updates

2026-06-08 17:32:49 +00:00 · 2024-12-16 10:55:12 +01:00
parent 7d061fa22b
commit d3e1be0abe
17 changed files with 90 additions and 20 deletions
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ status: production
 type: Hunting
 description: The following analytic identifies the creation of AWS IAM access keys by a user for another user, which can indicate privilege escalation. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs to detect instances where the user creating the access key is different from the user for whom the key is created. This activity is significant because unauthorized access key creation can allow attackers to establish persistence or exfiltrate data via AWS APIs. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access to AWS services, data exfiltration, and long-term persistence in the environment.
 data_source: []
-search: '`amazon_security_lake` api.operation=CreateAccessKey | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by api.operation actor.user.uid http_request.user_agent src_endpoint.ip cloud.region | rename actor.user.uid as user, src_endpoint.ip as src_ip, cloud.region as region, http_request.user_agent as user_agent | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`asl_aws_create_access_key_filter`'
+search: '`amazon_security_lake` api.operation=CreateAccessKey | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by api.operation actor.user.uid actor.user.account.uid http_request.user_agent src_endpoint.ip cloud.region | rename actor.user.uid as user, src_endpoint.ip as src_ip, cloud.region as region, http_request.user_agent as user_agent | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`asl_aws_create_access_key_filter`'
 how_to_implement: The detection is based on Amazon Security Lake events from Amazon Web Services (AWS), which is a centralized data lake that provides security-related data from AWS services. To use this detection, you must ingest CloudTrail logs from Amazon Security Lake into Splunk. To run this search, ensure that you ingest events using the latest version of Splunk Add-on for Amazon Web Services (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1876) or the Federated Analytics App.
 known_false_positives: While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created keys for another user.
 references:
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ tags:
  required_fields:
  - api.operation
  - actor.user.uid
+  - actor.user.account.uid
  - http_request.user_agent
  - src_endpoint.ip
  - src_endpoint.domain
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ status: production
 type: TTP
 description: The following analytic identifies the creation of a new AWS IAM policy version that allows access to all resources. It detects this activity by analyzing AWS CloudTrail logs for the CreatePolicyVersion event with a policy document that grants broad permissions. This behavior is significant because it violates the principle of least privilege, potentially exposing the environment to misuse or abuse. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain extensive access to AWS resources, leading to unauthorized actions, data exfiltration, or further compromise of the AWS environment.
 data_source: []
-search: '`amazon_security_lake` api.operation=CreatePolicy | spath input=api.request.data | spath input=policyDocument | regex Statement{}.Action="\*" | regex Statement{}.Resource="\*" | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by api.operation actor.user.uid http_request.user_agent src_endpoint.ip cloud.region api.request.data | rename actor.user.uid as user, src_endpoint.ip as src_ip, cloud.region as region, http_request.user_agent as user_agent | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|`asl_aws_create_policy_version_to_allow_all_resources_filter`'
+search: '`amazon_security_lake` api.operation=CreatePolicy | spath input=api.request.data | spath input=policyDocument | regex Statement{}.Action="\*" | regex Statement{}.Resource="\*" | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by api.operation actor.user.uid actor.user.account.uid http_request.user_agent src_endpoint.ip cloud.region api.request.data | rename actor.user.uid as user, src_endpoint.ip as src_ip, cloud.region as region, http_request.user_agent as user_agent | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|`asl_aws_create_policy_version_to_allow_all_resources_filter`'
 how_to_implement: The detection is based on Amazon Security Lake events from Amazon Web Services (AWS), which is a centralized data lake that provides security-related data from AWS services. To use this detection, you must ingest CloudTrail logs from Amazon Security Lake into Splunk. To run this search, ensure that you ingest events using the latest version of Splunk Add-on for Amazon Web Services (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1876) or the Federated Analytics App.
 known_false_positives: While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created a policy to allow a user to access all resources. That said, AWS strongly advises against granting full control to all AWS resources and you must verify this activity.
 references:
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ tags:
  - Splunk Cloud
  required_fields:
  - api.operation
+  - actor.user.account.uid
  - api.request.data
  - actor.user.uid
  - http_request.user_agent
@@ -7,19 +7,19 @@ status: production
 type: Anomaly
 description: The following analytic identifies more than 10 GetPasswordData API calls within a 5-minute window in your AWS account. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs to detect this activity by counting the distinct instance IDs accessed. This behavior is significant as it may indicate an attempt to retrieve encrypted administrator passwords for running Windows instances, which is a critical security concern. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain unauthorized access to administrative credentials, potentially leading to full control over the affected instances and further compromise of the AWS environment.
 data_source: []
-search: '`amazon_security_lake` api.operation=GetPasswordData | spath input=api.request.data | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by api.operation actor.user.uid http_request.user_agent src_endpoint.ip cloud.region instanceId | rename actor.user.uid as user, src_endpoint.ip as src_ip, cloud.region as region, http_request.user_agent as user_agent | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`asl_aws_credential_access_getpassworddata_filter`'
+search: '`amazon_security_lake` api.operation=GetPasswordData | spath input=api.request.data | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by api.operation actor.user.uid actor.user.account.uid http_request.user_agent src_endpoint.ip cloud.region instanceId | rename actor.user.uid as user, src_endpoint.ip as src_ip, cloud.region as region, http_request.user_agent as user_agent | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`asl_aws_credential_access_getpassworddata_filter`'
 how_to_implement: The detection is based on Amazon Security Lake events from Amazon Web Services (AWS), which is a centralized data lake that provides security-related data from AWS services. To use this detection, you must ingest CloudTrail logs from Amazon Security Lake into Splunk. To run this search, ensure that you ingest events using the latest version of Splunk Add-on for Amazon Web Services (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1876) or the Federated Analytics App.
 known_false_positives: Administrator tooling or automated scripts may make these calls but it is highly unlikely to make several calls in a short period of time.
 references:
 - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/
 - https://stratus-red-team.cloud/attack-techniques/AWS/aws.credential-access.ec2-get-password-data/
 drilldown_searches:
- name: View the detection results for - "$user_arn$"
-  search: '%original_detection_search% | search  user_arn = "$user_arn$"'
+- name: View the detection results for - "$user$"
+  search: '%original_detection_search% | search  user_arn = "$user$"'
  earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
  latest_offset: $info_max_time$
- name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user_arn$"
-  search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user_arn$") starthoursago=168  | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
+- name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$"
+  search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$") starthoursago=168  | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
  earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
  latest_offset: $info_max_time$
 tags:
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ tags:
  required_fields:
  - api.operation
  - actor.user.uid
+  - actor.user.account.uid
  - http_request.user_agent
  - src_endpoint.ip
  - src_endpoint.domain
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ status: production
 type: TTP
 description: The following analytic detects the resetting of the master user password for an Amazon RDS DB instance. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs to identify events where the `ModifyDBInstance` API call includes a new `masterUserPassword` parameter. This activity is significant because unauthorized password resets can grant attackers access to sensitive data stored in production databases, such as credit card information, PII, and healthcare data. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to data breaches, regulatory non-compliance, and significant reputational damage. Immediate investigation is required to determine the legitimacy of the password reset.
 data_source: []
-search: '`amazon_security_lake` api.operation=ModifyDBInstance OR api.operation=ModifyDBCluster | spath input=api.request.data | search masterUserPassword=* | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by api.operation actor.user.uid http_request.user_agent src_endpoint.ip cloud.region api.request.data | rename actor.user.uid as user, src_endpoint.ip as src_ip, cloud.region as region, http_request.user_agent as user_agent | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`asl_aws_credential_access_rds_password_reset_filter`'
+search: '`amazon_security_lake` api.operation=ModifyDBInstance OR api.operation=ModifyDBCluster | spath input=api.request.data | search masterUserPassword=* | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by api.operation actor.user.uid actor.user.account.uid http_request.user_agent src_endpoint.ip cloud.region api.request.data | rename actor.user.uid as user, src_endpoint.ip as src_ip, cloud.region as region, http_request.user_agent as user_agent | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`asl_aws_credential_access_rds_password_reset_filter`'
 how_to_implement: You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs.
 known_false_positives: Users may genuinely reset the RDS password.
 references:
@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ tags:
  - api.operation
  - api.request.data
  - actor.user.uid
+  - actor.user.account.uid
  - http_request.user_agent
  - src_endpoint.ip
  - src_endpoint.domain
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ description: The following analytic detects AWS `DeleteTrail` events within Clou
  to cover their tracks, making it difficult to trace their activities and investigate
  other potential compromises within the AWS environment.
 data_source: []
-search: '`amazon_security_lake` api.operation=DeleteTrail | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by api.operation actor.user.uid http_request.user_agent src_endpoint.ip cloud.region | rename actor.user.uid as user, src_endpoint.ip as src_ip, cloud.region as region, http_request.user_agent as user_agent | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `asl_aws_defense_evasion_delete_cloudtrail_filter`'
+search: '`amazon_security_lake` api.operation=DeleteTrail | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by api.operation actor.user.uid actor.user.account.uid http_request.user_agent src_endpoint.ip cloud.region | rename actor.user.uid as user, src_endpoint.ip as src_ip, cloud.region as region, http_request.user_agent as user_agent | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `asl_aws_defense_evasion_delete_cloudtrail_filter`'
 how_to_implement: The detection is based on Amazon Security Lake events from Amazon Web Services (AWS), which is a centralized data lake that provides security-related data from AWS services. To use this detection, you must ingest CloudTrail logs from Amazon Security Lake into Splunk. To run this search, ensure that you ingest events using the latest version of Splunk Add-on for Amazon Web Services (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1876) or the Federated Analytics App.
 known_false_positives: While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has stopped cloudTrail logging. Please investigate this activity.
 references:
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ description: The following analytic detects the deletion of CloudWatch log group
  potentially leading to undetected data breaches or further malicious actions within
  the compromised AWS environment.
 data_source: []
-search: '`amazon_security_lake` api.operation=DeleteLogGroup | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by api.operation actor.user.uid http_request.user_agent src_endpoint.ip cloud.region | rename actor.user.uid as user, src_endpoint.ip as src_ip, cloud.region as region, http_request.user_agent as user_agent | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `asl_aws_defense_evasion_delete_cloudwatch_log_group_filter`'
+search: '`amazon_security_lake` api.operation=DeleteLogGroup | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by api.operation actor.user.uid actor.user.account.uid http_request.user_agent src_endpoint.ip cloud.region | rename actor.user.uid as user, src_endpoint.ip as src_ip, cloud.region as region, http_request.user_agent as user_agent | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `asl_aws_defense_evasion_delete_cloudwatch_log_group_filter`'
 how_to_implement: The detection is based on Amazon Security Lake events from Amazon Web Services (AWS), which is a centralized data lake that provides security-related data from AWS services. To use this detection, you must ingest CloudTrail logs from Amazon Security Lake into Splunk. To run this search, ensure that you ingest events using the latest version of Splunk Add-on for Amazon Web Services (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1876) or the Federated Analytics App.
 known_false_positives: While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has deleted CloudWatch logging. Please investigate this activity.
 references:
@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ tags:
  required_fields:
  - api.operation
  - actor.user.uid
+  - actor.user.account.uid
  - http_request.user_agent
  - src_endpoint.ip
  - src_endpoint.domain
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ description: The following analytic detects the deletion of critical AWS Securit
  leading to potential data breaches, unauthorized access, and prolonged persistence
  within the AWS environment.
 data_source: []
-search: '`amazon_security_lake` api.operation IN ("DeleteLogStream","DeleteDetector","DeleteIPSet","DeleteWebACL","DeleteRule","DeleteRuleGroup","DeleteLoggingConfiguration","DeleteAlarms") | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by api.operation actor.user.uid http_request.user_agent src_endpoint.ip cloud.region | rename actor.user.uid as user, src_endpoint.ip as src_ip, cloud.region as region, http_request.user_agent as user_agent, actor.user.account_uid as aws_account_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `asl_aws_defense_evasion_impair_security_services_filter`'
+search: '`amazon_security_lake` api.operation IN ("DeleteLogStream","DeleteDetector","DeleteIPSet","DeleteWebACL","DeleteRule","DeleteRuleGroup","DeleteLoggingConfiguration","DeleteAlarms") | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by api.operation actor.user.uid actor.user.account.uid http_request.user_agent src_endpoint.ip cloud.region | rename actor.user.uid as user, src_endpoint.ip as src_ip, cloud.region as region, http_request.user_agent as user_agent, actor.user.account_uid as aws_account_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `asl_aws_defense_evasion_impair_security_services_filter`'
 how_to_implement: The detection is based on Amazon Security Lake events from Amazon Web Services (AWS), which is a centralized data lake that provides security-related data from AWS services. To use this detection, you must ingest CloudTrail logs from Amazon Security Lake into Splunk. To run this search, ensure that you ingest events using the latest version of Splunk Add-on for Amazon Web Services (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1876) or the Federated Analytics App.
 known_false_positives: While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that it is a legitimate admin activity. Please consider filtering out these noisy events using userAgent, user_arn field names.
 references:
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ tags:
  required_fields:
  - api.operation
  - actor.user.uid
+  - actor.user.account.uid
  - http_request.user_agent
  - src_endpoint.ip
  - src_endpoint.domain
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+name: ASL AWS Defense Evasion PutBucketLifecycle
+id: 986565a2-7707-48ea-9590-37929cebc938
+version: 1
+date: '2024-12-16'
+author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
+status: production
+type: Hunting
+description: The following analytic detects `PutBucketLifecycle` events in AWS CloudTrail logs where a user sets a lifecycle rule for an S3 bucket with an expiration period of fewer than three days. This detection leverages CloudTrail logs to identify suspicious lifecycle configurations. This activity is significant because attackers may use it to delete CloudTrail logs quickly, thereby evading detection and impairing forensic investigations. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to cover their tracks, making it difficult to trace their actions and respond to the breach effectively.
+data_source:
+- AWS CloudTrail PutBucketLifecycle
+search: '`amazon_security_lake` api.operation=PutBucketLifecycle | spath input=api.request.data path=LifecycleConfiguration.Rule.NoncurrentVersionExpiration.NoncurrentDays output=NoncurrentDays | where NoncurrentDays < 3 | spath input=api.request.data | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by api.operation actor.user.uid actor.user.account.uid http_request.user_agent src_endpoint.ip cloud.region NoncurrentDays bukcetName | rename actor.user.uid as user, src_endpoint.ip as src_ip, cloud.region as region, http_request.user_agent as user_agent | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |  `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where expiration_days < 3 | `aws_defense_evasion_putbucketlifecycle_filter`'
+how_to_implement: You must install Splunk AWS Add on and enable CloudTrail logs in your AWS Environment. We recommend our users to set the expiration days value according to your company's log retention policies.
+known_false_positives: While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that it is a legitimate admin activity. Please consider filtering out these noisy events using userAgent, user_arn field names.
+references:
+- https://stratus-red-team.cloud/attack-techniques/AWS/aws.defense-evasion.cloudtrail-lifecycle-rule/
+tags:
+  analytic_story:
+  - AWS Defense Evasion
+  asset_type: AWS Account
+  confidence: 40
+  impact: 50
+  message: User $user$ has created a new rule to on an S3 bucket $bucket_name$ with short expiration days
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1562.008
+  - T1562
+  - T1485.001
+  - T1485
+  observable:
+  - name: src
+    type: IP Address
+    role:
+    - Attacker
+  - name: user_arn
+    type: User
+    role:
+    - Attacker
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  required_fields:
+  - api.operation
+  - api.request.data
+  - actor.user.uid
+  - actor.user.account.uid
+  - http_request.user_agent
+  - src_endpoint.ip
+  - src_endpoint.domain
+  - cloud.region
+  risk_score: 20
+  security_domain: threat
+tests:
+- name: True Positive Test
+  attack_data:
+  - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.008/put_bucketlifecycle/asl_ocsf_cloudtrail.json
+    sourcetype: aws:cloudtrail:lake
+    source: aws_asl
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ description: The following analytic detects `StopLogging` events within AWS Clou
  significant, as it can severely hamper incident response and forensic investigations
  by obscuring the attacker's actions.
 data_source: []
-search: '`amazon_security_lake` api.operation=StopLogging | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by api.operation actor.user.uid http_request.user_agent src_endpoint.ip cloud.region | rename actor.user.uid as user, src_endpoint.ip as src_ip, cloud.region as region, http_request.user_agent as user_agent, actor.user.account_uid as aws_account_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `asl_aws_defense_evasion_stop_logging_cloudtrail_filter`'
+search: '`amazon_security_lake` api.operation=StopLogging | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by api.operation actor.user.uid actor.user.account.uid http_request.user_agent src_endpoint.ip cloud.region | rename actor.user.uid as user, src_endpoint.ip as src_ip, cloud.region as region, http_request.user_agent as user_agent, actor.user.account_uid as aws_account_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `asl_aws_defense_evasion_stop_logging_cloudtrail_filter`'
 how_to_implement: The detection is based on Amazon Security Lake events from Amazon Web Services (AWS), which is a centralized data lake that provides security-related data from AWS services. To use this detection, you must ingest CloudTrail logs from Amazon Security Lake into Splunk. To run this search, ensure that you ingest events using the latest version of Splunk Add-on for Amazon Web Services (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1876) or the Federated Analytics App.
 known_false_positives: While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has stopped cloudtrail logging. Please investigate this activity.
 references:
@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ tags:
  required_fields:
  - api.operation
  - actor.user.uid
+  - actor.user.account.uid
  - http_request.user_agent
  - src_endpoint.ip
  - src_endpoint.domain
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ description: The following analytic detects `UpdateTrail` events within AWS Clou
  tactics is significant, potentially allowing malicious activities to proceed without
  being logged, thereby hindering incident response and forensic investigations.
 data_source: []
-search: '`amazon_security_lake` api.operation=UpdateTrail | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by api.operation actor.user.uid http_request.user_agent src_endpoint.ip cloud.region | rename actor.user.uid as user, src_endpoint.ip as src_ip, cloud.region as region, http_request.user_agent as user_agent, actor.user.account_uid as aws_account_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `asl_aws_defense_evasion_update_cloudtrail_filter`'
+search: '`amazon_security_lake` api.operation=UpdateTrail | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by api.operation actor.user.uid actor.user.account.uid http_request.user_agent src_endpoint.ip cloud.region | rename actor.user.uid as user, src_endpoint.ip as src_ip, cloud.region as region, http_request.user_agent as user_agent, actor.user.account_uid as aws_account_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `asl_aws_defense_evasion_update_cloudtrail_filter`'
 how_to_implement: The detection is based on Amazon Security Lake events from Amazon Web Services (AWS), which is a centralized data lake that provides security-related data from AWS services. To use this detection, you must ingest CloudTrail logs from Amazon Security Lake into Splunk. To run this search, ensure that you ingest events using the latest version of Splunk Add-on for Amazon Web Services (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1876) or the Federated Analytics App.
 known_false_positives: While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has updated cloudtrail logging. Please investigate this activity.
 references:
@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ tags:
  required_fields:
  - api.operation
  - actor.user.uid
+  - actor.user.account.uid
  - http_request.user_agent
  - src_endpoint.ip
  - src_endpoint.domain
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ description: The following analytic detects the upload of new containers to AWS
  and addressing such uploads promptly can mitigate the risk of security incidents
  and their associated impacts.
 data_source: []
-search: '`amazon_security_lake` api.operation=PutImage | eval hour=strftime(time/pow(10,3), "%H"), weekday=strftime(time/pow(10,3), "%A") | where hour >= 20 OR hour < 8 OR weekday=Saturday OR weekday=Sunday | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by api.operation actor.user.uid http_request.user_agent cloud.region | rename actor.user.uid as user, cloud.region as region, http_request.user_agent as user_agent | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `asl_aws_ecr_container_upload_outside_business_hours_filter`'
+search: '`amazon_security_lake` api.operation=PutImage | eval hour=strftime(time/pow(10,3), "%H"), weekday=strftime(time/pow(10,3), "%A") | where hour >= 20 OR hour < 8 OR weekday=Saturday OR weekday=Sunday | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by api.operation actor.user.uid actor.user.account.uid http_request.user_agent cloud.region | rename actor.user.uid as user, cloud.region as region, http_request.user_agent as user_agent | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `asl_aws_ecr_container_upload_outside_business_hours_filter`'
 how_to_implement: The detection is based on Amazon Security Lake events from Amazon Web Services (AWS), which is a centralized data lake that provides security-related data from AWS services. To use this detection, you must ingest CloudTrail logs from Amazon Security Lake into Splunk. To run this search, ensure that you ingest events using the latest version of Splunk Add-on for Amazon Web Services (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1876) or the Federated Analytics App.
 known_false_positives: When your development is spreaded in different time zones, applying this rule can be difficult.
 references:
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ description: The following analytic detects unauthorized container uploads to AW
  could be significant, compromising the integrity and security of the organization's
  cloud environment.
 data_source: []
-search: '`amazon_security_lake` api.operation=PutImage NOT `aws_ecr_users_asl` | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by api.operation actor.user.uid http_request.user_agent src_endpoint.ip cloud.region | rename actor.user.uid as user, src_endpoint.ip as src_ip, cloud.region as region, http_request.user_agent as user_agent | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `asl_aws_ecr_container_upload_unknown_user_filter`'
+search: '`amazon_security_lake` api.operation=PutImage NOT `aws_ecr_users_asl` | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by api.operation actor.user.uid actor.user.account.uid http_request.user_agent src_endpoint.ip cloud.region | rename actor.user.uid as user, src_endpoint.ip as src_ip, cloud.region as region, http_request.user_agent as user_agent | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `asl_aws_ecr_container_upload_unknown_user_filter`'
 how_to_implement: The detection is based on Amazon Security Lake events from Amazon Web Services (AWS), which is a centralized data lake that provides security-related data from AWS services. To use this detection, you must ingest CloudTrail logs from Amazon Security Lake into Splunk. To run this search, ensure that you ingest events using the latest version of Splunk Add-on for Amazon Web Services (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1876) or the Federated Analytics App.
 known_false_positives: unknown
 references:
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ description: The following analytic identifies when a policy is deleted in AWS.
  critical security policies, potentially leading to privilege escalation or unauthorized
  access to sensitive resources.
 data_source: []
-search: '`amazon_security_lake` api.operation=DeletePolicy | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by api.operation actor.user.uid http_request.user_agent src_endpoint.ip cloud.region | rename actor.user.uid as user, src_endpoint.ip as src_ip, cloud.region as region, http_request.user_agent as user_agent | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `asl_aws_iam_delete_policy_filter`'
+search: '`amazon_security_lake` api.operation=DeletePolicy | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by api.operation actor.user.uid actor.user.account.uid http_request.user_agent src_endpoint.ip cloud.region | rename actor.user.uid as user, src_endpoint.ip as src_ip, cloud.region as region, http_request.user_agent as user_agent | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `asl_aws_iam_delete_policy_filter`'
 how_to_implement: The detection is based on Amazon Security Lake events from Amazon Web Services (AWS), which is a centralized data lake that provides security-related data from AWS services. To use this detection, you must ingest CloudTrail logs from Amazon Security Lake into Splunk. To run this search, ensure that you ingest events using the latest version of Splunk Add-on for Amazon Web Services (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1876) or the Federated Analytics App.
 known_false_positives: This detection will require tuning to provide high fidelity detection capabilties. Tune based on src addresses (corporate offices, VPN terminations) or by groups of users. Not every user with AWS access should have permission to delete policies (least privilege). In addition, this may be saved seperately and tuned for failed or success attempts only.
 references:
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ tags:
  required_fields:
  - api.operation
  - actor.user.uid
+  - actor.user.account.uid
  - http_request.user_agent
  - src_endpoint.ip
  - src_endpoint.domain
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ description: The following analytic detects failed attempts to delete AWS IAM gr
  these attempts allows for timely investigation and mitigation, preventing potential
  impact on the organizations security posture.
 data_source: []
-search: '`amazon_security_lake` api.operation=DeleteGroup status=Failure http_request.user_agent!=*.amazonaws.com | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by api.operation actor.user.uid http_request.user_agent src_endpoint.ip cloud.region | rename actor.user.uid as user, src_endpoint.ip as src_ip, cloud.region as region, http_request.user_agent as user_agent | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `asl_aws_iam_failure_group_deletion_filter`'
+search: '`amazon_security_lake` api.operation=DeleteGroup status=Failure http_request.user_agent!=*.amazonaws.com | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by api.operation actor.user.uid actor.user.account.uid http_request.user_agent src_endpoint.ip cloud.region | rename actor.user.uid as user, src_endpoint.ip as src_ip, cloud.region as region, http_request.user_agent as user_agent | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `asl_aws_iam_failure_group_deletion_filter`'
 how_to_implement: The detection is based on Amazon Security Lake events from Amazon Web Services (AWS), which is a centralized data lake that provides security-related data from AWS services. To use this detection, you must ingest CloudTrail logs from Amazon Security Lake into Splunk. To run this search, ensure that you ingest events using the latest version of Splunk Add-on for Amazon Web Services (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1876) or the Federated Analytics App.
 known_false_positives: This detection will require tuning to provide high fidelity detection capabilties. Tune based on src addresses (corporate offices, VPN terminations) or by groups of users. Not every user with AWS access should have permission to delete groups (least privilege).
 references:
@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ tags:
  required_fields:
  - api.operation
  - actor.user.uid
+  - actor.user.account.uid
  - http_request.user_agent
  - src_endpoint.ip
  - src_endpoint.domain
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ description: The following analytic detects the successful deletion of a group w
  a SOC to prevent the potential impact of an attack, which could include unauthorized
  access to sensitive resources or disruption of AWS environment operations.
 data_source: []
-search: '`amazon_security_lake` api.operation=DeleteGroup status=Success | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by api.operation actor.user.uid http_request.user_agent src_endpoint.ip cloud.region | rename actor.user.uid as user, src_endpoint.ip as src_ip, cloud.region as region, http_request.user_agent as user_agent | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `asl_aws_iam_successful_group_deletion_filter`'
+search: '`amazon_security_lake` api.operation=DeleteGroup status=Success | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by api.operation actor.user.uid actor.user.account.uid http_request.user_agent src_endpoint.ip cloud.region | rename actor.user.uid as user, src_endpoint.ip as src_ip, cloud.region as region, http_request.user_agent as user_agent | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `asl_aws_iam_successful_group_deletion_filter`'
 how_to_implement: You must install the Data Lake Federated Analytics App and ingest the logs into Splunk.
 known_false_positives: This detection will require tuning to provide high fidelity detection capabilties. Tune based on src addresses (corporate offices, VPN terminations) or by groups of users. Not every user with AWS access should have permission to delete groups (least privilege).
 references:
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ tags:
  required_fields:
  - api.operation
  - actor.user.uid
+  - actor.user.account.uid
  - http_request.user_agent
  - src_endpoint.ip
  - src_endpoint.domain
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ description: The following analytic detects attempts to disable multi-factor aut
  AWS environment without detection, potentially leading to unauthorized access to
  sensitive resources and prolonged compromise.
 data_source: []
-search: '`amazon_security_lake` (api.operation=DeleteVirtualMFADevice OR api.operation=DeactivateMFADevice) | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by api.operation actor.user.uid http_request.user_agent src_endpoint.ip cloud.region | rename actor.user.uid as user, src_endpoint.ip as src_ip, cloud.region as region, http_request.user_agent as user_agent | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `asl_aws_multi_factor_authentication_disabled_filter`'
+search: '`amazon_security_lake` (api.operation=DeleteVirtualMFADevice OR api.operation=DeactivateMFADevice) | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by api.operation actor.user.uid actor.user.account.uid http_request.user_agent src_endpoint.ip cloud.region | rename actor.user.uid as user, src_endpoint.ip as src_ip, cloud.region as region, http_request.user_agent as user_agent | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `asl_aws_multi_factor_authentication_disabled_filter`'
 how_to_implement: The detection is based on Amazon Security Lake events from Amazon Web Services (AWS), which is a centralized data lake that provides security-related data from AWS services. To use this detection, you must ingest CloudTrail logs from Amazon Security Lake into Splunk. To run this search, ensure that you ingest events using the latest version of Splunk Add-on for Amazon Web Services (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1876) or the Federated Analytics App.
 known_false_positives: AWS Administrators may disable MFA but it is highly unlikely for this event to occur without prior notice to the company
 references:
@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ tags:
  required_fields:
  - api.operation
  - actor.user.uid
+  - actor.user.account.uid
  - http_request.user_agent
  - src_endpoint.ip
  - src_endpoint.domain
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ description: The following analytic identifies the registration of a new Multi-F
  to secure their access, making it harder to detect and remove their presence from
  the compromised environment.
 data_source: []
-search: '`amazon_security_lake` api.operation=CreateVirtualMFADevice | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by api.operation actor.user.uid http_request.user_agent src_endpoint.ip cloud.region | rename actor.user.uid as user, src_endpoint.ip as src_ip, cloud.region as region, http_request.user_agent as user_agent | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `asl_aws_new_mfa_method_registered_for_user_filter`'
+search: '`amazon_security_lake` api.operation=CreateVirtualMFADevice | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by api.operation actor.user.uid actor.user.account.uid http_request.user_agent src_endpoint.ip cloud.region | rename actor.user.uid as user, src_endpoint.ip as src_ip, cloud.region as region, http_request.user_agent as user_agent | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `asl_aws_new_mfa_method_registered_for_user_filter`'
 how_to_implement: The detection is based on Amazon Security Lake events from Amazon Web Services (AWS), which is a centralized data lake that provides security-related data from AWS services. To use this detection, you must ingest CloudTrail logs from Amazon Security Lake into Splunk. To run this search, ensure that you ingest events using the latest version of Splunk Add-on for Amazon Web Services (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1876) or the Federated Analytics App.
 known_false_positives: Newly onboarded users who are registering an MFA method for the first time will also trigger this detection.
 references:
@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ tags:
  required_fields:
  - api.operation
  - actor.user.uid
+  - actor.user.account.uid
  - http_request.user_agent
  - src_endpoint.ip
  - src_endpoint.domain