Branch was auto-updated.

detections/endpoint/windows_execute_arbitrary_commands_with_msdt.yml

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 name: Windows Execute Arbitrary Commands with MSDT
 id: e1d5145f-38fe-42b9-a5d5-457796715f97
-version: 2
-date: '2022-05-30'
+version: 3
+date: '2022-06-29'
 author: Michael Haag, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
 type: TTP
 datamodel:
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ description: The following analytic identifies a recently disclosed arbitraty co
   During triage, review file modifications for html. Identify parallel process execution that may be related, including an Office Product.
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
   as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=msdt.exe
-  Processes.process IN ("*ms-msdt:/id*","*ms-msdt:-id*","*/id*") AND (Processes.process="*IT_BrowseForFile=*" OR Processes.process="*IT_RebrowseForFile=*" OR Processes.process="*.xml*") AND Processes.process="*PCWDiagnostic*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name
+  Processes.process IN ("*msdt*","*ms-msdt:*","*ms-msdt:/id*","*ms-msdt:-id*","*/id*") AND (Processes.process="*IT_BrowseForFile=*" OR Processes.process="*IT_RebrowseForFile=*" OR Processes.process="*.xml*") AND Processes.process="*PCWDiagnostic*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name
   Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id
   | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` 
   | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`

detections/endpoint/windows_odbcconf_hunting.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+name: Windows Odbcconf Hunting
+id: 0562ad4b-fdaa-4882-b12f-7b8e0034cd72
+version: 1
+date: '2022-06-30'
+author: Michael Haag, Splunk
+type: Hunting
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
+description: The following analytic identifies Odbcconf.exe running in the environment to assist with identifying tuning higher fidelity analytics related to Odbcconf.exe.
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
+  as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=odbcconf.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id
+  | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` 
+  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
+  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
+  | `windows_odbcconf_hunting_filter`'
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.
+known_false_positives: False positives will be present as this is meant to assist with filtering and tuning.
+references:
+- https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/odbcconf.exe-07FBA12552331355C103999806627314.html
+- https://twitter.com/redcanary/status/1541838407894171650?s=20&t=kp3WBPtfnyA3xW7D7wx0uw
+tags:
+  analytic_story:
+  - Living Off The Land
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  cis20:
+  - CIS 3
+  - CIS 5
+  - CIS 16
+  confidence: 20
+  context:
+  - Source:Endpoint
+  - Stage:Defense Evasion
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.008/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon-odbc-regsvr.log
+  impact: 30
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Exploitation
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1218.008
+  nist:
+  - DE.CM
+  message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to circumvent controls.
+  observable:
+  - name: user
+    type: User
+    role:
+    - Victim
+  - name: dest
+    type: Hostname
+    role:
+    - Victim
+  - name: parent_process_name
+    type: Process Name
+    role:
+    - Parent Process
+  - name: process_name
+    type: Process
+    role:
+    - Child Process
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  required_fields:
+  - _time
+  - Processes.dest
+  - Processes.user
+  - Processes.parent_process_name #parent process name
+  - Processes.parent_process #parent cmdline
+  - Processes.original_file_name
+  - Processes.process_name #process name
+  - Processes.process #process cmdline
+  - Processes.process_id
+  - Processes.parent_process_path
+  - Processes.process_path
+  - Processes.parent_process_id
+  risk_score: 6
+  security_domain: endpoint

detections/endpoint/windows_odbcconf_load_dll.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+name: Windows Odbcconf Load DLL
+id: 141e7fca-a9f0-40fd-a539-9aac8be41f1b
+version: 1
+date: '2022-06-28'
+author: Michael Haag, Splunk
+type: TTP
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
+description: The following analytic identifies odbcconf.exe, Windows Open Database Connectivity utility, utilizing the action function of regsvr to load a DLL. 
+  An example will look like - odbcconf.exe /A { REGSVR T1218-2.dll }. 
+  During triage, review parent process, parallel procesess and file modifications.  
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
+  as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=odbcconf.exe
+  Processes.process IN ("*/a *",  "*-a*") Processes.process="*regsvr*"  by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name
+  Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id
+  | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` 
+  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
+  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
+  | `windows_odbcconf_load_dll_filter`'
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.
+known_false_positives: False positives may be present and filtering may need to occur based on legitimate application usage. Filter as needed.
+references:
+- https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/odbcconf.exe-07FBA12552331355C103999806627314.html
+- https://twitter.com/redcanary/status/1541838407894171650?s=20&t=kp3WBPtfnyA3xW7D7wx0uw
+tags:
+  analytic_story:
+  - Living Off The Land
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  cis20:
+  - CIS 3
+  - CIS 5
+  - CIS 16
+  confidence: 70
+  context:
+  - Source:Endpoint
+  - Stage:Defense Evasion
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.008/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon-odbc-regsvr.log
+  impact: 60
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Exploitation
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1218.008
+  nist:
+  - DE.CM
+  message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to circumvent controls.
+  observable:
+  - name: user
+    type: User
+    role:
+    - Victim
+  - name: dest
+    type: Hostname
+    role:
+    - Victim
+  - name: parent_process_name
+    type: Process Name
+    role:
+    - Parent Process
+  - name: process_name
+    type: Process
+    role:
+    - Child Process
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  required_fields:
+  - _time
+  - Processes.dest
+  - Processes.user
+  - Processes.parent_process_name #parent process name
+  - Processes.parent_process #parent cmdline
+  - Processes.original_file_name
+  - Processes.process_name #process name
+  - Processes.process #process cmdline
+  - Processes.process_id
+  - Processes.parent_process_path
+  - Processes.process_path
+  - Processes.parent_process_id
+  risk_score: 42
+  security_domain: endpoint

detections/endpoint/windows_odbcconf_load_response_file.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+name: Windows Odbcconf Load Response File
+id: 1acafff9-1347-4b40-abae-f35aa4ba85c1
+version: 1
+date: '2022-06-30'
+author: Michael Haag, Splunk
+type: TTP
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
+description: The following analytic identifies the odbcconf.exe, Windows Open Database Connectivity utility, loading up a resource file. The file extension is arbitrary and may be named anything. The resource file itself may have different commands supported by Odbcconf to load up a DLL (REGSVR) on disk or additional commands. 
+  During triage, review file modifications and parallel processes. 
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
+  as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=odbcconf.exe
+  Processes.process IN ("*-f *","*/f *") Processes.process="*.rsp*"  by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name
+  Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id
+  | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` 
+  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
+  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
+  | `windows_odbcconf_load_response_file_filter`'
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.
+known_false_positives: False positives may be present and filtering may need to occur based on legitimate application usage. Filter as needed.
+references:
+- https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/odbcconf.exe-07FBA12552331355C103999806627314.html
+- https://twitter.com/redcanary/status/1541838407894171650?s=20&t=kp3WBPtfnyA3xW7D7wx0uw
+tags:
+  analytic_story:
+  - Living Off The Land
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  cis20:
+  - CIS 3
+  - CIS 5
+  - CIS 16
+  confidence: 70
+  context:
+  - Source:Endpoint
+  - Stage:Defense Evasion
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.008/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon-odbc-rsp.log
+  impact: 60
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Exploitation
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1218.008
+  nist:
+  - DE.CM
+  message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to circumvent controls.
+  observable:
+  - name: user
+    type: User
+    role:
+    - Victim
+  - name: dest
+    type: Hostname
+    role:
+    - Victim
+  - name: parent_process_name
+    type: Process Name
+    role:
+    - Parent Process
+  - name: process_name
+    type: Process
+    role:
+    - Child Process
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  required_fields:
+  - _time
+  - Processes.dest
+  - Processes.user
+  - Processes.parent_process_name #parent process name
+  - Processes.parent_process #parent cmdline
+  - Processes.original_file_name
+  - Processes.process_name #process name
+  - Processes.process #process cmdline
+  - Processes.process_id
+  - Processes.parent_process_path
+  - Processes.process_path
+  - Processes.parent_process_id
+  risk_score: 42
+  security_domain: endpoint

tests/endpoint/windows_odbcconf_hunting.test.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+name: Windows Odbcconf Hunting Unit Test
+tests:
+- name: Windows Odbcconf Hunting
+  file: endpoint/windows_odbcconf_hunting.yml
+  pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0'
+  earliest_time: -24h
+  latest_time: now
+  attack_data:
+  - file_name: windows-sysmon-odbc-regsvr.log
+    data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.008/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon-odbc-regsvr.log
+    source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
+    sourcetype: xmlwineventlog
+    update_timestamp: true

tests/endpoint/windows_odbcconf_load_dll.test.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+name: Windows Odbcconf Load DLL Unit Test
+tests:
+- name: Windows Odbcconf Load DLL
+  file: endpoint/windows_odbcconf_load_dll.yml
+  pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0'
+  earliest_time: -24h
+  latest_time: now
+  attack_data:
+  - file_name: windows-sysmon-odbc-regsvr.log
+    data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.008/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon-odbc-regsvr.log
+    source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
+    sourcetype: xmlwineventlog
+    update_timestamp: true

tests/endpoint/windows_odbcconf_load_response_file.test.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+name: Windows Odbcconf Load Response File Unit Test
+tests:
+- name: Windows Odbcconf Load Response File
+  file: endpoint/windows_odbcconf_load_response_file.yml
+  pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0'
+  earliest_time: -24h
+  latest_time: now
+  attack_data:
+  - file_name: windows-sysmon-odbc-rsp.log
+    data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.008/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon-odbc-rsp.log
+    source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
+    sourcetype: xmlwineventlog
+    update_timestamp: true