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Merge pull request #2208 from splunk/test_fix

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Fixing tests
This commit is contained in:
Bhavin Patel
2022-05-20 15:08:29 -07:00
committed by GitHub
parent e1008e74e3 53977d166e
commit bfe79f6c57
543 changed files with 1203 additions and 1497 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files
bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/default/collections.conf
-1
View File
@@ -8,4 +8,3 @@
[api_call_by_user_baseline]
enforceTypes = false
replicate = false
bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/mitre_enrichment.csv
+184 -208
View File
@@ -1,30 +1,18 @@
mitre_id,technique,tactics,groups
T1647,Plist File Modification,Defense Evasion,no
T1622,Debugger Evasion,Defense Evasion|Discovery,no
T1621,Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation,Credential Access,APT29
T1505.005,Terminal Services DLL,Persistence,no
T1557.003,DHCP Spoofing,Credential Access|Collection,no
T1595.003,Wordlist Scanning,Reconnaissance,Volatile Cedar
T1098.005,Device Registration,Persistence,APT29
T1574.013,KernelCallbackTable,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,Lazarus Group
T1556.005,Reversible Encryption,Credential Access|Defense Evasion|Persistence,no
T1055.015,ListPlanting,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
T1564.010,Process Argument Spoofing,Defense Evasion,no
T1564.009,Resource Forking,Defense Evasion,no
T1559.003,XPC Services,Execution,no
T1562.010,Downgrade Attack,Defense Evasion,no
T1547.015,Login Items,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
T1620,Reflective Code Loading,Defense Evasion,Lazarus Group
T1620,Reflective Code Loading,Defense Evasion,no
T1619,Cloud Storage Object Discovery,Discovery,no
T1218.014,MMC,Defense Evasion,no
T1218.013,Mavinject,Defense Evasion,no
T1614.001,System Language Discovery,Discovery,Ke3chang|Lazarus Group
T1614.001,System Language Discovery,Discovery,no
T1615,Group Policy Discovery,Discovery,Turla
T1036.007,Double File Extension,Defense Evasion,Mustang Panda
T1562.009,Safe Mode Boot,Defense Evasion,no
T1564.008,Email Hiding Rules,Defense Evasion,FIN4
T1505.004,IIS Components,Persistence,no
T1027.006,HTML Smuggling,Defense Evasion,APT29
T1027.006,HTML Smuggling,Defense Evasion,no
T1213.003,Code Repositories,Collection,APT29
T1553.006,Code Signing Policy Modification,Defense Evasion,Turla|APT39
T1614,System Location Discovery,Discovery,no
@@ -37,19 +25,19 @@ T1053.007,Container Orchestration Job,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation
T1610,Deploy Container,Defense Evasion|Execution,TeamTNT
T1609,Container Administration Command,Execution,TeamTNT
T1608.005,Link Target,Resource Development,Silent Librarian
T1608.004,Drive-by Target,Resource Development,Dragonfly|Transparent Tribe|APT32|Threat Group-3390
T1608.004,Drive-by Target,Resource Development,Transparent Tribe|APT32|Threat Group-3390
T1608.003,Install Digital Certificate,Resource Development,no
T1608.002,Upload Tool,Resource Development,Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390
T1608.001,Upload Malware,Resource Development,Threat Group-3390|LazyScripter|Mustang Panda|Gamaredon Group|Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|TeamTNT|APT32
T1608,Stage Capabilities,Resource Development,Mustang Panda
T1016.001,Internet Connection Discovery,Discovery,Gamaredon Group|APT29|UNC2452|Turla
T1553.005,Mark-of-the-Web Bypass,Defense Evasion,APT29|TA505
T1555.005,Password Managers,Credential Access,Threat Group-3390|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao
T1484.002,Domain Trust Modification,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,APT29|UNC2452
T1608.002,Upload Tool,Resource Development,Threat Group-3390
T1608.001,Upload Malware,Resource Development,TeamTNT|APT32
T1608,Stage Capabilities,Resource Development,no
T1016.001,Internet Connection Discovery,Discovery,APT29|Turla
T1553.005,Mark-of-the-Web Bypass,Defense Evasion,TA505
T1555.005,Password Managers,Credential Access,Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao
T1484.002,Domain Trust Modification,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,APT29
T1484.001,Group Policy Modification,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Indrik Spider
T1547.014,Active Setup,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
T1606.002,SAML Tokens,Credential Access,APT29|UNC2452
T1606.001,Web Cookies,Credential Access,APT29|UNC2452
T1606.002,SAML Tokens,Credential Access,APT29
T1606.001,Web Cookies,Credential Access,APT29
T1606,Forge Web Credentials,Credential Access,no
T1555.004,Windows Credential Manager,Credential Access,Stealth Falcon|OilRig|Turla
T1059.008,Network Device CLI,Execution,no
@@ -73,8 +61,8 @@ T1588.006,Vulnerabilities,Resource Development,Sandworm Team
T1053.006,Systemd Timers,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
T1562.008,Disable Cloud Logs,Defense Evasion,no
T1547.012,Print Processors,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
T1598.003,Spearphishing Link,Reconnaissance,APT28|Dragonfly|Magic Hound|Silent Librarian|Sidewinder|Sandworm Team|APT32|Kimsuky
T1598.002,Spearphishing Attachment,Reconnaissance,Dragonfly|Sidewinder
T1598.003,Spearphishing Link,Reconnaissance,Magic Hound|Silent Librarian|Sidewinder|Sandworm Team|APT32|Kimsuky
T1598.002,Spearphishing Attachment,Reconnaissance,Sidewinder
T1598.001,Spearphishing Service,Reconnaissance,no
T1598,Phishing for Information,Reconnaissance,ZIRCONIUM|APT28
T1597.002,Purchase Technical Data,Reconnaissance,no
@@ -86,23 +74,23 @@ T1596.003,Digital Certificates,Reconnaissance,no
T1596.001,DNS/Passive DNS,Reconnaissance,no
T1596.002,WHOIS,Reconnaissance,no
T1596,Search Open Technical Databases,Reconnaissance,no
T1595.002,Vulnerability Scanning,Reconnaissance,Magic Hound|Aquatic Panda|Dragonfly|TeamTNT|APT29|Volatile Cedar|APT28|Sandworm Team
T1595.002,Vulnerability Scanning,Reconnaissance,TeamTNT|APT29|Volatile Cedar|APT28|Sandworm Team
T1595.001,Scanning IP Blocks,Reconnaissance,TeamTNT
T1595,Active Scanning,Reconnaissance,no
T1594,Search Victim-Owned Websites,Reconnaissance,Kimsuky|Silent Librarian|Sandworm Team
T1593.002,Search Engines,Reconnaissance,Kimsuky
T1593.001,Social Media,Reconnaissance,Lazarus Group|Kimsuky
T1594,Search Victim-Owned Websites,Reconnaissance,Silent Librarian|Sandworm Team
T1593.002,Search Engines,Reconnaissance,no
T1593.001,Social Media,Reconnaissance,Kimsuky
T1593,Search Open Websites/Domains,Reconnaissance,Sandworm Team
T1592.004,Client Configurations,Reconnaissance,HAFNIUM
T1592.003,Firmware,Reconnaissance,no
T1592.002,Software,Reconnaissance,Andariel|Sandworm Team
T1592.001,Hardware,Reconnaissance,no
T1592,Gather Victim Host Information,Reconnaissance,no
T1591.004,Identify Roles,Reconnaissance,Lazarus Group
T1591.004,Identify Roles,Reconnaissance,no
T1591.003,Identify Business Tempo,Reconnaissance,no
T1591.001,Determine Physical Locations,Reconnaissance,no
T1591.002,Business Relationships,Reconnaissance,Dragonfly|Sandworm Team
T1591,Gather Victim Org Information,Reconnaissance,Kimsuky|Lazarus Group
T1591.002,Business Relationships,Reconnaissance,Sandworm Team
T1591,Gather Victim Org Information,Reconnaissance,no
T1590.006,Network Security Appliances,Reconnaissance,no
T1590.005,IP Addresses,Reconnaissance,Andariel|HAFNIUM
T1590.004,Network Topology,Reconnaissance,no
@@ -110,40 +98,40 @@ T1590.003,Network Trust Dependencies,Reconnaissance,no
T1590.002,DNS,Reconnaissance,no
T1590.001,Domain Properties,Reconnaissance,Sandworm Team
T1590,Gather Victim Network Information,Reconnaissance,HAFNIUM
T1589.003,Employee Names,Reconnaissance,Kimsuky|Silent Librarian|Sandworm Team
T1589.002,Email Addresses,Reconnaissance,Lazarus Group|Kimsuky|Magic Hound|TA551|MuddyWater|HAFNIUM|APT32|Silent Librarian|Sandworm Team
T1589.001,Credentials,Reconnaissance,APT29|Leviathan|APT28|Magic Hound|Chimera
T1589.003,Employee Names,Reconnaissance,Silent Librarian|Sandworm Team
T1589.002,Email Addresses,Reconnaissance,Kimsuky|Magic Hound|TA551|MuddyWater|HAFNIUM|APT32|Silent Librarian|Sandworm Team
T1589.001,Credentials,Reconnaissance,Leviathan|APT28|Magic Hound|Chimera
T1589,Gather Victim Identity Information,Reconnaissance,Magic Hound|APT32
T1588.005,Exploits,Resource Development,Kimsuky
T1588.004,Digital Certificates,Resource Development,BlackTech|Lazarus Group|Silent Librarian
T1588.003,Code Signing Certificates,Resource Development,BlackTech|Lazarus Group|Wizard Spider
T1588.002,Tool,Resource Development,Aquatic Panda|BlackTech|Lazarus Group|CostaRicto|Night Dragon|DarkVishnya|FIN5|Gorgon Group|Patchwork|Chimera|Dragonfly|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|APT41|FIN6|TEMP.Veles|Kimsuky|PittyTiger|Cobalt Group|APT29|Thrip|Ke3chang|DarkHydrus|APT32|APT38|BRONZE BUTLER|Carbanak|Cleaver|Inception|Leafminer|Threat Group-3390|Ferocious Kitten|IndigoZebra|BackdoorDiplomacy|menuPass|APT-C-36|Magic Hound|APT28|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Silence|WIRTE|Turla|APT33|APT19|FIN10|CopyKittens|APT39|APT1|MuddyWater|Silent Librarian|GALLIUM|Sandworm Team
T1588.001,Malware,Resource Development,Aquatic Panda|LazyScripter|Andariel|BackdoorDiplomacy|Turla|APT1
T1588.005,Exploits,Resource Development,no
T1588.004,Digital Certificates,Resource Development,Lazarus Group|Silent Librarian
T1588.003,Code Signing Certificates,Resource Development,Wizard Spider
T1588.002,Tool,Resource Development,CostaRicto|Night Dragon|DarkVishnya|FIN5|Gorgon Group|Patchwork|Chimera|Dragonfly|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|APT41|FIN6|TEMP.Veles|Kimsuky|PittyTiger|Cobalt Group|APT29|Thrip|Ke3chang|DarkHydrus|APT32|APT38|BRONZE BUTLER|Carbanak|Cleaver|Inception|Leafminer|Threat Group-3390|Ferocious Kitten|IndigoZebra|BackdoorDiplomacy|menuPass|APT-C-36|Magic Hound|APT28|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Silence|WIRTE|Turla|APT33|APT19|FIN10|CopyKittens|APT39|APT1|MuddyWater|Silent Librarian|GALLIUM|Sandworm Team
T1588.001,Malware,Resource Development,Andariel|BackdoorDiplomacy|Turla|APT1
T1588,Obtain Capabilities,Resource Development,no
T1587.004,Exploits,Resource Development,no
T1587.003,Digital Certificates,Resource Development,APT29|PROMETHIUM
T1587.002,Code Signing Certificates,Resource Development,PROMETHIUM|Patchwork
T1587.001,Malware,Resource Development,Ke3chang|Kimsuky|TeamTNT|APT29|Lazarus Group|UNC2452|Sandworm Team|Turla|FIN7|Night Dragon|Cleaver
T1587.001,Malware,Resource Development,TeamTNT|APT29|Lazarus Group|Sandworm Team|Turla|FIN7|Night Dragon|Cleaver
T1587,Develop Capabilities,Resource Development,Kimsuky
T1586.002,Email Accounts,Resource Development,APT29|APT28|IndigoZebra|Leviathan|Magic Hound|Kimsuky
T1586.002,Email Accounts,Resource Development,IndigoZebra|Leviathan|Magic Hound|Kimsuky
T1586.001,Social Media Accounts,Resource Development,Leviathan
T1586,Compromise Accounts,Resource Development,no
T1585.002,Email Accounts,Resource Development,Mustang Panda|Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|Leviathan|Magic Hound|Silent Librarian|Sandworm Team|APT1
T1585.001,Social Media Accounts,Resource Development,Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|Leviathan|Magic Hound|Fox Kitten|Sandworm Team|APT32|Cleaver
T1585.002,Email Accounts,Resource Development,Leviathan|Magic Hound|Silent Librarian|Sandworm Team|APT1
T1585.001,Social Media Accounts,Resource Development,Leviathan|Magic Hound|Fox Kitten|Sandworm Team|APT32|Cleaver
T1585,Establish Accounts,Resource Development,Fox Kitten|APT17
T1584.006,Web Services,Resource Development,Turla
T1584.005,Botnet,Resource Development,Sandworm Team|Axiom
T1584.004,Server,Resource Development,Lazarus Group|Dragonfly|Indrik Spider|Turla|APT16
T1584.005,Botnet,Resource Development,no
T1584.004,Server,Resource Development,Indrik Spider|Turla|APT16
T1584.003,Virtual Private Server,Resource Development,Turla
T1584.002,DNS Server,Resource Development,no
T1584.001,Domains,Resource Development,Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|Transparent Tribe|Magic Hound|APT29|UNC2452|APT1
T1583.006,Web Services,Resource Development,APT28|Confucius|LazyScripter|Kimsuky|Magic Hound|IndigoZebra|ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|HAFNIUM|Lazarus Group|Turla|APT32|APT17|APT29
T1584.001,Domains,Resource Development,Transparent Tribe|Magic Hound|APT29|APT1
T1583.006,Web Services,Resource Development,IndigoZebra|ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|HAFNIUM|Lazarus Group|Turla|APT32|APT17|APT29
T1583.005,Botnet,Resource Development,no
T1583.004,Server,Resource Development,Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|Gelsemium|GALLIUM|Sandworm Team
T1583.003,Virtual Private Server,Resource Development,Axiom|Dragonfly|HAFNIUM|TEMP.Veles
T1583.002,DNS Server,Resource Development,Axiom
T1583.004,Server,Resource Development,GALLIUM|Sandworm Team
T1583.003,Virtual Private Server,Resource Development,HAFNIUM|TEMP.Veles
T1583.002,DNS Server,Resource Development,no
T1584,Compromise Infrastructure,Resource Development,no
T1583.001,Domains,Resource Development,LazyScripter|Gamaredon Group|Winnti Group|Dragonfly|IndigoZebra|TeamTNT|Ferocious Kitten|FIN7|Transparent Tribe|Leviathan|Magic Hound|APT29|Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|UNC2452|Lazarus Group|Silent Librarian|menuPass|Sandworm Team|APT32|Kimsuky|APT1|APT28
T1583.001,Domains,Resource Development,IndigoZebra|TeamTNT|Ferocious Kitten|FIN7|Transparent Tribe|Leviathan|Magic Hound|APT29|Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|Lazarus Group|Silent Librarian|menuPass|Sandworm Team|APT32|Kimsuky|APT1|APT28
T1583,Acquire Infrastructure,Resource Development,no
T1564.007,VBA Stomping,Defense Evasion,no
T1558.004,AS-REP Roasting,Credential Access,no
@@ -157,7 +145,7 @@ T1574.012,COR_PROFILER,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,Blue Moc
T1562.007,Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall,Defense Evasion,no
T1098.004,SSH Authorized Keys,Persistence,TeamTNT
T1480.001,Environmental Keying,Defense Evasion,APT41|Equation
T1059.007,JavaScript,Execution,LazyScripter|Indrik Spider|MuddyWater|Turla|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Evilnum|Kimsuky|FIN6|APT32|FIN7|Cobalt Group|Molerats|TA505|Silence|Leafminer
T1059.007,JavaScript,Execution,Indrik Spider|MuddyWater|Turla|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Evilnum|Kimsuky|FIN6|APT32|FIN7|Cobalt Group|Molerats|TA505|Silence|Leafminer
T1578.004,Revert Cloud Instance,Defense Evasion,no
T1578.003,Delete Cloud Instance,Defense Evasion,no
T1578.001,Create Snapshot,Defense Evasion,no
@@ -167,17 +155,17 @@ T1027.005,Indicator Removal from Tools,Defense Evasion,Operation Wocao|GALLIUM|T
T1562.006,Indicator Blocking,Defense Evasion,no
T1573.002,Asymmetric Cryptography,Command And Control,Operation Wocao|Tropic Trooper|Cobalt Group|OilRig|FIN8|FIN6
T1573.001,Symmetric Cryptography,Command And Control,Mustang Panda|Darkhotel|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Frankenstein|Inception|APT28|APT33|BRONZE BUTLER|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group
T1573,Encrypted Channel,Command And Control,APT29|Tropic Trooper
T1573,Encrypted Channel,Command And Control,Tropic Trooper
T1027.004,Compile After Delivery,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|Rocke|MuddyWater
T1574.004,Dylib Hijacking,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
T1546.015,Component Object Model Hijacking,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,APT28
T1071.004,DNS,Command And Control,LazyScripter|Chimera|APT39|Tropic Trooper|OilRig|Ke3chang|Cobalt Group|APT18|APT41|FIN7
T1071.004,DNS,Command And Control,Chimera|APT39|Tropic Trooper|OilRig|Ke3chang|Cobalt Group|APT18|APT41|FIN7
T1071.003,Mail Protocols,Command And Control,Turla|Kimsuky|APT32|SilverTerrier|APT28
T1071.002,File Transfer Protocols,Command And Control,Kimsuky|APT41|SilverTerrier|Honeybee
T1071.001,Web Protocols,Command And Control,Kimsuky|Confucius|TeamTNT|FIN8|APT29|Mustang Panda|Windshift|TA551|Higaisa|HAFNIUM|Sidewinder|Chimera|UNC2452|Sandworm Team|TA505|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Inception|APT41|SilverTerrier|APT28|WIRTE|APT33|FIN4|Night Dragon|APT18|APT38|Rancor|Ke3chang|Orangeworm|APT37|APT19|Cobalt Group|Threat Group-3390|Dark Caracal|Turla|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|APT32|OilRig|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon
T1071.001,Web Protocols,Command And Control,TeamTNT|FIN8|APT29|Mustang Panda|Windshift|TA551|Higaisa|HAFNIUM|Sidewinder|Chimera|Sandworm Team|TA505|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Inception|APT41|SilverTerrier|APT28|WIRTE|APT33|FIN4|Night Dragon|APT18|APT38|Rancor|Ke3chang|Orangeworm|APT37|APT19|Cobalt Group|Threat Group-3390|Dark Caracal|Turla|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|APT32|OilRig|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon
T1572,Protocol Tunneling,Command And Control,Leviathan|CostaRicto|Chimera|Fox Kitten|OilRig|Cobalt Group|FIN6
T1048.003,Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol,Exfiltration,Wizard Spider|FIN6|APT32|APT33|Thrip|FIN8|OilRig|Lazarus Group
T1048.002,Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol,Exfiltration,APT28|APT29|UNC2452
T1048.002,Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol,Exfiltration,APT28|APT29
T1048.001,Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol,Exfiltration,no
T1001.003,Protocol Impersonation,Command And Control,Higaisa|Lazarus Group
T1001.002,Steganography,Command And Control,APT29|Axiom
@@ -187,23 +175,23 @@ T1132.001,Standard Encoding,Command And Control,HAFNIUM|TA551|Sandworm Team|Trop
T1090.004,Domain Fronting,Command And Control,APT29
T1090.003,Multi-hop Proxy,Command And Control,Leviathan|CostaRicto|APT28|Operation Wocao|Inception|FIN4|APT29
T1090.002,External Proxy,Command And Control,Tonto Team|APT39|Silence|GALLIUM|MuddyWater|APT3|FIN5|Lazarus Group|menuPass|APT28
T1090.001,Internal Proxy,Command And Control,Lazarus Group|Turla|APT29|Higaisa|UNC2452|Operation Wocao|APT39|Strider
T1090.001,Internal Proxy,Command And Control,APT29|Higaisa|Operation Wocao|APT39|Strider
T1102.003,One-Way Communication,Command And Control,Leviathan
T1102.002,Bidirectional Communication,Command And Control,Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|APT28|APT29|Sandworm Team|APT39|APT12|Turla|FIN7|APT37|Magic Hound|Carbanak
T1102.002,Bidirectional Communication,Command And Control,ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|APT28|APT29|Sandworm Team|APT39|APT12|Turla|FIN7|APT37|Magic Hound|Carbanak
T1102.001,Dead Drop Resolver,Command And Control,Rocke|APT41|BRONZE BUTLER|RTM|Patchwork
T1571,Non-Standard Port,Command And Control,WIRTE|Sandworm Team|Rocke|DarkVishnya|Silence|APT-C-36|Magic Hound|APT33|APT32|TEMP.Veles|Lazarus Group|FIN7
T1074.002,Remote Data Staging,Collection,Leviathan|APT28|APT29|Chimera|UNC2452|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|FIN6|Night Dragon|FIN8
T1074.001,Local Data Staging,Collection,Dragonfly|Indrik Spider|BackdoorDiplomacy|Mustang Panda|Sidewinder|Chimera|Kimsuky|APT39|Operation Wocao|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|Patchwork|Honeybee|Dragonfly 2.0|Leviathan|APT3|FIN5|menuPass|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28
T1078.004,Cloud Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,Ke3chang|APT29|APT28|APT33
T1571,Non-Standard Port,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|Rocke|DarkVishnya|Silence|APT-C-36|Magic Hound|APT33|APT32|TEMP.Veles|Lazarus Group|FIN7
T1074.002,Remote Data Staging,Collection,Leviathan|APT28|APT29|Chimera|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|FIN6|Night Dragon|FIN8
T1074.001,Local Data Staging,Collection,Indrik Spider|BackdoorDiplomacy|Mustang Panda|Sidewinder|Chimera|Kimsuky|APT39|Operation Wocao|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|Patchwork|Honeybee|Dragonfly 2.0|Leviathan|APT3|FIN5|menuPass|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28
T1078.004,Cloud Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,APT28|APT33
T1564.004,NTFS File Attributes,Defense Evasion,APT32
T1564.003,Hidden Window,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|Kimsuky|Nomadic Octopus|Higaisa|Gorgon Group|Deep Panda|DarkHydrus|CopyKittens|APT19|APT32|APT28|APT3|Magic Hound
T1078.003,Local Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,APT29|Kimsuky|HAFNIUM|Turla|Operation Wocao|PROMETHIUM|Tropic Trooper|FIN10|Stolen Pencil|APT32
T1564.003,Hidden Window,Defense Evasion,Nomadic Octopus|Higaisa|Gorgon Group|Deep Panda|DarkHydrus|CopyKittens|APT19|APT32|APT28|APT3|Magic Hound
T1078.003,Local Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,Kimsuky|HAFNIUM|Turla|Operation Wocao|PROMETHIUM|Tropic Trooper|FIN10|APT32
T1078.002,Domain Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,Naikon|Indrik Spider|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|APT29|TA505|APT3|Threat Group-1314
T1078.001,Default Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,no
T1564.002,Hidden Users,Defense Evasion,Kimsuky|Dragonfly|Dragonfly 2.0
T1564.002,Hidden Users,Defense Evasion,Dragonfly 2.0
T1574.006,Dynamic Linker Hijacking,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,APT41|Rocke
T1574.002,DLL Side-Loading,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,Lazarus Group|Mustang Panda|Higaisa|BlackTech|Sidewinder|Chimera|BRONZE BUTLER|Naikon|APT41|GALLIUM|Tropic Trooper|APT19|Patchwork|APT32|APT3|menuPass|Threat Group-3390
T1574.001,DLL Search Order Hijacking,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,Aquatic Panda|BackdoorDiplomacy|Tonto Team|Evilnum|APT41|Whitefly|RTM|Threat Group-3390|menuPass
T1574.002,DLL Side-Loading,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,Mustang Panda|Higaisa|BlackTech|Sidewinder|Chimera|BRONZE BUTLER|Naikon|APT41|GALLIUM|Tropic Trooper|APT19|Patchwork|APT32|APT3|menuPass|Threat Group-3390
T1574.001,DLL Search Order Hijacking,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,BackdoorDiplomacy|Tonto Team|Evilnum|APT41|Whitefly|RTM|Threat Group-3390|menuPass
T1574.008,Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
T1574.007,Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
T1574.009,Path Interception by Unquoted Path,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
@@ -214,10 +202,10 @@ T1574,Hijack Execution Flow,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
T1069.001,Local Groups,Discovery,Tonto Team|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Turla|OilRig|admin@338
T1570,Lateral Tool Transfer,Lateral Movement,Sandworm Team|Chimera|GALLIUM|Operation Wocao|APT32|Wizard Spider|Turla|FIN10
T1568.003,DNS Calculation,Command And Control,APT12
T1204.002,Malicious File,Execution,LazyScripter|WIRTE|Confucius|Dragonfly|Threat Group-3390|Nomadic Octopus|Indrik Spider|APT38|Andariel|Ferocious Kitten|IndigoZebra|Transparent Tribe|Tonto Team|Magic Hound|Ajax Security Team|Mustang Panda|TA551|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Kimsuky|FIN6|PROMETHIUM|APT30|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|RTM|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|Machete|admin@338|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN7|BRONZE BUTLER|Gorgon Group|OilRig|Dark Caracal|Cobalt Group|DarkHydrus|Rancor|Patchwork|APT32|APT19|MuddyWater|Lazarus Group|menuPass|APT37|Leviathan|TA459|APT29|APT28|FIN8|PLATINUM|Elderwood
T1204.001,Malicious Link,Execution,LazyScripter|Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|Confucius|FIN7|Transparent Tribe|APT3|Magic Hound|APT28|APT29|Mustang Panda|Sidewinder|ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|Evilnum|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|Patchwork|Windshift|APT32|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|TA505|OilRig|Machete|Leviathan|FIN8|FIN4|Elderwood|Dragonfly 2.0|Cobalt Group|APT39|Night Dragon|Turla|APT33
T1204.002,Malicious File,Execution,Nomadic Octopus|Indrik Spider|APT38|Andariel|Ferocious Kitten|IndigoZebra|Transparent Tribe|Tonto Team|Magic Hound|Ajax Security Team|Mustang Panda|TA551|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Kimsuky|FIN6|PROMETHIUM|APT30|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|RTM|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|Machete|admin@338|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN7|BRONZE BUTLER|Gorgon Group|OilRig|Dark Caracal|Cobalt Group|DarkHydrus|Rancor|Patchwork|APT32|APT19|MuddyWater|Lazarus Group|menuPass|APT37|Leviathan|TA459|APT29|APT28|FIN8|PLATINUM|Elderwood
T1204.001,Malicious Link,Execution,FIN7|Transparent Tribe|APT3|Magic Hound|APT28|APT29|Mustang Panda|Sidewinder|ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|Evilnum|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|Patchwork|Windshift|APT32|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|TA505|OilRig|Machete|Leviathan|FIN8|FIN4|Elderwood|Dragonfly 2.0|Cobalt Group|APT39|Night Dragon|Turla|APT33
T1195.003,Compromise Hardware Supply Chain,Initial Access,no
T1195.002,Compromise Software Supply Chain,Initial Access,Gelsemium|Threat Group-3390|APT29|UNC2452|Cobalt Group|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Dragonfly|Sandworm Team|APT41
T1195.002,Compromise Software Supply Chain,Initial Access,APT29|Cobalt Group|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Dragonfly|Sandworm Team|APT41
T1195.001,Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools,Initial Access,no
T1568.001,Fast Flux DNS,Command And Control,menuPass|TA505
T1052.001,Exfiltration over USB,Exfiltration,Mustang Panda|Tropic Trooper
@@ -225,65 +213,65 @@ T1569.002,Service Execution,Execution,APT38|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spide
T1569.001,Launchctl,Execution,no
T1569,System Services,Execution,no
T1568.002,Domain Generation Algorithms,Command And Control,TA551|APT41
T1568,Dynamic Resolution,Command And Control,Gamaredon Group|Gelsemium|Transparent Tribe|APT29|UNC2452
T1568,Dynamic Resolution,Command And Control,Transparent Tribe|APT29
T1011.001,Exfiltration Over Bluetooth,Exfiltration,no
T1567.002,Exfiltration to Cloud Storage,Exfiltration,Kimsuky|Threat Group-3390|Confucius|Lazarus Group|FIN7|ZIRCONIUM|HAFNIUM|Chimera|Leviathan|Turla
T1567.002,Exfiltration to Cloud Storage,Exfiltration,FIN7|ZIRCONIUM|HAFNIUM|Chimera|Leviathan|Turla
T1567.001,Exfiltration to Code Repository,Exfiltration,no
T1059.006,Python,Execution,Dragonfly|Tonto Team|APT37|ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|Turla|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|APT29|Rocke|BRONZE BUTLER|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|Machete
T1059.005,Visual Basic,Execution,Confucius|Lazarus Group|LazyScripter|OilRig|APT38|Transparent Tribe|APT29|Mustang Panda|Windshift|Higaisa|Sidewinder|APT39|Machete|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|APT33|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|Rancor|Patchwork|MuddyWater|Honeybee|FIN7|APT37|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|Turla|TA505|Silence|WIRTE|FIN4|Cobalt Group|Gorgon Group|Leviathan|TA459|Magic Hound
T1059.006,Python,Execution,Tonto Team|APT37|ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|Turla|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|APT29|Rocke|BRONZE BUTLER|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|Machete
T1059.005,Visual Basic,Execution,OilRig|APT38|Transparent Tribe|APT29|Mustang Panda|Windshift|Higaisa|Sidewinder|APT39|Machete|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|APT33|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|Rancor|Patchwork|MuddyWater|Honeybee|FIN7|APT37|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|Turla|TA505|Silence|WIRTE|FIN4|Cobalt Group|Gorgon Group|Leviathan|TA459|Magic Hound
T1059.004,Unix Shell,Execution,TeamTNT|Rocke|APT41
T1059.003,Windows Command Shell,Execution,Kimsuky|Aquatic Panda|Dragonfly|LazyScripter|Sandworm Team|Nomadic Octopus|TeamTNT|APT29|Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|TA551|Higaisa|Indrik Spider|Chimera|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|Machete|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|FIN6|TA505|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|OilRig|Lazarus Group|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|FIN7|APT41|GALLIUM|Turla|Silence|APT32|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Gorgon Group|Dark Caracal|Ke3chang|Dragonfly 2.0|Rancor|FIN8|APT28|APT37|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|Sowbug|menuPass|FIN10|Threat Group-3390|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Suckfly|Threat Group-1314|APT3|admin@338|APT1
T1059.003,Windows Command Shell,Execution,Sandworm Team|Nomadic Octopus|TeamTNT|APT29|Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|TA551|Higaisa|Indrik Spider|Chimera|Fox Kitten|Machete|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|FIN6|TA505|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|OilRig|Lazarus Group|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|FIN7|APT41|GALLIUM|Turla|Silence|APT32|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Gorgon Group|Dark Caracal|Ke3chang|Dragonfly 2.0|Rancor|FIN8|APT28|APT37|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|Sowbug|menuPass|FIN10|Threat Group-3390|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Suckfly|Threat Group-1314|APT3|admin@338|APT1
T1059.002,AppleScript,Execution,no
T1059.001,PowerShell,Execution,Gamaredon Group|Lazarus Group|Aquatic Panda|Confucius|Dragonfly|LazyScripter|Nomadic Octopus|TeamTNT|APT38|Tonto Team|Mustang Panda|Indrik Spider|HAFNIUM|Sidewinder|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|APT39|DarkVishnya|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Inception|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|GALLIUM|TA505|WIRTE|TEMP.Veles|APT33|Gallmaker|Turla|Thrip|Cobalt Group|APT28|DarkHydrus|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|Gorgon Group|TA459|Leviathan|MuddyWater|FIN8|CopyKittens|OilRig|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN7|APT32|menuPass|FIN10|Threat Group-3390|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Poseidon Group|APT3|APT29|Deep Panda
T1059.001,PowerShell,Execution,Nomadic Octopus|TeamTNT|APT38|Tonto Team|Mustang Panda|Indrik Spider|HAFNIUM|Sidewinder|Fox Kitten|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|APT39|DarkVishnya|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Inception|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|GALLIUM|TA505|WIRTE|TEMP.Veles|APT33|Gallmaker|Turla|Thrip|Cobalt Group|APT28|DarkHydrus|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|Gorgon Group|TA459|Leviathan|MuddyWater|FIN8|CopyKittens|OilRig|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN7|APT32|menuPass|FIN10|Threat Group-3390|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Poseidon Group|APT3|APT29|Deep Panda
T1567,Exfiltration Over Web Service,Exfiltration,APT28
T1497.003,Time Based Evasion,Defense Evasion|Discovery,no
T1497.002,User Activity Based Checks,Defense Evasion|Discovery,Darkhotel|FIN7
T1497.001,System Checks,Defense Evasion|Discovery,Lazarus Group|OilRig|Darkhotel|Evilnum|Frankenstein
T1497.001,System Checks,Defense Evasion|Discovery,OilRig|Darkhotel|Evilnum|Frankenstein
T1498.002,Reflection Amplification,Impact,no
T1498.001,Direct Network Flood,Impact,no
T1566.003,Spearphishing via Service,Initial Access,Lazarus Group|APT29|Ajax Security Team|Magic Hound|Windshift|FIN6|OilRig|Dark Caracal
T1566.002,Spearphishing Link,Initial Access,Lazarus Group|Confucius|LazyScripter|Transparent Tribe|FIN7|APT3|Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|Sidewinder|Evilnum|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|APT1|Windshift|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|Machete|Kimsuky|TA505|Stolen Pencil|APT39|FIN4|APT32|Night Dragon|APT28|Cobalt Group|Turla|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|Elderwood|APT33|APT29|Leviathan|FIN8|Patchwork|Magic Hound
T1566.001,Spearphishing Attachment,Initial Access,WIRTE|Confucius|Dragonfly|LazyScripter|Threat Group-3390|APT38|Andariel|Ferocious Kitten|IndigoZebra|Transparent Tribe|Nomadic Octopus|Tonto Team|Ajax Security Team|Mustang Panda|TA551|Higaisa|Sidewinder|APT1|FIN6|APT30|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Mofang|Wizard Spider|RTM|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|APT41|Machete|admin@338|Kimsuky|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|Tropic Trooper|DarkHydrus|Lazarus Group|Gorgon Group|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|APT19|APT32|Cobalt Group|Rancor|FIN7|Dragonfly 2.0|MuddyWater|APT28|TA459|APT29|APT37|Leviathan|FIN8|Patchwork|menuPass|Elderwood|PLATINUM
T1566,Phishing,Initial Access,Axiom|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Dragonfly
T1566.003,Spearphishing via Service,Initial Access,APT29|Ajax Security Team|Magic Hound|Windshift|FIN6|OilRig|Dark Caracal
T1566.002,Spearphishing Link,Initial Access,Transparent Tribe|FIN7|APT3|Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|Sidewinder|Evilnum|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|APT1|Windshift|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|Machete|Kimsuky|TA505|APT39|FIN4|APT32|Night Dragon|APT28|Cobalt Group|Turla|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|Elderwood|APT33|APT29|Leviathan|FIN8|Patchwork|Magic Hound
T1566.001,Spearphishing Attachment,Initial Access,APT38|Andariel|Ferocious Kitten|IndigoZebra|Transparent Tribe|Nomadic Octopus|Tonto Team|Ajax Security Team|Mustang Panda|TA551|Higaisa|Sidewinder|APT1|FIN6|APT30|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Mofang|Wizard Spider|RTM|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|APT41|Machete|admin@338|Kimsuky|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|Tropic Trooper|DarkHydrus|Lazarus Group|Gorgon Group|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|APT19|APT32|Cobalt Group|Rancor|FIN7|Dragonfly 2.0|MuddyWater|APT28|TA459|APT29|APT37|Leviathan|FIN8|Patchwork|menuPass|Elderwood|PLATINUM
T1566,Phishing,Initial Access,GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Dragonfly
T1565.003,Runtime Data Manipulation,Impact,APT38
T1565.002,Transmitted Data Manipulation,Impact,APT38
T1565.001,Stored Data Manipulation,Impact,APT38
T1565,Data Manipulation,Impact,no
T1564.001,Hidden Files and Directories,Defense Evasion,Transparent Tribe|Mustang Panda|Rocke|APT32|Tropic Trooper|APT28|Lazarus Group
T1564,Hide Artifacts,Defense Evasion,no
T1563.002,RDP Hijacking,Lateral Movement,Axiom
T1563.002,RDP Hijacking,Lateral Movement,no
T1563.001,SSH Hijacking,Lateral Movement,no
T1563,Remote Service Session Hijacking,Lateral Movement,no
T1518.001,Security Software Discovery,Discovery,Kimsuky|Aquatic Panda|TeamTNT|APT38|Windshift|Sidewinder|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Turla|Rocke|Frankenstein|The White Company|Cobalt Group|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|Tropic Trooper|FIN8|Patchwork|Naikon
T1518.001,Security Software Discovery,Discovery,TeamTNT|APT38|Windshift|Sidewinder|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Turla|Rocke|Frankenstein|The White Company|Cobalt Group|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|Tropic Trooper|FIN8|Patchwork|Naikon
T1069.003,Cloud Groups,Discovery,no
T1069.002,Domain Groups,Discovery,APT29|Dragonfly|Turla|Inception|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|Ke3chang
T1087.004,Cloud Account,Discovery,APT29
T1069.002,Domain Groups,Discovery,Turla|Inception|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|Ke3chang
T1087.004,Cloud Account,Discovery,no
T1087.003,Email Account,Discovery,Sandworm Team|TA505
T1087.002,Domain Account,Discovery,APT29|Lazarus Group|Dragonfly|MuddyWater|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Chimera|Turla|Sandworm Team|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN6|Poseidon Group|Ke3chang
T1087.002,Domain Account,Discovery,MuddyWater|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Chimera|Turla|Sandworm Team|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN6|Poseidon Group|Ke3chang
T1087.001,Local Account,Discovery,Chimera|Fox Kitten|Turla|Poseidon Group|OilRig|Ke3chang|APT32|APT1|Threat Group-3390|APT3|admin@338
T1553.004,Install Root Certificate,Defense Evasion,no
T1562.004,Disable or Modify System Firewall,Defense Evasion,Dragonfly|TeamTNT|APT38|APT29|UNC2452|Operation Wocao|Rocke|Lazarus Group|Kimsuky|Dragonfly 2.0|Carbanak
T1562.004,Disable or Modify System Firewall,Defense Evasion,TeamTNT|APT38|APT29|Operation Wocao|Rocke|Lazarus Group|Kimsuky|Dragonfly 2.0|Carbanak
T1562.003,Impair Command History Logging,Defense Evasion,APT38
T1562.002,Disable Windows Event Logging,Defense Evasion,Sandworm Team|APT29|UNC2452|Threat Group-3390
T1562.001,Disable or Modify Tools,Defense Evasion,Aquatic Panda|TeamTNT|Indrik Spider|APT29|MuddyWater|UNC2452|Wizard Spider|FIN6|Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Rocke|Kimsuky|Turla|Night Dragon|Gorgon Group|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda
T1562.002,Disable Windows Event Logging,Defense Evasion,Sandworm Team|APT29|Threat Group-3390
T1562.001,Disable or Modify Tools,Defense Evasion,TeamTNT|Indrik Spider|APT29|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|FIN6|Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Rocke|Kimsuky|Turla|Night Dragon|Gorgon Group|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda
T1562,Impair Defenses,Defense Evasion,no
T1003.004,LSA Secrets,Credential Access,Dragonfly|OilRig|MuddyWater|menuPass|Leafminer|Ke3chang|Dragonfly 2.0|APT33|Threat Group-3390
T1003.004,LSA Secrets,Credential Access,OilRig|MuddyWater|menuPass|Leafminer|Ke3chang|Dragonfly 2.0|APT33|Threat Group-3390
T1003.005,Cached Domain Credentials,Credential Access,OilRig|MuddyWater|Leafminer|APT33
T1561.002,Disk Structure Wipe,Impact,Sandworm Team|Lazarus Group|APT38|APT37
T1561.001,Disk Content Wipe,Impact,Lazarus Group
T1561,Disk Wipe,Impact,no
T1560.003,Archive via Custom Method,Collection,Mustang Panda|Lazarus Group|Kimsuky|CopyKittens|FIN6
T1560.002,Archive via Library,Collection,Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390
T1560.001,Archive via Utility,Collection,Kimsuky|Aquatic Panda|APT28|APT29|Mustang Panda|HAFNIUM|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Chimera|APT41|GALLIUM|Turla|Gallmaker|APT33|APT39|MuddyWater|Magic Hound|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|CopyKittens|Sowbug|APT3|menuPass|APT1|Ke3chang
T1560,Archive Collected Data,Collection,Axiom|Dragonfly|Leviathan|menuPass|APT32|Honeybee|Patchwork|APT28|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Ke3chang
T1560.001,Archive via Utility,Collection,APT28|APT29|Mustang Panda|HAFNIUM|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Chimera|APT41|GALLIUM|Turla|Gallmaker|APT33|APT39|MuddyWater|Magic Hound|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|CopyKittens|Sowbug|APT3|menuPass|APT1|Ke3chang
T1560,Archive Collected Data,Collection,Leviathan|menuPass|APT32|Honeybee|Patchwork|APT28|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Ke3chang
T1499.004,Application or System Exploitation,Impact,no
T1499.003,Application Exhaustion Flood,Impact,no
T1499.002,Service Exhaustion Flood,Impact,no
T1499.001,OS Exhaustion Flood,Impact,no
T1491.002,External Defacement,Impact,Sandworm Team
T1491.001,Internal Defacement,Impact,Gamaredon Group|Lazarus Group
T1491.001,Internal Defacement,Impact,Lazarus Group
T1114.003,Email Forwarding Rule,Collection,Silent Librarian|Kimsuky
T1114.002,Remote Email Collection,Collection,Kimsuky|Dragonfly|APT29|HAFNIUM|Chimera|UNC2452|APT1|FIN4|Ke3chang|Leafminer|Dragonfly 2.0|APT28
T1114.002,Remote Email Collection,Collection,APT29|HAFNIUM|Chimera|APT1|FIN4|Ke3chang|Leafminer|Dragonfly 2.0|APT28
T1114.001,Local Email Collection,Collection,Chimera|Magic Hound|APT1
T1134.005,SID-History Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
T1134.004,Parent PID Spoofing,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
@@ -292,7 +280,7 @@ T1134.002,Create Process with Token,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Turla|L
T1134.001,Token Impersonation/Theft,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,FIN8|APT28
T1213.002,Sharepoint,Collection,Chimera|Ke3chang|APT28
T1213.001,Confluence,Collection,no
T1555.003,Credentials from Web Browsers,Credential Access,APT29|Ajax Security Team|ZIRCONIUM|FIN6|Sandworm Team|Inception|Stealth Falcon|OilRig|Leafminer|APT33|APT3|Kimsuky|TA505|Stolen Pencil|MuddyWater|APT37|Patchwork|Molerats
T1555.003,Credentials from Web Browsers,Credential Access,Ajax Security Team|ZIRCONIUM|FIN6|Sandworm Team|Inception|Stealth Falcon|OilRig|Leafminer|APT33|APT3|Kimsuky|TA505|MuddyWater|APT37|Patchwork|Molerats
T1555.002,Securityd Memory,Credential Access,no
T1555.001,Keychain,Credential Access,no
T1559.002,Dynamic Data Exchange,Execution,Leviathan|Sidewinder|Sharpshooter|TA505|MuddyWater|Gallmaker|Patchwork|Cobalt Group|APT37|FIN7|APT28
@@ -301,7 +289,7 @@ T1559,Inter-Process Communication,Execution,no
T1558.002,Silver Ticket,Credential Access,no
T1558.001,Golden Ticket,Credential Access,Ke3chang
T1558,Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets,Credential Access,no
T1557.001,LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay,Credential Access|Collection,Lazarus Group|Wizard Spider
T1557.001,LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay,Credential Access|Collection,Wizard Spider
T1557,Adversary-in-the-Middle,Credential Access|Collection,Kimsuky
T1556.002,Password Filter DLL,Credential Access|Defense Evasion|Persistence,Strider
T1556.001,Domain Controller Authentication,Credential Access|Defense Evasion|Persistence,Chimera
@@ -309,71 +297,71 @@ T1556,Modify Authentication Process,Credential Access|Defense Evasion|Persistenc
T1056.004,Credential API Hooking,Collection|Credential Access,PLATINUM
T1056.003,Web Portal Capture,Collection|Credential Access,no
T1056.002,GUI Input Capture,Collection|Credential Access,FIN4
T1056.001,Keylogging,Collection|Credential Access,Tonto Team|Ajax Security Team|Operation Wocao|APT32|Sandworm Team|APT39|APT41|Kimsuky|menuPass|Stolen Pencil|FIN4|APT38|OilRig|Ke3chang|PLATINUM|Sowbug|Magic Hound|Group5|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT3|Darkhotel|APT28
T1555,Credentials from Password Stores,Credential Access,APT29|Evilnum|UNC2452|FIN6|APT39|OilRig|MuddyWater|Leafminer|APT33|Stealth Falcon
T1056.001,Keylogging,Collection|Credential Access,Tonto Team|Ajax Security Team|Operation Wocao|APT32|Sandworm Team|APT39|APT41|Kimsuky|menuPass|FIN4|APT38|OilRig|Ke3chang|PLATINUM|Sowbug|Magic Hound|Group5|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT3|Darkhotel|APT28
T1555,Credentials from Password Stores,Credential Access,APT29|Evilnum|FIN6|APT39|OilRig|MuddyWater|Leafminer|APT33|Stealth Falcon
T1552.005,Cloud Instance Metadata API,Credential Access,TeamTNT
T1003.008,/etc/passwd and /etc/shadow,Credential Access,no
T1003.007,Proc Filesystem,Credential Access,no
T1003.006,DCSync,Credential Access,APT29|UNC2452|Operation Wocao
T1558.003,Kerberoasting,Credential Access,FIN7|APT29|UNC2452|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider
T1003.006,DCSync,Credential Access,APT29|Operation Wocao
T1558.003,Kerberoasting,Credential Access,FIN7|APT29|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider
T1552.006,Group Policy Preferences,Credential Access,APT33
T1003.003,NTDS,Credential Access,Ke3chang|Dragonfly|APT28|Mustang Panda|HAFNIUM|Fox Kitten|menuPass|Wizard Spider|Chimera|FIN6|Dragonfly 2.0
T1003.002,Security Account Manager,Credential Access,Dragonfly|Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390|Ke3chang|GALLIUM|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|menuPass
T1003.001,LSASS Memory,Credential Access,Aquatic Panda|Indrik Spider|HAFNIUM|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Blue Mockingbird|Silence|Threat Group-3390|Leviathan|APT41|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|Stolen Pencil|APT32|Leafminer|Magic Hound|FIN8|PLATINUM|MuddyWater|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN6|APT3|APT28|APT1|Ke3chang|Cleaver
T1003.003,NTDS,Credential Access,APT28|Mustang Panda|HAFNIUM|Fox Kitten|menuPass|Wizard Spider|Chimera|FIN6|Dragonfly 2.0
T1003.002,Security Account Manager,Credential Access,Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390|Ke3chang|GALLIUM|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|menuPass
T1003.001,LSASS Memory,Credential Access,Indrik Spider|HAFNIUM|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Blue Mockingbird|Silence|Threat Group-3390|Leviathan|APT41|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|APT32|Leafminer|Magic Hound|FIN8|PLATINUM|MuddyWater|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN6|APT3|APT28|APT1|Ke3chang|Cleaver
T1110.004,Credential Stuffing,Credential Access,Chimera
T1110.003,Password Spraying,Credential Access,Sandworm Team|APT29|Silent Librarian|Chimera|APT28|APT33|Leafminer|Lazarus Group
T1110.002,Password Cracking,Credential Access,Dragonfly|FIN6|APT41|Dragonfly 2.0|APT3
T1110.002,Password Cracking,Credential Access,FIN6|APT41|Dragonfly 2.0|APT3
T1110.001,Password Guessing,Credential Access,APT28
T1021.006,Windows Remote Management,Lateral Movement,APT29|UNC2452|Chimera|Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390
T1021.005,VNC,Lateral Movement,Gamaredon Group|FIN7|Fox Kitten|GCMAN
T1021.004,SSH,Lateral Movement,BlackTech|Lazarus Group|TeamTNT|FIN7|Fox Kitten|Rocke|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|OilRig|menuPass|GCMAN
T1021.006,Windows Remote Management,Lateral Movement,APT29|Chimera|Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390
T1021.005,VNC,Lateral Movement,FIN7|Fox Kitten|GCMAN
T1021.004,SSH,Lateral Movement,TeamTNT|FIN7|Fox Kitten|Rocke|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|OilRig|menuPass|GCMAN
T1021.003,Distributed Component Object Model,Lateral Movement,no
T1021.002,SMB/Windows Admin Shares,Lateral Movement,APT29|Sandworm Team|APT28|Fox Kitten|APT41|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|APT39|APT32|Orangeworm|FIN8|APT3|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-1314|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang
T1021.001,Remote Desktop Protocol,Lateral Movement,APT29|Dragonfly|Kimsuky|FIN7|Fox Kitten|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Stolen Pencil|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|APT3|OilRig|FIN10|menuPass|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|APT1|Axiom
T1021.002,SMB/Windows Admin Shares,Lateral Movement,Sandworm Team|APT28|Fox Kitten|APT41|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|APT39|APT32|Orangeworm|FIN8|APT3|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-1314|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang
T1021.001,Remote Desktop Protocol,Lateral Movement,Kimsuky|FIN7|Fox Kitten|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|APT3|OilRig|FIN10|menuPass|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|APT1|Axiom
T1554,Compromise Client Software Binary,Persistence,no
T1036.006,Space after Filename,Defense Evasion,no
T1036.005,Match Legitimate Name or Location,Defense Evasion,Ke3chang|Kimsuky|Gamaredon Group|WIRTE|APT28|Ferocious Kitten|FIN7|BackdoorDiplomacy|Transparent Tribe|Naikon|APT29|Mustang Panda|Sidewinder|Darkhotel|Lazarus Group|Indrik Spider|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|Machete|Chimera|PROMETHIUM|Rocke|Sandworm Team|APT39|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Silence|APT41|menuPass|TEMP.Veles|MuddyWater|Sowbug|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|Patchwork|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Carbanak|APT1
T1036.004,Masquerade Task or Service,Defense Evasion,Lazarus Group|BackdoorDiplomacy|APT41|Naikon|ZIRCONIUM|APT29|Higaisa|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|Kimsuky|PROMETHIUM|Wizard Spider|APT-C-36|Carbanak|APT32|FIN6|FIN7
T1036.003,Rename System Utilities,Defense Evasion,Lazarus Group|menuPass|APT32|GALLIUM
T1036.005,Match Legitimate Name or Location,Defense Evasion,APT28|Ferocious Kitten|FIN7|BackdoorDiplomacy|Transparent Tribe|Naikon|APT29|Mustang Panda|Sidewinder|Darkhotel|Lazarus Group|Indrik Spider|Fox Kitten|Machete|Chimera|PROMETHIUM|Rocke|Sandworm Team|APT39|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Silence|APT41|menuPass|TEMP.Veles|MuddyWater|Sowbug|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|Patchwork|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Carbanak|APT1
T1036.004,Masquerade Task or Service,Defense Evasion,BackdoorDiplomacy|APT41|Naikon|ZIRCONIUM|APT29|Higaisa|Fox Kitten|Kimsuky|PROMETHIUM|Wizard Spider|APT-C-36|Carbanak|APT32|FIN6|FIN7
T1036.003,Rename System Utilities,Defense Evasion,menuPass|APT32|GALLIUM
T1036.002,Right-to-Left Override,Defense Evasion,Ferocious Kitten|BRONZE BUTLER|BlackTech|Ke3chang|Scarlet Mimic
T1036.001,Invalid Code Signature,Defense Evasion,Windshift|APT37
T1553.003,SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking,Defense Evasion,no
T1553.002,Code Signing,Defense Evasion,Lazarus Group|menuPass|APT29|GALLIUM|UNC2452|Wizard Spider|Kimsuky|PROMETHIUM|Patchwork|Silence|APT41|FIN6|TA505|FIN7|Honeybee|Leviathan|CopyKittens|Winnti Group|Suckfly|Molerats|Darkhotel
T1553.002,Code Signing,Defense Evasion,menuPass|APT29|GALLIUM|Wizard Spider|Kimsuky|PROMETHIUM|Patchwork|Silence|APT41|FIN6|TA505|FIN7|Honeybee|Leviathan|CopyKittens|Winnti Group|Suckfly|Molerats|Darkhotel
T1553.001,Gatekeeper Bypass,Defense Evasion,no
T1553,Subvert Trust Controls,Defense Evasion,Axiom
T1553,Subvert Trust Controls,Defense Evasion,no
T1027.003,Steganography,Defense Evasion,Andariel|Leviathan|TA551|BRONZE BUTLER|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|APT37
T1027.002,Software Packing,Defense Evasion,Threat Group-3390|Lazarus Group|Sandworm Team|Kimsuky|TeamTNT|ZIRCONIUM|TA505|Rocke|GALLIUM|The White Company|APT39|APT38|Dark Caracal|Elderwood|APT3|Patchwork|APT29|Night Dragon
T1027.002,Software Packing,Defense Evasion,Sandworm Team|Kimsuky|TeamTNT|ZIRCONIUM|TA505|Rocke|GALLIUM|The White Company|APT39|APT38|Dark Caracal|Elderwood|APT3|Patchwork|APT29|Night Dragon
T1027.001,Binary Padding,Defense Evasion,APT29|Mustang Panda|Higaisa|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|APT32|Leviathan|BRONZE BUTLER|Moafee
T1222.002,Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification,Defense Evasion,TeamTNT|Rocke|APT32
T1222.001,Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification,Defense Evasion,Wizard Spider
T1552.004,Private Keys,Credential Access,TeamTNT|APT29|UNC2452|Operation Wocao|Rocke
T1552.004,Private Keys,Credential Access,TeamTNT|APT29|Operation Wocao|Rocke
T1552.003,Bash History,Credential Access,no
T1552.002,Credentials in Registry,Credential Access,APT32
T1552.001,Credentials In Files,Credential Access,TeamTNT|Kimsuky|Fox Kitten|Leafminer|APT33|OilRig|TA505|Stolen Pencil|MuddyWater|APT3
T1552.001,Credentials In Files,Credential Access,TeamTNT|Kimsuky|Fox Kitten|Leafminer|APT33|OilRig|TA505|MuddyWater|APT3
T1552,Unsecured Credentials,Credential Access,no
T1216.001,PubPrn,Defense Evasion,APT32
T1070.006,Timestomp,Defense Evasion,APT38|APT29|UNC2452|Chimera|Kimsuky|Rocke|TEMP.Veles|APT32|Lazarus Group|APT28
T1070.006,Timestomp,Defense Evasion,APT38|APT29|Chimera|Kimsuky|Rocke|TEMP.Veles|APT32|Lazarus Group|APT28
T1070.005,Network Share Connection Removal,Defense Evasion,Threat Group-3390
T1070.004,File Deletion,Defense Evasion,Aquatic Panda|Dragonfly|TeamTNT|APT39|Mustang Panda|Chimera|Evilnum|UNC2452|Operation Wocao|FIN6|Sandworm Team|Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Wizard Spider|APT41|Kimsuky|Silence|The White Company|TEMP.Veles|APT32|APT38|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Honeybee|Patchwork|menuPass|FIN8|OilRig|FIN5|BRONZE BUTLER|APT3|Magic Hound|Threat Group-3390|APT28|FIN10|Group5|Lazarus Group|APT18|APT29
T1070.003,Clear Command History,Defense Evasion,Lazarus Group|TeamTNT|menuPass|APT41
T1550.004,Web Session Cookie,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,APT29|UNC2452
T1550.001,Application Access Token,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,APT29|APT28
T1070.004,File Deletion,Defense Evasion,TeamTNT|APT39|Mustang Panda|Chimera|Evilnum|Operation Wocao|FIN6|Sandworm Team|Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Wizard Spider|APT41|Kimsuky|Silence|The White Company|TEMP.Veles|APT32|APT38|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Honeybee|Patchwork|menuPass|FIN8|OilRig|FIN5|BRONZE BUTLER|APT3|Magic Hound|Threat Group-3390|APT28|FIN10|Group5|Lazarus Group|APT18|APT29
T1070.003,Clear Command History,Defense Evasion,TeamTNT|menuPass|APT41
T1550.004,Web Session Cookie,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,APT29
T1550.001,Application Access Token,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,APT28
T1550.003,Pass the Ticket,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|APT29
T1550.002,Pass the Hash,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,Chimera|Kimsuky|GALLIUM|APT32|Night Dragon|APT28|APT1
T1550,Use Alternate Authentication Material,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,APT29|UNC2452
T1550,Use Alternate Authentication Material,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,APT29
T1548.004,Elevated Execution with Prompt,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
T1548.003,Sudo and Sudo Caching,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
T1548.002,Bypass User Account Control,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,Evilnum|APT37|MuddyWater|Threat Group-3390|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork|APT29
T1548.001,Setuid and Setgid,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
T1548,Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
T1136.003,Cloud Account,Persistence,APT29
T1136.003,Cloud Account,Persistence,no
T1070.002,Clear Linux or Mac System Logs,Defense Evasion,TeamTNT|Rocke
T1070.001,Clear Windows Event Logs,Defense Evasion,Dragonfly|Indrik Spider|Chimera|Operation Wocao|APT41|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|APT32|FIN8|FIN5|APT28
T1070.001,Clear Windows Event Logs,Defense Evasion,Indrik Spider|Chimera|Operation Wocao|APT41|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|APT32|FIN8|FIN5|APT28
T1136.002,Domain Account,Persistence,Sandworm Team|HAFNIUM|GALLIUM
T1136.001,Local Account,Persistence,Kimsuky|Dragonfly|TeamTNT|Fox Kitten|APT39|APT41|Leafminer|Dragonfly 2.0|APT3
T1136.001,Local Account,Persistence,TeamTNT|Fox Kitten|APT39|APT41|Leafminer|Dragonfly 2.0|APT3
T1547.011,Plist Modification,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
T1547.010,Port Monitors,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
T1547.009,Shortcut Modification,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Dragonfly|APT39|Darkhotel|APT29|Gorgon Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Lazarus Group|Leviathan
T1547.009,Shortcut Modification,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,APT39|Darkhotel|APT29|Gorgon Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Lazarus Group|Leviathan
T1547.008,LSASS Driver,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
T1547.007,Re-opened Applications,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
T1547.006,Kernel Modules and Extensions,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
@@ -394,30 +382,30 @@ T1546.007,Netsh Helper DLL,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
T1546.006,LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
T1546.005,Trap,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
T1546.004,Unix Shell Configuration Modification,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
T1546.003,Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,FIN8|Mustang Panda|UNC2452|APT33|Blue Mockingbird|Turla|Leviathan|APT29
T1546.003,Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,FIN8|Mustang Panda|APT33|Blue Mockingbird|Turla|Leviathan|APT29
T1546.002,Screensaver,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
T1546.001,Change Default File Association,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,Kimsuky
T1547.001,Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Confucius|Dragonfly|LazyScripter|TeamTNT|Naikon|Windshift|Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Sidewinder|APT28|Wizard Spider|PROMETHIUM|Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Silence|RTM|Inception|APT41|Kimsuky|APT33|APT39|APT32|APT18|Dark Caracal|Threat Group-3390|Honeybee|Turla|Cobalt Group|Ke3chang|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|Gorgon Group|MuddyWater|APT37|Leviathan|BRONZE BUTLER|APT3|Magic Hound|FIN10|FIN7|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT29|Darkhotel
T1547.001,Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,TeamTNT|Naikon|Windshift|Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Sidewinder|APT28|Wizard Spider|PROMETHIUM|Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Silence|RTM|Inception|APT41|Kimsuky|APT33|APT39|APT32|APT18|Dark Caracal|Threat Group-3390|Honeybee|Turla|Cobalt Group|Ke3chang|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|Gorgon Group|MuddyWater|APT37|Leviathan|BRONZE BUTLER|APT3|Magic Hound|FIN10|FIN7|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT29|Darkhotel
T1218.002,Control Panel,Defense Evasion,no
T1218.010,Regsvr32,Defense Evasion,Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|TA551|Blue Mockingbird|Inception|WIRTE|Cobalt Group|APT19|Leviathan|APT32|Deep Panda
T1218.010,Regsvr32,Defense Evasion,TA551|Blue Mockingbird|Inception|WIRTE|Cobalt Group|APT19|Leviathan|APT32|Deep Panda
T1218.009,Regsvcs/Regasm,Defense Evasion,no
T1218.005,Mshta,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|Confucius|Lazarus Group|APT29|LazyScripter|Mustang Panda|TA551|Sidewinder|Inception|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|FIN7
T1218.005,Mshta,Defense Evasion,Mustang Panda|TA551|Sidewinder|Inception|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|FIN7
T1218.004,InstallUtil,Defense Evasion,Mustang Panda|menuPass
T1218.001,Compiled HTML File,Defense Evasion,APT38|APT41|Silence|Dark Caracal|OilRig|Lazarus Group
T1218.001,Compiled HTML File,Defense Evasion,APT41|Silence|Dark Caracal|OilRig|Lazarus Group
T1218.003,CMSTP,Defense Evasion,Cobalt Group|MuddyWater
T1218.011,Rundll32,Defense Evasion,Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|LazyScripter|APT38|HAFNIUM|TA551|UNC2452|APT41|Gamaredon Group|APT32|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|TA505|MuddyWater|APT29|APT19|CopyKittens|APT3|Carbanak|APT28
T1218.011,Rundll32,Defense Evasion,APT38|HAFNIUM|TA551|APT41|Gamaredon Group|APT32|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|TA505|MuddyWater|APT29|APT19|CopyKittens|APT3|Carbanak|APT28
T1547,Boot or Logon Autostart Execution,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
T1546,Event Triggered Execution,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
T1098.003,Add Office 365 Global Administrator Role,Persistence,APT29
T1098.002,Exchange Email Delegate Permissions,Persistence,APT28|APT29|UNC2452|Magic Hound
T1098.001,Additional Cloud Credentials,Persistence,APT29|UNC2452
T1098.003,Add Office 365 Global Administrator Role,Persistence,no
T1098.002,Exchange Email Delegate Permissions,Persistence,APT28|APT29|Magic Hound
T1098.001,Additional Cloud Credentials,Persistence,APT29
T1543.004,Launch Daemon,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
T1543.003,Windows Service,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,TeamTNT|APT38|PROMETHIUM|Blue Mockingbird|DarkVishnya|Wizard Spider|APT32|APT41|Kimsuky|Tropic Trooper|Cobalt Group|Ke3chang|FIN7|APT19|Threat Group-3390|Honeybee|APT3|Lazarus Group|Carbanak
T1543.002,Systemd Service,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,TeamTNT|Rocke
T1543.001,Launch Agent,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
T1037.005,Startup Items,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
T1037.004,RC Scripts,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
T1055.012,Process Hollowing,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Kimsuky|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Gorgon Group|Patchwork
T1055.012,Process Hollowing,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Gorgon Group|Patchwork
T1055.013,Process Doppelgänging,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Leafminer
T1055.011,Extra Window Memory Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
T1055.014,VDSO Hijacking,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
@@ -435,13 +423,12 @@ T1037.001,Logon Script (Windows),Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Cobalt Group|A
T1542.003,Bootkit,Persistence|Defense Evasion,APT41|Lazarus Group|APT28
T1542.002,Component Firmware,Persistence|Defense Evasion,Equation
T1542.001,System Firmware,Persistence|Defense Evasion,no
T1505.003,Web Shell,Persistence,Dragonfly|BackdoorDiplomacy|APT38|APT29|APT28|Tonto Team|Sandworm Team|HAFNIUM|Volatile Cedar|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|Tropic Trooper|GALLIUM|Threat Group-3390|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|APT32|OilRig|Deep Panda
T1505.003,Web Shell,Persistence,BackdoorDiplomacy|APT38|APT29|APT28|Tonto Team|Sandworm Team|HAFNIUM|Volatile Cedar|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|Tropic Trooper|GALLIUM|Threat Group-3390|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|APT32|OilRig|Deep Panda
T1505.002,Transport Agent,Persistence,no
T1505.001,SQL Stored Procedures,Persistence,Sandworm Team
T1053.003,Cron,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,APT38|Rocke
T1053.004,Launchd,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
T1053.001,At (Linux),Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
T1053.005,Scheduled Task,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|Confucius|Dragonfly|APT37|APT38|Naikon|CostaRicto|Mustang Panda|Higaisa|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|Molerats|Machete|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT-C-36|BRONZE BUTLER|APT41|GALLIUM|Silence|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|Rancor|OilRig|Patchwork|Dragonfly 2.0|Cobalt Group|FIN8|menuPass|FIN10|FIN7|APT32|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|APT3|APT29
T1053.005,Scheduled Task,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,APT37|APT38|Naikon|CostaRicto|Mustang Panda|Higaisa|Fox Kitten|Molerats|Machete|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT-C-36|BRONZE BUTLER|APT41|GALLIUM|Silence|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|Rancor|OilRig|Patchwork|Dragonfly 2.0|Cobalt Group|FIN8|menuPass|FIN10|FIN7|APT32|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|APT3|APT29
T1053.002,At (Windows),Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,BRONZE BUTLER|Threat Group-3390|APT18
T1542,Pre-OS Boot,Defense Evasion|Persistence,no
T1137.001,Office Template Macros,Persistence,MuddyWater
@@ -451,11 +438,11 @@ T1137.005,Outlook Rules,Persistence,no
T1137.006,Add-ins,Persistence,Naikon
T1137.002,Office Test,Persistence,APT28
T1531,Account Access Removal,Impact,no
T1539,Steal Web Session Cookie,Credential Access,APT29|Evilnum
T1539,Steal Web Session Cookie,Credential Access,Evilnum
T1529,System Shutdown/Reboot,Impact,Lazarus Group|APT38|APT37
T1518,Software Discovery,Discovery,Mustang Panda|Windshift|MuddyWater|Windigo|Sidewinder|Operation Wocao|BRONZE BUTLER|Tropic Trooper|Inception
T1547.013,XDG Autostart Entries,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
T1534,Internal Spearphishing,Lateral Movement,Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|Leviathan|Gamaredon Group
T1534,Internal Spearphishing,Lateral Movement,Leviathan|Gamaredon Group
T1528,Steal Application Access Token,Credential Access,APT28
T1535,Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions,Defense Evasion,no
T1525,Implant Internal Image,Persistence,no
@@ -474,45 +461,42 @@ T1491,Defacement,Impact,no
T1490,Inhibit System Recovery,Impact,no
T1489,Service Stop,Impact,Indrik Spider|Wizard Spider|Lazarus Group
T1486,Data Encrypted for Impact,Impact,FIN7|Indrik Spider|APT41|TA505|APT38
T1485,Data Destruction,Impact,Gamaredon Group|Sandworm Team|Lazarus Group|APT38
T1485,Data Destruction,Impact,Sandworm Team|Lazarus Group|APT38
T1484,Domain Policy Modification,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
T1482,Domain Trust Discovery,Discovery,FIN8|APT29|Chimera|UNC2452
T1482,Domain Trust Discovery,Discovery,FIN8|APT29|Chimera
T1480,Execution Guardrails,Defense Evasion,no
T1221,Template Injection,Defense Evasion,Lazarus Group|Confucius|Dragonfly|Gamaredon Group|Frankenstein|Inception|APT28|Tropic Trooper|DarkHydrus|Dragonfly 2.0
T1221,Template Injection,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|Frankenstein|Inception|APT28|Tropic Trooper|DarkHydrus|Dragonfly 2.0
T1222,File and Directory Permissions Modification,Defense Evasion,no
T1220,XSL Script Processing,Defense Evasion,Lazarus Group|Higaisa|Cobalt Group
T1220,XSL Script Processing,Defense Evasion,Higaisa|Cobalt Group
T1217,Browser Bookmark Discovery,Discovery,APT38|Chimera|Fox Kitten
T1212,Exploitation for Credential Access,Credential Access,no
T1189,Drive-by Compromise,Initial Access,Magic Hound|APT28|Axiom|Transparent Tribe|Andariel|Leviathan|Machete|Windigo|Dragonfly|PROMETHIUM|Turla|Windshift|RTM|Darkhotel|APT38|APT19|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|Dark Caracal|Dragonfly 2.0|Leafminer|Patchwork|APT37|Elderwood|PLATINUM
T1189,Drive-by Compromise,Initial Access,Transparent Tribe|Andariel|Leviathan|Machete|Windigo|Dragonfly|PROMETHIUM|Turla|Windshift|RTM|Darkhotel|APT38|APT19|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|Dark Caracal|Dragonfly 2.0|Leafminer|Patchwork|APT37|Elderwood|PLATINUM
T1211,Exploitation for Defense Evasion,Defense Evasion,APT28
T1197,BITS Jobs,Defense Evasion|Persistence,APT39|Patchwork|APT41|Leviathan
T1203,Exploitation for Client Execution,Execution,Axiom|Confucius|Dragonfly|Andariel|Transparent Tribe|APT3|Tonto Team|Mustang Panda|Darkhotel|Higaisa|HAFNIUM|Sidewinder|Sandworm Team|MuddyWater|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT41|admin@338|Threat Group-3390|APT12|The White Company|APT33|APT32|APT28|Tropic Trooper|BRONZE BUTLER|Cobalt Group|Lazarus Group|Patchwork|Elderwood|APT29|TA459|APT37|Leviathan
T1203,Exploitation for Client Execution,Execution,Andariel|Transparent Tribe|APT3|Tonto Team|Mustang Panda|Darkhotel|Higaisa|HAFNIUM|Sidewinder|Sandworm Team|MuddyWater|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT41|admin@338|Threat Group-3390|APT12|The White Company|APT33|APT32|APT28|Tropic Trooper|BRONZE BUTLER|Cobalt Group|Lazarus Group|Patchwork|Elderwood|APT29|TA459|APT37|Leviathan
T1201,Password Policy Discovery,Discovery,Chimera|Turla|OilRig
T1195,Supply Chain Compromise,Initial Access,no
T1199,Trusted Relationship,Initial Access,Threat Group-3390|APT29|Sandworm Team|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|APT28|menuPass
T1218,Signed Binary Proxy Execution,Defense Evasion,Lazarus Group
T1199,Trusted Relationship,Initial Access,APT29|Sandworm Team|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|APT28|menuPass
T1218,Signed Binary Proxy Execution,Defense Evasion,no
T1204,User Execution,Execution,no
T1213,Data from Information Repositories,Collection,APT29|APT28|Fox Kitten|FIN6|Turla
T1190,Exploit Public-Facing Application,Initial Access,Threat Group-3390|Ke3chang|Kimsuky|Magic Hound|Dragonfly|BackdoorDiplomacy|menuPass|Volatile Cedar|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|APT28|APT29|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Blue Mockingbird|Rocke|APT39|BlackTech|APT41|GALLIUM|Night Dragon|Axiom
T1210,Exploitation of Remote Services,Lateral Movement,Dragonfly|Tonto Team|FIN7|Fox Kitten|menuPass|Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390|APT28
T1213,Data from Information Repositories,Collection,APT28|Fox Kitten|FIN6|Turla
T1190,Exploit Public-Facing Application,Initial Access,BackdoorDiplomacy|menuPass|Volatile Cedar|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|APT28|APT29|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Blue Mockingbird|Rocke|APT39|BlackTech|APT41|GALLIUM|Night Dragon|Axiom
T1210,Exploitation of Remote Services,Lateral Movement,Tonto Team|FIN7|Fox Kitten|menuPass|Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390|APT28
T1200,Hardware Additions,Initial Access,DarkVishnya
T1202,Indirect Command Execution,Defense Evasion,Lazarus Group
T1202,Indirect Command Execution,Defense Evasion,no
T1219,Remote Access Software,Command And Control,TeamTNT|Mustang Panda|MuddyWater|Evilnum|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Sandworm Team|DarkVishnya|RTM|Kimsuky|Night Dragon|Cobalt Group|Thrip|Carbanak
T1207,Rogue Domain Controller,Defense Evasion,no
T1216,Signed Script Proxy Execution,Defense Evasion,no
T1205,Traffic Signaling,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Command And Control,no
T1176,Browser Extensions,Persistence,Kimsuky|Stolen Pencil
T1187,Forced Authentication,Credential Access,Dragonfly|DarkHydrus|Dragonfly 2.0
T1175,Component Object Model and Distributed COM,Lateral Movement|Execution,no
T1176,Browser Extensions,Persistence,Kimsuky
T1187,Forced Authentication,Credential Access,DarkHydrus|Dragonfly 2.0
T1185,Browser Session Hijacking,Collection,no
T1140,Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information,Defense Evasion,Lazarus Group|Ke3chang|Kimsuky|APT39|APT29|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|UNC2452|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Molerats|Frankenstein|Turla|WIRTE|Darkhotel|Tropic Trooper|Honeybee|Gorgon Group|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|APT19|Leviathan|MuddyWater|APT28|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER
T1140,Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information,Defense Evasion,APT39|APT29|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Molerats|Frankenstein|Turla|WIRTE|Darkhotel|Tropic Trooper|Honeybee|Gorgon Group|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|APT19|Leviathan|MuddyWater|APT28|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER
T1134,Access Token Manipulation,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,FIN6|Blue Mockingbird
T1149,LC_MAIN Hijacking,Defense Evasion,no
T1136,Create Account,Persistence,Sandworm Team|Indrik Spider
T1135,Network Share Discovery,Discovery,Dragonfly|Tonto Team|APT38|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|APT32|APT39|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT1|Dragonfly 2.0|Sowbug
T1135,Network Share Discovery,Discovery,Tonto Team|APT38|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|APT32|APT39|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT1|Dragonfly 2.0|Sowbug
T1137,Office Application Startup,Persistence,Gamaredon Group|APT32
T1153,Source,Execution,no
T1133,External Remote Services,Persistence|Initial Access,Dragonfly|TeamTNT|Leviathan|APT28|APT29|UNC2452|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Kimsuky|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Chimera|Sandworm Team|APT41|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|Night Dragon|Ke3chang|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|APT18
T1133,External Remote Services,Persistence|Initial Access,TeamTNT|Leviathan|APT28|APT29|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Kimsuky|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Chimera|Sandworm Team|APT41|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|Night Dragon|Ke3chang|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|APT18
T1132,Data Encoding,Command And Control,no
T1129,Shared Modules,Execution,no
T1127,Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution,Defense Evasion,no
@@ -520,72 +504,64 @@ T1125,Video Capture,Collection,Silence|FIN7
T1124,System Time Discovery,Discovery,Darkhotel|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Chimera|Operation Wocao|The White Company|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Turla
T1123,Audio Capture,Collection,APT37
T1120,Peripheral Device Discovery,Discovery,OilRig|BackdoorDiplomacy|Operation Wocao|Turla|APT37|Gamaredon Group|Equation|APT28
T1119,Automated Collection,Collection,Ke3chang|Confucius|Mustang Panda|Sidewinder|Chimera|menuPass|Operation Wocao|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT1|APT28|Patchwork|OilRig|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|FIN6
T1119,Automated Collection,Collection,Mustang Panda|Sidewinder|Chimera|menuPass|Operation Wocao|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT1|APT28|Patchwork|OilRig|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|FIN6
T1115,Clipboard Data,Collection,Operation Wocao|APT39|APT38
T1114,Email Collection,Collection,Magic Hound|Silent Librarian
T1113,Screen Capture,Collection,Dragonfly|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Gamaredon Group|APT39|Silence|MuddyWater|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|Dark Caracal|FIN7|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|Group5|APT28
T1112,Modify Registry,Defense Evasion,Dragonfly|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|Turla|APT32|APT38|Patchwork|Gorgon Group|Threat Group-3390|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|Honeybee|FIN8
T1111,Two-Factor Authentication Interception,Credential Access,Kimsuky|Chimera|Operation Wocao
T1110,Brute Force,Credential Access,Lazarus Group|Dragonfly|APT38|APT28|Fox Kitten|DarkVishnya|APT39|OilRig|FIN5|Turla
T1108,Redundant Access,Defense Evasion|Persistence,no
T1106,Native API,Execution,BlackTech|Lazarus Group|APT38|Higaisa|menuPass|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Turla|Silence|APT37|Gorgon Group
T1105,Ingress Tool Transfer,Command And Control,LazyScripter|Ke3chang|Aquatic Panda|Winnti Group|Confucius|Dragonfly|TeamTNT|Nomadic Octopus|IndigoZebra|Andariel|BackdoorDiplomacy|Tonto Team|HAFNIUM|APT29|Ajax Security Team|Mustang Panda|Windshift|Darkhotel|ZIRCONIUM|TA551|Volatile Cedar|Indrik Spider|Evilnum|Sidewinder|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|Kimsuky|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Silence|APT-C-36|APT41|GALLIUM|TA505|WIRTE|APT33|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Rancor|Gorgon Group|OilRig|Turla|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|PLATINUM|APT37|Elderwood|Leviathan|APT32|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|APT3|menuPass|FIN7|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28
T1104,Multi-Stage Channels,Command And Control,Lazarus Group|APT41|MuddyWater|APT3
T1102,Web Service,Command And Control,Mustang Panda|LazyScripter|TeamTNT|FIN8|Fox Kitten|Turla|APT32|Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Inception|FIN6
T1098,Account Manipulation,Persistence,Kimsuky|Dragonfly|Sandworm Team|APT3|Dragonfly 2.0|Lazarus Group
T1113,Screen Capture,Collection,GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Gamaredon Group|APT39|Silence|MuddyWater|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|Dark Caracal|FIN7|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|Group5|APT28
T1112,Modify Registry,Defense Evasion,Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|Turla|APT32|APT38|Patchwork|Gorgon Group|Threat Group-3390|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|Honeybee|FIN8
T1111,Two-Factor Authentication Interception,Credential Access,Chimera|Operation Wocao
T1110,Brute Force,Credential Access,APT38|APT28|Fox Kitten|DarkVishnya|APT39|OilRig|FIN5|Turla
T1106,Native API,Execution,APT38|Higaisa|menuPass|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Turla|Silence|APT37|Gorgon Group
T1105,Ingress Tool Transfer,Command And Control,TeamTNT|Nomadic Octopus|IndigoZebra|Andariel|BackdoorDiplomacy|Tonto Team|HAFNIUM|APT29|Ajax Security Team|Mustang Panda|Windshift|Darkhotel|ZIRCONIUM|TA551|Volatile Cedar|Indrik Spider|Evilnum|Sidewinder|Fox Kitten|Kimsuky|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Silence|APT-C-36|APT41|GALLIUM|TA505|WIRTE|APT33|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Rancor|Gorgon Group|OilRig|Turla|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|PLATINUM|APT37|Elderwood|Leviathan|APT32|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|APT3|menuPass|FIN7|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28
T1104,Multi-Stage Channels,Command And Control,APT41|MuddyWater|APT3
T1102,Web Service,Command And Control,TeamTNT|FIN8|Fox Kitten|Turla|APT32|Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Inception|FIN6
T1098,Account Manipulation,Persistence,Sandworm Team|APT3|Dragonfly 2.0|Lazarus Group
T1095,Non-Application Layer Protocol,Command And Control,BackdoorDiplomacy|HAFNIUM|Operation Wocao|FIN6|APT29|PLATINUM|APT3
T1092,Communication Through Removable Media,Command And Control,APT28
T1091,Replication Through Removable Media,Lateral Movement|Initial Access,FIN7|Mustang Panda|Tropic Trooper|Darkhotel|APT28
T1091,Replication Through Removable Media,Lateral Movement|Initial Access,Mustang Panda|Tropic Trooper|Darkhotel|APT28
T1090,Proxy,Command And Control,Windigo|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|APT41|Turla
T1087,Account Discovery,Discovery,APT29|UNC2452
T1083,File and Directory Discovery,Discovery,Winnti Group|Confucius|Dragonfly|APT38|APT29|Mustang Panda|Darkhotel|Windigo|Sidewinder|Chimera|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|menuPass|APT39|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Inception|APT41|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|APT18|Leafminer|Honeybee|Dark Caracal|Dragonfly 2.0|APT3|Sowbug|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|APT28|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
T1082,System Information Discovery,Discovery,Aquatic Panda|Confucius|TeamTNT|APT38|APT29|Mustang Panda|Windshift|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Windigo|Sidewinder|UNC2452|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|APT32|APT37|Honeybee|APT19|Magic Hound|Sowbug|OilRig|APT3|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
T1087,Account Discovery,Discovery,APT29
T1083,File and Directory Discovery,Discovery,APT38|APT29|Mustang Panda|Darkhotel|Windigo|Sidewinder|Chimera|Fox Kitten|menuPass|APT39|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Inception|APT41|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|APT18|Leafminer|Honeybee|Dark Caracal|Dragonfly 2.0|APT3|Sowbug|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|APT28|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
T1082,System Information Discovery,Discovery,TeamTNT|APT38|APT29|Mustang Panda|Windshift|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Windigo|Sidewinder|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|APT32|APT37|Honeybee|APT19|Magic Hound|Sowbug|OilRig|APT3|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
T1080,Taint Shared Content,Lateral Movement,Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Darkhotel
T1078,Valid Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,Ke3chang|Lazarus Group|Axiom|Dragonfly|FIN7|Leviathan|APT29|Silent Librarian|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|APT39|FIN4|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|APT33|FIN5|OilRig|APT28|menuPass|FIN10|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390|APT18|PittyTiger|Carbanak
T1078,Valid Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,FIN7|Leviathan|APT29|Silent Librarian|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|APT39|FIN4|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|APT33|FIN5|OilRig|APT28|menuPass|FIN10|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390|APT18|PittyTiger|Carbanak
T1074,Data Staged,Collection,Wizard Spider
T1072,Software Deployment Tools,Execution|Lateral Movement,Silence|APT32|Threat Group-1314
T1071,Application Layer Protocol,Command And Control,Dragonfly|TeamTNT|Rocke|Magic Hound|Dragonfly 2.0
T1070,Indicator Removal on Host,Defense Evasion,Lazarus Group|APT29|UNC2452
T1069,Permission Groups Discovery,Discovery,APT29|UNC2452|TA505|APT3
T1068,Exploitation for Privilege Escalation,Privilege Escalation,APT29|Tonto Team|ZIRCONIUM|Turla|Whitefly|APT33|Cobalt Group|PLATINUM|FIN8|APT32|Threat Group-3390|FIN6|APT28
T1064,Scripting,Defense Evasion|Execution,no
T1062,Hypervisor,Persistence,no
T1061,Graphical User Interface,Execution,no
T1059,Command and Scripting Interpreter,Execution,Dragonfly|APT37|Windigo|Fox Kitten|APT32|Whitefly|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN7|APT19|OilRig|FIN5|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Ke3chang
T1057,Process Discovery,Discovery,Gamaredon Group|Kimsuky|TeamTNT|Andariel|APT29|Mustang Panda|Windshift|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Chimera|UNC2452|Operation Wocao|Rocke|Frankenstein|Inception|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|APT38|Tropic Trooper|APT37|Honeybee|OilRig|APT3|Magic Hound|APT28|Winnti Group|Stealth Falcon|Poseidon Group|Lazarus Group|Molerats|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang
T1071,Application Layer Protocol,Command And Control,TeamTNT|Rocke|Magic Hound|Dragonfly 2.0
T1070,Indicator Removal on Host,Defense Evasion,APT29
T1069,Permission Groups Discovery,Discovery,APT29|TA505|APT3
T1068,Exploitation for Privilege Escalation,Privilege Escalation,Tonto Team|ZIRCONIUM|Turla|Whitefly|APT33|Cobalt Group|PLATINUM|FIN8|APT32|Threat Group-3390|FIN6|APT28
T1059,Command and Scripting Interpreter,Execution,APT37|Windigo|Fox Kitten|APT32|Whitefly|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN7|APT19|OilRig|FIN5|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Ke3chang
T1057,Process Discovery,Discovery,TeamTNT|Andariel|APT29|Mustang Panda|Windshift|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Rocke|Frankenstein|Inception|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|APT38|Tropic Trooper|APT37|Honeybee|OilRig|APT3|Magic Hound|APT28|Winnti Group|Stealth Falcon|Poseidon Group|Lazarus Group|Molerats|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang
T1056,Input Capture,Collection|Credential Access,APT39
T1055,Process Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Operation Wocao|APT32|Sharpshooter|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|Cobalt Group|Turla|APT37|Honeybee|PLATINUM
T1053,Scheduled Task/Job,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
T1052,Exfiltration Over Physical Medium,Exfiltration,no
T1051,Shared Webroot,Lateral Movement,no
T1049,System Network Connections Discovery,Discovery,Lazarus Group|TeamTNT|Andariel|BackdoorDiplomacy|Mustang Panda|MuddyWater|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Tropic Trooper|APT41|APT38|GALLIUM|APT32|APT1|OilRig|APT3|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
T1049,System Network Connections Discovery,Discovery,TeamTNT|Andariel|BackdoorDiplomacy|Mustang Panda|MuddyWater|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Tropic Trooper|APT41|APT38|GALLIUM|APT32|APT1|OilRig|APT3|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
T1048,Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol,Exfiltration,no
T1047,Windows Management Instrumentation,Execution,Gamaredon Group|Sandworm Team|FIN7|Indrik Spider|Naikon|Mustang Panda|Windshift|UNC2452|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT41|FIN6|GALLIUM|APT32|MuddyWater|Threat Group-3390|OilRig|FIN8|Leviathan|menuPass|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT29|Deep Panda
T1046,Network Service Scanning,Discovery,BlackTech|Lazarus Group|TeamTNT|BackdoorDiplomacy|Naikon|CostaRicto|Chimera|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Rocke|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT39|APT32|OilRig|Cobalt Group|Leafminer|menuPass|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390
T1043,Commonly Used Port,Command And Control,OilRig|APT28|TEMP.Veles|Night Dragon|APT29|APT18|FIN7|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|APT37|APT3|Magic Hound|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390
T1041,Exfiltration Over C2 Channel,Exfiltration,Confucius|Leviathan|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Chimera|APT39|Operation Wocao|Sandworm Team|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Kimsuky|GALLIUM|APT32|APT3|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Ke3chang
T1040,Network Sniffing,Credential Access|Discovery,Kimsuky|Sandworm Team|DarkVishnya|APT33|Stolen Pencil|APT28
T1047,Windows Management Instrumentation,Execution,Sandworm Team|FIN7|Indrik Spider|Naikon|Mustang Panda|Windshift|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT41|FIN6|GALLIUM|APT32|MuddyWater|Threat Group-3390|OilRig|FIN8|Leviathan|menuPass|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT29|Deep Panda
T1046,Network Service Scanning,Discovery,TeamTNT|BackdoorDiplomacy|Naikon|CostaRicto|Chimera|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Rocke|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT39|APT32|OilRig|Cobalt Group|Leafminer|menuPass|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390
T1041,Exfiltration Over C2 Channel,Exfiltration,Leviathan|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Chimera|APT39|Operation Wocao|Sandworm Team|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Kimsuky|GALLIUM|APT32|APT3|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Ke3chang
T1040,Network Sniffing,Credential Access|Discovery,Kimsuky|Sandworm Team|DarkVishnya|APT33|APT28
T1039,Data from Network Shared Drive,Collection,APT28|Chimera|Fox Kitten|Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Sowbug|menuPass
T1037,Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Rocke
T1036,Masquerading,Defense Evasion,Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|Dragonfly|LazyScripter|APT28|Nomadic Octopus|OilRig|APT29|ZIRCONIUM|TA551|UNC2452|Windshift|APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|PLATINUM|Dragonfly 2.0
T1034,Path Interception,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
T1033,System Owner/User Discovery,Discovery,Threat Group-3390|Ke3chang|Dragonfly|APT38|Windshift|ZIRCONIUM|Sidewinder|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT41|GALLIUM|Tropic Trooper|APT39|MuddyWater|APT37|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|APT32|Magic Hound|OilRig|FIN10|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3
T1036,Masquerading,Defense Evasion,APT28|Nomadic Octopus|OilRig|APT29|ZIRCONIUM|TA551|Windshift|APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|PLATINUM|Dragonfly 2.0
T1033,System Owner/User Discovery,Discovery,APT38|Windshift|ZIRCONIUM|Sidewinder|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT41|GALLIUM|Tropic Trooper|APT39|MuddyWater|APT37|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|APT32|Magic Hound|OilRig|FIN10|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3
T1030,Data Transfer Size Limits,Exfiltration,APT28|Threat Group-3390
T1029,Scheduled Transfer,Exfiltration,Higaisa
T1027,Obfuscated Files or Information,Defense Evasion,Aquatic Panda|Ke3chang|LazyScripter|TeamTNT|BackdoorDiplomacy|Transparent Tribe|APT39|Mustang Panda|Windshift|TA551|Higaisa|Sidewinder|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|FIN6|Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|APT41|GALLIUM|Turla|TA505|Silence|APT33|Night Dragon|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|APT29|APT18|Tropic Trooper|Patchwork|menuPass|APT37|Threat Group-3390|Cobalt Group|Dark Caracal|Leafminer|Honeybee|APT19|BlackOasis|Leviathan|FIN8|MuddyWater|FIN7|Elderwood|OilRig|Magic Hound|APT3|APT32|Group5|Dust Storm|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT28
T1026,Multiband Communication,Command And Control,Lazarus Group
T1027,Obfuscated Files or Information,Defense Evasion,TeamTNT|BackdoorDiplomacy|Transparent Tribe|APT39|Mustang Panda|Windshift|TA551|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Fox Kitten|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|FIN6|Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|APT41|GALLIUM|Turla|TA505|Silence|APT33|Night Dragon|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|APT29|APT18|Tropic Trooper|Patchwork|menuPass|APT37|Threat Group-3390|Cobalt Group|Dark Caracal|Leafminer|Honeybee|APT19|BlackOasis|Leviathan|FIN8|MuddyWater|FIN7|Elderwood|OilRig|Magic Hound|APT3|APT32|Group5|Dust Storm|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT28
T1025,Data from Removable Media,Collection,Turla|Gamaredon Group|APT28
T1021,Remote Services,Lateral Movement,no
T1020,Automated Exfiltration,Exfiltration,Ke3chang|Sidewinder|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Honeybee
T1018,Remote System Discovery,Discovery,Dragonfly|Indrik Spider|Naikon|APT29|UNC2452|Chimera|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Sandworm Team|Rocke|Wizard Spider|Silence|GALLIUM|APT39|APT32|Deep Panda|Ke3chang|Threat Group-3390|Dragonfly 2.0|Leafminer|FIN8|FIN5|APT3|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN6|Turla
T1016,System Network Configuration Discovery,Discovery,Kimsuky|Dragonfly|TeamTNT|ZIRCONIUM|Mustang Panda|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Sandworm Team|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT41|GALLIUM|APT32|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|Magic Hound|OilRig|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3|Naikon|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
T1020,Automated Exfiltration,Exfiltration,Sidewinder|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Honeybee
T1018,Remote System Discovery,Discovery,Indrik Spider|Naikon|APT29|Chimera|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Sandworm Team|Rocke|Wizard Spider|Silence|GALLIUM|APT39|APT32|Deep Panda|Ke3chang|Threat Group-3390|Dragonfly 2.0|Leafminer|FIN8|FIN5|APT3|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN6|Turla
T1016,System Network Configuration Discovery,Discovery,TeamTNT|ZIRCONIUM|Mustang Panda|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Sandworm Team|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT41|GALLIUM|APT32|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|Magic Hound|OilRig|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3|Naikon|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
T1014,Rootkit,Defense Evasion,TeamTNT|Rocke|APT41|APT28|Winnti Group
T1012,Query Registry,Discovery,Kimsuky|Dragonfly|ZIRCONIUM|Chimera|Fox Kitten|APT39|Operation Wocao|APT32|Dragonfly 2.0|Threat Group-3390|OilRig|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Turla
T1012,Query Registry,Discovery,ZIRCONIUM|Chimera|Fox Kitten|APT39|Operation Wocao|APT32|Dragonfly 2.0|Threat Group-3390|OilRig|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Turla
T1011,Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium,Exfiltration,no
T1010,Application Window Discovery,Discovery,Lazarus Group
T1008,Fallback Channels,Command And Control,FIN7|APT41|OilRig|Lazarus Group
T1007,System Service Discovery,Discovery,Kimsuky|Aquatic Panda|Indrik Spider|Chimera|Operation Wocao|BRONZE BUTLER|APT1|OilRig|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
T1007,System Service Discovery,Discovery,Indrik Spider|Chimera|Operation Wocao|BRONZE BUTLER|APT1|OilRig|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
T1006,Direct Volume Access,Defense Evasion,no
T1005,Data from Local System,Collection,Axiom|Dragonfly|FIN7|APT41|APT38|Andariel|APT29|Windigo|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|FIN6|Gamaredon Group|APT39|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|GALLIUM|Turla|menuPass|Dark Caracal|Dragonfly 2.0|Honeybee|APT37|APT28|APT3|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|Threat Group-3390|APT1|Ke3chang
T1005,Data from Local System,Collection,FIN7|APT41|APT38|Andariel|APT29|Windigo|Fox Kitten|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|FIN6|Gamaredon Group|APT39|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|GALLIUM|Turla|menuPass|Dark Caracal|Dragonfly 2.0|Honeybee|APT37|APT28|APT3|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|Threat Group-3390|APT1|Ke3chang
T1003,OS Credential Dumping,Credential Access,Tonto Team|APT39|Frankenstein|APT32|APT28|Leviathan|Sowbug|Suckfly|Poseidon Group|Axiom
T1001,Data Obfuscation,Command And Control,Operation Wocao|Axiom
1 mitre_id technique tactics groups
T1647 Plist File Modification Defense Evasion no
T1622 Debugger Evasion Defense Evasion|Discovery no
T1621 Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation Credential Access APT29
T1505.005 Terminal Services DLL Persistence no
T1557.003 DHCP Spoofing Credential Access|Collection no
T1595.003 Wordlist Scanning Reconnaissance Volatile Cedar
T1098.005 Device Registration Persistence APT29
T1574.013 KernelCallbackTable Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion Lazarus Group
T1556.005 Reversible Encryption Credential Access|Defense Evasion|Persistence no
T1055.015 ListPlanting Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation no
T1564.010 Process Argument Spoofing Defense Evasion no
2 T1564.009 Resource Forking Defense Evasion no
T1559.003 XPC Services Execution no
3 T1562.010 Downgrade Attack Defense Evasion no
4 T1547.015 Login Items Persistence|Privilege Escalation no
5 T1620 Reflective Code Loading Defense Evasion Lazarus Group no
6 T1619 Cloud Storage Object Discovery Discovery no
7 T1218.014 MMC Defense Evasion no
8 T1218.013 Mavinject Defense Evasion no
9 T1614.001 System Language Discovery Discovery Ke3chang|Lazarus Group no
10 T1615 Group Policy Discovery Discovery Turla
11 T1036.007 Double File Extension Defense Evasion Mustang Panda
12 T1562.009 Safe Mode Boot Defense Evasion no
13 T1564.008 Email Hiding Rules Defense Evasion FIN4
14 T1505.004 IIS Components Persistence no
15 T1027.006 HTML Smuggling Defense Evasion APT29 no
16 T1213.003 Code Repositories Collection APT29
17 T1553.006 Code Signing Policy Modification Defense Evasion Turla|APT39
18 T1614 System Location Discovery Discovery no
25 T1610 Deploy Container Defense Evasion|Execution TeamTNT
26 T1609 Container Administration Command Execution TeamTNT
27 T1608.005 Link Target Resource Development Silent Librarian
28 T1608.004 Drive-by Target Resource Development Dragonfly|Transparent Tribe|APT32|Threat Group-3390 Transparent Tribe|APT32|Threat Group-3390
29 T1608.003 Install Digital Certificate Resource Development no
30 T1608.002 Upload Tool Resource Development Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390 Threat Group-3390
31 T1608.001 Upload Malware Resource Development Threat Group-3390|LazyScripter|Mustang Panda|Gamaredon Group|Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|TeamTNT|APT32 TeamTNT|APT32
32 T1608 Stage Capabilities Resource Development Mustang Panda no
33 T1016.001 Internet Connection Discovery Discovery Gamaredon Group|APT29|UNC2452|Turla APT29|Turla
34 T1553.005 Mark-of-the-Web Bypass Defense Evasion APT29|TA505 TA505
35 T1555.005 Password Managers Credential Access Threat Group-3390|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao
36 T1484.002 Domain Trust Modification Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation APT29|UNC2452 APT29
37 T1484.001 Group Policy Modification Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation Indrik Spider
38 T1547.014 Active Setup Persistence|Privilege Escalation no
39 T1606.002 SAML Tokens Credential Access APT29|UNC2452 APT29
40 T1606.001 Web Cookies Credential Access APT29|UNC2452 APT29
41 T1606 Forge Web Credentials Credential Access no
42 T1555.004 Windows Credential Manager Credential Access Stealth Falcon|OilRig|Turla
43 T1059.008 Network Device CLI Execution no
61 T1053.006 Systemd Timers Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation no
62 T1562.008 Disable Cloud Logs Defense Evasion no
63 T1547.012 Print Processors Persistence|Privilege Escalation no
64 T1598.003 Spearphishing Link Reconnaissance APT28|Dragonfly|Magic Hound|Silent Librarian|Sidewinder|Sandworm Team|APT32|Kimsuky Magic Hound|Silent Librarian|Sidewinder|Sandworm Team|APT32|Kimsuky
65 T1598.002 Spearphishing Attachment Reconnaissance Dragonfly|Sidewinder Sidewinder
66 T1598.001 Spearphishing Service Reconnaissance no
67 T1598 Phishing for Information Reconnaissance ZIRCONIUM|APT28
68 T1597.002 Purchase Technical Data Reconnaissance no
74 T1596.001 DNS/Passive DNS Reconnaissance no
75 T1596.002 WHOIS Reconnaissance no
76 T1596 Search Open Technical Databases Reconnaissance no
77 T1595.002 Vulnerability Scanning Reconnaissance Magic Hound|Aquatic Panda|Dragonfly|TeamTNT|APT29|Volatile Cedar|APT28|Sandworm Team TeamTNT|APT29|Volatile Cedar|APT28|Sandworm Team
78 T1595.001 Scanning IP Blocks Reconnaissance TeamTNT
79 T1595 Active Scanning Reconnaissance no
80 T1594 Search Victim-Owned Websites Reconnaissance Kimsuky|Silent Librarian|Sandworm Team Silent Librarian|Sandworm Team
81 T1593.002 Search Engines Reconnaissance Kimsuky no
82 T1593.001 Social Media Reconnaissance Lazarus Group|Kimsuky Kimsuky
83 T1593 Search Open Websites/Domains Reconnaissance Sandworm Team
84 T1592.004 Client Configurations Reconnaissance HAFNIUM
85 T1592.003 Firmware Reconnaissance no
86 T1592.002 Software Reconnaissance Andariel|Sandworm Team
87 T1592.001 Hardware Reconnaissance no
88 T1592 Gather Victim Host Information Reconnaissance no
89 T1591.004 Identify Roles Reconnaissance Lazarus Group no
90 T1591.003 Identify Business Tempo Reconnaissance no
91 T1591.001 Determine Physical Locations Reconnaissance no
92 T1591.002 Business Relationships Reconnaissance Dragonfly|Sandworm Team Sandworm Team
93 T1591 Gather Victim Org Information Reconnaissance Kimsuky|Lazarus Group no
94 T1590.006 Network Security Appliances Reconnaissance no
95 T1590.005 IP Addresses Reconnaissance Andariel|HAFNIUM
96 T1590.004 Network Topology Reconnaissance no
98 T1590.002 DNS Reconnaissance no
99 T1590.001 Domain Properties Reconnaissance Sandworm Team
100 T1590 Gather Victim Network Information Reconnaissance HAFNIUM
101 T1589.003 Employee Names Reconnaissance Kimsuky|Silent Librarian|Sandworm Team Silent Librarian|Sandworm Team
102 T1589.002 Email Addresses Reconnaissance Lazarus Group|Kimsuky|Magic Hound|TA551|MuddyWater|HAFNIUM|APT32|Silent Librarian|Sandworm Team Kimsuky|Magic Hound|TA551|MuddyWater|HAFNIUM|APT32|Silent Librarian|Sandworm Team
103 T1589.001 Credentials Reconnaissance APT29|Leviathan|APT28|Magic Hound|Chimera Leviathan|APT28|Magic Hound|Chimera
104 T1589 Gather Victim Identity Information Reconnaissance Magic Hound|APT32
105 T1588.005 Exploits Resource Development Kimsuky no
106 T1588.004 Digital Certificates Resource Development BlackTech|Lazarus Group|Silent Librarian Lazarus Group|Silent Librarian
107 T1588.003 Code Signing Certificates Resource Development BlackTech|Lazarus Group|Wizard Spider Wizard Spider
108 T1588.002 Tool Resource Development Aquatic Panda|BlackTech|Lazarus Group|CostaRicto|Night Dragon|DarkVishnya|FIN5|Gorgon Group|Patchwork|Chimera|Dragonfly|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|APT41|FIN6|TEMP.Veles|Kimsuky|PittyTiger|Cobalt Group|APT29|Thrip|Ke3chang|DarkHydrus|APT32|APT38|BRONZE BUTLER|Carbanak|Cleaver|Inception|Leafminer|Threat Group-3390|Ferocious Kitten|IndigoZebra|BackdoorDiplomacy|menuPass|APT-C-36|Magic Hound|APT28|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Silence|WIRTE|Turla|APT33|APT19|FIN10|CopyKittens|APT39|APT1|MuddyWater|Silent Librarian|GALLIUM|Sandworm Team CostaRicto|Night Dragon|DarkVishnya|FIN5|Gorgon Group|Patchwork|Chimera|Dragonfly|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|APT41|FIN6|TEMP.Veles|Kimsuky|PittyTiger|Cobalt Group|APT29|Thrip|Ke3chang|DarkHydrus|APT32|APT38|BRONZE BUTLER|Carbanak|Cleaver|Inception|Leafminer|Threat Group-3390|Ferocious Kitten|IndigoZebra|BackdoorDiplomacy|menuPass|APT-C-36|Magic Hound|APT28|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Silence|WIRTE|Turla|APT33|APT19|FIN10|CopyKittens|APT39|APT1|MuddyWater|Silent Librarian|GALLIUM|Sandworm Team
109 T1588.001 Malware Resource Development Aquatic Panda|LazyScripter|Andariel|BackdoorDiplomacy|Turla|APT1 Andariel|BackdoorDiplomacy|Turla|APT1
110 T1588 Obtain Capabilities Resource Development no
111 T1587.004 Exploits Resource Development no
112 T1587.003 Digital Certificates Resource Development APT29|PROMETHIUM
113 T1587.002 Code Signing Certificates Resource Development PROMETHIUM|Patchwork
114 T1587.001 Malware Resource Development Ke3chang|Kimsuky|TeamTNT|APT29|Lazarus Group|UNC2452|Sandworm Team|Turla|FIN7|Night Dragon|Cleaver TeamTNT|APT29|Lazarus Group|Sandworm Team|Turla|FIN7|Night Dragon|Cleaver
115 T1587 Develop Capabilities Resource Development Kimsuky
116 T1586.002 Email Accounts Resource Development APT29|APT28|IndigoZebra|Leviathan|Magic Hound|Kimsuky IndigoZebra|Leviathan|Magic Hound|Kimsuky
117 T1586.001 Social Media Accounts Resource Development Leviathan
118 T1586 Compromise Accounts Resource Development no
119 T1585.002 Email Accounts Resource Development Mustang Panda|Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|Leviathan|Magic Hound|Silent Librarian|Sandworm Team|APT1 Leviathan|Magic Hound|Silent Librarian|Sandworm Team|APT1
120 T1585.001 Social Media Accounts Resource Development Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|Leviathan|Magic Hound|Fox Kitten|Sandworm Team|APT32|Cleaver Leviathan|Magic Hound|Fox Kitten|Sandworm Team|APT32|Cleaver
121 T1585 Establish Accounts Resource Development Fox Kitten|APT17
122 T1584.006 Web Services Resource Development Turla
123 T1584.005 Botnet Resource Development Sandworm Team|Axiom no
124 T1584.004 Server Resource Development Lazarus Group|Dragonfly|Indrik Spider|Turla|APT16 Indrik Spider|Turla|APT16
125 T1584.003 Virtual Private Server Resource Development Turla
126 T1584.002 DNS Server Resource Development no
127 T1584.001 Domains Resource Development Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|Transparent Tribe|Magic Hound|APT29|UNC2452|APT1 Transparent Tribe|Magic Hound|APT29|APT1
128 T1583.006 Web Services Resource Development APT28|Confucius|LazyScripter|Kimsuky|Magic Hound|IndigoZebra|ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|HAFNIUM|Lazarus Group|Turla|APT32|APT17|APT29 IndigoZebra|ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|HAFNIUM|Lazarus Group|Turla|APT32|APT17|APT29
129 T1583.005 Botnet Resource Development no
130 T1583.004 Server Resource Development Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|Gelsemium|GALLIUM|Sandworm Team GALLIUM|Sandworm Team
131 T1583.003 Virtual Private Server Resource Development Axiom|Dragonfly|HAFNIUM|TEMP.Veles HAFNIUM|TEMP.Veles
132 T1583.002 DNS Server Resource Development Axiom no
133 T1584 Compromise Infrastructure Resource Development no
134 T1583.001 Domains Resource Development LazyScripter|Gamaredon Group|Winnti Group|Dragonfly|IndigoZebra|TeamTNT|Ferocious Kitten|FIN7|Transparent Tribe|Leviathan|Magic Hound|APT29|Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|UNC2452|Lazarus Group|Silent Librarian|menuPass|Sandworm Team|APT32|Kimsuky|APT1|APT28 IndigoZebra|TeamTNT|Ferocious Kitten|FIN7|Transparent Tribe|Leviathan|Magic Hound|APT29|Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|Lazarus Group|Silent Librarian|menuPass|Sandworm Team|APT32|Kimsuky|APT1|APT28
135 T1583 Acquire Infrastructure Resource Development no
136 T1564.007 VBA Stomping Defense Evasion no
137 T1558.004 AS-REP Roasting Credential Access no
145 T1562.007 Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall Defense Evasion no
146 T1098.004 SSH Authorized Keys Persistence TeamTNT
147 T1480.001 Environmental Keying Defense Evasion APT41|Equation
148 T1059.007 JavaScript Execution LazyScripter|Indrik Spider|MuddyWater|Turla|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Evilnum|Kimsuky|FIN6|APT32|FIN7|Cobalt Group|Molerats|TA505|Silence|Leafminer Indrik Spider|MuddyWater|Turla|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Evilnum|Kimsuky|FIN6|APT32|FIN7|Cobalt Group|Molerats|TA505|Silence|Leafminer
149 T1578.004 Revert Cloud Instance Defense Evasion no
150 T1578.003 Delete Cloud Instance Defense Evasion no
151 T1578.001 Create Snapshot Defense Evasion no
155 T1562.006 Indicator Blocking Defense Evasion no
156 T1573.002 Asymmetric Cryptography Command And Control Operation Wocao|Tropic Trooper|Cobalt Group|OilRig|FIN8|FIN6
157 T1573.001 Symmetric Cryptography Command And Control Mustang Panda|Darkhotel|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Frankenstein|Inception|APT28|APT33|BRONZE BUTLER|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group
158 T1573 Encrypted Channel Command And Control APT29|Tropic Trooper Tropic Trooper
159 T1027.004 Compile After Delivery Defense Evasion Gamaredon Group|Rocke|MuddyWater
160 T1574.004 Dylib Hijacking Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion no
161 T1546.015 Component Object Model Hijacking Privilege Escalation|Persistence APT28
162 T1071.004 DNS Command And Control LazyScripter|Chimera|APT39|Tropic Trooper|OilRig|Ke3chang|Cobalt Group|APT18|APT41|FIN7 Chimera|APT39|Tropic Trooper|OilRig|Ke3chang|Cobalt Group|APT18|APT41|FIN7
163 T1071.003 Mail Protocols Command And Control Turla|Kimsuky|APT32|SilverTerrier|APT28
164 T1071.002 File Transfer Protocols Command And Control Kimsuky|APT41|SilverTerrier|Honeybee
165 T1071.001 Web Protocols Command And Control Kimsuky|Confucius|TeamTNT|FIN8|APT29|Mustang Panda|Windshift|TA551|Higaisa|HAFNIUM|Sidewinder|Chimera|UNC2452|Sandworm Team|TA505|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Inception|APT41|SilverTerrier|APT28|WIRTE|APT33|FIN4|Night Dragon|APT18|APT38|Rancor|Ke3chang|Orangeworm|APT37|APT19|Cobalt Group|Threat Group-3390|Dark Caracal|Turla|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|APT32|OilRig|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon TeamTNT|FIN8|APT29|Mustang Panda|Windshift|TA551|Higaisa|HAFNIUM|Sidewinder|Chimera|Sandworm Team|TA505|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Inception|APT41|SilverTerrier|APT28|WIRTE|APT33|FIN4|Night Dragon|APT18|APT38|Rancor|Ke3chang|Orangeworm|APT37|APT19|Cobalt Group|Threat Group-3390|Dark Caracal|Turla|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|APT32|OilRig|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon
166 T1572 Protocol Tunneling Command And Control Leviathan|CostaRicto|Chimera|Fox Kitten|OilRig|Cobalt Group|FIN6
167 T1048.003 Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol Exfiltration Wizard Spider|FIN6|APT32|APT33|Thrip|FIN8|OilRig|Lazarus Group
168 T1048.002 Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol Exfiltration APT28|APT29|UNC2452 APT28|APT29
169 T1048.001 Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol Exfiltration no
170 T1001.003 Protocol Impersonation Command And Control Higaisa|Lazarus Group
171 T1001.002 Steganography Command And Control APT29|Axiom
175 T1090.004 Domain Fronting Command And Control APT29
176 T1090.003 Multi-hop Proxy Command And Control Leviathan|CostaRicto|APT28|Operation Wocao|Inception|FIN4|APT29
177 T1090.002 External Proxy Command And Control Tonto Team|APT39|Silence|GALLIUM|MuddyWater|APT3|FIN5|Lazarus Group|menuPass|APT28
178 T1090.001 Internal Proxy Command And Control Lazarus Group|Turla|APT29|Higaisa|UNC2452|Operation Wocao|APT39|Strider APT29|Higaisa|Operation Wocao|APT39|Strider
179 T1102.003 One-Way Communication Command And Control Leviathan
180 T1102.002 Bidirectional Communication Command And Control Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|APT28|APT29|Sandworm Team|APT39|APT12|Turla|FIN7|APT37|Magic Hound|Carbanak ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|APT28|APT29|Sandworm Team|APT39|APT12|Turla|FIN7|APT37|Magic Hound|Carbanak
181 T1102.001 Dead Drop Resolver Command And Control Rocke|APT41|BRONZE BUTLER|RTM|Patchwork
182 T1571 Non-Standard Port Command And Control WIRTE|Sandworm Team|Rocke|DarkVishnya|Silence|APT-C-36|Magic Hound|APT33|APT32|TEMP.Veles|Lazarus Group|FIN7 Sandworm Team|Rocke|DarkVishnya|Silence|APT-C-36|Magic Hound|APT33|APT32|TEMP.Veles|Lazarus Group|FIN7
183 T1074.002 Remote Data Staging Collection Leviathan|APT28|APT29|Chimera|UNC2452|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|FIN6|Night Dragon|FIN8 Leviathan|APT28|APT29|Chimera|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|FIN6|Night Dragon|FIN8
184 T1074.001 Local Data Staging Collection Dragonfly|Indrik Spider|BackdoorDiplomacy|Mustang Panda|Sidewinder|Chimera|Kimsuky|APT39|Operation Wocao|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|Patchwork|Honeybee|Dragonfly 2.0|Leviathan|APT3|FIN5|menuPass|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28 Indrik Spider|BackdoorDiplomacy|Mustang Panda|Sidewinder|Chimera|Kimsuky|APT39|Operation Wocao|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|Patchwork|Honeybee|Dragonfly 2.0|Leviathan|APT3|FIN5|menuPass|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28
185 T1078.004 Cloud Accounts Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access Ke3chang|APT29|APT28|APT33 APT28|APT33
186 T1564.004 NTFS File Attributes Defense Evasion APT32
187 T1564.003 Hidden Window Defense Evasion Gamaredon Group|Kimsuky|Nomadic Octopus|Higaisa|Gorgon Group|Deep Panda|DarkHydrus|CopyKittens|APT19|APT32|APT28|APT3|Magic Hound Nomadic Octopus|Higaisa|Gorgon Group|Deep Panda|DarkHydrus|CopyKittens|APT19|APT32|APT28|APT3|Magic Hound
188 T1078.003 Local Accounts Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access APT29|Kimsuky|HAFNIUM|Turla|Operation Wocao|PROMETHIUM|Tropic Trooper|FIN10|Stolen Pencil|APT32 Kimsuky|HAFNIUM|Turla|Operation Wocao|PROMETHIUM|Tropic Trooper|FIN10|APT32
189 T1078.002 Domain Accounts Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access Naikon|Indrik Spider|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|APT29|TA505|APT3|Threat Group-1314
190 T1078.001 Default Accounts Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access no
191 T1564.002 Hidden Users Defense Evasion Kimsuky|Dragonfly|Dragonfly 2.0 Dragonfly 2.0
192 T1574.006 Dynamic Linker Hijacking Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion APT41|Rocke
193 T1574.002 DLL Side-Loading Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion Lazarus Group|Mustang Panda|Higaisa|BlackTech|Sidewinder|Chimera|BRONZE BUTLER|Naikon|APT41|GALLIUM|Tropic Trooper|APT19|Patchwork|APT32|APT3|menuPass|Threat Group-3390 Mustang Panda|Higaisa|BlackTech|Sidewinder|Chimera|BRONZE BUTLER|Naikon|APT41|GALLIUM|Tropic Trooper|APT19|Patchwork|APT32|APT3|menuPass|Threat Group-3390
194 T1574.001 DLL Search Order Hijacking Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion Aquatic Panda|BackdoorDiplomacy|Tonto Team|Evilnum|APT41|Whitefly|RTM|Threat Group-3390|menuPass BackdoorDiplomacy|Tonto Team|Evilnum|APT41|Whitefly|RTM|Threat Group-3390|menuPass
195 T1574.008 Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion no
196 T1574.007 Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion no
197 T1574.009 Path Interception by Unquoted Path Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion no
202 T1069.001 Local Groups Discovery Tonto Team|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Turla|OilRig|admin@338
203 T1570 Lateral Tool Transfer Lateral Movement Sandworm Team|Chimera|GALLIUM|Operation Wocao|APT32|Wizard Spider|Turla|FIN10
204 T1568.003 DNS Calculation Command And Control APT12
205 T1204.002 Malicious File Execution LazyScripter|WIRTE|Confucius|Dragonfly|Threat Group-3390|Nomadic Octopus|Indrik Spider|APT38|Andariel|Ferocious Kitten|IndigoZebra|Transparent Tribe|Tonto Team|Magic Hound|Ajax Security Team|Mustang Panda|TA551|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Kimsuky|FIN6|PROMETHIUM|APT30|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|RTM|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|Machete|admin@338|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN7|BRONZE BUTLER|Gorgon Group|OilRig|Dark Caracal|Cobalt Group|DarkHydrus|Rancor|Patchwork|APT32|APT19|MuddyWater|Lazarus Group|menuPass|APT37|Leviathan|TA459|APT29|APT28|FIN8|PLATINUM|Elderwood Nomadic Octopus|Indrik Spider|APT38|Andariel|Ferocious Kitten|IndigoZebra|Transparent Tribe|Tonto Team|Magic Hound|Ajax Security Team|Mustang Panda|TA551|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Kimsuky|FIN6|PROMETHIUM|APT30|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|RTM|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|Machete|admin@338|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN7|BRONZE BUTLER|Gorgon Group|OilRig|Dark Caracal|Cobalt Group|DarkHydrus|Rancor|Patchwork|APT32|APT19|MuddyWater|Lazarus Group|menuPass|APT37|Leviathan|TA459|APT29|APT28|FIN8|PLATINUM|Elderwood
206 T1204.001 Malicious Link Execution LazyScripter|Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|Confucius|FIN7|Transparent Tribe|APT3|Magic Hound|APT28|APT29|Mustang Panda|Sidewinder|ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|Evilnum|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|Patchwork|Windshift|APT32|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|TA505|OilRig|Machete|Leviathan|FIN8|FIN4|Elderwood|Dragonfly 2.0|Cobalt Group|APT39|Night Dragon|Turla|APT33 FIN7|Transparent Tribe|APT3|Magic Hound|APT28|APT29|Mustang Panda|Sidewinder|ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|Evilnum|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|Patchwork|Windshift|APT32|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|TA505|OilRig|Machete|Leviathan|FIN8|FIN4|Elderwood|Dragonfly 2.0|Cobalt Group|APT39|Night Dragon|Turla|APT33
207 T1195.003 Compromise Hardware Supply Chain Initial Access no
208 T1195.002 Compromise Software Supply Chain Initial Access Gelsemium|Threat Group-3390|APT29|UNC2452|Cobalt Group|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Dragonfly|Sandworm Team|APT41 APT29|Cobalt Group|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Dragonfly|Sandworm Team|APT41
209 T1195.001 Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools Initial Access no
210 T1568.001 Fast Flux DNS Command And Control menuPass|TA505
211 T1052.001 Exfiltration over USB Exfiltration Mustang Panda|Tropic Trooper
213 T1569.001 Launchctl Execution no
214 T1569 System Services Execution no
215 T1568.002 Domain Generation Algorithms Command And Control TA551|APT41
216 T1568 Dynamic Resolution Command And Control Gamaredon Group|Gelsemium|Transparent Tribe|APT29|UNC2452 Transparent Tribe|APT29
217 T1011.001 Exfiltration Over Bluetooth Exfiltration no
218 T1567.002 Exfiltration to Cloud Storage Exfiltration Kimsuky|Threat Group-3390|Confucius|Lazarus Group|FIN7|ZIRCONIUM|HAFNIUM|Chimera|Leviathan|Turla FIN7|ZIRCONIUM|HAFNIUM|Chimera|Leviathan|Turla
219 T1567.001 Exfiltration to Code Repository Exfiltration no
220 T1059.006 Python Execution Dragonfly|Tonto Team|APT37|ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|Turla|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|APT29|Rocke|BRONZE BUTLER|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|Machete Tonto Team|APT37|ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|Turla|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|APT29|Rocke|BRONZE BUTLER|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|Machete
221 T1059.005 Visual Basic Execution Confucius|Lazarus Group|LazyScripter|OilRig|APT38|Transparent Tribe|APT29|Mustang Panda|Windshift|Higaisa|Sidewinder|APT39|Machete|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|APT33|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|Rancor|Patchwork|MuddyWater|Honeybee|FIN7|APT37|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|Turla|TA505|Silence|WIRTE|FIN4|Cobalt Group|Gorgon Group|Leviathan|TA459|Magic Hound OilRig|APT38|Transparent Tribe|APT29|Mustang Panda|Windshift|Higaisa|Sidewinder|APT39|Machete|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|APT33|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|Rancor|Patchwork|MuddyWater|Honeybee|FIN7|APT37|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|Turla|TA505|Silence|WIRTE|FIN4|Cobalt Group|Gorgon Group|Leviathan|TA459|Magic Hound
222 T1059.004 Unix Shell Execution TeamTNT|Rocke|APT41
223 T1059.003 Windows Command Shell Execution Kimsuky|Aquatic Panda|Dragonfly|LazyScripter|Sandworm Team|Nomadic Octopus|TeamTNT|APT29|Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|TA551|Higaisa|Indrik Spider|Chimera|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|Machete|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|FIN6|TA505|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|OilRig|Lazarus Group|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|FIN7|APT41|GALLIUM|Turla|Silence|APT32|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Gorgon Group|Dark Caracal|Ke3chang|Dragonfly 2.0|Rancor|FIN8|APT28|APT37|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|Sowbug|menuPass|FIN10|Threat Group-3390|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Suckfly|Threat Group-1314|APT3|admin@338|APT1 Sandworm Team|Nomadic Octopus|TeamTNT|APT29|Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|TA551|Higaisa|Indrik Spider|Chimera|Fox Kitten|Machete|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|FIN6|TA505|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|OilRig|Lazarus Group|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|FIN7|APT41|GALLIUM|Turla|Silence|APT32|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Gorgon Group|Dark Caracal|Ke3chang|Dragonfly 2.0|Rancor|FIN8|APT28|APT37|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|Sowbug|menuPass|FIN10|Threat Group-3390|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Suckfly|Threat Group-1314|APT3|admin@338|APT1
224 T1059.002 AppleScript Execution no
225 T1059.001 PowerShell Execution Gamaredon Group|Lazarus Group|Aquatic Panda|Confucius|Dragonfly|LazyScripter|Nomadic Octopus|TeamTNT|APT38|Tonto Team|Mustang Panda|Indrik Spider|HAFNIUM|Sidewinder|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|APT39|DarkVishnya|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Inception|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|GALLIUM|TA505|WIRTE|TEMP.Veles|APT33|Gallmaker|Turla|Thrip|Cobalt Group|APT28|DarkHydrus|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|Gorgon Group|TA459|Leviathan|MuddyWater|FIN8|CopyKittens|OilRig|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN7|APT32|menuPass|FIN10|Threat Group-3390|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Poseidon Group|APT3|APT29|Deep Panda Nomadic Octopus|TeamTNT|APT38|Tonto Team|Mustang Panda|Indrik Spider|HAFNIUM|Sidewinder|Fox Kitten|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|APT39|DarkVishnya|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Inception|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|GALLIUM|TA505|WIRTE|TEMP.Veles|APT33|Gallmaker|Turla|Thrip|Cobalt Group|APT28|DarkHydrus|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|Gorgon Group|TA459|Leviathan|MuddyWater|FIN8|CopyKittens|OilRig|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN7|APT32|menuPass|FIN10|Threat Group-3390|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Poseidon Group|APT3|APT29|Deep Panda
226 T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service Exfiltration APT28
227 T1497.003 Time Based Evasion Defense Evasion|Discovery no
228 T1497.002 User Activity Based Checks Defense Evasion|Discovery Darkhotel|FIN7
229 T1497.001 System Checks Defense Evasion|Discovery Lazarus Group|OilRig|Darkhotel|Evilnum|Frankenstein OilRig|Darkhotel|Evilnum|Frankenstein
230 T1498.002 Reflection Amplification Impact no
231 T1498.001 Direct Network Flood Impact no
232 T1566.003 Spearphishing via Service Initial Access Lazarus Group|APT29|Ajax Security Team|Magic Hound|Windshift|FIN6|OilRig|Dark Caracal APT29|Ajax Security Team|Magic Hound|Windshift|FIN6|OilRig|Dark Caracal
233 T1566.002 Spearphishing Link Initial Access Lazarus Group|Confucius|LazyScripter|Transparent Tribe|FIN7|APT3|Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|Sidewinder|Evilnum|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|APT1|Windshift|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|Machete|Kimsuky|TA505|Stolen Pencil|APT39|FIN4|APT32|Night Dragon|APT28|Cobalt Group|Turla|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|Elderwood|APT33|APT29|Leviathan|FIN8|Patchwork|Magic Hound Transparent Tribe|FIN7|APT3|Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|Sidewinder|Evilnum|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|APT1|Windshift|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|Machete|Kimsuky|TA505|APT39|FIN4|APT32|Night Dragon|APT28|Cobalt Group|Turla|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|Elderwood|APT33|APT29|Leviathan|FIN8|Patchwork|Magic Hound
234 T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment Initial Access WIRTE|Confucius|Dragonfly|LazyScripter|Threat Group-3390|APT38|Andariel|Ferocious Kitten|IndigoZebra|Transparent Tribe|Nomadic Octopus|Tonto Team|Ajax Security Team|Mustang Panda|TA551|Higaisa|Sidewinder|APT1|FIN6|APT30|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Mofang|Wizard Spider|RTM|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|APT41|Machete|admin@338|Kimsuky|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|Tropic Trooper|DarkHydrus|Lazarus Group|Gorgon Group|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|APT19|APT32|Cobalt Group|Rancor|FIN7|Dragonfly 2.0|MuddyWater|APT28|TA459|APT29|APT37|Leviathan|FIN8|Patchwork|menuPass|Elderwood|PLATINUM APT38|Andariel|Ferocious Kitten|IndigoZebra|Transparent Tribe|Nomadic Octopus|Tonto Team|Ajax Security Team|Mustang Panda|TA551|Higaisa|Sidewinder|APT1|FIN6|APT30|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Mofang|Wizard Spider|RTM|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|APT41|Machete|admin@338|Kimsuky|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|Tropic Trooper|DarkHydrus|Lazarus Group|Gorgon Group|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|APT19|APT32|Cobalt Group|Rancor|FIN7|Dragonfly 2.0|MuddyWater|APT28|TA459|APT29|APT37|Leviathan|FIN8|Patchwork|menuPass|Elderwood|PLATINUM
235 T1566 Phishing Initial Access Axiom|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Dragonfly GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Dragonfly
236 T1565.003 Runtime Data Manipulation Impact APT38
237 T1565.002 Transmitted Data Manipulation Impact APT38
238 T1565.001 Stored Data Manipulation Impact APT38
239 T1565 Data Manipulation Impact no
240 T1564.001 Hidden Files and Directories Defense Evasion Transparent Tribe|Mustang Panda|Rocke|APT32|Tropic Trooper|APT28|Lazarus Group
241 T1564 Hide Artifacts Defense Evasion no
242 T1563.002 RDP Hijacking Lateral Movement Axiom no
243 T1563.001 SSH Hijacking Lateral Movement no
244 T1563 Remote Service Session Hijacking Lateral Movement no
245 T1518.001 Security Software Discovery Discovery Kimsuky|Aquatic Panda|TeamTNT|APT38|Windshift|Sidewinder|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Turla|Rocke|Frankenstein|The White Company|Cobalt Group|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|Tropic Trooper|FIN8|Patchwork|Naikon TeamTNT|APT38|Windshift|Sidewinder|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Turla|Rocke|Frankenstein|The White Company|Cobalt Group|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|Tropic Trooper|FIN8|Patchwork|Naikon
246 T1069.003 Cloud Groups Discovery no
247 T1069.002 Domain Groups Discovery APT29|Dragonfly|Turla|Inception|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|Ke3chang Turla|Inception|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|Ke3chang
248 T1087.004 Cloud Account Discovery APT29 no
249 T1087.003 Email Account Discovery Sandworm Team|TA505
250 T1087.002 Domain Account Discovery APT29|Lazarus Group|Dragonfly|MuddyWater|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Chimera|Turla|Sandworm Team|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN6|Poseidon Group|Ke3chang MuddyWater|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Chimera|Turla|Sandworm Team|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN6|Poseidon Group|Ke3chang
251 T1087.001 Local Account Discovery Chimera|Fox Kitten|Turla|Poseidon Group|OilRig|Ke3chang|APT32|APT1|Threat Group-3390|APT3|admin@338
252 T1553.004 Install Root Certificate Defense Evasion no
253 T1562.004 Disable or Modify System Firewall Defense Evasion Dragonfly|TeamTNT|APT38|APT29|UNC2452|Operation Wocao|Rocke|Lazarus Group|Kimsuky|Dragonfly 2.0|Carbanak TeamTNT|APT38|APT29|Operation Wocao|Rocke|Lazarus Group|Kimsuky|Dragonfly 2.0|Carbanak
254 T1562.003 Impair Command History Logging Defense Evasion APT38
255 T1562.002 Disable Windows Event Logging Defense Evasion Sandworm Team|APT29|UNC2452|Threat Group-3390 Sandworm Team|APT29|Threat Group-3390
256 T1562.001 Disable or Modify Tools Defense Evasion Aquatic Panda|TeamTNT|Indrik Spider|APT29|MuddyWater|UNC2452|Wizard Spider|FIN6|Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Rocke|Kimsuky|Turla|Night Dragon|Gorgon Group|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda TeamTNT|Indrik Spider|APT29|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|FIN6|Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Rocke|Kimsuky|Turla|Night Dragon|Gorgon Group|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda
257 T1562 Impair Defenses Defense Evasion no
258 T1003.004 LSA Secrets Credential Access Dragonfly|OilRig|MuddyWater|menuPass|Leafminer|Ke3chang|Dragonfly 2.0|APT33|Threat Group-3390 OilRig|MuddyWater|menuPass|Leafminer|Ke3chang|Dragonfly 2.0|APT33|Threat Group-3390
259 T1003.005 Cached Domain Credentials Credential Access OilRig|MuddyWater|Leafminer|APT33
260 T1561.002 Disk Structure Wipe Impact Sandworm Team|Lazarus Group|APT38|APT37
261 T1561.001 Disk Content Wipe Impact Lazarus Group
262 T1561 Disk Wipe Impact no
263 T1560.003 Archive via Custom Method Collection Mustang Panda|Lazarus Group|Kimsuky|CopyKittens|FIN6
264 T1560.002 Archive via Library Collection Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390
265 T1560.001 Archive via Utility Collection Kimsuky|Aquatic Panda|APT28|APT29|Mustang Panda|HAFNIUM|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Chimera|APT41|GALLIUM|Turla|Gallmaker|APT33|APT39|MuddyWater|Magic Hound|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|CopyKittens|Sowbug|APT3|menuPass|APT1|Ke3chang APT28|APT29|Mustang Panda|HAFNIUM|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Chimera|APT41|GALLIUM|Turla|Gallmaker|APT33|APT39|MuddyWater|Magic Hound|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|CopyKittens|Sowbug|APT3|menuPass|APT1|Ke3chang
266 T1560 Archive Collected Data Collection Axiom|Dragonfly|Leviathan|menuPass|APT32|Honeybee|Patchwork|APT28|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Ke3chang Leviathan|menuPass|APT32|Honeybee|Patchwork|APT28|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Ke3chang
267 T1499.004 Application or System Exploitation Impact no
268 T1499.003 Application Exhaustion Flood Impact no
269 T1499.002 Service Exhaustion Flood Impact no
270 T1499.001 OS Exhaustion Flood Impact no
271 T1491.002 External Defacement Impact Sandworm Team
272 T1491.001 Internal Defacement Impact Gamaredon Group|Lazarus Group Lazarus Group
273 T1114.003 Email Forwarding Rule Collection Silent Librarian|Kimsuky
274 T1114.002 Remote Email Collection Collection Kimsuky|Dragonfly|APT29|HAFNIUM|Chimera|UNC2452|APT1|FIN4|Ke3chang|Leafminer|Dragonfly 2.0|APT28 APT29|HAFNIUM|Chimera|APT1|FIN4|Ke3chang|Leafminer|Dragonfly 2.0|APT28
275 T1114.001 Local Email Collection Collection Chimera|Magic Hound|APT1
276 T1134.005 SID-History Injection Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation no
277 T1134.004 Parent PID Spoofing Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation no
280 T1134.001 Token Impersonation/Theft Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation FIN8|APT28
281 T1213.002 Sharepoint Collection Chimera|Ke3chang|APT28
282 T1213.001 Confluence Collection no
283 T1555.003 Credentials from Web Browsers Credential Access APT29|Ajax Security Team|ZIRCONIUM|FIN6|Sandworm Team|Inception|Stealth Falcon|OilRig|Leafminer|APT33|APT3|Kimsuky|TA505|Stolen Pencil|MuddyWater|APT37|Patchwork|Molerats Ajax Security Team|ZIRCONIUM|FIN6|Sandworm Team|Inception|Stealth Falcon|OilRig|Leafminer|APT33|APT3|Kimsuky|TA505|MuddyWater|APT37|Patchwork|Molerats
284 T1555.002 Securityd Memory Credential Access no
285 T1555.001 Keychain Credential Access no
286 T1559.002 Dynamic Data Exchange Execution Leviathan|Sidewinder|Sharpshooter|TA505|MuddyWater|Gallmaker|Patchwork|Cobalt Group|APT37|FIN7|APT28
289 T1558.002 Silver Ticket Credential Access no
290 T1558.001 Golden Ticket Credential Access Ke3chang
291 T1558 Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets Credential Access no
292 T1557.001 LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay Credential Access|Collection Lazarus Group|Wizard Spider Wizard Spider
293 T1557 Adversary-in-the-Middle Credential Access|Collection Kimsuky
294 T1556.002 Password Filter DLL Credential Access|Defense Evasion|Persistence Strider
295 T1556.001 Domain Controller Authentication Credential Access|Defense Evasion|Persistence Chimera
297 T1056.004 Credential API Hooking Collection|Credential Access PLATINUM
298 T1056.003 Web Portal Capture Collection|Credential Access no
299 T1056.002 GUI Input Capture Collection|Credential Access FIN4
300 T1056.001 Keylogging Collection|Credential Access Tonto Team|Ajax Security Team|Operation Wocao|APT32|Sandworm Team|APT39|APT41|Kimsuky|menuPass|Stolen Pencil|FIN4|APT38|OilRig|Ke3chang|PLATINUM|Sowbug|Magic Hound|Group5|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT3|Darkhotel|APT28 Tonto Team|Ajax Security Team|Operation Wocao|APT32|Sandworm Team|APT39|APT41|Kimsuky|menuPass|FIN4|APT38|OilRig|Ke3chang|PLATINUM|Sowbug|Magic Hound|Group5|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT3|Darkhotel|APT28
301 T1555 Credentials from Password Stores Credential Access APT29|Evilnum|UNC2452|FIN6|APT39|OilRig|MuddyWater|Leafminer|APT33|Stealth Falcon APT29|Evilnum|FIN6|APT39|OilRig|MuddyWater|Leafminer|APT33|Stealth Falcon
302 T1552.005 Cloud Instance Metadata API Credential Access TeamTNT
303 T1003.008 /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow Credential Access no
304 T1003.007 Proc Filesystem Credential Access no
305 T1003.006 DCSync Credential Access APT29|UNC2452|Operation Wocao APT29|Operation Wocao
306 T1558.003 Kerberoasting Credential Access FIN7|APT29|UNC2452|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider FIN7|APT29|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider
307 T1552.006 Group Policy Preferences Credential Access APT33
308 T1003.003 NTDS Credential Access Ke3chang|Dragonfly|APT28|Mustang Panda|HAFNIUM|Fox Kitten|menuPass|Wizard Spider|Chimera|FIN6|Dragonfly 2.0 APT28|Mustang Panda|HAFNIUM|Fox Kitten|menuPass|Wizard Spider|Chimera|FIN6|Dragonfly 2.0
309 T1003.002 Security Account Manager Credential Access Dragonfly|Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390|Ke3chang|GALLIUM|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|menuPass Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390|Ke3chang|GALLIUM|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|menuPass
310 T1003.001 LSASS Memory Credential Access Aquatic Panda|Indrik Spider|HAFNIUM|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Blue Mockingbird|Silence|Threat Group-3390|Leviathan|APT41|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|Stolen Pencil|APT32|Leafminer|Magic Hound|FIN8|PLATINUM|MuddyWater|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN6|APT3|APT28|APT1|Ke3chang|Cleaver Indrik Spider|HAFNIUM|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Blue Mockingbird|Silence|Threat Group-3390|Leviathan|APT41|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|APT32|Leafminer|Magic Hound|FIN8|PLATINUM|MuddyWater|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN6|APT3|APT28|APT1|Ke3chang|Cleaver
311 T1110.004 Credential Stuffing Credential Access Chimera
312 T1110.003 Password Spraying Credential Access Sandworm Team|APT29|Silent Librarian|Chimera|APT28|APT33|Leafminer|Lazarus Group
313 T1110.002 Password Cracking Credential Access Dragonfly|FIN6|APT41|Dragonfly 2.0|APT3 FIN6|APT41|Dragonfly 2.0|APT3
314 T1110.001 Password Guessing Credential Access APT28
315 T1021.006 Windows Remote Management Lateral Movement APT29|UNC2452|Chimera|Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390 APT29|Chimera|Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390
316 T1021.005 VNC Lateral Movement Gamaredon Group|FIN7|Fox Kitten|GCMAN FIN7|Fox Kitten|GCMAN
317 T1021.004 SSH Lateral Movement BlackTech|Lazarus Group|TeamTNT|FIN7|Fox Kitten|Rocke|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|OilRig|menuPass|GCMAN TeamTNT|FIN7|Fox Kitten|Rocke|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|OilRig|menuPass|GCMAN
318 T1021.003 Distributed Component Object Model Lateral Movement no
319 T1021.002 SMB/Windows Admin Shares Lateral Movement APT29|Sandworm Team|APT28|Fox Kitten|APT41|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|APT39|APT32|Orangeworm|FIN8|APT3|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-1314|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang Sandworm Team|APT28|Fox Kitten|APT41|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|APT39|APT32|Orangeworm|FIN8|APT3|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-1314|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang
320 T1021.001 Remote Desktop Protocol Lateral Movement APT29|Dragonfly|Kimsuky|FIN7|Fox Kitten|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Stolen Pencil|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|APT3|OilRig|FIN10|menuPass|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|APT1|Axiom Kimsuky|FIN7|Fox Kitten|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|APT3|OilRig|FIN10|menuPass|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|APT1|Axiom
321 T1554 Compromise Client Software Binary Persistence no
322 T1036.006 Space after Filename Defense Evasion no
323 T1036.005 Match Legitimate Name or Location Defense Evasion Ke3chang|Kimsuky|Gamaredon Group|WIRTE|APT28|Ferocious Kitten|FIN7|BackdoorDiplomacy|Transparent Tribe|Naikon|APT29|Mustang Panda|Sidewinder|Darkhotel|Lazarus Group|Indrik Spider|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|Machete|Chimera|PROMETHIUM|Rocke|Sandworm Team|APT39|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Silence|APT41|menuPass|TEMP.Veles|MuddyWater|Sowbug|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|Patchwork|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Carbanak|APT1 APT28|Ferocious Kitten|FIN7|BackdoorDiplomacy|Transparent Tribe|Naikon|APT29|Mustang Panda|Sidewinder|Darkhotel|Lazarus Group|Indrik Spider|Fox Kitten|Machete|Chimera|PROMETHIUM|Rocke|Sandworm Team|APT39|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Silence|APT41|menuPass|TEMP.Veles|MuddyWater|Sowbug|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|Patchwork|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Carbanak|APT1
324 T1036.004 Masquerade Task or Service Defense Evasion Lazarus Group|BackdoorDiplomacy|APT41|Naikon|ZIRCONIUM|APT29|Higaisa|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|Kimsuky|PROMETHIUM|Wizard Spider|APT-C-36|Carbanak|APT32|FIN6|FIN7 BackdoorDiplomacy|APT41|Naikon|ZIRCONIUM|APT29|Higaisa|Fox Kitten|Kimsuky|PROMETHIUM|Wizard Spider|APT-C-36|Carbanak|APT32|FIN6|FIN7
325 T1036.003 Rename System Utilities Defense Evasion Lazarus Group|menuPass|APT32|GALLIUM menuPass|APT32|GALLIUM
326 T1036.002 Right-to-Left Override Defense Evasion Ferocious Kitten|BRONZE BUTLER|BlackTech|Ke3chang|Scarlet Mimic
327 T1036.001 Invalid Code Signature Defense Evasion Windshift|APT37
328 T1553.003 SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking Defense Evasion no
329 T1553.002 Code Signing Defense Evasion Lazarus Group|menuPass|APT29|GALLIUM|UNC2452|Wizard Spider|Kimsuky|PROMETHIUM|Patchwork|Silence|APT41|FIN6|TA505|FIN7|Honeybee|Leviathan|CopyKittens|Winnti Group|Suckfly|Molerats|Darkhotel menuPass|APT29|GALLIUM|Wizard Spider|Kimsuky|PROMETHIUM|Patchwork|Silence|APT41|FIN6|TA505|FIN7|Honeybee|Leviathan|CopyKittens|Winnti Group|Suckfly|Molerats|Darkhotel
330 T1553.001 Gatekeeper Bypass Defense Evasion no
331 T1553 Subvert Trust Controls Defense Evasion Axiom no
332 T1027.003 Steganography Defense Evasion Andariel|Leviathan|TA551|BRONZE BUTLER|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|APT37
333 T1027.002 Software Packing Defense Evasion Threat Group-3390|Lazarus Group|Sandworm Team|Kimsuky|TeamTNT|ZIRCONIUM|TA505|Rocke|GALLIUM|The White Company|APT39|APT38|Dark Caracal|Elderwood|APT3|Patchwork|APT29|Night Dragon Sandworm Team|Kimsuky|TeamTNT|ZIRCONIUM|TA505|Rocke|GALLIUM|The White Company|APT39|APT38|Dark Caracal|Elderwood|APT3|Patchwork|APT29|Night Dragon
334 T1027.001 Binary Padding Defense Evasion APT29|Mustang Panda|Higaisa|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|APT32|Leviathan|BRONZE BUTLER|Moafee
335 T1222.002 Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification Defense Evasion TeamTNT|Rocke|APT32
336 T1222.001 Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification Defense Evasion Wizard Spider
337 T1552.004 Private Keys Credential Access TeamTNT|APT29|UNC2452|Operation Wocao|Rocke TeamTNT|APT29|Operation Wocao|Rocke
338 T1552.003 Bash History Credential Access no
339 T1552.002 Credentials in Registry Credential Access APT32
340 T1552.001 Credentials In Files Credential Access TeamTNT|Kimsuky|Fox Kitten|Leafminer|APT33|OilRig|TA505|Stolen Pencil|MuddyWater|APT3 TeamTNT|Kimsuky|Fox Kitten|Leafminer|APT33|OilRig|TA505|MuddyWater|APT3
341 T1552 Unsecured Credentials Credential Access no
342 T1216.001 PubPrn Defense Evasion APT32
343 T1070.006 Timestomp Defense Evasion APT38|APT29|UNC2452|Chimera|Kimsuky|Rocke|TEMP.Veles|APT32|Lazarus Group|APT28 APT38|APT29|Chimera|Kimsuky|Rocke|TEMP.Veles|APT32|Lazarus Group|APT28
344 T1070.005 Network Share Connection Removal Defense Evasion Threat Group-3390
345 T1070.004 File Deletion Defense Evasion Aquatic Panda|Dragonfly|TeamTNT|APT39|Mustang Panda|Chimera|Evilnum|UNC2452|Operation Wocao|FIN6|Sandworm Team|Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Wizard Spider|APT41|Kimsuky|Silence|The White Company|TEMP.Veles|APT32|APT38|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Honeybee|Patchwork|menuPass|FIN8|OilRig|FIN5|BRONZE BUTLER|APT3|Magic Hound|Threat Group-3390|APT28|FIN10|Group5|Lazarus Group|APT18|APT29 TeamTNT|APT39|Mustang Panda|Chimera|Evilnum|Operation Wocao|FIN6|Sandworm Team|Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Wizard Spider|APT41|Kimsuky|Silence|The White Company|TEMP.Veles|APT32|APT38|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Honeybee|Patchwork|menuPass|FIN8|OilRig|FIN5|BRONZE BUTLER|APT3|Magic Hound|Threat Group-3390|APT28|FIN10|Group5|Lazarus Group|APT18|APT29
346 T1070.003 Clear Command History Defense Evasion Lazarus Group|TeamTNT|menuPass|APT41 TeamTNT|menuPass|APT41
347 T1550.004 Web Session Cookie Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement APT29|UNC2452 APT29
348 T1550.001 Application Access Token Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement APT29|APT28 APT28
349 T1550.003 Pass the Ticket Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|APT29
350 T1550.002 Pass the Hash Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement Chimera|Kimsuky|GALLIUM|APT32|Night Dragon|APT28|APT1
351 T1550 Use Alternate Authentication Material Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement APT29|UNC2452 APT29
352 T1548.004 Elevated Execution with Prompt Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion no
353 T1548.003 Sudo and Sudo Caching Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion no
354 T1548.002 Bypass User Account Control Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion Evilnum|APT37|MuddyWater|Threat Group-3390|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork|APT29
355 T1548.001 Setuid and Setgid Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion no
356 T1548 Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion no
357 T1136.003 Cloud Account Persistence APT29 no
358 T1070.002 Clear Linux or Mac System Logs Defense Evasion TeamTNT|Rocke
359 T1070.001 Clear Windows Event Logs Defense Evasion Dragonfly|Indrik Spider|Chimera|Operation Wocao|APT41|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|APT32|FIN8|FIN5|APT28 Indrik Spider|Chimera|Operation Wocao|APT41|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|APT32|FIN8|FIN5|APT28
360 T1136.002 Domain Account Persistence Sandworm Team|HAFNIUM|GALLIUM
361 T1136.001 Local Account Persistence Kimsuky|Dragonfly|TeamTNT|Fox Kitten|APT39|APT41|Leafminer|Dragonfly 2.0|APT3 TeamTNT|Fox Kitten|APT39|APT41|Leafminer|Dragonfly 2.0|APT3
362 T1547.011 Plist Modification Persistence|Privilege Escalation no
363 T1547.010 Port Monitors Persistence|Privilege Escalation no
364 T1547.009 Shortcut Modification Persistence|Privilege Escalation Dragonfly|APT39|Darkhotel|APT29|Gorgon Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Lazarus Group|Leviathan APT39|Darkhotel|APT29|Gorgon Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Lazarus Group|Leviathan
365 T1547.008 LSASS Driver Persistence|Privilege Escalation no
366 T1547.007 Re-opened Applications Persistence|Privilege Escalation no
367 T1547.006 Kernel Modules and Extensions Persistence|Privilege Escalation no
382 T1546.006 LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition Privilege Escalation|Persistence no
383 T1546.005 Trap Privilege Escalation|Persistence no
384 T1546.004 Unix Shell Configuration Modification Privilege Escalation|Persistence no
385 T1546.003 Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription Privilege Escalation|Persistence FIN8|Mustang Panda|UNC2452|APT33|Blue Mockingbird|Turla|Leviathan|APT29 FIN8|Mustang Panda|APT33|Blue Mockingbird|Turla|Leviathan|APT29
386 T1546.002 Screensaver Privilege Escalation|Persistence no
387 T1546.001 Change Default File Association Privilege Escalation|Persistence Kimsuky
388 T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder Persistence|Privilege Escalation Confucius|Dragonfly|LazyScripter|TeamTNT|Naikon|Windshift|Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Sidewinder|APT28|Wizard Spider|PROMETHIUM|Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Silence|RTM|Inception|APT41|Kimsuky|APT33|APT39|APT32|APT18|Dark Caracal|Threat Group-3390|Honeybee|Turla|Cobalt Group|Ke3chang|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|Gorgon Group|MuddyWater|APT37|Leviathan|BRONZE BUTLER|APT3|Magic Hound|FIN10|FIN7|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT29|Darkhotel TeamTNT|Naikon|Windshift|Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Sidewinder|APT28|Wizard Spider|PROMETHIUM|Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Silence|RTM|Inception|APT41|Kimsuky|APT33|APT39|APT32|APT18|Dark Caracal|Threat Group-3390|Honeybee|Turla|Cobalt Group|Ke3chang|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|Gorgon Group|MuddyWater|APT37|Leviathan|BRONZE BUTLER|APT3|Magic Hound|FIN10|FIN7|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT29|Darkhotel
389 T1218.002 Control Panel Defense Evasion no
390 T1218.010 Regsvr32 Defense Evasion Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|TA551|Blue Mockingbird|Inception|WIRTE|Cobalt Group|APT19|Leviathan|APT32|Deep Panda TA551|Blue Mockingbird|Inception|WIRTE|Cobalt Group|APT19|Leviathan|APT32|Deep Panda
391 T1218.009 Regsvcs/Regasm Defense Evasion no
392 T1218.005 Mshta Defense Evasion Gamaredon Group|Confucius|Lazarus Group|APT29|LazyScripter|Mustang Panda|TA551|Sidewinder|Inception|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|FIN7 Mustang Panda|TA551|Sidewinder|Inception|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|FIN7
393 T1218.004 InstallUtil Defense Evasion Mustang Panda|menuPass
394 T1218.001 Compiled HTML File Defense Evasion APT38|APT41|Silence|Dark Caracal|OilRig|Lazarus Group APT41|Silence|Dark Caracal|OilRig|Lazarus Group
395 T1218.003 CMSTP Defense Evasion Cobalt Group|MuddyWater
396 T1218.011 Rundll32 Defense Evasion Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|LazyScripter|APT38|HAFNIUM|TA551|UNC2452|APT41|Gamaredon Group|APT32|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|TA505|MuddyWater|APT29|APT19|CopyKittens|APT3|Carbanak|APT28 APT38|HAFNIUM|TA551|APT41|Gamaredon Group|APT32|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|TA505|MuddyWater|APT29|APT19|CopyKittens|APT3|Carbanak|APT28
397 T1547 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution Persistence|Privilege Escalation no
398 T1546 Event Triggered Execution Privilege Escalation|Persistence no
399 T1098.003 Add Office 365 Global Administrator Role Persistence APT29 no
400 T1098.002 Exchange Email Delegate Permissions Persistence APT28|APT29|UNC2452|Magic Hound APT28|APT29|Magic Hound
401 T1098.001 Additional Cloud Credentials Persistence APT29|UNC2452 APT29
402 T1543.004 Launch Daemon Persistence|Privilege Escalation no
403 T1543.003 Windows Service Persistence|Privilege Escalation TeamTNT|APT38|PROMETHIUM|Blue Mockingbird|DarkVishnya|Wizard Spider|APT32|APT41|Kimsuky|Tropic Trooper|Cobalt Group|Ke3chang|FIN7|APT19|Threat Group-3390|Honeybee|APT3|Lazarus Group|Carbanak
404 T1543.002 Systemd Service Persistence|Privilege Escalation TeamTNT|Rocke
405 T1543.001 Launch Agent Persistence|Privilege Escalation no
406 T1037.005 Startup Items Persistence|Privilege Escalation no
407 T1037.004 RC Scripts Persistence|Privilege Escalation no
408 T1055.012 Process Hollowing Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation Kimsuky|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Gorgon Group|Patchwork Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Gorgon Group|Patchwork
409 T1055.013 Process Doppelgänging Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation Leafminer
410 T1055.011 Extra Window Memory Injection Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation no
411 T1055.014 VDSO Hijacking Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation no
423 T1542.003 Bootkit Persistence|Defense Evasion APT41|Lazarus Group|APT28
424 T1542.002 Component Firmware Persistence|Defense Evasion Equation
425 T1542.001 System Firmware Persistence|Defense Evasion no
426 T1505.003 Web Shell Persistence Dragonfly|BackdoorDiplomacy|APT38|APT29|APT28|Tonto Team|Sandworm Team|HAFNIUM|Volatile Cedar|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|Tropic Trooper|GALLIUM|Threat Group-3390|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|APT32|OilRig|Deep Panda BackdoorDiplomacy|APT38|APT29|APT28|Tonto Team|Sandworm Team|HAFNIUM|Volatile Cedar|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|Tropic Trooper|GALLIUM|Threat Group-3390|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|APT32|OilRig|Deep Panda
427 T1505.002 Transport Agent Persistence no
428 T1505.001 SQL Stored Procedures Persistence Sandworm Team
429 T1053.003 Cron Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation APT38|Rocke
T1053.004 Launchd Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation no
430 T1053.001 At (Linux) Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation no
431 T1053.005 Scheduled Task Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|Confucius|Dragonfly|APT37|APT38|Naikon|CostaRicto|Mustang Panda|Higaisa|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|Molerats|Machete|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT-C-36|BRONZE BUTLER|APT41|GALLIUM|Silence|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|Rancor|OilRig|Patchwork|Dragonfly 2.0|Cobalt Group|FIN8|menuPass|FIN10|FIN7|APT32|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|APT3|APT29 APT37|APT38|Naikon|CostaRicto|Mustang Panda|Higaisa|Fox Kitten|Molerats|Machete|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT-C-36|BRONZE BUTLER|APT41|GALLIUM|Silence|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|Rancor|OilRig|Patchwork|Dragonfly 2.0|Cobalt Group|FIN8|menuPass|FIN10|FIN7|APT32|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|APT3|APT29
432 T1053.002 At (Windows) Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation BRONZE BUTLER|Threat Group-3390|APT18
433 T1542 Pre-OS Boot Defense Evasion|Persistence no
434 T1137.001 Office Template Macros Persistence MuddyWater
438 T1137.006 Add-ins Persistence Naikon
439 T1137.002 Office Test Persistence APT28
440 T1531 Account Access Removal Impact no
441 T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie Credential Access APT29|Evilnum Evilnum
442 T1529 System Shutdown/Reboot Impact Lazarus Group|APT38|APT37
443 T1518 Software Discovery Discovery Mustang Panda|Windshift|MuddyWater|Windigo|Sidewinder|Operation Wocao|BRONZE BUTLER|Tropic Trooper|Inception
444 T1547.013 XDG Autostart Entries Persistence|Privilege Escalation no
445 T1534 Internal Spearphishing Lateral Movement Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|Leviathan|Gamaredon Group Leviathan|Gamaredon Group
446 T1528 Steal Application Access Token Credential Access APT28
447 T1535 Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions Defense Evasion no
448 T1525 Implant Internal Image Persistence no
461 T1490 Inhibit System Recovery Impact no
462 T1489 Service Stop Impact Indrik Spider|Wizard Spider|Lazarus Group
463 T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact Impact FIN7|Indrik Spider|APT41|TA505|APT38
464 T1485 Data Destruction Impact Gamaredon Group|Sandworm Team|Lazarus Group|APT38 Sandworm Team|Lazarus Group|APT38
465 T1484 Domain Policy Modification Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation no
466 T1482 Domain Trust Discovery Discovery FIN8|APT29|Chimera|UNC2452 FIN8|APT29|Chimera
467 T1480 Execution Guardrails Defense Evasion no
468 T1221 Template Injection Defense Evasion Lazarus Group|Confucius|Dragonfly|Gamaredon Group|Frankenstein|Inception|APT28|Tropic Trooper|DarkHydrus|Dragonfly 2.0 Gamaredon Group|Frankenstein|Inception|APT28|Tropic Trooper|DarkHydrus|Dragonfly 2.0
469 T1222 File and Directory Permissions Modification Defense Evasion no
470 T1220 XSL Script Processing Defense Evasion Lazarus Group|Higaisa|Cobalt Group Higaisa|Cobalt Group
471 T1217 Browser Bookmark Discovery Discovery APT38|Chimera|Fox Kitten
472 T1212 Exploitation for Credential Access Credential Access no
473 T1189 Drive-by Compromise Initial Access Magic Hound|APT28|Axiom|Transparent Tribe|Andariel|Leviathan|Machete|Windigo|Dragonfly|PROMETHIUM|Turla|Windshift|RTM|Darkhotel|APT38|APT19|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|Dark Caracal|Dragonfly 2.0|Leafminer|Patchwork|APT37|Elderwood|PLATINUM Transparent Tribe|Andariel|Leviathan|Machete|Windigo|Dragonfly|PROMETHIUM|Turla|Windshift|RTM|Darkhotel|APT38|APT19|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|Dark Caracal|Dragonfly 2.0|Leafminer|Patchwork|APT37|Elderwood|PLATINUM
474 T1211 Exploitation for Defense Evasion Defense Evasion APT28
475 T1197 BITS Jobs Defense Evasion|Persistence APT39|Patchwork|APT41|Leviathan
476 T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution Execution Axiom|Confucius|Dragonfly|Andariel|Transparent Tribe|APT3|Tonto Team|Mustang Panda|Darkhotel|Higaisa|HAFNIUM|Sidewinder|Sandworm Team|MuddyWater|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT41|admin@338|Threat Group-3390|APT12|The White Company|APT33|APT32|APT28|Tropic Trooper|BRONZE BUTLER|Cobalt Group|Lazarus Group|Patchwork|Elderwood|APT29|TA459|APT37|Leviathan Andariel|Transparent Tribe|APT3|Tonto Team|Mustang Panda|Darkhotel|Higaisa|HAFNIUM|Sidewinder|Sandworm Team|MuddyWater|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT41|admin@338|Threat Group-3390|APT12|The White Company|APT33|APT32|APT28|Tropic Trooper|BRONZE BUTLER|Cobalt Group|Lazarus Group|Patchwork|Elderwood|APT29|TA459|APT37|Leviathan
477 T1201 Password Policy Discovery Discovery Chimera|Turla|OilRig
478 T1195 Supply Chain Compromise Initial Access no
479 T1199 Trusted Relationship Initial Access Threat Group-3390|APT29|Sandworm Team|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|APT28|menuPass APT29|Sandworm Team|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|APT28|menuPass
480 T1218 Signed Binary Proxy Execution Defense Evasion Lazarus Group no
481 T1204 User Execution Execution no
482 T1213 Data from Information Repositories Collection APT29|APT28|Fox Kitten|FIN6|Turla APT28|Fox Kitten|FIN6|Turla
483 T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application Initial Access Threat Group-3390|Ke3chang|Kimsuky|Magic Hound|Dragonfly|BackdoorDiplomacy|menuPass|Volatile Cedar|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|APT28|APT29|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Blue Mockingbird|Rocke|APT39|BlackTech|APT41|GALLIUM|Night Dragon|Axiom BackdoorDiplomacy|menuPass|Volatile Cedar|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|APT28|APT29|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Blue Mockingbird|Rocke|APT39|BlackTech|APT41|GALLIUM|Night Dragon|Axiom
484 T1210 Exploitation of Remote Services Lateral Movement Dragonfly|Tonto Team|FIN7|Fox Kitten|menuPass|Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390|APT28 Tonto Team|FIN7|Fox Kitten|menuPass|Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390|APT28
485 T1200 Hardware Additions Initial Access DarkVishnya
486 T1202 Indirect Command Execution Defense Evasion Lazarus Group no
487 T1219 Remote Access Software Command And Control TeamTNT|Mustang Panda|MuddyWater|Evilnum|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Sandworm Team|DarkVishnya|RTM|Kimsuky|Night Dragon|Cobalt Group|Thrip|Carbanak
488 T1207 Rogue Domain Controller Defense Evasion no
489 T1216 Signed Script Proxy Execution Defense Evasion no
490 T1205 Traffic Signaling Defense Evasion|Persistence|Command And Control no
491 T1176 Browser Extensions Persistence Kimsuky|Stolen Pencil Kimsuky
492 T1187 Forced Authentication Credential Access Dragonfly|DarkHydrus|Dragonfly 2.0 DarkHydrus|Dragonfly 2.0
T1175 Component Object Model and Distributed COM Lateral Movement|Execution no
493 T1185 Browser Session Hijacking Collection no
494 T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information Defense Evasion Lazarus Group|Ke3chang|Kimsuky|APT39|APT29|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|UNC2452|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Molerats|Frankenstein|Turla|WIRTE|Darkhotel|Tropic Trooper|Honeybee|Gorgon Group|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|APT19|Leviathan|MuddyWater|APT28|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER APT39|APT29|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Molerats|Frankenstein|Turla|WIRTE|Darkhotel|Tropic Trooper|Honeybee|Gorgon Group|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|APT19|Leviathan|MuddyWater|APT28|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER
495 T1134 Access Token Manipulation Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation FIN6|Blue Mockingbird
T1149 LC_MAIN Hijacking Defense Evasion no
496 T1136 Create Account Persistence Sandworm Team|Indrik Spider
497 T1135 Network Share Discovery Discovery Dragonfly|Tonto Team|APT38|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|APT32|APT39|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT1|Dragonfly 2.0|Sowbug Tonto Team|APT38|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|APT32|APT39|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT1|Dragonfly 2.0|Sowbug
498 T1137 Office Application Startup Persistence Gamaredon Group|APT32
499 T1153 T1133 Source External Remote Services Execution Persistence|Initial Access no TeamTNT|Leviathan|APT28|APT29|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Kimsuky|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Chimera|Sandworm Team|APT41|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|Night Dragon|Ke3chang|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|APT18
T1133 External Remote Services Persistence|Initial Access Dragonfly|TeamTNT|Leviathan|APT28|APT29|UNC2452|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Kimsuky|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Chimera|Sandworm Team|APT41|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|Night Dragon|Ke3chang|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|APT18
500 T1132 Data Encoding Command And Control no
501 T1129 Shared Modules Execution no
502 T1127 Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution Defense Evasion no
504 T1124 System Time Discovery Discovery Darkhotel|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Chimera|Operation Wocao|The White Company|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Turla
505 T1123 Audio Capture Collection APT37
506 T1120 Peripheral Device Discovery Discovery OilRig|BackdoorDiplomacy|Operation Wocao|Turla|APT37|Gamaredon Group|Equation|APT28
507 T1119 Automated Collection Collection Ke3chang|Confucius|Mustang Panda|Sidewinder|Chimera|menuPass|Operation Wocao|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT1|APT28|Patchwork|OilRig|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|FIN6 Mustang Panda|Sidewinder|Chimera|menuPass|Operation Wocao|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT1|APT28|Patchwork|OilRig|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|FIN6
508 T1115 Clipboard Data Collection Operation Wocao|APT39|APT38
509 T1114 Email Collection Collection Magic Hound|Silent Librarian
510 T1113 Screen Capture Collection Dragonfly|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Gamaredon Group|APT39|Silence|MuddyWater|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|Dark Caracal|FIN7|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|Group5|APT28 GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Gamaredon Group|APT39|Silence|MuddyWater|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|Dark Caracal|FIN7|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|Group5|APT28
511 T1112 Modify Registry Defense Evasion Dragonfly|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|Turla|APT32|APT38|Patchwork|Gorgon Group|Threat Group-3390|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|Honeybee|FIN8 Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|Turla|APT32|APT38|Patchwork|Gorgon Group|Threat Group-3390|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|Honeybee|FIN8
512 T1111 Two-Factor Authentication Interception Credential Access Kimsuky|Chimera|Operation Wocao Chimera|Operation Wocao
513 T1110 Brute Force Credential Access Lazarus Group|Dragonfly|APT38|APT28|Fox Kitten|DarkVishnya|APT39|OilRig|FIN5|Turla APT38|APT28|Fox Kitten|DarkVishnya|APT39|OilRig|FIN5|Turla
514 T1108 T1106 Redundant Access Native API Defense Evasion|Persistence Execution no APT38|Higaisa|menuPass|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Turla|Silence|APT37|Gorgon Group
515 T1106 T1105 Native API Ingress Tool Transfer Execution Command And Control BlackTech|Lazarus Group|APT38|Higaisa|menuPass|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Turla|Silence|APT37|Gorgon Group TeamTNT|Nomadic Octopus|IndigoZebra|Andariel|BackdoorDiplomacy|Tonto Team|HAFNIUM|APT29|Ajax Security Team|Mustang Panda|Windshift|Darkhotel|ZIRCONIUM|TA551|Volatile Cedar|Indrik Spider|Evilnum|Sidewinder|Fox Kitten|Kimsuky|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Silence|APT-C-36|APT41|GALLIUM|TA505|WIRTE|APT33|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Rancor|Gorgon Group|OilRig|Turla|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|PLATINUM|APT37|Elderwood|Leviathan|APT32|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|APT3|menuPass|FIN7|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28
516 T1105 T1104 Ingress Tool Transfer Multi-Stage Channels Command And Control LazyScripter|Ke3chang|Aquatic Panda|Winnti Group|Confucius|Dragonfly|TeamTNT|Nomadic Octopus|IndigoZebra|Andariel|BackdoorDiplomacy|Tonto Team|HAFNIUM|APT29|Ajax Security Team|Mustang Panda|Windshift|Darkhotel|ZIRCONIUM|TA551|Volatile Cedar|Indrik Spider|Evilnum|Sidewinder|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|Kimsuky|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Silence|APT-C-36|APT41|GALLIUM|TA505|WIRTE|APT33|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Rancor|Gorgon Group|OilRig|Turla|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|PLATINUM|APT37|Elderwood|Leviathan|APT32|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|APT3|menuPass|FIN7|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28 APT41|MuddyWater|APT3
517 T1104 T1102 Multi-Stage Channels Web Service Command And Control Lazarus Group|APT41|MuddyWater|APT3 TeamTNT|FIN8|Fox Kitten|Turla|APT32|Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Inception|FIN6
518 T1102 T1098 Web Service Account Manipulation Command And Control Persistence Mustang Panda|LazyScripter|TeamTNT|FIN8|Fox Kitten|Turla|APT32|Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Inception|FIN6 Sandworm Team|APT3|Dragonfly 2.0|Lazarus Group
T1098 Account Manipulation Persistence Kimsuky|Dragonfly|Sandworm Team|APT3|Dragonfly 2.0|Lazarus Group
519 T1095 Non-Application Layer Protocol Command And Control BackdoorDiplomacy|HAFNIUM|Operation Wocao|FIN6|APT29|PLATINUM|APT3
520 T1092 Communication Through Removable Media Command And Control APT28
521 T1091 Replication Through Removable Media Lateral Movement|Initial Access FIN7|Mustang Panda|Tropic Trooper|Darkhotel|APT28 Mustang Panda|Tropic Trooper|Darkhotel|APT28
522 T1090 Proxy Command And Control Windigo|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|APT41|Turla
523 T1087 Account Discovery Discovery APT29|UNC2452 APT29
524 T1083 File and Directory Discovery Discovery Winnti Group|Confucius|Dragonfly|APT38|APT29|Mustang Panda|Darkhotel|Windigo|Sidewinder|Chimera|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|menuPass|APT39|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Inception|APT41|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|APT18|Leafminer|Honeybee|Dark Caracal|Dragonfly 2.0|APT3|Sowbug|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|APT28|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang APT38|APT29|Mustang Panda|Darkhotel|Windigo|Sidewinder|Chimera|Fox Kitten|menuPass|APT39|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Inception|APT41|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|APT18|Leafminer|Honeybee|Dark Caracal|Dragonfly 2.0|APT3|Sowbug|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|APT28|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
525 T1082 System Information Discovery Discovery Aquatic Panda|Confucius|TeamTNT|APT38|APT29|Mustang Panda|Windshift|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Windigo|Sidewinder|UNC2452|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|APT32|APT37|Honeybee|APT19|Magic Hound|Sowbug|OilRig|APT3|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang TeamTNT|APT38|APT29|Mustang Panda|Windshift|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Windigo|Sidewinder|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|APT32|APT37|Honeybee|APT19|Magic Hound|Sowbug|OilRig|APT3|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
526 T1080 Taint Shared Content Lateral Movement Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Darkhotel
527 T1078 Valid Accounts Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access Ke3chang|Lazarus Group|Axiom|Dragonfly|FIN7|Leviathan|APT29|Silent Librarian|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|APT39|FIN4|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|APT33|FIN5|OilRig|APT28|menuPass|FIN10|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390|APT18|PittyTiger|Carbanak FIN7|Leviathan|APT29|Silent Librarian|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|APT39|FIN4|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|APT33|FIN5|OilRig|APT28|menuPass|FIN10|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390|APT18|PittyTiger|Carbanak
528 T1074 Data Staged Collection Wizard Spider
529 T1072 Software Deployment Tools Execution|Lateral Movement Silence|APT32|Threat Group-1314
530 T1071 Application Layer Protocol Command And Control Dragonfly|TeamTNT|Rocke|Magic Hound|Dragonfly 2.0 TeamTNT|Rocke|Magic Hound|Dragonfly 2.0
531 T1070 Indicator Removal on Host Defense Evasion Lazarus Group|APT29|UNC2452 APT29
532 T1069 Permission Groups Discovery Discovery APT29|UNC2452|TA505|APT3 APT29|TA505|APT3
533 T1068 Exploitation for Privilege Escalation Privilege Escalation APT29|Tonto Team|ZIRCONIUM|Turla|Whitefly|APT33|Cobalt Group|PLATINUM|FIN8|APT32|Threat Group-3390|FIN6|APT28 Tonto Team|ZIRCONIUM|Turla|Whitefly|APT33|Cobalt Group|PLATINUM|FIN8|APT32|Threat Group-3390|FIN6|APT28
534 T1064 T1059 Scripting Command and Scripting Interpreter Defense Evasion|Execution Execution no APT37|Windigo|Fox Kitten|APT32|Whitefly|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN7|APT19|OilRig|FIN5|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Ke3chang
535 T1062 T1057 Hypervisor Process Discovery Persistence Discovery no TeamTNT|Andariel|APT29|Mustang Panda|Windshift|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Rocke|Frankenstein|Inception|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|APT38|Tropic Trooper|APT37|Honeybee|OilRig|APT3|Magic Hound|APT28|Winnti Group|Stealth Falcon|Poseidon Group|Lazarus Group|Molerats|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang
T1061 Graphical User Interface Execution no
T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter Execution Dragonfly|APT37|Windigo|Fox Kitten|APT32|Whitefly|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN7|APT19|OilRig|FIN5|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Ke3chang
T1057 Process Discovery Discovery Gamaredon Group|Kimsuky|TeamTNT|Andariel|APT29|Mustang Panda|Windshift|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Chimera|UNC2452|Operation Wocao|Rocke|Frankenstein|Inception|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|APT38|Tropic Trooper|APT37|Honeybee|OilRig|APT3|Magic Hound|APT28|Winnti Group|Stealth Falcon|Poseidon Group|Lazarus Group|Molerats|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang
536 T1056 Input Capture Collection|Credential Access APT39
537 T1055 Process Injection Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation Operation Wocao|APT32|Sharpshooter|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|Cobalt Group|Turla|APT37|Honeybee|PLATINUM
538 T1053 Scheduled Task/Job Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation no
539 T1052 Exfiltration Over Physical Medium Exfiltration no
540 T1051 T1049 Shared Webroot System Network Connections Discovery Lateral Movement Discovery no TeamTNT|Andariel|BackdoorDiplomacy|Mustang Panda|MuddyWater|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Tropic Trooper|APT41|APT38|GALLIUM|APT32|APT1|OilRig|APT3|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
T1049 System Network Connections Discovery Discovery Lazarus Group|TeamTNT|Andariel|BackdoorDiplomacy|Mustang Panda|MuddyWater|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Tropic Trooper|APT41|APT38|GALLIUM|APT32|APT1|OilRig|APT3|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
541 T1048 Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol Exfiltration no
542 T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation Execution Gamaredon Group|Sandworm Team|FIN7|Indrik Spider|Naikon|Mustang Panda|Windshift|UNC2452|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT41|FIN6|GALLIUM|APT32|MuddyWater|Threat Group-3390|OilRig|FIN8|Leviathan|menuPass|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT29|Deep Panda Sandworm Team|FIN7|Indrik Spider|Naikon|Mustang Panda|Windshift|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT41|FIN6|GALLIUM|APT32|MuddyWater|Threat Group-3390|OilRig|FIN8|Leviathan|menuPass|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT29|Deep Panda
543 T1046 Network Service Scanning Discovery BlackTech|Lazarus Group|TeamTNT|BackdoorDiplomacy|Naikon|CostaRicto|Chimera|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Rocke|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT39|APT32|OilRig|Cobalt Group|Leafminer|menuPass|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390 TeamTNT|BackdoorDiplomacy|Naikon|CostaRicto|Chimera|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Rocke|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT39|APT32|OilRig|Cobalt Group|Leafminer|menuPass|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390
544 T1043 T1041 Commonly Used Port Exfiltration Over C2 Channel Command And Control Exfiltration OilRig|APT28|TEMP.Veles|Night Dragon|APT29|APT18|FIN7|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|APT37|APT3|Magic Hound|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390 Leviathan|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Chimera|APT39|Operation Wocao|Sandworm Team|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Kimsuky|GALLIUM|APT32|APT3|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Ke3chang
545 T1041 T1040 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel Network Sniffing Exfiltration Credential Access|Discovery Confucius|Leviathan|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Chimera|APT39|Operation Wocao|Sandworm Team|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Kimsuky|GALLIUM|APT32|APT3|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Ke3chang Kimsuky|Sandworm Team|DarkVishnya|APT33|APT28
T1040 Network Sniffing Credential Access|Discovery Kimsuky|Sandworm Team|DarkVishnya|APT33|Stolen Pencil|APT28
546 T1039 Data from Network Shared Drive Collection APT28|Chimera|Fox Kitten|Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Sowbug|menuPass
547 T1037 Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts Persistence|Privilege Escalation Rocke
548 T1036 Masquerading Defense Evasion Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|Dragonfly|LazyScripter|APT28|Nomadic Octopus|OilRig|APT29|ZIRCONIUM|TA551|UNC2452|Windshift|APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|PLATINUM|Dragonfly 2.0 APT28|Nomadic Octopus|OilRig|APT29|ZIRCONIUM|TA551|Windshift|APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|PLATINUM|Dragonfly 2.0
549 T1034 T1033 Path Interception System Owner/User Discovery Persistence|Privilege Escalation Discovery no APT38|Windshift|ZIRCONIUM|Sidewinder|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT41|GALLIUM|Tropic Trooper|APT39|MuddyWater|APT37|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|APT32|Magic Hound|OilRig|FIN10|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3
T1033 System Owner/User Discovery Discovery Threat Group-3390|Ke3chang|Dragonfly|APT38|Windshift|ZIRCONIUM|Sidewinder|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT41|GALLIUM|Tropic Trooper|APT39|MuddyWater|APT37|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|APT32|Magic Hound|OilRig|FIN10|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3
550 T1030 Data Transfer Size Limits Exfiltration APT28|Threat Group-3390
551 T1029 Scheduled Transfer Exfiltration Higaisa
552 T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information Defense Evasion Aquatic Panda|Ke3chang|LazyScripter|TeamTNT|BackdoorDiplomacy|Transparent Tribe|APT39|Mustang Panda|Windshift|TA551|Higaisa|Sidewinder|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|FIN6|Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|APT41|GALLIUM|Turla|TA505|Silence|APT33|Night Dragon|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|APT29|APT18|Tropic Trooper|Patchwork|menuPass|APT37|Threat Group-3390|Cobalt Group|Dark Caracal|Leafminer|Honeybee|APT19|BlackOasis|Leviathan|FIN8|MuddyWater|FIN7|Elderwood|OilRig|Magic Hound|APT3|APT32|Group5|Dust Storm|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT28 TeamTNT|BackdoorDiplomacy|Transparent Tribe|APT39|Mustang Panda|Windshift|TA551|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Fox Kitten|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|FIN6|Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|APT41|GALLIUM|Turla|TA505|Silence|APT33|Night Dragon|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|APT29|APT18|Tropic Trooper|Patchwork|menuPass|APT37|Threat Group-3390|Cobalt Group|Dark Caracal|Leafminer|Honeybee|APT19|BlackOasis|Leviathan|FIN8|MuddyWater|FIN7|Elderwood|OilRig|Magic Hound|APT3|APT32|Group5|Dust Storm|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT28
T1026 Multiband Communication Command And Control Lazarus Group
553 T1025 Data from Removable Media Collection Turla|Gamaredon Group|APT28
554 T1021 Remote Services Lateral Movement no
555 T1020 Automated Exfiltration Exfiltration Ke3chang|Sidewinder|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Honeybee Sidewinder|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Honeybee
556 T1018 Remote System Discovery Discovery Dragonfly|Indrik Spider|Naikon|APT29|UNC2452|Chimera|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Sandworm Team|Rocke|Wizard Spider|Silence|GALLIUM|APT39|APT32|Deep Panda|Ke3chang|Threat Group-3390|Dragonfly 2.0|Leafminer|FIN8|FIN5|APT3|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN6|Turla Indrik Spider|Naikon|APT29|Chimera|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Sandworm Team|Rocke|Wizard Spider|Silence|GALLIUM|APT39|APT32|Deep Panda|Ke3chang|Threat Group-3390|Dragonfly 2.0|Leafminer|FIN8|FIN5|APT3|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN6|Turla
557 T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery Discovery Kimsuky|Dragonfly|TeamTNT|ZIRCONIUM|Mustang Panda|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Sandworm Team|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT41|GALLIUM|APT32|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|Magic Hound|OilRig|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3|Naikon|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang TeamTNT|ZIRCONIUM|Mustang Panda|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Sandworm Team|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT41|GALLIUM|APT32|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|Magic Hound|OilRig|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3|Naikon|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
558 T1014 Rootkit Defense Evasion TeamTNT|Rocke|APT41|APT28|Winnti Group
559 T1012 Query Registry Discovery Kimsuky|Dragonfly|ZIRCONIUM|Chimera|Fox Kitten|APT39|Operation Wocao|APT32|Dragonfly 2.0|Threat Group-3390|OilRig|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Turla ZIRCONIUM|Chimera|Fox Kitten|APT39|Operation Wocao|APT32|Dragonfly 2.0|Threat Group-3390|OilRig|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Turla
560 T1011 Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium Exfiltration no
561 T1010 Application Window Discovery Discovery Lazarus Group
562 T1008 Fallback Channels Command And Control FIN7|APT41|OilRig|Lazarus Group
563 T1007 System Service Discovery Discovery Kimsuky|Aquatic Panda|Indrik Spider|Chimera|Operation Wocao|BRONZE BUTLER|APT1|OilRig|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang Indrik Spider|Chimera|Operation Wocao|BRONZE BUTLER|APT1|OilRig|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
564 T1006 Direct Volume Access Defense Evasion no
565 T1005 Data from Local System Collection Axiom|Dragonfly|FIN7|APT41|APT38|Andariel|APT29|Windigo|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|FIN6|Gamaredon Group|APT39|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|GALLIUM|Turla|menuPass|Dark Caracal|Dragonfly 2.0|Honeybee|APT37|APT28|APT3|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|Threat Group-3390|APT1|Ke3chang FIN7|APT41|APT38|Andariel|APT29|Windigo|Fox Kitten|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|FIN6|Gamaredon Group|APT39|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|GALLIUM|Turla|menuPass|Dark Caracal|Dragonfly 2.0|Honeybee|APT37|APT28|APT3|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|Threat Group-3390|APT1|Ke3chang
566 T1003 OS Credential Dumping Credential Access Tonto Team|APT39|Frankenstein|APT32|APT28|Leviathan|Sowbug|Suckfly|Poseidon Group|Axiom
567 T1001 Data Obfuscation Command And Control Operation Wocao|Axiom
bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_attack_data/coverage.json
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{
"version": "4.2",
"version": "4.3",
"name": "Detection Coverage",
"description": "security_content detection coverage",
"domain": "mitre-enterprise",
bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_attack_data_ref/coverage.json
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@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
{
"version": "4.2",
"version": "4.3",
"name": "Detection Coverage",
"description": "security_content detection coverage",
"domain": "mitre-enterprise",
bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/detections.json
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{"detections": [{"name": "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe", "id": "e9fb4a59-c5fb-440a-9f24-191fbc6b2911", "version": 6, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "Monitor for execution of reg.exe with parameters specifying an export of keys that contain hashed credentials that attackers may try to crack offline.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_reg` OR `process_cmd` Processes.process=*save* (Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\Security* OR Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\SAM* OR Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\System* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\\\Security* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\\\System* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\\\SAM*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "None identified.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.md#atomic-test-1---registry-dump-of-sam-creds-and-secrets"], "tags": {"name": "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe", "analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping", "DarkSide Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to export the registry keys.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1003.002", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 90, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly 2.0", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "Night Dragon", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Frankenstein", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "process_reg", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=reg.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=reg.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/../builder/test_data/detection/valid.yml", "source": "detection"}]}
{"detections": [{"name": "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe", "id": "e9fb4a59-c5fb-440a-9f24-191fbc6b2911", "version": 6, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "Monitor for execution of reg.exe with parameters specifying an export of keys that contain hashed credentials that attackers may try to crack offline.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_reg` OR `process_cmd` Processes.process=*save* (Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\Security* OR Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\SAM* OR Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\System* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\\\Security* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\\\System* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\\\SAM*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "None identified.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.md#atomic-test-1---registry-dump-of-sam-creds-and-secrets"], "tags": {"name": "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe", "analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping", "DarkSide Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to export the registry keys.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1003.002", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 90, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly", "Dragonfly 2.0", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "Night Dragon", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Frankenstein", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "process_reg", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=reg.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=reg.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/lstella/ThreatResearch/security_content/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/../builder/test_data/detection/valid.yml", "source": "detection"}]}
bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_md_data/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_new_user_aws_console_login.md
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[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_splunk_app_enrichmentus/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success}
[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/products/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success}
#### Description
bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_md_data/_posts/2021-09-16-attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.md
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@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ tags:
[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_splunk_app_enrichmentus/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success}
[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/products/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success}
#### Description
bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_md_data_ref/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_new_user_aws_console_login.md
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@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ tags:
[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_splunk_app_enrichmentus/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success}
[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/products/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success}
#### Description
bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_md_data_ref/_posts/2021-09-16-attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.md
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[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_splunk_app_enrichmentus/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success}
[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/products/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success}
#### Description
dist/escu/default/analyticstories.conf
Vendored
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#############
# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
# On Date: 2022-05-02T22:16:41 UTC
# On Date: 2022-05-20T21:45:40 UTC
# Author: Splunk Security Research
# Contact: research@splunk.com
#############
@@ -71,10 +71,10 @@ providing_technologies = []
type = detection
asset_type = AWS Account
confidence = medium
explanation = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user created a policy version that allows them to access any resource in their account
explanation = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user created a policy version that allows them to access any resource in their account.
how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs.
annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1078"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]}
known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created a policy to allow a user to access all resources. That said, AWS strongly advises against granting full control to all AWS resources
known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created a policy to allow a user to access all resources. That said, AWS strongly advises against granting full control to all AWS resources and you must verify this activity.
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS CreateAccessKey - Rule]
@@ -456,7 +456,7 @@ type = detection
asset_type = AWS Instance
confidence = medium
explanation = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour
how_to_implement = You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Run the `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Initial` support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Update` hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines.
how_to_implement = You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Run the `Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail - Initial` support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run `Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail - Update` hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines.
annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]}
known_false_positives = When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate.
providing_technologies = []
@@ -1412,7 +1412,7 @@ type = detection
asset_type = Endpoint
confidence = medium
explanation = This search looks for DNS requests for faux domains similar to the domains that you want to have monitored for abuse.
how_to_implement = You need to ingest data from your DNS logs. Specifically you must ingest the domain that is being queried and the IP of the host originating the request. Ideally, you should also be ingesting the answer to the query and the query type. This approach allows you to also create your own localized passive DNS capability which can aid you in future investigations. You also need to have run the search "ESCU - DNSTwist Domain Names", which creates the permutations of the domain that will be checked for.
how_to_implement = You need to ingest data from your DNS logs. Specifically you must ingest the domain that is being queried and the IP of the host originating the request. Ideally, you should also be ingesting the answer to the query and the query type. This approach allows you to also create your own localized passive DNS capability which can aid you in future investigations. You also need to have run the search "ESCU - DNSTwist Domain Names", which creates the permutations of the domain that will be checked for. You also need the [`dnstwist`](https://gist.github.com/d1vious/c4c2aae7fa7d5cbb1f24adc5f6303) custom command.
annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Actions on Objectives"]}
known_false_positives = None at this time
providing_technologies = []
@@ -3609,7 +3609,7 @@ This analytic identifies Get-ForestTrust from PowerSploit in order to gather dom
During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block.
how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.
annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1482"]}
known_false_positives = UPDATE_KNOWN_FALSE_POSITIVES
known_false_positives = False positives may be present. Tune as needed.
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - Get WMIObject Group Discovery - Rule]
@@ -4194,7 +4194,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exp
known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - Linux deletion Of SSH Key - Rule]
[savedsearch://ESCU - Linux deletion Of SSH Hash Conf - Rule]
type = detection
asset_type = endpoint
confidence = medium
@@ -5390,7 +5390,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint
confidence = medium
explanation = The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104 that is using memory stream as new object backstore. The malicious PowerShell script will contain stream flate data and will be decompressed in memory to run or drop the actual payload. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts.
how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.
annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1140"]}
annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001", "T1059"]}
known_false_positives = powershell may used this function to store out object into memory.
providing_technologies = []
@@ -6771,7 +6771,7 @@ explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (E
This analytic identifies the behavior of AMSI being tampered with. Implemented natively in many frameworks, the command will look similar to `SEtValuE($Null,(New-OBJEct COLlECtionS.GenerIC.HAshSEt{[StrINg]))}$ReF=[ReF].AsSeMbLY.GeTTyPe("System.Management.Automation.Amsi"+"Utils")` taken from Powershell-Empire. \
During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block.
how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.
annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562"]}
annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562", "T1059.001", "T1059"]}
known_false_positives = Potential for some third party applications to disable AMSI upon invocation. Filter as needed.
providing_technologies = []
@@ -8899,6 +8899,16 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command \u00
known_false_positives = It's possible there can be long domain names that are legitimate.
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - F5 BIG-IP iControl REST Vulnerability CVE-2022-1388 - Rule]
type = detection
asset_type = Web Server
confidence = medium
explanation = The following analytic identifies a recent unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerablity against the F5 BIG-IP iControl REST API. The analytic identifies the URI path found in the POCs and the HTTP Method of POST. In addition, the request header will have the commands that may be executed in fields utilcmdargs and the auth field of X-F5-Auth-Token, which may have a random base64 encoded value.
how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting web or proxy logs, or ensure it is being filled by a proxy like device, into the Web Datamodel. For additional filtering, allow list private IP space or restrict by known good.
annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
known_false_positives = False positives may be present if the activity is blocked or was not successful. Filter known vulnerablity scanners. Filter as needed.
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - Multiple Archive Files Http Post Traffic - Rule]
type = detection
asset_type = Endpoint
@@ -9312,7 +9322,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/files/Cyclops-Blink-Malware-Analysis-Report.pdf", "https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/22/c/cyclops-blink-sets-sights-on-asus-routers--.html"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Teoderick Contreras"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = []
searches = ["ESCU - Linux Iptables Firewall Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Kworker Process In Writable Process Path - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Stdout Redirection To Dev Null File - Rule"]
description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the cyclopsblink malware including firewall modification, spawning more process, botnet c2 communication, defense evasion and etc. Cyclops Blink is a Linux ELF executable compiled for 32-bit x86 and PowerPC architecture that has targeted several network devices. The complete list of targeted devices is unknown at this time, but WatchGuard FireBox has specifically been listed as a target. The modular malware consists of core components and modules that are deployed as child processes using the Linux API fork. At this point, four modules have been identified that download and upload files, gather system information and contain updating mechanisms for the malware itself. Additional modules can be downloaded and executed from the command and control (C2) server.
narrative = Adversaries may use this technique to maximize the impact on the target organization in operations where network wide availability interruption is the goal.
@@ -9628,6 +9638,17 @@ narrative = The trojan downloader known as Emotet first surfaced in 2014, when i
According to the TA, the the malware continues to be among the most costly and destructive malware affecting the private and public sectors. Researchers have linked it to the threat group Mealybug, which has also been on the security communitys radar since 2014.\
The searches in this Analytic Story will help you find executables that are rarely used in your environment, specific registry paths that malware often uses to ensure survivability and persistence, instances where cmd.exe is used to launch script interpreters, and other indicators that Emotet or other malware has compromised your environment.
[analytic_story://F5 BIG-IP Vulnerability CVE-2022-1388]
category = Adversary Tactics
last_updated = 2022-05-10
version = 1
references = ["https://github.com/dk4trin/templates-nuclei/blob/main/CVE-2022-1388.yaml", "https://www.randori.com/blog/vulnerability-analysis-cve-2022-1388/", "https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2022-1388", "https://twitter.com/da_667/status/1523770267327250438?s=20\u0026t=-JnB_aNWuJFsmcOmxGUWLQ", "https://github.com/horizon3ai/CVE-2022-1388/blob/main/CVE-2022-1388.py"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - F5 BIG-IP iControl REST Vulnerability CVE-2022-1388 - Rule"]
description = CVE-2022-1388 is a unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerablity against BIG-IP iControl REST API.
narrative = CVE-2022-1388 is a critical vulnerability (CVSS 9.8) in the management interface of F5 Networks'' BIG-IP solution that enables an unauthenticated attacker to gain remote code execution on the system through bypassing F5''s iControl REST authentication. The vulnerability was first discovered by F5''s internal product security team and disclosed publicly on May 4, 2022, per Randori. This vulnerability,CVE-2022-1388, may allow an unauthenticated attacker with network access to the BIG-IP system through the management port and/or self IP addresses to execute arbitrary system commands, create or delete files, or disable services. There is no data plane exposure; this is a control plane issue only per F5 article K23605346. Is CVE-2022-1388 Exploitable? Yes. There are now multiple POC scripts available and reports of threat actors scanning and potentially exploiting the vulnerablity. Per Randori the specific interface needed to exploit this vulnerability is rarely publicly exposed, and the risk to most organizations of exploitation by an unauthenticated external actor is low.
[analytic_story://F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902]
category = Adversary Tactics
last_updated = 2020-08-02
@@ -9734,6 +9755,17 @@ searches = ["ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadFile - Rule", "ESCU - Any Powershell
description = Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Files may be copied from an external adversary controlled system through the command and control channel to bring tools into the victim network or through alternate protocols with another tool such as FTP.
narrative = Ingress tool transfer is a Technique under tactic Command and Control. Behaviors will include the use of living off the land binaries to download implants or binaries over alternate communication ports. It is imperative to baseline applications on endpoints to understand what generates network activity, to where, and what is its native behavior. These utilities, when abused, will write files to disk in world writeable paths.\ During triage, review the reputation of the remote public destination IP or domain. Capture any files written to disk and perform analysis. Review other parrallel processes for additional behaviors.
[analytic_story://Insider Threat]
category = Adversary Tactics
last_updated = 2022-05-19
version = 1
references = ["https://www.imperva.com/learn/application-security/insider-threats/", "https://www.cisa.gov/defining-insider-threats", "https://www.code42.com/glossary/types-of-insider-threats/", "https://github.com/Insider-Threat/Insider-Threat", "https://ctid.mitre-engenuity.org/our-work/insider-ttp-kb/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Jose Hernandez"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Gsuite Drive Share In External Email - Rule", "ESCU - Gsuite Outbound Email With Attachment To External Domain - Rule", "ESCU - High Frequency Copy Of Files In Network Share - Rule", "ESCU - Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Process - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Users Authenticate Using Explicit Credentials - Rule"]
description = Monitor for activities and techniques associated with insider threats and specifically focusing on malicious insiders operating with in a corporate environment.
narrative = Insider Threats are best defined by CISA: "Insider threat incidents are possible in any sector or organization. An insider threat is typically a current or former employee, third-party contractor, or business partner. In their present or former role, the person has or had access to an organization's network systems, data, or premises, and uses their access (sometimes unwittingly). To combat the insider threat, organizations can implement a proactive, prevention-focused mitigation program to detect and identify threats, assess risk, and manage that risk - before an incident occurs." An insider is any person who has or had authorized access to or knowledge of an organization's resources, including personnel, facilities, information, equipment, networks, and systems. These are the common insiders that create insider threats: Departing Employees, Security Evaders, Malicious Insiders, and Negligent Employees. This story aims at detecting the malicious insider.
[analytic_story://JBoss Vulnerability]
category = Vulnerability
last_updated = 2017-09-14
dist/escu/default/collections.conf
Vendored
+1 -181
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@@ -1,223 +1,43 @@
#############
# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
# On Date: 2022-05-02T22:16:41 UTC
# On Date: 2022-05-20T21:45:40 UTC
# Author: Splunk Security Research
# Contact: research@splunk.com
#############
[__mlspl_unusual_commandline_detection]
enforceTypes = false
replicate = false
[api_call_by_user_baseline]
enforceTypes = false
replicate = false
[attacker_tools]
enforceTypes = false
replicate = false
[aws_service_accounts]
enforceTypes = false
replicate = false
[baseline_blocked_outbound_connections]
enforceTypes = false
replicate = false
[brandMonitoring_lookup]
enforceTypes = false
replicate = false
[cloud_instances_enough_data]
enforceTypes = false
replicate = false
[csc_lookup]
enforceTypes = false
replicate = false
[discovered_dns_records]
enforceTypes = false
replicate = false
[domains]
enforceTypes = false
replicate = false
[dynamic_dns_providers_default]
enforceTypes = false
replicate = false
[dynamic_dns_providers_local]
enforceTypes = false
replicate = false
[escu_search_id_lookup]
enforceTypes = false
replicate = false
[images_to_repository]
enforceTypes = false
replicate = false
[is_net_windows_file]
enforceTypes = false
replicate = false
[is_nirsoft_software]
enforceTypes = false
replicate = false
[is_suspicious_file_extension_lookup]
enforceTypes = false
replicate = false
[is_windows_system_file]
enforceTypes = false
replicate = false
[legit_domains]
enforceTypes = false
replicate = false
[linux_tool_discovery_process]
enforceTypes = false
replicate = false
[local_file_inclusion_paths]
enforceTypes = false
replicate = false
[lookup_rare_process_allow_list_default]
enforceTypes = false
replicate = false
[lookup_rare_process_allow_list_local]
enforceTypes = false
replicate = false
[lookup_uncommon_processes_default]
enforceTypes = false
replicate = false
[lookup_uncommon_processes_local]
enforceTypes = false
replicate = false
[mandatory_job_for_workflow]
enforceTypes = false
replicate = false
[mandatory_step_for_job]
enforceTypes = false
replicate = false
[network_acl_activity_baseline]
enforceTypes = false
replicate = false
[previously_seen_S3_access_from_remote_ip]
enforceTypes = false
replicate = false
[previously_seen_api_calls_from_user_roles]
enforceTypes = false
replicate = false
[previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity]
enforceTypes = false
replicate = false
[previously_seen_aws_regions]
enforceTypes = false
replicate = false
[previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role]
enforceTypes = false
replicate = false
[previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user]
enforceTypes = false
replicate = false
[previously_seen_cloud_compute_images]
enforceTypes = false
replicate = false
[previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types]
enforceTypes = false
replicate = false
[previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user]
enforceTypes = false
replicate = false
[previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources]
enforceTypes = false
replicate = false
[previously_seen_cloud_regions]
enforceTypes = false
replicate = false
[previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments]
enforceTypes = false
replicate = false
[previously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user]
enforceTypes = false
replicate = false
[previously_seen_gcp_storage_access_from_remote_ip]
enforceTypes = false
replicate = false
[previously_seen_running_windows_services]
enforceTypes = false
replicate = false
[previously_seen_users_console_logins]
enforceTypes = false
replicate = false
[prohibited_apps_launching_cmd]
enforceTypes = false
replicate = false
[prohibited_processes]
enforceTypes = false
replicate = false
[prohibited_softwares]
enforceTypes = false
replicate = false
[ransomware_extensions_lookup]
enforceTypes = false
replicate = false
[ransomware_notes_lookup]
enforceTypes = false
replicate = false
[s3_deletion_baseline]
enforceTypes = false
replicate = false
[security_group_activity_baseline]
enforceTypes = false
replicate = false
[security_services_lookup]
enforceTypes = false
replicate = false
[suspicious_writes_lookup]
enforceTypes = false
replicate = false
[zoom_first_time_child_process]
enforceTypes = false
replicate = false
dist/escu/default/es_investigations.conf
Vendored
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
#############
# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
# On Date: 2022-05-02T22:16:41 UTC
# On Date: 2022-05-20T21:45:40 UTC
# Author: Splunk Security Research
# Contact: research@splunk.com
#############
dist/escu/default/macros.conf
Vendored
+6 -2
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
#############
# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
# On Date: 2022-05-02T22:16:41 UTC
# On Date: 2022-05-20T21:45:40 UTC
# Author: Splunk Security Research
# Contact: research@splunk.com
#############
@@ -1645,7 +1645,7 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[linux_deletion_of_ssh_key_filter]
[linux_deletion_of_ssh_hash_conf_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
@@ -3465,6 +3465,10 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[f5_big_ip_icontrol_rest_vulnerability_cve_2022_1388_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[multiple_archive_files_http_post_traffic_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
dist/escu/default/savedsearches.conf
Vendored
+128 -82
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@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
#############
# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
# On Date: 2022-05-02T22:16:41 UTC
# On Date: 2022-05-20T21:45:40 UTC
# Author: Splunk Security Research
# Contact: research@splunk.com
#############
@@ -273,14 +273,14 @@ search = | tstats count as security_group_api_calls values(All_Changes.command)
[ESCU - AWS Create Policy Version to allow all resources - Rule]
action.escu = 0
action.escu.enabled = 1
description = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user created a policy version that allows them to access any resource in their account
description = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user created a policy version that allows them to access any resource in their account.
action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1078"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]}
action.escu.data_models = []
action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user created a policy version that allows them to access any resource in their account
action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user created a policy version that allows them to access any resource in their account.
action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs.
action.escu.known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created a policy to allow a user to access all resources. That said, AWS strongly advises against granting full control to all AWS resources
action.escu.creation_date = 2021-02-22
action.escu.modification_date = 2021-02-22
action.escu.known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created a policy to allow a user to access all resources. That said, AWS strongly advises against granting full control to all AWS resources and you must verify this activity.
action.escu.creation_date = 2022-05-17
action.escu.modification_date = 2022-05-17
action.escu.confidence = high
action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Create Policy Version to allow all resources - Rule
action.escu.search_type = detection
@@ -288,7 +288,7 @@ action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splun
action.escu.providing_technologies = []
action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS IAM Privilege Escalation"]
action.risk = 1
action.risk.param._risk_message = User $user$ created a policy version that allows them to access any resource in their account
action.risk.param._risk_message = User $user$ created a policy version that allows them to access any resource in their account.
action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 49}]
action.risk.param._risk_score = 0
action.risk.param.verbose = 0
@@ -301,7 +301,7 @@ action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS IAM Privilege Es
schedule_window = auto
action.notable = 1
action.notable.param.nes_fields = user,dest
action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user created a policy version that allows them to access any resource in their account
action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user created a policy version that allows them to access any resource in their account.
action.notable.param.rule_title = AWS Create Policy Version to allow all resources
action.notable.param.security_domain = network
action.notable.param.severity = high
@@ -314,7 +314,7 @@ relation = greater than
quantity = 0
realtime_schedule = 0
is_visible = false
search = `cloudtrail` eventName=CreatePolicyVersion eventSource = iam.amazonaws.com errorCode = success | spath input=requestParameters.policyDocument output=key_policy_statements path=Statement{} | mvexpand key_policy_statements | spath input=key_policy_statements output=key_policy_action_1 path=Action | search key_policy_action_1 = "*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(key_policy_statements) as policy_added by eventName eventSource aws_account_id errorCode userAgent eventID awsRegion userIdentity.principalId user_arn | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|`aws_create_policy_version_to_allow_all_resources_filter`
search = `cloudtrail` eventName=CreatePolicyVersion eventSource = iam.amazonaws.com errorCode = success | spath input=requestParameters.policyDocument output=key_policy_statements path=Statement{} | mvexpand key_policy_statements | spath input=key_policy_statements output=key_policy_action_1 path=Action | where key_policy_action_1 = "*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(key_policy_statements) as policy_added by eventName eventSource aws_account_id errorCode userAgent eventID awsRegion user user_arn | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|`aws_create_policy_version_to_allow_all_resources_filter`
[ESCU - AWS CreateAccessKey - Rule]
action.escu = 0
@@ -1873,10 +1873,10 @@ description = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console logi
action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]}
action.escu.data_models = ["Authentication"]
action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour
action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Run the `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Initial` support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Update` hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines.
action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Run the `Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail - Initial` support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run `Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail - Update` hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines.
action.escu.known_false_positives = When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate.
action.escu.creation_date = 2020-05-28
action.escu.modification_date = 2020-05-28
action.escu.creation_date = 2022-05-10
action.escu.modification_date = 2022-05-10
action.escu.confidence = high
action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by New User - Rule
action.escu.search_type = detection
@@ -2420,7 +2420,7 @@ action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Gsuite Drive Share In External Email - Rul
action.escu.search_type = detection
action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
action.escu.providing_technologies = []
action.escu.analytic_story = ["Dev Sec Ops"]
action.escu.analytic_story = ["Dev Sec Ops", "Insider Threat"]
action.risk = 1
action.risk.param._risk_message = suspicious share gdrive from $parameters.owner$ to $email$ namely as $parameters.doc_title$
action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "parameters.owner", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 72}, {"risk_object_field": "email", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 72}]
@@ -2431,7 +2431,7 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Gsuite Drive Share In External Email - Rule
action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1567.002", "T1567"], "observable": [{"name": "parameters.owner", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "email", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]}
action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops", "Insider Threat"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1567.002", "T1567"], "observable": [{"name": "parameters.owner", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "email", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]}
schedule_window = auto
alert.digest_mode = 1
disabled = true
@@ -2580,7 +2580,7 @@ action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Gsuite Outbound Email With Attachment To E
action.escu.search_type = detection
action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
action.escu.providing_technologies = []
action.escu.analytic_story = ["Dev Sec Ops"]
action.escu.analytic_story = ["Dev Sec Ops", "Insider Threat"]
action.risk = 1
action.risk.param._risk_message = suspicious email from $source.address$ to $destination{}.address$
action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "source.address", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 9}, {"risk_object_field": "destination{}.address", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 9}]
@@ -2591,7 +2591,7 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Gsuite Outbound Email With Attachment To External Domain - Rule
action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003", "T1048"], "observable": [{"name": "source.address", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "destination{}.address", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]}
action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops", "Insider Threat"], "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003", "T1048"], "observable": [{"name": "source.address", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "destination{}.address", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]}
schedule_window = auto
alert.digest_mode = 1
disabled = true
@@ -5736,7 +5736,7 @@ description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk T
action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Actions on Objectives"]}
action.escu.data_models = ["Network_Resolution"]
action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for DNS requests for faux domains similar to the domains that you want to have monitored for abuse.
action.escu.how_to_implement = You need to ingest data from your DNS logs. Specifically you must ingest the domain that is being queried and the IP of the host originating the request. Ideally, you should also be ingesting the answer to the query and the query type. This approach allows you to also create your own localized passive DNS capability which can aid you in future investigations. You also need to have run the search "ESCU - DNSTwist Domain Names", which creates the permutations of the domain that will be checked for.
action.escu.how_to_implement = You need to ingest data from your DNS logs. Specifically you must ingest the domain that is being queried and the IP of the host originating the request. Ideally, you should also be ingesting the answer to the query and the query type. This approach allows you to also create your own localized passive DNS capability which can aid you in future investigations. You also need to have run the search "ESCU - DNSTwist Domain Names", which creates the permutations of the domain that will be checked for. You also need the [`dnstwist`](https://gist.github.com/d1vious/c4c2aae7fa7d5cbb1f24adc5f6303) custom command.
action.escu.known_false_positives = None at this time
action.escu.creation_date = 2017-09-23
action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-23
@@ -14929,8 +14929,8 @@ action.escu.data_models = []
action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy` commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.
action.escu.how_to_implement = The following Hunting analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging.
action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.
action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-26
action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-26
action.escu.creation_date = 2022-03-22
action.escu.modification_date = 2022-03-22
action.escu.confidence = high
action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule
action.escu.search_type = detection
@@ -14958,7 +14958,7 @@ relation = greater than
quantity = 0
realtime_schedule = 0
is_visible = false
search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 Message ="*Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block_filter`
search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText ="*Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer user_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block_filter`
[ESCU - Get ADUser with PowerShell - Rule]
action.escu = 0
@@ -15377,8 +15377,8 @@ action.escu.data_models = []
action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainUser` commandlet. `GetDomainUser` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerView to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.
action.escu.how_to_implement = The following Hunting analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging.
action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.
action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-24
action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-24
action.escu.creation_date = 2022-03-22
action.escu.modification_date = 2022-03-22
action.escu.confidence = high
action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule
action.escu.search_type = detection
@@ -15412,7 +15412,7 @@ relation = greater than
quantity = 0
realtime_schedule = 0
is_visible = false
search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = "*Get-DomainUser*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_domainuser_with_powershell_script_block_filter`
search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = "*Get-DomainUser*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer user_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_domainuser_with_powershell_script_block_filter`
[ESCU - Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell - Rule]
action.escu = 0
@@ -15472,7 +15472,7 @@ action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Loggi
This analytic identifies Get-ForestTrust from PowerSploit in order to gather domain trust information. \
During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block.
action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.
action.escu.known_false_positives = UPDATE_KNOWN_FALSE_POSITIVES
action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present. Tune as needed.
action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-02
action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-02
action.escu.confidence = high
@@ -15510,7 +15510,7 @@ relation = greater than
quantity = 0
realtime_schedule = 0
is_visible = false
search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = "*get-foresttrust*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Message OpCode ComputerName User EventCode | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_foresttrust_with_powershell_script_block_filter`
search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = "*get-foresttrust*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer user_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_foresttrust_with_powershell_script_block_filter`
[ESCU - Get WMIObject Group Discovery - Rule]
action.escu = 0
@@ -15565,8 +15565,8 @@ This analytic identifies the usage of `Get-WMIObject Win32_Group`, which is typi
During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block.
action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.
action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present. Tune as needed.
action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-14
action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-14
action.escu.creation_date = 2022-03-22
action.escu.modification_date = 2022-03-22
action.escu.confidence = high
action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get WMIObject Group Discovery with Script Block Logging - Rule
action.escu.search_type = detection
@@ -15594,7 +15594,7 @@ relation = greater than
quantity = 0
realtime_schedule = 0
is_visible = false
search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = "*Get-WMIObject*" AND Message = "*Win32_Group*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Message OpCode ComputerName User EventCode| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_wmiobject_group_discovery_with_script_block_logging_filter`
search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = "*Get-WMIObject*" AND ScriptBlockText = "*Win32_Group*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer user_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_wmiobject_group_discovery_with_script_block_logging_filter`
[ESCU - GetAdComputer with PowerShell - Rule]
action.escu = 0
@@ -15725,8 +15725,8 @@ action.escu.data_models = []
action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-AdGroup` commandlet. The `Get-AdGroup` commandlet is used to return a list of all domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.
action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.
action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting.
action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-25
action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-25
action.escu.creation_date = 2022-03-22
action.escu.modification_date = 2022-03-22
action.escu.confidence = high
action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GetAdGroup with PowerShell Script Block - Rule
action.escu.search_type = detection
@@ -15754,7 +15754,7 @@ relation = greater than
quantity = 0
realtime_schedule = 0
is_visible = false
search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = "*Get-ADGroup*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getadgroup_with_powershell_script_block_filter`
search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = "*Get-ADGroup*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer user_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getadgroup_with_powershell_script_block_filter`
[ESCU - GetCurrent User with PowerShell - Rule]
action.escu = 0
@@ -15805,8 +15805,8 @@ action.escu.data_models = []
action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `GetCurrent` method of the WindowsIdentity .NET class. This method returns an object that represents the current Windows user. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this method to identify the logged user on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.
action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.
action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting.
action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-13
action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-13
action.escu.creation_date = 2022-03-22
action.escu.modification_date = 2022-03-22
action.escu.confidence = high
action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GetCurrent User with PowerShell Script Block - Rule
action.escu.search_type = detection
@@ -15834,7 +15834,7 @@ relation = greater than
quantity = 0
realtime_schedule = 0
is_visible = false
search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = "*[System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity]*" AND Message = "*GetCurrent()*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getcurrent_user_with_powershell_script_block_filter`
search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = "*[System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity]*" ScriptBlockText = "*GetCurrent()*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer user_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getcurrent_user_with_powershell_script_block_filter`
[ESCU - GetDomainComputer with PowerShell - Rule]
action.escu = 0
@@ -16155,8 +16155,8 @@ action.escu.data_models = []
action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-LocalUser` commandlet. The `Get-LocalUser` commandlet is used to return a list of all local users. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.
action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.
action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting.
action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-23
action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-23
action.escu.creation_date = 2022-03-22
action.escu.modification_date = 2022-03-22
action.escu.confidence = high
action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GetLocalUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule
action.escu.search_type = detection
@@ -16184,7 +16184,7 @@ relation = greater than
quantity = 0
realtime_schedule = 0
is_visible = false
search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = "*Get-LocalUser*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getlocaluser_with_powershell_script_block_filter`
search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 (ScriptBlockText = "*Get-LocalUser*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer user_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getlocaluser_with_powershell_script_block_filter`
[ESCU - GetNetTcpconnection with PowerShell - Rule]
action.escu = 0
@@ -16776,7 +16776,7 @@ action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - High Frequency Copy Of Files In Network Sh
action.escu.search_type = detection
action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
action.escu.providing_technologies = []
action.escu.analytic_story = ["Information Sabotage"]
action.escu.analytic_story = ["Information Sabotage", "Insider Threat"]
action.risk = 1
action.risk.param._risk_message = high frequency copy of document in network share $Share_Name$ from $Source_Address$ by $user$
action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 9}]
@@ -16787,7 +16787,7 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - High Frequency Copy Of Files In Network Share - Rule
action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Information Sabotage"], "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Exfiltration"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1537"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]}
action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Information Sabotage", "Insider Threat"], "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Exfiltration"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1537"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]}
schedule_window = auto
alert.digest_mode = 1
disabled = true
@@ -17087,8 +17087,8 @@ action.escu.data_models = []
action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the usage of the `Enter-PSSession`. This commandlet can be used to open an interactive session on a remote endpoint leveraging the WinRM protocol. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse WinRM and `Enter-PSSession` for lateral movement and remote code execution.
action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup instructions can be found https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.
action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may leverage WinRM and `Enter-PSSession` for administrative and troubleshooting tasks. This activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users. In certain environments, tuning may not be possible.
action.escu.creation_date = 2022-02-18
action.escu.modification_date = 2022-02-18
action.escu.creation_date = 2022-03-22
action.escu.modification_date = 2022-03-22
action.escu.confidence = high
action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Interactive Session on Remote Endpoint with PowerShell - Rule
action.escu.search_type = detection
@@ -17122,7 +17122,7 @@ relation = greater than
quantity = 0
realtime_schedule = 0
is_visible = false
search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message="*Enter-PSSession*" AND Message="*-ComputerName*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `interactive_session_on_remote_endpoint_with_powershell_filter`
search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 (ScriptBlockText="*Enter-PSSession*" AND ScriptBlockText="*-ComputerName*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer user_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `interactive_session_on_remote_endpoint_with_powershell_filter`
[ESCU - Java Class File download by Java User Agent - Rule]
action.escu = 0
@@ -17363,8 +17363,8 @@ action.escu.data_models = []
action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Set-ADAccountControl` commandlet with specific parameters. `Set-ADAccountControl` is part of the Active Directory PowerShell module used to manage Windows Active Directory networks. As the name suggests, `Set-ADAccountControl` is used to modify User Account Control values for an Active Directory domain account. With the appropiate parameters, Set-ADAccountControl allows adversaries to disable Kerberos Pre-Authentication for an account to to easily perform a brute force attack against the user's password offline leveraging the ASP REP Roasting technique. Red Teams and adversaries alike who have obtained privileges in an Active Directory network may use this technique as a backdoor or a way to escalate privileges.
action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.
action.escu.known_false_positives = Although unlikely, Administrators may need to set this flag for legitimate purposes.
action.escu.creation_date = 2022-02-23
action.escu.modification_date = 2022-02-23
action.escu.creation_date = 2022-03-22
action.escu.modification_date = 2022-03-22
action.escu.confidence = high
action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled with PowerShell - Rule
action.escu.search_type = detection
@@ -17398,7 +17398,7 @@ relation = greater than
quantity = 0
realtime_schedule = 0
is_visible = false
search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = "*Set-ADAccountControl*" AND Message="*DoesNotRequirePreAuth:$true*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `kerberos_pre_authentication_flag_disabled_with_powershell_filter`
search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 (ScriptBlockText = "*Set-ADAccountControl*" AND ScriptBlockText="*DoesNotRequirePreAuth:$true*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer user_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `kerberos_pre_authentication_flag_disabled_with_powershell_filter`
[ESCU - Kerberos Service Ticket Request Using RC4 Encryption - Rule]
action.escu = 0
@@ -17996,7 +17996,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
is_visible = false
search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.action=deleted Filesystem.file_path IN ( "/etc/systemd/*", "/usr/lib/systemd/*") Filesystem.file_path = "*.service" by _time span=1h Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.dest Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.action | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [ | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name != unknown by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_path Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name action] | table process_name process proc_guid file_name file_path action _time parent_process_name parent_process process_path dest user | `linux_deletion_of_services_filter`
[ESCU - Linux deletion Of SSH Key - Rule]
[ESCU - Linux deletion Of SSH Hash Conf - Rule]
action.escu = 0
action.escu.enabled = 1
description = This analytic is to detect a deletion of ssh key in a linux machine. attacker may delete or modify ssh key to impair some security features or act as defense evasion in compromised linux machine. This Anomaly can be also a good indicator of a malware trying to wipe or delete several files in a compromised host as part of its destructive payload like what acidrain malware does in linux or router machines. This detection can be a good pivot to check what process and user tries to delete this type of files which is not so common and need further investigation.
@@ -18008,7 +18008,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can execut
action.escu.creation_date = 2022-04-12
action.escu.modification_date = 2022-04-12
action.escu.confidence = high
action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux deletion Of SSH Key - Rule
action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux deletion Of SSH Hash Conf - Rule
action.escu.search_type = detection
action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
action.escu.providing_technologies = []
@@ -18022,7 +18022,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux deletion Of SSH Key - Rule
action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux deletion Of SSH Hash Conf - Rule
action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Acidrain"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1485", "T1070.004", "T1070"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]}
schedule_window = auto
alert.digest_mode = 1
@@ -18034,7 +18034,7 @@ relation = greater than
quantity = 0
realtime_schedule = 0
is_visible = false
search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.action=deleted Filesystem.file_path = "/etc/ssh/*" by _time span=1h Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.dest Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.action | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [ | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name != unknown by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_path Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name action] | table process_name process proc_guid file_name file_path action _time parent_process_name parent_process process_path dest user | `linux_deletion_of_ssh_key_filter`
search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.action=deleted AND Filesystem.file_path IN ("/etc/ssh/*", "~/.ssh/*") by _time span=1h Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.dest Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.action | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [ | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name != unknown by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_path Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name action] | table process_name process proc_guid file_name file_path action _time parent_process_name parent_process process_path dest user | `linux_deletion_of_ssh_hash_conf_filter`
[ESCU - Linux Deletion of SSL Certificate - Rule]
action.escu = 0
@@ -18452,7 +18452,7 @@ action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Iptables Firewall Modification - Rul
action.escu.search_type = detection
action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
action.escu.providing_technologies = []
action.escu.analytic_story = ["Cyclops BLink"]
action.escu.analytic_story = ["CyclopsBLink"]
action.risk = 1
action.risk.param._risk_message = A commandline $process$ that may modify iptables firewall on $dest$
action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}]
@@ -18463,7 +18463,7 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Iptables Firewall Modification - Rule
action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Cyclops BLink"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.004", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]}
action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["CyclopsBLink"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.004", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]}
schedule_window = auto
alert.digest_mode = 1
disabled = true
@@ -18538,7 +18538,7 @@ action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Kworker Process In Writable Process
action.escu.search_type = detection
action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
action.escu.providing_technologies = []
action.escu.analytic_story = ["Cyclops BLink"]
action.escu.analytic_story = ["CyclopsBLink"]
action.risk = 1
action.risk.param._risk_message = a $process_name$ with kworker commandline in $dest$
action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 36}]
@@ -18549,7 +18549,7 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Kworker Process In Writable Process Path - Rule
action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Cyclops BLink"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036.004", "T1036"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]}
action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["CyclopsBLink"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036.004", "T1036"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]}
schedule_window = auto
alert.digest_mode = 1
disabled = true
@@ -20658,7 +20658,7 @@ action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate Fro
action.escu.search_type = detection
action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
action.escu.providing_technologies = []
action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Password Spraying"]
action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Password Spraying", "Insider Threat"]
action.risk = 1
action.risk.param._risk_message = Potential password spraying attack from $ComputerName$
action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 49}]
@@ -20669,7 +20669,7 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Process - Rule
action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Password Spraying"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110.003", "T1110"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]}
action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Password Spraying", "Insider Threat"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110.003", "T1110"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]}
schedule_window = auto
alert.digest_mode = 1
disabled = true
@@ -22566,8 +22566,8 @@ action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"]
action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect a COM CLSID execution through powershell. This technique was seen in several adversaries and malware like ransomware conti where it has a feature to execute command using COM Object. This technique may use by network operator at some cases but a good indicator if some application want to gain privilege escalation or bypass uac.
action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.
action.escu.known_false_positives = network operrator may use this command.
action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-10
action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-10
action.escu.creation_date = 2022-03-22
action.escu.modification_date = 2022-03-22
action.escu.confidence = high
action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Powershell Execute COM Object - Rule
action.escu.search_type = detection
@@ -22601,7 +22601,7 @@ relation = greater than
quantity = 0
realtime_schedule = 0
is_visible = false
search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = "*CreateInstance([type]::GetTypeFromCLSID*" OR Message = "*CreateInstance([Type]::GetTypeFromProgID*"| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_execute_com_object_filter`
search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = "*CreateInstance([type]::GetTypeFromCLSID*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer user_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_execute_com_object_filter`
[ESCU - Powershell Fileless Process Injection via GetProcAddress - Rule]
action.escu = 0
@@ -23037,13 +23037,13 @@ search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
action.escu = 0
action.escu.enabled = 1
description = The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104 that is using memory stream as new object backstore. The malicious PowerShell script will contain stream flate data and will be decompressed in memory to run or drop the actual payload. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts.
action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1140"]}
action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001", "T1059"]}
action.escu.data_models = []
action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104 that is using memory stream as new object backstore. The malicious PowerShell script will contain stream flate data and will be decompressed in memory to run or drop the actual payload. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts.
action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.
action.escu.known_false_positives = powershell may used this function to store out object into memory.
action.escu.creation_date = 2021-06-10
action.escu.modification_date = 2021-06-10
action.escu.creation_date = 2022-03-22
action.escu.modification_date = 2022-03-22
action.escu.confidence = high
action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Powershell Using memory As Backing Store - Rule
action.escu.search_type = detection
@@ -23060,7 +23060,7 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Powershell Using memory As Backing Store - Rule
action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Hermetic Wiper", "Malicious PowerShell"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1140"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]}
action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Hermetic Wiper", "Malicious PowerShell"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001", "T1059"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]}
schedule_window = auto
action.notable = 1
action.notable.param.nes_fields = user,dest
@@ -23077,7 +23077,7 @@ relation = greater than
quantity = 0
realtime_schedule = 0
is_visible = false
search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = "*New-Object IO.MemoryStream*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_using_memory_as_backing_store_filter`
search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = *New-Object* ScriptBlockText = *IO.MemoryStream* | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer user_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_using_memory_as_backing_store_filter`
[ESCU - Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands - Rule]
action.escu = 0
@@ -23597,8 +23597,8 @@ action.escu.data_models = []
action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104 performing checks to identify anti-virus products installed on the endpoint. This technique is commonly found in malware and APT events where the adversary will map all running security applications or services. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts.
action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.
action.escu.known_false_positives = network administrator may used this command for checking purposes
action.escu.creation_date = 2021-06-10
action.escu.modification_date = 2021-06-10
action.escu.creation_date = 2022-03-22
action.escu.modification_date = 2022-03-22
action.escu.confidence = high
action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI - Rule
action.escu.search_type = detection
@@ -23632,7 +23632,7 @@ relation = greater than
quantity = 0
realtime_schedule = 0
is_visible = false
search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = "*SELECT*" OR Message = "*WMIC*") AND (Message = "*AntiVirusProduct*" OR Message = "*AntiSpywareProduct*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `recon_avproduct_through_pwh_or_wmi_filter`
search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 (ScriptBlockText = "*SELECT*" OR ScriptBlockText = "*WMIC*") AND (ScriptBlockText = "*AntiVirusProduct*" OR ScriptBlockText = "*AntiSpywareProduct*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer user_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `recon_avproduct_through_pwh_or_wmi_filter`
[ESCU - Recon Using WMI Class - Rule]
action.escu = 0
@@ -24137,8 +24137,8 @@ action.escu.data_models = []
action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of PowerShell with arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint by abusing the DCOM protocol. Specifically, this search looks for the abuse of ShellExecute and ExecuteShellCommand. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse DCOM for lateral movement and remote code execution.
action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup instructions can be found https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.
action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may leverage DCOM to start a process on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users.
action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-15
action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-15
action.escu.creation_date = 2022-03-22
action.escu.modification_date = 2022-03-22
action.escu.confidence = high
action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via DCOM and PowerShell Script Block - Rule
action.escu.search_type = detection
@@ -24172,7 +24172,7 @@ relation = greater than
quantity = 0
realtime_schedule = 0
is_visible = false
search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message="*Document.Application.ShellExecute*" OR Message="*Document.ActiveView.ExecuteShellCommand*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell_script_block_filter`
search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 (ScriptBlockText="*Document.Application.ShellExecute*" OR ScriptBlockText="*Document.ActiveView.ExecuteShellCommand*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer user_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell_script_block_filter`
[ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and PowerShell - Rule]
action.escu = 0
@@ -24229,8 +24229,8 @@ action.escu.data_models = []
action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of PowerShell with arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint by abusing the WinRM protocol. Specifically, this search looks for the abuse of the `Invoke-Command` commandlet. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse WinRM for lateral movement and remote code execution.
action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup instructions can be found https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.
action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may leverage WinRM and `Invoke-Command` to start a process on remote systems for system administration or automation use cases. This activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users. In certain environments, tuning may not be possible.
action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-16
action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-16
action.escu.creation_date = 2022-03-22
action.escu.modification_date = 2022-03-22
action.escu.confidence = high
action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and PowerShell Script Block - Rule
action.escu.search_type = detection
@@ -24264,7 +24264,7 @@ relation = greater than
quantity = 0
realtime_schedule = 0
is_visible = false
search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message="*Invoke-Command*" AND Message="*-ComputerName*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell_script_block_filter`
search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 (ScriptBlockText="*Invoke-Command*" AND ScriptBlockText="*-ComputerName*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer user_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell_script_block_filter`
[ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and Winrs - Rule]
action.escu = 0
@@ -29244,7 +29244,7 @@ action.escu.enabled = 1
description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \
This analytic identifies the behavior of AMSI being tampered with. Implemented natively in many frameworks, the command will look similar to `SEtValuE($Null,(New-OBJEct COLlECtionS.GenerIC.HAshSEt{[StrINg]))}$ReF=[ReF].AsSeMbLY.GeTTyPe("System.Management.Automation.Amsi"+"Utils")` taken from Powershell-Empire. \
During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block.
action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562"]}
action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562", "T1059.001", "T1059"]}
action.escu.data_models = []
action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \
This analytic identifies the behavior of AMSI being tampered with. Implemented natively in many frameworks, the command will look similar to `SEtValuE($Null,(New-OBJEct COLlECtionS.GenerIC.HAshSEt{[StrINg]))}$ReF=[ReF].AsSeMbLY.GeTTyPe("System.Management.Automation.Amsi"+"Utils")` taken from Powershell-Empire. \
@@ -29269,7 +29269,7 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Unloading AMSI via Reflection - Rule
action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Hermetic Wiper", "Malicious PowerShell"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]}
action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Hermetic Wiper", "Malicious PowerShell"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562", "T1059.001", "T1059"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]}
schedule_window = auto
action.notable = 1
action.notable.param.nes_fields = user,dest
@@ -29288,7 +29288,7 @@ relation = greater than
quantity = 0
realtime_schedule = 0
is_visible = false
search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 Message=*system.management.automation.amsi* | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by OpCode ComputerName User EventCode Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `unloading_amsi_via_reflection_filter`
search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = *system.management.automation.amsi* | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer user_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `unloading_amsi_via_reflection_filter`
[ESCU - Unusual Number of Kerberos Service Tickets Requested - Rule]
action.escu = 0
@@ -29381,8 +29381,8 @@ action.escu.data_models = []
action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the use of PowerShell environment variables to identify the current logged user. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this method to identify the logged user on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.
action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.
action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting.
action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-13
action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-13
action.escu.creation_date = 2022-03-22
action.escu.modification_date = 2022-03-22
action.escu.confidence = high
action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell Script Block - Rule
action.escu.search_type = detection
@@ -29410,7 +29410,7 @@ relation = greater than
quantity = 0
realtime_schedule = 0
is_visible = false
search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = "*$env:UserName*" OR Message = "*[System.Environment]::UserName*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `user_discovery_with_env_vars_powershell_script_block_filter`
search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 (ScriptBlockText = "*$env:UserName*" OR ScriptBlockText = "*[System.Environment]::UserName*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer user_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `user_discovery_with_env_vars_powershell_script_block_filter`
[ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule]
action.escu = 0
@@ -32897,7 +32897,7 @@ action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Users Authenticate Using Explicit
action.escu.search_type = detection
action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
action.escu.providing_technologies = []
action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Password Spraying"]
action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Password Spraying", "Insider Threat"]
action.risk = 1
action.risk.param._risk_message = Potential password spraying attack from $ComputerName$
action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 49}]
@@ -32908,7 +32908,7 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Users Authenticate Using Explicit Credentials - Rule
action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Password Spraying"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110.003", "T1110"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]}
action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Password Spraying", "Insider Threat"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110.003", "T1110"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]}
schedule_window = auto
alert.digest_mode = 1
disabled = true
@@ -35825,7 +35825,7 @@ action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Stdout Redirection To Dev Null File
action.escu.search_type = detection
action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
action.escu.providing_technologies = []
action.escu.analytic_story = ["Cyclops BLink", "Industroyer2"]
action.escu.analytic_story = ["CyclopsBLink", "Industroyer2"]
action.risk = 1
action.risk.param._risk_message = a commandline $process$ that redirect stdout to dev/null in $dest$
action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 36}]
@@ -35836,7 +35836,7 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Stdout Redirection To Dev Null File - Rule
action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Cyclops BLink", "Industroyer2"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.004", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]}
action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["CyclopsBLink", "Industroyer2"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.004", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]}
schedule_window = auto
alert.digest_mode = 1
disabled = true
@@ -38372,6 +38372,52 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
is_visible = false
search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Resolution where NOT DNS.message_type IN("Pointer","PTR") by DNS.query | `drop_dm_object_name("DNS")` | eval tlds=split(query,".") | eval tld=mvindex(tlds,-1) | eval tld_len=len(tld) | search tld_len<=24 | eval query_length = len(query) | table query query_length record_type count | eventstats stdev(query_length) AS stdev avg(query_length) AS avg p50(query_length) AS p50| where query_length>(avg+stdev*2) | eval z_score=(query_length-avg)/stdev | `dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation_filter`
[ESCU - F5 BIG-IP iControl REST Vulnerability CVE-2022-1388 - Rule]
action.escu = 0
action.escu.enabled = 1
description = The following analytic identifies a recent unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerablity against the F5 BIG-IP iControl REST API. The analytic identifies the URI path found in the POCs and the HTTP Method of POST. In addition, the request header will have the commands that may be executed in fields utilcmdargs and the auth field of X-F5-Auth-Token, which may have a random base64 encoded value.
action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
action.escu.data_models = ["Web"]
action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies a recent unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerablity against the F5 BIG-IP iControl REST API. The analytic identifies the URI path found in the POCs and the HTTP Method of POST. In addition, the request header will have the commands that may be executed in fields utilcmdargs and the auth field of X-F5-Auth-Token, which may have a random base64 encoded value.
action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting web or proxy logs, or ensure it is being filled by a proxy like device, into the Web Datamodel. For additional filtering, allow list private IP space or restrict by known good.
action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present if the activity is blocked or was not successful. Filter known vulnerablity scanners. Filter as needed.
action.escu.creation_date = 2022-05-10
action.escu.modification_date = 2022-05-10
action.escu.confidence = high
action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - F5 BIG-IP iControl REST Vulnerability CVE-2022-1388 - Rule
action.escu.search_type = detection
action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
action.escu.providing_technologies = []
action.escu.analytic_story = ["F5 BIG-IP Vulnerability CVE-2022-1388"]
action.risk = 1
action.risk.param._risk_message = An attempt to exploit CVE-2022-1388 against an F5 appliance $dest$ has occurred.
action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 70}]
action.risk.param._risk_score = 0
action.risk.param.verbose = 0
cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - F5 BIG-IP iControl REST Vulnerability CVE-2022-1388 - Rule
action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["F5 BIG-IP Vulnerability CVE-2022-1388"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Scope:Network"], "cve": ["CVE-2022-1388"], "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]}
schedule_window = auto
action.notable = 1
action.notable.param.nes_fields = user,dest
action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies a recent unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerablity against the F5 BIG-IP iControl REST API. The analytic identifies the URI path found in the POCs and the HTTP Method of POST. In addition, the request header will have the commands that may be executed in fields utilcmdargs and the auth field of X-F5-Auth-Token, which may have a random base64 encoded value.
action.notable.param.rule_title = F5 BIG-IP iControl REST Vulnerability CVE-2022-1388
action.notable.param.security_domain = network
action.notable.param.severity = high
alert.digest_mode = 1
disabled = true
enableSched = 1
allow_skew = 100%
counttype = number of events
relation = greater than
quantity = 0
realtime_schedule = 0
is_visible = false
search = | tstats count from datamodel=Web where Web.url="*/mgmt/tm/util/bash*" Web.http_method="POST" by Web.http_user_agent Web.http_method, Web.url,Web.url_length Web.src, Web.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `f5_big_ip_icontrol_rest_vulnerability_cve_2022_1388_filter`
[ESCU - Multiple Archive Files Http Post Traffic - Rule]
action.escu = 0
action.escu.enabled = 1
dist/escu/default/transforms.conf
Vendored
+25 -204
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
#############
# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
# On Date: 2022-05-02T22:16:41 UTC
# On Date: 2022-05-20T21:45:40 UTC
# Author: Splunk Security Research
# Contact: research@splunk.com
#############
@@ -10,17 +10,12 @@ filename = __mlspl_unusual_commandline_detection.mlmodel
default_match = false
case_sensitive_match = false
# description = An MLTK model for detecting malicious commandlines
match_type = None
min_matches = 1
fields_list = None
[api_call_by_user_baseline]
filename = None
default_match = None
case_sensitive_match = None
collection = api_call_by_user_baseline
external_type = kvstore
# description = A collection that will contain the baseline information for number of AWS API calls per user
match_type = None
min_matches = None
fields_list = arn, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls
[attacker_tools]
@@ -30,151 +25,94 @@ case_sensitive_match = false
# description = A list of tools used by attackers
match_type = WILDCARD(attacker_tool_names)
min_matches = 1
fields_list = None
[aws_service_accounts]
filename = aws_service_accounts.csv
default_match = None
case_sensitive_match = None
# description = A lookup file that will contain AWS Service accounts
match_type = None
min_matches = None
fields_list = None
[baseline_blocked_outbound_connections]
filename = baseline_blocked_outbound_connections.csv
default_match = None
case_sensitive_match = None
# description = A lookup file that will contain the baseline information for number of blocked outbound connections
match_type = None
min_matches = None
fields_list = None
[brandMonitoring_lookup]
filename = brand_monitoring.csv
default_match = false
case_sensitive_match = None
# description = A file that contains look-a-like domains for brands that you want to monitor
match_type = WILDCARD(domain)
min_matches = 1
fields_list = None
[cloud_instances_enough_data]
filename = None
collection = cloud_instances_enough_data
external_type = kvstore
default_match = false
case_sensitive_match = None
# description = A lookup to determine if you have a sufficient amount of time has passed to collect cloud instance data for behavioral searches
match_type = WILDCARD(filter)
min_matches = None
fields_list = _key, filter, enough_data
[csc_lookup]
filename = csc_lookup.csv
default_match = None
case_sensitive_match = None
# description = The CSC control numbers and names
match_type = None
min_matches = 1
fields_list = None
[discovered_dns_records]
filename = discovered_dns_records.csv
default_match = false
case_sensitive_match = None
# description = A placeholder for a list of discovered DNS records generated by the baseline discover_dns_records
match_type = None
min_matches = 1
fields_list = None
[domains]
filename = domains.csv
default_match = None
case_sensitive_match = None
# description = A list of domains that can be ignored
match_type = None
min_matches = None
fields_list = None
[dynamic_dns_providers_default]
filename = dynamic_dns_providers_default.csv
default_match = None
case_sensitive_match = false
# description = A list of dynammic dns providers that should not be modified
match_type = WILDCARD(dynamic_dns_domains)
min_matches = None
fields_list = None
[dynamic_dns_providers_local]
filename = dynamic_dns_providers_local.csv
default_match = None
case_sensitive_match = false
# description = A list of dynammic dns providers that can be modified
match_type = WILDCARD(dynamic_dns_domains)
min_matches = None
fields_list = None
[escu_search_id_lookup]
filename = escu_search_id.csv
default_match = None
case_sensitive_match = None
# description = A placeholder lookup file to hold information for ESCU Usage dashboard
match_type = None
min_matches = None
fields_list = None
[images_to_repository]
filename = images_to_repository.csv
default_match = None
case_sensitive_match = None
# description = Mapping images to repositories
match_type = None
min_matches = None
fields_list = None
[is_net_windows_file]
filename = is_net_windows_file.csv
default_match = false
case_sensitive_match = false
# description = A full baseline of executable files in \Windows\, including sub-directories from Server 2016 and Windows 11. Certain .net binaries may not have been captured due to different Windows SDK's or developer utilities not installed during baseline.
match_type = None
min_matches = 1
fields_list = None
[is_nirsoft_software]
filename = is_nirsoft_software.csv
default_match = false
case_sensitive_match = false
# description = A subset of utilities provided by NirSoft that may be used by adversaries.
match_type = None
min_matches = 1
fields_list = None
[is_suspicious_file_extension_lookup]
filename = is_suspicious_file_extension_lookup.csv
default_match = None
case_sensitive_match = None
# description = A list of suspicious extensions for email attachments
match_type = WILDCARD(file_name)
min_matches = None
fields_list = None
[is_windows_system_file]
filename = is_windows_system_file.csv
default_match = false
case_sensitive_match = false
# description = A full baseline of executable files in Windows\System32 and Windows\Syswow64, including sub-directories from Server 2016 and Windows 10.
match_type = None
min_matches = 1
fields_list = None
[legit_domains]
filename = legit_domains.csv
default_match = None
case_sensitive_match = None
# description = A list of legit domains to be used as an ignore list for possible phishing sites
match_type = None
min_matches = None
fields_list = None
[linux_tool_discovery_process]
filename = linux_tool_discovery_process.csv
@@ -183,7 +121,6 @@ case_sensitive_match = false
# description = A list of suspicious bash commonly used by attackers via scripts
match_type = WILDCARD(process)
min_matches = 1
fields_list = None
[local_file_inclusion_paths]
filename = local_file_inclusion_paths.csv
@@ -192,7 +129,6 @@ case_sensitive_match = false
# description = A list of interesting files in a local file inclusion attack
match_type = WILDCARD(local_file_inclusion_paths)
min_matches = 1
fields_list = None
[lookup_rare_process_allow_list_default]
filename = rare_process_allow_list_default.csv
@@ -201,7 +137,6 @@ case_sensitive_match = false
# description = A list of rare processes that are legitimate that is provided by Splunk
match_type = WILDCARD(process)
min_matches = 1
fields_list = None
[lookup_rare_process_allow_list_local]
filename = rare_process_allow_list_local.csv
@@ -210,223 +145,129 @@ case_sensitive_match = false
# description = A list of rare processes that are legitimate provided by the end user
match_type = WILDCARD(process)
min_matches = 1
fields_list = None
[lookup_uncommon_processes_default]
filename = uncommon_processes_default.csv
default_match = None
case_sensitive_match = false
# description = A list of processes that are not common
match_type = WILDCARD(process)
min_matches = None
fields_list = None
[lookup_uncommon_processes_local]
filename = uncommon_processes_local.csv
default_match = None
case_sensitive_match = false
# description = A list of processes that are not common
match_type = WILDCARD(process)
min_matches = None
fields_list = None
[mandatory_job_for_workflow]
filename = mandatory_job_for_workflow.csv
default_match = None
case_sensitive_match = None
# description = A lookup file that will be used to define the mandatory job for workflow
match_type = None
min_matches = None
fields_list = None
[mandatory_step_for_job]
filename = mandatory_step_for_job.csv
default_match = None
case_sensitive_match = None
# description = A lookup file that will be used to define the mandatory step for job
match_type = None
min_matches = None
fields_list = None
[network_acl_activity_baseline]
filename = network_acl_activity_baseline.csv
default_match = None
case_sensitive_match = None
# description = A lookup file that will contain the baseline information for number of AWS Network ACL Activity
match_type = None
min_matches = None
fields_list = None
[previously_seen_S3_access_from_remote_ip]
filename = previously_seen_S3_access_from_remote_ip.csv
default_match = None
case_sensitive_match = None
# description = A placeholder for a list of IPs that have access S3
match_type = None
min_matches = None
fields_list = None
[previously_seen_api_calls_from_user_roles]
filename = previously_seen_api_calls_from_user_roles.csv
default_match = None
case_sensitive_match = None
# description = A placeholder for a list of AWS API calls for each user role
match_type = None
min_matches = None
fields_list = None
[previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity]
filename = previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity.csv
default_match = None
case_sensitive_match = None
# description = A placeholder for a list of AWS accounts and assumed roles
match_type = None
min_matches = None
fields_list = None
[previously_seen_aws_regions]
filename = previously_seen_aws_regions.csv
default_match = false
case_sensitive_match = None
# description = A place holder for a list of used AWS regions
match_type = None
min_matches = 1
fields_list = None
[previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role]
filename = None
default_match = None
case_sensitive_match = None
collection = previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role
external_type = kvstore
# description = A table of users, commands, and the first and last time that they have been seen
match_type = None
min_matches = None
fields_list = _key, user, command, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, enough_data
[previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user]
filename = None
default_match = None
case_sensitive_match = None
collection = previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user
external_type = kvstore
# description = A table of previously seen users creating cloud instances
match_type = None
min_matches = None
fields_list = _key, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, user, enough_data
[previously_seen_cloud_compute_images]
filename = None
default_match = None
case_sensitive_match = None
collection = previously_seen_cloud_compute_images
external_type = kvstore
# description = A table of previously seen Cloud image IDs
match_type = None
min_matches = None
fields_list = _key, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, image_id, enough_data
[previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types]
filename = None
default_match = None
case_sensitive_match = None
collection = previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types
external_type = kvstore
# description = A place holder for a list of used cloud compute instance types
match_type = None
min_matches = None
fields_list = _key, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, instance_type, enough_data
[previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user]
filename = None
default_match = None
case_sensitive_match = None
collection = previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user
external_type = kvstore
# description = A table of users seen making instance modifications, and the first and last time that the activity was observed
match_type = None
min_matches = None
fields_list = _key, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, user, enough_data
[previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources]
filename = None
default_match = None
case_sensitive_match = None
collection = previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources
external_type = kvstore
# description = A table of source IPs, geographic locations, and the first and last time that they have that done cloud provisioning activities
match_type = None
min_matches = None
fields_list = _key, src, City, Country, Region, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, enough_data
[previously_seen_cloud_regions]
filename = None
default_match = None
case_sensitive_match = None
collection = previously_seen_cloud_regions
external_type = kvstore
# description = A table of vendor_region values and the first and last time that they have been observed in cloud provisioning activities
match_type = None
min_matches = None
fields_list = _key, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, vendor_region, enough_data
[previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments]
filename = previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments.csv
default_match = None
case_sensitive_match = None
# description = A placeholder for a list of cmd line arugments that been seen before
match_type = None
min_matches = None
fields_list = None
[previously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user]
filename = previously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user.csv
default_match = None
case_sensitive_match = None
# description = A place holder for a list of AWS EC2 modifications done by each user
match_type = None
min_matches = None
fields_list = None
[previously_seen_gcp_storage_access_from_remote_ip]
filename = previously_seen_gcp_storage_access_from_remote_ip.csv
default_match = false
case_sensitive_match = None
# description = A place holder for a list of GCP storage access from remote IPs
match_type = None
min_matches = 1
fields_list = None
[previously_seen_running_windows_services]
filename = None
default_match = None
case_sensitive_match = None
collection = previously_seen_running_windows_services
external_type = kvstore
# description = A placeholder for the list of Windows Services running
match_type = None
min_matches = None
fields_list = _key, service, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen
[previously_seen_users_console_logins]
filename = None
default_match = None
case_sensitive_match = None
collection = previously_seen_users_console_logins
external_type = kvstore
# description = A table of users seen doing console logins, and the first and last time that the activity was observed
match_type = None
min_matches = None
fields_list = _key, firstTime, lastTime, user, src, City, Region, Country
[prohibited_apps_launching_cmd]
filename = prohibited_apps_launching_cmd.csv
default_match = None
case_sensitive_match = None
# description = A list of processes that should not be launching cmd.exe
match_type = WILDCARD(prohibited_applications)
min_matches = None
fields_list = None
[prohibited_processes]
filename = prohibited_processes.csv
default_match = None
case_sensitive_match = None
# description = A list of processes that have been marked as prohibited
match_type = None
min_matches = None
fields_list = None
[prohibited_softwares]
filename = prohibited_softwares.csv
default_match = None
case_sensitive_match = None
# description = A list of processes that have been marked as prohibited
match_type = None
min_matches = None
fields_list = None
[ransomware_extensions_lookup]
filename = ransomware_extensions.csv
@@ -435,60 +276,40 @@ case_sensitive_match = false
# description = A list of file extensions that are associated with ransomware
match_type = WILDCARD(Extensions)
min_matches = 1
fields_list = None
[ransomware_notes_lookup]
filename = ransomware_notes.csv
default_match = false
case_sensitive_match = None
# description = A list of file names that are ransomware note files
match_type = WILDCARD(ransomware_notes)
min_matches = 1
fields_list = None
[s3_deletion_baseline]
filename = s3_deletion_baseline.csv
default_match = None
case_sensitive_match = None
# description = A placeholder for the baseline information for AWS S3 deletions
match_type = None
min_matches = None
fields_list = None
[security_group_activity_baseline]
filename = security_group_activity_baseline.csv
default_match = None
case_sensitive_match = None
# description = A placeholder for the baseline information for AWS security groups
match_type = None
min_matches = None
fields_list = None
[security_services_lookup]
filename = security_services.csv
default_match = false
case_sensitive_match = None
# description = A list of services that deal with security
match_type = WILDCARD(service)
min_matches = 1
fields_list = None
[suspicious_writes_lookup]
filename = suspicious_files.csv
default_match = false
case_sensitive_match = None
# description = A list of suspicious file names
match_type = WILDCARD(file)
min_matches = 1
fields_list = None
[zoom_first_time_child_process]
filename = None
default_match = None
case_sensitive_match = None
collection = zoom_first_time_child_process
external_type = kvstore
# description = A list of suspicious file names
match_type = None
min_matches = None
fields_list = _key, dest, process_name, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen
dist/escu/default/workflow_actions.conf
Vendored
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
#############
# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
# On Date: 2022-05-02T22:16:41 UTC
# On Date: 2022-05-20T21:45:40 UTC
# Author: Splunk Security Research
# Contact: research@splunk.com
#############
docs/_posts/2017-01-07-spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems.md
+1 -1
View File
@@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ The search is used to detect systems that are still vulnerable to the Spectre an
#### Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
Note that **spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
docs/_posts/2017-09-12-detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers.md
+1 -1
View File
@@ -104,8 +104,8 @@ The search queries the authentication logs for assets that are categorized as ro
#### Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
Note that **detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
docs/_posts/2017-09-12-extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups.md
+1 -1
View File
@@ -99,8 +99,8 @@ This search returns a list of hosts that have not successfully completed a backu
#### Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [netbackup](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/netbackup.yml)
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [netbackup](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/netbackup.yml)
Note that **extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
docs/_posts/2017-09-12-unsuccessful_netbackup_backups.md
+1 -1
View File
@@ -98,8 +98,8 @@ This search gives you the hosts where a backup was attempted and then failed.
#### Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [netbackup](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/netbackup.yml)
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [netbackup](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/netbackup.yml)
Note that **unsuccessful_netbackup_backups_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
docs/_posts/2017-09-15-no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame.md
+1 -1
View File
@@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ This search looks for Windows endpoints that have not generated an event indicat
#### Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
Note that **no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
docs/_posts/2017-09-19-email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces.md
+1 -1
View File
@@ -103,8 +103,8 @@ Attackers often use spaces as a means to obfuscate an attachment's file extensio
#### Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
Note that **email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
docs/_posts/2017-09-23-detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers.md
+1 -1
View File
@@ -104,8 +104,8 @@ This search looks for specific GET or HEAD requests to web servers that are indi
#### Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
Note that **detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
docs/_posts/2017-09-23-detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers.md
+1 -1
View File
@@ -109,8 +109,8 @@ This search is used to detect malicious HTTP requests crafted to exploit jmx-con
#### Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
Note that **detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
docs/_posts/2017-09-23-monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse.md
+2 -2
View File
@@ -95,9 +95,9 @@ This search looks for DNS requests for faux domains similar to the domains that
#### Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
* [brand_abuse_dns](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/brand_abuse_dns.yml)
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [brand_abuse_dns](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/brand_abuse_dns.yml)
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
Note that **monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
docs/_posts/2017-09-23-monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse.md
+2 -2
View File
@@ -100,9 +100,9 @@ This search looks for Web requests to faux domains similar to the one that you w
#### Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
* [brand_abuse_web](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/brand_abuse_web.yml)
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [brand_abuse_web](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/brand_abuse_web.yml)
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
Note that **monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
docs/_posts/2017-11-27-detect_usb_device_insertion.md
+1 -1
View File
@@ -100,8 +100,8 @@ The search is used to detect hosts that generate Windows Event ID 4663 for succe
#### Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
Note that **detect_usb_device_insertion_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
docs/_posts/2018-01-05-monitor_email_for_brand_abuse.md
+1 -1
View File
@@ -105,8 +105,8 @@ This search looks for emails claiming to be sent from a domain similar to one th
#### Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
Note that **monitor_email_for_brand_abuse_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
docs/_posts/2018-02-23-ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region.md
+1 -1
View File
@@ -110,8 +110,8 @@ This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where an instance is started in a pa
#### Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml)
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml)
Note that **ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
docs/_posts/2018-03-12-ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_ami.md
+1 -1
View File
@@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ This search looks for EC2 instances being created with previously unseen AMIs.
#### Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml)
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml)
Note that **ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_ami_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
docs/_posts/2018-04-16-detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles.md
+1 -1
View File
@@ -117,8 +117,8 @@ This search detects new API calls that have either never been seen before or tha
#### Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml)
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml)
Note that **detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
docs/_posts/2018-05-17-detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa.md
+1 -1
View File
@@ -101,8 +101,8 @@ This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user logged into the AWS acc
#### Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml)
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml)
Note that **detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
docs/_posts/2018-06-01-detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets.md
+1 -1
View File
@@ -110,8 +110,8 @@ This search looks for outbound ICMP packets with a packet size larger than 1,000
#### Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
Note that **detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
docs/_posts/2018-10-23-wmi_permanent_event_subscription.md
+1 -1
View File
@@ -114,8 +114,8 @@ This search looks for the creation of WMI permanent event subscriptions.
#### Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [wmi](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wmi.yml)
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [wmi](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wmi.yml)
Note that **wmi_permanent_event_subscription_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
docs/_posts/2018-10-23-wmi_temporary_event_subscription.md
+1 -1
View File
@@ -113,8 +113,8 @@ This search looks for the creation of WMI temporary event subscriptions.
#### Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [wmi](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wmi.yml)
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [wmi](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wmi.yml)
Note that **wmi_temporary_event_subscription_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
docs/_posts/2018-11-02-windows_hosts_file_modification.md
+1 -1
View File
@@ -104,8 +104,8 @@ The search looks for modifications to the hosts file on all Windows endpoints ac
#### Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
Note that **windows_hosts_file_modification_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
docs/_posts/2018-12-03-remote_wmi_command_attempt.md
+2 -2
View File
@@ -110,9 +110,9 @@ The following analytic identifies usage of `wmic.exe` spawning a local or remote
#### Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
* [process_wmic](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_wmic.yml)
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [process_wmic](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_wmic.yml)
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
Note that **remote_wmi_command_attempt_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
docs/_posts/2018-12-03-usn_journal_deletion.md
+1 -1
View File
@@ -113,8 +113,8 @@ The fsutil.exe application is a legitimate Windows utility used to perform tasks
#### Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
Note that **usn_journal_deletion_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
docs/_posts/2018-12-14-file_with_samsam_extension.md
+1 -1
View File
@@ -101,8 +101,8 @@ The search looks for file writes with extensions consistent with a SamSam ransom
#### Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
Note that **file_with_samsam_extension_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
docs/_posts/2018-12-14-samsam_test_file_write.md
+1 -1
View File
@@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ The search looks for a file named "test.txt" written to the windows system direc
#### Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
Note that **samsam_test_file_write_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
docs/_posts/2019-02-27-reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys.md
+1 -1
View File
@@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ The search looks for command-line arguments used to hide a file or directory usi
#### Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
Note that **reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
docs/_posts/2019-04-01-web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes.md
+1 -1
View File
@@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ This search looks for suspicious processes on all systems labeled as web servers
#### Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
Note that **web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
docs/_posts/2019-04-25-suspicious_file_write.md
+1 -1
View File
@@ -99,9 +99,9 @@ The search looks for files created with names that have been linked to malicious
#### Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
* [suspicious_writes](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/suspicious_writes.yml)
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
Note that **suspicious_file_write_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
docs/_posts/2019-05-08-unusually_long_command_line_-_mltk.md
+1 -1
View File
@@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ Command lines that are extremely long may be indicative of malicious activity on
#### Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
Note that **unusually_long_command_line_-_mltk_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
docs/_posts/2019-10-11-prohibited_software_on_endpoint.md
+2 -2
View File
@@ -102,9 +102,9 @@ This search looks for applications on the endpoint that you have marked as prohi
#### Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
* [prohibited_softwares](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/prohibited_softwares.yml)
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [prohibited_softwares](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/prohibited_softwares.yml)
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
Note that **prohibited_software_on_endpoint_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
docs/_posts/2019-12-10-creation_of_shadow_copy.md
+1 -1
View File
@@ -112,8 +112,8 @@ Monitor for signs that Vssadmin or Wmic has been used to create a shadow copy.
#### Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
Note that **creation_of_shadow_copy_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
docs/_posts/2020-01-22-dns_query_length_outliers_-_mltk.md
+1 -1
View File
@@ -123,8 +123,8 @@ This search allows you to identify DNS requests that are unusually large for the
#### Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
Note that **dns_query_length_outliers_-_mltk_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
docs/_posts/2020-02-07-ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.md
+1 -1
View File
@@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ This search looks for EC2 instances being created with previously unseen instanc
#### Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml)
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml)
Note that **ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_instance_type_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
docs/_posts/2020-02-07-macos_-_re-opened_applications.md
+1 -1
View File
@@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ This search looks for processes referencing the plist files that determine which
#### Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
Note that **macos_-_re-opened_applications_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
docs/_posts/2020-02-21-dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.md
+1 -1
View File
@@ -113,9 +113,9 @@ Detect the usage of comsvcs.dll for dumping the lsass process.
#### Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
* [process_rundll32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_rundll32.yml)
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
Note that **dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
docs/_posts/2020-03-02-remote_registry_key_modifications.md
+1 -1
View File
@@ -98,8 +98,8 @@ This search monitors for remote modifications to registry keys.
#### Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
Note that **remote_registry_key_modifications_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
docs/_posts/2020-03-16-child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe.md
+1 -1
View File
@@ -116,8 +116,8 @@ This search looks for child processes of spoolsv.exe. This activity is associate
#### Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
Note that **child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
docs/_posts/2020-03-16-detect_rare_executables.md
+2 -2
View File
@@ -113,9 +113,9 @@ This search will return a table of rare processes, the names of the systems runn
#### Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
* [filter_rare_process_allow_list](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/filter_rare_process_allow_list.yml)
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [filter_rare_process_allow_list](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/filter_rare_process_allow_list.yml)
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
Note that **detect_rare_executables_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
docs/_posts/2020-03-16-process_execution_via_wmi.md
+1 -1
View File
@@ -110,8 +110,8 @@ The following analytic identifies `WmiPrvSE.exe` spawning a process. This typica
#### Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
Note that **process_execution_via_wmi_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
docs/_posts/2020-03-16-script_execution_via_wmi.md
+1 -1
View File
@@ -110,8 +110,8 @@ This search looks for scripts launched via WMI.
#### Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
Note that **script_execution_via_wmi_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
docs/_posts/2020-05-20-first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom.md
+1 -1
View File
@@ -113,9 +113,9 @@ This search looks for child processes spawned by zoom.exe or zoom.us that has no
#### Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_window](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_window.yml)
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
Note that **first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
docs/_posts/2020-07-03-detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe.md
+1 -1
View File
@@ -123,8 +123,8 @@ The detection Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe is detecting t
#### Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
Note that **detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
docs/_posts/2020-07-06-short_lived_windows_accounts.md
+1 -1
View File
@@ -114,8 +114,8 @@ This search detects accounts that were created and deleted in a short time perio
#### Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
Note that **short_lived_windows_accounts_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
docs/_posts/2020-07-07-remote_desktop_network_traffic.md
+1 -1
View File
@@ -117,8 +117,8 @@ This search looks for network traffic on TCP/3389, the default port used by remo
#### Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
Note that **remote_desktop_network_traffic_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
docs/_posts/2020-07-21-attempt_to_stop_security_service.md
+2 -2
View File
@@ -118,9 +118,9 @@ This search looks for attempts to stop security-related services on the endpoint
#### Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
* [process_net](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_net.yml)
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [process_net](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_net.yml)
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
Note that **attempt_to_stop_security_service_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts.md
+1 -1
View File
@@ -118,8 +118,8 @@ This search looks for successful AWS CloudTrail activity by user accounts that a
#### Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml)
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml)
Note that **detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2.md
+6 -6
View File
@@ -123,14 +123,14 @@ This search looks for DNS requests for phishing domains that are leveraging Evil
#### Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
* [evilginx_phishlets_facebook](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/evilginx_phishlets_facebook.yml)
* [evilginx_phishlets_aws](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/evilginx_phishlets_aws.yml)
* [evilginx_phishlets_outlook](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/evilginx_phishlets_outlook.yml)
* [evilginx_phishlets_amazon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/evilginx_phishlets_amazon.yml)
* [evilginx_phishlets_0365](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/evilginx_phishlets_0365.yml)
* [evilginx_phishlets_github](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/evilginx_phishlets_github.yml)
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
* [evilginx_phishlets_amazon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/evilginx_phishlets_amazon.yml)
* [evilginx_phishlets_outlook](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/evilginx_phishlets_outlook.yml)
* [evilginx_phishlets_aws](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/evilginx_phishlets_aws.yml)
* [evilginx_phishlets_facebook](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/evilginx_phishlets_facebook.yml)
* [evilginx_phishlets_google](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/evilginx_phishlets_google.yml)
* [evilginx_phishlets_0365](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/evilginx_phishlets_0365.yml)
Note that **detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts.md
+1 -1
View File
@@ -119,8 +119,8 @@ This search detects user accounts that have been locked out a relatively high nu
#### Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
Note that **detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_long_dns_txt_record_response.md
+1 -1
View File
@@ -115,8 +115,8 @@ This search is used to detect attempts to use DNS tunneling, by calculating the
#### Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
Note that **detect_long_dns_txt_record_response_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_new_user_aws_console_login.md
+1 -1
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@@ -113,8 +113,8 @@ This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a u
#### Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml)
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml)
Note that **detect_new_user_aws_console_login_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_outbound_smb_traffic.md
+1 -1
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@@ -114,8 +114,8 @@ This search looks for outbound SMB connections made by hosts within your network
#### Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
Note that **detect_outbound_smb_traffic_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_outlook_exe_writing_a_zip_file.md
+1 -1
View File
@@ -126,8 +126,8 @@ This search looks for execution of process `outlook.exe` where the process is wr
#### Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
Note that **detect_outlook_exe_writing_a_zip_file_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters.md
+1 -1
View File
@@ -112,8 +112,8 @@ This search looks for the execution of the cscript.exe or wscript.exe processes,
#### Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
Note that **detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers.md
+2 -2
View File
@@ -109,9 +109,9 @@ This search looks for web connections to dynamic DNS providers.
#### Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
* [dynamic_dns_web_traffic](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/dynamic_dns_web_traffic.yml)
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [dynamic_dns_web_traffic](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/dynamic_dns_web_traffic.yml)
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
Note that **detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft.md
+1 -1
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@@ -110,8 +110,8 @@ This search looks for specific command-line arguments that may indicate the exec
#### Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
Note that **detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
docs/_posts/2020-07-21-ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.md
+1 -1
View File
@@ -118,9 +118,9 @@ This search looks for EC2 instances being modified by users who have not previou
#### Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [ec2_modification_api_calls](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/ec2_modification_api_calls.yml)
* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml)
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
Note that **ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
docs/_posts/2020-07-21-ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user.md
+1 -1
View File
@@ -117,8 +117,8 @@ This search looks for EC2 instances being created by users who have not created
#### Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml)
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml)
Note that **ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
docs/_posts/2020-07-21-email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory.md
+1 -1
View File
@@ -111,8 +111,8 @@ The search looks at the change-analysis data model and detects email files creat
#### Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
Note that **email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
docs/_posts/2020-07-21-first_time_seen_command_line_argument.md
+1 -1
View File
@@ -126,8 +126,8 @@ This search looks for command-line arguments that use a `/c` parameter to execut
#### Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
Note that **first_time_seen_command_line_argument_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
docs/_posts/2020-07-21-first_time_seen_running_windows_service.md
+1 -1
View File
@@ -118,8 +118,8 @@ This search looks for the first and last time a Windows service is seen running
#### Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [previously_seen_windows_services_window](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/previously_seen_windows_services_window.yml)
* [wineventlog_system](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_system.yml)
* [previously_seen_windows_services_window](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/previously_seen_windows_services_window.yml)
Note that **first_time_seen_running_windows_service_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
docs/_posts/2020-07-21-hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe.md
+1 -1
View File
@@ -111,8 +111,8 @@ Attackers leverage an existing Windows binary, attrib.exe, to mark specific as h
#### Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
Note that **hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
docs/_posts/2020-07-21-malicious_powershell_process_-_execution_policy_bypass.md
+2 -2
View File
@@ -116,9 +116,9 @@ This search looks for PowerShell processes started with parameters used to bypas
#### Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml)
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml)
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
Note that **malicious_powershell_process_-_execution_policy_bypass_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
docs/_posts/2020-07-21-multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentials_from_the_same_ip.md
+1 -1
View File
@@ -119,8 +119,8 @@ This search detects Okta login failures due to bad credentials for multiple user
#### Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [okta](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/okta.yml)
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [okta](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/okta.yml)
Note that **multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentials_from_the_same_ip_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
docs/_posts/2020-07-21-okta_failed_sso_attempts.md
+1 -1
View File
@@ -117,8 +117,8 @@ Detect failed Okta SSO events
#### Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [okta](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/okta.yml)
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [okta](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/okta.yml)
Note that **okta_failed_sso_attempts_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
docs/_posts/2020-07-21-okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities.md
+1 -1
View File
@@ -118,8 +118,8 @@ This search detects logins from the same user from different cities in a 24 hour
#### Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [okta](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/okta.yml)
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [okta](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/okta.yml)
Note that **okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
docs/_posts/2020-07-21-overwriting_accessibility_binaries.md
+1 -1
View File
@@ -114,8 +114,8 @@ Microsoft Windows contains accessibility features that can be launched with a ke
#### Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
Note that **overwriting_accessibility_binaries_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
docs/_posts/2020-07-21-prohibited_network_traffic_allowed.md
+1 -1
View File
@@ -113,8 +113,8 @@ This search looks for network traffic defined by port and transport layer protoc
#### Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
Note that **prohibited_network_traffic_allowed_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
docs/_posts/2020-07-21-protocol_or_port_mismatch.md
+1 -1
View File
@@ -115,8 +115,8 @@ This search looks for network traffic on common ports where a higher layer proto
#### Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
Note that **protocol_or_port_mismatch_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
docs/_posts/2020-07-21-remote_desktop_process_running_on_system.md
+1 -1
View File
@@ -117,8 +117,8 @@ This search looks for the remote desktop process mstsc.exe running on systems up
#### Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
Note that **remote_desktop_process_running_on_system_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
docs/_posts/2020-07-21-sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services.md
+1 -1
View File
@@ -119,8 +119,8 @@ This search looks for arguments to sc.exe indicating the creation or modificatio
#### Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
Note that **sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
docs/_posts/2020-07-21-scheduled_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware.md
+1 -1
View File
@@ -109,8 +109,8 @@ This search looks for flags passed to schtasks.exe on the command-line that indi
#### Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
Note that **scheduled_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
docs/_posts/2020-07-22-suspicious_changes_to_file_associations.md
+1 -1
View File
@@ -113,8 +113,8 @@ This search looks for changes to registry values that control Windows file assoc
#### Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
Note that **suspicious_changes_to_file_associations_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
docs/_posts/2020-07-22-suspicious_email_-_uba_anomaly.md
+1 -1
View File
@@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ This detection looks for emails that are suspicious because of their sender, dom
#### Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
Note that **suspicious_email_-_uba_anomaly_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
docs/_posts/2020-07-22-suspicious_email_attachment_extensions.md
+1 -1
View File
@@ -117,9 +117,9 @@ This search looks for emails that have attachments with suspicious file extensio
#### Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
* [suspicious_email_attachments](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/suspicious_email_attachments.yml)
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
Note that **suspicious_email_attachment_extensions_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
docs/_posts/2020-07-22-suspicious_reg_exe_process.md
+1 -1
View File
@@ -114,8 +114,8 @@ This search looks for reg.exe being launched from a command prompt not started b
#### Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
Note that **suspicious_reg_exe_process_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
docs/_posts/2020-07-22-tor_traffic.md
+1 -1
View File
@@ -114,8 +114,8 @@ This search looks for network traffic identified as The Onion Router (TOR), a be
#### Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
Note that **tor_traffic_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
docs/_posts/2020-07-22-uncommon_processes_on_endpoint.md
+2 -2
View File
@@ -108,9 +108,9 @@ This search looks for applications on the endpoint that you have marked as uncom
#### Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
* [uncommon_processes](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/uncommon_processes.yml)
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [uncommon_processes](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/uncommon_processes.yml)
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
Note that **uncommon_processes_on_endpoint_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
docs/_posts/2020-07-22-unload_sysmon_filter_driver.md
+1 -1
View File
@@ -112,8 +112,8 @@ Attackers often disable security tools to avoid detection. This search looks for
#### Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
Note that **unload_sysmon_filter_driver_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
docs/_posts/2020-07-28-detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream.md
+1 -1
View File
@@ -117,8 +117,8 @@ This search detects SIGRed via Splunk Stream.
#### Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [stream_dns](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/stream_dns.yml)
* [stream_tcp](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/stream_tcp.yml)
* [stream_dns](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/stream_dns.yml)
Note that **detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
docs/_posts/2020-07-29-cloud_instance_modified_by_previously_unseen_user.md
+1 -1
View File
@@ -122,8 +122,8 @@ This search looks for cloud instances being modified by users who have not previ
#### Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
Note that **cloud_instance_modified_by_previously_unseen_user_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
docs/_posts/2020-09-08-cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted.md
+1 -1
View File
@@ -98,8 +98,8 @@ Enforcing network-access controls is one of the defensive mechanisms used by clo
#### Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml)
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml)
Note that **cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
docs/_posts/2020-09-16-create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe.md
+2 -2
View File
@@ -113,9 +113,9 @@ This search looks for the creation or deletion of hidden shares using net.exe.
#### Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
* [process_net](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_net.yml)
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [process_net](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_net.yml)
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
Note that **create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
docs/_posts/2020-10-28-detect_software_download_to_network_device.md
+1 -1
View File
@@ -117,8 +117,8 @@ Adversaries may abuse netbooting to load an unauthorized network device operatin
#### Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
Note that **detect_software_download_to_network_device_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
docs/_posts/2020-11-06-ryuk_test_files_detected.md
+1 -1
View File
@@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ The search looks for files that contain the key word *Ryuk* under any folder in
#### Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
Note that **ryuk_test_files_detected_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
docs/_posts/2020-11-06-windows_connhost_exe_started_forcefully.md
+1 -1
View File
@@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ The search looks for the Console Window Host process (connhost.exe) executed usi
#### Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml)
* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml)
Note that **windows_connhost_exe_started_forcefully_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.

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