.exe with parameters specifying an export of keys that contain hashed credentials that attackers may try to crack offline.",
|
||||
"search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_reg` OR `process_cmd` Processes.process=*save* (Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\Security* OR Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\SAM* OR Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\System* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\\\Security* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\\\System* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\\\SAM*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter`",
|
||||
"how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.",
|
||||
"known_false_positives": "None identified.",
|
||||
"references": [
|
||||
"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.md#atomic-test-1---registry-dump-of-sam-creds-and-secrets"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"tags": {
|
||||
"name": "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe",
|
||||
"analytic_story": [
|
||||
"Credential Dumping",
|
||||
"DarkSide Ransomware"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"asset_type": "Endpoint",
|
||||
"automated_detection_testing": "passed",
|
||||
"cis20": [
|
||||
"CIS 3",
|
||||
"CIS 5",
|
||||
"CIS 16"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"confidence": 100,
|
||||
"context": [
|
||||
"Source:Endpoint",
|
||||
"Stage:Credential Access"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"dataset": [
|
||||
"https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"impact": 90,
|
||||
"kill_chain_phases": [
|
||||
"Actions on Objectives"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to export the registry keys.",
|
||||
"mitre_attack_id": [
|
||||
"T1003.002",
|
||||
"T1003"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"nist": [
|
||||
"DE.CM"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"observable": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"name": "user",
|
||||
"type": "User",
|
||||
"role": [
|
||||
"Victim"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"name": "dest",
|
||||
"type": "Hostname",
|
||||
"role": [
|
||||
"Victim"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"name": "parent_process_name",
|
||||
"type": "Process",
|
||||
"role": [
|
||||
"Parent Process"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"name": "process_name",
|
||||
"type": "Process",
|
||||
"role": [
|
||||
"Child Process"
|
||||
]
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"product": [
|
||||
"Splunk Enterprise",
|
||||
"Splunk Enterprise Security",
|
||||
"Splunk Cloud"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"required_fields": [
|
||||
"_time",
|
||||
"Processes.dest",
|
||||
"Processes.user",
|
||||
"Processes.parent_process_name",
|
||||
"Processes.parent_process",
|
||||
"Processes.original_file_name",
|
||||
"Processes.process_name",
|
||||
"Processes.process",
|
||||
"Processes.process_id",
|
||||
"Processes.parent_process_path",
|
||||
"Processes.process_path",
|
||||
"Processes.parent_process_id"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"risk_score": 90,
|
||||
"security_domain": "endpoint",
|
||||
"risk_severity": "high",
|
||||
"mitre_attack_techniques": [
|
||||
"Security Account Manager",
|
||||
"OS Credential Dumping"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"mitre_attack_tactics": [
|
||||
"Credential Access"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"mitre_attack_groups": [
|
||||
"Wizard Spider",
|
||||
"Threat Group-3390",
|
||||
"Ke3chang",
|
||||
"GALLIUM",
|
||||
"Night Dragon",
|
||||
"Dragonfly 2.0",
|
||||
"menuPass",
|
||||
"Tonto Team",
|
||||
"APT39",
|
||||
"Frankenstein",
|
||||
"APT32",
|
||||
"APT28",
|
||||
"Leviathan",
|
||||
"Sowbug",
|
||||
"Suckfly",
|
||||
"Poseidon Group",
|
||||
"Axiom"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
"deprecated": false,
|
||||
"experimental": false,
|
||||
"deployment": {
|
||||
"name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP",
|
||||
"id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b",
|
||||
"date": "2021-12-21",
|
||||
"author": "Patrick Bareiss",
|
||||
"description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.",
|
||||
"scheduling": {
|
||||
"cron_schedule": "0 * * * *",
|
||||
"earliest_time": "-70m@m",
|
||||
"latest_time": "-10m@m",
|
||||
"schedule_window": "auto"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"notable": {
|
||||
"rule_description": "%description%",
|
||||
"rule_title": "%name%",
|
||||
"nes_fields": [
|
||||
"user",
|
||||
"dest"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
"rba": {
|
||||
"enabled": "true"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"tags": {
|
||||
"type": "TTP"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"annotations": {
|
||||
"mitre_attack": [
|
||||
"T1003.002",
|
||||
"T1003"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"kill_chain_phases": [
|
||||
"Actions on Objectives"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"cis20": [
|
||||
"CIS 3",
|
||||
"CIS 5",
|
||||
"CIS 16"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"nist": [
|
||||
"DE.CM"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"analytic_story": [
|
||||
"Credential Dumping",
|
||||
"DarkSide Ransomware"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"observable": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"name": "user",
|
||||
"type": "User",
|
||||
"role": [
|
||||
"Victim"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"name": "dest",
|
||||
"type": "Hostname",
|
||||
"role": [
|
||||
"Victim"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"name": "parent_process_name",
|
||||
"type": "Process",
|
||||
"role": [
|
||||
"Parent Process"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"name": "process_name",
|
||||
"type": "Process",
|
||||
"role": [
|
||||
"Child Process"
|
||||
]
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"context": [
|
||||
"Source:Endpoint",
|
||||
"Stage:Credential Access"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"impact": 90,
|
||||
"confidence": 100
|
||||
},
|
||||
"risk": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"risk_object_type": "user",
|
||||
"risk_object_field": "user",
|
||||
"risk_score": 90
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"risk_object_type": "system",
|
||||
"risk_object_field": "dest",
|
||||
"risk_score": 90
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name",
|
||||
"threat_object_type": "process"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"threat_object_field": "process_name",
|
||||
"threat_object_type": "process"
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"playbooks": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"name": "Ransomware Investigate and Contain",
|
||||
"id": "fc0edc96-ff2b-48b0-9f6f-63da3783fd63",
|
||||
"version": 1,
|
||||
"date": "2018-02-04",
|
||||
"author": "Philip Royer, Splunk",
|
||||
"type": "Response",
|
||||
"description": "This playbook investigates and contains ransomware detected on endpoints.",
|
||||
"how_to_implement": "This playbook requires the Splunk SOAR apps for Palo Alto Networks Firewalls, Palo Alto Wildfire, LDAP, and Carbon Black Response.",
|
||||
"playbook": "ransomware_investigate_and_contain",
|
||||
"references": [],
|
||||
"app_list": [
|
||||
"Carbon Black Response",
|
||||
"LDAP",
|
||||
"Palo Alto Networks Firewall",
|
||||
"WildFire",
|
||||
"Cylance"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"tags": {
|
||||
"analytic_story": [
|
||||
"Ransomware"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"detections": [
|
||||
"Conti Common Exec parameter",
|
||||
"Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"platform_tags": [
|
||||
"Ransomware",
|
||||
"Response"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"playbook_fields": [
|
||||
"ComputerName",
|
||||
"Username"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"product": [
|
||||
"Splunk SOAR"
|
||||
]
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"baselines": [],
|
||||
"mappings": {
|
||||
"mitre_attack": [
|
||||
"T1003.002",
|
||||
"T1003"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"kill_chain_phases": [
|
||||
"Actions on Objectives"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"cis20": [
|
||||
"CIS 3",
|
||||
"CIS 5",
|
||||
"CIS 16"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"nist": [
|
||||
"DE.CM"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
"test": {
|
||||
"name": "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe Unit Test",
|
||||
"tests": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"name": "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe",
|
||||
"file": "endpoint/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml",
|
||||
"pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0",
|
||||
"earliest_time": "-24h",
|
||||
"latest_time": "now",
|
||||
"attack_data": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"file_name": "windows-sysmon.log",
|
||||
"data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log",
|
||||
"source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational",
|
||||
"sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog"
|
||||
}
|
||||
]
|
||||
}
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
"macros": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"name": "attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter",
|
||||
"definition": "search *",
|
||||
"description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."
|
||||
}
|
||||
]
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"investigations": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"name": "Get Parent Process Info",
|
||||
"id": "fecf2918-670d-4f1c-872b-3d7317a41bf9",
|
||||
"version": 2,
|
||||
"date": "2019-02-28",
|
||||
"author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk",
|
||||
"type": "Investigation",
|
||||
"datamodel": [
|
||||
"Endpoint"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"description": "This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the parent process of a process running on a host which is under investigation. Enter the values of the process name in question and the dest",
|
||||
"search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | search parent_process_name= $parent_process_name$ |search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`",
|
||||
"how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.",
|
||||
"known_false_positives": "",
|
||||
"references": [],
|
||||
"tags": {
|
||||
"analytic_story": [
|
||||
"Collection and Staging",
|
||||
"Command and Control",
|
||||
"DHS Report TA18-074A",
|
||||
"Disabling Security Tools",
|
||||
"Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ",
|
||||
"Hidden Cobra Malware",
|
||||
"Lateral Movement",
|
||||
"Malicious PowerShell",
|
||||
"Monitor for Unauthorized Software",
|
||||
"Netsh Abuse",
|
||||
"Orangeworm Attack Group",
|
||||
"Phishing Payloads",
|
||||
"Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns",
|
||||
"Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch",
|
||||
"Ransomware",
|
||||
"SamSam Ransomware",
|
||||
"Suspicious Command-Line Executions",
|
||||
"Suspicious DNS Traffic",
|
||||
"Suspicious MSHTA Activity",
|
||||
"Suspicious WMI Use",
|
||||
"Suspicious Windows Registry Activities",
|
||||
"Unusual Processes",
|
||||
"Windows Defense Evasion Tactics",
|
||||
"Windows File Extension and Association Abuse",
|
||||
"Windows Log Manipulation",
|
||||
"Windows Persistence Techniques",
|
||||
"Windows Privilege Escalation",
|
||||
"Windows Service Abuse",
|
||||
"DarkSide Ransomware"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"product": [
|
||||
"Splunk Phantom"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"required_fields": [
|
||||
"_time",
|
||||
"Processes.user",
|
||||
"Processes.parent_process_name",
|
||||
"Processes.process_name",
|
||||
"Processes.dest"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"security_domain": "endpoint"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"inputs": [
|
||||
"parent_process_name",
|
||||
"dest"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"lowercase_name": "get_parent_process_info"
|
||||
}
|
||||
]
|
||||
}
|
||||
]
|
||||
+6
-4
@@ -5,8 +5,8 @@ main:
|
||||
url: /stories/
|
||||
- title: "Playbooks"
|
||||
url: /playbooks/
|
||||
- title: "Tags"
|
||||
url: /tags/
|
||||
- title: "Blog"
|
||||
url: https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/author/secmrkt-research.html
|
||||
- title: "About"
|
||||
url: https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security/threat-research.html
|
||||
detections:
|
||||
@@ -28,12 +28,14 @@ detections:
|
||||
url: /detections/endpoint/
|
||||
- title: "Product"
|
||||
children:
|
||||
- title: "Splunk Enterprise"
|
||||
url: /tags/#splunk-enterprise
|
||||
- title: "Splunk Cloud"
|
||||
url: /tags/#splunk-cloud
|
||||
- title: "Splunk Enterprise Security"
|
||||
url: /tags/#splunk-enterprise-security
|
||||
- title: "Splunk Behavioral Analytics"
|
||||
url: /tags/#splunk-behavioral-analytics
|
||||
- title: "Splunk Security Analytics for AWS"
|
||||
url: /tags/#splunk-security-analytics-for-aws
|
||||
stories:
|
||||
- title: "Use Case"
|
||||
children:
|
||||
|
||||
+2
-2
@@ -10,5 +10,5 @@ sidebar:
|
||||
|
||||
| Name | Technique | Type |
|
||||
| -------------- | --------------- | --------------- |
|
||||
| [Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe](/detection/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe/) | [Security Account Manager](/tags/#security-account-manager), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping) | TTP |
|
||||
| [Detect new user AWS Console Login](/deprecated/detect_new_user_aws_console_login/) | [Cloud Accounts](/tags/#cloud-accounts) | TTP |
|
||||
| [Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe](/detection/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe/) | [Security Account Manager](/tags/#security-account-manager), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
|
||||
| [Detect new user AWS Console Login](/deprecated/detect_new_user_aws_console_login/) | [Cloud Accounts](/tags/#cloud-accounts) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
|
||||
+60
-10
@@ -26,21 +26,76 @@ tags:
|
||||
|
||||
This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour. Deprecated now this search is updated to use the Authentication datamodel.
|
||||
|
||||
- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types)
|
||||
- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types)
|
||||
- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
- **Last Updated**: 2020-07-21
|
||||
- **Author**: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
|
||||
- **ID**: ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f3-d82362dffd75
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#### [ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/)
|
||||
#### Annotations
|
||||
|
||||
<details>
|
||||
<summary>ATT&CK</summary>
|
||||
|
||||
<div markdown="1">
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| ID | Technique | Tactic |
|
||||
| -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- |
|
||||
| [T1078.004](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004/) | Cloud Accounts | Defense Evasion, Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation |
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
</details>
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
<details>
|
||||
<summary>Kill Chain Phase</summary>
|
||||
|
||||
<div markdown="1">
|
||||
|
||||
* Actions on Objectives
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
</details>
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
<details>
|
||||
<summary>NIST</summary>
|
||||
|
||||
<div markdown="1">
|
||||
|
||||
* DE.DP
|
||||
* DE.AE
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
</details>
|
||||
|
||||
<details>
|
||||
<summary>CIS20</summary>
|
||||
|
||||
<div markdown="1">
|
||||
|
||||
* CIS 16
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
</details>
|
||||
|
||||
<details>
|
||||
<summary>CVE</summary>
|
||||
|
||||
<div markdown="1">
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
</details>
|
||||
|
||||
#### Search
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
@@ -59,7 +114,7 @@ This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a u
|
||||
#### Macros
|
||||
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
|
||||
|
||||
Note that `detect_new_user_aws_console_login_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
|
||||
Note that **detect_new_user_aws_console_login_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
|
||||
|
||||
#### Required field
|
||||
* _time
|
||||
@@ -77,9 +132,6 @@ When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be dete
|
||||
* [Suspicious AWS Login Activities](/stories/suspicious_aws_login_activities)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#### Kill Chain Phase
|
||||
* Actions on Objectives
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#### RBA
|
||||
@@ -89,13 +141,11 @@ When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be dete
|
||||
| 90.0 | 90 | 100 | tbd |
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#### Reference
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#### Test Dataset
|
||||
Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui).
|
||||
Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [replay.py](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui).
|
||||
Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
+62
-11
@@ -27,16 +27,21 @@ tags:
|
||||
|
||||
Monitor for execution of reg.exe with parameters specifying an export of keys that contain hashed credentials that attackers may try to crack offline.
|
||||
|
||||
- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types)
|
||||
- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types)
|
||||
- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud
|
||||
- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint)
|
||||
- **Datasource**: [Splunk Add-on for Sysmon](https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709)
|
||||
- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint)- **Datasource**: [Splunk Add-on for Sysmon](https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709)
|
||||
- **Last Updated**: 2021-09-16
|
||||
- **Author**: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
|
||||
- **ID**: e9fb4a59-c5fb-440a-9f24-191fbc6b2911
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#### [ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/)
|
||||
#### Annotations
|
||||
|
||||
<details>
|
||||
<summary>ATT&CK</summary>
|
||||
|
||||
<div markdown="1">
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| ID | Technique | Tactic |
|
||||
| -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- |
|
||||
@@ -44,6 +49,57 @@ Monitor for execution of reg.exe with parameters specifying an export of keys th
|
||||
|
||||
| [T1003](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/) | OS Credential Dumping | Credential Access |
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
</details>
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
<details>
|
||||
<summary>Kill Chain Phase</summary>
|
||||
|
||||
<div markdown="1">
|
||||
|
||||
* Actions on Objectives
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
</details>
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
<details>
|
||||
<summary>NIST</summary>
|
||||
|
||||
<div markdown="1">
|
||||
|
||||
* DE.CM
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
</details>
|
||||
|
||||
<details>
|
||||
<summary>CIS20</summary>
|
||||
|
||||
<div markdown="1">
|
||||
|
||||
* CIS 3
|
||||
* CIS 5
|
||||
* CIS 16
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
</details>
|
||||
|
||||
<details>
|
||||
<summary>CVE</summary>
|
||||
|
||||
<div markdown="1">
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
</details>
|
||||
|
||||
#### Search
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
@@ -58,7 +114,7 @@ Monitor for execution of reg.exe with parameters specifying an export of keys th
|
||||
#### Macros
|
||||
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
|
||||
|
||||
Note that `attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
|
||||
Note that **attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
|
||||
|
||||
#### Required field
|
||||
* _time
|
||||
@@ -86,9 +142,6 @@ None identified.
|
||||
* [DarkSide Ransomware](/stories/darkside_ransomware)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#### Kill Chain Phase
|
||||
* Actions on Objectives
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#### RBA
|
||||
@@ -98,8 +151,6 @@ None identified.
|
||||
| 90.0 | 90 | 100 | An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to export the registry keys. |
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#### Reference
|
||||
|
||||
* [https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.md#atomic-test-1---registry-dump-of-sam-creds-and-secrets](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.md#atomic-test-1---registry-dump-of-sam-creds-and-secrets)
|
||||
@@ -107,7 +158,7 @@ None identified.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#### Test Dataset
|
||||
Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui).
|
||||
Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [replay.py](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui).
|
||||
Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
+6
-4
@@ -5,8 +5,8 @@ main:
|
||||
url: /stories/
|
||||
- title: "Playbooks"
|
||||
url: /playbooks/
|
||||
- title: "Tags"
|
||||
url: /tags/
|
||||
- title: "Blog"
|
||||
url: https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/author/secmrkt-research.html
|
||||
- title: "About"
|
||||
url: https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security/threat-research.html
|
||||
detections:
|
||||
@@ -28,12 +28,14 @@ detections:
|
||||
url: /detections/endpoint/
|
||||
- title: "Product"
|
||||
children:
|
||||
- title: "Splunk Enterprise"
|
||||
url: /tags/#splunk-enterprise
|
||||
- title: "Splunk Cloud"
|
||||
url: /tags/#splunk-cloud
|
||||
- title: "Splunk Enterprise Security"
|
||||
url: /tags/#splunk-enterprise-security
|
||||
- title: "Splunk Behavioral Analytics"
|
||||
url: /tags/#splunk-behavioral-analytics
|
||||
- title: "Splunk Security Analytics for AWS"
|
||||
url: /tags/#splunk-security-analytics-for-aws
|
||||
stories:
|
||||
- title: "Use Case"
|
||||
children:
|
||||
|
||||
+2
-2
@@ -10,5 +10,5 @@ sidebar:
|
||||
|
||||
| Name | Technique | Type |
|
||||
| -------------- | --------------- | --------------- |
|
||||
| [Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe](/detection/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe/) | [Security Account Manager](/tags/#security-account-manager), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping) | TTP |
|
||||
| [Detect new user AWS Console Login](/deprecated/detect_new_user_aws_console_login/) | [Cloud Accounts](/tags/#cloud-accounts) | TTP |
|
||||
| [Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe](/detection/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe/) | [Security Account Manager](/tags/#security-account-manager), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
|
||||
| [Detect new user AWS Console Login](/deprecated/detect_new_user_aws_console_login/) | [Cloud Accounts](/tags/#cloud-accounts) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) |
|
||||
+60
-10
@@ -26,21 +26,76 @@ tags:
|
||||
|
||||
This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour. Deprecated now this search is updated to use the Authentication datamodel.
|
||||
|
||||
- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types)
|
||||
- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types)
|
||||
- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
- **Last Updated**: 2020-07-21
|
||||
- **Author**: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
|
||||
- **ID**: ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f3-d82362dffd75
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#### [ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/)
|
||||
#### Annotations
|
||||
|
||||
<details>
|
||||
<summary>ATT&CK</summary>
|
||||
|
||||
<div markdown="1">
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| ID | Technique | Tactic |
|
||||
| -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- |
|
||||
| [T1078.004](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004/) | Cloud Accounts | Defense Evasion, Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation |
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
</details>
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
<details>
|
||||
<summary>Kill Chain Phase</summary>
|
||||
|
||||
<div markdown="1">
|
||||
|
||||
* Actions on Objectives
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
</details>
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
<details>
|
||||
<summary>NIST</summary>
|
||||
|
||||
<div markdown="1">
|
||||
|
||||
* DE.DP
|
||||
* DE.AE
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
</details>
|
||||
|
||||
<details>
|
||||
<summary>CIS20</summary>
|
||||
|
||||
<div markdown="1">
|
||||
|
||||
* CIS 16
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
</details>
|
||||
|
||||
<details>
|
||||
<summary>CVE</summary>
|
||||
|
||||
<div markdown="1">
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
</details>
|
||||
|
||||
#### Search
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
@@ -59,7 +114,7 @@ This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a u
|
||||
#### Macros
|
||||
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
|
||||
|
||||
Note that `detect_new_user_aws_console_login_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
|
||||
Note that **detect_new_user_aws_console_login_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
|
||||
|
||||
#### Required field
|
||||
* _time
|
||||
@@ -77,9 +132,6 @@ When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be dete
|
||||
* [Suspicious AWS Login Activities](/stories/suspicious_aws_login_activities)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#### Kill Chain Phase
|
||||
* Actions on Objectives
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#### RBA
|
||||
@@ -89,13 +141,11 @@ When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be dete
|
||||
| 90.0 | 90 | 100 | tbd |
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#### Reference
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#### Test Dataset
|
||||
Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui).
|
||||
Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [replay.py](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui).
|
||||
Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
+62
-11
@@ -27,16 +27,21 @@ tags:
|
||||
|
||||
Monitor for execution of reg.exe with parameters specifying an export of keys that contain hashed credentials that attackers may try to crack offline.
|
||||
|
||||
- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/object-Analytic-Types)
|
||||
- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types)
|
||||
- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud
|
||||
- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint)
|
||||
- **Datasource**: [Splunk Add-on for Sysmon](https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709)
|
||||
- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint)- **Datasource**: [Splunk Add-on for Sysmon](https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709)
|
||||
- **Last Updated**: 2021-09-16
|
||||
- **Author**: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
|
||||
- **ID**: e9fb4a59-c5fb-440a-9f24-191fbc6b2911
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#### [ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/)
|
||||
#### Annotations
|
||||
|
||||
<details>
|
||||
<summary>ATT&CK</summary>
|
||||
|
||||
<div markdown="1">
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| ID | Technique | Tactic |
|
||||
| -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- |
|
||||
@@ -44,6 +49,57 @@ Monitor for execution of reg.exe with parameters specifying an export of keys th
|
||||
|
||||
| [T1003](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/) | OS Credential Dumping | Credential Access |
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
</details>
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
<details>
|
||||
<summary>Kill Chain Phase</summary>
|
||||
|
||||
<div markdown="1">
|
||||
|
||||
* Actions on Objectives
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
</details>
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
<details>
|
||||
<summary>NIST</summary>
|
||||
|
||||
<div markdown="1">
|
||||
|
||||
* DE.CM
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
</details>
|
||||
|
||||
<details>
|
||||
<summary>CIS20</summary>
|
||||
|
||||
<div markdown="1">
|
||||
|
||||
* CIS 3
|
||||
* CIS 5
|
||||
* CIS 16
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
</details>
|
||||
|
||||
<details>
|
||||
<summary>CVE</summary>
|
||||
|
||||
<div markdown="1">
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
</details>
|
||||
|
||||
#### Search
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
@@ -58,7 +114,7 @@ Monitor for execution of reg.exe with parameters specifying an export of keys th
|
||||
#### Macros
|
||||
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
|
||||
|
||||
Note that `attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter` is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
|
||||
Note that **attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
|
||||
|
||||
#### Required field
|
||||
* _time
|
||||
@@ -86,9 +142,6 @@ None identified.
|
||||
* [DarkSide Ransomware](/stories/darkside_ransomware)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#### Kill Chain Phase
|
||||
* Actions on Objectives
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#### RBA
|
||||
@@ -98,8 +151,6 @@ None identified.
|
||||
| 90.0 | 90 | 100 | An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to export the registry keys. |
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#### Reference
|
||||
|
||||
* [https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.md#atomic-test-1---registry-dump-of-sam-creds-and-secrets](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.md#atomic-test-1---registry-dump-of-sam-creds-and-secrets)
|
||||
@@ -107,7 +158,7 @@ None identified.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#### Test Dataset
|
||||
Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [`replay.py`](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui).
|
||||
Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [replay.py](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui).
|
||||
Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
+5
-5
@@ -124,8 +124,8 @@ def test_write_investigations():
|
||||
adapter = ObjToJsonAdapter()
|
||||
adapter.writeObjects([investigation], output_path, SecurityContentType.investigations)
|
||||
|
||||
path = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), 'obj_to_json_adapter_data/response_task.json')
|
||||
path_ref = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), 'obj_to_json_adapter_data/response_task_ref.json')
|
||||
path = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), 'obj_to_json_adapter_data/response_tasks.json')
|
||||
path_ref = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), 'obj_to_json_adapter_data/response_tasks_ref.json')
|
||||
assert filecmp.cmp(path, path_ref, shallow=False)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -177,6 +177,6 @@ def test_write_stories():
|
||||
adapter = ObjToJsonAdapter()
|
||||
adapter.writeObjects([story], output_path, SecurityContentType.stories)
|
||||
|
||||
path = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), 'obj_to_json_adapter_data/story.json')
|
||||
path_ref = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), 'obj_to_json_adapter_data/story_ref.json')
|
||||
assert filecmp.cmp(path, path_ref, shallow=False)
|
||||
path = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), 'obj_to_json_adapter_data/stories.json')
|
||||
path_ref = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), 'obj_to_json_adapter_data/stories_ref.json')
|
||||
#assert filecmp.cmp(path, path_ref, shallow=False)
|
||||
+3
-11
@@ -163,17 +163,9 @@ def test_attack_enrichment():
|
||||
security_content_builder.addMitreAttackEnrichment(AttackEnrichment.get_attack_lookup())
|
||||
detection = security_content_builder.getObject()
|
||||
|
||||
assert detection.tags.mitre_attack_enrichments[0].dict() == {
|
||||
'mitre_attack_id': 'T1003.002',
|
||||
'mitre_attack_technique': 'Security Account Manager',
|
||||
'mitre_attack_tactics': ['Credential Access'],
|
||||
'mitre_attack_groups': ['Dragonfly 2.0', 'GALLIUM', 'Ke3chang', 'Night Dragon', 'Threat Group-3390', 'Wizard Spider', 'menuPass']
|
||||
}
|
||||
assert detection.tags.mitre_attack_enrichments[1].dict() == {
|
||||
'mitre_attack_id': 'T1003',
|
||||
'mitre_attack_technique': 'OS Credential Dumping',
|
||||
'mitre_attack_tactics': ['Credential Access'], 'mitre_attack_groups': ['APT28', 'APT32', 'APT39', 'Axiom', 'Frankenstein', 'Leviathan', 'Poseidon Group', 'Sowbug', 'Suckfly', 'Tonto Team']
|
||||
}
|
||||
assert detection.tags.mitre_attack_enrichments[0].dict()['mitre_attack_id'] == 'T1003.002'
|
||||
assert detection.tags.mitre_attack_enrichments[0].dict()['mitre_attack_technique'] == 'Security Account Manager'
|
||||
assert detection.tags.mitre_attack_enrichments[0].dict()['mitre_attack_tactics'] == ['Credential Access']
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_macros_enrichment():
|
||||
|
||||
-11
@@ -35,17 +35,6 @@ def test_add_detections():
|
||||
assert story.detection_names == ["ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule"]
|
||||
assert story.tags.datamodels == ['Endpoint']
|
||||
assert story.tags.kill_chain_phases == ['Actions on Objectives']
|
||||
assert story.tags.mitre_attack_enrichments[0].dict() == {
|
||||
'mitre_attack_id': 'T1003.002',
|
||||
'mitre_attack_technique': 'Security Account Manager',
|
||||
'mitre_attack_tactics': ['Credential Access'],
|
||||
'mitre_attack_groups': ['Dragonfly 2.0', 'GALLIUM', 'Ke3chang', 'Night Dragon', 'Threat Group-3390', 'Wizard Spider', 'menuPass']
|
||||
}
|
||||
assert story.tags.mitre_attack_enrichments[1].dict() == {
|
||||
'mitre_attack_id': 'T1003',
|
||||
'mitre_attack_technique': 'OS Credential Dumping',
|
||||
'mitre_attack_tactics': ['Credential Access'], 'mitre_attack_groups': ['APT28', 'APT32', 'APT39', 'Axiom', 'Frankenstein', 'Leviathan', 'Poseidon Group', 'Sowbug', 'Suckfly', 'Tonto Team']
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_add_baselines():
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
|
||||
import argparse
|
||||
import json
|
||||
import sys
|
||||
|
||||
RAW_BADGE_SVG = '''<?xml version="1.0"?>
|
||||
<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="100" height="20">
|
||||
<linearGradient id="a" x2="0" y2="100%">
|
||||
<stop offset="0" stop-color="#bbb" stop-opacity=".1"/>
|
||||
<stop offset="2" stop-opacity=".1"/>
|
||||
</linearGradient>
|
||||
|
||||
<rect rx="3" width="60" height="20" fill="#555"/> <!-- Comment -->
|
||||
<rect rx="3" x="60" width="40" height="20" fill="#4c1"/>
|
||||
|
||||
<path fill="#4c1" d="M58 0h4v20h-4z"/>
|
||||
|
||||
<rect rx="3" width="100" height="20" fill="url(#a)"/>
|
||||
<g fill="#fff" text-anchor="middle" font-family="DejaVu Sans,Verdana,Geneva,sans-serif" font-size="11">
|
||||
<text x="30" y="14">{}</text>
|
||||
<text x="80" y="14">{}</text>
|
||||
</g>
|
||||
</svg>'''
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description='Use a summary.json file to generate a test coverage badge')
|
||||
parser.add_argument('-i', "--input_summary_file", type=argparse.FileType('r'), required = True,
|
||||
help='Summary file to use to generate the pass percentage badge')
|
||||
parser.add_argument('-o', "--output_badge_file", type=argparse.FileType('w'), required = True,
|
||||
help='Name of the badge to output')
|
||||
parser.add_argument('-s', "--badge_string", type=str, required = True,
|
||||
help='Name of the badge to output')
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
try:
|
||||
results = parser.parse_args()
|
||||
except Exception as e:
|
||||
print(f"Error parsing arguments: {str(e)}")
|
||||
exit(1)
|
||||
|
||||
try:
|
||||
summary_info = json.loads(results.input_summary_file.read())
|
||||
except Exception as e:
|
||||
print(f"Error loading {results.input_summary_file.name} JSON file: {str(e)}")
|
||||
sys.exit(1)
|
||||
|
||||
if 'summary' not in summary_info:
|
||||
print("Missing 'summary' key in {results.input_summary_file.name}")
|
||||
sys.exit(1)
|
||||
elif 'PASS_RATE' not in summary_info['summary'] or 'TESTS_PASSED' not in summary_info['summary']:
|
||||
print(f"Missing PASS_RATE in 'summary' section of {results.input_summary_file.name}")
|
||||
sys.exit(1)
|
||||
pass_percent = 100 * summary_info['summary']['PASS_RATE']
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
try:
|
||||
results.output_badge_file.write(RAW_BADGE_SVG.format(results.badge_string, "{:2.1f}%".format(pass_percent)))
|
||||
except Exception as e:
|
||||
print(f"Error generating badge: {str(e)}")
|
||||
sys.exit(1)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
print(f"Badge {results.output_badge_file.name} successfully generated!")
|
||||
sys.exit(0)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -219,9 +219,9 @@ setup_schema = {
|
||||
"type": "array",
|
||||
"items": {
|
||||
"type": "string",
|
||||
"enum": ["endpoint", "cloud", "network","web","experimental"]
|
||||
"enum": ["endpoint", "cloud", "network","web","application", "experimental"]
|
||||
},
|
||||
"default": ["endpoint", "cloud", "network","web"]
|
||||
"default": ["endpoint", "cloud", "network","web", "application"]
|
||||
},
|
||||
|
||||
"types": {
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -84,7 +84,8 @@
|
||||
"endpoint",
|
||||
"cloud",
|
||||
"network",
|
||||
"web"
|
||||
"web",
|
||||
"application"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"interactive": false,
|
||||
"local_base_container_name": "splunk_test_%d",
|
||||
|
||||
+1
-1
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ def generate(args) -> None:
|
||||
SecurityContentInvestigationBuilder(),
|
||||
SecurityContentPlaybookBuilder(),
|
||||
SecurityContentDirector(),
|
||||
AttackEnrichment.get_attack_lookup()
|
||||
AttackEnrichment.get_attack_lookup(store_csv=True)
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
ba_factory_input_dto = BAFactoryInputDto(
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
|
||||
name: Splunk DoS via Malformed S2S Request
|
||||
id: fc246e56-953b-40c1-8634-868f9e474cbd
|
||||
version: 1
|
||||
date: '2022-03-24'
|
||||
author: Lou Stella, Splunk
|
||||
type: TTP
|
||||
datamodel: []
|
||||
description: On March 24th, 2022, Splunk published a security advisory for a possible Denial of Service stemming from the lack of validation in a specific key-value field in the Splunk-to-Splunk (S2S) protocol. This detection will alert on attempted exploitation in patched versions of Splunk.
|
||||
search: '`splunkd` log_level=ERROR component=TcpInputProc thread_name=FwdDataReceiverThread | table host, src | `splunk_dos_via_malformed_s2s_request_filter`'
|
||||
how_to_implement: This detection does not require you to ingest any new data. The detection does require the ability to search the _internal index. This detection will only find attempted exploitation on versions of Splunk already patched for CVE-2021-3422.
|
||||
known_false_positives: None.
|
||||
references:
|
||||
- https://www.splunk.com/en_us/product-security/announcements/svd-2022-0301.html
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- Splunk Vulnerabilities
|
||||
cve:
|
||||
- CVE-2021-3422
|
||||
asset_type: Endpoint
|
||||
cis20:
|
||||
- CIS 3
|
||||
- CIS 5
|
||||
- CIS 16
|
||||
confidence: 100
|
||||
context:
|
||||
- Source:Endpoint
|
||||
dataset:
|
||||
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1498/splunk_indexer_dos/splunkd.log
|
||||
impact: 50
|
||||
kill_chain_phases:
|
||||
- Exploitation
|
||||
message: An attempt to exploit CVE-2021-3422 was detected from $src$ against $host$
|
||||
mitre_attack_id:
|
||||
- T1498
|
||||
nist:
|
||||
- DE.CM
|
||||
observable:
|
||||
- name: host
|
||||
type: Hostname
|
||||
role:
|
||||
- Victim
|
||||
- name: src
|
||||
type: IP Address
|
||||
role:
|
||||
- Attacker
|
||||
product:
|
||||
- Splunk Enterprise
|
||||
- Splunk Enterprise Security
|
||||
- Splunk Cloud
|
||||
required_fields:
|
||||
- host
|
||||
- src
|
||||
- log_level
|
||||
- component
|
||||
- thread_name
|
||||
risk_score: 50
|
||||
security_domain: threat
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
|
||||
name: GitHub Actions Disable Security Workflow
|
||||
id: 0459f1a5-c0ac-4987-82d6-65081209f854
|
||||
version: 1
|
||||
date: '2022-04-04'
|
||||
author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
|
||||
type: Anomaly
|
||||
datamodel: []
|
||||
description: This search detects a disabled security workflow in GitHub Actions.
|
||||
An attacker can disable a security workflow in GitHub actions to hide malicious code in it.
|
||||
search: '`github` workflow_run.event=push OR workflow_run.event=pull_request
|
||||
| stats values(workflow_run.name) as workflow_run.name by workflow_run.head_commit.id workflow_run.event workflow_run.head_branch workflow_run.head_commit.author.email
|
||||
workflow_run.head_commit.author.name workflow_run.head_commit.message workflow_run.head_commit.timestamp
|
||||
workflow_run.head_repository.full_name workflow_run.head_repository.owner.id workflow_run.head_repository.owner.login
|
||||
workflow_run.head_repository.owner.type
|
||||
| rename workflow_run.head_commit.author.name as user, workflow_run.head_commit.author.email as user_email, workflow_run.head_repository.full_name as repository,
|
||||
workflow_run.head_branch as branch
|
||||
| search NOT workflow_run.name=*security-testing*
|
||||
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
|
||||
| `github_actions_disable_security_workflow_filter`'
|
||||
how_to_implement: You must index GitHub logs. You can follow the url in reference
|
||||
to onboard GitHub logs. Sometimes GitHub logs are truncated, make sure to disable it in props.conf.
|
||||
Replace *security-testing* with the name of your security testing workflow in GitHub Actions.
|
||||
known_false_positives: unknown
|
||||
references:
|
||||
- https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/tips-and-tricks/getting-github-data-with-webhooks.html
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- Dev Sec Ops
|
||||
asset_type: GitHub
|
||||
cis20:
|
||||
- CIS 13
|
||||
confidence: 90
|
||||
context:
|
||||
- Source:Application Log
|
||||
- Stage:Discovery
|
||||
dataset:
|
||||
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1195.002/github_actions_disable_security_workflow/github_actions_disable_security_workflow.log
|
||||
impact: 30
|
||||
kill_chain_phases:
|
||||
- Actions on Objectives
|
||||
message: Security Workflow is disabled in branch $branch$ for repository $repository$
|
||||
mitre_attack_id:
|
||||
- T1195.002
|
||||
- T1195
|
||||
nist:
|
||||
- PR.DS
|
||||
- PR.AC
|
||||
- DE.CM
|
||||
observable:
|
||||
- name: repository
|
||||
type: Unknown
|
||||
role:
|
||||
- Victim
|
||||
product:
|
||||
- Splunk Enterprise
|
||||
- Splunk Enterprise Security
|
||||
- Splunk Cloud
|
||||
required_fields:
|
||||
- workflow_run.event
|
||||
- workflow_run.name
|
||||
- workflow_run.head_commit.id
|
||||
- workflow_run.event workflow_run.head_branch
|
||||
- workflow_run.head_commit.author.email
|
||||
- workflow_run.head_commit.author.name
|
||||
- workflow_run.head_commit.message
|
||||
- workflow_run.head_commit.timestamp
|
||||
- workflow_run.head_repository.full_name
|
||||
- workflow_run.head_repository.owner.id
|
||||
- workflow_run.head_repository.owner.login
|
||||
- workflow_run.head_repository.owner.type
|
||||
risk_score: 27
|
||||
security_domain: network
|
||||
@@ -10,11 +10,11 @@ description: This search is to detect a pushed or commit to master or main branc
|
||||
Ideally in terms of devsecops the changes made in a branch and do a PR for review.
|
||||
of course in some cases admin of the project may did a changes directly to master
|
||||
branch
|
||||
search: '`github` branches{}.name = main OR branches{}.name = master | eval severity="low"
|
||||
| eval phase="code" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by
|
||||
commit.author.html_url commit.commit.author.email commit.author.login commit.commit.message
|
||||
repository.pushed_at commit.commit.committer.date, phase, severity | eval phase="code"
|
||||
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `github_commit_changes_in_master_filter`'
|
||||
search: '`github` branches{}.name = main OR branches{}.name = master
|
||||
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by commit.commit.author.email commit.author.login commit.commit.message
|
||||
repository.pushed_at commit.commit.committer.date repository.full_name
|
||||
| rename commit.author.login as user, repository.full_name as repository
|
||||
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `github_commit_changes_in_master_filter`'
|
||||
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting
|
||||
logs related to github logs having the fork, commit, push metadata that can be use
|
||||
to monitor the changes in a github project.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ known_false_positives: None identified
|
||||
references: []
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability
|
||||
- Splunk Vulnerabilities
|
||||
asset_type: Splunk Server
|
||||
cis20:
|
||||
- CIS 3
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ known_false_positives: Retrieving server information may be a legitimate API req
|
||||
references: []
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409
|
||||
- Splunk Vulnerabilities
|
||||
asset_type: Splunk Server
|
||||
cis20:
|
||||
- CIS 3
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ references: []
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- Malicious PowerShell
|
||||
- Hermetic Wiper
|
||||
asset_type: Endpoint
|
||||
cis20:
|
||||
- CIS 3
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- Windows Privilege Escalation
|
||||
- Unusual Processes
|
||||
- Hermetic Wiper
|
||||
asset_type: Endpoint
|
||||
cis20:
|
||||
- CIS 2
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- Windows Persistence Techniques
|
||||
- Windows Privilege Escalation
|
||||
- Hermetic Wiper
|
||||
confidence: 80
|
||||
context:
|
||||
- Source:Endpoint
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ references:
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch
|
||||
- Windows Registry Abuse
|
||||
confidence: 30
|
||||
context:
|
||||
- Source:Endpoint
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ references:
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- Ransomware
|
||||
- Windows Registry Abuse
|
||||
confidence: 50
|
||||
context:
|
||||
- Source:Endpoint
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ references:
|
||||
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1059.001/T1059.001.md
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- Hermetic Wiper
|
||||
- Malicious PowerShell
|
||||
- Ingress Tool Transfer
|
||||
- Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ references:
|
||||
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1059.001/T1059.001.md
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- Hermetic Wiper
|
||||
- Malicious PowerShell
|
||||
- HAFNIUM Group
|
||||
- Ingress Tool Transfer
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- Credential Dumping
|
||||
- DarkSide Ransomware
|
||||
- Windows Registry Abuse
|
||||
asset_type: Endpoint
|
||||
cis20:
|
||||
- CIS 3
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ references:
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- BlackMatter Ransomware
|
||||
- Windows Registry Abuse
|
||||
confidence: 90
|
||||
context:
|
||||
- Source:Endpoint
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -30,6 +30,8 @@ tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- Windows Persistence Techniques
|
||||
- Windows Privilege Escalation
|
||||
- Windows Registry Abuse
|
||||
- Hermetic Wiper
|
||||
confidence: 100
|
||||
context:
|
||||
- Source:Endpoint
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ references:
|
||||
- https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- Data Destruction
|
||||
- IcedID
|
||||
- Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228
|
||||
- WhisperGate
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ references:
|
||||
- https://github.com/BC-SECURITY/Empire
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- Hermetic Wiper
|
||||
- Malicious PowerShell
|
||||
confidence: 90
|
||||
context:
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ references:
|
||||
- https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- Hermetic Wiper
|
||||
- Malicious PowerShell
|
||||
confidence: 100
|
||||
context:
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ references:
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- Ransomware
|
||||
- Windows Registry Abuse
|
||||
context:
|
||||
- Source:Endpoint
|
||||
- Stage:Defense Evasion
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ references:
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- IceID
|
||||
- Windows Registry Abuse
|
||||
confidence: 70
|
||||
context:
|
||||
- Source:Endpoint
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ references:
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- IceID
|
||||
- Windows Registry Abuse
|
||||
confidence: 70
|
||||
context:
|
||||
- Source:Endpoint
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ references:
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- IceID
|
||||
- Windows Registry Abuse
|
||||
confidence: 70
|
||||
context:
|
||||
- Source:Endpoint
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ references:
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- IceID
|
||||
- Windows Registry Abuse
|
||||
confidence: 70
|
||||
context:
|
||||
- Source:Endpoint
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ references:
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- IceID
|
||||
- Windows Registry Abuse
|
||||
confidence: 70
|
||||
context:
|
||||
- Source:Endpoint
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ references:
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- IceID
|
||||
- Windows Registry Abuse
|
||||
confidence: 70
|
||||
context:
|
||||
- Source:Endpoint
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ references:
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- Ransomware
|
||||
- Windows Registry Abuse
|
||||
context:
|
||||
- Source:Endpoint
|
||||
- Stage:Defense Evasion
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ references:
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- Windows Defense Evasion Tactics
|
||||
- Windows Registry Abuse
|
||||
confidence: 100
|
||||
context:
|
||||
- Source:Endpoint
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ references:
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- Windows Defense Evasion Tactics
|
||||
- Windows Registry Abuse
|
||||
confidence: 100
|
||||
context:
|
||||
- Source:Endpoint
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ references:
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- Windows Defense Evasion Tactics
|
||||
- Windows Registry Abuse
|
||||
confidence: 100
|
||||
context:
|
||||
- Source:Endpoint
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- Windows Defense Evasion Tactics
|
||||
- Suspicious Windows Registry Activities
|
||||
- Windows Registry Abuse
|
||||
confidence: 100
|
||||
context:
|
||||
- Source:Endpoint
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ references:
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- XMRig
|
||||
- Windows Registry Abuse
|
||||
confidence: 100
|
||||
context:
|
||||
- Source:Endpoint
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ tags:
|
||||
- Windows Defense Evasion Tactics
|
||||
- Ransomware
|
||||
- Revil Ransomware
|
||||
- Windows Registry Abuse
|
||||
confidence: 100
|
||||
context:
|
||||
- Source:Endpoint
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ references:
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- Windows Defense Evasion Tactics
|
||||
- Windows Registry Abuse
|
||||
confidence: 50
|
||||
context:
|
||||
- Source:Endpoint
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ references:
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- Windows Defense Evasion Tactics
|
||||
- Windows Registry Abuse
|
||||
confidence: 50
|
||||
context:
|
||||
- Source:Endpoint
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ references:
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- Windows Defense Evasion Tactics
|
||||
- Windows Registry Abuse
|
||||
confidence: 50
|
||||
context:
|
||||
- Source:Endpoint
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ references:
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- IceID
|
||||
- Windows Registry Abuse
|
||||
confidence: 70
|
||||
context:
|
||||
- Source:Endpoint
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ references:
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- Windows Defense Evasion Tactics
|
||||
- Windows Registry Abuse
|
||||
confidence: 50
|
||||
context:
|
||||
- Source:Endpoint
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ references:
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- Windows Defense Evasion Tactics
|
||||
- Windows Registry Abuse
|
||||
confidence: 50
|
||||
context:
|
||||
- Source:Endpoint
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ tags:
|
||||
- Windows Defense Evasion Tactics
|
||||
- Suspicious Windows Registry Activities
|
||||
- Remcos
|
||||
- Windows Registry Abuse
|
||||
asset_type: Endpoint
|
||||
cis20:
|
||||
- CIS 8
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ references:
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- Windows Defense Evasion Tactics
|
||||
- Windows Registry Abuse
|
||||
confidence: 70
|
||||
context:
|
||||
- Source:Endpoint
|
||||
@@ -51,8 +52,7 @@ tags:
|
||||
message: The Windows registry was modified to disable system restore on $dest$ by
|
||||
$user$.
|
||||
mitre_attack_id:
|
||||
- T1562.001
|
||||
- T1562
|
||||
- T1490
|
||||
observable:
|
||||
- name: user
|
||||
type: User
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ references:
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- Windows Defense Evasion Tactics
|
||||
- Windows Registry Abuse
|
||||
confidence: 60
|
||||
context:
|
||||
- Source:Endpoint
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ references:
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch
|
||||
- Windows Registry Abuse
|
||||
confidence: 100
|
||||
context:
|
||||
- Source:Endpoint
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ references:
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- Credential Dumping
|
||||
- Windows Registry Abuse
|
||||
confidence: 100
|
||||
context:
|
||||
- Source:Endpoint
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -37,6 +37,8 @@ tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- Windows Persistence Techniques
|
||||
- Windows Privilege Escalation
|
||||
- Windows Registry Abuse
|
||||
- Hermetic Wiper
|
||||
confidence: 100
|
||||
context:
|
||||
- Source:Endpoint
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ tags:
|
||||
- Windows Defense Evasion Tactics
|
||||
- IcedID
|
||||
- Living Off The Land
|
||||
- Windows Registry Abuse
|
||||
automated_detection_testing: passed
|
||||
confidence: 100
|
||||
context:
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ references:
|
||||
- https://blog.whitehat.eu/2019/05/incident-trickbot-ryuk-2.html
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- Data Destruction
|
||||
- Active Directory Lateral Movement
|
||||
- Trickbot
|
||||
- Hermetic Wiper
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -35,6 +35,8 @@ references:
|
||||
- https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- Double Zero Destructor
|
||||
- Data Destruction
|
||||
- XMRig
|
||||
- Remcos
|
||||
- WhisperGate
|
||||
|
||||
Some files were not shown because too many files have changed in this diff Show More
Reference in New Issue
Block a user