Merge pull request #1787 from splunk/fixing_issues

fix_issues

detections/endpoint/office_application_drop_executable.yml

@@ -15,13 +15,16 @@ description: This search is to detect a suspicious MS office application that dr
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
   where Processes.process_name IN ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe","wordpad.exe","wordview.exe")
   by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest
-  | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
-  count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem
+  Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as
+  proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count
+  min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem
   where Filesystem.file_name IN ("*.exe","*.dll","*.pif","*.scr","*.js","*.vbs","*.vbe","*.ps1")
   by _time span=1h Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name
-  Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | fields _time dest file_create_time
-  file_name file_path process_name process_path process] | dedup file_create_time
-  | table dest, process_name, process, file_create_time, file_name, file_path | `office_application_drop_executable_filter`'
+  Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
+  | rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest file_create_time file_name
+  file_path process_name process_path process proc_guid] | dedup file_create_time
+  | table dest, process_name, process, file_create_time, file_name, file_path, proc_guid
+  | `office_application_drop_executable_filter`'
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting
   logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your
   endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the

detections/endpoint/office_application_spawn_rundll32_process.yml

@@ -10,12 +10,12 @@ description: this detection was designed to identifies suspicious spawned proces
   of known MS office application due to macro or malicious code. this technique can
   be seen in so many malware like trickbot that used MS office as its weapon or attack
   vector to initially infect the machines.
-search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process)
-  min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
-  where (Processes.parent_process_name = "winword.exe" OR Processes.parent_process_name
-  = "excel.exe" OR Processes.parent_process_name = "powerpnt.exe") `process_rundll32`  by
-  Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid
-  Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
+  where (Processes.parent_process_name = "winword.exe" OR Processes.parent_process_name = "excel.exe" OR Processes.parent_process_name = "powerpnt.exe") AND `process_rundll32` 
+  by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.process Processes.user Processes.dest 
+  | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` 
+  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
+  |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `office_application_spawn_rundll32_process_filter`'
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
   on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from

detections/endpoint/regsvr32_silent_and_install_param_dll_loading.yml

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-name: Regsvr32 Silent Param Dll Loading
+name: Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading
 id: f421c250-24e7-11ec-bc43-acde48001122
 version: 1
 date: '2021-10-04'
@@ -8,20 +8,21 @@ datamodel:
 - Endpoint
 description: This analytic is to detect a loading of dll using regsvr32 application
   with silent parameter and dllinstall execution. This technique was seen in several
-  RAT malware like remcos, njrat and APT's to load their malicious dll in the compromised
-  machine. This TTP may executed by normal 3rd party application so it is better to
-  pivot the parent process, parent commandline and commandline of the file that execute
-  this regsvr32.
+  RAT malware similar to remcos, njrat and adversaries to load their malicious DLL
+  on the compromised machine. This TTP may executed by normal 3rd party application
+  so it is better to pivot by the parent process, parent command-line and command-line
+  of the file that execute this regsvr32.
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
-  as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = regsvr32.exe
-  Processes.process="*/i*" Processes.process="*/s*" by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process
-  Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name
-  Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
-  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `regsvr32_silent_param_dll_loading_filter`'
-how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting
-  logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your
-  endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the
-  Sysmon TA.
+  as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_regsvr32` AND Processes.process="*/i*"
+  by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name
+  Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
+  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where
+  match(process,"(?i)[\-|\/]s(il*e*n*t*)*") | `regsvr32_silent_and_install_param_dll_loading_filter`'
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
+  on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
+  your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition,
+  confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the
+  endpoint product.
 known_false_positives: Other third part application may used this parameter but not
   so common in base windows environment.
 references:
@@ -40,7 +41,9 @@ tags:
   impact: 60
   kill_chain_phases:
   - Exploitation
-  message: regsvr32 process with $process$ commandline in $dest$
+  message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified
+    on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to load a DLL using the silent and
+    dllinstall parameter.
   mitre_attack_id:
   - T1218
   - T1218.010
@@ -53,6 +56,14 @@ tags:
     type: Hostname
     role:
     - Victim
+  - name: parent_process_name
+    type: Parent Process
+    role:
+    - Parent Process
+  - name: process_name
+    type: Process
+    role:
+    - Child Process
   product:
   - Splunk Enterprise
   - Splunk Enterprise Security

detections/endpoint/regsvr32_with_known_silent_switch_cmdline.yml

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-name: Suspicious IcedID Regsvr32 Cmdline
+name: Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline
 id: c9ef7dc4-eeaf-11eb-b2b6-acde48001122
 version: 2
 date: '2021-07-27'
@@ -6,16 +6,20 @@ author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
 type: TTP
 datamodel:
 - Endpoint
-description: this search is to detect a suspicious regsvr32 commandline "-s" to execute
-  a dll files. This technique was seen in IcedID malware to execute its initial downloader
-  dll that will download the 2nd stage loader that will download and decrypt the config
-  payload.
+description: The following analytic identifies Regsvr32.exe utilizing the silent switch
+  to load DLLs. This technique has most recently been seen in IcedID campaigns to
+  load its initial dll that will download the 2nd stage loader that will download
+  and decrypt the config payload. The switch type may be either a hyphen `-` or forward
+  slash `/`. This behavior is typically found with `-s`, and it is possible there
+  are more switch types that may be used. \ During triage, review parallel processes
+  and capture any artifacts that may have landed on disk. Isolate and contain the
+  endpoint as necessary.
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
-  as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_regsvr32` Processes.process=*-s*
-  by  Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name
-  Processes.parent_process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.dest
-  Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
-  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_icedid_regsvr32_cmdline_filter`'
+  as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_regsvr32` by Processes.user
+  Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name
+  Processes.dest Processes.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
+  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where match(process,"(?i)[\-|\/]s(il*e*n*t*)*")
+  | `regsvr32_with_known_silent_switch_cmdline_filter`'
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
   on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
   your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition,
@@ -25,9 +29,11 @@ known_false_positives: minimal. but network operator can use this application to
   dll.
 references:
 - https://app.any.run/tasks/56680cba-2bbc-4b34-8633-5f7878ddf858/
+- https://regexr.com/699e2
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - IcedID
+  - Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity
   automated_detection_testing: passed
   confidence: 80
   context:
@@ -38,19 +44,28 @@ tags:
   impact: 70
   kill_chain_phases:
   - Exploitation
-  message: regsvr32 process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in host $dest$
+  message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified
+    on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to load a DLL using the silent parameter.
   mitre_attack_id:
   - T1218
   - T1218.010
   observable:
+  - name: user
+    type: User
+    role:
+    - Victim
   - name: dest
     type: Hostname
     role:
     - Victim
-  - name: process_name
-    type: process name
+  - name: parent_process_name
+    type: Parent Process
     role:
-    - Attacker
+    - Parent Process
+  - name: process_name
+    type: Process
+    role:
+    - Child Process
   product:
   - Splunk Enterprise
   - Splunk Enterprise Security

tests/endpoint/office_application_drop_executable.test.yml

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ tests:
 - name: Office Application Drop Executable
   file: endpoint/office_application_drop_executable.yml
   pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0'
-  earliest_time: '-24h'
+  earliest_time: '-120d'
   latest_time: 'now'
   attack_data:
   - file_name: sysmon.log

tests/endpoint/regsvr32_silent_and_install_param_dll_loading.test.yml

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
-name: Regsvr32 Silent Param Dll Loading Unit Test
+name: Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading Unit Test
 tests:
-- name: Regsvr32 Silent Param Dll Loading
-  file: endpoint/regsvr32_silent_param_dll_loading.yml
+- name: Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading
+  file: endpoint/regsvr32_silent_and_install_param_dll_loading.yml
   pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0'
   earliest_time: '-24h'
   latest_time: 'now'

tests/endpoint/regsvr32_with_known_silent_switch_cmdline.test.yml

@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
-name: Suspicious IcedID Regsvr32 Cmdline Unit Test
+name: Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline Unit Test
 tests:
-- name: Suspicious IcedID Regsvr32 Cmdline
-  file: endpoint/suspicious_icedid_regsvr32_cmdline.yml
+- name: Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline
+  file: endpoint/regsvr32_with_known_silent_switch_cmdline.yml
   pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0'
-  earliest_time: '-24h'
+  earliest_time: '-150d'
   latest_time: 'now'
   attack_data:
   - file_name: windows-sysmon.log