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This commit is contained in:
srv-rr-gh-researchbt
2023-07-11 13:23:39 -07:00
committed by GitHub
50 changed files with 350 additions and 138 deletions
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ references:
tags:
analytic_story:
- Ransomware
- BlackByte Ransomware
asset_type: Endpoint
confidence: 50
impact: 50
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ tags:
analytic_story:
- Ransomware
- Revil Ransomware
- BlackByte Ransomware
asset_type: Endpoint
confidence: 50
impact: 50
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
name: Anomalous usage of 7zip
id: 9364ee8e-a39a-11eb-8f1d-acde48001122
version: 1
date: '2023-06-13'
date: '2023-07-10'
author: Michael Haag, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
@@ -31,8 +31,9 @@ references:
- https://thedfirreport.com/2021/01/31/bazar-no-ryuk/
tags:
analytic_story:
- Cobalt Strike
- NOBELIUM Group
- BlackByte Ransomware
- Cobalt Strike
- Graceful Wipe Out Attack
asset_type: Endpoint
confidence: 80
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
name: CMD Echo Pipe - Escalation
id: eb277ba0-b96b-11eb-b00e-acde48001122
version: 2
date: '2023-06-13'
date: '2023-07-10'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ references:
- https://github.com/rapid7/meterpreter/blob/master/source/extensions/priv/server/elevate/namedpipe.c
tags:
analytic_story:
- BlackByte Ransomware
- Cobalt Strike
- Graceful Wipe Out Attack
asset_type: Endpoint
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
name: Cobalt Strike Named Pipes
id: 5876d429-0240-4709-8b93-ea8330b411b5
version: 2
date: '2023-06-13'
date: '2023-07-10'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
@@ -41,11 +41,12 @@ references:
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations
tags:
analytic_story:
- LockBit Ransomware
- Graceful Wipe Out Attack
- Cobalt Strike
- DarkSide Ransomware
- Trickbot
- DarkSide Ransomware
- Cobalt Strike
- BlackByte Ransomware
- Graceful Wipe Out Attack
- LockBit Ransomware
asset_type: Endpoint
confidence: 90
impact: 80
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
name: Detect Exchange Web Shell
id: 8c14eeee-2af1-4a4b-bda8-228da0f4862a
version: 4
date: '2022-09-30'
date: '2023-07-10'
author: Michael Haag, Shannon Davis, David Dorsey, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
@@ -52,10 +52,11 @@ references:
- https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-microsoft-exchange-servers-still-vulnerable-to-proxyshell-exploit#what-should-you-do
tags:
analytic_story:
- HAFNIUM Group
- ProxyNotShell
- ProxyShell
- CISA AA22-257A
- ProxyNotShell
- HAFNIUM Group
- BlackByte Ransomware
asset_type: Endpoint
confidence: 90
impact: 90
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ tags:
- Sandworm Tools
- Volt Typhoon
- IcedID
- BlackByte Ransomware
asset_type: Endpoint
confidence: 70
impact: 50
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
name: Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass
id: 070e9b80-6252-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
version: 2
date: '2023-06-13'
date: '2023-07-10'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
@@ -37,10 +37,11 @@ references:
- https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/how-to-use-the-regsvr32-tool-and-troubleshoot-regsvr32-error-messages-a98d960a-7392-e6fe-d90a-3f4e0cb543e5
tags:
analytic_story:
- Cobalt Strike
- Living Off The Land
- Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity
- Cobalt Strike
- BlackByte Ransomware
- Graceful Wipe Out Attack
- Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity
asset_type: Endpoint
confidence: 100
impact: 80
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ tags:
- Active Directory Lateral Movement
- CISA AA22-320A
- Sandworm Tools
- BlackByte Ransomware
asset_type: Endpoint
confidence: 90
impact: 30
@@ -1,82 +1,88 @@
name: Detect Webshell Exploit Behavior
id: 22597426-6dbd-49bd-bcdc-4ec19857192f
version: 2
date: '2023-04-26'
author: Steven Dick
status: production
type: TTP
description: This search is used to detect the abuse of web applications by adversaries. Adversaries may install a backdoor or script onto web servers by exploiting known vulnerabilities or misconfigruations. Web shells are used to establish persistent access to systems and provide a set of executable functions or a command-line interface on the system hosting the Web server.
data_source:
- Sysmon Event ID 1
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count max(_time) as lastTime, min(_time) as firstTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
where (Processes.process_name IN ("arp.exe","at.exe","bash.exe","bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe","cmd.exe","cscript.exe",
"dsget.exe","dsquery.exe","find.exe","findstr.exe","fsutil.exe","hostname.exe","ipconfig.exe","ksh.exe","nbstat.exe",
"net.exe","net1.exe","netdom.exe","netsh.exe","netstat.exe","nltest.exe","nslookup.exe","ntdsutil.exe","pathping.exe",
"ping.exe","powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","qprocess.exe","query.exe","qwinsta.exe","reg.exe","rundll32.exe","sc.exe",
"scrcons.exe","schtasks.exe","sh.exe","systeminfo.exe","tasklist.exe","tracert.exe","ver.exe","vssadmin.exe",
"wevtutil.exe","whoami.exe","wmic.exe","wscript.exe","wusa.exe","zsh.exe")
AND Processes.parent_process_name IN ("w3wp.exe", "http*.exe", "nginx*.exe", "php*.exe", "php-cgi*.exe","tomcat*.exe"))
by Processes.dest,Processes.user,Processes.parent_process,Processes.parent_process_name,Processes.process,Processes.process_name
| `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `detect_webshell_exploit_behavior_filter`'
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
on process that includes the full command line of the process being launched on
your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition,
confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the
endpoint product.
known_false_positives: Legitimate OS functions called by vendor applications, baseline the environment and filter before enabling. Recommend throttle by dest/process_name
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/003/
- https://github.com/nsacyber/Mitigating-Web-Shells
- https://www.hackingarticles.in/multiple-ways-to-exploit-tomcat-manager/
tags:
analytic_story:
- ProxyShell
- ProxyNotShell
- HAFNIUM Group
- CISA AA22-257A
- CISA AA22-264A
asset_type: Endpoint
confidence: 80
impact: 100
message: Webshell Exploit Behavior - $parent_process_name$ spawned $process_name$ on $dest$.
mitre_attack_id:
- T1505
- T1505.003
observable:
- name: user
type: User
role:
- Victim
- name: dest
type: Endpoint
role:
- Victim
- name: process_name
type: Process
role:
- Attacker
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
required_fields:
- _time
- Processes.dest
- Processes.user
- Processes.parent_process
- Processes.parent_process_name
- Processes.process
- Processes.process_name
risk_score: 80
security_domain: endpoint
supported_tas:
- Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1505.003/generic_webshell_exploit/generic_webshell_exploit.log
source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
sourcetype: xmlwineventlog
name: Detect Webshell Exploit Behavior
id: 22597426-6dbd-49bd-bcdc-4ec19857192f
version: 2
date: '2023-07-10'
author: Steven Dick
status: production
type: TTP
description: This search is used to detect the abuse of web applications by adversaries.
Adversaries may install a backdoor or script onto web servers by exploiting known
vulnerabilities or misconfigruations. Web shells are used to establish persistent
access to systems and provide a set of executable functions or a command-line interface
on the system hosting the Web server.
data_source:
- Sysmon Event ID 1
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count max(_time) as lastTime, min(_time)
as firstTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name IN
("arp.exe","at.exe","bash.exe","bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe","cmd.exe","cscript.exe",
"dsget.exe","dsquery.exe","find.exe","findstr.exe","fsutil.exe","hostname.exe","ipconfig.exe","ksh.exe","nbstat.exe",
"net.exe","net1.exe","netdom.exe","netsh.exe","netstat.exe","nltest.exe","nslookup.exe","ntdsutil.exe","pathping.exe",
"ping.exe","powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","qprocess.exe","query.exe","qwinsta.exe","reg.exe","rundll32.exe","sc.exe",
"scrcons.exe","schtasks.exe","sh.exe","systeminfo.exe","tasklist.exe","tracert.exe","ver.exe","vssadmin.exe",
"wevtutil.exe","whoami.exe","wmic.exe","wscript.exe","wusa.exe","zsh.exe") AND Processes.parent_process_name
IN ("w3wp.exe", "http*.exe", "nginx*.exe", "php*.exe", "php-cgi*.exe","tomcat*.exe"))
by Processes.dest,Processes.user,Processes.parent_process,Processes.parent_process_name,Processes.process,Processes.process_name
| `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `detect_webshell_exploit_behavior_filter`'
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
on process that includes the full command line of the process being launched on
your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition,
confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the
endpoint product.
known_false_positives: Legitimate OS functions called by vendor applications, baseline
the environment and filter before enabling. Recommend throttle by dest/process_name
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/003/
- https://github.com/nsacyber/Mitigating-Web-Shells
- https://www.hackingarticles.in/multiple-ways-to-exploit-tomcat-manager/
tags:
analytic_story:
- ProxyNotShell
- ProxyShell
- CISA AA22-257A
- HAFNIUM Group
- BlackByte Ransomware
- CISA AA22-264A
asset_type: Endpoint
confidence: 80
impact: 100
message: Webshell Exploit Behavior - $parent_process_name$ spawned $process_name$
on $dest$.
mitre_attack_id:
- T1505
- T1505.003
observable:
- name: user
type: User
role:
- Victim
- name: dest
type: Endpoint
role:
- Victim
- name: process_name
type: Process
role:
- Attacker
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
required_fields:
- _time
- Processes.dest
- Processes.user
- Processes.parent_process
- Processes.parent_process_name
- Processes.process
- Processes.process_name
risk_score: 80
security_domain: endpoint
supported_tas:
- Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1505.003/generic_webshell_exploit/generic_webshell_exploit.log
source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
sourcetype: xmlwineventlog
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ references:
tags:
analytic_story:
- Windows Defense Evasion Tactics
- BlackByte Ransomware
asset_type: Endpoint
confidence: 50
impact: 50
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
name: DLLHost with no Command Line Arguments with Network
id: f1c07594-a141-11eb-8407-acde48001122
version: 4
date: '2023-06-13'
date: '2023-07-10'
author: Steven Dick, Michael Haag, Splunk
status: experimental
type: TTP
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ references:
- https://www.cobaltstrike.com/blog/learn-pipe-fitting-for-all-of-your-offense-projects/
tags:
analytic_story:
- BlackByte Ransomware
- Cobalt Strike
- Graceful Wipe Out Attack
asset_type: Endpoint
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ tags:
analytic_story:
- Data Destruction
- WhisperGate
- BlackByte Ransomware
asset_type: Endpoint
confidence: 50
impact: 50
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ tags:
analytic_story:
- XMRig
- Ransomware
- BlackByte Ransomware
asset_type: Endpoint
confidence: 100
impact: 80
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
name: Exchange PowerShell Abuse via SSRF
id: 29228ab4-0762-11ec-94aa-acde48001122
version: 2
date: '2022-10-02'
date: '2023-07-10'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
status: experimental
type: TTP
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ references:
tags:
analytic_story:
- ProxyShell
- BlackByte Ransomware
- ProxyNotShell
asset_type: Endpoint
confidence: 100
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
name: Exchange PowerShell Module Usage
id: 2d10095e-05ae-11ec-8fdf-acde48001122
version: 5
date: '2022-11-21'
date: '2023-07-10'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
@@ -51,10 +51,11 @@ references:
- https://thedfirreport.com/2022/03/21/apt35-automates-initial-access-using-proxyshell/
tags:
analytic_story:
- ProxyShell
- CISA AA22-264A
- ProxyNotShell
- CISA AA22-277A
- ProxyShell
- BlackByte Ransomware
- CISA AA22-264A
asset_type: Endpoint
confidence: 80
impact: 40
@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ tags:
- Chaos Ransomware
- Trickbot
- Amadey
- BlackByte Ransomware
asset_type: Endpoint
confidence: 50
impact: 40
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ tags:
analytic_story:
- Windows Defense Evasion Tactics
- Azorult
- BlackByte Ransomware
asset_type: Endpoint
confidence: 50
impact: 50
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
name: GPUpdate with no Command Line Arguments with Network
id: 2c853856-a140-11eb-a5b5-acde48001122
version: 2
date: '2023-06-13'
date: '2023-07-10'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ references:
- https://www.cobaltstrike.com/blog/learn-pipe-fitting-for-all-of-your-offense-projects/
tags:
analytic_story:
- BlackByte Ransomware
- Cobalt Strike
- Graceful Wipe Out Attack
asset_type: Endpoint
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ tags:
analytic_story:
- Clop Ransomware
- LockBit Ransomware
- BlackByte Ransomware
asset_type: Endpoint
confidence: 80
impact: 90
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
name: MS Exchange Mailbox Replication service writing Active Server Pages
id: 985f322c-57a5-11ec-b9ac-acde48001122
version: 1
date: '2021-12-07'
date: '2023-07-10'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
status: experimental
type: TTP
@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ tags:
analytic_story:
- ProxyShell
- Ransomware
- BlackByte Ransomware
asset_type: Endpoint
confidence: 90
impact: 90
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ tags:
analytic_story:
- Data Destruction
- WhisperGate
- BlackByte Ransomware
asset_type: Endpoint
confidence: 60
impact: 60
@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ tags:
- AsyncRAT
- Amadey
- Sneaky Active Directory Persistence Tricks
- BlackByte Ransomware
asset_type: Endpoint
confidence: 95
impact: 80
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ references:
tags:
analytic_story:
- Clop Ransomware
- BlackByte Ransomware
asset_type: Endpoint
confidence: 90
impact: 80
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
name: Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network
id: 35307032-a12d-11eb-835f-acde48001122
version: 4
date: '2023-06-13'
date: '2023-07-10'
author: Steven Dick, Michael Haag, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
@@ -40,9 +40,10 @@ references:
- https://bohops.com/2018/02/26/leveraging-inf-sct-fetch-execute-techniques-for-bypass-evasion-persistence/
tags:
analytic_story:
- Cobalt Strike
- PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527
- Suspicious Rundll32 Activity
- Cobalt Strike
- BlackByte Ransomware
- PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527
- Graceful Wipe Out Attack
asset_type: Endpoint
confidence: 100
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
name: SearchProtocolHost with no Command Line with Network
id: b690df8c-a145-11eb-a38b-acde48001122
version: 3
date: '2023-06-13'
date: '2023-07-10'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ references:
- https://github.com/mandiant/red_team_tool_countermeasures/blob/master/rules/PGF/supplemental/hxioc/SUSPICIOUS%20EXECUTION%20OF%20SEARCHPROTOCOLHOST%20(METHODOLOGY).ioc
tags:
analytic_story:
- BlackByte Ransomware
- Cobalt Strike
- Graceful Wipe Out Attack
asset_type: Endpoint
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
name: Services Escalate Exe
id: c448488c-b7ec-11eb-8253-acde48001122
version: 1
date: '2023-06-13'
date: '2023-07-10'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ references:
- https://hstechdocs.helpsystems.com/manuals/cobaltstrike/current/userguide/index.htm#cshid=1085
tags:
analytic_story:
- BlackByte Ransomware
- Cobalt Strike
- Graceful Wipe Out Attack
asset_type: Endpoint
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
name: Suspicious DLLHost no Command Line Arguments
id: ff61e98c-0337-4593-a78f-72a676c56f26
version: 4
date: '2023-06-13'
date: '2023-07-10'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ references:
- https://www.cobaltstrike.com/blog/learn-pipe-fitting-for-all-of-your-offense-projects/
tags:
analytic_story:
- BlackByte Ransomware
- Cobalt Strike
- Graceful Wipe Out Attack
asset_type: Endpoint
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ tags:
- XMRig
- CISA AA22-320A
- AgentTesla
- BlackByte Ransomware
asset_type: Endpoint
confidence: 90
impact: 70
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
name: Suspicious GPUpdate no Command Line Arguments
id: f308490a-473a-40ef-ae64-dd7a6eba284a
version: 3
date: '2023-06-13'
date: '2023-07-10'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ references:
- https://www.cobaltstrike.com/blog/learn-pipe-fitting-for-all-of-your-offense-projects/
tags:
analytic_story:
- BlackByte Ransomware
- Cobalt Strike
- Graceful Wipe Out Attack
asset_type: Endpoint
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
name: Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename
id: f0db4464-55d9-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
version: 4
date: '2023-06-13'
date: '2023-07-10'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
status: production
type: Hunting
@@ -33,10 +33,11 @@ references:
tags:
analytic_story:
- Masquerading - Rename System Utilities
- Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution
- Graceful Wipe Out Attack
- Living Off The Land
- Cobalt Strike
- Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution
- BlackByte Ransomware
- Graceful Wipe Out Attack
asset_type: Endpoint
confidence: 90
impact: 70
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
name: Suspicious msbuild path
id: f5198224-551c-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
version: 3
date: '2023-06-13'
date: '2023-07-10'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
@@ -32,11 +32,12 @@ references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1127.001/T1127.001.md
tags:
analytic_story:
- Masquerading - Rename System Utilities
- Graceful Wipe Out Attack
- Living Off The Land
- Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild
- Masquerading - Rename System Utilities
- Living Off The Land
- Cobalt Strike
- BlackByte Ransomware
- Graceful Wipe Out Attack
asset_type: Endpoint
confidence: 70
impact: 70
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
name: Suspicious MSBuild Rename
id: 4006adac-5937-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
version: 3
date: '2023-06-13'
date: '2023-07-10'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
status: production
type: Hunting
@@ -30,11 +30,12 @@ references:
- https://github.com/infosecn1nja/MaliciousMacroMSBuild/
tags:
analytic_story:
- Masquerading - Rename System Utilities
- Graceful Wipe Out Attack
- Living Off The Land
- Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild
- Masquerading - Rename System Utilities
- Living Off The Land
- Cobalt Strike
- BlackByte Ransomware
- Graceful Wipe Out Attack
asset_type: Endpoint
confidence: 90
impact: 70
@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ tags:
- Chaos Ransomware
- Trickbot
- Amadey
- BlackByte Ransomware
asset_type: Endpoint
confidence: 50
impact: 70
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
name: Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments
id: e451bd16-e4c5-4109-8eb1-c4c6ecf048b4
version: 3
date: '2023-06-13'
date: '2023-07-10'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
@@ -32,9 +32,10 @@ references:
- https://bohops.com/2018/02/26/leveraging-inf-sct-fetch-execute-techniques-for-bypass-evasion-persistence/
tags:
analytic_story:
- Cobalt Strike
- PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527
- Suspicious Rundll32 Activity
- Cobalt Strike
- BlackByte Ransomware
- PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527
- Graceful Wipe Out Attack
asset_type: Endpoint
confidence: 70
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
name: Suspicious Rundll32 StartW
id: 9319dda5-73f2-4d43-a85a-67ce961bddb7
version: 3
date: '2023-06-13'
date: '2023-07-10'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
@@ -37,10 +37,11 @@ references:
- https://bohops.com/2018/02/26/leveraging-inf-sct-fetch-execute-techniques-for-bypass-evasion-persistence/
tags:
analytic_story:
- Cobalt Strike
- Suspicious Rundll32 Activity
- Graceful Wipe Out Attack
- Trickbot
- Suspicious Rundll32 Activity
- Cobalt Strike
- BlackByte Ransomware
- Graceful Wipe Out Attack
asset_type: Endpoint
confidence: 50
impact: 70
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
name: Suspicious SearchProtocolHost no Command Line Arguments
id: f52d2db8-31f9-4aa7-a176-25779effe55c
version: 3
date: '2023-06-13'
date: '2023-07-10'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ references:
- https://github.com/mandiant/red_team_tool_countermeasures/blob/master/rules/PGF/supplemental/hxioc/SUSPICIOUS%20EXECUTION%20OF%20SEARCHPROTOCOLHOST%20(METHODOLOGY).ioc
tags:
analytic_story:
- BlackByte Ransomware
- Cobalt Strike
- Graceful Wipe Out Attack
asset_type: Endpoint
+7 -6
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
name: W3WP Spawning Shell
id: 0f03423c-7c6a-11eb-bc47-acde48001122
version: 2
date: '2023-04-14'
date: '2023-07-10'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
@@ -36,13 +36,14 @@ references:
- https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-microsoft-exchange-servers-still-vulnerable-to-proxyshell-exploit#what-should-you-do
tags:
analytic_story:
- HAFNIUM Group
- CISA AA22-264A
- Hermetic Wiper
- ProxyNotShell
- ProxyShell
- CISA AA22-257A
- Data Destruction
- ProxyShell
- Hermetic Wiper
- CISA AA22-257A
- HAFNIUM Group
- BlackByte Ransomware
- CISA AA22-264A
asset_type: Endpoint
confidence: 80
cve:
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ tags:
- Windows Drivers
- CISA AA22-320A
- AgentTesla
- BlackByte Ransomware
asset_type: Endpoint
confidence: 60
impact: 60
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ tags:
- Windows Drivers
- CISA AA22-320A
- AgentTesla
- BlackByte Ransomware
asset_type: Endpoint
confidence: 70
impact: 60
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
name: Windows Modify Registry EnableLinkedConnections
id: 93048164-3358-4af0-8680-aa5f38440516
version: 1
date: '2023-07-10'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
data_source:
- Sysmon EventID 12
- Sysmon EventID 13
- Sysmon EventID 14
description: The following analytic identifies a suspicious registry modification of Windows linked connection configuration.
This technique was being abused by several adversaries, malware like BlackByte ransomware to enable the linked connections feature,
that allows network shares to be accessed using both standard and administrator-level privileges simultaneously.
By default, Windows does not enable this feature to enhance security.
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry
WHERE (Registry.registry_path= "*\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System\\EnableLinkedConnections" Registry.registry_value_data = "0x00000001")
BY _time span=1h Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid
| `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_modify_registry_enablelinkedconnections_filter`'
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure
that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.
known_false_positives: Administrators may enable or disable this feature that may
cause some false positive.
references:
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/07/06/the-five-day-job-a-blackbyte-ransomware-intrusion-case-study/
tags:
analytic_story:
- BlackByte Ransomware
asset_type: endpoint
atomic_guid:
- 4f4e2f9f-6209-4fcf-9b15-3b7455706f5b
confidence: 70
impact: 70
message: A registry modification in Windows EnableLinkedConnections configuration on $dest$
mitre_attack_id:
- T1112
observable:
- name: dest
type: Endpoint
role:
- Victim
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
risk_score: 49
required_fields:
- _time
- Registry.registry_key_name
- Registry.registry_path
- Registry.user
- Registry.dest
- Registry.registry_value_name
- Registry.action
- Registry.registry_value_data
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1112/blackbyte/enablelinkedconnections/blackbyte_sysmon.log
source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
sourcetype: xmlwineventlog
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
name: Windows Modify Registry LongPathsEnabled
id: 36f9626c-4272-4808-aadd-267acce681c0
version: 1
date: '2023-07-10'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
data_source:
- Sysmon EventID 12
- Sysmon EventID 13
- Sysmon EventID 14
description: The following analytic identifies a suspicious registry modification of Windows long path enable configuration.
This technique was being abused by several adversaries, malware like BlackByte to enable long file path support in the operating system.
By default, Windows has a limitation on the maximum length of a file path, which is set to 260 characters.
Enabling the LongPathsEnabled setting allows you to work with file paths longer than 260 characters.
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry
WHERE (Registry.registry_path= "*\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\FileSystem\\LongPathsEnabled" Registry.registry_value_data = "0x00000001")
BY _time span=1h Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid
| `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_modify_registry_longpathsenabled_filter`'
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure
that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.
known_false_positives: Administrators may enable or disable this feature that may
cause some false positive.
references:
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/07/06/the-five-day-job-a-blackbyte-ransomware-intrusion-case-study/
tags:
analytic_story:
- BlackByte Ransomware
asset_type: endpoint
atomic_guid:
- 4f4e2f9f-6209-4fcf-9b15-3b7455706f5b
confidence: 40
impact: 40
message: A registry modification in Windows LongPathEnable configuration on $dest$
mitre_attack_id:
- T1112
observable:
- name: dest
type: Endpoint
role:
- Victim
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
risk_score: 16
required_fields:
- _time
- Registry.registry_key_name
- Registry.registry_path
- Registry.user
- Registry.dest
- Registry.registry_value_name
- Registry.action
- Registry.registry_value_data
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1112/blackbyte/longpathsenabled/longpath_sysmon.log
source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
sourcetype: xmlwineventlog
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
name: Windows MSExchange Management Mailbox Cmdlet Usage
id: 396de86f-25e7-4b0e-be09-a330be35249d
version: 1
date: '2022-11-21'
date: '2023-07-10'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ references:
tags:
analytic_story:
- ProxyShell
- BlackByte Ransomware
- ProxyNotShell
asset_type: Endpoint
confidence: 80
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ tags:
- Data Destruction
- Hermetic Wiper
- Caddy Wiper
- BlackByte Ransomware
asset_type: Endpoint
confidence: 100
impact: 90
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ tags:
- Data Destruction
- Hermetic Wiper
- Caddy Wiper
- BlackByte Ransomware
asset_type: Endpoint
confidence: 100
impact: 90
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ references:
tags:
analytic_story:
- Active Directory Lateral Movement
- BlackByte Ransomware
asset_type: Endpoint
atomic_guid: []
confidence: 50
@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ references:
tags:
analytic_story:
- Windows Drivers
- BlackByte Ransomware
asset_type: Endpoint
confidence: 50
impact: 50
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
name: ProxyShell ProxyNotShell Behavior Detected
id: c32fab32-6aaf-492d-bfaf-acbed8e50cdf
version: 1
date: '2022-10-03'
date: '2023-07-10'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
status: production
type: Correlation
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ references:
tags:
analytic_story:
- ProxyShell
- BlackByte Ransomware
- ProxyNotShell
asset_type: Web Server
confidence: 90
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
name: Windows Exchange Autodiscover SSRF Abuse
id: d436f9e7-0ee7-4a47-864b-6dea2c4e2752
version: 1
date: '2022-10-03'
date: '2023-07-10'
author: Michael Haag, Nathaniel Stearns, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ references:
tags:
analytic_story:
- ProxyShell
- BlackByte Ransomware
- ProxyNotShell
asset_type: Web server
confidence: 80
+26
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
name: BlackByte Ransomware
id: b18259ac-0746-45d7-bd1f-81d65274a80b
version: 1
date: '2023-07-10'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
description: Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities
that might relate to the BlackByte ransomware, including looking for file writes
associated with BlackByte, persistence, initial access, account registry
modification and more.
narrative: BlackByte ransomware campaigns targeting business operations,
involve the use of ransomware payloads, infection chain to collect and exfiltrate data and drop payload on the targeted system.
BlackByte Ransomware operates by infiltrating a system through various methods, such as malicious email attachments, exploit kits,
or compromised websites. Once inside a system, it begins encrypting files using strong encryption algorithms, rendering them unusable.
After completing the encryption process, BlackByte Ransomware typically leaves a ransom note that explains the situation to the victim
and provides instructions on how to pay the ransom to obtain the decryption key.
references:
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/07/06/the-five-day-job-a-blackbyte-ransomware-intrusion-case-study/
tags:
analytic_story: BlackByte Ransomware
category:
- Malware
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
usecase: Advanced Threat Detection