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Merge branch 'ssa_detection_testing_two' of github.com:splunk/security-content into ssa_detection_testing_two

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P4T12ICK
2021-03-26 10:21:30 +01:00
parent e2209cb741 f2cc703a4f
commit d041b43ede
44 changed files with 90845 additions and 61426 deletions
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bin/jinja2_templates/detection.j2
+4 -2
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@@ -26,11 +26,13 @@ tags:
- {{kill_chain_phase}}
{% endfor -%}
mitre_attack_id:
- {{mitre_attack_id}}
{% for id in mitre_attack_id -%}
- {{id}}
{% endfor -%}
product:
{% for product in products -%}
- {{product}}
{% endfor -%}
required_fields:
- _time
security_domain: {{security_domain}}
security_domain: {{security_domain}}
bin/newcontent.py
+6 -2
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@@ -195,7 +195,11 @@ def detection_wizard(security_content_path,type,TEMPLATE_PATH):
]
answers = prompt(questions)
mitre_attack_id = answers['mitre_attack_ids'].split(',')
mitre_attack_id = [x.strip() for x in answers['mitre_attack_ids'].split(',')]
print(mitre_attack_id)
j2_env = Environment(loader=FileSystemLoader(TEMPLATE_PATH),
trim_blocks=True)
@@ -218,7 +222,7 @@ def detection_wizard(security_content_path,type,TEMPLATE_PATH):
description='UPDATE_DESCRIPTION', how_to_implement='UPDATE_HOW_TO_IMPLEMENT', known_false_positives='UPDATE_KNOWN_FALSE_POSITIVES',
references='',datamodels=answers['datamodels'],
search= answers['detection_search'] + ' | `' + detection_file_name + '_filter`',
type=answers['detection_type'], analytic_story_name='UPDATE_STORY_NAME', mitre_attack_id = answers['mitre_attack_ids'],
type=answers['detection_type'], analytic_story_name='UPDATE_STORY_NAME', mitre_attack_id=mitre_attack_id,
kill_chain_phases=answers['kill_chain_phases'], dataset_url='UPDATE_DATASET_URL',
products=answers['products'], security_domain=answers['security_domain'])
with open(output_path, 'w', encoding="utf-8") as f:
detections/cloud/aws_create_policy_version_to_allow_all_resources.yml
+3 -4
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@@ -1,4 +1,3 @@
name: AWS Create Policy Version to allow all resources
id: 2a9b80d3-6340-4345-b5ad-212bf3d0dac4
version: 2
@@ -29,8 +28,11 @@ tags:
analytic_story:
- AWS IAM Privilege Escalation
asset_type: AWS Account
automated_detection_testing: passed
cis20:
- CIS 13
dataset:
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078/aws_create_policy_version/aws_cloudtrail_events.json
kill_chain_phases:
- Actions on Objectives
mitre_attack_id:
@@ -54,6 +56,3 @@ tags:
risk_object_type: system
risk_score: 20
security_domain: network
automated_detection_testing: passed
dataset:
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078/aws_create_policy_version/aws_cloudtrail_events.json
detections/cloud/aws_createaccesskey.yml
+3 -3
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@@ -25,8 +25,11 @@ tags:
analytic_story:
- AWS IAM Privilege Escalation
asset_type: AWS Account
automated_detection_testing: passed
cis20:
- CIS 13
dataset:
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078/aws_createaccesskey/aws_cloudtrail_events.json
kill_chain_phases:
- Actions on Objectives
mitre_attack_id:
@@ -50,6 +53,3 @@ tags:
risk_object_type: system
risk_score: 20
security_domain: network
automated_detection_testing: passed
dataset:
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078/aws_createaccesskey/aws_cloudtrail_events.json
detections/cloud/aws_createloginprofile.yml
+3 -3
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@@ -27,8 +27,11 @@ tags:
analytic_story:
- AWS IAM Privilege Escalation
asset_type: AWS Account
automated_detection_testing: passed
cis20:
- CIS 13
dataset:
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078/aws_createloginprofile/aws_cloudtrail_events.json
kill_chain_phases:
- Actions on Objectives
mitre_attack_id:
@@ -52,6 +55,3 @@ tags:
risk_object_type: system
risk_score: 20
security_domain: network
automated_detection_testing: passed
dataset:
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078/aws_createloginprofile/aws_cloudtrail_events.json
detections/cloud/aws_setdefaultpolicyversion.yml
+3 -3
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@@ -27,8 +27,11 @@ tags:
analytic_story:
- AWS IAM Privilege Escalation
asset_type: AWS Account
automated_detection_testing: passed
cis20:
- CIS 13
dataset:
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078/aws_setdefaultpolicyversion/aws_cloudtrail_events.json
kill_chain_phases:
- Actions on Objectives
mitre_attack_id:
@@ -53,6 +56,3 @@ tags:
risk_object_type: system
risk_score: 20
security_domain: network
automated_detection_testing: passed
dataset:
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078/aws_setdefaultpolicyversion/aws_cloudtrail_events.json
detections/cloud/aws_updateloginprofile.yml
+3 -3
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@@ -25,8 +25,11 @@ tags:
analytic_story:
- AWS IAM Privilege Escalation
asset_type: AWS Account
automated_detection_testing: passed
cis20:
- CIS 13
dataset:
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078/aws_updateloginprofile/aws_cloudtrail_events.json
kill_chain_phases:
- Actions on Objectives
mitre_attack_id:
@@ -50,6 +53,3 @@ tags:
risk_object_type: system
risk_score: 20
security_domain: network
automated_detection_testing: passed
dataset:
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078/aws_updateloginprofile/aws_cloudtrail_events.json
detections/endpoint/attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store.yml
-1
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@@ -52,4 +52,3 @@ tags:
- Processes.parent_process
- Processes.user
security_domain: endpoint
detections/endpoint/certutil_download_with_urlcache_and_split_arguments.yml
+1 -1
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@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ references:
tags:
analytic_story:
- Ingress Tool Transfer
automated_detection_testing: passed
dataset:
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
kill_chain_phases:
@@ -49,4 +50,3 @@ tags:
- Processes.user
- Processes.dest
security_domain: endpoint
automated_detection_testing: passed
detections/endpoint/certutil_download_with_verifyctl_and_split_arguments.yml
+1 -1
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@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ references:
tags:
analytic_story:
- Ingress Tool Transfer
automated_detection_testing: passed
dataset:
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
kill_chain_phases:
@@ -50,4 +51,3 @@ tags:
- Processes.user
- Processes.dest
security_domain: endpoint
automated_detection_testing: passed
detections/endpoint/certutil_with_decode_argument.yml
+1 -1
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@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ references:
tags:
analytic_story:
- Deobfuscate-Decode Files or Information
automated_detection_testing: passed
dataset:
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1140/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
kill_chain_phases:
@@ -52,4 +53,3 @@ tags:
- Processes.user
- Processes.dest
security_domain: endpoint
automated_detection_testing: passed
detections/endpoint/clop_common_exec_parameter.yml
+5 -7
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@@ -17,11 +17,9 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as
values(Processes.parent_process_name) as parent_process values(Processes.process_name)
count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
where Processes.process = "*runrun*" OR Processes.process = "*temp.dat*" by Processes.parent_process_name
Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `clop_common_exec_parameter_filter`'
Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_id
Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `clop_common_exec_parameter_filter`'
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting
logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your
endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the
@@ -34,6 +32,8 @@ tags:
analytic_story:
- Clop Ransomware
automated_detection_testing: passed
dataset:
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_b/windows-sysmon.log
kill_chain_phases:
- Obfuscation
mitre_attack_id:
@@ -51,5 +51,3 @@ tags:
- Processes.user
- Processes.process_id
security_domain: endpoint
dataset:
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_b/windows-sysmon.log
detections/endpoint/clop_ransomware_known_service_name.yml
+3 -3
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@@ -24,6 +24,9 @@ references:
tags:
analytic_story:
- Clop Ransomware
automated_detection_testing: passed
dataset:
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-system.log
kill_chain_phases:
- Privilege Escalation
mitre_attack_id:
@@ -41,6 +44,3 @@ tags:
- OriginalFileName
- process_path
security_domain: endpoint
automated_detection_testing: passed
dataset:
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-system.log
detections/endpoint/create_service_in_suspicious_file_path.yml
+3 -3
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@@ -23,6 +23,9 @@ references:
tags:
analytic_story:
- Clop Ransomware
automated_detection_testing: passed
dataset:
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-system.log
kill_chain_phases:
- Privilege Escalation
mitre_attack_id:
@@ -39,6 +42,3 @@ tags:
- Service_Name
- Service_Start_Type
security_domain: endpoint
automated_detection_testing: passed
dataset:
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-system.log
detections/endpoint/detect_exchange_web_shell.yml
+1 -1
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@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ references:
tags:
analytic_story:
- HAFNIUM Group
automated_detection_testing: passed
dataset:
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1505.003/windows-sysmon_proxylogon.log
kill_chain_phases:
@@ -52,4 +53,3 @@ tags:
- Filesystem.file_hash
- Filesystem.user
security_domain: endpoint
automated_detection_testing: passed
detections/endpoint/high_file_deletion_frequency.yml
+3 -3
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@@ -26,6 +26,9 @@ references:
tags:
analytic_story:
- Clop Ransomware
automated_detection_testing: passed
dataset:
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-sysmon.log
kill_chain_phases:
- Exploitation
mitre_attack_id:
@@ -43,6 +46,3 @@ tags:
- ProcessID
- _time
security_domain: endpoint
automated_detection_testing: passed
dataset:
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-sysmon.log
detections/endpoint/high_process_termination_frequency.yml
+3 -3
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@@ -24,6 +24,9 @@ references:
tags:
analytic_story:
- Clop Ransomware
automated_detection_testing: passed
dataset:
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-sysmon.log
kill_chain_phases:
- Exploitation
mitre_attack_id:
@@ -39,6 +42,3 @@ tags:
- _time
- ProcessID
security_domain: endpoint
automated_detection_testing: passed
dataset:
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-sysmon.log
detections/endpoint/process_deleting_its_process_file_path.yml
+3 -3
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@@ -28,6 +28,9 @@ references:
tags:
analytic_story:
- Clop Ransomware
automated_detection_testing: passed
dataset:
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-sysmon.log
kill_chain_phases:
- Exploitation
mitre_attack_id:
@@ -48,6 +51,3 @@ tags:
- result
- _time
security_domain: endpoint
automated_detection_testing: passed
dataset:
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-sysmon.log
detections/endpoint/ransomware_notes_bulk_creation.yml
+3 -3
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@@ -26,6 +26,9 @@ references:
tags:
analytic_story:
- Clop Ransomware
automated_detection_testing: passed
dataset:
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-sysmon.log
kill_chain_phases:
- Obfuscation
mitre_attack_id:
@@ -43,6 +46,3 @@ tags:
- Image
- user
security_domain: endpoint
automated_detection_testing: passed
dataset:
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-sysmon.log
detections/endpoint/resize_shadowstorage_volume.yml
+5 -8
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@@ -20,11 +20,8 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as
= "wmic.exe" Processes.process_name = "vssadmin.exe" Processes.process="*resize*"
Processes.process="*shadowstorage*" Processes.process="*/maxsize*" by Processes.parent_process_name
Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest
Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `resize_shadowstorage_volume_filter`'
Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `resize_shadowstorage_volume_filter`'
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting
logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your
endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the
@@ -36,6 +33,9 @@ references:
tags:
analytic_story:
- Clop Ransomware
automated_detection_testing: passed
dataset:
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-sysmon.log
kill_chain_phases:
- Exploitation
mitre_attack_id:
@@ -53,6 +53,3 @@ tags:
- Processes.dest
- Processes.user
security_domain: endpoint
automated_detection_testing: passed
dataset:
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-sysmon.log
detections/endpoint/ssa___applying_stolen_credentials_via_mimikatz_modules.yml
-2
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@@ -59,5 +59,3 @@ tags:
- _time
risk_severity: high
security_domain: endpoint
detections/endpoint/suspicious_wevtutil_usage.yml
+1 -1
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@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ tags:
analytic_story:
- Windows Log Manipulation
- Ransomware
- Clop Ransomware
- Clop Ransomware
asset_type: ''
automated_detection_testing: passed
cis20:
detections/endpoint/windows_event_log_cleared.yml
+1 -1
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@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ tags:
analytic_story:
- Windows Log Manipulation
- Ransomware
- Clop Ransomware
- Clop Ransomware
asset_type: Endpoint
automated_detection_testing: passed
cis20:
docs/detections.md
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docs/detections.wiki
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docs/mitre-map/coverage.csv
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docs/mitre-map/coverage.json
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docs/mitre-map/detections.csv
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docs/mitre-map/detections.json
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docs/stories.md
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docs/stories.wiki
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package/app.manifest
+1 -1
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@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
"id": {
"group": null,
"name": "DA-ESS-ContentUpdate",
"version": "3.17.0"
"version": "3.18.0"
},
"author": [
{
package/default/analytic_stories.conf
+117 -53
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@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
#############
# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
# On Date: 2021-03-12T17:19:06 UTC
# On Date: 2021-03-25T19:21:00 UTC
# Author: Splunk Security Research
# Contact: research@splunk.com
#############
@@ -34,8 +34,8 @@ version = 1
reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 12", "CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1535"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP", "ID.AM"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User", "ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 AMIs", "ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Instance Types", "ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Regions"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Regions", "ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User", "ESCU - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Instance Types", "ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 AMIs"]
data_models = []
providing_technologies = none
description = Monitor your AWS EC2 instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or EC2 instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior.
@@ -44,6 +44,22 @@ Cryptojacking has attracted an increasing amount of media attention since its ex
When malicious miners appropriate a cloud instance, often spinning up hundreds of new instances, the costs can become astronomical for the account holder. So, it is critically important to monitor your systems for suspicious activities that could indicate that your network has been infiltrated. \
This Analytic Story is focused on detecting suspicious new instances in your EC2 environment to help prevent such a disaster. It contains detection searches that will detect when a previously unused instance type or AMI is used. It also contains support searches to build lookup files to ensure proper execution of the detection searches.
[AWS IAM Privilege Escalation]
category = Cloud Security
creation_date = 2021-03-08
modification_date = 2021-03-08
id = ced74200-8465-4bc3-bd2c-22782eec6750
version = 1
reference = ["https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation/", "https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/the-cloud-shadow-admin-threat-10-permissions-to-protect", "https://labs.bishopfox.com/tech-blog/privilege-escalation-in-aws"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Create Policy Version to allow all resources - Rule", "ESCU - AWS CreateAccessKey - Rule", "ESCU - AWS CreateLoginProfile - Rule", "ESCU - AWS SetDefaultPolicyVersion - Rule", "ESCU - AWS UpdateLoginProfile - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1136.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.DS"]}
investigative_searches = []
support_searches = []
data_models = []
providing_technologies = none
description = This analytic story contains detections that query your AWS Cloudtrail for activities related to privilege escalation.
narrative = Amazon Web Services provides a neat feature called Identity and Access Management (IAM) that enables organizations to manage various AWS services and resources in a secure way. All IAM users have roles, groups and policies associated with them which governs and sets permissions to allow a user to access specific restrictions. \ However, if these IAM policies are misconfigured and have specific combinations of weak permissions; it can allow attackers to escalate their privileges and further compromise the organization. Rhino Security Labs have published comprehensive blogs detailing various AWS Escalation methods. By using this as an inspiration, Splunk’s research team wants to highlight how these attack vectors look in AWS Cloudtrail logs and provide you with detection queries to uncover these potentially malicious events via this Analytic Story. \
[AWS Network ACL Activity]
category = Cloud Security
creation_date = 2018-05-21
@@ -53,8 +69,8 @@ version = 2
reference = ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonVPC/latest/UserGuide/VPC_Appendix_NACLs.html", "https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/how-to-help-prepare-for-ddos-attacks-by-reducing-your-attack-surface/"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 11", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.007"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "DE.DP", "PR.AC"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of Network ACL Activity by ARN", "ESCU - Baseline of blocked outbound traffic from AWS"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of blocked outbound traffic from AWS", "ESCU - Baseline of Network ACL Activity by ARN"]
data_models = []
providing_technologies = none
description = Monitor your AWS network infrastructure for bad configurations and malicious activity. Investigative searches help you probe deeper, when the facts warrant it.
@@ -69,7 +85,7 @@ version = 1
reference = ["https://aws.amazon.com/security-hub/features/"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for User - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task"]
support_searches = []
data_models = []
providing_technologies = none
@@ -85,7 +101,7 @@ version = 1
reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Region - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Country - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From City - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From City - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Region - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Country - Response Task"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources"]
data_models = []
providing_technologies = none
@@ -103,7 +119,7 @@ reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.p
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect API activity from users without MFA - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS API Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Security Group Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new API calls from user roles - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "DE.DP", "ID.AM", "PR.AC"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Create a list of approved AWS service accounts", "ESCU - Baseline of API Calls per User ARN", "ESCU - Previously seen API call per user roles in CloudTrail", "ESCU - Baseline of Security Group Activity by ARN"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously seen API call per user roles in CloudTrail", "ESCU - Create a list of approved AWS service accounts", "ESCU - Baseline of API Calls per User ARN", "ESCU - Baseline of Security Group Activity by ARN"]
data_models = []
providing_technologies = none
description = Detect and investigate dormant user accounts for your AWS environment that have become active again. Because inactive and ad-hoc accounts are common attack targets, it's critical to enable governance within your environment.
@@ -182,7 +198,7 @@ version = 1
reference = ["https://www.zerofox.com/blog/what-is-digital-risk-monitoring/", "https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/consumer/family-safety/what-is-typosquatting/", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2016/06/explained-typosquatting/"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Delivery"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - DNSTwist Domain Names"]
data_models = ["Email", "Network_Resolution", "Web"]
providing_technologies = none
@@ -191,6 +207,22 @@ narrative = While you can educate your users and customers about the risks and t
You can use our adaptation of `DNSTwist`, together with the support searches in this Analytic Story, to generate permutations of specified brands and external domains. Splunk can monitor email, DNS requests, and web traffic for these permutations and provide you with early warnings and situational awareness--powerful elements of an effective defense.\
Notable events will include IP addresses, URLs, and user data. Drilling down can provide you with even more actionable intelligence, including likely geographic information, contextual searches to help you scope the problem, and investigative searches.
[Clop Ransomware]
category = Malware
creation_date = 2021-03-17
modification_date = 2021-03-17
id = 5a6f6849-1a26-4fae-aa05-fa730556eeb6
version = 1
reference = ["https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/analyst-note-cl0p-tlp-white.pdf", "https://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/115250/data-breach/qualys-clop-ransomware.html", "https://www.darkreading.com/attacks-breaches/qualys-is-the-latest-victim-of-accellion-data-breach/d/d-id/1340323"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Clop Common Exec Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Clop Ransomware Known Service Name - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Create Service In Suspicious File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - High File Deletion Frequency - Rule", "ESCU - High Process Termination Frequency - Rule", "ESCU - Process Deleting Its Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Ransomware Notes bulk creation - Rule", "ESCU - Resize ShadowStorage volume - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 10", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation", "Obfuscation", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.002", "T1070.001", "T1204", "T1485", "T1486", "T1490", "T1543", "T1569.001, T1569.002"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "DE.DP", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = []
support_searches = []
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
providing_technologies = none
description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the Clop ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with Clope, encrypting network shares, deleting and resizing shadow volume storage, registry key modification, deleting of security logs, and more.
narrative = Clop ransomware campaigns targeting healthcare and other vertical sectors, involve the use of ransomware payloads along with exfiltration of data per HHS bulletin. Malicious actors demand payment for ransome of data and threaten deletion and exposure of exfiltrated data.
[Cloud Cryptomining]
category = Cloud Security
creation_date = 2019-10-02
@@ -200,8 +232,8 @@ version = 1
reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 12", "CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1535"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP", "ID.AM"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Initial", "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Destroyed", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Update"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Update", "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Destroyed", "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Initial"]
data_models = ["Change"]
providing_technologies = none
description = Monitor your cloud compute instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or compute instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior.
@@ -234,7 +266,7 @@ id = bcfd17e8-5461-400a-80a2-3b7d1459220c
version = 1
reference = ["https://www.cobaltstrike.com/", "https://www.infocyte.com/blog/2020/09/02/cobalt-strike-the-new-favorite-among-thieves/", "https://bluescreenofjeff.com/2017-01-24-how-to-write-malleable-c2-profiles-for-cobalt-strike/", "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2020/09/coverage-strikes-back-cobalt-strike-paper.html", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/unauthorized-access-of-fireeye-red-team-tools.html", "https://github.com/MichaelKoczwara/Awesome-CobaltStrike-Defence", "https://github.com/zer0yu/Awesome-CobaltStrike"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Cobalt Strike Named Pipes - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious DLLHost no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious GPUpdate no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 StartW - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious SearchProtocolHost no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious msbuild path - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036.003", "T1055", "T1127, T1036.003", "T1127.001", "T1218.010", "T1218.011"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.PT"]}
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036.003", "T1055", "T1127", "T1127.001", "T1218.010", "T1218.011"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = []
support_searches = []
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
@@ -296,8 +328,8 @@ version = 1
reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Command_and_Control", "https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/feature/Command-and-control-servers-The-puppet-masters-that-govern-malware"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 11", "CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048", "T1048.003", "T1071.001", "T1071.004", "T1095", "T1189"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.AC", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK", "ESCU - Baseline of blocked outbound traffic from AWS"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of blocked outbound traffic from AWS", "ESCU - Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK"]
data_models = ["Network_Resolution", "Network_Traffic"]
providing_technologies = none
description = Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures leveraged by attackers to establish and operate command and control channels. Implants installed by attackers on compromised endpoints use these channels to receive instructions and send data back to the malicious operators.
@@ -346,7 +378,7 @@ version = 3
reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1003", "https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for.html"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", "ESCU - Create Remote Thread into LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of lsass Dump with Taskmgr - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Ntdsutil Export NTDS - Rule", "ESCU - Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001", "T1003.002", "T1003.003", "T1059.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Previous Unseen User - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts - Response Task"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Previous Unseen User - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts - Response Task"]
support_searches = []
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
providing_technologies = none
@@ -364,8 +396,8 @@ version = 2
reference = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Create local admin accounts using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Single Letter Process On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 16", "CIS 2", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.002", "T1053.005", "T1059.001", "T1059.003", "T1071.002", "T1112", "T1136.001", "T1204.002", "T1543.003", "T1547.001", "T1562.004"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process File Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments", "ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process File Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments"]
data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"]
providing_technologies = none
description = Monitor for suspicious activities associated with DHS Technical Alert US-CERT TA18-074A. Some of the activities that adversaries used in these compromises included spearfishing attacks, malware, watering-hole domains, many and more.
@@ -440,13 +472,29 @@ version = 1
reference = ["https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/data-protection/", "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/dns/splunk-detect-dns-tunneling-37022", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect USB device insertion - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003", "T1189"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.DS", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
support_searches = []
data_models = ["Change_Analysis", "Network_Resolution"]
providing_technologies = none
description = Fortify your data-protection arsenal--while continuing to ensure data confidentiality and integrity--with searches that monitor for and help you investigate possible signs of data exfiltration.
narrative = Attackers can leverage a variety of resources to compromise or exfiltrate enterprise data. Common exfiltration techniques include remote-access channels via low-risk, high-payoff active-collections operations and close-access operations using insiders and removable media. While this Analytic Story is not a comprehensive listing of all the methods by which attackers can exfiltrate data, it provides a useful starting point.
[Deobfuscate-Decode Files or Information]
category = Adversary Tactics
creation_date = 2021-03-24
modification_date = 2021-03-24
id = 0bd01a54-8cbe-11eb-abcd-acde48001122
version = 1
reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140/"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - CertUtil With Decode Argument - Rule"]
mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1140"]}
investigative_searches = []
support_searches = []
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
providing_technologies = none
description = Adversaries may use Obfuscated Files or Information to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis.
narrative = An example of obfuscated files is `Certutil.exe` usage to encode a portable executable to a certificate file, which is base64 encoded, to hide the originating file. There are many utilities cross-platform to encode using XOR, using compressed .cab files to hide contents and scripting languages that may perform similar native Windows tasks. Triaging an event related will require the capability to review related process events and file modifications. Using a tool such as CyberChef will assist with identifying the encoding that was used, and potentially assist with decoding the contents.
[Detect Zerologon Attack]
category = Adversary Tactics
creation_date = 2020-09-18
@@ -473,7 +521,7 @@ reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1089", "https://blog.malw
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Unload Sysmon Filter Driver - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112", "T1543.003", "T1553.004", "T1562.001", "T1562.004"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments", "ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments"]
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
providing_technologies = none
description = Looks for activities and techniques associated with the disabling of security tools on a Windows system, such as suspicious `reg.exe` processes, processes launching netsh, and many others.
@@ -488,7 +536,7 @@ version = 2
reference = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/", "http://www.noip.com/blog/2014/07/11/dynamic-dns-can-use-2/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/08/04/detecting-dynamic-dns-domains-in-splunk.html"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1071.001", "T1189"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "DE.DP", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
support_searches = []
data_models = ["Network_Resolution", "Web"]
providing_technologies = none
@@ -504,7 +552,7 @@ version = 1
reference = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-201A", "https://www.first.org/resources/papers/conf2017/Advanced-Incident-Detection-and-Threat-Hunting-using-Sysmon-and-Splunk.pdf", "https://www.vkremez.com/2017/05/emotet-banking-trojan-malware-analysis.html"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of tools built by NirSoft - Rule", "ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 2", "CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Delivery", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.002", "T1059.003", "T1072", "T1547.001", "T1566.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK"]
data_models = ["Email", "Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"]
providing_technologies = none
@@ -574,8 +622,8 @@ version = 2
reference = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/HIDDEN-COBRA-North-Korean-Malicious-Cyber-Activity", "https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Destructive-Malware-Report.pdf"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious File Write - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 16", "CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001", "T1021.002", "T1048.003", "T1059.001", "T1059.003", "T1070.005", "T1071.002", "T1071.004"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Outbound Emails to Hidden Cobra Threat Actors - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments", "ESCU - Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK", "ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Outbound Emails to Hidden Cobra Threat Actors - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", "ESCU - Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments"]
data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Resolution", "Network_Traffic"]
providing_technologies = none
description = Monitor for and investigate activities, including the creation or deletion of hidden shares and file writes, that may be evidence of infiltration by North Korean government-sponsored cybercriminals. Details of this activity were reported in DHS Report TA-18-149A.
@@ -600,6 +648,22 @@ providing_technologies = none
description = Detect evidence of tactics used to redirect traffic from a host to a destination other than the one intended--potentially one that is part of an adversary's attack infrastructure. An example is redirecting communications regarding patches and updates or misleading users into visiting a malicious website.
narrative = Attackers will often attempt to manipulate client communications for nefarious purposes. In some cases, an attacker may endeavor to modify a local host file to redirect communications with resources (such as antivirus or system-update services) to prevent clients from receiving patches or updates. In other cases, an attacker might use this tactic to have the client connect to a site that looks like the intended site, but instead installs malware or collects information from the victim. Additionally, an attacker may redirect a victim in order to execute a MITM attack and observe communications.
[Ingress Tool Transfer]
category = Adversary Tactics
creation_date = 2021-03-24
modification_date = 2021-03-24
id = b3782036-8cbd-11eb-9d8e-acde48001122
version = 1
reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105/"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - CertUtil Download With VerifyCtl and Split Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Curl Network Connection - Rule"]
mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1105"]}
investigative_searches = []
support_searches = []
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
providing_technologies = none
description = Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Files may be copied from an external adversary controlled system through the command and control channel to bring tools into the victim network or through alternate protocols with another tool such as FTP.
narrative = Ingress tool transfer is a Technique under tactic Command and Control. Behaviors will include the use of living off the land binaries to download implants or binaries over alternate communication ports. It is imperative to baseline applications on endpoints to understand what generates network activity, to where, and what is its native behavior. These utilities, when abused, will write files to disk in world writeable paths.\ During triage, review the reputation of the remote public destination IP or domain. Capture any files written to disk and perform analysis. Review other parrallel processes for additional behaviors.
[JBoss Vulnerability]
category = Vulnerability
creation_date = 2017-09-14
@@ -639,7 +703,7 @@ version = 1
reference = ["https://github.com/splunk/cloud-datamodel-security-research"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint - Rule"]
mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1526"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task"]
support_searches = []
data_models = []
providing_technologies = none
@@ -687,7 +751,7 @@ version = 2
reference = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/executive-perspective/2015/08/malware_lateral_move.html"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks - Rule", "ESCU - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001", "T1053.005", "T1550.002", "T1558.003"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
support_searches = []
data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"]
providing_technologies = none
@@ -707,7 +771,7 @@ version = 4
reference = ["https://blogs.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/malware-employs-powershell-to-infect-systems/", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadFile - Rule", "ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Multiple Suspicious Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1027", "T1059.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
support_searches = []
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
providing_technologies = none
@@ -784,7 +848,7 @@ reference = ["https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/04/goldmax-goldfin
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ESCU - Sunburst Correlation DLL and Network Event - Rule", "ESCU - Supernova Webshell - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AdFind Exe - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 18", "CIS 2", "CIS 3", "CIS 4", "CIS 5", "CIS 6", "CIS 7", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Exfiltration", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018", "T1027", "T1053.005", "T1059.003", "T1071.001", "T1071.002", "T1203", "T1218.005", "T1505.003", "T1543.003", "T1569.002"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "ID.RA", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = []
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update"]
data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic", "Web"]
providing_technologies = none
description = Sunburst is a trojanized updates to SolarWinds Orion IT monitoring and management software. It was discovered by FireEye in December 2020. The actors behind this campaign gained access to numerous public and private organizations around the world.
@@ -800,7 +864,7 @@ reference = ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/tn-archive/bb49
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Processes created by netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.004"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments", "ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments"]
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
providing_technologies = none
description = Detect activities and various techniques associated with the abuse of `netsh.exe`, which can disable local firewall settings or set up a remote connection to a host from an infected system.
@@ -832,8 +896,8 @@ version = 2
reference = ["https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/orangeworm-targets-healthcare-us-europe-asia", "https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/healthcare-targeted-by-hacker/"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 2", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001", "T1059.003", "T1543.003", "T1569.002"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments", "ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update", "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments"]
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
providing_technologies = none
description = Detect activities and various techniques associated with the Orangeworm Attack Group, a group that frequently targets the healthcare industry.
@@ -874,8 +938,8 @@ version = 1
reference = ["https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/scope-of-mudcarp-attacks-highlight-1/", "http://blog.amossys.fr/badflick-is-not-so-bad.html"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001", "T1059.003", "T1547.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments", "ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments"]
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
providing_technologies = none
description = Monitor your environment for suspicious behaviors that resemble the techniques employed by the MUDCARP threat group.
@@ -917,7 +981,7 @@ version = 1
reference = ["http://www.novetta.com/2015/02/advanced-methods-to-detect-advanced-cyber-attacks-protocol-abuse/"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048", "T1048.003", "T1071.001", "T1189"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.DS", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
support_searches = []
data_models = ["Network_Resolution", "Network_Traffic"]
providing_technologies = none
@@ -933,7 +997,7 @@ version = 1
reference = ["https://www.carbonblack.com/2017/06/28/carbon-black-threat-research-technical-analysis-petya-notpetya-ransomware/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2017/06/27/closing-the-detection-to-mitigation-gap-or-to-petya-or-notpetya-whocares-.html"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 10", "CIS 12", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 6", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Delivery", "Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.002", "T1036.003", "T1047", "T1048", "T1053.005", "T1070", "T1070.001", "T1071.001", "T1485", "T1490", "T1547.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "DE.DP", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK", "ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK"]
data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"]
providing_technologies = none
@@ -1015,7 +1079,7 @@ version = 1
reference = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/an-in-depth-analysis-of-samsam-ransomware-and-boss-spider/", "https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2018/07/31/samsam-the-almost-6-million-ransomware/", "https://thehackernews.com/2018/07/samsam-ransomware-attacks.html"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Batch File Write to System32 - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - File with Samsam Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Samsam Test File Write - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 10", "CIS 12", "CIS 16", "CIS 18", "CIS 2", "CIS 3", "CIS 4", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Delivery", "Installation", "Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001", "T1021.002", "T1082", "T1204.002", "T1485", "T1486", "T1490"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "ID.RA", "PR.AC", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.MA", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task"]
support_searches = []
data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic", "Web"]
providing_technologies = none
@@ -1112,8 +1176,8 @@ version = 1
reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 12", "CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1535"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP", "ID.AM"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User", "ESCU - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Regions"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Regions", "ESCU - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User", "ESCU - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK"]
data_models = []
providing_technologies = none
description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS EC2 instances for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as EC2 instances that originate from unusual locations or those launched by previously unseen users (among others). Included investigative searches will help you probe more deeply, when the information warrants it.
@@ -1144,8 +1208,8 @@ version = 2
reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/security-data-protection/cloud/public-aws-s3-buckets-writable/"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Open S3 buckets - Rule", "ESCU - Detect S3 access from a new IP - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13", "CIS 14"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1530"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "DE.DP", "PR.AC", "PR.DS"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of S3 Bucket deletion activity by ARN", "ESCU - Previously seen S3 bucket access by remote IP"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously seen S3 bucket access by remote IP", "ESCU - Baseline of S3 Bucket deletion activity by ARN"]
data_models = []
providing_technologies = none
description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS S3 buckets for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as detecting open S3 buckets and buckets being accessed from a new IP. The contextual and investigative searches will give you more information, when required.
@@ -1162,7 +1226,7 @@ version = 1
reference = ["https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/hiding-cloudcobalt-strike-beacon-c2-using-amazon-apis/"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of blocked outbound traffic from AWS"]
data_models = []
providing_technologies = none
@@ -1182,7 +1246,7 @@ reference = ["https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-cloudtrail-now-tracks-cr
detection_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by New User - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP", "PR.AC", "PR.DS"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Users In CloudTrail - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail - Initial"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Users In CloudTrail - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Initial"]
data_models = ["Authentication"]
providing_technologies = none
description = Monitor your cloud authentication events. Searches within this Analytic Story leverage the recent cloud updates to the Authentication data model to help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious login activity.
@@ -1199,7 +1263,7 @@ reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.p
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP", "ID.AM"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Destroyed", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Update", "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Destroyed", "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Update"]
data_models = ["Change"]
providing_technologies = none
description = Monitor your cloud infrastructure provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your cloud environment.
@@ -1232,7 +1296,7 @@ reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.p
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "DE.DP", "ID.AM", "PR.AC"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls Per User", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Initial", "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Security Group API Calls Per User"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls Per User", "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Security Group API Calls Per User", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Initial"]
data_models = ["Change"]
providing_technologies = none
description = Detect and investigate suspicious activities by users and roles in your cloud environments.
@@ -1249,7 +1313,7 @@ reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1059", "https://www.micro
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036.003", "T1059.001", "T1059.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments", "ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments"]
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
providing_technologies = none
description = Leveraging the Windows command-line interface (CLI) is one of the most common attack techniques--one that is also detailed in the MITRE ATT&CK framework. Use this Analytic Story to help you identify unusual or suspicious use of the CLI on Windows systems.
@@ -1264,7 +1328,7 @@ version = 1
reference = ["http://blogs.splunk.com/2015/10/01/random-words-on-entropy-and-dns/", "http://www.darkreading.com/analytics/security-monitoring/got-malware-three-signs-revealed-in-dns-traffic/d/d-id/1139680", "https://live.paloaltonetworks.com/t5/Threat-Vulnerability-Articles/What-are-suspicious-DNS-queries/ta-p/71454"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003", "T1071.004", "T1189"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK"]
data_models = ["Network_Resolution"]
providing_technologies = none
@@ -1280,7 +1344,7 @@ version = 1
reference = ["https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/06/26/phishing-hits-a-new-level-of-quality/"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 3", "CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.IP"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - DNSTwist Domain Names"]
data_models = ["Email", "UEBA"]
providing_technologies = none
@@ -1317,7 +1381,7 @@ reference = ["https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/", "htt
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Detect mshta inline hta execution - Rule", "ESCU - Detect mshta renamed - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious mshta child process - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious mshta spawn - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.003", "T1218.005", "T1547.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments", "ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments"]
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
providing_technologies = none
description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe process to execute malicious code.
@@ -1344,7 +1408,7 @@ version = 1
reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1078", "https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Credential_stuffing", "https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/answer/What-is-a-password-spraying-attack-and-how-does-it-work"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentials From The Same IP - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Account Lockout Events - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Failed SSO Attempts - Rule", "ESCU - Okta User Logins From Multiple Cities - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate User Activities In Okta - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by app - Response Task"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by app - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate User Activities In Okta - Response Task"]
support_searches = []
data_models = []
providing_technologies = none
@@ -1394,7 +1458,7 @@ version = 2
reference = ["https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Graeber-Abusing-Windows-Management-Instrumentation-WMI-To-Build-A-Persistent%20Asynchronous-And-Fileless-Backdoor-wp.pdf", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/wmimplant_a_wmi_ba.html"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Process Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - Script Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Temporary Event Subscription - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047", "T1546.003"], "nist": ["PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
support_searches = []
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
providing_technologies = none
@@ -1431,7 +1495,7 @@ reference = ["https://blog.rapid7.com/2020/04/02/dispelling-zoom-bugbears-what-y
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Child Process of Zoom - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.003", "T1068"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process File Activity - Response Task"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Update"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Initial"]
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
providing_technologies = none
description = Attackers are using Zoom as an vector to increase privileges on a sytems. This story detects new child processes of zoom and provides investigative actions for this detection.
@@ -1446,7 +1510,7 @@ id = 270a67a6-55d8-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
version = 1
reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218/T1218.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler/"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler usage - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1127", "T1127, T1036.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.PT"]}
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036.003", "T1127"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = []
support_searches = []
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
@@ -1544,7 +1608,7 @@ version = 1
reference = ["https://www.fbi.gov/scams-and-safety/common-fraud-schemes/internet-fraud", "https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2017-internet-crime-report-released-050718"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Web Fraud - Account Harvesting - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Anomalous User Clickspeed - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Password Sharing Across Accounts - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16", "CIS 6"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1136"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "DE.DP"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Web Session Information via session id - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Web Session Information via session id - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
support_searches = []
data_models = []
providing_technologies = none
@@ -1667,7 +1731,7 @@ reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1050", "https://attack.mi
detection_searches = ["ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 2", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543.003", "T1569.002", "T1574.011"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update"]
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
providing_technologies = none
description = Windows services are often used by attackers for persistence and the ability to load drivers or otherwise interact with the Windows kernel. This Analytic Story helps you monitor your environment for indications that Windows services are being modified or created in a suspicious manner.
package/default/analyticstories.conf
+284 -80
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
#############
# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
# On Date: 2021-03-12T17:19:06 UTC
# On Date: 2021-03-25T19:21:00 UTC
# Author: Splunk Security Research
# Contact: research@splunk.com
#############
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-cloudtrail-now-tracks-cross-account-activity-to-its-origin/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - aws detect sts get session token abuse - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect attach to role policy - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect permanent key creation - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect sts assume role abuse - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect role creation - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - aws detect role creation - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect sts assume role abuse - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect sts get session token abuse - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect permanent key creation - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect attach to role policy - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Track when a user assumes an IAM role in another AWS account to obtain cross-account access to services and resources in that account. Accessing new roles could be an indication of malicious activity.
narrative = Amazon Web Services (AWS) admins manage access to AWS resources and services across the enterprise using AWS's Identity and Access Management (IAM) functionality. IAM provides the ability to create and manage AWS users, groups, and roles-each with their own unique set of privileges and defined access to specific resources (such as EC2 instances, the AWS Management Console, API, or the command-line interface). Unlike conventional (human) users, IAM roles are assumable by anyone in the organization. They provide users with dynamically created temporary security credentials that expire within a set time period.\
Herein lies the rub. In between the time between when the temporary credentials are issued and when they expire is a period of opportunity, where a user could leverage the temporary credentials to wreak havoc-spin up or remove instances, create new users, elevate privileges, and other malicious activities-throughout the environment.\
@@ -27,13 +27,24 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Monitor your AWS EC2 instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or EC2 instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior.
narrative = Cryptomining is an intentionally difficult, resource-intensive business. Its complexity was designed into the process to ensure that the number of blocks mined each day would remain steady. So, it's par for the course that ambitious, but unscrupulous, miners make amassing the computing power of large enterprises--a practice known as cryptojacking--a top priority. \
Cryptojacking has attracted an increasing amount of media attention since its explosion in popularity in the fall of 2017. The attacks have moved from in-browser exploits and mobile phones to enterprise cloud services, such as Amazon Web Services (AWS). It's difficult to determine exactly how widespread the practice has become, since bad actors continually evolve their ability to escape detection, including employing unlisted endpoints, moderating their CPU usage, and hiding the mining pool's IP address behind a free CDN. \
When malicious miners appropriate a cloud instance, often spinning up hundreds of new instances, the costs can become astronomical for the account holder. So, it is critically important to monitor your systems for suspicious activities that could indicate that your network has been infiltrated. \
This Analytic Story is focused on detecting suspicious new instances in your EC2 environment to help prevent such a disaster. It contains detection searches that will detect when a previously unused instance type or AMI is used. It also contains support searches to build lookup files to ensure proper execution of the detection searches.
[analytic_story://AWS IAM Privilege Escalation]
category = Cloud Security
last_updated = 2021-03-08
version = 1
references = ["https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation/", "https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/the-cloud-shadow-admin-threat-10-permissions-to-protect", "https://labs.bishopfox.com/tech-blog/privilege-escalation-in-aws"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - AWS Create Policy Version to allow all resources - Rule", "ESCU - AWS CreateAccessKey - Rule", "ESCU - AWS UpdateLoginProfile - Rule", "ESCU - AWS SetDefaultPolicyVersion - Rule", "ESCU - AWS CreateLoginProfile - Rule"]
description = This analytic story contains detections that query your AWS Cloudtrail for activities related to privilege escalation.
narrative = Amazon Web Services provides a neat feature called Identity and Access Management (IAM) that enables organizations to manage various AWS services and resources in a secure way. All IAM users have roles, groups and policies associated with them which governs and sets permissions to allow a user to access specific restrictions. \ However, if these IAM policies are misconfigured and have specific combinations of weak permissions; it can allow attackers to escalate their privileges and further compromise the organization. Rhino Security Labs have published comprehensive blogs detailing various AWS Escalation methods. By using this as an inspiration, Splunk’s research team wants to highlight how these attack vectors look in AWS Cloudtrail logs and provide you with detection queries to uncover these potentially malicious events via this Analytic Story. \
[analytic_story://AWS Network ACL Activity]
category = Cloud Security
last_updated = 2018-05-21
@@ -41,7 +52,7 @@ version = 2
references = ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonVPC/latest/UserGuide/VPC_Appendix_NACLs.html", "https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/how-to-help-prepare-for-ddos-attacks-by-reducing-your-attack-surface/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task"]
description = Monitor your AWS network infrastructure for bad configurations and malicious activity. Investigative searches help you probe deeper, when the facts warrant it.
narrative = AWS CloudTrail is an AWS service that helps you enable governance, compliance, and operational/risk auditing of your AWS account. Actions taken by a user, role, or an AWS service are recorded as events in CloudTrail. It is crucial for a company to monitor events and actions taken in the AWS Management Console, AWS Command Line Interface, and AWS SDKs and APIs to ensure that your servers are not vulnerable to attacks. This analytic story contains detection searches that leverage CloudTrail logs from AWS to check for bad configurations and malicious activity in your AWS network access controls.
@@ -52,7 +63,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://aws.amazon.com/security-hub/features/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for User - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for User - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task"]
description = This story is focused around detecting Security Hub alerts generated from AWS
narrative = AWS Security Hub collects and consolidates findings from AWS security services enabled in your environment, such as intrusion detection findings from Amazon GuardDuty, vulnerability scans from Amazon Inspector, S3 bucket policy findings from Amazon Macie, publicly accessible and cross-account resources from IAM Access Analyzer, and resources lacking WAF coverage from AWS Firewall Manager.
@@ -63,7 +74,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Region - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Country - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From City - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From City - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Region - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Country - Response Task"]
description = Monitor your AWS provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your network.
narrative = Because most enterprise AWS activities originate from familiar geographic locations, monitoring for activity from unknown or unusual regions is an important security measure. This indicator can be especially useful in environments where it is impossible to add specific IPs to an allow list because they vary. \
This Analytic Story was designed to provide you with flexibility in the precision you employ in specifying legitimate geographic regions. It can be as specific as an IP address or a city, or as broad as a region (think state) or an entire country. By determining how precise you want your geographical locations to be and monitoring for new locations that haven't previously accessed your environment, you can detect adversaries as they begin to probe your environment. Since there are legitimate reasons for activities from unfamiliar locations, this is not a standalone indicator. Nevertheless, location can be a relevant piece of information that you may wish to investigate further.
@@ -75,7 +86,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://redlock.io/blog/cryptojacking-tesla"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Detect API activity from users without MFA - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new API calls from user roles - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS API Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Security Group Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Detect API activity from users without MFA - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS API Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new API calls from user roles - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Security Group Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Detect and investigate dormant user accounts for your AWS environment that have become active again. Because inactive and ad-hoc accounts are common attack targets, it's critical to enable governance within your environment.
narrative = It seems obvious that it is critical to monitor and control the users who have access to your cloud infrastructure. Nevertheless, it's all too common for enterprises to lose track of ad-hoc accounts, leaving their servers vulnerable to attack. In fact, this was the very oversight that led to Tesla's cryptojacking attack in February, 2018.\
In addition to compromising the security of your data, when bad actors leverage your compute resources, it can incur monumental costs, since you will be billed for any new EC2 instances and increased bandwidth usage. \
@@ -89,7 +100,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs/blob/v3.2/dev/rules/REQUEST-944-APPLICATION-ATTACK-JAVA.conf"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Java Classes - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Content-Type Length - Rule", "ESCU - Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Web POSTs From src - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Suspicious Strings in HTTP Header - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Java Classes - Rule", "ESCU - Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Content-Type Length - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Web POSTs From src - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Suspicious Strings in HTTP Header - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Detect and investigate activities--such as unusually long `Content-Type` length, suspicious java classes and web servers executing suspicious processes--consistent with attempts to exploit Apache Struts vulnerabilities.
narrative = In March of 2017, a remote code-execution vulnerability in the Jakarta Multipart parser in Apache Struts, a widely used open-source framework for creating Java web applications, was disclosed and assigned to CVE-2017-5638. About two months later, hackers exploited the flaw to carry out the world's <a href=https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2017/09/07/nations-biggest-hacks-and-data-breaches-millions/644311001/> 5th largest data breach</a>. The target, credit giant Equifax, <a href=https://money.cnn.com/2017/09/16/technology/equifax-breach-security-hole/index.html>told investigators</a> that it had become aware of the vulnerability two months before the attack. \
The exploit involved manipulating the `Content-Type HTTP` header to execute commands embedded in the header.\
@@ -124,7 +135,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-research/2021/01/26/cve-2021-3156-heap-based-buffer-overflow-in-sudo-baron-samedit"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Shannon Davis"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 Segfault - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 via OSQuery - Rule"]
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 via OSQuery - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 Segfault - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 - Rule"]
description = Uncover activity consistent with CVE-2021-3156. Discovered by the Qualys Research Team, this vulnerability has been found to affect sudo across multiple Linux distributions (Ubuntu 20.04 and prior, Debian 10 and prior, Fedora 33 and prior). As this vulnerability was committed to code in July 2011, there will be many distributions affected. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability allows any unprivileged user to gain root privileges on the vulnerable host.
narrative = A non-privledged user is able to execute the sudoedit command to trigger a buffer overflow. After the successful buffer overflow, they are then able to gain root privileges on the affected host. The conditions needed to be run are a trailing "\" along with shell and edit flags. Monitoring the /var/log directory on Linux hosts using the Splunk Universal Forwarder will allow you to pick up this behavior when using the provided detection.
@@ -135,12 +146,23 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://www.zerofox.com/blog/what-is-digital-risk-monitoring/", "https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/consumer/family-safety/what-is-typosquatting/", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2016/06/explained-typosquatting/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task"]
description = Detect and investigate activity that may indicate that an adversary is using faux domains to mislead users into interacting with malicious infrastructure. Monitor DNS, email, and web traffic for permutations of your brand name.
narrative = While you can educate your users and customers about the risks and threats posed by typosquatting, phishing, and corporate espionage, human error is a persistent fact of life. Of course, your adversaries are all too aware of this reality and will happily leverage it for nefarious purposes whenever possible&#51;phishing with lookalike addresses, embedding faux command-and-control domains in malware, and hosting malicious content on domains that closely mimic your corporate servers. This is where brand monitoring comes in.\
You can use our adaptation of `DNSTwist`, together with the support searches in this Analytic Story, to generate permutations of specified brands and external domains. Splunk can monitor email, DNS requests, and web traffic for these permutations and provide you with early warnings and situational awareness--powerful elements of an effective defense.\
Notable events will include IP addresses, URLs, and user data. Drilling down can provide you with even more actionable intelligence, including likely geographic information, contextual searches to help you scope the problem, and investigative searches.
[analytic_story://Clop Ransomware]
category = Malware
last_updated = 2021-03-17
version = 1
references = ["https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/analyst-note-cl0p-tlp-white.pdf", "https://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/115250/data-breach/qualys-clop-ransomware.html", "https://www.darkreading.com/attacks-breaches/qualys-is-the-latest-victim-of-accellion-data-breach/d/d-id/1340323"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - High Process Termination Frequency - Rule", "ESCU - Clop Ransomware Known Service Name - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - High File Deletion Frequency - Rule", "ESCU - Process Deleting Its Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Resize ShadowStorage volume - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Ransomware Notes bulk creation - Rule", "ESCU - Create Service In Suspicious File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Clop Common Exec Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule"]
description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the Clop ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with Clope, encrypting network shares, deleting and resizing shadow volume storage, registry key modification, deleting of security logs, and more.
narrative = Clop ransomware campaigns targeting healthcare and other vertical sectors, involve the use of ransomware payloads along with exfiltration of data per HHS bulletin. Malicious actors demand payment for ransome of data and threaten deletion and exposure of exfiltrated data.
[analytic_story://Cloud Cryptomining]
category = Cloud Security
last_updated = 2019-10-02
@@ -148,7 +170,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Monitor your cloud compute instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or compute instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior.
narrative = Cryptomining is an intentionally difficult, resource-intensive business. Its complexity was designed into the process to ensure that the number of blocks mined each day would remain steady. So, it's par for the course that ambitious, but unscrupulous, miners make amassing the computing power of large enterprises--a practice known as cryptojacking--a top priority. \
Cryptojacking has attracted an increasing amount of media attention since its explosion in popularity in the fall of 2017. The attacks have moved from in-browser exploits and mobile phones to enterprise cloud services, such as Amazon Web Services (AWS), Google Cloud Platform (GCP), and Azure. It's difficult to determine exactly how widespread the practice has become, since bad actors continually evolve their ability to escape detection, including employing unlisted endpoints, moderating their CPU usage, and hiding the mining pool's IP address behind a free CDN. \
@@ -162,7 +184,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/golden-saml-newly-discovered-attack-technique-forges-authentication-to-cloud-apps", "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf", "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Excessive SSO logon errors - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Via PowerShell And EventCode 4703 - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Added Service Principal - Rule", "ESCU - AWS SAML Access by Provider User and Principal - Rule", "ESCU - O365 New Federated Domain Added - Rule", "ESCU - Certutil exe certificate extraction - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - AWS SAML Update identity provider - Rule"]
searches = ["ESCU - AWS SAML Access by Provider User and Principal - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - O365 New Federated Domain Added - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Excessive SSO logon errors - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User - Rule", "ESCU - Certutil exe certificate extraction - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Via PowerShell And EventCode 4703 - Rule", "ESCU - AWS SAML Update identity provider - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Added Service Principal - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule"]
description = This analytical story addresses events that indicate abuse of cloud federated credentials. These credentials are usually extracted from endpoint desktop or servers specially those servers that provide federation services such as Windows Active Directory Federation Services. Identity Federation relies on objects such as Oauth2 tokens, cookies or SAML assertions in order to provide seamless access between cloud and perimeter environments. If these objects are either hijacked or forged then attackers will be able to pivot into victim's cloud environements.
narrative = This story is composed of detection searches based on endpoint that addresses the use of Mimikatz, Escalation of Privileges and Abnormal processes that may indicate the extraction of Federated directory objects such as passwords, Oauth2 tokens, certificates and keys. Cloud environment (AWS, Azure) related events are also addressed in specific cloud environment detection searches.
@@ -173,7 +195,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://www.cobaltstrike.com/", "https://www.infocyte.com/blog/2020/09/02/cobalt-strike-the-new-favorite-among-thieves/", "https://bluescreenofjeff.com/2017-01-24-how-to-write-malleable-c2-profiles-for-cobalt-strike/", "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2020/09/coverage-strikes-back-cobalt-strike-paper.html", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/unauthorized-access-of-fireeye-red-team-tools.html", "https://github.com/MichaelKoczwara/Awesome-CobaltStrike-Defence", "https://github.com/zer0yu/Awesome-CobaltStrike"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious SearchProtocolHost no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious DLLHost no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious msbuild path - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 StartW - Rule", "ESCU - Cobalt Strike Named Pipes - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious GPUpdate no Command Line Arguments - Rule"]
searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious DLLHost no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious SearchProtocolHost no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious msbuild path - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 StartW - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious GPUpdate no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Cobalt Strike Named Pipes - Rule"]
description = Cobalt Strike is threat emulation software. Red teams and penetration testers use Cobalt Strike to demonstrate the risk of a breach and evaluate mature security programs. Most recently, Cobalt Strike has become the choice tool by threat groups due to its ease of use and extensibility.
narrative = This Analytic Story supports you to detect Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) from Cobalt Strike. Cobalt Strike has many ways to be enhanced by using aggressor scripts, malleable C2 profiles, default attack packages, and much more. For endpoint behavior, Cobalt Strike is most commonly identified via named pipes, spawn to processes, and DLL function names. Many additional variables are provided for in memory operation of the beacon implant. On the network, depending on the malleable C2 profile used, it is near infinite in the amount of ways to conceal the C2 traffic with Cobalt Strike. Not every query may be specific to Cobalt Strike the tool, but the methodologies and techniques used by it.\
Splunk Threat Research reviewed all publicly available instances of Malleabe C2 Profiles and generated a list of the most commonly used spawnto and pipenames.\
@@ -193,7 +215,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://www.intego.com/mac-security-blog/osxcoldroot-and-the-rat-invasion/", "https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x2A.html", "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/coldroot-rat-still-undetectable-despite-being-uploaded-on-github-two-years-ago/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Jose Hernandez"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Processes Tapping Keyboard Events - Rule", "ESCU - Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection - Rule", "ESCU - Processes Tapping Keyboard Events - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that relate to the ColdRoot Remote Access Trojan that affects MacOS. An example of some of these activities are changing sensative binaries in the MacOS sub-system, detecting process names and executables associated with the RAT, detecting when a keyboard tab is installed on a MacOS machine and more.
narrative = Conventional wisdom holds that Apple's MacOS operating system is significantly less vulnerable to attack than Windows machines. While that point is debatable, it is true that attacks against MacOS systems are much less common. However, this fact does not mean that Macs are impervious to breaches. To the contrary, research has shown that that Mac malware is increasing at an alarming rate. According to AV-test, in 2018, there were 86,865 new MacOS malware variants, up from 27,338 the year before&#151;a 31% increase. In contrast, the independent research firm found that new Windows malware had increased from 65.17M to 76.86M during that same period, less than half the rate of growth. The bottom line is that while the numbers look a lot smaller than Windows, it's definitely time to take Mac security more seriously.\
This Analytic Story addresses the ColdRoot remote access trojan (RAT), which was uploaded to Github in 2016, but was still escaping detection by the first quarter of 2018, when a new, more feature-rich variant was discovered masquerading as an Apple audio driver. Among other capabilities, the Pascal-based ColdRoot can heist passwords from users' keychains and remotely control infected machines without detection. In the initial report of his findings, Patrick Wardle, Chief Research Officer for Digita Security, explained that the new ColdRoot RAT could start and kill processes on the breached system, spawn new remote-desktop sessions, take screen captures and assemble them into a live stream of the victim's desktop, and more.\
@@ -206,7 +228,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Collection", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1074"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts - Rule", "ESCU - Email files written outside of the Outlook directory - Rule", "ESCU - Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious writes to System Volume Information - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts - Rule", "ESCU - Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious writes to System Volume Information - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin - Rule", "ESCU - Email files written outside of the Outlook directory - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Monitor for and investigate activities--such as suspicious writes to the Windows Recycling Bin or email servers sending high amounts of traffic to specific hosts, for example--that may indicate that an adversary is harvesting and exfiltrating sensitive data.
narrative = A common adversary goal is to identify and exfiltrate data of value from a target organization. This data may include email conversations and addresses, confidential company information, links to network design/infrastructure, important dates, and so on.\
Attacks are composed of three activities: identification, collection, and staging data for exfiltration. Identification typically involves scanning systems and observing user activity. Collection can involve the transfer of large amounts of data from various repositories. Staging/preparation includes moving data to a central location and compressing (and optionally encoding and/or encrypting) it. All of these activities provide opportunities for defenders to identify their presence. \
@@ -219,7 +241,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Command_and_Control", "https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/feature/Command-and-control-servers-The-puppet-masters-that-govern-malware"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task"]
description = Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures leveraged by attackers to establish and operate command and control channels. Implants installed by attackers on compromised endpoints use these channels to receive instructions and send data back to the malicious operators.
narrative = Threat actors typically architect and implement an infrastructure to use in various ways during the course of their attack campaigns. In some cases, they leverage this infrastructure for scanning and performing reconnaissance activities. In others, they may use this infrastructure to launch actual attacks. One of the most important functions of this infrastructure is to establish servers that will communicate with implants on compromised endpoints. These servers establish a command and control channel that is used to proxy data between the compromised endpoint and the attacker. These channels relay commands from the attacker to the compromised endpoint and the output of those commands back to the attacker.\
Because this communication is so critical for an adversary, they often use techniques designed to hide the true nature of the communications. There are many different techniques used to establish and communicate over these channels. This Analytic Story provides searches that look for a variety of the techniques used for these channels, as well as indications that these channels are active, by examining logs associated with border control devices and network-access control lists.
@@ -254,7 +276,7 @@ version = 3
references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1003", "https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for.html"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump - Rule", "ESCU - Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Ntdsutil Export NTDS - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of lsass Dump with Taskmgr - Rule", "ESCU - Create Remote Thread into LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", "ESCU - Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Previous Unseen User - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Create Remote Thread into LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of lsass Dump with Taskmgr - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Ntdsutil Export NTDS - Rule", "ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Previous Unseen User - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts - Response Task"]
description = Uncover activity consistent with credential dumping, a technique wherein attackers compromise systems and attempt to obtain and exfiltrate passwords. The threat actors use these pilfered credentials to further escalate privileges and spread throughout a target environment. The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify attempts to credential dumping.
narrative = Credential dumping&#151;gathering credentials from a target system, often hashed or encrypted&#151;is a common attack technique. Even though the credentials may not be in plain text, an attacker can still exfiltrate the data and set to cracking it offline, on their own systems. The threat actors target a variety of sources to extract them, including the Security Accounts Manager (SAM), Local Security Authority (LSA), NTDS from Domain Controllers, or the Group Policy Preference (GPP) files.\
Once attackers obtain valid credentials, they use them to move throughout a target network with ease, discovering new systems and identifying assets of interest. Credentials obtained in this manner typically include those of privileged users, which may provide access to more sensitive information and system operations.\
@@ -267,7 +289,7 @@ version = 2
references = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Single Letter Process On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Create local admin accounts using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process File Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Create local admin accounts using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Single Letter Process On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process File Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Monitor for suspicious activities associated with DHS Technical Alert US-CERT TA18-074A. Some of the activities that adversaries used in these compromises included spearfishing attacks, malware, watering-hole domains, many and more.
narrative = The frequency of nation-state cyber attacks has increased significantly over the last decade. Employing numerous tactics and techniques, these attacks continue to escalate in complexity. \
There is a wide range of motivations for these state-sponsored hacks, including stealing valuable corporate, military, or diplomatic data&#1151;all of which could confer advantages in various arenas. They may also target critical infrastructure. \
@@ -293,7 +315,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/", "http://www.noip.com/blog/2014/07/11/dynamic-dns-can-use-2/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/08/04/detecting-dynamic-dns-domains-in-splunk.html"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS record changed - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - DNS Hijack Enrichment - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS record changed - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - DNS Hijack Enrichment - Response Task"]
description = Secure your environment against DNS hijacks with searches that help you detect and investigate unauthorized changes to DNS records.
narrative = Dubbed the Achilles heel of the Internet (see https://www.f5.com/labs/articles/threat-intelligence/dns-is-still-the-achilles-heel-of-the-internet-25613), DNS plays a critical role in routing web traffic but is notoriously vulnerable to attack. One reason is its distributed nature. It relies on unstructured connections between millions of clients and servers over inherently insecure protocols.\
The gravity and extent of the importance of securing DNS from attacks is undeniable. The fallout of compromised DNS can be disastrous. Not only can hackers bring down an entire business, they can intercept confidential information, emails, and login credentials, as well. \
@@ -323,10 +345,21 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/data-protection/", "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/dns/splunk-detect-dns-tunneling-37022", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Detect USB device insertion - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect USB device insertion - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Fortify your data-protection arsenal--while continuing to ensure data confidentiality and integrity--with searches that monitor for and help you investigate possible signs of data exfiltration.
narrative = Attackers can leverage a variety of resources to compromise or exfiltrate enterprise data. Common exfiltration techniques include remote-access channels via low-risk, high-payoff active-collections operations and close-access operations using insiders and removable media. While this Analytic Story is not a comprehensive listing of all the methods by which attackers can exfiltrate data, it provides a useful starting point.
[analytic_story://Deobfuscate-Decode Files or Information]
category = Adversary Tactics
last_updated = 2021-03-24
version = 1
references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - CertUtil With Decode Argument - Rule"]
description = Adversaries may use Obfuscated Files or Information to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis.
narrative = An example of obfuscated files is `Certutil.exe` usage to encode a portable executable to a certificate file, which is base64 encoded, to hide the originating file. There are many utilities cross-platform to encode using XOR, using compressed .cab files to hide contents and scripting languages that may perform similar native Windows tasks. Triaging an event related will require the capability to review related process events and file modifications. Using a tool such as CyberChef will assist with identifying the encoding that was used, and potentially assist with decoding the contents.
[analytic_story://Detect Zerologon Attack]
category = Adversary Tactics
last_updated = 2020-09-18
@@ -334,7 +367,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1003", "https://github.com/SecuraBV/CVE-2020-1472", "https://www.secura.com/blog/zero-logon", "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-1472"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Jose Hernandez, Stan Miskowicz, David Dorsey, Shannon Davis Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Computer Changed with Anonymous Account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Zerologon via Zeek - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Zerologon via Zeek - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Computer Changed with Anonymous Account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Uncover activity related to the execution of Zerologon CVE-2020-11472, a technique wherein attackers target a Microsoft Windows Domain Controller to reset its computer account password. The result from this attack is attackers can now provide themselves high privileges and take over Domain Controller. The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify attempts to reset Domain Controller Computer Account via exploit code remotely or via the use of tool Mimikatz as payload carrier.
narrative = This attack is a privilege escalation technique, where attacker targets a Netlogon secure channel connection to a domain controller, using Netlogon Remote Protocol (MS-NRPC). This vulnerability exposes vulnerable Windows Domain Controllers to be targeted via unaunthenticated RPC calls which eventually reset Domain Contoller computer account ($) providing the attacker the opportunity to exfil domain controller credential secrets and assign themselve high privileges that can lead to domain controller and potentially complete network takeover. The detection searches in this Analytic Story use Windows Event viewer events and Sysmon events to detect attack execution, these searches monitor access to the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process which is an indicator of the use of Mimikatz tool which has bee updated to carry this attack payload.
@@ -345,7 +378,7 @@ version = 2
references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1089", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2015/11/vonteera-adware-uses-certificates-to-disable-anti-malware/", "https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Tools-Report.pdf"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Unload Sysmon Filter Driver - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule", "ESCU - Unload Sysmon Filter Driver - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Looks for activities and techniques associated with the disabling of security tools on a Windows system, such as suspicious `reg.exe` processes, processes launching netsh, and many others.
narrative = Attackers employ a variety of tactics in order to avoid detection and operate without barriers. This often involves modifying the configuration of security tools to get around them or explicitly disabling them to prevent them from running. This Analytic Story includes searches that look for activity consistent with attackers attempting to disable various security mechanisms. Such activity may involve monitoring for suspicious registry activity, as this is where much of the configuration for Windows and various other programs reside, or explicitly attempting to shut down security-related services. Other times, attackers attempt various tricks to prevent specific programs from running, such as adding the certificates with which the security tools are signed to a block list (which would prevent them from running).
@@ -356,7 +389,7 @@ version = 2
references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/", "http://www.noip.com/blog/2014/07/11/dynamic-dns-can-use-2/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/08/04/detecting-dynamic-dns-domains-in-splunk.html"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Detect and investigate hosts in your environment that may be communicating with dynamic domain providers. Attackers may leverage these services to help them avoid firewall blocks and deny lists.
narrative = Dynamic DNS services (DDNS) are legitimate low-cost or free services that allow users to rapidly update domain resolutions to IP infrastructure. While their usage can be benign, malicious actors can abuse DDNS to host harmful payloads or interactive-command-and-control infrastructure. These attackers will manually update or automate domain resolution changes by routing dynamic domains to IP addresses that circumvent firewall blocks and deny lists and frustrate a network defender's analytic and investigative processes. These searches will look for DNS queries made from within your infrastructure to suspicious dynamic domains and then investigate more deeply, when appropriate. While this list of top-level dynamic domains is not exhaustive, it can be dynamically updated as new suspicious dynamic domains are identified.
@@ -367,7 +400,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-201A", "https://www.first.org/resources/papers/conf2017/Advanced-Incident-Detection-and-Threat-Hunting-using-Sysmon-and-Splunk.pdf", "https://www.vkremez.com/2017/05/emotet-banking-trojan-malware-analysis.html"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of tools built by NirSoft - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of tools built by NirSoft - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Detect rarely used executables, specific registry paths that may confer malware survivability and persistence, instances where cmd.exe is used to launch script interpreters, and other indicators that the Emotet financial malware has compromised your environment.
narrative = The trojan downloader known as Emotet first surfaced in 2014, when it was discovered targeting the banking industry to steal credentials. However, according to a joint technical alert (TA) issued by three government agencies (https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-201A), Emotet has evolved far beyond those beginnings to become what a ThreatPost article called a threat-delivery service(see https://threatpost.com/emotet-malware-evolves-beyond-banking-to-threat-delivery-service/134342/). For example, in early 2018, Emotet was found to be using its loader function to spread the Quakbot and Ransomware variants. \
According to the TA, the the malware continues to be among the most costly and destructive malware affecting the private and public sectors. Researchers have linked it to the threat group Mealybug, which has also been on the security communitys radar since 2014.\
@@ -391,7 +424,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/understanding-service-accounts"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - GCP Detect accounts with high risk roles by project - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Detect high risk permissions by resource and account - Rule", "ESCU - gcp detect oauth token abuse - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Detect gcploit framework - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - gcp detect oauth token abuse - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Detect accounts with high risk roles by project - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Detect gcploit framework - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Detect high risk permissions by resource and account - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Track when a user assumes an IAM role in another GCP account to obtain cross-account access to services and resources in that account. Accessing new roles could be an indication of malicious activity.
narrative = Google Cloud Platform (GCP) admins manage access to GCP resources and services across the enterprise using GCP Identity and Access Management (IAM) functionality. IAM provides the ability to create and manage GCP users, groups, and roles-each with their own unique set of privileges and defined access to specific resources (such as Compute instances, the GCP Management Console, API, or the command-line interface). Unlike conventional (human) users, IAM roles are potentially assumable by anyone in the organization. They provide users with dynamically created temporary security credentials that expire within a set time period.\
In between the time between when the temporary credentials are issued and when they expire is a period of opportunity, where a user could leverage the temporary credentials to wreak havoc-spin up or remove instances, create new users, elevate privileges, and other malicious activities-throughout the environment.\
@@ -404,7 +437,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/detecting-hafnium-exchange-server-zero-day-activity-in-splunk.html", "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/03/02/active-exploitation-of-microsoft-exchange-zero-day-vulnerabilities/", "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/", "https://blog.rapid7.com/2021/03/03/rapid7s-insightidr-enables-detection-and-response-to-microsoft-exchange-0-day/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Exchange Web Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Ntdsutil Export NTDS - Rule", "ESCU - Unified Messaging Service Spawning a Process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule", "ESCU - Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts - Rule", "ESCU - Nishang PowershellTCPOneLine - Rule", "ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - W3WP Spawning Shell - Rule"]
searches = ["ESCU - Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Exchange Web Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - W3WP Spawning Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Nishang PowershellTCPOneLine - Rule", "ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule", "ESCU - Unified Messaging Service Spawning a Process - Rule", "ESCU - Ntdsutil Export NTDS - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule"]
description = HAFNIUM group was identified by Microsoft as exploiting 4 Microsoft Exchange CVEs in the wild - CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858 and CVE-2021-27065.
narrative = On Tuesday, March 2, 2021, Microsoft released a set of security patches for its mail server, Microsoft Exchange. These patches respond to a group of vulnerabilities known to impact Exchange 2013, 2016, and 2019. It is important to note that an Exchange 2010 security update has also been issued, though the CVEs do not reference that version as being vulnerable.\
While the CVEs do not shed much light on the specifics of the vulnerabilities or exploits, the first vulnerability (CVE-2021-26855) has a remote network attack vector that allows the attacker, a group Microsoft named HAFNIUM, to authenticate as the Exchange server. Three additional vulnerabilities (CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, and CVE-2021-27065) were also identified as part of this activity. When chained together along with CVE-2021-26855 for initial access, the attacker would have complete control over the Exchange server. This includes the ability to run code as SYSTEM and write to any path on the server.\
@@ -417,7 +450,7 @@ version = 2
references = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/HIDDEN-COBRA-North-Korean-Malicious-Cyber-Activity", "https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Destructive-Malware-Report.pdf"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious File Write - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Outbound Emails to Hidden Cobra Threat Actors - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious File Write - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Outbound Emails to Hidden Cobra Threat Actors - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Monitor for and investigate activities, including the creation or deletion of hidden shares and file writes, that may be evidence of infiltration by North Korean government-sponsored cybercriminals. Details of this activity were reported in DHS Report TA-18-149A.
narrative = North Korea's government-sponsored "cyber army" has been slowly building momentum and gaining sophistication over the last 15 years or so. As a result, the group's activity, which the US government refers to as "Hidden Cobra," has surreptitiously crept onto the collective radar as a preeminent global threat.\
These state-sponsored actors are thought to be responsible for everything from a hack on a South Korean nuclear plant to an attack on Sony in anticipation of its release of the movie "The Interview" at the end of 2014. They're also notorious for cyberespionage. In recent years, the group seems to be focused on financial crimes, such as cryptojacking.\
@@ -431,10 +464,21 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2016/09/hosts-file-hijacks/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Windows hosts file modification - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Windows hosts file modification - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Detect evidence of tactics used to redirect traffic from a host to a destination other than the one intended--potentially one that is part of an adversary's attack infrastructure. An example is redirecting communications regarding patches and updates or misleading users into visiting a malicious website.
narrative = Attackers will often attempt to manipulate client communications for nefarious purposes. In some cases, an attacker may endeavor to modify a local host file to redirect communications with resources (such as antivirus or system-update services) to prevent clients from receiving patches or updates. In other cases, an attacker might use this tactic to have the client connect to a site that looks like the intended site, but instead installs malware or collects information from the victim. Additionally, an attacker may redirect a victim in order to execute a MITM attack and observe communications.
[analytic_story://Ingress Tool Transfer]
category = Adversary Tactics
last_updated = 2021-03-24
version = 1
references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Curl Network Connection - Rule", "ESCU - CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - CertUtil Download With VerifyCtl and Split Arguments - Rule"]
description = Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Files may be copied from an external adversary controlled system through the command and control channel to bring tools into the victim network or through alternate protocols with another tool such as FTP.
narrative = Ingress tool transfer is a Technique under tactic Command and Control. Behaviors will include the use of living off the land binaries to download implants or binaries over alternate communication ports. It is imperative to baseline applications on endpoints to understand what generates network activity, to where, and what is its native behavior. These utilities, when abused, will write files to disk in world writeable paths.\ During triage, review the reputation of the remote public destination IP or domain. Capture any files written to disk and perform analysis. Review other parrallel processes for additional behaviors.
[analytic_story://JBoss Vulnerability]
category = Vulnerability
last_updated = 2017-09-14
@@ -467,7 +511,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://github.com/splunk/cloud-datamodel-security-research"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task"]
description = This story addresses detection against Kubernetes cluster fingerprint scan and attack by providing information on items such as source ip, user agent, cluster names.
narrative = Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration platform contains sensitve information and management priviledges of production workloads, microservices and applications. These searches allow operator to detect suspicious unauthenticated requests from the internet to kubernetes cluster.
@@ -478,7 +522,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/approaching-kubernetes-security-detecting-kubernetes-scan-with-splunk.html"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = This story addresses detection and response of accounts acccesing Kubernetes cluster sensitive objects such as configmaps or secrets providing information on items such as user user, group. object, namespace and authorization reason.
narrative = Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration platform contains sensitive objects within its architecture, specifically configmaps and secrets, if accessed by an attacker can lead to further compromise. These searches allow operator to detect suspicious requests against Kubernetes sensitive objects.
@@ -489,7 +533,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/approaching-kubernetes-security-detecting-kubernetes-scan-with-splunk.html"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect RBAC authorizations by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect most active service accounts by pod namespace - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect most active service accounts by pod namespace - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect RBAC authorizations by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = This story addresses detection and response around Sensitive Role usage within a Kubernetes clusters against cluster resources and namespaces.
narrative = Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration platform contains sensitive roles within its architecture, specifically configmaps and secrets, if accessed by an attacker can lead to further compromise. These searches allow operator to detect suspicious requests against Kubernetes role activities
@@ -500,7 +544,7 @@ version = 2
references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/executive-perspective/2015/08/malware_lateral_move.html"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures around how attackers move laterally within the enterprise. Because lateral movement can expose the adversary to detection, it should be an important focus for security analysts.
narrative = Once attackers gain a foothold within an enterprise, they will seek to expand their accesses and leverage techniques that facilitate lateral movement. Attackers will often spend quite a bit of time and effort moving laterally. Because lateral movement renders an attacker the most vulnerable to detection, it's an excellent focus for detection and investigation.\
Indications of lateral movement can include the abuse of system utilities (such as `psexec.exe`), unauthorized use of remote desktop services, `file/admin$` shares, WMI, PowerShell, pass-the-hash, or the abuse of scheduled tasks. Organizations must be extra vigilant in detecting lateral movement techniques and look for suspicious activity in and around high-value strategic network assets, such as Active Directory, which are often considered the primary target or "crown jewels" to a persistent threat actor.\
@@ -515,7 +559,7 @@ version = 4
references = ["https://blogs.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/malware-employs-powershell-to-infect-systems/", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Multiple Suspicious Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadFile - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques - Rule", "ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Multiple Suspicious Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques - Rule", "ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadFile - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Attackers are finding stealthy ways "live off the land," leveraging utilities and tools that come standard on the endpoint--such as PowerShell--to achieve their goals without downloading binary files. These searches can help you detect and investigate PowerShell command-line options that may be indicative of malicious intent.
narrative = The searches in this Analytic Story monitor for parameters often used for malicious purposes. It is helpful to understand how often the notable events generated by this story occur, as well as the commonalities between some of these events. These factors may provide clues about whether this is a common occurrence of minimal concern or a rare event that may require more extensive investigation. Likewise, it is important to determine whether the issue is restricted to a single user/system or is broader in scope.\
The following factors may assist you in determining whether the event is malicious: \
@@ -535,7 +579,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/03/04/tracking-locky-ransomware-using-carbon-black/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Extended Period Without Successful Netbackup Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Unsuccessful Netbackup backups - Rule", "ESCU - All backup logs for host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Unsuccessful Netbackup backups - Rule", "ESCU - Extended Period Without Successful Netbackup Backups - Rule", "ESCU - All backup logs for host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Address common concerns when monitoring your backup processes. These searches can help you reduce risks from ransomware, device theft, or denial of physical access to a host by backing up data on endpoints.
narrative = Having backups is a standard best practice that helps ensure continuity of business operations. Having mature backup processes can also help you reduce the risks of many security-related incidents and streamline your response processes. The detection searches in this Analytic Story will help you identify systems that have backup failures, as well as systems that have not been backed up for an extended period of time. The story will also return the notable event history and all of the backup logs for an endpoint.
@@ -571,7 +615,7 @@ version = 2
references = ["https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/04/goldmax-goldfinder-sibot-analyzing-nobelium-malware/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor.html", "https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Patrick Bareiss"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Supernova Webshell - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Sunburst Correlation DLL and Network Event - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AdFind Exe - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule"]
searches = ["ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Supernova Webshell - Rule", "ESCU - Sunburst Correlation DLL and Network Event - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AdFind Exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule"]
description = Sunburst is a trojanized updates to SolarWinds Orion IT monitoring and management software. It was discovered by FireEye in December 2020. The actors behind this campaign gained access to numerous public and private organizations around the world.
narrative = This Analytic Story supports you to detect Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) of the NOBELIUM Group. The threat actor behind sunburst compromised the SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll, is a SolarWinds digitally-signed component of the Orion software framework that contains a backdoor that communicates via HTTP to third party servers. The detections in this Analytic Story are focusing on the dll loading events, file create events and network events to detect This malware.
@@ -582,7 +626,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/tn-archive/bb490939(v=technet.10)", "https://htmlpreview.github.io/?https://github.com/MatthewDemaske/blogbackup/blob/master/netshell.html", "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Processes created by netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Processes created by netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Detect activities and various techniques associated with the abuse of `netsh.exe`, which can disable local firewall settings or set up a remote connection to a host from an infected system.
narrative = It is a common practice for attackers of all types to leverage native Windows tools and functionality to execute commands for malicious reasons. One such tool on Windows OS is `netsh.exe`,a command-line scripting utility that allows you to--either locally or remotely--display or modify the network configuration of a computer that is currently running. `Netsh.exe` can be used to discover and disable local firewall settings. It can also be used to set up a remote connection to a host from an infected system.\
To get started, run the detection search to identify parent processes of `netsh.exe`.
@@ -594,7 +638,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://i.blackhat.com/USA-20/Thursday/us-20-Bienstock-My-Cloud-Is-APTs-Cloud-Investigating-And-Defending-Office-365.pdf"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Patrick Bareiss"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - O365 Suspicious Rights Delegation - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Disable MFA - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Excessive SSO logon errors - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding - Rule", "ESCU - O365 PST export alert - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Added Service Principal - Rule", "ESCU - O365 New Federated Domain Added - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User - Rule", "ESCU - High Number of Login Failures from a single source - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Bypass MFA via Trusted IP - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Excessive Authentication Failures Alert - Rule"]
searches = ["ESCU - O365 PST export alert - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Bypass MFA via Trusted IP - Rule", "ESCU - O365 New Federated Domain Added - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Excessive SSO logon errors - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Disable MFA - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious Rights Delegation - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Added Service Principal - Rule", "ESCU - High Number of Login Failures from a single source - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Excessive Authentication Failures Alert - Rule"]
description = This story is focused around detecting Office 365 Attacks.
narrative = More and more companies are using Microsofts Office 365 cloud offering. Therefore, we see more and more attacks against Office 365. This story provides various detections for Office 365 attacks.
@@ -605,7 +649,7 @@ version = 2
references = ["https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/orangeworm-targets-healthcare-us-europe-asia", "https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/healthcare-targeted-by-hacker/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Detect activities and various techniques associated with the Orangeworm Attack Group, a group that frequently targets the healthcare industry.
narrative = In May of 2018, the attack group Orangeworm was implicated for installing a custom backdoor called Trojan.Kwampirs within large international healthcare corporations in the United States, Europe, and Asia. This malware provides the attackers with remote access to the target system, decrypting and extracting a copy of its main DLL payload from its resource section. Before writing the payload to disk, it inserts a randomly generated string into the middle of the decrypted payload in an attempt to evade hash-based detections.\
Awareness of the Orangeworm group first surfaced in January, 2015. It has conducted targeted attacks against related industries, as well, such as pharmaceuticals and healthcare IT solution providers.\
@@ -619,7 +663,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/spear-phishing-campaign-targets-ukraine-government.html"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Splunk Research Team"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Oulook exe writing a zip file - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Oulook exe writing a zip file - Rule", "ESCU - Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
description = Detect signs of malicious payloads that may indicate that your environment has been breached via a phishing attack.
narrative = Despite its simplicity, phishing remains the most pervasive and dangerous cyberthreat. In fact, research shows that as many as [91% of all successful attacks](https://digitalguardian.com/blog/91-percent-cyber-attacks-start-phishing-email-heres-how-protect-against-phishing) are initiated via a phishing email. \
As most people know, these emails use fraudulent domains, [email scraping](https://www.cyberscoop.com/emotet-trojan-phishing-scraping-templates-cofense-geodo/), familiar contact names inserted as senders, and other tactics to lure targets into clicking a malicious link, opening an attachment with a [nefarious payload](https://www.cyberscoop.com/emotet-trojan-phishing-scraping-templates-cofense-geodo/), or entering sensitive personal information that perpetrators may intercept. This attack technique requires a relatively low level of skill and allows adversaries to easily cast a wide net. Worse, because its success relies on the gullibility of humans, it's impossible to completely "automate" it out of your environment. However, you can use ES and ESCU to detect and investigate potentially malicious payloads injected into your environment subsequent to a phishing attack. \
@@ -637,7 +681,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/scope-of-mudcarp-attacks-highlight-1/", "http://blog.amossys.fr/badflick-is-not-so-bad.html"]
maintainers = [{"company": "iDefense", "email": "-", "name": "iDefense Cyber Espionage Team"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Monitor your environment for suspicious behaviors that resemble the techniques employed by the MUDCARP threat group.
narrative = This story was created as a joint effort between iDefense and Splunk.\
iDefense analysts have recently discovered a Windows executable file that, upon execution, spoofs a decryption tool and then drops a file that appears to be the custom-built javascript backdoor, "Orz," which is associated with the threat actors known as MUDCARP (as well as "temp.Periscope" and "Leviathan"). The file is executed using Wscript.\
@@ -675,7 +719,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["http://www.novetta.com/2015/02/advanced-methods-to-detect-advanced-cyber-attacks-protocol-abuse/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Detect instances of prohibited network traffic allowed in the environment, as well as protocols running on non-standard ports. Both of these types of behaviors typically violate policy and can be leveraged by attackers.
narrative = A traditional security best practice is to control the ports, protocols, and services allowed within your environment. By limiting the services and protocols to those explicitly approved by policy, administrators can minimize the attack surface. The combined effect allows both network defenders and security controls to focus and not be mired in superfluous traffic or data types. Looking for deviations to policy can identify attacker activity that abuses services and protocols to run on alternate or non-standard ports in the attempt to avoid detection or frustrate forensic analysts.
@@ -686,7 +730,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://www.carbonblack.com/2017/06/28/carbon-black-threat-research-technical-analysis-petya-notpetya-ransomware/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2017/06/27/closing-the-detection-to-mitigation-gap-or-to-petya-or-notpetya-whocares-.html"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task"]
description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to ransomware--spikes in SMB traffic, suspicious wevtutil usage, the presence of common ransomware extensions, and system processes run from unexpected locations, and many others.
narrative = Ransomware is an ever-present risk to the enterprise, wherein an infected host encrypts business-critical data, holding it hostage until the victim pays the attacker a ransom. There are many types and varieties of ransomware that can affect an enterprise. Attackers can deploy ransomware to enterprises through spearphishing campaigns and driveby downloads, as well as through traditional remote service-based exploitation. In the case of the WannaCry campaign, there was self-propagating wormable functionality that was used to maximize infection. Fortunately, organizations can apply several techniques--such as those in this Analytic Story--to detect and or mitigate the effects of ransomware.
@@ -708,7 +752,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/executive-perspective/2015/09/the_new_route_toper.html", "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/about/security-center/event-response/synful-knock.html"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Port Security Violation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect IPv6 Network Infrastructure Threats - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Login Attempts to Routers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rogue DHCP Server - Rule", "ESCU - Detect ARP Poisoning - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Traffic Mirroring - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Software Download To Network Device - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Detect IPv6 Network Infrastructure Threats - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Traffic Mirroring - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Software Download To Network Device - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rogue DHCP Server - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Port Security Violation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect ARP Poisoning - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Login Attempts to Routers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Validate the security configuration of network infrastructure and verify that only authorized users and systems are accessing critical assets. Core routing and switching infrastructure are common strategic targets for attackers.
narrative = Networking devices, such as routers and switches, are often overlooked as resources that attackers will leverage to subvert an enterprise. Advanced threats actors have shown a proclivity to target these critical assets as a means to siphon and redirect network traffic, flash backdoored operating systems, and implement cryptographic weakened algorithms to more easily decrypt network traffic.\
This Analytic Story helps you gain a better understanding of how your network devices are interacting with your hosts. By compromising your network devices, attackers can obtain direct access to the company's internal infrastructure&#151; effectively increasing the attack surface and accessing private services/data.
@@ -720,7 +764,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/detecting-ryuk-using-splunk-attack-range.html", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/big-game-hunting-with-ryuk-another-lucrative-targeted-ransomware/", "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-302a"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Jose Hernandez"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Windows connhost exe started forcefully - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Ryuk Test Files Detected - Rule", "ESCU - Ryuk Wake on LAN Command - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Security Account Manager Stopped - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Ryuk Test Files Detected - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Ryuk Wake on LAN Command - Rule", "ESCU - Windows connhost exe started forcefully - Rule", "ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", "ESCU - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Security Account Manager Stopped - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the Ryuk ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with Ryuk, Stopping Security Access Manager, DisableAntiSpyware registry key modification, suspicious psexec use, and more.
narrative = Cybersecurity Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) released Alert (AA20-302A) on October 28th called “Ransomware Activity Targeting the Healthcare and Public Health Sector.” This alert details TTPs associated with ongoing and possible imminent attacks against the Healthcare sector, and is a joint advisory in coordination with other U.S. Government agencies. The objective of these malicious campaigns is to infiltrate targets in named sectors and to drop ransomware payloads, which will likely cause disruption of service and increase risk of actual harm to the health and safety of patients at hospitals, even with the aggravant of an ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. This document specifically refers to several crimeware exploitation frameworks, emphasizing the use of Ryuk ransomware as payload. The Ryuk ransomware payload is not new. It has been well documented and identified in multiple variants. Payloads need a carrier, and for Ryuk it has often been exploitation frameworks such as Cobalt Strike, or popular crimeware frameworks such as Emotet or Trickbot.
@@ -743,7 +787,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/an-in-depth-analysis-of-samsam-ransomware-and-boss-spider/", "https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2018/07/31/samsam-the-almost-6-million-ransomware/", "https://thehackernews.com/2018/07/samsam-ransomware-attacks.html"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Samsam Test File Write - Rule", "ESCU - Batch File Write to System32 - Rule", "ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - File with Samsam Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - File with Samsam Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Samsam Test File Write - Rule", "ESCU - Batch File Write to System32 - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task"]
description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the SamSam ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with SamSam, RDP brute force attacks, the presence of files with SamSam ransomware extensions, suspicious psexec use, and more.
narrative = The first version of the SamSam ransomware (a.k.a. Samas or SamsamCrypt) was launched in 2015 by a group of Iranian threat actors. The malicious software has affected and continues to affect thousands of victims and has raised almost $6M in ransom.\
Although categorized under the heading of ransomware, SamSam campaigns have some importance distinguishing characteristics. Most notable is the fact that conventional ransomware is a numbers game. Perpetrators use a "spray-and-pray" approach with phishing campaigns or other mechanisms, charging a small ransom (typically under $1,000). The goal is to find a large number of victims willing to pay these mini-ransoms, adding up to a lucrative payday. They use relatively simple methods for infecting systems.\
@@ -759,7 +803,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://redcanary.com/blog/clipping-silver-sparrows-wings/", "https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/5-things-you-need-to-know-about-silver-sparrow/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Curl Network Connection - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage via OSquery - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious SQLite3 LSQuarantine Behavior - Rule"]
searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Curl Network Connection - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious SQLite3 LSQuarantine Behavior - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage via OSquery - Rule"]
description = Silver Sparrow, identified by Red Canary Intelligence, is a new forward looking MacOS (Intel and M1) malicious software downloader utilizing JavaScript for execution and a launchAgent to establish persistence.
narrative = Silver Sparrow works is a dropper and uses typical persistence mechanisms on a Mac. It is cross platform, covering both Intel and Apple M1 architecture. To this date, no implant has been downloaded for malicious purposes. During installation of the update.pkg or updater.pkg file, the malicious software utilizes JavaScript to generate files and scripts on disk for persistence.These files later download a implant from an S3 bucket every hour. This analytic assists with identifying different types of macOS malware families establishing LaunchAgent persistence. Per SentinelOne source, it is predicted that Silver Sparrow is likely selling itself as a mechanism to 3rd party “affiliates” or pay-per-install (PPI) partners, typically seen as commodity adware/malware. Additional indicators and behaviors may be found within the references.
@@ -815,7 +859,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS EC2 instances for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as EC2 instances that originate from unusual locations or those launched by previously unseen users (among others). Included investigative searches will help you probe more deeply, when the information warrants it.
narrative = AWS CloudTrail is an AWS service that helps you enable governance, compliance, and risk auditing within your AWS account. Actions taken by a user, role, or an AWS service are recorded as events in CloudTrail. It is crucial for a company to monitor events and actions taken in the AWS Console, AWS command-line interface, and AWS SDKs and APIs to ensure that your EC2 instances are not vulnerable to attacks. This Analytic Story identifies suspicious activities in your AWS EC2 instances and helps you respond and investigate those activities.
@@ -826,7 +870,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integration.html"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new user AWS Console Login - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Detect new user AWS Console Login - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
description = Monitor your AWS authentication events using your CloudTrail logs. Searches within this Analytic Story will help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious logins.
narrative = It is important to monitor and control who has access to your AWS infrastructure. Detecting suspicious logins to your AWS infrastructure will provide good starting points for investigations. Abusive behaviors caused by compromised credentials can lead to direct monetary costs, as you will be billed for any EC2 instances created by the attacker.
@@ -837,7 +881,7 @@ version = 2
references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/security-data-protection/cloud/public-aws-s3-buckets-writable/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI - Rule", "ESCU - Detect S3 access from a new IP - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Open S3 buckets - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Detect S3 access from a new IP - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Open S3 buckets - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS S3 buckets for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as detecting open S3 buckets and buckets being accessed from a new IP. The contextual and investigative searches will give you more information, when required.
narrative = As cloud computing has exploded, so has the number of creative attacks on virtual environments. And as the number-two cloud-service provider, Amazon Web Services (AWS) has certainly had its share.\
Amazon's "shared responsibility" model dictates that the company has responsibility for the environment outside of the VM and the customer is responsible for the security inside of the S3 container. As such, it's important to stay vigilant for activities that may belie suspicious behavior inside of your environment.\
@@ -850,7 +894,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/hiding-cloudcobalt-strike-beacon-c2-using-amazon-apis/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task"]
description = Leverage these searches to monitor your AWS network traffic for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as a spike in blocked outbound traffic in your virtual private cloud (VPC).
narrative = A virtual private cloud (VPC) is an on-demand managed cloud-computing service that isolates computing resources for each client. Inside the VPC container, the environment resembles a physical network. \
Amazon's VPC service enables you to launch EC2 instances and leverage other Amazon resources. The traffic that flows in and out of this VPC can be controlled via network access-control rules and security groups. Amazon also has a feature called VPC Flow Logs that enables you to log IP traffic going to and from the network interfaces in your VPC. This data is stored using Amazon CloudWatch Logs.\
@@ -864,7 +908,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-cloudtrail-now-tracks-cross-account-activity-to-its-origin/", "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integration.html"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by New User - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by New User - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Monitor your cloud authentication events. Searches within this Analytic Story leverage the recent cloud updates to the Authentication data model to help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious login activity.
narrative = It is important to monitor and control who has access to your cloud infrastructure. Detecting suspicious logins will provide good starting points for investigations. Abusive behaviors caused by compromised credentials can lead to direct monetary costs, as you will be billed for any compute activity whether legitimate or otherwise.\
This Analytic Story has data model versions of cloud searches leveraging Authentication data, including those looking for suspicious login activity, and cross-account activity for AWS.
@@ -876,7 +920,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task"]
description = Monitor your cloud infrastructure provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your cloud environment.
narrative = Monitoring your cloud infrastructure logs allows you enable governance, compliance, and risk auditing. It is crucial for a company to monitor events and actions taken in the their cloud environments to ensure that your instances are not vulnerable to attacks. This Analytic Story identifies suspicious activities in your cloud compute instances and helps you respond and investigate those activities.
@@ -887,7 +931,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Monitor your cloud infrastructure provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your cloud environment.
narrative = Because most enterprise cloud infrastructure activities originate from familiar geographic locations, monitoring for activity from unknown or unusual regions is an important security measure. This indicator can be especially useful in environments where it is impossible to add specific IPs to an allow list because they vary.\
This Analytic Story was designed to provide you with flexibility in the precision you employ in specifying legitimate geographic regions. It can be as specific as an IP address or a city, or as broad as a region (think state) or an entire country. By determining how precise you want your geographical locations to be and monitoring for new locations that haven't previously accessed your environment, you can detect adversaries as they begin to probe your environment. Since there are legitimate reasons for activities from unfamiliar locations, this is not a standalone indicator. Nevertheless, location can be a relevant piece of information that you may wish to investigate further.
@@ -911,7 +955,7 @@ version = 2
references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1059", "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/macro-malware", "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Leveraging the Windows command-line interface (CLI) is one of the most common attack techniques--one that is also detailed in the MITRE ATT&CK framework. Use this Analytic Story to help you identify unusual or suspicious use of the CLI on Windows systems.
narrative = The ability to execute arbitrary commands via the Windows CLI is a primary goal for the adversary. With access to the shell, an attacker can easily run scripts and interact with the target system. Often, attackers may only have limited access to the shell or may obtain access in unusual ways. In addition, malware may execute and interact with the CLI in ways that would be considered unusual and inconsistent with typical user activity. This provides defenders with opportunities to identify suspicious use and investigate, as appropriate. This Analytic Story contains various searches to help identify this suspicious activity, as well as others to aid you in deeper investigation.
@@ -922,7 +966,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["http://blogs.splunk.com/2015/10/01/random-words-on-entropy-and-dns/", "http://www.darkreading.com/analytics/security-monitoring/got-malware-three-signs-revealed-in-dns-traffic/d/d-id/1139680", "https://live.paloaltonetworks.com/t5/Threat-Vulnerability-Articles/What-are-suspicious-DNS-queries/ta-p/71454"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Attackers often attempt to hide within or otherwise abuse the domain name system (DNS). You can thwart attempts to manipulate this omnipresent protocol by monitoring for these types of abuses.
narrative = Although DNS is one of the fundamental underlying protocols that make the Internet work, it is often ignored (perhaps because of its complexity and effectiveness). However, attackers have discovered ways to abuse the protocol to meet their objectives. One potential abuse involves manipulating DNS to hijack traffic and redirect it to an IP address under the attacker's control. This could inadvertently send users intending to visit google.com, for example, to an unrelated malicious website. Another technique involves using the DNS protocol for command-and-control activities with the attacker's malicious code or to covertly exfiltrate data. The searches within this Analytic Story look for these types of abuses.
@@ -933,7 +977,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/06/26/phishing-hits-a-new-level-of-quality/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly - Rule", "ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task"]
description = Email remains one of the primary means for attackers to gain an initial foothold within the modern enterprise. Detect and investigate suspicious emails in your environment with the help of the searches in this Analytic Story.
narrative = It is a common practice for attackers of all types to leverage targeted spearphishing campaigns and mass mailers to deliver weaponized email messages and attachments. Fortunately, there are a number of ways to monitor email data in Splunk to detect suspicious content.\
Once a phishing message has been detected, the next steps are to answer the following questions: \
@@ -959,7 +1003,7 @@ version = 2
references = ["https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/", "https://redcanary.com/blog/windows-registry-attacks-threat-detection/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/005/", "https://medium.com/@mbromileyDFIR/malware-monday-aebb456356c5"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious mshta spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious mshta child process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect mshta renamed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Detect mshta inline hta execution - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Detect mshta renamed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious mshta spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious mshta child process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect mshta inline hta execution - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe process to execute malicious code.
narrative = One common adversary tactic is to bypass application control solutions via the mshta.exe process, which loads Microsoft HTML applications (mshtml.dll) with the .hta suffix. In these cases, attackers use the trusted Windows utility to proxy execution of malicious files, whether an .hta application, javascript, or VBScript.\
The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an attacker is leveraging mshta.exe to execute malicious code.\
@@ -982,7 +1026,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1078", "https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Credential_stuffing", "https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/answer/What-is-a-password-spraying-attack-and-how-does-it-work"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentials From The Same IP - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Account Lockout Events - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Failed SSO Attempts - Rule", "ESCU - Okta User Logins From Multiple Cities - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate User Activities In Okta - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by app - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Okta Account Lockout Events - Rule", "ESCU - Okta User Logins From Multiple Cities - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Failed SSO Attempts - Rule", "ESCU - Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentials From The Same IP - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by app - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate User Activities In Okta - Response Task"]
description = Monitor your Okta environment for suspicious activities. Due to the Covid outbreak, many users are migrating over to leverage cloud services more and more. Okta is a popular tool to manage multiple users and the web-based applications they need to stay productive. The searches in this story will help monitor your Okta environment for suspicious activities and associated user behaviors.
narrative = Okta is the leading single sign on (SSO) provider, allowing users to authenticate once to Okta, and from there access a variety of web-based applications. These applications are assigned to users and allow administrators to centrally manage which users are allowed to access which applications. It also provides centralized logging to help understand how the applications are used and by whom. \
While SSO is a major convenience for users, it also provides attackers with an opportunity. If the attacker can gain access to Okta, they can access a variety of applications. As such monitoring the environment is important. \
@@ -995,7 +1039,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.010/T1218.010.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvr32/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Regsvr32 Register Suspicious Path - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass - Rule"]
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Regsvr32 Register Suspicious Path - Rule"]
description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the regsvr32.exe process to execute malicious code.
narrative = One common adversary tactic is to bypass application control solutions via the regsvr32.exe process. This particular bypass was popularized with "SquiblyDoo" using the "scrobj.dll" dll to load .sct scriptlets. This technique is still widely used by adversaries to bypass detection and prevention controls. The file extension of the DLL is irrelevant (it may load a .txt file extension for example). The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an adversary is leveraging regsvr32.exe to execute malicious code. Validate execution Determine if regsvr32.exe executed. Validate the OriginalFileName of regsvr32.exe and further PE metadata. If executed outside of c:\windows\system32 or c:\windows\syswow64, it should be highly suspect. Determine if script code was executed with regsvr32. Situational Awareness - The objective of this step is meant to identify suspicious behavioral indicators related to executed of Script code by regsvr32.exe. Parent process. Is the parent process a known LOLBin? Is the parent process an Office Application? Module loads. Is regsvr32 loading any suspicious .DLLs? Unsigned or signed from non-standard paths. Network connections. Any network connections? Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain. Retrieval of Script Code - confirm the executed script code is benign or malicious.
@@ -1006,7 +1050,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 dllregisterserver - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 StartW - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - syssetup - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - advpack - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - setupapi - Rule"]
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - syssetup - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - advpack - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - setupapi - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 dllregisterserver - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 StartW - Rule"]
description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage rundll32.exe to execute arbitrary malicious code.
narrative = One common adversary tactic is to bypass application control solutions via the rundll32.exe process. Natively, rundll32.exe will load DLLs and is a great example of a Living off the Land Binary. Rundll32.exe may load malicious DLLs by ordinals, function names or directly. The queries in this story focus on loading default DLLs, syssetup.dll, ieadvpack.dll, advpack.dll and setupapi.dll from disk that may be abused by adversaries. Additionally, two analytics developed to assist with identifying DLLRegisterServer, Start and StartW functions being called. The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an adversary is leveraging rundll32.exe to execute malicious code.
@@ -1017,7 +1061,7 @@ version = 2
references = ["https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Graeber-Abusing-Windows-Management-Instrumentation-WMI-To-Build-A-Persistent%20Asynchronous-And-Fileless-Backdoor-wp.pdf", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/wmimplant_a_wmi_ba.html"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - WMI Temporary Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - Script Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon - Rule", "ESCU - Process Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Script Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Temporary Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon - Rule", "ESCU - Process Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Attackers are increasingly abusing Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI), a framework and associated utilities available on all modern Windows operating systems. Because WMI can be leveraged to manage both local and remote systems, it is important to identify the processes executed and the user context within which the activity occurred.
narrative = WMI is a Microsoft infrastructure for management data and operations on Windows operating systems. It includes of a set of utilities that can be leveraged to manage both local and remote Windows systems. Attackers are increasingly turning to WMI abuse in their efforts to conduct nefarious tasks, such as reconnaissance, detection of antivirus and virtual machines, code execution, lateral movement, persistence, and data exfiltration. \
The detection searches included in this Analytic Story are used to look for suspicious use of WMI commands that attackers may leverage to interact with remote systems. The searches specifically look for the use of WMI to run processes on remote systems.\
@@ -1030,7 +1074,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://redcanary.com/blog/windows-registry-attacks-threat-detection/", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1112"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Monitor and detect registry changes initiated from remote locations, which can be a sign that an attacker has infiltrated your system.
narrative = Attackers are developing increasingly sophisticated techniques for hijacking target servers, while evading detection. One such technique that has become progressively more common is registry modification.\
The registry is a key component of the Windows operating system. It has a hierarchical database called "registry" that contains settings, options, and values for executables. Once the threat actor gains access to a machine, they can use reg.exe to modify their account to obtain administrator-level privileges, maintain persistence, and move laterally within the environment.\
@@ -1043,7 +1087,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://blog.rapid7.com/2020/04/02/dispelling-zoom-bugbears-what-you-need-to-know-about-the-latest-zoom-vulnerabilities/", "https://threatpost.com/two-zoom-zero-day-flaws-uncovered/154337/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - First Time Seen Child Process of Zoom - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process File Activity - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Child Process of Zoom - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process File Activity - Response Task"]
description = Attackers are using Zoom as an vector to increase privileges on a sytems. This story detects new child processes of zoom and provides investigative actions for this detection.
narrative = Zoom is a leader in modern enterprise video communications and its usage has increased dramatically with a large amount of the population under stay-at-home orders due to the COVID-19 pandemic. With increased usage has come increased scrutiny and several security flaws have been found with this application on both Windows and macOS systems.\
Current detections focus on finding new child processes of this application on a per host basis. Investigative searches are included to gather information needed during an investigation.
@@ -1055,7 +1099,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218/T1218.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler usage - Rule"]
searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler usage - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule"]
description = Monitor and detect behaviors used by attackers who leverage trusted developer utilities to execute malicious code.
narrative = Adversaries may take advantage of trusted developer utilities to proxy execution of malicious payloads. There are many utilities used for software development related tasks that can be used to execute code in various forms to assist in development, debugging, and reverse engineering. These utilities may often be signed with legitimate certificates that allow them to execute on a system and proxy execution of malicious code through a trusted process that effectively bypasses application control solutions.\
The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an adversary is leveraging microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe to execute malicious code.
@@ -1067,7 +1111,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/001/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1127.001/T1127.001.md", "https://github.com/infosecn1nja/MaliciousMacroMSBuild", "https://github.com/xorrior/RandomPS-Scripts/blob/master/Invoke-ExecuteMSBuild.ps1", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/", "https://github.com/MHaggis/CBR-Queries/blob/master/msbuild.md"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious msbuild path - Rule"]
searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious msbuild path - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Spawn - Rule"]
description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the msbuild.exe process to execute malicious code.
narrative = Adversaries may use MSBuild to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. MSBuild.exe (Microsoft Build Engine) is a software build platform used by Visual Studio and is native to Windows. It handles XML formatted project files that define requirements for loading and building various platforms and configurations.\
The inline task capability of MSBuild that was introduced in .NET version 4 allows for C# code to be inserted into an XML project file. MSBuild will compile and execute the inline task. MSBuild.exe is a signed Microsoft binary, so when it is used this way it can execute arbitrary code and bypass application control defenses that are configured to allow MSBuild.exe execution.\
@@ -1103,7 +1147,7 @@ version = 2
references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/08/monitoring-windows-console-activity-part-two.html", "https://www.splunk.com/pdfs/technical-briefs/advanced-threat-detection-and-response-tech-brief.pdf", "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/logging/detecting-security-incidents-windows-workstation-event-logs-34262"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Quickly identify systems running new or unusual processes in your environment that could be indicators of suspicious activity. Processes run from unusual locations, those with conspicuously long command lines, and rare executables are all examples of activities that may warrant deeper investigation.
narrative = Being able to profile a host's processes within your environment can help you more quickly identify processes that seem out of place when compared to the rest of the population of hosts or asset types.\
This Analytic Story lets you identify processes that are either a) not typically seen running or b) have some sort of suspicious command-line arguments associated with them. This Analytic Story will also help you identify the user running these processes and the associated process activity on the host.\
@@ -1127,7 +1171,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://www.fbi.gov/scams-and-safety/common-fraud-schemes/internet-fraud", "https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2017-internet-crime-report-released-050718"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Jim Apger"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Web Fraud - Password Sharing Across Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Account Harvesting - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Anomalous User Clickspeed - Rule", "ESCU - Get Web Session Information via session id - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Web Fraud - Account Harvesting - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Anomalous User Clickspeed - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Password Sharing Across Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Web Session Information via session id - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Monitor your environment for activity consistent with common attack techniques bad actors use when attempting to compromise web servers or other web-related assets.
narrative = The Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) defines Internet fraud as the use of Internet services or software with Internet access to defraud victims or to otherwise take advantage of them. According to the Bureau, Internet crime schemes are used to steal millions of dollars each year from victims and continue to plague the Internet through various methods. The agency includes phishing scams, data breaches, Denial of Service (DOS) attacks, email account compromise, malware, spoofing, and ransomware in this category.\
These crimes are not the fraud itself, but rather the attack techniques commonly employed by fraudsters in their pursuit of data that enables them to commit malicious actssuch as obtaining and using stolen credit cards. They represent a serious problem that is steadily increasing and not likely to go away anytime soon.\
@@ -1143,7 +1187,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://research.checkpoint.com/2020/resolving-your-way-into-domain-admin-exploiting-a-17-year-old-bug-in-windows-dns-servers/", "https://support.microsoft.com/en-au/help/4569509/windows-dns-server-remote-code-execution-vulnerability"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Shannon Davis"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Zeek - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Splunk Stream - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Splunk Stream - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Zeek - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Uncover activity consistent with CVE-2020-1350, or SIGRed. Discovered by Checkpoint researchers, this vulnerability affects Windows 2003 to 2019, and is triggered by a malicious DNS response (only affects DNS over TCP). An attacker can use the malicious payload to cause a buffer overflow on the vulnerable system, leading to compromise. The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify the large response payload for SIG and KEY DNS records which can be used for the exploit.
narrative = When a client requests a DNS record for a particular domain, that request gets routed first through the client's locally configured DNS server, then to any DNS server(s) configured as forwarders, and then onto the target domain's own DNS server(s). If a attacker wanted to, they could host a malicious DNS server that responds to the initial request with a specially crafted large response (~65KB). This response would flow through to the client's local DNS server, which if not patched for CVE-2020-1350, would cause the buffer overflow. The detection searches in this Analytic Story use wire data to detect the malicious behavior. Searches for Splunk Stream and Zeek are included. The Splunk Stream search correlates across stream:dns and stream:tcp, while the Zeek search correlates across bro:dns:json and bro:conn:json. These correlations are required to pick up both the DNS record types (SIG and KEY) along with the payload size (>65KB).
@@ -1154,7 +1198,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Defense_Evasion"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Eventvwr UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - FodHelper UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - FodHelper UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Eventvwr UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Detect tactics used by malware to evade defenses on Windows endpoints. A few of these include suspicious `reg.exe` processes, files hidden with `attrib.exe` and disabling user-account control, among many others
narrative = Defense evasion is a tactic--identified in the MITRE ATT&CK framework--that adversaries employ in a variety of ways to bypass or defeat defensive security measures. There are many techniques enumerated by the MITRE ATT&CK framework that are applicable in this context. This Analytic Story includes searches designed to identify the use of such techniques on Windows platforms.
@@ -1165,7 +1209,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2013/12/file-extensions-2/", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1042"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Execution of File with Multiple Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule", "ESCU - Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule", "ESCU - Execution of File with Multiple Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Detect and investigate suspected abuse of file extensions and Windows file associations. Some of the malicious behaviors involved may include inserting spaces before file extensions or prepending the file extension with a different one, among other techniques.
narrative = Attackers use a variety of techniques to entice users to run malicious code or to persist on an endpoint. One way to accomplish these goals is to leverage file extensions and the mechanism Windows uses to associate files with specific applications. \
Since its earliest days, Windows has used extensions to identify file types. Users have become familiar with these extensions and their application associations. For example, if users see that a file ends in `.doc` or `.docx`, they will assume that it is a Microsoft Word document and expect that double-clicking will open it using `winword.exe`. The user will typically also presume that the `.docx` file is safe. \
@@ -1180,7 +1224,7 @@ version = 2
references = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/", "https://zeltser.com/security-incident-log-review-checklist/", "http://journeyintoir.blogspot.com/2013/01/re-introducing-usnjrnl.html"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Adversaries often try to cover their tracks by manipulating Windows logs. Use these searches to help you monitor for suspicious activity surrounding log files--an essential component of an effective defense.
narrative = Because attackers often modify system logs to cover their tracks and/or to thwart the investigative process, log monitoring is an industry-recognized best practice. While there are legitimate reasons to manipulate system logs, it is still worthwhile to keep track of who manipulated the logs, when they manipulated them, and in what way they manipulated them (determining which accesses, tools, or utilities were employed). Even if no malicious activity is detected, the knowledge of an attempt to manipulate system logs may be indicative of a broader security risk that should be thoroughly investigated.\
The Analytic Story gives users two different ways to detect manipulation of Windows Event Logs and one way to detect deletion of the Update Sequence Number (USN) Change Journal. The story helps determine the history of the host and the users who have accessed it. Finally, the story aides in investigation by retrieving all the information on the process that caused these events (if the process has been identified).
@@ -1192,7 +1236,7 @@ version = 2
references = ["http://www.fuzzysecurity.com/tutorials/19.html", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2010/07/malware-persistence-windows-registry.html", "http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/common-malware-persistence-mechanisms/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/fin7-shim-databases-persistence.html", "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dq2Hv7J9fvk"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Certutil exe certificate extraction - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Certutil exe certificate extraction - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Monitor for activities and techniques associated with maintaining persistence on a Windows system--a sign that an adversary may have compromised your environment.
narrative = Maintaining persistence is one of the first steps taken by attackers after the initial compromise. Attackers leverage various custom and built-in tools to ensure survivability and persistent access within a compromised enterprise. This Analytic Story provides searches to help you identify various behaviors used by attackers to maintain persistent access to a Windows environment.
@@ -1203,7 +1247,7 @@ version = 2
references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Child Processes of Spoolsv exe - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Overwriting Accessibility Binaries - Rule", "ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Child Processes of Spoolsv exe - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Overwriting Accessibility Binaries - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Monitor for and investigate activities that may be associated with a Windows privilege-escalation attack, including unusual processes running on endpoints, modified registry keys, and more.
narrative = Privilege escalation is a "land-and-expand" technique, wherein an adversary gains an initial foothold on a host and then exploits its weaknesses to increase his privileges. The motivation is simple: certain actions on a Windows machine--such as installing software--may require higher-level privileges than those the attacker initially acquired. By increasing his privilege level, the attacker can gain the control required to carry out his malicious ends. This Analytic Story provides searches to detect and investigate behaviors that attackers may use to elevate their privileges in your environment.
@@ -1214,7 +1258,7 @@ version = 3
references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1050", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1031"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Windows services are often used by attackers for persistence and the ability to load drivers or otherwise interact with the Windows kernel. This Analytic Story helps you monitor your environment for indications that Windows services are being modified or created in a suspicious manner.
narrative = The Windows operating system uses a services architecture to allow for running code in the background, similar to a UNIX daemon. Attackers will often leverage Windows services for persistence, hiding in plain sight, seeking the ability to run privileged code that can interact with the kernel. In many cases, attackers will create a new service to host their malicious code. Attackers have also been observed modifying unnecessary or unused services to point to their own code, as opposed to what was intended. In these cases, attackers often use tools to create or modify services in ways that are not typical for most environments, providing opportunities for detection.
@@ -1266,6 +1310,36 @@ known_false_positives = This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define "fals
This search will fire any time a new region is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your region, there should be few false positives. If you are located in regions where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you.
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Create Policy Version to allow all resources - Rule]
type = detection
asset_type = AWS Account
confidence = medium
explanation = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user created a policy version that allows them to access any resource in their account
how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudtrail logs.
annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]}
known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created a policy to allow a user to access all resources. That said, AWS strongly advises against granting full control to all AWS resources
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS CreateAccessKey - Rule]
type = detection
asset_type = AWS Account
confidence = medium
explanation = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user A who has already permission to create access keys, makes an API call to create access keys for another user B. Attackers have been know to use this technique for Privilege Escalation in case new victim(user B) has more permissions than old victim(user B)
how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudtrail logs.
annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136.003"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]}
known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created keys for another user.
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS CreateLoginProfile - Rule]
type = detection
asset_type = AWS Account
confidence = medium
explanation = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user A(victim A) creates a login profile for user B, followed by a AWS Console login event from user B from the same src_ip as user B. This correlated event can be indicative of privilege escalation since both events happened from the same src_ip
how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudtrail logs.
annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136.003"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]}
known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created a login profile for another user.
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account - Rule]
type = detection
asset_type = AWS Instance
@@ -1346,6 +1420,26 @@ annotations = {"mitre_attack": ["T1078"]}
known_false_positives = Updating a SAML provider or creating a new one may not necessarily be malicious however it needs to be closely monitored.
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS SetDefaultPolicyVersion - Rule]
type = detection
asset_type = AWS Account
confidence = medium
explanation = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user has set a default policy versions. Attackers have been know to use this technique for Privilege Escalation in case the previous versions of the policy had permissions to access more resources than the current version of the policy
how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudtrail logs.
annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]}
known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately set a default policy to allow a user to access all resources. That said, AWS strongly advises against granting full control to all AWS resources
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS UpdateLoginProfile - Rule]
type = detection
asset_type = AWS Account
confidence = medium
explanation = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user A who has already permission to update login profile, makes an API call to update login profile for another user B . Attackers have been know to use this technique for Privilege Escalation in case new victim(user B) has more permissions than old victim(user B)
how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudtrail logs.
annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136.003"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]}
known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created keys for another user.
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule]
type = detection
asset_type = AWS Instance
@@ -1480,7 +1574,7 @@ providing_technologies = []
type = detection
asset_type = Endpoint
confidence = medium
explanation = Attempt to add a certificate to the certificate store
explanation = Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store
how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model.
annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1553.004"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"]}
known_false_positives = There may be legitimate reasons for administrators to add a certificate to the untrusted certificate store. In such cases, this will typically be done on a large number of systems.
@@ -1536,6 +1630,36 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_att
known_false_positives = It is possible for this search to generate a notable event for a batch file write to a path that includes the string "system32", but is not the actual Windows system directory. As such, you should confirm the path of the batch file identified by the search. In addition, a false positive may be generated by an administrator copying a legitimate batch file in this directory tree. You should confirm that the activity is legitimate and modify the search to add exclusions, as necessary.
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments - Rule]
type = detection
asset_type =
confidence = medium
explanation = Certutil.exe may download a file from a remote destination using `-urlcache`. This behavior does require a URL to be passed on the command-line. In addition, `-f` (force) and `-split` (Split embedded ASN.1 elements, and save to files) will be used. It is not entirely common for `certutil.exe` to contact public IP space. However, it is uncommon for `certutil.exe` to write files to world writeable paths.\ During triage, capture any files on disk and review. Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain in question.
how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1105"]}
known_false_positives = Limited false positives in most environments, however tune as needed based on parent-child relationship or network connection.
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - CertUtil Download With VerifyCtl and Split Arguments - Rule]
type = detection
asset_type =
confidence = medium
explanation = Certutil.exe may download a file from a remote destination using `-VerifyCtl`. This behavior does require a URL to be passed on the command-line. In addition, `-f` (force) and `-split` (Split embedded ASN.1 elements, and save to files) will be used. It is not entirely common for `certutil.exe` to contact public IP space. \ During triage, capture any files on disk and review. Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain in question. Using `-VerifyCtl`, the file will either be written to the current working directory or `%APPDATA%\..\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\Content\<hash>`.
how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1105"]}
known_false_positives = Limited false positives in most environments, however tune as needed based on parent-child relationship or network connection.
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - CertUtil With Decode Argument - Rule]
type = detection
asset_type =
confidence = medium
explanation = CertUtil.exe may be used to `encode` and `decode` a file, including PE and script code. Encoding will convert a file to base64 with `-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----` and `-----END CERTIFICATE-----` tags. Malicious usage will include decoding a encoded file that was downloaded. Once decoded, it will be loaded by a parallel process. Note that there are two additional command switches that may be used - `encodehex` and `decodehex`. Similarly, the file will be encoded in HEX and later decoded for further execution. During triage, identify the source of the file being decoded. Review its contents or execution behavior for further analysis.
how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1140"]}
known_false_positives = Typically seen used to `encode` files, but it is possible to see legitimate use of `decode`. Filter based on parent-child relationship, file paths, endpoint or user.
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - Certutil exe certificate extraction - Rule]
type = detection
asset_type = Endpoint
@@ -1568,6 +1692,26 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 9", "CIS 12", "CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Co
known_false_positives = It's possible that an enterprise has more than five DNS servers that are configured in a round-robin rotation. Please customize the search, as appropriate.
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - Clop Common Exec Parameter - Rule]
type = detection
asset_type =
confidence = medium
explanation = The following analytics are designed to identifies some CLOP ransomware variant that using arguments to execute its main code or feature of its code. In this variant if the parameter is "runrun", CLOP ransomware will try to encrypt files in network shares and if it is "temp.dat", it will try to read from some stream pipe or file start encrypting files within the infected local machines. This technique can be also identified as an anti-sandbox technique to make its code non-responsive since it is waiting for some parameter to execute properly.
how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.
annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Obfuscation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204"]}
known_false_positives = Operators can execute third party tools using these parameters.
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - Clop Ransomware Known Service Name - Rule]
type = detection
asset_type =
confidence = medium
explanation = This detection is to identify the common service name created by the CLOP ransomware as part of its persistence and high privilege code execution in the infected machine. Ussually CLOP ransomware use StartServiceCtrlDispatcherW API in creating this service entry.
how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Service name, Service File Name Service Start type, and Service Type from your endpoints.
annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543"]}
known_false_positives = unknown
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles - Rule]
type = detection
asset_type = AWS Instance
@@ -1727,6 +1871,16 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on O
known_false_positives = Other tools can access LSASS for legitimate reasons and generate an event. In these cases, tweaking the search may help eliminate noise.
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - Create Service In Suspicious File Path - Rule]
type = detection
asset_type =
confidence = medium
explanation = This detection is to identify a creation of "user mode service" where the service file path is located in non-common service folder in windows.
how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Service name, Service File Name Service Start type, and Service Type from your endpoints.
annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1569.001, T1569.002"]}
known_false_positives = unknown
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - Create local admin accounts using net exe - Rule]
type = detection
asset_type = Endpoint
@@ -2041,7 +2195,7 @@ providing_technologies = []
type = detection
asset_type =
confidence = medium
explanation = The following query identifies suspicious .aspx created in 3 paths identified by Microsoft as known drop locations for Exchange exploitation related to HAFNIUM group. Paths include: `\HttpProxy\owa\auth\`, `\inetpub\wwwroot\aspnet_client\`, and `\HttpProxy\OAB\`. Upon triage, the suspicious .aspx file will have a randomized name of 8 characters long. Review the file for suspect commands. Identify additional log sources, IIS included, to review source and other potential exploitation.
explanation = The following query identifies suspicious .aspx created in 3 paths identified by Microsoft as known drop locations for Exchange exploitation related to HAFNIUM group. Paths include: `\HttpProxy\owa\auth\`, `\inetpub\wwwroot\aspnet_client\`, and `\HttpProxy\OAB\`. Upon triage, the suspicious .aspx file will likely look obvious on the surface. inspect the contents for script code inside. Identify additional log sources, IIS included, to review source and other potential exploitation.
how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node and `Filesystem` node.
annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1505.003"]}
known_false_positives = The query is structured in a way that `action` (read, create) is not defined. Review the results of this query, filter, and tune as necessary. It may be necessary to generate this query specific to your endpoint product.
@@ -3000,6 +3154,16 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"
known_false_positives = Some applications and users may legitimately use attrib.exe to interact with the files.
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - High File Deletion Frequency - Rule]
type = detection
asset_type =
confidence = medium
explanation = This search looks for high frequency of file deletion relative to process name and process id. These events usually happen when the ransomware tries to encrypt the files with the ransomware file extensions and sysmon treat the original files to be deleted as soon it was replace as encrypted data.
how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the deleted target file name, process name and process id from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.
annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1485"]}
known_false_positives = user may delete bunch of pictures or files in a folder.
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - High Number of Login Failures from a single source - Rule]
type = detection
asset_type = Office 365
@@ -3010,6 +3174,16 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
known_false_positives = unknown
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - High Process Termination Frequency - Rule]
type = detection
asset_type =
confidence = medium
explanation = This analytics are designed to indentify a high frequency of process termination on a machine which is a common behavior of ransomware malware before encrypting files. This technique is designed to avoid an exception error while accessing (docs, images, database and etc..) in the infected machine for encryption.
how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Image (process full path of terminated process) from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.
annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1486"]}
known_false_positives = admin or user tool that can terminate multiple process.
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server - Rule]
type = detection
asset_type = Endpoint
@@ -3487,7 +3661,7 @@ type = detection
asset_type = Office 365
confidence = medium
explanation = This search detects when an admin configured a forwarding rule for multiple mailboxes to the same destination.
how_to_implement =
how_to_implement = You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity
annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1114.003"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]}
known_false_positives = unknown
providing_technologies = []
@@ -3497,7 +3671,7 @@ type = detection
asset_type = Office 365
confidence = medium
explanation = This search detects the assignment of rights to accesss content from another mailbox. This is usually only assigned to a service account.
how_to_implement =
how_to_implement = You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity
annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1114.002"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]}
known_false_positives = Service Accounts
providing_technologies = []
@@ -3507,7 +3681,7 @@ type = detection
asset_type = Office 365
confidence = medium
explanation = This search detects when multiple user configured a forwarding rule to the same destination.
how_to_implement =
how_to_implement = You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity
annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1114.003"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]}
known_false_positives = unknown
providing_technologies = []
@@ -3582,6 +3756,16 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"
known_false_positives = This detection should yield little or no false positive results. It is uncommon for LNK files to be executed from temporary or user directories.
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - Process Deleting Its Process File Path - Rule]
type = detection
asset_type =
confidence = medium
explanation = This detection is to identify a suspicious process that tries to delete the process file path related to its process. This technique is known to be defense evasion once a certain condition of malware is satisfied or not. Clop ransomware use this technique where it will try to delete its process file path using a .bat command if the keyboard layout is not the layout it tries to infect.
how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model.
annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.002"]}
known_false_positives = unknown
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - Process Execution via WMI - Rule]
type = detection
asset_type = Endpoint
@@ -3662,6 +3846,16 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 9", "CIS 14"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissan
known_false_positives = Some networks may use kerberized FTP or telnet servers, however, this is rare.
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - Ransomware Notes bulk creation - Rule]
type = detection
asset_type =
confidence = medium
explanation = The following analytics identifies a big number of instance of ransomware notes (filetype e.g .txt, .html, .hta) file creation to the infected machine. This behavior is a good sensor if the ransomware note filename is quite new for security industry or the ransomware note filename is not in your lookup table list for monitoring.
how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data.
annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Obfuscation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1486"]}
known_false_positives = unknown
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule]
type = detection
asset_type = Endpoint
@@ -3772,6 +3966,16 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Ob
known_false_positives = Administrators may use this legitimately to gather info from remote systems.
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - Resize ShadowStorage volume - Rule]
type = detection
asset_type =
confidence = medium
explanation = The following analytics identifies the resizing of shadowstorage by ransomware malware to avoid the shadow volumes being made again. this technique is an alternative by ransomware attacker than deleting the shadowstorage which is known alert in defensive team. one example of ransomware that use this technique is CLOP ransomware where it drops a .bat file that will resize the shadowstorage to minimum size as much as possible
how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.
annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1490"]}
known_false_positives = network admin can resize the shadowstorage for valid purposes.
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule]
type = detection
asset_type = Endpoint
@@ -4227,7 +4431,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint
confidence = medium
explanation = The following analytic identifies a renamed instance of microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe. Microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319 and is rarely utilized. When investigating, identify the executed code on disk and review. A spawned child process from microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe is uncommon. In any instance, microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe spawning from an Office product or any living off the land binary is highly suspect.
how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.
annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1127, T1036.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]}
annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1127", "T1036.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]}
known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe, triggering a false positive.
providing_technologies = []
package/default/app.conf
+2 -2
View File
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
is_configured = false
state = enabled
state_change_requires_restart = false
build = 22604
build = 25386
[triggers]
reload.analytic_stories = simple
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ reload.content-version = simple
[launcher]
author = Splunk
version = 3.17.0
version = 3.18.0
description = Explore the Analytic Stories included with ES Content Updates.
[ui]
package/default/collections.conf
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
#############
# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
# On Date: 2021-03-12T17:19:06 UTC
# On Date: 2021-03-25T19:21:00 UTC
# Author: Splunk Security Research
# Contact: research@splunk.com
#############
package/default/content-version.conf
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
[content-version]
version = 3.17.0
version = 3.18.0
package/default/es_investigations.conf
+57 -29
View File
@@ -11,28 +11,35 @@ label = AWS Cryptomining
description = Monitor your AWS EC2 instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or EC2 instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior.
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task"]
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_aws_iam_privilege_escalation]
label = AWS IAM Privilege Escalation
description = This analytic story contains detections that query your AWS Cloudtrail for activities related to privilege escalation.
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_aws_network_acl_activity]
label = AWS Network ACL Activity
description = Monitor your AWS network infrastructure for bad configurations and malicious activity. Investigative searches help you probe deeper, when the facts warrant it.
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task"]
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id___response_task"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_aws_security_hub_alerts]
label = AWS Security Hub Alerts
description = This story is focused around detecting Security Hub alerts generated from AWS
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task"]
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details___response_task"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_aws_suspicious_provisioning_activities]
label = AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities
description = Monitor your AWS provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your network.
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_region___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_country___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_city___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task"]
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_city___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_region___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_country___response_task"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_aws_user_monitoring]
label = AWS User Monitoring
@@ -67,14 +74,21 @@ label = Brand Monitoring
description = Detect and investigate activity that may indicate that an adversary is using faux domains to mislead users into interacting with malicious infrastructure. Monitor DNS, email, and web traffic for permutations of your brand name.
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_email_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_emails_from_specific_sender___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_emails_from_specific_sender___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_email_info___response_task"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_clop_ransomware]
label = Clop Ransomware
description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the Clop ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with Clope, encrypting network shares, deleting and resizing shadow volume storage, registry key modification, deleting of security logs, and more.
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_cloud_cryptomining]
label = Cloud Cryptomining
description = Monitor your cloud compute instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or compute instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior.
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task"]
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_cloud_federated_credential_abuse]
label = Cloud Federated Credential Abuse
@@ -109,7 +123,7 @@ label = Command and Control
description = Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures leveraged by attackers to establish and operate command and control channels. Implants installed by attackers on compromised endpoints use these channels to receive instructions and send data back to the malicious operators.
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task"]
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id___response_task"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_common_phishing_frameworks]
label = Common Phishing Frameworks
@@ -130,14 +144,14 @@ label = Credential Dumping
description = Uncover activity consistent with credential dumping, a technique wherein attackers compromise systems and attempt to obtain and exfiltrate passwords. The threat actors use these pilfered credentials to further escalate privileges and spread throughout a target environment. The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify attempts to credential dumping.
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_failed_logins_for_multiple_destinations___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_previous_unseen_user___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_hash_attempts___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_ticket_attempts___response_task"]
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_ticket_attempts___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_previous_unseen_user___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_failed_logins_for_multiple_destinations___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_hash_attempts___response_task"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_dhs_report_ta18_074a]
label = DHS Report TA18-074A
description = Monitor for suspicious activities associated with DHS Technical Alert US-CERT TA18-074A. Some of the activities that adversaries used in these compromises included spearfishing attacks, malware, watering-hole domains, many and more.
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_file_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task"]
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_file_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_dns_amplification_attacks]
label = DNS Amplification Attacks
@@ -165,7 +179,14 @@ label = Data Protection
description = Fortify your data-protection arsenal--while continuing to ensure data confidentiality and integrity--with searches that monitor for and help you investigate possible signs of data exfiltration.
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task"]
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_deobfuscate_decode_files_or_information]
label = Deobfuscate-Decode Files or Information
description = Adversaries may use Obfuscated Files or Information to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis.
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_detect_zerologon_attack]
label = Detect Zerologon Attack
@@ -186,14 +207,14 @@ label = Dynamic DNS
description = Detect and investigate hosts in your environment that may be communicating with dynamic domain providers. Attackers may leverage these services to help them avoid firewall blocks and deny lists.
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_emotet_malware__dhs_report_ta18_201a_]
label = Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A
description = Detect rarely used executables, specific registry paths that may confer malware survivability and persistence, instances where cmd.exe is used to launch script interpreters, and other indicators that the Emotet financial malware has compromised your environment.
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task"]
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_f5_tmui_rce_cve_2020_5902]
label = F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902
@@ -221,7 +242,7 @@ label = Hidden Cobra Malware
description = Monitor for and investigate activities, including the creation or deletion of hidden shares and file writes, that may be evidence of infiltration by North Korean government-sponsored cybercriminals. Details of this activity were reported in DHS Report TA-18-149A.
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_outbound_emails_to_hidden_cobra_threat_actors___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task"]
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_outbound_emails_to_hidden_cobra_threat_actors___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_host_redirection]
label = Host Redirection
@@ -230,6 +251,13 @@ disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_ingress_tool_transfer]
label = Ingress Tool Transfer
description = Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Files may be copied from an external adversary controlled system through the command and control channel to bring tools into the victim network or through alternate protocols with another tool such as FTP.
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_jboss_vulnerability]
label = JBoss Vulnerability
description = In March of 2016, adversaries were seen using JexBoss--an open-source utility used for testing and exploiting JBoss application servers. These searches help detect evidence of these attacks, such as network connections to external resources or web services spawning atypical child processes, among others.
@@ -242,7 +270,7 @@ label = Kubernetes Scanning Activity
description = This story addresses detection against Kubernetes cluster fingerprint scan and attack by providing information on items such as source ip, user agent, cluster names.
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_gcp_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_amazon_eks_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_gcp_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_amazon_eks_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip___response_task"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_kubernetes_sensitive_object_access_activity]
label = Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity
@@ -263,14 +291,14 @@ label = Lateral Movement
description = Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures around how attackers move laterally within the enterprise. Because lateral movement can expose the adversary to detection, it should be an important focus for security analysts.
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task"]
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_malicious_powershell]
label = Malicious PowerShell
description = Attackers are finding stealthy ways "live off the land," leveraging utilities and tools that come standard on the endpoint--such as PowerShell--to achieve their goals without downloading binary files. These searches can help you detect and investigate PowerShell command-line options that may be indicative of malicious intent.
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_monitor_backup_solution]
label = Monitor Backup Solution
@@ -319,7 +347,7 @@ label = Orangeworm Attack Group
description = Detect activities and various techniques associated with the Orangeworm Attack Group, a group that frequently targets the healthcare industry.
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_phishing_payloads]
label = Phishing Payloads
@@ -333,21 +361,21 @@ label = Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns
description = Monitor your environment for suspicious behaviors that resemble the techniques employed by the MUDCARP threat group.
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_prohibited_traffic_allowed_or_protocol_mismatch]
label = Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch
description = Detect instances of prohibited network traffic allowed in the environment, as well as protocols running on non-standard ports. Both of these types of behaviors typically violate policy and can be leveraged by attackers.
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task"]
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_ransomware]
label = Ransomware
description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to ransomware--spikes in SMB traffic, suspicious wevtutil usage, the presence of common ransomware extensions, and system processes run from unexpected locations, and many others.
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_backup_logs_for_endpoint___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_sysmon_wmi_activity_for_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task"]
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_sysmon_wmi_activity_for_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_backup_logs_for_endpoint___response_task"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_ransomware_cloud]
label = Ransomware Cloud
@@ -382,7 +410,7 @@ label = SamSam Ransomware
description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the SamSam ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with SamSam, RDP brute force attacks, the presence of files with SamSam ransomware extensions, suspicious psexec use, and more.
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_backup_logs_for_endpoint___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task"]
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_backup_logs_for_endpoint___response_task"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_silver_sparrow]
label = Silver Sparrow
@@ -417,7 +445,7 @@ label = Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities
description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS EC2 instances for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as EC2 instances that originate from unusual locations or those launched by previously unseen users (among others). Included investigative searches will help you probe more deeply, when the information warrants it.
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task"]
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_aws_login_activities]
label = Suspicious AWS Login Activities
@@ -431,14 +459,14 @@ label = Suspicious AWS S3 Activities
description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS S3 buckets for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as detecting open S3 buckets and buckets being accessed from a new IP. The contextual and investigative searches will give you more information, when required.
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_s3_bucket_details_via_bucketname___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task"]
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_s3_bucket_details_via_bucketname___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_aws_traffic]
label = Suspicious AWS Traffic
description = Leverage these searches to monitor your AWS network traffic for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as a spike in blocked outbound traffic in your virtual private cloud (VPC).
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task"]
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id___response_task"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_cloud_authentication_activities]
label = Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities
@@ -480,14 +508,14 @@ label = Suspicious DNS Traffic
description = Attackers often attempt to hide within or otherwise abuse the domain name system (DNS). You can thwart attempts to manipulate this omnipresent protocol by monitoring for these types of abuses.
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task"]
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_emails]
label = Suspicious Emails
description = Email remains one of the primary means for attackers to gain an initial foothold within the modern enterprise. Detect and investigate suspicious emails in your environment with the help of the searches in this Analytic Story.
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_email_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_emails_from_specific_sender___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_emails_from_specific_sender___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_email_info___response_task"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_gcp_storage_activities]
label = Suspicious GCP Storage Activities
@@ -508,7 +536,7 @@ label = Suspicious Okta Activity
description = Monitor your Okta environment for suspicious activities. Due to the Covid outbreak, many users are migrating over to leverage cloud services more and more. Okta is a popular tool to manage multiple users and the web-based applications they need to stay productive. The searches in this story will help monitor your Okta environment for suspicious activities and associated user behaviors.
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_okta_activity_by_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_user_activities_in_okta___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_okta_activity_by_app___response_task"]
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_okta_activity_by_app___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_okta_activity_by_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_user_activities_in_okta___response_task"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_regsvr32_activity]
label = Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity
@@ -529,7 +557,7 @@ label = Suspicious WMI Use
description = Attackers are increasingly abusing Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI), a framework and associated utilities available on all modern Windows operating systems. Because WMI can be leveraged to manage both local and remote systems, it is important to identify the processes executed and the user context within which the activity occurred.
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_sysmon_wmi_activity_for_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_sysmon_wmi_activity_for_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_windows_registry_activities]
label = Suspicious Windows Registry Activities
@@ -585,7 +613,7 @@ label = Web Fraud Detection
description = Monitor your environment for activity consistent with common attack techniques bad actors use when attempting to compromise web servers or other web-related assets.
disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_web_session_information_via_session_id___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_emails_from_specific_sender___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_emails_from_specific_sender___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_web_session_information_via_session_id___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_windows_dns_sigred_cve_2020_1350]
label = Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350
package/default/macros.conf
+65 -1
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
#############
# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
# On Date: 2021-03-12T17:19:06 UTC
# On Date: 2021-03-25T19:21:00 UTC
# Author: Splunk Security Research
# Contact: research@splunk.com
#############
@@ -307,6 +307,18 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[aws_create_policy_version_to_allow_all_resources_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[aws_createaccesskey_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[aws_createloginprofile_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
@@ -339,6 +351,14 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[aws_setdefaultpolicyversion_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[aws_updateloginprofile_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
@@ -415,6 +435,18 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[certutil_download_with_urlcache_and_split_arguments_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[certutil_download_with_verifyctl_and_split_arguments_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[certutil_with_decode_argument_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[certutil_exe_certificate_extraction_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
@@ -427,6 +459,14 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[clop_common_exec_parameter_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[clop_ransomware_known_service_name_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
@@ -487,6 +527,10 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[create_service_in_suspicious_file_path_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
@@ -975,10 +1019,18 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[high_file_deletion_frequency_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[high_process_termination_frequency_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[hosts_receiving_high_volume_of_network_traffic_from_email_server_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
@@ -1207,6 +1259,10 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[process_deleting_its_process_file_path_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[process_execution_via_wmi_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
@@ -1239,6 +1295,10 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[ransomware_notes_bulk_creation_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
@@ -1283,6 +1343,10 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[resize_shadowstorage_volume_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
[rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
package/default/savedsearches.conf
+786 -137
View File
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
package/default/transforms.conf
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
#############
# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
# On Date: 2021-03-12T17:19:06 UTC
# On Date: 2021-03-25T19:21:00 UTC
# Author: Splunk Security Research
# Contact: research@splunk.com
#############
package/default/use_case_library.conf
+284 -80
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
#############
# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
# On Date: 2021-03-12T17:19:06 UTC
# On Date: 2021-03-25T19:21:00 UTC
# Author: Splunk Security Research
# Contact: research@splunk.com
#############
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-cloudtrail-now-tracks-cross-account-activity-to-its-origin/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - aws detect sts get session token abuse - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect attach to role policy - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect permanent key creation - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect sts assume role abuse - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect role creation - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - aws detect role creation - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect sts assume role abuse - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect sts get session token abuse - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect permanent key creation - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect attach to role policy - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Track when a user assumes an IAM role in another AWS account to obtain cross-account access to services and resources in that account. Accessing new roles could be an indication of malicious activity.
narrative = Amazon Web Services (AWS) admins manage access to AWS resources and services across the enterprise using AWS's Identity and Access Management (IAM) functionality. IAM provides the ability to create and manage AWS users, groups, and roles-each with their own unique set of privileges and defined access to specific resources (such as EC2 instances, the AWS Management Console, API, or the command-line interface). Unlike conventional (human) users, IAM roles are assumable by anyone in the organization. They provide users with dynamically created temporary security credentials that expire within a set time period.\
Herein lies the rub. In between the time between when the temporary credentials are issued and when they expire is a period of opportunity, where a user could leverage the temporary credentials to wreak havoc-spin up or remove instances, create new users, elevate privileges, and other malicious activities-throughout the environment.\
@@ -27,13 +27,24 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Monitor your AWS EC2 instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or EC2 instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior.
narrative = Cryptomining is an intentionally difficult, resource-intensive business. Its complexity was designed into the process to ensure that the number of blocks mined each day would remain steady. So, it's par for the course that ambitious, but unscrupulous, miners make amassing the computing power of large enterprises--a practice known as cryptojacking--a top priority. \
Cryptojacking has attracted an increasing amount of media attention since its explosion in popularity in the fall of 2017. The attacks have moved from in-browser exploits and mobile phones to enterprise cloud services, such as Amazon Web Services (AWS). It's difficult to determine exactly how widespread the practice has become, since bad actors continually evolve their ability to escape detection, including employing unlisted endpoints, moderating their CPU usage, and hiding the mining pool's IP address behind a free CDN. \
When malicious miners appropriate a cloud instance, often spinning up hundreds of new instances, the costs can become astronomical for the account holder. So, it is critically important to monitor your systems for suspicious activities that could indicate that your network has been infiltrated. \
This Analytic Story is focused on detecting suspicious new instances in your EC2 environment to help prevent such a disaster. It contains detection searches that will detect when a previously unused instance type or AMI is used. It also contains support searches to build lookup files to ensure proper execution of the detection searches.
[analytic_story://AWS IAM Privilege Escalation]
category = Cloud Security
last_updated = 2021-03-08
version = 1
references = ["https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation/", "https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/the-cloud-shadow-admin-threat-10-permissions-to-protect", "https://labs.bishopfox.com/tech-blog/privilege-escalation-in-aws"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - AWS Create Policy Version to allow all resources - Rule", "ESCU - AWS CreateAccessKey - Rule", "ESCU - AWS UpdateLoginProfile - Rule", "ESCU - AWS SetDefaultPolicyVersion - Rule", "ESCU - AWS CreateLoginProfile - Rule"]
description = This analytic story contains detections that query your AWS Cloudtrail for activities related to privilege escalation.
narrative = Amazon Web Services provides a neat feature called Identity and Access Management (IAM) that enables organizations to manage various AWS services and resources in a secure way. All IAM users have roles, groups and policies associated with them which governs and sets permissions to allow a user to access specific restrictions. \ However, if these IAM policies are misconfigured and have specific combinations of weak permissions; it can allow attackers to escalate their privileges and further compromise the organization. Rhino Security Labs have published comprehensive blogs detailing various AWS Escalation methods. By using this as an inspiration, Splunk’s research team wants to highlight how these attack vectors look in AWS Cloudtrail logs and provide you with detection queries to uncover these potentially malicious events via this Analytic Story. \
[analytic_story://AWS Network ACL Activity]
category = Cloud Security
last_updated = 2018-05-21
@@ -41,7 +52,7 @@ version = 2
references = ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonVPC/latest/UserGuide/VPC_Appendix_NACLs.html", "https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/how-to-help-prepare-for-ddos-attacks-by-reducing-your-attack-surface/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task"]
description = Monitor your AWS network infrastructure for bad configurations and malicious activity. Investigative searches help you probe deeper, when the facts warrant it.
narrative = AWS CloudTrail is an AWS service that helps you enable governance, compliance, and operational/risk auditing of your AWS account. Actions taken by a user, role, or an AWS service are recorded as events in CloudTrail. It is crucial for a company to monitor events and actions taken in the AWS Management Console, AWS Command Line Interface, and AWS SDKs and APIs to ensure that your servers are not vulnerable to attacks. This analytic story contains detection searches that leverage CloudTrail logs from AWS to check for bad configurations and malicious activity in your AWS network access controls.
@@ -52,7 +63,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://aws.amazon.com/security-hub/features/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for User - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for User - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task"]
description = This story is focused around detecting Security Hub alerts generated from AWS
narrative = AWS Security Hub collects and consolidates findings from AWS security services enabled in your environment, such as intrusion detection findings from Amazon GuardDuty, vulnerability scans from Amazon Inspector, S3 bucket policy findings from Amazon Macie, publicly accessible and cross-account resources from IAM Access Analyzer, and resources lacking WAF coverage from AWS Firewall Manager.
@@ -63,7 +74,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Region - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Country - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From City - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From City - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Region - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Country - Response Task"]
description = Monitor your AWS provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your network.
narrative = Because most enterprise AWS activities originate from familiar geographic locations, monitoring for activity from unknown or unusual regions is an important security measure. This indicator can be especially useful in environments where it is impossible to add specific IPs to an allow list because they vary. \
This Analytic Story was designed to provide you with flexibility in the precision you employ in specifying legitimate geographic regions. It can be as specific as an IP address or a city, or as broad as a region (think state) or an entire country. By determining how precise you want your geographical locations to be and monitoring for new locations that haven't previously accessed your environment, you can detect adversaries as they begin to probe your environment. Since there are legitimate reasons for activities from unfamiliar locations, this is not a standalone indicator. Nevertheless, location can be a relevant piece of information that you may wish to investigate further.
@@ -75,7 +86,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://redlock.io/blog/cryptojacking-tesla"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Detect API activity from users without MFA - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new API calls from user roles - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS API Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Security Group Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Detect API activity from users without MFA - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS API Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new API calls from user roles - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Security Group Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Detect and investigate dormant user accounts for your AWS environment that have become active again. Because inactive and ad-hoc accounts are common attack targets, it's critical to enable governance within your environment.
narrative = It seems obvious that it is critical to monitor and control the users who have access to your cloud infrastructure. Nevertheless, it's all too common for enterprises to lose track of ad-hoc accounts, leaving their servers vulnerable to attack. In fact, this was the very oversight that led to Tesla's cryptojacking attack in February, 2018.\
In addition to compromising the security of your data, when bad actors leverage your compute resources, it can incur monumental costs, since you will be billed for any new EC2 instances and increased bandwidth usage. \
@@ -89,7 +100,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs/blob/v3.2/dev/rules/REQUEST-944-APPLICATION-ATTACK-JAVA.conf"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Java Classes - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Content-Type Length - Rule", "ESCU - Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Web POSTs From src - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Suspicious Strings in HTTP Header - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Java Classes - Rule", "ESCU - Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Content-Type Length - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Web POSTs From src - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Suspicious Strings in HTTP Header - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Detect and investigate activities--such as unusually long `Content-Type` length, suspicious java classes and web servers executing suspicious processes--consistent with attempts to exploit Apache Struts vulnerabilities.
narrative = In March of 2017, a remote code-execution vulnerability in the Jakarta Multipart parser in Apache Struts, a widely used open-source framework for creating Java web applications, was disclosed and assigned to CVE-2017-5638. About two months later, hackers exploited the flaw to carry out the world's <a href=https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2017/09/07/nations-biggest-hacks-and-data-breaches-millions/644311001/> 5th largest data breach</a>. The target, credit giant Equifax, <a href=https://money.cnn.com/2017/09/16/technology/equifax-breach-security-hole/index.html>told investigators</a> that it had become aware of the vulnerability two months before the attack. \
The exploit involved manipulating the `Content-Type HTTP` header to execute commands embedded in the header.\
@@ -124,7 +135,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-research/2021/01/26/cve-2021-3156-heap-based-buffer-overflow-in-sudo-baron-samedit"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Shannon Davis"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 Segfault - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 via OSQuery - Rule"]
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 via OSQuery - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 Segfault - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 - Rule"]
description = Uncover activity consistent with CVE-2021-3156. Discovered by the Qualys Research Team, this vulnerability has been found to affect sudo across multiple Linux distributions (Ubuntu 20.04 and prior, Debian 10 and prior, Fedora 33 and prior). As this vulnerability was committed to code in July 2011, there will be many distributions affected. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability allows any unprivileged user to gain root privileges on the vulnerable host.
narrative = A non-privledged user is able to execute the sudoedit command to trigger a buffer overflow. After the successful buffer overflow, they are then able to gain root privileges on the affected host. The conditions needed to be run are a trailing "\" along with shell and edit flags. Monitoring the /var/log directory on Linux hosts using the Splunk Universal Forwarder will allow you to pick up this behavior when using the provided detection.
@@ -135,12 +146,23 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://www.zerofox.com/blog/what-is-digital-risk-monitoring/", "https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/consumer/family-safety/what-is-typosquatting/", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2016/06/explained-typosquatting/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task"]
description = Detect and investigate activity that may indicate that an adversary is using faux domains to mislead users into interacting with malicious infrastructure. Monitor DNS, email, and web traffic for permutations of your brand name.
narrative = While you can educate your users and customers about the risks and threats posed by typosquatting, phishing, and corporate espionage, human error is a persistent fact of life. Of course, your adversaries are all too aware of this reality and will happily leverage it for nefarious purposes whenever possible&#51;phishing with lookalike addresses, embedding faux command-and-control domains in malware, and hosting malicious content on domains that closely mimic your corporate servers. This is where brand monitoring comes in.\
You can use our adaptation of `DNSTwist`, together with the support searches in this Analytic Story, to generate permutations of specified brands and external domains. Splunk can monitor email, DNS requests, and web traffic for these permutations and provide you with early warnings and situational awareness--powerful elements of an effective defense.\
Notable events will include IP addresses, URLs, and user data. Drilling down can provide you with even more actionable intelligence, including likely geographic information, contextual searches to help you scope the problem, and investigative searches.
[analytic_story://Clop Ransomware]
category = Malware
last_updated = 2021-03-17
version = 1
references = ["https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/analyst-note-cl0p-tlp-white.pdf", "https://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/115250/data-breach/qualys-clop-ransomware.html", "https://www.darkreading.com/attacks-breaches/qualys-is-the-latest-victim-of-accellion-data-breach/d/d-id/1340323"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - High Process Termination Frequency - Rule", "ESCU - Clop Ransomware Known Service Name - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - High File Deletion Frequency - Rule", "ESCU - Process Deleting Its Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Resize ShadowStorage volume - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Ransomware Notes bulk creation - Rule", "ESCU - Create Service In Suspicious File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Clop Common Exec Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule"]
description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the Clop ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with Clope, encrypting network shares, deleting and resizing shadow volume storage, registry key modification, deleting of security logs, and more.
narrative = Clop ransomware campaigns targeting healthcare and other vertical sectors, involve the use of ransomware payloads along with exfiltration of data per HHS bulletin. Malicious actors demand payment for ransome of data and threaten deletion and exposure of exfiltrated data.
[analytic_story://Cloud Cryptomining]
category = Cloud Security
last_updated = 2019-10-02
@@ -148,7 +170,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Monitor your cloud compute instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or compute instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior.
narrative = Cryptomining is an intentionally difficult, resource-intensive business. Its complexity was designed into the process to ensure that the number of blocks mined each day would remain steady. So, it's par for the course that ambitious, but unscrupulous, miners make amassing the computing power of large enterprises--a practice known as cryptojacking--a top priority. \
Cryptojacking has attracted an increasing amount of media attention since its explosion in popularity in the fall of 2017. The attacks have moved from in-browser exploits and mobile phones to enterprise cloud services, such as Amazon Web Services (AWS), Google Cloud Platform (GCP), and Azure. It's difficult to determine exactly how widespread the practice has become, since bad actors continually evolve their ability to escape detection, including employing unlisted endpoints, moderating their CPU usage, and hiding the mining pool's IP address behind a free CDN. \
@@ -162,7 +184,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/golden-saml-newly-discovered-attack-technique-forges-authentication-to-cloud-apps", "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf", "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Excessive SSO logon errors - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Via PowerShell And EventCode 4703 - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Added Service Principal - Rule", "ESCU - AWS SAML Access by Provider User and Principal - Rule", "ESCU - O365 New Federated Domain Added - Rule", "ESCU - Certutil exe certificate extraction - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - AWS SAML Update identity provider - Rule"]
searches = ["ESCU - AWS SAML Access by Provider User and Principal - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - O365 New Federated Domain Added - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Excessive SSO logon errors - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User - Rule", "ESCU - Certutil exe certificate extraction - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Via PowerShell And EventCode 4703 - Rule", "ESCU - AWS SAML Update identity provider - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Added Service Principal - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule"]
description = This analytical story addresses events that indicate abuse of cloud federated credentials. These credentials are usually extracted from endpoint desktop or servers specially those servers that provide federation services such as Windows Active Directory Federation Services. Identity Federation relies on objects such as Oauth2 tokens, cookies or SAML assertions in order to provide seamless access between cloud and perimeter environments. If these objects are either hijacked or forged then attackers will be able to pivot into victim's cloud environements.
narrative = This story is composed of detection searches based on endpoint that addresses the use of Mimikatz, Escalation of Privileges and Abnormal processes that may indicate the extraction of Federated directory objects such as passwords, Oauth2 tokens, certificates and keys. Cloud environment (AWS, Azure) related events are also addressed in specific cloud environment detection searches.
@@ -173,7 +195,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://www.cobaltstrike.com/", "https://www.infocyte.com/blog/2020/09/02/cobalt-strike-the-new-favorite-among-thieves/", "https://bluescreenofjeff.com/2017-01-24-how-to-write-malleable-c2-profiles-for-cobalt-strike/", "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2020/09/coverage-strikes-back-cobalt-strike-paper.html", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/unauthorized-access-of-fireeye-red-team-tools.html", "https://github.com/MichaelKoczwara/Awesome-CobaltStrike-Defence", "https://github.com/zer0yu/Awesome-CobaltStrike"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious SearchProtocolHost no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious DLLHost no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious msbuild path - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 StartW - Rule", "ESCU - Cobalt Strike Named Pipes - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious GPUpdate no Command Line Arguments - Rule"]
searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious DLLHost no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious SearchProtocolHost no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious msbuild path - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 StartW - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious GPUpdate no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Cobalt Strike Named Pipes - Rule"]
description = Cobalt Strike is threat emulation software. Red teams and penetration testers use Cobalt Strike to demonstrate the risk of a breach and evaluate mature security programs. Most recently, Cobalt Strike has become the choice tool by threat groups due to its ease of use and extensibility.
narrative = This Analytic Story supports you to detect Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) from Cobalt Strike. Cobalt Strike has many ways to be enhanced by using aggressor scripts, malleable C2 profiles, default attack packages, and much more. For endpoint behavior, Cobalt Strike is most commonly identified via named pipes, spawn to processes, and DLL function names. Many additional variables are provided for in memory operation of the beacon implant. On the network, depending on the malleable C2 profile used, it is near infinite in the amount of ways to conceal the C2 traffic with Cobalt Strike. Not every query may be specific to Cobalt Strike the tool, but the methodologies and techniques used by it.\
Splunk Threat Research reviewed all publicly available instances of Malleabe C2 Profiles and generated a list of the most commonly used spawnto and pipenames.\
@@ -193,7 +215,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://www.intego.com/mac-security-blog/osxcoldroot-and-the-rat-invasion/", "https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x2A.html", "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/coldroot-rat-still-undetectable-despite-being-uploaded-on-github-two-years-ago/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Jose Hernandez"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Processes Tapping Keyboard Events - Rule", "ESCU - Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection - Rule", "ESCU - Processes Tapping Keyboard Events - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that relate to the ColdRoot Remote Access Trojan that affects MacOS. An example of some of these activities are changing sensative binaries in the MacOS sub-system, detecting process names and executables associated with the RAT, detecting when a keyboard tab is installed on a MacOS machine and more.
narrative = Conventional wisdom holds that Apple's MacOS operating system is significantly less vulnerable to attack than Windows machines. While that point is debatable, it is true that attacks against MacOS systems are much less common. However, this fact does not mean that Macs are impervious to breaches. To the contrary, research has shown that that Mac malware is increasing at an alarming rate. According to AV-test, in 2018, there were 86,865 new MacOS malware variants, up from 27,338 the year before&#151;a 31% increase. In contrast, the independent research firm found that new Windows malware had increased from 65.17M to 76.86M during that same period, less than half the rate of growth. The bottom line is that while the numbers look a lot smaller than Windows, it's definitely time to take Mac security more seriously.\
This Analytic Story addresses the ColdRoot remote access trojan (RAT), which was uploaded to Github in 2016, but was still escaping detection by the first quarter of 2018, when a new, more feature-rich variant was discovered masquerading as an Apple audio driver. Among other capabilities, the Pascal-based ColdRoot can heist passwords from users' keychains and remotely control infected machines without detection. In the initial report of his findings, Patrick Wardle, Chief Research Officer for Digita Security, explained that the new ColdRoot RAT could start and kill processes on the breached system, spawn new remote-desktop sessions, take screen captures and assemble them into a live stream of the victim's desktop, and more.\
@@ -206,7 +228,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Collection", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1074"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts - Rule", "ESCU - Email files written outside of the Outlook directory - Rule", "ESCU - Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious writes to System Volume Information - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts - Rule", "ESCU - Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious writes to System Volume Information - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin - Rule", "ESCU - Email files written outside of the Outlook directory - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Monitor for and investigate activities--such as suspicious writes to the Windows Recycling Bin or email servers sending high amounts of traffic to specific hosts, for example--that may indicate that an adversary is harvesting and exfiltrating sensitive data.
narrative = A common adversary goal is to identify and exfiltrate data of value from a target organization. This data may include email conversations and addresses, confidential company information, links to network design/infrastructure, important dates, and so on.\
Attacks are composed of three activities: identification, collection, and staging data for exfiltration. Identification typically involves scanning systems and observing user activity. Collection can involve the transfer of large amounts of data from various repositories. Staging/preparation includes moving data to a central location and compressing (and optionally encoding and/or encrypting) it. All of these activities provide opportunities for defenders to identify their presence. \
@@ -219,7 +241,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Command_and_Control", "https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/feature/Command-and-control-servers-The-puppet-masters-that-govern-malware"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task"]
description = Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures leveraged by attackers to establish and operate command and control channels. Implants installed by attackers on compromised endpoints use these channels to receive instructions and send data back to the malicious operators.
narrative = Threat actors typically architect and implement an infrastructure to use in various ways during the course of their attack campaigns. In some cases, they leverage this infrastructure for scanning and performing reconnaissance activities. In others, they may use this infrastructure to launch actual attacks. One of the most important functions of this infrastructure is to establish servers that will communicate with implants on compromised endpoints. These servers establish a command and control channel that is used to proxy data between the compromised endpoint and the attacker. These channels relay commands from the attacker to the compromised endpoint and the output of those commands back to the attacker.\
Because this communication is so critical for an adversary, they often use techniques designed to hide the true nature of the communications. There are many different techniques used to establish and communicate over these channels. This Analytic Story provides searches that look for a variety of the techniques used for these channels, as well as indications that these channels are active, by examining logs associated with border control devices and network-access control lists.
@@ -254,7 +276,7 @@ version = 3
references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1003", "https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for.html"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump - Rule", "ESCU - Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Ntdsutil Export NTDS - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of lsass Dump with Taskmgr - Rule", "ESCU - Create Remote Thread into LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", "ESCU - Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Previous Unseen User - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Create Remote Thread into LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of lsass Dump with Taskmgr - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Ntdsutil Export NTDS - Rule", "ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Previous Unseen User - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts - Response Task"]
description = Uncover activity consistent with credential dumping, a technique wherein attackers compromise systems and attempt to obtain and exfiltrate passwords. The threat actors use these pilfered credentials to further escalate privileges and spread throughout a target environment. The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify attempts to credential dumping.
narrative = Credential dumping&#151;gathering credentials from a target system, often hashed or encrypted&#151;is a common attack technique. Even though the credentials may not be in plain text, an attacker can still exfiltrate the data and set to cracking it offline, on their own systems. The threat actors target a variety of sources to extract them, including the Security Accounts Manager (SAM), Local Security Authority (LSA), NTDS from Domain Controllers, or the Group Policy Preference (GPP) files.\
Once attackers obtain valid credentials, they use them to move throughout a target network with ease, discovering new systems and identifying assets of interest. Credentials obtained in this manner typically include those of privileged users, which may provide access to more sensitive information and system operations.\
@@ -267,7 +289,7 @@ version = 2
references = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Single Letter Process On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Create local admin accounts using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process File Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Create local admin accounts using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Single Letter Process On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process File Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Monitor for suspicious activities associated with DHS Technical Alert US-CERT TA18-074A. Some of the activities that adversaries used in these compromises included spearfishing attacks, malware, watering-hole domains, many and more.
narrative = The frequency of nation-state cyber attacks has increased significantly over the last decade. Employing numerous tactics and techniques, these attacks continue to escalate in complexity. \
There is a wide range of motivations for these state-sponsored hacks, including stealing valuable corporate, military, or diplomatic data&#1151;all of which could confer advantages in various arenas. They may also target critical infrastructure. \
@@ -293,7 +315,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/", "http://www.noip.com/blog/2014/07/11/dynamic-dns-can-use-2/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/08/04/detecting-dynamic-dns-domains-in-splunk.html"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS record changed - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - DNS Hijack Enrichment - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS record changed - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - DNS Hijack Enrichment - Response Task"]
description = Secure your environment against DNS hijacks with searches that help you detect and investigate unauthorized changes to DNS records.
narrative = Dubbed the Achilles heel of the Internet (see https://www.f5.com/labs/articles/threat-intelligence/dns-is-still-the-achilles-heel-of-the-internet-25613), DNS plays a critical role in routing web traffic but is notoriously vulnerable to attack. One reason is its distributed nature. It relies on unstructured connections between millions of clients and servers over inherently insecure protocols.\
The gravity and extent of the importance of securing DNS from attacks is undeniable. The fallout of compromised DNS can be disastrous. Not only can hackers bring down an entire business, they can intercept confidential information, emails, and login credentials, as well. \
@@ -323,10 +345,21 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/data-protection/", "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/dns/splunk-detect-dns-tunneling-37022", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Detect USB device insertion - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect USB device insertion - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Fortify your data-protection arsenal--while continuing to ensure data confidentiality and integrity--with searches that monitor for and help you investigate possible signs of data exfiltration.
narrative = Attackers can leverage a variety of resources to compromise or exfiltrate enterprise data. Common exfiltration techniques include remote-access channels via low-risk, high-payoff active-collections operations and close-access operations using insiders and removable media. While this Analytic Story is not a comprehensive listing of all the methods by which attackers can exfiltrate data, it provides a useful starting point.
[analytic_story://Deobfuscate-Decode Files or Information]
category = Adversary Tactics
last_updated = 2021-03-24
version = 1
references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - CertUtil With Decode Argument - Rule"]
description = Adversaries may use Obfuscated Files or Information to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis.
narrative = An example of obfuscated files is `Certutil.exe` usage to encode a portable executable to a certificate file, which is base64 encoded, to hide the originating file. There are many utilities cross-platform to encode using XOR, using compressed .cab files to hide contents and scripting languages that may perform similar native Windows tasks. Triaging an event related will require the capability to review related process events and file modifications. Using a tool such as CyberChef will assist with identifying the encoding that was used, and potentially assist with decoding the contents.
[analytic_story://Detect Zerologon Attack]
category = Adversary Tactics
last_updated = 2020-09-18
@@ -334,7 +367,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1003", "https://github.com/SecuraBV/CVE-2020-1472", "https://www.secura.com/blog/zero-logon", "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-1472"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Jose Hernandez, Stan Miskowicz, David Dorsey, Shannon Davis Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Computer Changed with Anonymous Account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Zerologon via Zeek - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Zerologon via Zeek - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Computer Changed with Anonymous Account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Uncover activity related to the execution of Zerologon CVE-2020-11472, a technique wherein attackers target a Microsoft Windows Domain Controller to reset its computer account password. The result from this attack is attackers can now provide themselves high privileges and take over Domain Controller. The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify attempts to reset Domain Controller Computer Account via exploit code remotely or via the use of tool Mimikatz as payload carrier.
narrative = This attack is a privilege escalation technique, where attacker targets a Netlogon secure channel connection to a domain controller, using Netlogon Remote Protocol (MS-NRPC). This vulnerability exposes vulnerable Windows Domain Controllers to be targeted via unaunthenticated RPC calls which eventually reset Domain Contoller computer account ($) providing the attacker the opportunity to exfil domain controller credential secrets and assign themselve high privileges that can lead to domain controller and potentially complete network takeover. The detection searches in this Analytic Story use Windows Event viewer events and Sysmon events to detect attack execution, these searches monitor access to the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process which is an indicator of the use of Mimikatz tool which has bee updated to carry this attack payload.
@@ -345,7 +378,7 @@ version = 2
references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1089", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2015/11/vonteera-adware-uses-certificates-to-disable-anti-malware/", "https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Tools-Report.pdf"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Unload Sysmon Filter Driver - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule", "ESCU - Unload Sysmon Filter Driver - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Looks for activities and techniques associated with the disabling of security tools on a Windows system, such as suspicious `reg.exe` processes, processes launching netsh, and many others.
narrative = Attackers employ a variety of tactics in order to avoid detection and operate without barriers. This often involves modifying the configuration of security tools to get around them or explicitly disabling them to prevent them from running. This Analytic Story includes searches that look for activity consistent with attackers attempting to disable various security mechanisms. Such activity may involve monitoring for suspicious registry activity, as this is where much of the configuration for Windows and various other programs reside, or explicitly attempting to shut down security-related services. Other times, attackers attempt various tricks to prevent specific programs from running, such as adding the certificates with which the security tools are signed to a block list (which would prevent them from running).
@@ -356,7 +389,7 @@ version = 2
references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/", "http://www.noip.com/blog/2014/07/11/dynamic-dns-can-use-2/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/08/04/detecting-dynamic-dns-domains-in-splunk.html"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Detect and investigate hosts in your environment that may be communicating with dynamic domain providers. Attackers may leverage these services to help them avoid firewall blocks and deny lists.
narrative = Dynamic DNS services (DDNS) are legitimate low-cost or free services that allow users to rapidly update domain resolutions to IP infrastructure. While their usage can be benign, malicious actors can abuse DDNS to host harmful payloads or interactive-command-and-control infrastructure. These attackers will manually update or automate domain resolution changes by routing dynamic domains to IP addresses that circumvent firewall blocks and deny lists and frustrate a network defender's analytic and investigative processes. These searches will look for DNS queries made from within your infrastructure to suspicious dynamic domains and then investigate more deeply, when appropriate. While this list of top-level dynamic domains is not exhaustive, it can be dynamically updated as new suspicious dynamic domains are identified.
@@ -367,7 +400,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-201A", "https://www.first.org/resources/papers/conf2017/Advanced-Incident-Detection-and-Threat-Hunting-using-Sysmon-and-Splunk.pdf", "https://www.vkremez.com/2017/05/emotet-banking-trojan-malware-analysis.html"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of tools built by NirSoft - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of tools built by NirSoft - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Detect rarely used executables, specific registry paths that may confer malware survivability and persistence, instances where cmd.exe is used to launch script interpreters, and other indicators that the Emotet financial malware has compromised your environment.
narrative = The trojan downloader known as Emotet first surfaced in 2014, when it was discovered targeting the banking industry to steal credentials. However, according to a joint technical alert (TA) issued by three government agencies (https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-201A), Emotet has evolved far beyond those beginnings to become what a ThreatPost article called a threat-delivery service(see https://threatpost.com/emotet-malware-evolves-beyond-banking-to-threat-delivery-service/134342/). For example, in early 2018, Emotet was found to be using its loader function to spread the Quakbot and Ransomware variants. \
According to the TA, the the malware continues to be among the most costly and destructive malware affecting the private and public sectors. Researchers have linked it to the threat group Mealybug, which has also been on the security communitys radar since 2014.\
@@ -391,7 +424,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/understanding-service-accounts"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - GCP Detect accounts with high risk roles by project - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Detect high risk permissions by resource and account - Rule", "ESCU - gcp detect oauth token abuse - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Detect gcploit framework - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - gcp detect oauth token abuse - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Detect accounts with high risk roles by project - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Detect gcploit framework - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Detect high risk permissions by resource and account - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Track when a user assumes an IAM role in another GCP account to obtain cross-account access to services and resources in that account. Accessing new roles could be an indication of malicious activity.
narrative = Google Cloud Platform (GCP) admins manage access to GCP resources and services across the enterprise using GCP Identity and Access Management (IAM) functionality. IAM provides the ability to create and manage GCP users, groups, and roles-each with their own unique set of privileges and defined access to specific resources (such as Compute instances, the GCP Management Console, API, or the command-line interface). Unlike conventional (human) users, IAM roles are potentially assumable by anyone in the organization. They provide users with dynamically created temporary security credentials that expire within a set time period.\
In between the time between when the temporary credentials are issued and when they expire is a period of opportunity, where a user could leverage the temporary credentials to wreak havoc-spin up or remove instances, create new users, elevate privileges, and other malicious activities-throughout the environment.\
@@ -404,7 +437,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/detecting-hafnium-exchange-server-zero-day-activity-in-splunk.html", "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/03/02/active-exploitation-of-microsoft-exchange-zero-day-vulnerabilities/", "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/", "https://blog.rapid7.com/2021/03/03/rapid7s-insightidr-enables-detection-and-response-to-microsoft-exchange-0-day/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Exchange Web Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Ntdsutil Export NTDS - Rule", "ESCU - Unified Messaging Service Spawning a Process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule", "ESCU - Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts - Rule", "ESCU - Nishang PowershellTCPOneLine - Rule", "ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - W3WP Spawning Shell - Rule"]
searches = ["ESCU - Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Exchange Web Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - W3WP Spawning Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Nishang PowershellTCPOneLine - Rule", "ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule", "ESCU - Unified Messaging Service Spawning a Process - Rule", "ESCU - Ntdsutil Export NTDS - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule"]
description = HAFNIUM group was identified by Microsoft as exploiting 4 Microsoft Exchange CVEs in the wild - CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858 and CVE-2021-27065.
narrative = On Tuesday, March 2, 2021, Microsoft released a set of security patches for its mail server, Microsoft Exchange. These patches respond to a group of vulnerabilities known to impact Exchange 2013, 2016, and 2019. It is important to note that an Exchange 2010 security update has also been issued, though the CVEs do not reference that version as being vulnerable.\
While the CVEs do not shed much light on the specifics of the vulnerabilities or exploits, the first vulnerability (CVE-2021-26855) has a remote network attack vector that allows the attacker, a group Microsoft named HAFNIUM, to authenticate as the Exchange server. Three additional vulnerabilities (CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, and CVE-2021-27065) were also identified as part of this activity. When chained together along with CVE-2021-26855 for initial access, the attacker would have complete control over the Exchange server. This includes the ability to run code as SYSTEM and write to any path on the server.\
@@ -417,7 +450,7 @@ version = 2
references = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/HIDDEN-COBRA-North-Korean-Malicious-Cyber-Activity", "https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Destructive-Malware-Report.pdf"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious File Write - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Outbound Emails to Hidden Cobra Threat Actors - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious File Write - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Outbound Emails to Hidden Cobra Threat Actors - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Monitor for and investigate activities, including the creation or deletion of hidden shares and file writes, that may be evidence of infiltration by North Korean government-sponsored cybercriminals. Details of this activity were reported in DHS Report TA-18-149A.
narrative = North Korea's government-sponsored "cyber army" has been slowly building momentum and gaining sophistication over the last 15 years or so. As a result, the group's activity, which the US government refers to as "Hidden Cobra," has surreptitiously crept onto the collective radar as a preeminent global threat.\
These state-sponsored actors are thought to be responsible for everything from a hack on a South Korean nuclear plant to an attack on Sony in anticipation of its release of the movie "The Interview" at the end of 2014. They're also notorious for cyberespionage. In recent years, the group seems to be focused on financial crimes, such as cryptojacking.\
@@ -431,10 +464,21 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2016/09/hosts-file-hijacks/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Windows hosts file modification - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Windows hosts file modification - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Detect evidence of tactics used to redirect traffic from a host to a destination other than the one intended--potentially one that is part of an adversary's attack infrastructure. An example is redirecting communications regarding patches and updates or misleading users into visiting a malicious website.
narrative = Attackers will often attempt to manipulate client communications for nefarious purposes. In some cases, an attacker may endeavor to modify a local host file to redirect communications with resources (such as antivirus or system-update services) to prevent clients from receiving patches or updates. In other cases, an attacker might use this tactic to have the client connect to a site that looks like the intended site, but instead installs malware or collects information from the victim. Additionally, an attacker may redirect a victim in order to execute a MITM attack and observe communications.
[analytic_story://Ingress Tool Transfer]
category = Adversary Tactics
last_updated = 2021-03-24
version = 1
references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Curl Network Connection - Rule", "ESCU - CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - CertUtil Download With VerifyCtl and Split Arguments - Rule"]
description = Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Files may be copied from an external adversary controlled system through the command and control channel to bring tools into the victim network or through alternate protocols with another tool such as FTP.
narrative = Ingress tool transfer is a Technique under tactic Command and Control. Behaviors will include the use of living off the land binaries to download implants or binaries over alternate communication ports. It is imperative to baseline applications on endpoints to understand what generates network activity, to where, and what is its native behavior. These utilities, when abused, will write files to disk in world writeable paths.\ During triage, review the reputation of the remote public destination IP or domain. Capture any files written to disk and perform analysis. Review other parrallel processes for additional behaviors.
[analytic_story://JBoss Vulnerability]
category = Vulnerability
last_updated = 2017-09-14
@@ -467,7 +511,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://github.com/splunk/cloud-datamodel-security-research"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task"]
description = This story addresses detection against Kubernetes cluster fingerprint scan and attack by providing information on items such as source ip, user agent, cluster names.
narrative = Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration platform contains sensitve information and management priviledges of production workloads, microservices and applications. These searches allow operator to detect suspicious unauthenticated requests from the internet to kubernetes cluster.
@@ -478,7 +522,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/approaching-kubernetes-security-detecting-kubernetes-scan-with-splunk.html"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = This story addresses detection and response of accounts acccesing Kubernetes cluster sensitive objects such as configmaps or secrets providing information on items such as user user, group. object, namespace and authorization reason.
narrative = Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration platform contains sensitive objects within its architecture, specifically configmaps and secrets, if accessed by an attacker can lead to further compromise. These searches allow operator to detect suspicious requests against Kubernetes sensitive objects.
@@ -489,7 +533,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/approaching-kubernetes-security-detecting-kubernetes-scan-with-splunk.html"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect RBAC authorizations by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect most active service accounts by pod namespace - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect most active service accounts by pod namespace - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect RBAC authorizations by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = This story addresses detection and response around Sensitive Role usage within a Kubernetes clusters against cluster resources and namespaces.
narrative = Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration platform contains sensitive roles within its architecture, specifically configmaps and secrets, if accessed by an attacker can lead to further compromise. These searches allow operator to detect suspicious requests against Kubernetes role activities
@@ -500,7 +544,7 @@ version = 2
references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/executive-perspective/2015/08/malware_lateral_move.html"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures around how attackers move laterally within the enterprise. Because lateral movement can expose the adversary to detection, it should be an important focus for security analysts.
narrative = Once attackers gain a foothold within an enterprise, they will seek to expand their accesses and leverage techniques that facilitate lateral movement. Attackers will often spend quite a bit of time and effort moving laterally. Because lateral movement renders an attacker the most vulnerable to detection, it's an excellent focus for detection and investigation.\
Indications of lateral movement can include the abuse of system utilities (such as `psexec.exe`), unauthorized use of remote desktop services, `file/admin$` shares, WMI, PowerShell, pass-the-hash, or the abuse of scheduled tasks. Organizations must be extra vigilant in detecting lateral movement techniques and look for suspicious activity in and around high-value strategic network assets, such as Active Directory, which are often considered the primary target or "crown jewels" to a persistent threat actor.\
@@ -515,7 +559,7 @@ version = 4
references = ["https://blogs.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/malware-employs-powershell-to-infect-systems/", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Multiple Suspicious Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadFile - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques - Rule", "ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Multiple Suspicious Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques - Rule", "ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadFile - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Attackers are finding stealthy ways "live off the land," leveraging utilities and tools that come standard on the endpoint--such as PowerShell--to achieve their goals without downloading binary files. These searches can help you detect and investigate PowerShell command-line options that may be indicative of malicious intent.
narrative = The searches in this Analytic Story monitor for parameters often used for malicious purposes. It is helpful to understand how often the notable events generated by this story occur, as well as the commonalities between some of these events. These factors may provide clues about whether this is a common occurrence of minimal concern or a rare event that may require more extensive investigation. Likewise, it is important to determine whether the issue is restricted to a single user/system or is broader in scope.\
The following factors may assist you in determining whether the event is malicious: \
@@ -535,7 +579,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/03/04/tracking-locky-ransomware-using-carbon-black/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Extended Period Without Successful Netbackup Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Unsuccessful Netbackup backups - Rule", "ESCU - All backup logs for host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Unsuccessful Netbackup backups - Rule", "ESCU - Extended Period Without Successful Netbackup Backups - Rule", "ESCU - All backup logs for host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Address common concerns when monitoring your backup processes. These searches can help you reduce risks from ransomware, device theft, or denial of physical access to a host by backing up data on endpoints.
narrative = Having backups is a standard best practice that helps ensure continuity of business operations. Having mature backup processes can also help you reduce the risks of many security-related incidents and streamline your response processes. The detection searches in this Analytic Story will help you identify systems that have backup failures, as well as systems that have not been backed up for an extended period of time. The story will also return the notable event history and all of the backup logs for an endpoint.
@@ -571,7 +615,7 @@ version = 2
references = ["https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/04/goldmax-goldfinder-sibot-analyzing-nobelium-malware/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor.html", "https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Patrick Bareiss"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Supernova Webshell - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Sunburst Correlation DLL and Network Event - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AdFind Exe - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule"]
searches = ["ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Supernova Webshell - Rule", "ESCU - Sunburst Correlation DLL and Network Event - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AdFind Exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule"]
description = Sunburst is a trojanized updates to SolarWinds Orion IT monitoring and management software. It was discovered by FireEye in December 2020. The actors behind this campaign gained access to numerous public and private organizations around the world.
narrative = This Analytic Story supports you to detect Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) of the NOBELIUM Group. The threat actor behind sunburst compromised the SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll, is a SolarWinds digitally-signed component of the Orion software framework that contains a backdoor that communicates via HTTP to third party servers. The detections in this Analytic Story are focusing on the dll loading events, file create events and network events to detect This malware.
@@ -582,7 +626,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/tn-archive/bb490939(v=technet.10)", "https://htmlpreview.github.io/?https://github.com/MatthewDemaske/blogbackup/blob/master/netshell.html", "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Processes created by netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Processes created by netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Detect activities and various techniques associated with the abuse of `netsh.exe`, which can disable local firewall settings or set up a remote connection to a host from an infected system.
narrative = It is a common practice for attackers of all types to leverage native Windows tools and functionality to execute commands for malicious reasons. One such tool on Windows OS is `netsh.exe`,a command-line scripting utility that allows you to--either locally or remotely--display or modify the network configuration of a computer that is currently running. `Netsh.exe` can be used to discover and disable local firewall settings. It can also be used to set up a remote connection to a host from an infected system.\
To get started, run the detection search to identify parent processes of `netsh.exe`.
@@ -594,7 +638,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://i.blackhat.com/USA-20/Thursday/us-20-Bienstock-My-Cloud-Is-APTs-Cloud-Investigating-And-Defending-Office-365.pdf"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Patrick Bareiss"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - O365 Suspicious Rights Delegation - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Disable MFA - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Excessive SSO logon errors - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding - Rule", "ESCU - O365 PST export alert - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Added Service Principal - Rule", "ESCU - O365 New Federated Domain Added - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User - Rule", "ESCU - High Number of Login Failures from a single source - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Bypass MFA via Trusted IP - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Excessive Authentication Failures Alert - Rule"]
searches = ["ESCU - O365 PST export alert - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Bypass MFA via Trusted IP - Rule", "ESCU - O365 New Federated Domain Added - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Excessive SSO logon errors - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Disable MFA - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious Rights Delegation - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Added Service Principal - Rule", "ESCU - High Number of Login Failures from a single source - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Excessive Authentication Failures Alert - Rule"]
description = This story is focused around detecting Office 365 Attacks.
narrative = More and more companies are using Microsofts Office 365 cloud offering. Therefore, we see more and more attacks against Office 365. This story provides various detections for Office 365 attacks.
@@ -605,7 +649,7 @@ version = 2
references = ["https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/orangeworm-targets-healthcare-us-europe-asia", "https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/healthcare-targeted-by-hacker/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Detect activities and various techniques associated with the Orangeworm Attack Group, a group that frequently targets the healthcare industry.
narrative = In May of 2018, the attack group Orangeworm was implicated for installing a custom backdoor called Trojan.Kwampirs within large international healthcare corporations in the United States, Europe, and Asia. This malware provides the attackers with remote access to the target system, decrypting and extracting a copy of its main DLL payload from its resource section. Before writing the payload to disk, it inserts a randomly generated string into the middle of the decrypted payload in an attempt to evade hash-based detections.\
Awareness of the Orangeworm group first surfaced in January, 2015. It has conducted targeted attacks against related industries, as well, such as pharmaceuticals and healthcare IT solution providers.\
@@ -619,7 +663,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/spear-phishing-campaign-targets-ukraine-government.html"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Splunk Research Team"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Oulook exe writing a zip file - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Oulook exe writing a zip file - Rule", "ESCU - Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
description = Detect signs of malicious payloads that may indicate that your environment has been breached via a phishing attack.
narrative = Despite its simplicity, phishing remains the most pervasive and dangerous cyberthreat. In fact, research shows that as many as [91% of all successful attacks](https://digitalguardian.com/blog/91-percent-cyber-attacks-start-phishing-email-heres-how-protect-against-phishing) are initiated via a phishing email. \
As most people know, these emails use fraudulent domains, [email scraping](https://www.cyberscoop.com/emotet-trojan-phishing-scraping-templates-cofense-geodo/), familiar contact names inserted as senders, and other tactics to lure targets into clicking a malicious link, opening an attachment with a [nefarious payload](https://www.cyberscoop.com/emotet-trojan-phishing-scraping-templates-cofense-geodo/), or entering sensitive personal information that perpetrators may intercept. This attack technique requires a relatively low level of skill and allows adversaries to easily cast a wide net. Worse, because its success relies on the gullibility of humans, it's impossible to completely "automate" it out of your environment. However, you can use ES and ESCU to detect and investigate potentially malicious payloads injected into your environment subsequent to a phishing attack. \
@@ -637,7 +681,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/scope-of-mudcarp-attacks-highlight-1/", "http://blog.amossys.fr/badflick-is-not-so-bad.html"]
maintainers = [{"company": "iDefense", "email": "-", "name": "iDefense Cyber Espionage Team"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Monitor your environment for suspicious behaviors that resemble the techniques employed by the MUDCARP threat group.
narrative = This story was created as a joint effort between iDefense and Splunk.\
iDefense analysts have recently discovered a Windows executable file that, upon execution, spoofs a decryption tool and then drops a file that appears to be the custom-built javascript backdoor, "Orz," which is associated with the threat actors known as MUDCARP (as well as "temp.Periscope" and "Leviathan"). The file is executed using Wscript.\
@@ -675,7 +719,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["http://www.novetta.com/2015/02/advanced-methods-to-detect-advanced-cyber-attacks-protocol-abuse/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Detect instances of prohibited network traffic allowed in the environment, as well as protocols running on non-standard ports. Both of these types of behaviors typically violate policy and can be leveraged by attackers.
narrative = A traditional security best practice is to control the ports, protocols, and services allowed within your environment. By limiting the services and protocols to those explicitly approved by policy, administrators can minimize the attack surface. The combined effect allows both network defenders and security controls to focus and not be mired in superfluous traffic or data types. Looking for deviations to policy can identify attacker activity that abuses services and protocols to run on alternate or non-standard ports in the attempt to avoid detection or frustrate forensic analysts.
@@ -686,7 +730,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://www.carbonblack.com/2017/06/28/carbon-black-threat-research-technical-analysis-petya-notpetya-ransomware/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2017/06/27/closing-the-detection-to-mitigation-gap-or-to-petya-or-notpetya-whocares-.html"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task"]
description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to ransomware--spikes in SMB traffic, suspicious wevtutil usage, the presence of common ransomware extensions, and system processes run from unexpected locations, and many others.
narrative = Ransomware is an ever-present risk to the enterprise, wherein an infected host encrypts business-critical data, holding it hostage until the victim pays the attacker a ransom. There are many types and varieties of ransomware that can affect an enterprise. Attackers can deploy ransomware to enterprises through spearphishing campaigns and driveby downloads, as well as through traditional remote service-based exploitation. In the case of the WannaCry campaign, there was self-propagating wormable functionality that was used to maximize infection. Fortunately, organizations can apply several techniques--such as those in this Analytic Story--to detect and or mitigate the effects of ransomware.
@@ -708,7 +752,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/executive-perspective/2015/09/the_new_route_toper.html", "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/about/security-center/event-response/synful-knock.html"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Port Security Violation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect IPv6 Network Infrastructure Threats - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Login Attempts to Routers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rogue DHCP Server - Rule", "ESCU - Detect ARP Poisoning - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Traffic Mirroring - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Software Download To Network Device - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Detect IPv6 Network Infrastructure Threats - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Traffic Mirroring - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Software Download To Network Device - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rogue DHCP Server - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Port Security Violation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect ARP Poisoning - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Login Attempts to Routers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Validate the security configuration of network infrastructure and verify that only authorized users and systems are accessing critical assets. Core routing and switching infrastructure are common strategic targets for attackers.
narrative = Networking devices, such as routers and switches, are often overlooked as resources that attackers will leverage to subvert an enterprise. Advanced threats actors have shown a proclivity to target these critical assets as a means to siphon and redirect network traffic, flash backdoored operating systems, and implement cryptographic weakened algorithms to more easily decrypt network traffic.\
This Analytic Story helps you gain a better understanding of how your network devices are interacting with your hosts. By compromising your network devices, attackers can obtain direct access to the company's internal infrastructure&#151; effectively increasing the attack surface and accessing private services/data.
@@ -720,7 +764,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/detecting-ryuk-using-splunk-attack-range.html", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/big-game-hunting-with-ryuk-another-lucrative-targeted-ransomware/", "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-302a"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Jose Hernandez"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Windows connhost exe started forcefully - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Ryuk Test Files Detected - Rule", "ESCU - Ryuk Wake on LAN Command - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Security Account Manager Stopped - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Ryuk Test Files Detected - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Ryuk Wake on LAN Command - Rule", "ESCU - Windows connhost exe started forcefully - Rule", "ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", "ESCU - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Security Account Manager Stopped - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the Ryuk ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with Ryuk, Stopping Security Access Manager, DisableAntiSpyware registry key modification, suspicious psexec use, and more.
narrative = Cybersecurity Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) released Alert (AA20-302A) on October 28th called “Ransomware Activity Targeting the Healthcare and Public Health Sector.” This alert details TTPs associated with ongoing and possible imminent attacks against the Healthcare sector, and is a joint advisory in coordination with other U.S. Government agencies. The objective of these malicious campaigns is to infiltrate targets in named sectors and to drop ransomware payloads, which will likely cause disruption of service and increase risk of actual harm to the health and safety of patients at hospitals, even with the aggravant of an ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. This document specifically refers to several crimeware exploitation frameworks, emphasizing the use of Ryuk ransomware as payload. The Ryuk ransomware payload is not new. It has been well documented and identified in multiple variants. Payloads need a carrier, and for Ryuk it has often been exploitation frameworks such as Cobalt Strike, or popular crimeware frameworks such as Emotet or Trickbot.
@@ -743,7 +787,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/an-in-depth-analysis-of-samsam-ransomware-and-boss-spider/", "https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2018/07/31/samsam-the-almost-6-million-ransomware/", "https://thehackernews.com/2018/07/samsam-ransomware-attacks.html"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Samsam Test File Write - Rule", "ESCU - Batch File Write to System32 - Rule", "ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - File with Samsam Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - File with Samsam Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Samsam Test File Write - Rule", "ESCU - Batch File Write to System32 - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task"]
description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the SamSam ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with SamSam, RDP brute force attacks, the presence of files with SamSam ransomware extensions, suspicious psexec use, and more.
narrative = The first version of the SamSam ransomware (a.k.a. Samas or SamsamCrypt) was launched in 2015 by a group of Iranian threat actors. The malicious software has affected and continues to affect thousands of victims and has raised almost $6M in ransom.\
Although categorized under the heading of ransomware, SamSam campaigns have some importance distinguishing characteristics. Most notable is the fact that conventional ransomware is a numbers game. Perpetrators use a "spray-and-pray" approach with phishing campaigns or other mechanisms, charging a small ransom (typically under $1,000). The goal is to find a large number of victims willing to pay these mini-ransoms, adding up to a lucrative payday. They use relatively simple methods for infecting systems.\
@@ -759,7 +803,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://redcanary.com/blog/clipping-silver-sparrows-wings/", "https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/5-things-you-need-to-know-about-silver-sparrow/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Curl Network Connection - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage via OSquery - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious SQLite3 LSQuarantine Behavior - Rule"]
searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Curl Network Connection - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious SQLite3 LSQuarantine Behavior - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage via OSquery - Rule"]
description = Silver Sparrow, identified by Red Canary Intelligence, is a new forward looking MacOS (Intel and M1) malicious software downloader utilizing JavaScript for execution and a launchAgent to establish persistence.
narrative = Silver Sparrow works is a dropper and uses typical persistence mechanisms on a Mac. It is cross platform, covering both Intel and Apple M1 architecture. To this date, no implant has been downloaded for malicious purposes. During installation of the update.pkg or updater.pkg file, the malicious software utilizes JavaScript to generate files and scripts on disk for persistence.These files later download a implant from an S3 bucket every hour. This analytic assists with identifying different types of macOS malware families establishing LaunchAgent persistence. Per SentinelOne source, it is predicted that Silver Sparrow is likely selling itself as a mechanism to 3rd party “affiliates” or pay-per-install (PPI) partners, typically seen as commodity adware/malware. Additional indicators and behaviors may be found within the references.
@@ -815,7 +859,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS EC2 instances for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as EC2 instances that originate from unusual locations or those launched by previously unseen users (among others). Included investigative searches will help you probe more deeply, when the information warrants it.
narrative = AWS CloudTrail is an AWS service that helps you enable governance, compliance, and risk auditing within your AWS account. Actions taken by a user, role, or an AWS service are recorded as events in CloudTrail. It is crucial for a company to monitor events and actions taken in the AWS Console, AWS command-line interface, and AWS SDKs and APIs to ensure that your EC2 instances are not vulnerable to attacks. This Analytic Story identifies suspicious activities in your AWS EC2 instances and helps you respond and investigate those activities.
@@ -826,7 +870,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integration.html"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new user AWS Console Login - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Detect new user AWS Console Login - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
description = Monitor your AWS authentication events using your CloudTrail logs. Searches within this Analytic Story will help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious logins.
narrative = It is important to monitor and control who has access to your AWS infrastructure. Detecting suspicious logins to your AWS infrastructure will provide good starting points for investigations. Abusive behaviors caused by compromised credentials can lead to direct monetary costs, as you will be billed for any EC2 instances created by the attacker.
@@ -837,7 +881,7 @@ version = 2
references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/security-data-protection/cloud/public-aws-s3-buckets-writable/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI - Rule", "ESCU - Detect S3 access from a new IP - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Open S3 buckets - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Detect S3 access from a new IP - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Open S3 buckets - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS S3 buckets for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as detecting open S3 buckets and buckets being accessed from a new IP. The contextual and investigative searches will give you more information, when required.
narrative = As cloud computing has exploded, so has the number of creative attacks on virtual environments. And as the number-two cloud-service provider, Amazon Web Services (AWS) has certainly had its share.\
Amazon's "shared responsibility" model dictates that the company has responsibility for the environment outside of the VM and the customer is responsible for the security inside of the S3 container. As such, it's important to stay vigilant for activities that may belie suspicious behavior inside of your environment.\
@@ -850,7 +894,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/hiding-cloudcobalt-strike-beacon-c2-using-amazon-apis/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task"]
description = Leverage these searches to monitor your AWS network traffic for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as a spike in blocked outbound traffic in your virtual private cloud (VPC).
narrative = A virtual private cloud (VPC) is an on-demand managed cloud-computing service that isolates computing resources for each client. Inside the VPC container, the environment resembles a physical network. \
Amazon's VPC service enables you to launch EC2 instances and leverage other Amazon resources. The traffic that flows in and out of this VPC can be controlled via network access-control rules and security groups. Amazon also has a feature called VPC Flow Logs that enables you to log IP traffic going to and from the network interfaces in your VPC. This data is stored using Amazon CloudWatch Logs.\
@@ -864,7 +908,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-cloudtrail-now-tracks-cross-account-activity-to-its-origin/", "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integration.html"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by New User - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by New User - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Monitor your cloud authentication events. Searches within this Analytic Story leverage the recent cloud updates to the Authentication data model to help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious login activity.
narrative = It is important to monitor and control who has access to your cloud infrastructure. Detecting suspicious logins will provide good starting points for investigations. Abusive behaviors caused by compromised credentials can lead to direct monetary costs, as you will be billed for any compute activity whether legitimate or otherwise.\
This Analytic Story has data model versions of cloud searches leveraging Authentication data, including those looking for suspicious login activity, and cross-account activity for AWS.
@@ -876,7 +920,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task"]
description = Monitor your cloud infrastructure provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your cloud environment.
narrative = Monitoring your cloud infrastructure logs allows you enable governance, compliance, and risk auditing. It is crucial for a company to monitor events and actions taken in the their cloud environments to ensure that your instances are not vulnerable to attacks. This Analytic Story identifies suspicious activities in your cloud compute instances and helps you respond and investigate those activities.
@@ -887,7 +931,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Monitor your cloud infrastructure provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your cloud environment.
narrative = Because most enterprise cloud infrastructure activities originate from familiar geographic locations, monitoring for activity from unknown or unusual regions is an important security measure. This indicator can be especially useful in environments where it is impossible to add specific IPs to an allow list because they vary.\
This Analytic Story was designed to provide you with flexibility in the precision you employ in specifying legitimate geographic regions. It can be as specific as an IP address or a city, or as broad as a region (think state) or an entire country. By determining how precise you want your geographical locations to be and monitoring for new locations that haven't previously accessed your environment, you can detect adversaries as they begin to probe your environment. Since there are legitimate reasons for activities from unfamiliar locations, this is not a standalone indicator. Nevertheless, location can be a relevant piece of information that you may wish to investigate further.
@@ -911,7 +955,7 @@ version = 2
references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1059", "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/macro-malware", "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Leveraging the Windows command-line interface (CLI) is one of the most common attack techniques--one that is also detailed in the MITRE ATT&CK framework. Use this Analytic Story to help you identify unusual or suspicious use of the CLI on Windows systems.
narrative = The ability to execute arbitrary commands via the Windows CLI is a primary goal for the adversary. With access to the shell, an attacker can easily run scripts and interact with the target system. Often, attackers may only have limited access to the shell or may obtain access in unusual ways. In addition, malware may execute and interact with the CLI in ways that would be considered unusual and inconsistent with typical user activity. This provides defenders with opportunities to identify suspicious use and investigate, as appropriate. This Analytic Story contains various searches to help identify this suspicious activity, as well as others to aid you in deeper investigation.
@@ -922,7 +966,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["http://blogs.splunk.com/2015/10/01/random-words-on-entropy-and-dns/", "http://www.darkreading.com/analytics/security-monitoring/got-malware-three-signs-revealed-in-dns-traffic/d/d-id/1139680", "https://live.paloaltonetworks.com/t5/Threat-Vulnerability-Articles/What-are-suspicious-DNS-queries/ta-p/71454"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Attackers often attempt to hide within or otherwise abuse the domain name system (DNS). You can thwart attempts to manipulate this omnipresent protocol by monitoring for these types of abuses.
narrative = Although DNS is one of the fundamental underlying protocols that make the Internet work, it is often ignored (perhaps because of its complexity and effectiveness). However, attackers have discovered ways to abuse the protocol to meet their objectives. One potential abuse involves manipulating DNS to hijack traffic and redirect it to an IP address under the attacker's control. This could inadvertently send users intending to visit google.com, for example, to an unrelated malicious website. Another technique involves using the DNS protocol for command-and-control activities with the attacker's malicious code or to covertly exfiltrate data. The searches within this Analytic Story look for these types of abuses.
@@ -933,7 +977,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/06/26/phishing-hits-a-new-level-of-quality/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly - Rule", "ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task"]
description = Email remains one of the primary means for attackers to gain an initial foothold within the modern enterprise. Detect and investigate suspicious emails in your environment with the help of the searches in this Analytic Story.
narrative = It is a common practice for attackers of all types to leverage targeted spearphishing campaigns and mass mailers to deliver weaponized email messages and attachments. Fortunately, there are a number of ways to monitor email data in Splunk to detect suspicious content.\
Once a phishing message has been detected, the next steps are to answer the following questions: \
@@ -959,7 +1003,7 @@ version = 2
references = ["https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/", "https://redcanary.com/blog/windows-registry-attacks-threat-detection/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/005/", "https://medium.com/@mbromileyDFIR/malware-monday-aebb456356c5"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious mshta spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious mshta child process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect mshta renamed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Detect mshta inline hta execution - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Detect mshta renamed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious mshta spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious mshta child process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect mshta inline hta execution - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe process to execute malicious code.
narrative = One common adversary tactic is to bypass application control solutions via the mshta.exe process, which loads Microsoft HTML applications (mshtml.dll) with the .hta suffix. In these cases, attackers use the trusted Windows utility to proxy execution of malicious files, whether an .hta application, javascript, or VBScript.\
The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an attacker is leveraging mshta.exe to execute malicious code.\
@@ -982,7 +1026,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1078", "https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Credential_stuffing", "https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/answer/What-is-a-password-spraying-attack-and-how-does-it-work"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentials From The Same IP - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Account Lockout Events - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Failed SSO Attempts - Rule", "ESCU - Okta User Logins From Multiple Cities - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate User Activities In Okta - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by app - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Okta Account Lockout Events - Rule", "ESCU - Okta User Logins From Multiple Cities - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Failed SSO Attempts - Rule", "ESCU - Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentials From The Same IP - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by app - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate User Activities In Okta - Response Task"]
description = Monitor your Okta environment for suspicious activities. Due to the Covid outbreak, many users are migrating over to leverage cloud services more and more. Okta is a popular tool to manage multiple users and the web-based applications they need to stay productive. The searches in this story will help monitor your Okta environment for suspicious activities and associated user behaviors.
narrative = Okta is the leading single sign on (SSO) provider, allowing users to authenticate once to Okta, and from there access a variety of web-based applications. These applications are assigned to users and allow administrators to centrally manage which users are allowed to access which applications. It also provides centralized logging to help understand how the applications are used and by whom. \
While SSO is a major convenience for users, it also provides attackers with an opportunity. If the attacker can gain access to Okta, they can access a variety of applications. As such monitoring the environment is important. \
@@ -995,7 +1039,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.010/T1218.010.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvr32/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Regsvr32 Register Suspicious Path - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass - Rule"]
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Regsvr32 Register Suspicious Path - Rule"]
description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the regsvr32.exe process to execute malicious code.
narrative = One common adversary tactic is to bypass application control solutions via the regsvr32.exe process. This particular bypass was popularized with "SquiblyDoo" using the "scrobj.dll" dll to load .sct scriptlets. This technique is still widely used by adversaries to bypass detection and prevention controls. The file extension of the DLL is irrelevant (it may load a .txt file extension for example). The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an adversary is leveraging regsvr32.exe to execute malicious code. Validate execution Determine if regsvr32.exe executed. Validate the OriginalFileName of regsvr32.exe and further PE metadata. If executed outside of c:\windows\system32 or c:\windows\syswow64, it should be highly suspect. Determine if script code was executed with regsvr32. Situational Awareness - The objective of this step is meant to identify suspicious behavioral indicators related to executed of Script code by regsvr32.exe. Parent process. Is the parent process a known LOLBin? Is the parent process an Office Application? Module loads. Is regsvr32 loading any suspicious .DLLs? Unsigned or signed from non-standard paths. Network connections. Any network connections? Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain. Retrieval of Script Code - confirm the executed script code is benign or malicious.
@@ -1006,7 +1050,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 dllregisterserver - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 StartW - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - syssetup - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - advpack - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - setupapi - Rule"]
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - syssetup - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - advpack - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - setupapi - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 dllregisterserver - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 StartW - Rule"]
description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage rundll32.exe to execute arbitrary malicious code.
narrative = One common adversary tactic is to bypass application control solutions via the rundll32.exe process. Natively, rundll32.exe will load DLLs and is a great example of a Living off the Land Binary. Rundll32.exe may load malicious DLLs by ordinals, function names or directly. The queries in this story focus on loading default DLLs, syssetup.dll, ieadvpack.dll, advpack.dll and setupapi.dll from disk that may be abused by adversaries. Additionally, two analytics developed to assist with identifying DLLRegisterServer, Start and StartW functions being called. The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an adversary is leveraging rundll32.exe to execute malicious code.
@@ -1017,7 +1061,7 @@ version = 2
references = ["https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Graeber-Abusing-Windows-Management-Instrumentation-WMI-To-Build-A-Persistent%20Asynchronous-And-Fileless-Backdoor-wp.pdf", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/wmimplant_a_wmi_ba.html"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - WMI Temporary Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - Script Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon - Rule", "ESCU - Process Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Script Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Temporary Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon - Rule", "ESCU - Process Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Attackers are increasingly abusing Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI), a framework and associated utilities available on all modern Windows operating systems. Because WMI can be leveraged to manage both local and remote systems, it is important to identify the processes executed and the user context within which the activity occurred.
narrative = WMI is a Microsoft infrastructure for management data and operations on Windows operating systems. It includes of a set of utilities that can be leveraged to manage both local and remote Windows systems. Attackers are increasingly turning to WMI abuse in their efforts to conduct nefarious tasks, such as reconnaissance, detection of antivirus and virtual machines, code execution, lateral movement, persistence, and data exfiltration. \
The detection searches included in this Analytic Story are used to look for suspicious use of WMI commands that attackers may leverage to interact with remote systems. The searches specifically look for the use of WMI to run processes on remote systems.\
@@ -1030,7 +1074,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://redcanary.com/blog/windows-registry-attacks-threat-detection/", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1112"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Monitor and detect registry changes initiated from remote locations, which can be a sign that an attacker has infiltrated your system.
narrative = Attackers are developing increasingly sophisticated techniques for hijacking target servers, while evading detection. One such technique that has become progressively more common is registry modification.\
The registry is a key component of the Windows operating system. It has a hierarchical database called "registry" that contains settings, options, and values for executables. Once the threat actor gains access to a machine, they can use reg.exe to modify their account to obtain administrator-level privileges, maintain persistence, and move laterally within the environment.\
@@ -1043,7 +1087,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://blog.rapid7.com/2020/04/02/dispelling-zoom-bugbears-what-you-need-to-know-about-the-latest-zoom-vulnerabilities/", "https://threatpost.com/two-zoom-zero-day-flaws-uncovered/154337/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - First Time Seen Child Process of Zoom - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process File Activity - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Child Process of Zoom - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process File Activity - Response Task"]
description = Attackers are using Zoom as an vector to increase privileges on a sytems. This story detects new child processes of zoom and provides investigative actions for this detection.
narrative = Zoom is a leader in modern enterprise video communications and its usage has increased dramatically with a large amount of the population under stay-at-home orders due to the COVID-19 pandemic. With increased usage has come increased scrutiny and several security flaws have been found with this application on both Windows and macOS systems.\
Current detections focus on finding new child processes of this application on a per host basis. Investigative searches are included to gather information needed during an investigation.
@@ -1055,7 +1099,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218/T1218.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler usage - Rule"]
searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler usage - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule"]
description = Monitor and detect behaviors used by attackers who leverage trusted developer utilities to execute malicious code.
narrative = Adversaries may take advantage of trusted developer utilities to proxy execution of malicious payloads. There are many utilities used for software development related tasks that can be used to execute code in various forms to assist in development, debugging, and reverse engineering. These utilities may often be signed with legitimate certificates that allow them to execute on a system and proxy execution of malicious code through a trusted process that effectively bypasses application control solutions.\
The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an adversary is leveraging microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe to execute malicious code.
@@ -1067,7 +1111,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/001/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1127.001/T1127.001.md", "https://github.com/infosecn1nja/MaliciousMacroMSBuild", "https://github.com/xorrior/RandomPS-Scripts/blob/master/Invoke-ExecuteMSBuild.ps1", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/", "https://github.com/MHaggis/CBR-Queries/blob/master/msbuild.md"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious msbuild path - Rule"]
searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious msbuild path - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Spawn - Rule"]
description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the msbuild.exe process to execute malicious code.
narrative = Adversaries may use MSBuild to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. MSBuild.exe (Microsoft Build Engine) is a software build platform used by Visual Studio and is native to Windows. It handles XML formatted project files that define requirements for loading and building various platforms and configurations.\
The inline task capability of MSBuild that was introduced in .NET version 4 allows for C# code to be inserted into an XML project file. MSBuild will compile and execute the inline task. MSBuild.exe is a signed Microsoft binary, so when it is used this way it can execute arbitrary code and bypass application control defenses that are configured to allow MSBuild.exe execution.\
@@ -1103,7 +1147,7 @@ version = 2
references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/08/monitoring-windows-console-activity-part-two.html", "https://www.splunk.com/pdfs/technical-briefs/advanced-threat-detection-and-response-tech-brief.pdf", "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/logging/detecting-security-incidents-windows-workstation-event-logs-34262"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Quickly identify systems running new or unusual processes in your environment that could be indicators of suspicious activity. Processes run from unusual locations, those with conspicuously long command lines, and rare executables are all examples of activities that may warrant deeper investigation.
narrative = Being able to profile a host's processes within your environment can help you more quickly identify processes that seem out of place when compared to the rest of the population of hosts or asset types.\
This Analytic Story lets you identify processes that are either a) not typically seen running or b) have some sort of suspicious command-line arguments associated with them. This Analytic Story will also help you identify the user running these processes and the associated process activity on the host.\
@@ -1127,7 +1171,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://www.fbi.gov/scams-and-safety/common-fraud-schemes/internet-fraud", "https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2017-internet-crime-report-released-050718"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Jim Apger"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Web Fraud - Password Sharing Across Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Account Harvesting - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Anomalous User Clickspeed - Rule", "ESCU - Get Web Session Information via session id - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Web Fraud - Account Harvesting - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Anomalous User Clickspeed - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Password Sharing Across Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Web Session Information via session id - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Monitor your environment for activity consistent with common attack techniques bad actors use when attempting to compromise web servers or other web-related assets.
narrative = The Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) defines Internet fraud as the use of Internet services or software with Internet access to defraud victims or to otherwise take advantage of them. According to the Bureau, Internet crime schemes are used to steal millions of dollars each year from victims and continue to plague the Internet through various methods. The agency includes phishing scams, data breaches, Denial of Service (DOS) attacks, email account compromise, malware, spoofing, and ransomware in this category.\
These crimes are not the fraud itself, but rather the attack techniques commonly employed by fraudsters in their pursuit of data that enables them to commit malicious actssuch as obtaining and using stolen credit cards. They represent a serious problem that is steadily increasing and not likely to go away anytime soon.\
@@ -1143,7 +1187,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://research.checkpoint.com/2020/resolving-your-way-into-domain-admin-exploiting-a-17-year-old-bug-in-windows-dns-servers/", "https://support.microsoft.com/en-au/help/4569509/windows-dns-server-remote-code-execution-vulnerability"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Shannon Davis"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Zeek - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Splunk Stream - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Splunk Stream - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Zeek - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Uncover activity consistent with CVE-2020-1350, or SIGRed. Discovered by Checkpoint researchers, this vulnerability affects Windows 2003 to 2019, and is triggered by a malicious DNS response (only affects DNS over TCP). An attacker can use the malicious payload to cause a buffer overflow on the vulnerable system, leading to compromise. The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify the large response payload for SIG and KEY DNS records which can be used for the exploit.
narrative = When a client requests a DNS record for a particular domain, that request gets routed first through the client's locally configured DNS server, then to any DNS server(s) configured as forwarders, and then onto the target domain's own DNS server(s). If a attacker wanted to, they could host a malicious DNS server that responds to the initial request with a specially crafted large response (~65KB). This response would flow through to the client's local DNS server, which if not patched for CVE-2020-1350, would cause the buffer overflow. The detection searches in this Analytic Story use wire data to detect the malicious behavior. Searches for Splunk Stream and Zeek are included. The Splunk Stream search correlates across stream:dns and stream:tcp, while the Zeek search correlates across bro:dns:json and bro:conn:json. These correlations are required to pick up both the DNS record types (SIG and KEY) along with the payload size (>65KB).
@@ -1154,7 +1198,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Defense_Evasion"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Eventvwr UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - FodHelper UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - FodHelper UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Eventvwr UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Detect tactics used by malware to evade defenses on Windows endpoints. A few of these include suspicious `reg.exe` processes, files hidden with `attrib.exe` and disabling user-account control, among many others
narrative = Defense evasion is a tactic--identified in the MITRE ATT&CK framework--that adversaries employ in a variety of ways to bypass or defeat defensive security measures. There are many techniques enumerated by the MITRE ATT&CK framework that are applicable in this context. This Analytic Story includes searches designed to identify the use of such techniques on Windows platforms.
@@ -1165,7 +1209,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2013/12/file-extensions-2/", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1042"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Execution of File with Multiple Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule", "ESCU - Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule", "ESCU - Execution of File with Multiple Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Detect and investigate suspected abuse of file extensions and Windows file associations. Some of the malicious behaviors involved may include inserting spaces before file extensions or prepending the file extension with a different one, among other techniques.
narrative = Attackers use a variety of techniques to entice users to run malicious code or to persist on an endpoint. One way to accomplish these goals is to leverage file extensions and the mechanism Windows uses to associate files with specific applications. \
Since its earliest days, Windows has used extensions to identify file types. Users have become familiar with these extensions and their application associations. For example, if users see that a file ends in `.doc` or `.docx`, they will assume that it is a Microsoft Word document and expect that double-clicking will open it using `winword.exe`. The user will typically also presume that the `.docx` file is safe. \
@@ -1180,7 +1224,7 @@ version = 2
references = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/", "https://zeltser.com/security-incident-log-review-checklist/", "http://journeyintoir.blogspot.com/2013/01/re-introducing-usnjrnl.html"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Adversaries often try to cover their tracks by manipulating Windows logs. Use these searches to help you monitor for suspicious activity surrounding log files--an essential component of an effective defense.
narrative = Because attackers often modify system logs to cover their tracks and/or to thwart the investigative process, log monitoring is an industry-recognized best practice. While there are legitimate reasons to manipulate system logs, it is still worthwhile to keep track of who manipulated the logs, when they manipulated them, and in what way they manipulated them (determining which accesses, tools, or utilities were employed). Even if no malicious activity is detected, the knowledge of an attempt to manipulate system logs may be indicative of a broader security risk that should be thoroughly investigated.\
The Analytic Story gives users two different ways to detect manipulation of Windows Event Logs and one way to detect deletion of the Update Sequence Number (USN) Change Journal. The story helps determine the history of the host and the users who have accessed it. Finally, the story aides in investigation by retrieving all the information on the process that caused these events (if the process has been identified).
@@ -1192,7 +1236,7 @@ version = 2
references = ["http://www.fuzzysecurity.com/tutorials/19.html", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2010/07/malware-persistence-windows-registry.html", "http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/common-malware-persistence-mechanisms/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/fin7-shim-databases-persistence.html", "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dq2Hv7J9fvk"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Certutil exe certificate extraction - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Certutil exe certificate extraction - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Monitor for activities and techniques associated with maintaining persistence on a Windows system--a sign that an adversary may have compromised your environment.
narrative = Maintaining persistence is one of the first steps taken by attackers after the initial compromise. Attackers leverage various custom and built-in tools to ensure survivability and persistent access within a compromised enterprise. This Analytic Story provides searches to help you identify various behaviors used by attackers to maintain persistent access to a Windows environment.
@@ -1203,7 +1247,7 @@ version = 2
references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Child Processes of Spoolsv exe - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Overwriting Accessibility Binaries - Rule", "ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - Child Processes of Spoolsv exe - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Overwriting Accessibility Binaries - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Monitor for and investigate activities that may be associated with a Windows privilege-escalation attack, including unusual processes running on endpoints, modified registry keys, and more.
narrative = Privilege escalation is a "land-and-expand" technique, wherein an adversary gains an initial foothold on a host and then exploits its weaknesses to increase his privileges. The motivation is simple: certain actions on a Windows machine--such as installing software--may require higher-level privileges than those the attacker initially acquired. By increasing his privilege level, the attacker can gain the control required to carry out his malicious ends. This Analytic Story provides searches to detect and investigate behaviors that attackers may use to elevate their privileges in your environment.
@@ -1214,7 +1258,7 @@ version = 3
references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1050", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1031"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
searches = ["ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Windows services are often used by attackers for persistence and the ability to load drivers or otherwise interact with the Windows kernel. This Analytic Story helps you monitor your environment for indications that Windows services are being modified or created in a suspicious manner.
narrative = The Windows operating system uses a services architecture to allow for running code in the background, similar to a UNIX daemon. Attackers will often leverage Windows services for persistence, hiding in plain sight, seeking the ability to run privileged code that can interact with the kernel. In many cases, attackers will create a new service to host their malicious code. Attackers have also been observed modifying unnecessary or unused services to point to their own code, as opposed to what was intended. In these cases, attackers often use tools to create or modify services in ways that are not typical for most environments, providing opportunities for detection.
@@ -1266,6 +1310,36 @@ known_false_positives = This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define "fals
This search will fire any time a new region is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your region, there should be few false positives. If you are located in regions where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you.
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Create Policy Version to allow all resources - Rule]
type = detection
asset_type = AWS Account
confidence = medium
explanation = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user created a policy version that allows them to access any resource in their account
how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudtrail logs.
annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]}
known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created a policy to allow a user to access all resources. That said, AWS strongly advises against granting full control to all AWS resources
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS CreateAccessKey - Rule]
type = detection
asset_type = AWS Account
confidence = medium
explanation = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user A who has already permission to create access keys, makes an API call to create access keys for another user B. Attackers have been know to use this technique for Privilege Escalation in case new victim(user B) has more permissions than old victim(user B)
how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudtrail logs.
annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136.003"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]}
known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created keys for another user.
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS CreateLoginProfile - Rule]
type = detection
asset_type = AWS Account
confidence = medium
explanation = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user A(victim A) creates a login profile for user B, followed by a AWS Console login event from user B from the same src_ip as user B. This correlated event can be indicative of privilege escalation since both events happened from the same src_ip
how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudtrail logs.
annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136.003"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]}
known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created a login profile for another user.
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account - Rule]
type = detection
asset_type = AWS Instance
@@ -1346,6 +1420,26 @@ annotations = {"mitre_attack": ["T1078"]}
known_false_positives = Updating a SAML provider or creating a new one may not necessarily be malicious however it needs to be closely monitored.
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS SetDefaultPolicyVersion - Rule]
type = detection
asset_type = AWS Account
confidence = medium
explanation = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user has set a default policy versions. Attackers have been know to use this technique for Privilege Escalation in case the previous versions of the policy had permissions to access more resources than the current version of the policy
how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudtrail logs.
annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]}
known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately set a default policy to allow a user to access all resources. That said, AWS strongly advises against granting full control to all AWS resources
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS UpdateLoginProfile - Rule]
type = detection
asset_type = AWS Account
confidence = medium
explanation = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user A who has already permission to update login profile, makes an API call to update login profile for another user B . Attackers have been know to use this technique for Privilege Escalation in case new victim(user B) has more permissions than old victim(user B)
how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudtrail logs.
annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136.003"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]}
known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created keys for another user.
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule]
type = detection
asset_type = AWS Instance
@@ -1480,7 +1574,7 @@ providing_technologies = []
type = detection
asset_type = Endpoint
confidence = medium
explanation = Attempt to add a certificate to the certificate store
explanation = Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store
how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model.
annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1553.004"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"]}
known_false_positives = There may be legitimate reasons for administrators to add a certificate to the untrusted certificate store. In such cases, this will typically be done on a large number of systems.
@@ -1536,6 +1630,36 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_att
known_false_positives = It is possible for this search to generate a notable event for a batch file write to a path that includes the string "system32", but is not the actual Windows system directory. As such, you should confirm the path of the batch file identified by the search. In addition, a false positive may be generated by an administrator copying a legitimate batch file in this directory tree. You should confirm that the activity is legitimate and modify the search to add exclusions, as necessary.
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments - Rule]
type = detection
asset_type =
confidence = medium
explanation = Certutil.exe may download a file from a remote destination using `-urlcache`. This behavior does require a URL to be passed on the command-line. In addition, `-f` (force) and `-split` (Split embedded ASN.1 elements, and save to files) will be used. It is not entirely common for `certutil.exe` to contact public IP space. However, it is uncommon for `certutil.exe` to write files to world writeable paths.\ During triage, capture any files on disk and review. Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain in question.
how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1105"]}
known_false_positives = Limited false positives in most environments, however tune as needed based on parent-child relationship or network connection.
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - CertUtil Download With VerifyCtl and Split Arguments - Rule]
type = detection
asset_type =
confidence = medium
explanation = Certutil.exe may download a file from a remote destination using `-VerifyCtl`. This behavior does require a URL to be passed on the command-line. In addition, `-f` (force) and `-split` (Split embedded ASN.1 elements, and save to files) will be used. It is not entirely common for `certutil.exe` to contact public IP space. \ During triage, capture any files on disk and review. Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain in question. Using `-VerifyCtl`, the file will either be written to the current working directory or `%APPDATA%\..\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\Content\<hash>`.
how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1105"]}
known_false_positives = Limited false positives in most environments, however tune as needed based on parent-child relationship or network connection.
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - CertUtil With Decode Argument - Rule]
type = detection
asset_type =
confidence = medium
explanation = CertUtil.exe may be used to `encode` and `decode` a file, including PE and script code. Encoding will convert a file to base64 with `-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----` and `-----END CERTIFICATE-----` tags. Malicious usage will include decoding a encoded file that was downloaded. Once decoded, it will be loaded by a parallel process. Note that there are two additional command switches that may be used - `encodehex` and `decodehex`. Similarly, the file will be encoded in HEX and later decoded for further execution. During triage, identify the source of the file being decoded. Review its contents or execution behavior for further analysis.
how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1140"]}
known_false_positives = Typically seen used to `encode` files, but it is possible to see legitimate use of `decode`. Filter based on parent-child relationship, file paths, endpoint or user.
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - Certutil exe certificate extraction - Rule]
type = detection
asset_type = Endpoint
@@ -1568,6 +1692,26 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 9", "CIS 12", "CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Co
known_false_positives = It's possible that an enterprise has more than five DNS servers that are configured in a round-robin rotation. Please customize the search, as appropriate.
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - Clop Common Exec Parameter - Rule]
type = detection
asset_type =
confidence = medium
explanation = The following analytics are designed to identifies some CLOP ransomware variant that using arguments to execute its main code or feature of its code. In this variant if the parameter is "runrun", CLOP ransomware will try to encrypt files in network shares and if it is "temp.dat", it will try to read from some stream pipe or file start encrypting files within the infected local machines. This technique can be also identified as an anti-sandbox technique to make its code non-responsive since it is waiting for some parameter to execute properly.
how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.
annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Obfuscation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204"]}
known_false_positives = Operators can execute third party tools using these parameters.
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - Clop Ransomware Known Service Name - Rule]
type = detection
asset_type =
confidence = medium
explanation = This detection is to identify the common service name created by the CLOP ransomware as part of its persistence and high privilege code execution in the infected machine. Ussually CLOP ransomware use StartServiceCtrlDispatcherW API in creating this service entry.
how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Service name, Service File Name Service Start type, and Service Type from your endpoints.
annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543"]}
known_false_positives = unknown
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles - Rule]
type = detection
asset_type = AWS Instance
@@ -1727,6 +1871,16 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on O
known_false_positives = Other tools can access LSASS for legitimate reasons and generate an event. In these cases, tweaking the search may help eliminate noise.
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - Create Service In Suspicious File Path - Rule]
type = detection
asset_type =
confidence = medium
explanation = This detection is to identify a creation of "user mode service" where the service file path is located in non-common service folder in windows.
how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Service name, Service File Name Service Start type, and Service Type from your endpoints.
annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1569.001, T1569.002"]}
known_false_positives = unknown
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - Create local admin accounts using net exe - Rule]
type = detection
asset_type = Endpoint
@@ -2041,7 +2195,7 @@ providing_technologies = []
type = detection
asset_type =
confidence = medium
explanation = The following query identifies suspicious .aspx created in 3 paths identified by Microsoft as known drop locations for Exchange exploitation related to HAFNIUM group. Paths include: `\HttpProxy\owa\auth\`, `\inetpub\wwwroot\aspnet_client\`, and `\HttpProxy\OAB\`. Upon triage, the suspicious .aspx file will have a randomized name of 8 characters long. Review the file for suspect commands. Identify additional log sources, IIS included, to review source and other potential exploitation.
explanation = The following query identifies suspicious .aspx created in 3 paths identified by Microsoft as known drop locations for Exchange exploitation related to HAFNIUM group. Paths include: `\HttpProxy\owa\auth\`, `\inetpub\wwwroot\aspnet_client\`, and `\HttpProxy\OAB\`. Upon triage, the suspicious .aspx file will likely look obvious on the surface. inspect the contents for script code inside. Identify additional log sources, IIS included, to review source and other potential exploitation.
how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node and `Filesystem` node.
annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1505.003"]}
known_false_positives = The query is structured in a way that `action` (read, create) is not defined. Review the results of this query, filter, and tune as necessary. It may be necessary to generate this query specific to your endpoint product.
@@ -3000,6 +3154,16 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"
known_false_positives = Some applications and users may legitimately use attrib.exe to interact with the files.
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - High File Deletion Frequency - Rule]
type = detection
asset_type =
confidence = medium
explanation = This search looks for high frequency of file deletion relative to process name and process id. These events usually happen when the ransomware tries to encrypt the files with the ransomware file extensions and sysmon treat the original files to be deleted as soon it was replace as encrypted data.
how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the deleted target file name, process name and process id from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.
annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1485"]}
known_false_positives = user may delete bunch of pictures or files in a folder.
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - High Number of Login Failures from a single source - Rule]
type = detection
asset_type = Office 365
@@ -3010,6 +3174,16 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
known_false_positives = unknown
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - High Process Termination Frequency - Rule]
type = detection
asset_type =
confidence = medium
explanation = This analytics are designed to indentify a high frequency of process termination on a machine which is a common behavior of ransomware malware before encrypting files. This technique is designed to avoid an exception error while accessing (docs, images, database and etc..) in the infected machine for encryption.
how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Image (process full path of terminated process) from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.
annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1486"]}
known_false_positives = admin or user tool that can terminate multiple process.
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server - Rule]
type = detection
asset_type = Endpoint
@@ -3487,7 +3661,7 @@ type = detection
asset_type = Office 365
confidence = medium
explanation = This search detects when an admin configured a forwarding rule for multiple mailboxes to the same destination.
how_to_implement =
how_to_implement = You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity
annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1114.003"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]}
known_false_positives = unknown
providing_technologies = []
@@ -3497,7 +3671,7 @@ type = detection
asset_type = Office 365
confidence = medium
explanation = This search detects the assignment of rights to accesss content from another mailbox. This is usually only assigned to a service account.
how_to_implement =
how_to_implement = You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity
annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1114.002"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]}
known_false_positives = Service Accounts
providing_technologies = []
@@ -3507,7 +3681,7 @@ type = detection
asset_type = Office 365
confidence = medium
explanation = This search detects when multiple user configured a forwarding rule to the same destination.
how_to_implement =
how_to_implement = You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity
annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1114.003"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]}
known_false_positives = unknown
providing_technologies = []
@@ -3582,6 +3756,16 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"
known_false_positives = This detection should yield little or no false positive results. It is uncommon for LNK files to be executed from temporary or user directories.
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - Process Deleting Its Process File Path - Rule]
type = detection
asset_type =
confidence = medium
explanation = This detection is to identify a suspicious process that tries to delete the process file path related to its process. This technique is known to be defense evasion once a certain condition of malware is satisfied or not. Clop ransomware use this technique where it will try to delete its process file path using a .bat command if the keyboard layout is not the layout it tries to infect.
how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model.
annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.002"]}
known_false_positives = unknown
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - Process Execution via WMI - Rule]
type = detection
asset_type = Endpoint
@@ -3662,6 +3846,16 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 9", "CIS 14"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissan
known_false_positives = Some networks may use kerberized FTP or telnet servers, however, this is rare.
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - Ransomware Notes bulk creation - Rule]
type = detection
asset_type =
confidence = medium
explanation = The following analytics identifies a big number of instance of ransomware notes (filetype e.g .txt, .html, .hta) file creation to the infected machine. This behavior is a good sensor if the ransomware note filename is quite new for security industry or the ransomware note filename is not in your lookup table list for monitoring.
how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data.
annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Obfuscation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1486"]}
known_false_positives = unknown
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule]
type = detection
asset_type = Endpoint
@@ -3772,6 +3966,16 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Ob
known_false_positives = Administrators may use this legitimately to gather info from remote systems.
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - Resize ShadowStorage volume - Rule]
type = detection
asset_type =
confidence = medium
explanation = The following analytics identifies the resizing of shadowstorage by ransomware malware to avoid the shadow volumes being made again. this technique is an alternative by ransomware attacker than deleting the shadowstorage which is known alert in defensive team. one example of ransomware that use this technique is CLOP ransomware where it drops a .bat file that will resize the shadowstorage to minimum size as much as possible
how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.
annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1490"]}
known_false_positives = network admin can resize the shadowstorage for valid purposes.
providing_technologies = []
[savedsearch://ESCU - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule]
type = detection
asset_type = Endpoint
@@ -4227,7 +4431,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint
confidence = medium
explanation = The following analytic identifies a renamed instance of microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe. Microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319 and is rarely utilized. When investigating, identify the executed code on disk and review. A spawned child process from microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe is uncommon. In any instance, microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe spawning from an Office product or any living off the land binary is highly suspect.
how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.
annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1127, T1036.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]}
annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1127", "T1036.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]}
known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe, triggering a false positive.
providing_technologies = []
package/lookups/ransomware_extensions.csv
+3 -1
View File
@@ -285,4 +285,6 @@ Extensions,Name
.wnry,WannaCry
.wncryt,WannaCry
.WNCRYT,WannaCry
.RYK,Ryuk
.RYK,Ryuk
.Clop,Clop
.Cllp,Clop
1 Extensions Name
285 .wnry WannaCry
286 .wncryt WannaCry
287 .WNCRYT WannaCry
288 .RYK Ryuk
289 .Clop Clop
290 .Cllp Clop
package/lookups/ransomware_notes.csv
+2
View File
@@ -57,3 +57,5 @@ HELP_DECRYPT_YOUR_FILES.HTML,True
*-SORRY-FOR-FILES.html,True
*-READ-FOR-HELLPP.html,True
RyukReadMe.html,True
ClopReadMe.txt,True
README_README.txt,True
1 ransomware_notes status
57 *-SORRY-FOR-FILES.html True
58 *-READ-FOR-HELLPP.html True
59 RyukReadMe.html True
60 ClopReadMe.txt True
61 README_README.txt True