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Added detection testing service results inServicePrincipalNames Discovery with SetSPN
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@@ -6,50 +6,59 @@ author: Michael Haag, Splunk
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type: TTP
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datamodel:
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- Endpoint
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description: 'The following analytic identifies `setspn.exe` usage related to querying the domain for Service Principle Names. typically, this is a precursor activity related to kerberoasting or the silver ticket attack. \
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description: 'The following analytic identifies `setspn.exe` usage related to querying
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the domain for Service Principle Names. typically, this is a precursor activity
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related to kerberoasting or the silver ticket attack. \
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What is a ServicePrincipleName? \
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A service principal name (SPN) is a unique identifier of a service instance. SPNs are used by Kerberos authentication to associate a service instance with a service logon account. This allows a client application to request that the service authenticate an account even if the client does not have the account name.\
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A service principal name (SPN) is a unique identifier of a service instance. SPNs
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are used by Kerberos authentication to associate a service instance with a service
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logon account. This allows a client application to request that the service authenticate
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an account even if the client does not have the account name.\
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Example usage includes the following \
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1. setspn -T offense -Q */*
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1. setspn -T attackrange.local -F -Q MSSQLSvc/*
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1. setspn -Q */* > allspns.txt
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1. setspn -q \
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1. setspn -T offense -Q */* 1. setspn -T attackrange.local -F -Q MSSQLSvc/* 1. setspn
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-Q */* > allspns.txt 1. setspn -q \
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Values \
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1. -F = perform queries at the forest, rather than domain level
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1. -T = perform query on the specified domain or forest (when -F is also used)
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1. -Q = query for existence of SPN \
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1. -F = perform queries at the forest, rather than domain level 1. -T = perform
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query on the specified domain or forest (when -F is also used) 1. -Q = query for
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existence of SPN \
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During triage, review parallel processes for further suspicious activity.'
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search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
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as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_setspn`
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(Processes.process="*-t*" AND Processes.process="*-f*") OR (Processes.process="*-q*" AND Processes.process="**/**") OR (Processes.process="*-q*") OR (Processes.process="*-s*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name
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Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id
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| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
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| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
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| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_setspn_filter`'
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how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.
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known_false_positives: False positives may be caused by Administrators resetting SPNs or querying for SPNs. Filter as needed.
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as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_setspn` (Processes.process="*-t*"
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AND Processes.process="*-f*") OR (Processes.process="*-q*" AND Processes.process="**/**")
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OR (Processes.process="*-q*") OR (Processes.process="*-s*") by Processes.dest Processes.user
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Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name
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Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
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| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_setspn_filter`'
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how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
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on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
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your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition,
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confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the
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endpoint product.
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known_false_positives: False positives may be caused by Administrators resetting SPNs
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or querying for SPNs. Filter as needed.
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references:
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- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/ad/service-principal-names
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- https://www.ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/t1208-kerberoasting
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- https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/setspn.exe-5C184D581524245DAD7A0A02B51FD2C2.html
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- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003/
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- https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/717.service-principal-names-spn-setspn-syntax.aspx
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- https://www.harmj0y.net/blog/powershell/kerberoasting-without-mimikatz/
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- https://blog.zsec.uk/paving-2-da-wholeset/
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- https://msitpros.com/?p=3113
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- https://adsecurity.org/?p=3466
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- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/ad/service-principal-names
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- https://www.ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/t1208-kerberoasting
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- https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/setspn.exe-5C184D581524245DAD7A0A02B51FD2C2.html
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- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003/
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- https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/717.service-principal-names-spn-setspn-syntax.aspx
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- https://www.harmj0y.net/blog/powershell/kerberoasting-without-mimikatz/
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- https://blog.zsec.uk/paving-2-da-wholeset/
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- https://msitpros.com/?p=3113
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- https://adsecurity.org/?p=3466
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tags:
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analytic_story:
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- Active Directory Discovery
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- Lateral Movement
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dataset: []
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dataset:
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- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1558.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_setspn.log
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kill_chain_phases:
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- Lateral Movement
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mitre_attack_id:
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@@ -59,27 +68,27 @@ tags:
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- Splunk Enterprise Security
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- Splunk Cloud
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required_fields:
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- _time
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- Processes.dest
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- Processes.user
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- Processes.parent_process_name #parent process name
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- Processes.parent_process #parent cmdline
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- Processes.original_file_name
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- Processes.process_name #process name
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- Processes.process #process cmdline
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- Processes.process_id
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- Processes.parent_process_path
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- Processes.process_path
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- Processes.parent_process_id
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- _time
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- Processes.dest
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- Processes.user
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- Processes.parent_process_name
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- Processes.parent_process
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- Processes.original_file_name
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- Processes.process_name
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- Processes.process
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- Processes.process_id
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- Processes.parent_process_path
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- Processes.process_path
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- Processes.parent_process_id
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security_domain: endpoint
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impact: 80
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confidence: 100
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# (impact * confidence)/100
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risk_score: 80
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context:
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- Source:Endpoint
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- Stage:Credential Access
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message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to identify service principle names.
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message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified
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on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to identify service principle names.
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observable:
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- name: user
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type: User
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@@ -96,4 +105,5 @@ tags:
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- name: process_name
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type: Process
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role:
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- Child Process
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- Child Process
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automated_detection_testing: passed
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