mirror of
https://github.com/splunk/security_content
synced 2026-06-08 17:32:49 +00:00
Branch was auto-updated.
This commit is contained in:
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ references:
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- Ransomware
|
||||
- BlackByte Ransomware
|
||||
asset_type: Endpoint
|
||||
confidence: 50
|
||||
impact: 50
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- Ransomware
|
||||
- Revil Ransomware
|
||||
- BlackByte Ransomware
|
||||
asset_type: Endpoint
|
||||
confidence: 50
|
||||
impact: 50
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
||||
name: Anomalous usage of 7zip
|
||||
id: 9364ee8e-a39a-11eb-8f1d-acde48001122
|
||||
version: 1
|
||||
date: '2023-06-13'
|
||||
date: '2023-07-10'
|
||||
author: Michael Haag, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
|
||||
status: production
|
||||
type: Anomaly
|
||||
@@ -31,8 +31,9 @@ references:
|
||||
- https://thedfirreport.com/2021/01/31/bazar-no-ryuk/
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- Cobalt Strike
|
||||
- NOBELIUM Group
|
||||
- BlackByte Ransomware
|
||||
- Cobalt Strike
|
||||
- Graceful Wipe Out Attack
|
||||
asset_type: Endpoint
|
||||
confidence: 80
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
||||
name: CMD Echo Pipe - Escalation
|
||||
id: eb277ba0-b96b-11eb-b00e-acde48001122
|
||||
version: 2
|
||||
date: '2023-06-13'
|
||||
date: '2023-07-10'
|
||||
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
|
||||
status: production
|
||||
type: TTP
|
||||
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ references:
|
||||
- https://github.com/rapid7/meterpreter/blob/master/source/extensions/priv/server/elevate/namedpipe.c
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- BlackByte Ransomware
|
||||
- Cobalt Strike
|
||||
- Graceful Wipe Out Attack
|
||||
asset_type: Endpoint
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
||||
name: Cobalt Strike Named Pipes
|
||||
id: 5876d429-0240-4709-8b93-ea8330b411b5
|
||||
version: 2
|
||||
date: '2023-06-13'
|
||||
date: '2023-07-10'
|
||||
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
|
||||
status: production
|
||||
type: TTP
|
||||
@@ -41,11 +41,12 @@ references:
|
||||
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- LockBit Ransomware
|
||||
- Graceful Wipe Out Attack
|
||||
- Cobalt Strike
|
||||
- DarkSide Ransomware
|
||||
- Trickbot
|
||||
- DarkSide Ransomware
|
||||
- Cobalt Strike
|
||||
- BlackByte Ransomware
|
||||
- Graceful Wipe Out Attack
|
||||
- LockBit Ransomware
|
||||
asset_type: Endpoint
|
||||
confidence: 90
|
||||
impact: 80
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
||||
name: Detect Exchange Web Shell
|
||||
id: 8c14eeee-2af1-4a4b-bda8-228da0f4862a
|
||||
version: 4
|
||||
date: '2022-09-30'
|
||||
date: '2023-07-10'
|
||||
author: Michael Haag, Shannon Davis, David Dorsey, Splunk
|
||||
status: production
|
||||
type: TTP
|
||||
@@ -52,10 +52,11 @@ references:
|
||||
- https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-microsoft-exchange-servers-still-vulnerable-to-proxyshell-exploit#what-should-you-do
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- HAFNIUM Group
|
||||
- ProxyNotShell
|
||||
- ProxyShell
|
||||
- CISA AA22-257A
|
||||
- ProxyNotShell
|
||||
- HAFNIUM Group
|
||||
- BlackByte Ransomware
|
||||
asset_type: Endpoint
|
||||
confidence: 90
|
||||
impact: 90
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ tags:
|
||||
- Sandworm Tools
|
||||
- Volt Typhoon
|
||||
- IcedID
|
||||
- BlackByte Ransomware
|
||||
asset_type: Endpoint
|
||||
confidence: 70
|
||||
impact: 50
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
||||
name: Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass
|
||||
id: 070e9b80-6252-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
|
||||
version: 2
|
||||
date: '2023-06-13'
|
||||
date: '2023-07-10'
|
||||
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
|
||||
status: production
|
||||
type: TTP
|
||||
@@ -37,10 +37,11 @@ references:
|
||||
- https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/how-to-use-the-regsvr32-tool-and-troubleshoot-regsvr32-error-messages-a98d960a-7392-e6fe-d90a-3f4e0cb543e5
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- Cobalt Strike
|
||||
- Living Off The Land
|
||||
- Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity
|
||||
- Cobalt Strike
|
||||
- BlackByte Ransomware
|
||||
- Graceful Wipe Out Attack
|
||||
- Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity
|
||||
asset_type: Endpoint
|
||||
confidence: 100
|
||||
impact: 80
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ tags:
|
||||
- Active Directory Lateral Movement
|
||||
- CISA AA22-320A
|
||||
- Sandworm Tools
|
||||
- BlackByte Ransomware
|
||||
asset_type: Endpoint
|
||||
confidence: 90
|
||||
impact: 30
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,82 +1,88 @@
|
||||
name: Detect Webshell Exploit Behavior
|
||||
id: 22597426-6dbd-49bd-bcdc-4ec19857192f
|
||||
version: 2
|
||||
date: '2023-04-26'
|
||||
author: Steven Dick
|
||||
status: production
|
||||
type: TTP
|
||||
description: This search is used to detect the abuse of web applications by adversaries. Adversaries may install a backdoor or script onto web servers by exploiting known vulnerabilities or misconfigruations. Web shells are used to establish persistent access to systems and provide a set of executable functions or a command-line interface on the system hosting the Web server.
|
||||
data_source:
|
||||
- Sysmon Event ID 1
|
||||
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count max(_time) as lastTime, min(_time) as firstTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
|
||||
where (Processes.process_name IN ("arp.exe","at.exe","bash.exe","bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe","cmd.exe","cscript.exe",
|
||||
"dsget.exe","dsquery.exe","find.exe","findstr.exe","fsutil.exe","hostname.exe","ipconfig.exe","ksh.exe","nbstat.exe",
|
||||
"net.exe","net1.exe","netdom.exe","netsh.exe","netstat.exe","nltest.exe","nslookup.exe","ntdsutil.exe","pathping.exe",
|
||||
"ping.exe","powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","qprocess.exe","query.exe","qwinsta.exe","reg.exe","rundll32.exe","sc.exe",
|
||||
"scrcons.exe","schtasks.exe","sh.exe","systeminfo.exe","tasklist.exe","tracert.exe","ver.exe","vssadmin.exe",
|
||||
"wevtutil.exe","whoami.exe","wmic.exe","wscript.exe","wusa.exe","zsh.exe")
|
||||
AND Processes.parent_process_name IN ("w3wp.exe", "http*.exe", "nginx*.exe", "php*.exe", "php-cgi*.exe","tomcat*.exe"))
|
||||
by Processes.dest,Processes.user,Processes.parent_process,Processes.parent_process_name,Processes.process,Processes.process_name
|
||||
| `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")`
|
||||
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
|
||||
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
|
||||
| `detect_webshell_exploit_behavior_filter`'
|
||||
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
|
||||
on process that includes the full command line of the process being launched on
|
||||
your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition,
|
||||
confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the
|
||||
endpoint product.
|
||||
known_false_positives: Legitimate OS functions called by vendor applications, baseline the environment and filter before enabling. Recommend throttle by dest/process_name
|
||||
references:
|
||||
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/003/
|
||||
- https://github.com/nsacyber/Mitigating-Web-Shells
|
||||
- https://www.hackingarticles.in/multiple-ways-to-exploit-tomcat-manager/
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- ProxyShell
|
||||
- ProxyNotShell
|
||||
- HAFNIUM Group
|
||||
- CISA AA22-257A
|
||||
- CISA AA22-264A
|
||||
asset_type: Endpoint
|
||||
confidence: 80
|
||||
impact: 100
|
||||
message: Webshell Exploit Behavior - $parent_process_name$ spawned $process_name$ on $dest$.
|
||||
mitre_attack_id:
|
||||
- T1505
|
||||
- T1505.003
|
||||
observable:
|
||||
- name: user
|
||||
type: User
|
||||
role:
|
||||
- Victim
|
||||
- name: dest
|
||||
type: Endpoint
|
||||
role:
|
||||
- Victim
|
||||
- name: process_name
|
||||
type: Process
|
||||
role:
|
||||
- Attacker
|
||||
product:
|
||||
- Splunk Enterprise
|
||||
- Splunk Enterprise Security
|
||||
- Splunk Cloud
|
||||
required_fields:
|
||||
- _time
|
||||
- Processes.dest
|
||||
- Processes.user
|
||||
- Processes.parent_process
|
||||
- Processes.parent_process_name
|
||||
- Processes.process
|
||||
- Processes.process_name
|
||||
risk_score: 80
|
||||
security_domain: endpoint
|
||||
supported_tas:
|
||||
- Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon
|
||||
tests:
|
||||
- name: True Positive Test
|
||||
attack_data:
|
||||
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1505.003/generic_webshell_exploit/generic_webshell_exploit.log
|
||||
source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
|
||||
sourcetype: xmlwineventlog
|
||||
name: Detect Webshell Exploit Behavior
|
||||
id: 22597426-6dbd-49bd-bcdc-4ec19857192f
|
||||
version: 2
|
||||
date: '2023-07-10'
|
||||
author: Steven Dick
|
||||
status: production
|
||||
type: TTP
|
||||
description: This search is used to detect the abuse of web applications by adversaries.
|
||||
Adversaries may install a backdoor or script onto web servers by exploiting known
|
||||
vulnerabilities or misconfigruations. Web shells are used to establish persistent
|
||||
access to systems and provide a set of executable functions or a command-line interface
|
||||
on the system hosting the Web server.
|
||||
data_source:
|
||||
- Sysmon Event ID 1
|
||||
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count max(_time) as lastTime, min(_time)
|
||||
as firstTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name IN
|
||||
("arp.exe","at.exe","bash.exe","bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe","cmd.exe","cscript.exe",
|
||||
"dsget.exe","dsquery.exe","find.exe","findstr.exe","fsutil.exe","hostname.exe","ipconfig.exe","ksh.exe","nbstat.exe",
|
||||
"net.exe","net1.exe","netdom.exe","netsh.exe","netstat.exe","nltest.exe","nslookup.exe","ntdsutil.exe","pathping.exe",
|
||||
"ping.exe","powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","qprocess.exe","query.exe","qwinsta.exe","reg.exe","rundll32.exe","sc.exe",
|
||||
"scrcons.exe","schtasks.exe","sh.exe","systeminfo.exe","tasklist.exe","tracert.exe","ver.exe","vssadmin.exe",
|
||||
"wevtutil.exe","whoami.exe","wmic.exe","wscript.exe","wusa.exe","zsh.exe") AND Processes.parent_process_name
|
||||
IN ("w3wp.exe", "http*.exe", "nginx*.exe", "php*.exe", "php-cgi*.exe","tomcat*.exe"))
|
||||
by Processes.dest,Processes.user,Processes.parent_process,Processes.parent_process_name,Processes.process,Processes.process_name
|
||||
| `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
|
||||
| `detect_webshell_exploit_behavior_filter`'
|
||||
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
|
||||
on process that includes the full command line of the process being launched on
|
||||
your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition,
|
||||
confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the
|
||||
endpoint product.
|
||||
known_false_positives: Legitimate OS functions called by vendor applications, baseline
|
||||
the environment and filter before enabling. Recommend throttle by dest/process_name
|
||||
references:
|
||||
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/003/
|
||||
- https://github.com/nsacyber/Mitigating-Web-Shells
|
||||
- https://www.hackingarticles.in/multiple-ways-to-exploit-tomcat-manager/
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- ProxyNotShell
|
||||
- ProxyShell
|
||||
- CISA AA22-257A
|
||||
- HAFNIUM Group
|
||||
- BlackByte Ransomware
|
||||
- CISA AA22-264A
|
||||
asset_type: Endpoint
|
||||
confidence: 80
|
||||
impact: 100
|
||||
message: Webshell Exploit Behavior - $parent_process_name$ spawned $process_name$
|
||||
on $dest$.
|
||||
mitre_attack_id:
|
||||
- T1505
|
||||
- T1505.003
|
||||
observable:
|
||||
- name: user
|
||||
type: User
|
||||
role:
|
||||
- Victim
|
||||
- name: dest
|
||||
type: Endpoint
|
||||
role:
|
||||
- Victim
|
||||
- name: process_name
|
||||
type: Process
|
||||
role:
|
||||
- Attacker
|
||||
product:
|
||||
- Splunk Enterprise
|
||||
- Splunk Enterprise Security
|
||||
- Splunk Cloud
|
||||
required_fields:
|
||||
- _time
|
||||
- Processes.dest
|
||||
- Processes.user
|
||||
- Processes.parent_process
|
||||
- Processes.parent_process_name
|
||||
- Processes.process
|
||||
- Processes.process_name
|
||||
risk_score: 80
|
||||
security_domain: endpoint
|
||||
supported_tas:
|
||||
- Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon
|
||||
tests:
|
||||
- name: True Positive Test
|
||||
attack_data:
|
||||
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1505.003/generic_webshell_exploit/generic_webshell_exploit.log
|
||||
source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
|
||||
sourcetype: xmlwineventlog
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ references:
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- Windows Defense Evasion Tactics
|
||||
- BlackByte Ransomware
|
||||
asset_type: Endpoint
|
||||
confidence: 50
|
||||
impact: 50
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
||||
name: DLLHost with no Command Line Arguments with Network
|
||||
id: f1c07594-a141-11eb-8407-acde48001122
|
||||
version: 4
|
||||
date: '2023-06-13'
|
||||
date: '2023-07-10'
|
||||
author: Steven Dick, Michael Haag, Splunk
|
||||
status: experimental
|
||||
type: TTP
|
||||
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ references:
|
||||
- https://www.cobaltstrike.com/blog/learn-pipe-fitting-for-all-of-your-offense-projects/
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- BlackByte Ransomware
|
||||
- Cobalt Strike
|
||||
- Graceful Wipe Out Attack
|
||||
asset_type: Endpoint
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- Data Destruction
|
||||
- WhisperGate
|
||||
- BlackByte Ransomware
|
||||
asset_type: Endpoint
|
||||
confidence: 50
|
||||
impact: 50
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- XMRig
|
||||
- Ransomware
|
||||
- BlackByte Ransomware
|
||||
asset_type: Endpoint
|
||||
confidence: 100
|
||||
impact: 80
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
||||
name: Exchange PowerShell Abuse via SSRF
|
||||
id: 29228ab4-0762-11ec-94aa-acde48001122
|
||||
version: 2
|
||||
date: '2022-10-02'
|
||||
date: '2023-07-10'
|
||||
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
|
||||
status: experimental
|
||||
type: TTP
|
||||
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ references:
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- ProxyShell
|
||||
- BlackByte Ransomware
|
||||
- ProxyNotShell
|
||||
asset_type: Endpoint
|
||||
confidence: 100
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
||||
name: Exchange PowerShell Module Usage
|
||||
id: 2d10095e-05ae-11ec-8fdf-acde48001122
|
||||
version: 5
|
||||
date: '2022-11-21'
|
||||
date: '2023-07-10'
|
||||
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
|
||||
status: production
|
||||
type: TTP
|
||||
@@ -51,10 +51,11 @@ references:
|
||||
- https://thedfirreport.com/2022/03/21/apt35-automates-initial-access-using-proxyshell/
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- ProxyShell
|
||||
- CISA AA22-264A
|
||||
- ProxyNotShell
|
||||
- CISA AA22-277A
|
||||
- ProxyShell
|
||||
- BlackByte Ransomware
|
||||
- CISA AA22-264A
|
||||
asset_type: Endpoint
|
||||
confidence: 80
|
||||
impact: 40
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ tags:
|
||||
- Chaos Ransomware
|
||||
- Trickbot
|
||||
- Amadey
|
||||
- BlackByte Ransomware
|
||||
asset_type: Endpoint
|
||||
confidence: 50
|
||||
impact: 40
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- Windows Defense Evasion Tactics
|
||||
- Azorult
|
||||
- BlackByte Ransomware
|
||||
asset_type: Endpoint
|
||||
confidence: 50
|
||||
impact: 50
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
||||
name: GPUpdate with no Command Line Arguments with Network
|
||||
id: 2c853856-a140-11eb-a5b5-acde48001122
|
||||
version: 2
|
||||
date: '2023-06-13'
|
||||
date: '2023-07-10'
|
||||
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
|
||||
status: production
|
||||
type: TTP
|
||||
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ references:
|
||||
- https://www.cobaltstrike.com/blog/learn-pipe-fitting-for-all-of-your-offense-projects/
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- BlackByte Ransomware
|
||||
- Cobalt Strike
|
||||
- Graceful Wipe Out Attack
|
||||
asset_type: Endpoint
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- Clop Ransomware
|
||||
- LockBit Ransomware
|
||||
- BlackByte Ransomware
|
||||
asset_type: Endpoint
|
||||
confidence: 80
|
||||
impact: 90
|
||||
|
||||
+2
-1
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
||||
name: MS Exchange Mailbox Replication service writing Active Server Pages
|
||||
id: 985f322c-57a5-11ec-b9ac-acde48001122
|
||||
version: 1
|
||||
date: '2021-12-07'
|
||||
date: '2023-07-10'
|
||||
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
|
||||
status: experimental
|
||||
type: TTP
|
||||
@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- ProxyShell
|
||||
- Ransomware
|
||||
- BlackByte Ransomware
|
||||
asset_type: Endpoint
|
||||
confidence: 90
|
||||
impact: 90
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- Data Destruction
|
||||
- WhisperGate
|
||||
- BlackByte Ransomware
|
||||
asset_type: Endpoint
|
||||
confidence: 60
|
||||
impact: 60
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ tags:
|
||||
- AsyncRAT
|
||||
- Amadey
|
||||
- Sneaky Active Directory Persistence Tricks
|
||||
- BlackByte Ransomware
|
||||
asset_type: Endpoint
|
||||
confidence: 95
|
||||
impact: 80
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ references:
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- Clop Ransomware
|
||||
- BlackByte Ransomware
|
||||
asset_type: Endpoint
|
||||
confidence: 90
|
||||
impact: 80
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
||||
name: Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network
|
||||
id: 35307032-a12d-11eb-835f-acde48001122
|
||||
version: 4
|
||||
date: '2023-06-13'
|
||||
date: '2023-07-10'
|
||||
author: Steven Dick, Michael Haag, Splunk
|
||||
status: production
|
||||
type: TTP
|
||||
@@ -40,9 +40,10 @@ references:
|
||||
- https://bohops.com/2018/02/26/leveraging-inf-sct-fetch-execute-techniques-for-bypass-evasion-persistence/
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- Cobalt Strike
|
||||
- PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527
|
||||
- Suspicious Rundll32 Activity
|
||||
- Cobalt Strike
|
||||
- BlackByte Ransomware
|
||||
- PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527
|
||||
- Graceful Wipe Out Attack
|
||||
asset_type: Endpoint
|
||||
confidence: 100
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
||||
name: SearchProtocolHost with no Command Line with Network
|
||||
id: b690df8c-a145-11eb-a38b-acde48001122
|
||||
version: 3
|
||||
date: '2023-06-13'
|
||||
date: '2023-07-10'
|
||||
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
|
||||
status: production
|
||||
type: TTP
|
||||
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ references:
|
||||
- https://github.com/mandiant/red_team_tool_countermeasures/blob/master/rules/PGF/supplemental/hxioc/SUSPICIOUS%20EXECUTION%20OF%20SEARCHPROTOCOLHOST%20(METHODOLOGY).ioc
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- BlackByte Ransomware
|
||||
- Cobalt Strike
|
||||
- Graceful Wipe Out Attack
|
||||
asset_type: Endpoint
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
||||
name: Services Escalate Exe
|
||||
id: c448488c-b7ec-11eb-8253-acde48001122
|
||||
version: 1
|
||||
date: '2023-06-13'
|
||||
date: '2023-07-10'
|
||||
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
|
||||
status: production
|
||||
type: TTP
|
||||
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ references:
|
||||
- https://hstechdocs.helpsystems.com/manuals/cobaltstrike/current/userguide/index.htm#cshid=1085
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- BlackByte Ransomware
|
||||
- Cobalt Strike
|
||||
- Graceful Wipe Out Attack
|
||||
asset_type: Endpoint
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
||||
name: Suspicious DLLHost no Command Line Arguments
|
||||
id: ff61e98c-0337-4593-a78f-72a676c56f26
|
||||
version: 4
|
||||
date: '2023-06-13'
|
||||
date: '2023-07-10'
|
||||
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
|
||||
status: production
|
||||
type: TTP
|
||||
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ references:
|
||||
- https://www.cobaltstrike.com/blog/learn-pipe-fitting-for-all-of-your-offense-projects/
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- BlackByte Ransomware
|
||||
- Cobalt Strike
|
||||
- Graceful Wipe Out Attack
|
||||
asset_type: Endpoint
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ tags:
|
||||
- XMRig
|
||||
- CISA AA22-320A
|
||||
- AgentTesla
|
||||
- BlackByte Ransomware
|
||||
asset_type: Endpoint
|
||||
confidence: 90
|
||||
impact: 70
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
||||
name: Suspicious GPUpdate no Command Line Arguments
|
||||
id: f308490a-473a-40ef-ae64-dd7a6eba284a
|
||||
version: 3
|
||||
date: '2023-06-13'
|
||||
date: '2023-07-10'
|
||||
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
|
||||
status: production
|
||||
type: TTP
|
||||
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ references:
|
||||
- https://www.cobaltstrike.com/blog/learn-pipe-fitting-for-all-of-your-offense-projects/
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- BlackByte Ransomware
|
||||
- Cobalt Strike
|
||||
- Graceful Wipe Out Attack
|
||||
asset_type: Endpoint
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
||||
name: Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename
|
||||
id: f0db4464-55d9-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
|
||||
version: 4
|
||||
date: '2023-06-13'
|
||||
date: '2023-07-10'
|
||||
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
|
||||
status: production
|
||||
type: Hunting
|
||||
@@ -33,10 +33,11 @@ references:
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- Masquerading - Rename System Utilities
|
||||
- Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution
|
||||
- Graceful Wipe Out Attack
|
||||
- Living Off The Land
|
||||
- Cobalt Strike
|
||||
- Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution
|
||||
- BlackByte Ransomware
|
||||
- Graceful Wipe Out Attack
|
||||
asset_type: Endpoint
|
||||
confidence: 90
|
||||
impact: 70
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
||||
name: Suspicious msbuild path
|
||||
id: f5198224-551c-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
|
||||
version: 3
|
||||
date: '2023-06-13'
|
||||
date: '2023-07-10'
|
||||
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
|
||||
status: production
|
||||
type: TTP
|
||||
@@ -32,11 +32,12 @@ references:
|
||||
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1127.001/T1127.001.md
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- Masquerading - Rename System Utilities
|
||||
- Graceful Wipe Out Attack
|
||||
- Living Off The Land
|
||||
- Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild
|
||||
- Masquerading - Rename System Utilities
|
||||
- Living Off The Land
|
||||
- Cobalt Strike
|
||||
- BlackByte Ransomware
|
||||
- Graceful Wipe Out Attack
|
||||
asset_type: Endpoint
|
||||
confidence: 70
|
||||
impact: 70
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
||||
name: Suspicious MSBuild Rename
|
||||
id: 4006adac-5937-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
|
||||
version: 3
|
||||
date: '2023-06-13'
|
||||
date: '2023-07-10'
|
||||
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
|
||||
status: production
|
||||
type: Hunting
|
||||
@@ -30,11 +30,12 @@ references:
|
||||
- https://github.com/infosecn1nja/MaliciousMacroMSBuild/
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- Masquerading - Rename System Utilities
|
||||
- Graceful Wipe Out Attack
|
||||
- Living Off The Land
|
||||
- Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild
|
||||
- Masquerading - Rename System Utilities
|
||||
- Living Off The Land
|
||||
- Cobalt Strike
|
||||
- BlackByte Ransomware
|
||||
- Graceful Wipe Out Attack
|
||||
asset_type: Endpoint
|
||||
confidence: 90
|
||||
impact: 70
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ tags:
|
||||
- Chaos Ransomware
|
||||
- Trickbot
|
||||
- Amadey
|
||||
- BlackByte Ransomware
|
||||
asset_type: Endpoint
|
||||
confidence: 50
|
||||
impact: 70
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
||||
name: Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments
|
||||
id: e451bd16-e4c5-4109-8eb1-c4c6ecf048b4
|
||||
version: 3
|
||||
date: '2023-06-13'
|
||||
date: '2023-07-10'
|
||||
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
|
||||
status: production
|
||||
type: TTP
|
||||
@@ -32,9 +32,10 @@ references:
|
||||
- https://bohops.com/2018/02/26/leveraging-inf-sct-fetch-execute-techniques-for-bypass-evasion-persistence/
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- Cobalt Strike
|
||||
- PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527
|
||||
- Suspicious Rundll32 Activity
|
||||
- Cobalt Strike
|
||||
- BlackByte Ransomware
|
||||
- PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527
|
||||
- Graceful Wipe Out Attack
|
||||
asset_type: Endpoint
|
||||
confidence: 70
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
||||
name: Suspicious Rundll32 StartW
|
||||
id: 9319dda5-73f2-4d43-a85a-67ce961bddb7
|
||||
version: 3
|
||||
date: '2023-06-13'
|
||||
date: '2023-07-10'
|
||||
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
|
||||
status: production
|
||||
type: TTP
|
||||
@@ -37,10 +37,11 @@ references:
|
||||
- https://bohops.com/2018/02/26/leveraging-inf-sct-fetch-execute-techniques-for-bypass-evasion-persistence/
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- Cobalt Strike
|
||||
- Suspicious Rundll32 Activity
|
||||
- Graceful Wipe Out Attack
|
||||
- Trickbot
|
||||
- Suspicious Rundll32 Activity
|
||||
- Cobalt Strike
|
||||
- BlackByte Ransomware
|
||||
- Graceful Wipe Out Attack
|
||||
asset_type: Endpoint
|
||||
confidence: 50
|
||||
impact: 70
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
||||
name: Suspicious SearchProtocolHost no Command Line Arguments
|
||||
id: f52d2db8-31f9-4aa7-a176-25779effe55c
|
||||
version: 3
|
||||
date: '2023-06-13'
|
||||
date: '2023-07-10'
|
||||
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
|
||||
status: production
|
||||
type: TTP
|
||||
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ references:
|
||||
- https://github.com/mandiant/red_team_tool_countermeasures/blob/master/rules/PGF/supplemental/hxioc/SUSPICIOUS%20EXECUTION%20OF%20SEARCHPROTOCOLHOST%20(METHODOLOGY).ioc
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- BlackByte Ransomware
|
||||
- Cobalt Strike
|
||||
- Graceful Wipe Out Attack
|
||||
asset_type: Endpoint
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
||||
name: W3WP Spawning Shell
|
||||
id: 0f03423c-7c6a-11eb-bc47-acde48001122
|
||||
version: 2
|
||||
date: '2023-04-14'
|
||||
date: '2023-07-10'
|
||||
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
|
||||
status: production
|
||||
type: TTP
|
||||
@@ -36,13 +36,14 @@ references:
|
||||
- https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-microsoft-exchange-servers-still-vulnerable-to-proxyshell-exploit#what-should-you-do
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- HAFNIUM Group
|
||||
- CISA AA22-264A
|
||||
- Hermetic Wiper
|
||||
- ProxyNotShell
|
||||
- ProxyShell
|
||||
- CISA AA22-257A
|
||||
- Data Destruction
|
||||
- ProxyShell
|
||||
- Hermetic Wiper
|
||||
- CISA AA22-257A
|
||||
- HAFNIUM Group
|
||||
- BlackByte Ransomware
|
||||
- CISA AA22-264A
|
||||
asset_type: Endpoint
|
||||
confidence: 80
|
||||
cve:
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ tags:
|
||||
- Windows Drivers
|
||||
- CISA AA22-320A
|
||||
- AgentTesla
|
||||
- BlackByte Ransomware
|
||||
asset_type: Endpoint
|
||||
confidence: 60
|
||||
impact: 60
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ tags:
|
||||
- Windows Drivers
|
||||
- CISA AA22-320A
|
||||
- AgentTesla
|
||||
- BlackByte Ransomware
|
||||
asset_type: Endpoint
|
||||
confidence: 70
|
||||
impact: 60
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
|
||||
name: Windows Modify Registry EnableLinkedConnections
|
||||
id: 93048164-3358-4af0-8680-aa5f38440516
|
||||
version: 1
|
||||
date: '2023-07-10'
|
||||
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
|
||||
status: production
|
||||
type: TTP
|
||||
data_source:
|
||||
- Sysmon EventID 12
|
||||
- Sysmon EventID 13
|
||||
- Sysmon EventID 14
|
||||
description: The following analytic identifies a suspicious registry modification of Windows linked connection configuration.
|
||||
This technique was being abused by several adversaries, malware like BlackByte ransomware to enable the linked connections feature,
|
||||
that allows network shares to be accessed using both standard and administrator-level privileges simultaneously.
|
||||
By default, Windows does not enable this feature to enhance security.
|
||||
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry
|
||||
WHERE (Registry.registry_path= "*\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System\\EnableLinkedConnections" Registry.registry_value_data = "0x00000001")
|
||||
BY _time span=1h Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid
|
||||
| `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`
|
||||
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
|
||||
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
|
||||
| `windows_modify_registry_enablelinkedconnections_filter`'
|
||||
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
|
||||
on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
|
||||
your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure
|
||||
that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.
|
||||
known_false_positives: Administrators may enable or disable this feature that may
|
||||
cause some false positive.
|
||||
references:
|
||||
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/07/06/the-five-day-job-a-blackbyte-ransomware-intrusion-case-study/
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- BlackByte Ransomware
|
||||
asset_type: endpoint
|
||||
atomic_guid:
|
||||
- 4f4e2f9f-6209-4fcf-9b15-3b7455706f5b
|
||||
confidence: 70
|
||||
impact: 70
|
||||
message: A registry modification in Windows EnableLinkedConnections configuration on $dest$
|
||||
mitre_attack_id:
|
||||
- T1112
|
||||
observable:
|
||||
- name: dest
|
||||
type: Endpoint
|
||||
role:
|
||||
- Victim
|
||||
product:
|
||||
- Splunk Enterprise
|
||||
- Splunk Enterprise Security
|
||||
- Splunk Cloud
|
||||
risk_score: 49
|
||||
required_fields:
|
||||
- _time
|
||||
- Registry.registry_key_name
|
||||
- Registry.registry_path
|
||||
- Registry.user
|
||||
- Registry.dest
|
||||
- Registry.registry_value_name
|
||||
- Registry.action
|
||||
- Registry.registry_value_data
|
||||
security_domain: endpoint
|
||||
tests:
|
||||
- name: True Positive Test
|
||||
attack_data:
|
||||
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1112/blackbyte/enablelinkedconnections/blackbyte_sysmon.log
|
||||
source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
|
||||
sourcetype: xmlwineventlog
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
|
||||
name: Windows Modify Registry LongPathsEnabled
|
||||
id: 36f9626c-4272-4808-aadd-267acce681c0
|
||||
version: 1
|
||||
date: '2023-07-10'
|
||||
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
|
||||
status: production
|
||||
type: Anomaly
|
||||
data_source:
|
||||
- Sysmon EventID 12
|
||||
- Sysmon EventID 13
|
||||
- Sysmon EventID 14
|
||||
description: The following analytic identifies a suspicious registry modification of Windows long path enable configuration.
|
||||
This technique was being abused by several adversaries, malware like BlackByte to enable long file path support in the operating system.
|
||||
By default, Windows has a limitation on the maximum length of a file path, which is set to 260 characters.
|
||||
Enabling the LongPathsEnabled setting allows you to work with file paths longer than 260 characters.
|
||||
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry
|
||||
WHERE (Registry.registry_path= "*\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\FileSystem\\LongPathsEnabled" Registry.registry_value_data = "0x00000001")
|
||||
BY _time span=1h Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid
|
||||
| `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`
|
||||
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
|
||||
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
|
||||
| `windows_modify_registry_longpathsenabled_filter`'
|
||||
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
|
||||
on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
|
||||
your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure
|
||||
that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.
|
||||
known_false_positives: Administrators may enable or disable this feature that may
|
||||
cause some false positive.
|
||||
references:
|
||||
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/07/06/the-five-day-job-a-blackbyte-ransomware-intrusion-case-study/
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- BlackByte Ransomware
|
||||
asset_type: endpoint
|
||||
atomic_guid:
|
||||
- 4f4e2f9f-6209-4fcf-9b15-3b7455706f5b
|
||||
confidence: 40
|
||||
impact: 40
|
||||
message: A registry modification in Windows LongPathEnable configuration on $dest$
|
||||
mitre_attack_id:
|
||||
- T1112
|
||||
observable:
|
||||
- name: dest
|
||||
type: Endpoint
|
||||
role:
|
||||
- Victim
|
||||
product:
|
||||
- Splunk Enterprise
|
||||
- Splunk Enterprise Security
|
||||
- Splunk Cloud
|
||||
risk_score: 16
|
||||
required_fields:
|
||||
- _time
|
||||
- Registry.registry_key_name
|
||||
- Registry.registry_path
|
||||
- Registry.user
|
||||
- Registry.dest
|
||||
- Registry.registry_value_name
|
||||
- Registry.action
|
||||
- Registry.registry_value_data
|
||||
security_domain: endpoint
|
||||
tests:
|
||||
- name: True Positive Test
|
||||
attack_data:
|
||||
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1112/blackbyte/longpathsenabled/longpath_sysmon.log
|
||||
source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
|
||||
sourcetype: xmlwineventlog
|
||||
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
||||
name: Windows MSExchange Management Mailbox Cmdlet Usage
|
||||
id: 396de86f-25e7-4b0e-be09-a330be35249d
|
||||
version: 1
|
||||
date: '2022-11-21'
|
||||
date: '2023-07-10'
|
||||
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
|
||||
status: production
|
||||
type: Anomaly
|
||||
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ references:
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- ProxyShell
|
||||
- BlackByte Ransomware
|
||||
- ProxyNotShell
|
||||
asset_type: Endpoint
|
||||
confidence: 80
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ tags:
|
||||
- Data Destruction
|
||||
- Hermetic Wiper
|
||||
- Caddy Wiper
|
||||
- BlackByte Ransomware
|
||||
asset_type: Endpoint
|
||||
confidence: 100
|
||||
impact: 90
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ tags:
|
||||
- Data Destruction
|
||||
- Hermetic Wiper
|
||||
- Caddy Wiper
|
||||
- BlackByte Ransomware
|
||||
asset_type: Endpoint
|
||||
confidence: 100
|
||||
impact: 90
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ references:
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- Active Directory Lateral Movement
|
||||
- BlackByte Ransomware
|
||||
asset_type: Endpoint
|
||||
atomic_guid: []
|
||||
confidence: 50
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ references:
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- Windows Drivers
|
||||
- BlackByte Ransomware
|
||||
asset_type: Endpoint
|
||||
confidence: 50
|
||||
impact: 50
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
||||
name: ProxyShell ProxyNotShell Behavior Detected
|
||||
id: c32fab32-6aaf-492d-bfaf-acbed8e50cdf
|
||||
version: 1
|
||||
date: '2022-10-03'
|
||||
date: '2023-07-10'
|
||||
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
|
||||
status: production
|
||||
type: Correlation
|
||||
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ references:
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- ProxyShell
|
||||
- BlackByte Ransomware
|
||||
- ProxyNotShell
|
||||
asset_type: Web Server
|
||||
confidence: 90
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
||||
name: Windows Exchange Autodiscover SSRF Abuse
|
||||
id: d436f9e7-0ee7-4a47-864b-6dea2c4e2752
|
||||
version: 1
|
||||
date: '2022-10-03'
|
||||
date: '2023-07-10'
|
||||
author: Michael Haag, Nathaniel Stearns, Splunk
|
||||
status: production
|
||||
type: TTP
|
||||
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ references:
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- ProxyShell
|
||||
- BlackByte Ransomware
|
||||
- ProxyNotShell
|
||||
asset_type: Web server
|
||||
confidence: 80
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
|
||||
name: BlackByte Ransomware
|
||||
id: b18259ac-0746-45d7-bd1f-81d65274a80b
|
||||
version: 1
|
||||
date: '2023-07-10'
|
||||
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
|
||||
description: Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities
|
||||
that might relate to the BlackByte ransomware, including looking for file writes
|
||||
associated with BlackByte, persistence, initial access, account registry
|
||||
modification and more.
|
||||
narrative: BlackByte ransomware campaigns targeting business operations,
|
||||
involve the use of ransomware payloads, infection chain to collect and exfiltrate data and drop payload on the targeted system.
|
||||
BlackByte Ransomware operates by infiltrating a system through various methods, such as malicious email attachments, exploit kits,
|
||||
or compromised websites. Once inside a system, it begins encrypting files using strong encryption algorithms, rendering them unusable.
|
||||
After completing the encryption process, BlackByte Ransomware typically leaves a ransom note that explains the situation to the victim
|
||||
and provides instructions on how to pay the ransom to obtain the decryption key.
|
||||
references:
|
||||
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/07/06/the-five-day-job-a-blackbyte-ransomware-intrusion-case-study/
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story: BlackByte Ransomware
|
||||
category:
|
||||
- Malware
|
||||
product:
|
||||
- Splunk Enterprise
|
||||
- Splunk Enterprise Security
|
||||
- Splunk Cloud
|
||||
usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user