mirror of
https://github.com/splunk/security_content
synced 2026-06-08 17:32:49 +00:00
Branch was auto-updated.
This commit is contained in:
+3
-2
@@ -43,7 +43,8 @@ def generate_doc_stories(REPO_PATH, OUTPUT_DIR, TEMPLATE_PATH, attack, sorted_de
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manifest_files = []
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for root, dirs, files in walk(REPO_PATH + '/stories'):
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for file in files:
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if file.endswith(".yml"):
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print(root)
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if file.endswith(".yml") and root == './stories':
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manifest_files.append((path.join(root, file)))
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stories = []
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@@ -167,7 +168,7 @@ def generate_doc_stories(REPO_PATH, OUTPUT_DIR, TEMPLATE_PATH, attack, sorted_de
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def generate_doc_detections(REPO_PATH, OUTPUT_DIR, TEMPLATE_PATH, attack, messages, VERBOSE):
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types = ["endpoint", "application", "cloud", "network", "web", "experimental", "deprecated"]
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types = ["endpoint", "application", "cloud", "network", "web", "experimental"]
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manifest_files = []
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for t in types:
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for root, dirs, files in walk(REPO_PATH + '/detections/' + t):
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@@ -25,11 +25,21 @@ def load_objects(file_path, VERBOSE, REPO_PATH):
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files.append(load_file(file))
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return files
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def process_deprecated(file,file_path):
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DESCRIPTION_ANNOTATION = "WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. "
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if 'deprecated' in file_path:
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file['deprecated'] = True
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file['description'] = DESCRIPTION_ANNOTATION + file['description']
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return file
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def load_file(file_path):
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with open(file_path, 'r', encoding="utf-8") as stream:
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try:
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file = list(yaml.safe_load_all(stream))[0]
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# mark any files that have been deprecated
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file = process_deprecated(file,file_path)
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except yaml.YAMLError as exc:
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print(exc)
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sys.exit("ERROR: reading {0}".format(file_path))
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@@ -76,6 +86,7 @@ def generate_savedsearches_conf(detections, response_tasks, baselines, deploymen
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@return: the savedsearches.conf file located in package/default/
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'''
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utc_time = datetime.datetime.utcnow().replace(microsecond=0).isoformat()
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j2_env = Environment(loader=FileSystemLoader(TEMPLATE_PATH),
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@@ -567,10 +578,16 @@ def main(REPO_PATH, OUTPUT_PATH, PRODUCT, VERBOSE):
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workbench_panels_objects = generate_workbench_panels(objects["response_tasks"], objects["stories"], TEMPLATE_PATH, OUTPUT_PATH)
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# calculate deprecation totals
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deprecated = []
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for d in objects['detections']:
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if 'deprecated' in d:
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deprecated.append(d)
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if VERBOSE:
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print("{0} stories have been successfully written to {1}".format(len(objects["stories"]), story_path))
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print("{0} detections have been successfully written to {1}".format(len(objects["detections"]), detection_path))
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print("{0} detections have been marked deprecated on {1}".format(len(deprecated), detection_path))
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print("{0} response tasks have been successfully written to {1}".format(len(objects["response_tasks"]), detection_path))
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print("{0} baselines have been successfully written to {1}".format(len(objects["baselines"]), detection_path))
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print("{0} macros have been successfully written to {1}".format(len(objects["macros"]), macros_path))
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@@ -58,7 +58,11 @@ cron_schedule = {{ detection.deployment.scheduling.cron_schedule }}
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dispatch.earliest_time = {{ detection.deployment.scheduling.earliest_time }}
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dispatch.latest_time = {{ detection.deployment.scheduling.latest_time }}
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action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
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{% if detection.deprecated is defined %}
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action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - {{ detection.name }} - Rule
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{% else %}
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action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - {{ detection.name }} - Rule
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{% endif %}
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action.correlationsearch.annotations = {{ detection.savedsearch_annotations | tojson }}
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{% if detection.deployment.scheduling.schedule_window is defined %}
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schedule_window = {{ detection.deployment.scheduling.schedule_window }}
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+5
-2
@@ -41,7 +41,10 @@ def main(args):
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detections.extend(load_objects("detections/web/*.yml", REPO_PATH))
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detections_all = detections.copy()
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detections_all.extend(load_objects("detections/deprecated/*.yml", REPO_PATH))
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#lets exclude all deprecated detections from our reporting
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# detections_all.extend(load_objects("detections/deprecated/*.yml", REPO_PATH))
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detections_all.extend(load_objects("detections/experimental/*/*.yml", REPO_PATH))
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count_detections_all = len(detections_all)
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@@ -56,7 +59,7 @@ def main(args):
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for test in tests:
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counter_tests=counter_tests+1
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detection_coverage = "{:.0%}".format(counter_tests/counter_detection)
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TEMPLATE_PATH = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), 'jinja2_templates')
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+2
-2
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ def generate(args):
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print("ERROR: contentctl failed to find folder for deployment {0}".format(output))
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sys.exit(1)
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print("contentctl is generating a new splunk_app under ".format(output))
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print("contentctl is generating a new splunk_app under {}".format(output))
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generator.main(security_content_path, args.output, args.product, args.verbose)
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@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ def main(args):
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generate_parser.add_argument("-o", "--output", required=False, type=str, default="dist/escu",
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help="Path where to store the deployment package, defaults to `dist/escu`")
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generate_parser.add_argument("--product", required=False, type=str, default="ESCU",
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help="Type of package to create, choose between `ESCU`, or `SAAWS`. Defaults to `ESCU`")
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help="Type of package to create, choose between `ESCU`, or `SAAWS`. Defaults to `ESCU`")
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generate_parser.set_defaults(func=generate)
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# # parse them
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+58
-268
@@ -26,26 +26,6 @@ Herein lies the rub. In between the time between when the temporary credentials
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This Analytic Story includes searches that will help you monitor your AWS CloudTrail logs for evidence of suspicious cross-account activity. For example, while accessing multiple AWS accounts and roles may be perfectly valid behavior, it may be suspicious when an account requests privileges of an account it has not accessed in the past. After identifying suspicious activities, you can use the provided investigative searches to help you probe more deeply.
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product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud']
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[AWS Cryptomining]
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category = Cloud Security
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||||
creation_date = 2018-03-08
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modification_date = 2018-03-08
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id = ced74200-8465-4bc3-bd2c-9a782eec6750
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version = 1
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||||
reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
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detection_searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule"]
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mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 12", "CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1535"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP", "ID.AM"]}
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investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task"]
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support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Regions", "ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 AMIs", "ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Instance Types", "ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User"]
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data_models = []
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||||
providing_technologies = none
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description = Monitor your AWS EC2 instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or EC2 instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior.
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narrative = Cryptomining is an intentionally difficult, resource-intensive business. Its complexity was designed into the process to ensure that the number of blocks mined each day would remain steady. So, it's par for the course that ambitious, but unscrupulous, miners make amassing the computing power of large enterprises--a practice known as cryptojacking--a top priority. \
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Cryptojacking has attracted an increasing amount of media attention since its explosion in popularity in the fall of 2017. The attacks have moved from in-browser exploits and mobile phones to enterprise cloud services, such as Amazon Web Services (AWS). It's difficult to determine exactly how widespread the practice has become, since bad actors continually evolve their ability to escape detection, including employing unlisted endpoints, moderating their CPU usage, and hiding the mining pool's IP address behind a free CDN. \
|
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When malicious miners appropriate a cloud instance, often spinning up hundreds of new instances, the costs can become astronomical for the account holder. So, it is critically important to monitor your systems for suspicious activities that could indicate that your network has been infiltrated. \
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This Analytic Story is focused on detecting suspicious new instances in your EC2 environment to help prevent such a disaster. It contains detection searches that will detect when a previously unused instance type or AMI is used. It also contains support searches to build lookup files to ensure proper execution of the detection searches.
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product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud']
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[AWS IAM Privilege Escalation]
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category = Cloud Security
|
||||
creation_date = 2021-03-08
|
||||
@@ -71,8 +51,8 @@ modification_date = 2018-05-21
|
||||
id = 2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c50ff268af4
|
||||
version = 2
|
||||
reference = ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonVPC/latest/UserGuide/VPC_Appendix_NACLs.html", "https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/how-to-help-prepare-for-ddos-attacks-by-reducing-your-attack-surface/"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 11", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.007"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "DE.DP", "PR.AC"]}
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.007"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "DE.DP", "PR.AC"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of Network ACL Activity by ARN", "ESCU - Baseline of blocked outbound traffic from AWS"]
|
||||
data_models = []
|
||||
@@ -98,24 +78,6 @@ description = This story is focused around detecting Security Hub alerts generat
|
||||
narrative = AWS Security Hub collects and consolidates findings from AWS security services enabled in your environment, such as intrusion detection findings from Amazon GuardDuty, vulnerability scans from Amazon Inspector, S3 bucket policy findings from Amazon Macie, publicly accessible and cross-account resources from IAM Access Analyzer, and resources lacking WAF coverage from AWS Firewall Manager.
|
||||
product = ['Splunk Security Analytics for AWS', 'Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud']
|
||||
|
||||
[AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities]
|
||||
category = Cloud Security
|
||||
creation_date = 2018-03-16
|
||||
modification_date = 2018-03-16
|
||||
id = 3338b567-3804-4261-9889-cf0ca4753c7f
|
||||
version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From City - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Country - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Region - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources"]
|
||||
data_models = []
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
description = Monitor your AWS provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your network.
|
||||
narrative = Because most enterprise AWS activities originate from familiar geographic locations, monitoring for activity from unknown or unusual regions is an important security measure. This indicator can be especially useful in environments where it is impossible to add specific IPs to an allow list because they vary. \
|
||||
This Analytic Story was designed to provide you with flexibility in the precision you employ in specifying legitimate geographic regions. It can be as specific as an IP address or a city, or as broad as a region (think state) or an entire country. By determining how precise you want your geographical locations to be and monitoring for new locations that haven't previously accessed your environment, you can detect adversaries as they begin to probe your environment. Since there are legitimate reasons for activities from unfamiliar locations, this is not a standalone indicator. Nevertheless, location can be a relevant piece of information that you may wish to investigate further.
|
||||
product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud']
|
||||
|
||||
[AWS User Monitoring]
|
||||
category = Cloud Security
|
||||
creation_date = 2018-03-12
|
||||
@@ -123,8 +85,8 @@ modification_date = 2018-03-12
|
||||
id = 2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c50f1269af3
|
||||
version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://redlock.io/blog/cryptojacking-tesla"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Excessive Security Scanning - Rule", "ESCU - Detect API activity from users without MFA - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS API Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Security Group Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new API calls from user roles - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 13", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1526"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "DE.DP", "ID.AM", "PR.AC", "PR.DS"]}
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Excessive Security Scanning - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1526"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.DS"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of API Calls per User ARN", "ESCU - Baseline of Security Group Activity by ARN", "ESCU - Create a list of approved AWS service accounts", "ESCU - Previously seen API call per user roles in CloudTrail"]
|
||||
data_models = []
|
||||
@@ -243,11 +205,11 @@ modification_date = 2017-12-19
|
||||
id = 91c676cf-0b23-438d-abee-f6335e1fce78
|
||||
version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://www.zerofox.com/blog/what-is-digital-risk-monitoring/", "https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/consumer/family-safety/what-is-typosquatting/", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2016/06/explained-typosquatting/"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Delivery"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]}
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - DNSTwist Domain Names"]
|
||||
data_models = ["Email", "Network_Resolution", "Web"]
|
||||
data_models = ["Email", "Web"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
description = Detect and investigate activity that may indicate that an adversary is using faux domains to mislead users into interacting with malicious infrastructure. Monitor DNS, email, and web traffic for permutations of your brand name.
|
||||
narrative = While you can educate your users and customers about the risks and threats posed by typosquatting, phishing, and corporate espionage, human error is a persistent fact of life. Of course, your adversaries are all too aware of this reality and will happily leverage it for nefarious purposes whenever possible3phishing with lookalike addresses, embedding faux command-and-control domains in malware, and hosting malicious content on domains that closely mimic your corporate servers. This is where brand monitoring comes in.\
|
||||
@@ -299,8 +261,8 @@ modification_date = 2021-01-26
|
||||
id = cecdc1e7-0af2-4a55-8967-b9ea62c0317d
|
||||
version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/golden-saml-newly-discovered-attack-technique-forges-authentication-to-cloud-apps", "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf", "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - AWS SAML Access by Provider User and Principal - Rule", "ESCU - AWS SAML Update identity provider - Rule", "ESCU - Certutil exe certificate extraction - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Via PowerShell And EventCode 4703 - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Added Service Principal - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Excessive SSO logon errors - Rule", "ESCU - O365 New Federated Domain Added - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16", "CIS 2", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objective", "Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001", "T1078", "T1136.003", "T1546.012", "T1556"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.AC", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - AWS SAML Access by Provider User and Principal - Rule", "ESCU - AWS SAML Update identity provider - Rule", "ESCU - Certutil exe certificate extraction - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Added Service Principal - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Excessive SSO logon errors - Rule", "ESCU - O365 New Federated Domain Added - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 2", "CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objective", "Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001", "T1078", "T1136.003", "T1546.012", "T1556"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = []
|
||||
support_searches = []
|
||||
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
|
||||
@@ -342,8 +304,8 @@ modification_date = 2019-01-09
|
||||
id = bd91a2bc-d20b-4f44-a982-1bea98e86390
|
||||
version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://www.intego.com/mac-security-blog/osxcoldroot-and-the-rat-invasion/", "https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x2A.html", "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/coldroot-rat-still-undetectable-despite-being-uploaded-on-github-two-years-ago/"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection - Rule", "ESCU - Processes Tapping Keyboard Events - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 4", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Installation"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "DE.DP", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Processes Tapping Keyboard Events - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 4", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "nist": ["DE.DP"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = []
|
||||
data_models = []
|
||||
@@ -380,8 +342,8 @@ modification_date = 2018-06-01
|
||||
id = 943773c6-c4de-4f38-89a8-0b92f98804d8
|
||||
version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Command_and_Control", "https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/feature/Command-and-control-servers-The-puppet-masters-that-govern-malware"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App - Rule", "ESCU - Multiple Archive Files Http Post Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Plain HTTP POST Exfiltrated Data - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 11", "CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Delivery", "Exfiltration", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048", "T1048.003", "T1071.001", "T1071.004", "T1095", "T1189"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.AC", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App - Rule", "ESCU - Multiple Archive Files Http Post Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Plain HTTP POST Exfiltrated Data - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 11", "CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Delivery", "Exfiltration", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048", "T1048.003", "T1071.001", "T1071.004", "T1095", "T1189"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.DS", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK", "ESCU - Baseline of blocked outbound traffic from AWS"]
|
||||
data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Resolution", "Network_Traffic"]
|
||||
@@ -391,24 +353,6 @@ narrative = Threat actors typically architect and implement an infrastructure to
|
||||
Because this communication is so critical for an adversary, they often use techniques designed to hide the true nature of the communications. There are many different techniques used to establish and communicate over these channels. This Analytic Story provides searches that look for a variety of the techniques used for these channels, as well as indications that these channels are active, by examining logs associated with border control devices and network-access control lists.
|
||||
product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud']
|
||||
|
||||
[Common Phishing Frameworks]
|
||||
category = Adversary Tactics
|
||||
creation_date = 2019-04-29
|
||||
modification_date = 2019-04-29
|
||||
id = 9a64ab44-9214-4639-8163-7eaa2621bd61
|
||||
version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://github.com/kgretzky/evilginx2", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1192/", "https://breakdev.org/evilginx-advanced-phishing-with-two-factor-authentication-bypass/"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect DNS requests to Phishing Sites leveraging EvilGinx2 - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.003"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.IP"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Domain Certificate Investigation - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Certificate logs for a domain - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = []
|
||||
data_models = ["Network_Resolution"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
description = Detect DNS and web requests to fake websites generated by the EvilGinx2 toolkit. These websites are designed to fool unwitting users who have clicked on a malicious link in a phishing email.
|
||||
narrative = As most people know, these emails use fraudulent domains, [email scraping](https://www.cyberscoop.com/emotet-trojan-phishing-scraping-templates-cofense-geodo/), familiar contact names inserted as senders, and other tactics to lure targets into clicking a malicious link, opening an attachment with a [nefarious payload](https://www.cyberscoop.com/emotet-trojan-phishing-scraping-templates-cofense-geodo/), or entering sensitive personal information that perpetrators may intercept. This attack technique requires a relatively low level of skill and allows adversaries to easily cast a wide net. Because phishing is a technique that relies on human psychology, you will never be able to eliminate this vulnerability 100%. But you can use automated detection to significantly reduce the risks.\
|
||||
This Analytic Story focuses on detecting signs of MiTM attacks enabled by [EvilGinx2](https://github.com/kgretzky/evilginx2), a toolkit that sets up a transparent proxy between the targeted site and the user. In this way, the attacker is able to intercept credentials and two-factor identification tokens. It employs a proxy template to allow a registered domain to impersonate targeted sites, such as Linkedin, Amazon, Okta, Github, Twitter, Instagram, Reddit, Office 365, and others. It can even register SSL certificates and camouflage them via a URL shortener, making them difficult to detect. Searches in this story look for signs of MiTM attacks enabled by EvilGinx2.
|
||||
product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud']
|
||||
|
||||
[Container Implantation Monitoring and Investigation]
|
||||
category = Cloud Security
|
||||
creation_date = 2020-02-20
|
||||
@@ -416,7 +360,7 @@ modification_date = 2020-02-20
|
||||
id = aa0e28b1-0521-4b6f-9d2a-7b87e34af246
|
||||
version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://github.com/splunk/cloud-datamodel-security-research"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - GCP GCR container uploaded - Rule", "ESCU - New container uploaded to AWS ECR - Rule"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - New container uploaded to AWS ECR - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"mitre_attack": ["T1525"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = []
|
||||
support_searches = []
|
||||
@@ -490,8 +434,8 @@ modification_date = 2020-02-04
|
||||
id = 8169f17b-ef68-4b59-aa28-586907301221
|
||||
version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/", "http://www.noip.com/blog/2014/07/11/dynamic-dns-can-use-2/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/08/04/detecting-dynamic-dns-domains-in-splunk.html"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS record changed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003", "T1071.004", "T1189"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1189"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.DS", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - DNS Hijack Enrichment - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Discover DNS records"]
|
||||
data_models = ["Network_Resolution"]
|
||||
@@ -549,11 +493,11 @@ modification_date = 2017-09-14
|
||||
id = 91c676cf-0b23-438d-abee-f6335e1fce33
|
||||
version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/data-protection/", "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/dns/splunk-detect-dns-tunneling-37022", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect USB device insertion - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003", "T1189"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.DS", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1189"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.DS", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = []
|
||||
data_models = ["Change_Analysis", "Network_Resolution"]
|
||||
data_models = ["Network_Resolution"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
description = Fortify your data-protection arsenal--while continuing to ensure data confidentiality and integrity--with searches that monitor for and help you investigate possible signs of data exfiltration.
|
||||
narrative = Attackers can leverage a variety of resources to compromise or exfiltrate enterprise data. Common exfiltration techniques include remote-access channels via low-risk, high-payoff active-collections operations and close-access operations using insiders and removable media. While this Analytic Story is not a comprehensive listing of all the methods by which attackers can exfiltrate data, it provides a useful starting point.
|
||||
@@ -634,11 +578,11 @@ modification_date = 2018-09-06
|
||||
id = 8169f17b-ef68-4b59-aae8-586907301221
|
||||
version = 2
|
||||
reference = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/", "http://www.noip.com/blog/2014/07/11/dynamic-dns-can-use-2/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/08/04/detecting-dynamic-dns-domains-in-splunk.html"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048", "T1071.001", "T1189"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "DE.DP", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048", "T1189"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.DS", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = []
|
||||
data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Resolution", "Web"]
|
||||
data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Resolution"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
description = Detect and investigate hosts in your environment that may be communicating with dynamic domain providers. Attackers may leverage these services to help them avoid firewall blocks and deny lists.
|
||||
narrative = Dynamic DNS services (DDNS) are legitimate low-cost or free services that allow users to rapidly update domain resolutions to IP infrastructure. While their usage can be benign, malicious actors can abuse DDNS to host harmful payloads or interactive-command-and-control infrastructure. These attackers will manually update or automate domain resolution changes by routing dynamic domains to IP addresses that circumvent firewall blocks and deny lists and frustrate a network defender's analytic and investigative processes. These searches will look for DNS queries made from within your infrastructure to suspicious dynamic domains and then investigate more deeply, when appropriate. While this list of top-level dynamic domains is not exhaustive, it can be dynamically updated as new suspicious dynamic domains are identified.
|
||||
@@ -651,7 +595,7 @@ modification_date = 2020-01-27
|
||||
id = bb9f5ed2-916e-4364-bb6d-91c310efcf52
|
||||
version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-201A", "https://www.first.org/resources/papers/conf2017/Advanced-Incident-Detection-and-Threat-Hunting-using-Sysmon-and-Splunk.pdf", "https://www.vkremez.com/2017/05/emotet-banking-trojan-malware-analysis.html"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of tools built by NirSoft - Rule", "ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of tools built by NirSoft - Rule", "ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 2", "CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Delivery", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.002", "T1059.003", "T1072", "T1547.001", "T1566.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK"]
|
||||
@@ -687,7 +631,7 @@ modification_date = 2020-09-01
|
||||
id = 0432039c-ef41-4b03-b157-450c25dad1e6
|
||||
version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/understanding-service-accounts"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - GCP Detect accounts with high risk roles by project - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Detect gcploit framework - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Detect high risk permissions by resource and account - Rule", "ESCU - gcp detect oauth token abuse - Rule"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - GCP Detect gcploit framework - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = []
|
||||
@@ -725,8 +669,8 @@ modification_date = 2020-01-22
|
||||
id = baf7580b-d4b4-4774-8173-7d198e9da335
|
||||
version = 2
|
||||
reference = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/HIDDEN-COBRA-North-Korean-Malicious-Cyber-Activity", "https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Destructive-Malware-Report.pdf"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious File Write - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 16", "CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001", "T1021.002", "T1048.003", "T1059.001", "T1059.003", "T1070.005", "T1071.002", "T1071.004"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 16", "CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001", "T1021.002", "T1048.003", "T1070.005", "T1071.002", "T1071.004"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Outbound Emails to Hidden Cobra Threat Actors - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK", "ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments"]
|
||||
data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Resolution", "Network_Traffic"]
|
||||
@@ -738,23 +682,6 @@ In June of 2018, The Department of Homeland Security, together with the FBI and
|
||||
Among other searches in this Analytic Story is a detection search that looks for the creation or deletion of hidden shares, such as, "adnim$," which the Hidden Cobra malware creates on the target system. Another looks for the creation of three malicious files associated with the malware. You can also use a search in this story to investigate activity that indicates that malware is sending email back to the attackers.
|
||||
product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud']
|
||||
|
||||
[Host Redirection]
|
||||
category = Abuse
|
||||
creation_date = 2017-09-14
|
||||
modification_date = 2017-09-14
|
||||
id = 2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c50fe268af4
|
||||
version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2016/09/hosts-file-hijacks/"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Windows hosts file modification - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003", "T1071.004"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.AC", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = []
|
||||
data_models = ["Network_Resolution"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
description = Detect evidence of tactics used to redirect traffic from a host to a destination other than the one intended--potentially one that is part of an adversary's attack infrastructure. An example is redirecting communications regarding patches and updates or misleading users into visiting a malicious website.
|
||||
narrative = Attackers will often attempt to manipulate client communications for nefarious purposes. In some cases, an attacker may endeavor to modify a local host file to redirect communications with resources (such as antivirus or system-update services) to prevent clients from receiving patches or updates. In other cases, an attacker might use this tactic to have the client connect to a site that looks like the intended site, but instead installs malware or collects information from the victim. Additionally, an attacker may redirect a victim in order to execute a MITM attack and observe communications.
|
||||
product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud']
|
||||
|
||||
[Ingress Tool Transfer]
|
||||
category = Adversary Tactics
|
||||
creation_date = 2021-03-24
|
||||
@@ -810,7 +737,7 @@ modification_date = 2020-04-15
|
||||
id = a9ef59cf-e981-4e66-9eef-bb049f695c09
|
||||
version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://github.com/splunk/cloud-datamodel-security-research"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint - Rule"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster pod scan detection - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1526"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = []
|
||||
@@ -827,7 +754,7 @@ modification_date = 2020-05-20
|
||||
id = 2574e6d9-7254-4751-8925-0447deeec8ea
|
||||
version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/approaching-kubernetes-security-detecting-kubernetes-scan-with-splunk.html"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = []
|
||||
@@ -837,23 +764,6 @@ description = This story addresses detection and response of accounts acccesing
|
||||
narrative = Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration platform contains sensitive objects within its architecture, specifically configmaps and secrets, if accessed by an attacker can lead to further compromise. These searches allow operator to detect suspicious requests against Kubernetes sensitive objects.
|
||||
product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud']
|
||||
|
||||
[Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity]
|
||||
category = Cloud Security
|
||||
creation_date = 2020-05-20
|
||||
modification_date = 2020-05-20
|
||||
id = 2574e6d9-7254-4751-8925-0447deeec8ew
|
||||
version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/approaching-kubernetes-security-detecting-kubernetes-scan-with-splunk.html"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect most active service accounts by pod namespace - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect RBAC authorizations by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive role access - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = []
|
||||
data_models = []
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
description = This story addresses detection and response around Sensitive Role usage within a Kubernetes clusters against cluster resources and namespaces.
|
||||
narrative = Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration platform contains sensitive roles within its architecture, specifically configmaps and secrets, if accessed by an attacker can lead to further compromise. These searches allow operator to detect suspicious requests against Kubernetes role activities
|
||||
product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud']
|
||||
|
||||
[Lateral Movement]
|
||||
category = Adversary Tactics
|
||||
creation_date = 2020-02-04
|
||||
@@ -882,7 +792,7 @@ modification_date = 2017-08-23
|
||||
id = 2c8ff66e-0b57-42af-8ad7-912438a403fc
|
||||
version = 4
|
||||
reference = ["https://blogs.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/malware-employs-powershell-to-infect-systems/", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadFile - Rule", "ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Multiple Suspicious Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques - Rule", "ESCU - Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadFile - Rule", "ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques - Rule", "ESCU - Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1027", "T1059.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = []
|
||||
@@ -908,7 +818,7 @@ modification_date = 2021-04-26
|
||||
id = f0258af4-a6ae-11eb-b3c2-acde48001122
|
||||
version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/003/"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Execution of File with Multiple Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious msbuild path - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Execution of File with Multiple Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious msbuild path - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036.003", "T1127", "T1127.001", "T1218.011"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = []
|
||||
support_searches = []
|
||||
@@ -1017,7 +927,7 @@ modification_date = 2017-01-05
|
||||
id = 2b1800dd-92f9-47ec-a981-fdf1351e5f65
|
||||
version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/tn-archive/bb490939(v=technet.10)", "https://htmlpreview.github.io/?https://github.com/MatthewDemaske/blogbackup/blob/master/netshell.html", "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Processes created by netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.004"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments"]
|
||||
@@ -1052,8 +962,8 @@ modification_date = 2020-01-22
|
||||
id = bb9f5ed2-916e-4364-bb6d-97c370efcf52
|
||||
version = 2
|
||||
reference = ["https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/orangeworm-targets-healthcare-us-europe-asia", "https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/healthcare-targeted-by-hacker/"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 2", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001", "T1059.003", "T1543.003", "T1569.002"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 2", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543.003", "T1569.002"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update", "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments"]
|
||||
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
|
||||
@@ -1072,8 +982,8 @@ modification_date = 2020-01-22
|
||||
id = 988C59C5-0A1C-45B6-A555-0C62276E327E
|
||||
version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/scope-of-mudcarp-attacks-highlight-1/", "http://blog.amossys.fr/badflick-is-not-so-bad.html"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001", "T1059.003", "T1547.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001", "T1547.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments"]
|
||||
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
|
||||
@@ -1202,7 +1112,7 @@ modification_date = 2020-11-06
|
||||
id = 507edc74-13d5-4339-878e-b9744ded1f35
|
||||
version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/detecting-ryuk-using-splunk-attack-range.html", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/big-game-hunting-with-ryuk-another-lucrative-targeted-ransomware/", "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-302a"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Ryuk Test Files Detected - Rule", "ESCU - Ryuk Wake on LAN Command - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Security Account Manager Stopped - Rule", "ESCU - Windows connhost exe started forcefully - Rule"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Ryuk Test Files Detected - Rule", "ESCU - Ryuk Wake on LAN Command - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Security Account Manager Stopped - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 16", "CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Delivery", "Exploitation", "Lateral Movement", "Privilege Escalation", "Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001", "T1053.005", "T1059.003", "T1482", "T1485", "T1486", "T1489", "T1490", "T1562.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = []
|
||||
@@ -1293,86 +1203,6 @@ Following is a typical series of events, according to an [article by Trend Micro
|
||||
This Analytic Story focuses on detecting signs that a malicious payload has been injected into your environment. For example, one search detects outlook.exe writing a .zip file. Another looks for suspicious .lnk files launching processes.
|
||||
product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud']
|
||||
|
||||
[Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities]
|
||||
category = Vulnerability
|
||||
creation_date = 2018-01-08
|
||||
modification_date = 2018-01-08
|
||||
id = 6d3306f6-bb2b-4219-8609-8efad64032f2
|
||||
version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://meltdownattack.com/"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Spectre and Meltdown Vulnerable Systems - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 4"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "ID.RA", "PR.IP", "RS.MI"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Systems Ready for Spectre-Meltdown Windows Patch"]
|
||||
data_models = ["Vulnerabilities"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
description = Assess and mitigate your systems' vulnerability to Spectre and Meltdown exploitation with the searches in this Analytic Story.
|
||||
narrative = Meltdown and Spectre exploit critical vulnerabilities in modern CPUs that allow unintended access to data in memory. This Analytic Story will help you identify the systems can be patched for these vulnerabilities, as well as those that still need to be patched.
|
||||
product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud']
|
||||
|
||||
[Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability]
|
||||
category = Vulnerability
|
||||
creation_date = 2017-09-19
|
||||
modification_date = 2017-09-19
|
||||
id = 4e692b96-de2d-4bd1-9105-37e2368a8db1
|
||||
version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["http://www.splunk.com/view/SP-CAAAPQ6#announce", "https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2016-4859"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Open Redirect in Splunk Web - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 18", "CIS 3", "CIS 4"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "ID.RA", "PR.AC", "PR.IP", "PR.PT", "RS.MI"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = []
|
||||
data_models = []
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
description = Keeping your Splunk deployment up to date is critical and may help you reduce the risk of CVE-2016-4859, an open-redirection vulnerability within some older versions of Splunk Enterprise. The detection search will help ensure that users are being properly authenticated and not being redirected to malicious domains.
|
||||
narrative = This Analytic Story is associated with CVE-2016-4859, an open-redirect vulnerability in the following versions of Splunk Enterprise:\
|
||||
\
|
||||
1. Splunk Enterprise 6.4.x, prior to 6.4.3\
|
||||
1. Splunk Enterprise 6.3.x, prior to 6.3.6\
|
||||
1. Splunk Enterprise 6.2.x, prior to 6.2.10\
|
||||
1. Splunk Enterprise 6.1.x, prior to 6.1.11\
|
||||
1. Splunk Enterprise 6.0.x, prior to 6.0.12\
|
||||
1. Splunk Enterprise 5.0.x, prior to 5.0.16\
|
||||
1. Splunk Light, prior to 6.4.3CVE-2016-4859 allows attackers to redirect users to arbitrary web sites and conduct phishing attacks via unspecified vectors. (Credit: Noriaki Iwasaki, Cyber Defense Institute, Inc.).\
|
||||
It is important to ensure that your Splunk deployment is being kept up to date and is properly configured. This detection search allows analysts to monitor internal logs to ensure users are properly authenticated and cannot be redirected to any malicious third-party websites.
|
||||
product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud']
|
||||
|
||||
[Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409]
|
||||
category = Vulnerability
|
||||
creation_date = 2018-06-14
|
||||
modification_date = 2018-06-14
|
||||
id = 1fc34cbc-34e9-43ba-87ab-6811c9e95400
|
||||
version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-11409", "https://www.splunk.com/view/SP-CAAAP5E#VulnerabilityDescriptionsandRatings", "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44865/"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 18", "CIS 3", "CIS 4"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "ID.RA", "PR.AC", "PR.IP", "PR.PT", "RS.MI"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = []
|
||||
data_models = []
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
description = Reduce the risk of CVE-2018-11409, an information disclosure vulnerability within some older versions of Splunk Enterprise, with searches designed to help ensure that your Splunk system does not leak information to authenticated users.
|
||||
narrative = Although there have been no reports of it being exploited, Splunk Enterprise versions through 7.0.1 reportedly have a vulnerability that may expose information through a REST endpoint (read more here: https://www.splunk.com/view/SP-CAAAP5E#VulnerabilityDescriptionsandRatings). NIST has included it in its vulnerability database (read more here: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-11409). The REST endpoint that exposes system information is also necessary for the proper operation of Splunk clustering and instrumentation. Customers should upgrade to the latest version to reduce the risk of this vulnerability.\
|
||||
Splunk Enterprise exposes partial information about the host operating system, hardware, and Splunk license. Splunk Enterprise before 6.6.0 exposes this information without authentication. Splunk Enterprise 6.6.0 and later exposes this information only to authenticated Splunk users. Based on the information exposure, Splunk characterizes this issue as a low severity impact.\
|
||||
Read more in Splunk's official response: https://www.splunk.com/view/SP-CAAAP5E#VulnerabilityDescriptionsandRatings.\
|
||||
A detection search within this Analytic Story looks for vulnerabilities described in CVE-2018-11409: Information Exposure (https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-11409). If it turns up activities that may be specific, you can use the included investigative searches to return information regarding web activity and network traffic by src_ip.
|
||||
product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud']
|
||||
|
||||
[Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities]
|
||||
category = Cloud Security
|
||||
creation_date = 2018-02-09
|
||||
modification_date = 2018-02-09
|
||||
id = 2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c50f1268af3
|
||||
version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 12", "CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1535"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP", "ID.AM"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK", "ESCU - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Regions", "ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User"]
|
||||
data_models = []
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS EC2 instances for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as EC2 instances that originate from unusual locations or those launched by previously unseen users (among others). Included investigative searches will help you probe more deeply, when the information warrants it.
|
||||
narrative = AWS CloudTrail is an AWS service that helps you enable governance, compliance, and risk auditing within your AWS account. Actions taken by a user, role, or an AWS service are recorded as events in CloudTrail. It is crucial for a company to monitor events and actions taken in the AWS Console, AWS command-line interface, and AWS SDKs and APIs to ensure that your EC2 instances are not vulnerable to attacks. This Analytic Story identifies suspicious activities in your AWS EC2 instances and helps you respond and investigate those activities.
|
||||
product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud']
|
||||
|
||||
[Suspicious AWS Login Activities]
|
||||
category = Cloud Security
|
||||
creation_date = 2019-05-01
|
||||
@@ -1380,8 +1210,8 @@ modification_date = 2019-05-01
|
||||
id = 2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c59f1268af3
|
||||
version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integration.html"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new user AWS Console Login - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1535"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP"]}
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously seen users in CloudTrail", "ESCU - Update previously seen users in CloudTrail"]
|
||||
data_models = ["Authentication"]
|
||||
@@ -1507,8 +1337,8 @@ modification_date = 2020-02-03
|
||||
id = f4368ddf-d59f-4192-84f6-778ac5a3ffc7
|
||||
version = 2
|
||||
reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1059", "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/macro-malware", "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036.003", "T1059.001", "T1059.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036.003", "T1059.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments"]
|
||||
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
|
||||
@@ -1524,8 +1354,8 @@ modification_date = 2017-09-18
|
||||
id = 3c3835c0-255d-4f9e-ab84-e29ec9ec9b56
|
||||
version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["http://blogs.splunk.com/2015/10/01/random-words-on-entropy-and-dns/", "http://www.darkreading.com/analytics/security-monitoring/got-malware-three-signs-revealed-in-dns-traffic/d/d-id/1139680", "https://live.paloaltonetworks.com/t5/Threat-Vulnerability-Articles/What-are-suspicious-DNS-queries/ta-p/71454"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048", "T1048.003", "T1071.004", "T1189"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048", "T1048.003", "T1071.004", "T1189"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.DS", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK"]
|
||||
data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Resolution"]
|
||||
@@ -1541,11 +1371,11 @@ modification_date = 2020-01-27
|
||||
id = 2b1800dd-92f9-47ec-a981-fdf1351e5d55
|
||||
version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/06/26/phishing-hits-a-new-level-of-quality/"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 3", "CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.IP"]}
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 3", "CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.IP"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - DNSTwist Domain Names"]
|
||||
data_models = ["Email", "UEBA"]
|
||||
data_models = ["Email"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
description = Email remains one of the primary means for attackers to gain an initial foothold within the modern enterprise. Detect and investigate suspicious emails in your environment with the help of the searches in this Analytic Story.
|
||||
narrative = It is a common practice for attackers of all types to leverage targeted spearphishing campaigns and mass mailers to deliver weaponized email messages and attachments. Fortunately, there are a number of ways to monitor email data in Splunk to detect suspicious content.\
|
||||
@@ -1661,7 +1491,7 @@ modification_date = 2018-10-23
|
||||
id = c8ddc5be-69bc-4202-b3ab-4010b27d7ad5
|
||||
version = 2
|
||||
reference = ["https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Graeber-Abusing-Windows-Management-Instrumentation-WMI-To-Build-A-Persistent%20Asynchronous-And-Fileless-Backdoor-wp.pdf", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/wmimplant_a_wmi_ba.html"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Process Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - Script Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Temporary Event Subscription - Rule"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Process Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Script Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Temporary Event Subscription - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047", "T1546.003"], "nist": ["PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = []
|
||||
@@ -1680,11 +1510,11 @@ modification_date = 2018-05-31
|
||||
id = 2b1800dd-92f9-47dd-a981-fdf1351e5d55
|
||||
version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://redcanary.com/blog/windows-registry-attacks-threat-detection/", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1112"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.001", "T1546.011", "T1546.012", "T1547.001", "T1547.010", "T1548.002", "T1564.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.011", "T1546.012", "T1547.001", "T1547.010", "T1548.002"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = []
|
||||
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
|
||||
data_models = []
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
description = Monitor and detect registry changes initiated from remote locations, which can be a sign that an attacker has infiltrated your system.
|
||||
narrative = Attackers are developing increasingly sophisticated techniques for hijacking target servers, while evading detection. One such technique that has become progressively more common is registry modification.\
|
||||
@@ -1775,24 +1605,6 @@ Retrieval of script code\
|
||||
The objective of this step is to confirm the executed script code is benign or malicious.
|
||||
product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud']
|
||||
|
||||
[Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications]
|
||||
category = Cloud Security
|
||||
creation_date = 2018-04-09
|
||||
modification_date = 2018-04-09
|
||||
id = 73de57ef-0dfc-411f-b1e7-fa24428aeae0
|
||||
version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - EC2 Instance Modified With Previously Unseen User - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Modifications By User"]
|
||||
data_models = []
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
description = Identify unusual changes to your AWS EC2 instances that may indicate malicious activity. Modifications to your EC2 instances by previously unseen users is an example of an activity that may warrant further investigation.
|
||||
narrative = A common attack technique is to infiltrate a cloud instance and make modifications. The adversary can then secure access to your infrastructure or hide their activities. So it's important to stay alert to changes that may indicate that your environment has been compromised. \
|
||||
Searches within this Analytic Story can help you detect the presence of a threat by monitoring for EC2 instances that have been created or changed--either by users that have never previously performed these activities or by known users who modify or create instances in a way that have not been done before. This story also provides investigative searches that help you go deeper once you detect suspicious behavior.
|
||||
product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud']
|
||||
|
||||
[Unusual Processes]
|
||||
category = Malware
|
||||
creation_date = 2020-02-04
|
||||
@@ -1800,8 +1612,8 @@ modification_date = 2020-02-04
|
||||
id = f4368e3f-d59f-4192-84f6-748ac5a3ddb6
|
||||
version = 2
|
||||
reference = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/08/monitoring-windows-console-activity-part-two.html", "https://www.splunk.com/pdfs/technical-briefs/advanced-threat-detection-and-response-tech-brief.pdf", "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/logging/detecting-security-incidents-windows-workstation-event-logs-34262"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - WinRM Spawning a Process - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 2", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Denial of Service", "Exploitation", "Installation", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1016", "T1036.003", "T1190", "T1204.002", "T1218.011"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - WinRM Spawning a Process - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 2", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Denial of Service", "Exploitation", "Installation", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1016", "T1036.003", "T1190", "T1218.011"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK"]
|
||||
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
|
||||
@@ -1829,28 +1641,6 @@ description = Leverage searches that detect cleartext network protocols that may
|
||||
narrative = Various legacy protocols operate by default in the clear, without the protections of encryption. This potentially leaks sensitive information that can be exploited by passively sniffing network traffic. Depending on the protocol, this information could be highly sensitive, or could allow for session hijacking. In addition, these protocols send authentication information, which would allow for the harvesting of usernames and passwords that could potentially be used to authenticate and compromise secondary systems.
|
||||
product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud']
|
||||
|
||||
[Web Fraud Detection]
|
||||
category = Abuse
|
||||
creation_date = 2018-10-08
|
||||
modification_date = 2018-10-08
|
||||
id = 31337aaa-bc22-4752-b599-ef112dq1dq7a
|
||||
version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://www.fbi.gov/scams-and-safety/common-fraud-schemes/internet-fraud", "https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2017-internet-crime-report-released-050718"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Web Fraud - Account Harvesting - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Anomalous User Clickspeed - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Password Sharing Across Accounts - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16", "CIS 6"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1136"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "DE.DP"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Web Session Information via session id - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = []
|
||||
data_models = []
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
description = Monitor your environment for activity consistent with common attack techniques bad actors use when attempting to compromise web servers or other web-related assets.
|
||||
narrative = The Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) defines Internet fraud as the use of Internet services or software with Internet access to defraud victims or to otherwise take advantage of them. According to the Bureau, Internet crime schemes are used to steal millions of dollars each year from victims and continue to plague the Internet through various methods. The agency includes phishing scams, data breaches, Denial of Service (DOS) attacks, email account compromise, malware, spoofing, and ransomware in this category.\
|
||||
These crimes are not the fraud itself, but rather the attack techniques commonly employed by fraudsters in their pursuit of data that enables them to commit malicious actssuch as obtaining and using stolen credit cards. They represent a serious problem that is steadily increasing and not likely to go away anytime soon.\
|
||||
When developing a strategy for preventing fraud in your environment, its important to look across all of your web services for evidence that attackers are abusing enterprise resources to enumerate systems, harvest data for secondary fraudulent activity, or abuse terms of service.This Analytic Story looks for evidence of common Internet attack techniques that could be indicative of web fraud in your environmentincluding account harvesting, anomalous user clickspeed, and password sharing across accounts, to name just a few.\
|
||||
The account-harvesting search focuses on web pages used for user-account registration. It detects the creation of a large number of user accounts using the same email domain name, a type of activity frequently seen in advance of a fraud campaign.\
|
||||
The anomalous clickspeed search looks for users who are moving through your website at a faster-than-normal speed or with a perfect click cadence (high periodicity or low standard deviation), which could indicate that the user is a script, not an actual human.\
|
||||
Another search detects incidents wherein a single password is used across multiple accounts, which may indicate that a fraudster has infiltrated your environment and embedded a common password within a script.
|
||||
product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud']
|
||||
|
||||
[Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350]
|
||||
category = Adversary Tactics
|
||||
creation_date = 2020-07-28
|
||||
@@ -1875,7 +1665,7 @@ modification_date = 2018-05-31
|
||||
id = 56e24a28-5003-4047-b2db-e8f3c4618064
|
||||
version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Defense_Evasion"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Disable Registry Tool - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Show Hidden Files - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Windows SmartScreen Protection - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling CMD Application - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling ControlPanel - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Firewall with Netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling FolderOptions Windows Feature - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling NoRun Windows App - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling SystemRestore In Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Task Manager - Rule", "ESCU - Eventvwr UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - FodHelper UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - SLUI RunAs Elevated - Rule", "ESCU - SLUI Spawning a Process - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Disable Registry Tool - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Show Hidden Files - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Windows SmartScreen Protection - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling CMD Application - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling ControlPanel - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Firewall with Netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling FolderOptions Windows Feature - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling NoRun Windows App - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling SystemRestore In Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Task Manager - Rule", "ESCU - Eventvwr UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - FodHelper UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - SLUI RunAs Elevated - Rule", "ESCU - SLUI Spawning a Process - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Delivery", "Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112", "T1222.001", "T1548.002", "T1562.001", "T1564.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = []
|
||||
@@ -1892,8 +1682,8 @@ modification_date = 2018-01-26
|
||||
id = 30552a76-ac78-48e4-b3c0-de4e34e9563d
|
||||
version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2013/12/file-extensions-2/", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1042"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Execution of File with Multiple Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036.003", "T1546.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Execution of File with Multiple Extensions - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = []
|
||||
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
|
||||
@@ -1931,8 +1721,8 @@ modification_date = 2018-05-31
|
||||
id = 30874d4f-20a1-488f-85ec-5d52ef74e3f9
|
||||
version = 2
|
||||
reference = ["http://www.fuzzysecurity.com/tutorials/19.html", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2010/07/malware-persistence-windows-registry.html", "http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/common-malware-persistence-mechanisms/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/fin7-shim-databases-persistence.html", "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dq2Hv7J9fvk"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Certutil exe certificate extraction - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Schedule Task with HTTP Command Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation", "Installation", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053", "T1053.005", "T1222.001", "T1543.003", "T1546.011", "T1547.001", "T1547.010", "T1564.001", "T1574.009", "T1574.011"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Certutil exe certificate extraction - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Schedule Task with HTTP Command Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation", "Installation", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053", "T1053.005", "T1222.001", "T1543.003", "T1546.011", "T1547.001", "T1547.010", "T1574.009", "T1574.011"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = []
|
||||
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
|
||||
@@ -1948,8 +1738,8 @@ modification_date = 2020-02-04
|
||||
id = 644e22d3-598a-429c-a007-16fdb802cae5
|
||||
version = 2
|
||||
reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Child Processes of Spoolsv exe - Rule", "ESCU - Overwriting Accessibility Binaries - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 2", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068", "T1204.002", "T1546.008", "T1546.012"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.AC", "PR.DS", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Child Processes of Spoolsv exe - Rule", "ESCU - Overwriting Accessibility Binaries - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068", "T1546.008", "T1546.012"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = []
|
||||
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
|
||||
|
||||
-77
@@ -6,13 +6,6 @@ disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_accesskeyid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_aws_cryptomining]
|
||||
label = AWS Cryptomining
|
||||
description = Monitor your AWS EC2 instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or EC2 instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_aws_iam_privilege_escalation]
|
||||
label = AWS IAM Privilege Escalation
|
||||
description = This analytic story contains detections that query your AWS Cloudtrail for activities related to privilege escalation.
|
||||
@@ -34,13 +27,6 @@ disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_aws_suspicious_provisioning_activities]
|
||||
label = AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities
|
||||
description = Monitor your AWS provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your network.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_city___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_country___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_region___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_aws_user_monitoring]
|
||||
label = AWS User Monitoring
|
||||
description = Detect and investigate dormant user accounts for your AWS environment that have become active again. Because inactive and ad-hoc accounts are common attack targets, it's critical to enable governance within your environment.
|
||||
@@ -139,13 +125,6 @@ disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_common_phishing_frameworks]
|
||||
label = Common Phishing Frameworks
|
||||
description = Detect DNS and web requests to fake websites generated by the EvilGinx2 toolkit. These websites are designed to fool unwitting users who have clicked on a malicious link in a phishing email.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_domain_certificate_investigation___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_certificate_logs_for_a_domain___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_container_implantation_monitoring_and_investigation]
|
||||
label = Container Implantation Monitoring and Investigation
|
||||
description = Use the searches in this story to monitor your Kubernetes registry repositories for upload, and deployment of potentially vulnerable, backdoor, or implanted containers. These searches provide information on source users, destination path, container names and repository names. The searches provide context to address Mitre T1525 which refers to container implantation upload to a company's repository either in Amazon Elastic Container Registry, Google Container Registry and Azure Container Registry.
|
||||
@@ -272,13 +251,6 @@ disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_outbound_emails_to_hidden_cobra_threat_actors___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_host_redirection]
|
||||
label = Host Redirection
|
||||
description = Detect evidence of tactics used to redirect traffic from a host to a destination other than the one intended--potentially one that is part of an adversary's attack infrastructure. An example is redirecting communications regarding patches and updates or misleading users into visiting a malicious website.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_ingress_tool_transfer]
|
||||
label = Ingress Tool Transfer
|
||||
description = Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Files may be copied from an external adversary controlled system through the command and control channel to bring tools into the victim network or through alternate protocols with another tool such as FTP.
|
||||
@@ -307,13 +279,6 @@ disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_kubernetes_sensitive_role_activity]
|
||||
label = Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity
|
||||
description = This story addresses detection and response around Sensitive Role usage within a Kubernetes clusters against cluster resources and namespaces.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_lateral_movement]
|
||||
label = Lateral Movement
|
||||
description = Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures around how attackers move laterally within the enterprise. Because lateral movement can expose the adversary to detection, it should be an important focus for security analysts.
|
||||
@@ -468,34 +433,6 @@ disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerabilities]
|
||||
label = Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities
|
||||
description = Assess and mitigate your systems' vulnerability to Spectre and Meltdown exploitation with the searches in this Analytic Story.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_splunk_enterprise_vulnerability]
|
||||
label = Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability
|
||||
description = Keeping your Splunk deployment up to date is critical and may help you reduce the risk of CVE-2016-4859, an open-redirection vulnerability within some older versions of Splunk Enterprise. The detection search will help ensure that users are being properly authenticated and not being redirected to malicious domains.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_splunk_enterprise_vulnerability_cve_2018_11409]
|
||||
label = Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409
|
||||
description = Reduce the risk of CVE-2018-11409, an information disclosure vulnerability within some older versions of Splunk Enterprise, with searches designed to help ensure that your Splunk system does not leak information to authenticated users.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_network_traffic_from_src_ip___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_aws_ec2_activities]
|
||||
label = Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities
|
||||
description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS EC2 instances for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as EC2 instances that originate from unusual locations or those launched by previously unseen users (among others). Included investigative searches will help you probe more deeply, when the information warrants it.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_aws_login_activities]
|
||||
label = Suspicious AWS Login Activities
|
||||
description = Monitor your AWS authentication events using your CloudTrail logs. Searches within this Analytic Story will help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious logins.
|
||||
@@ -643,13 +580,6 @@ disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_unusual_aws_ec2_modifications]
|
||||
label = Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications
|
||||
description = Identify unusual changes to your AWS EC2 instances that may indicate malicious activity. Modifications to your EC2 instances by previously unseen users is an example of an activity that may warrant further investigation.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_unusual_processes]
|
||||
label = Unusual Processes
|
||||
description = Quickly identify systems running new or unusual processes in your environment that could be indicators of suspicious activity. Processes run from unusual locations, those with conspicuously long command lines, and rare executables are all examples of activities that may warrant deeper investigation.
|
||||
@@ -664,13 +594,6 @@ disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_web_fraud_detection]
|
||||
label = Web Fraud Detection
|
||||
description = Monitor your environment for activity consistent with common attack techniques bad actors use when attempting to compromise web servers or other web-related assets.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_emails_from_specific_sender___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_web_session_information_via_session_id___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_windows_dns_sigred_cve_2020_1350]
|
||||
label = Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350
|
||||
description = Uncover activity consistent with CVE-2020-1350, or SIGRed. Discovered by Checkpoint researchers, this vulnerability affects Windows 2003 to 2019, and is triggered by a malicious DNS response (only affects DNS over TCP). An attacker can use the malicious payload to cause a buffer overflow on the vulnerable system, leading to compromise. The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify the large response payload for SIG and KEY DNS records which can be used for the exploit.
|
||||
|
||||
Vendored
+4
-300
@@ -295,22 +295,6 @@ description = customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcet
|
||||
definition = index=zeek sourcetype="zeek:ssl:json"
|
||||
description = customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.
|
||||
|
||||
[aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[aws_create_policy_version_to_allow_all_resources_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
@@ -335,10 +319,6 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[aws_eks_kubernetes_cluster_sensitive_object_access_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[aws_excessive_security_scanning_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
@@ -387,22 +367,6 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
@@ -511,10 +475,6 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[clop_common_exec_parameter_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
@@ -547,10 +507,6 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_city_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
@@ -635,14 +591,6 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[dns_record_changed_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[dsquery_domain_discovery_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
@@ -659,18 +607,10 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[detect_arp_poisoning_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
@@ -719,10 +659,6 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
@@ -767,10 +703,6 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[detect_long_dns_txt_record_response_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[detect_mshta_url_in_command_line_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
@@ -779,10 +711,6 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[detect_new_local_admin_account_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
@@ -923,10 +851,6 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[detect_spike_in_aws_api_activity_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
@@ -935,18 +859,10 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[detect_spike_in_security_group_activity_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
@@ -955,10 +871,6 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[detect_usb_device_insertion_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
@@ -999,26 +911,10 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[detect_new_user_aws_console_login_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[detection_of_dns_tunnels_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
@@ -1095,26 +991,6 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_ami_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_instance_type_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
@@ -1183,18 +1059,10 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[execution_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[extract_sam_from_registry_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
@@ -1211,38 +1079,18 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[first_time_seen_command_line_argument_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[fodhelper_uac_bypass_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[gcp_detect_accounts_with_high_risk_roles_by_project_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[gcp_detect_gcploit_framework_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[gcp_detect_high_risk_permissions_by_resource_and_account_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[gcp_gcr_container_uploaded_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[gcp_kubernetes_cluster_pod_scan_detection_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[gcp_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[gpupdate_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
@@ -1279,10 +1127,6 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[identify_new_user_accounts_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
@@ -1311,62 +1155,6 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[kubernetes_azure_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[kubernetes_azure_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_namespace_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_object_access_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_role_access_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[kubernetes_azure_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[kubernetes_azure_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[kubernetes_azure_pod_scan_fingerprint_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[kubernetes_azure_scan_fingerprint_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[kubernetes_gcp_detect_rbac_authorizations_by_account_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[kubernetes_gcp_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_object_access_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_role_access_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[kubernetes_gcp_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[kubernetes_gcp_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[large_volume_of_dns_any_queries_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
@@ -1379,6 +1167,10 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[mailsniper_invoke_functions_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[malicious_powershell_process___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
@@ -1391,10 +1183,6 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[malicious_powershell_process___multiple_suspicious_command_line_arguments_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
@@ -1411,10 +1199,6 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[monitor_email_for_brand_abuse_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
@@ -1579,14 +1363,6 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[open_redirect_in_splunk_web_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[osquery_pack___coldroot_detection_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[overwriting_accessibility_binaries_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
@@ -1623,10 +1399,6 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[processes_created_by_netsh_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[processes_launching_netsh_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
@@ -1635,10 +1407,6 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[prohibited_software_on_endpoint_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[protocol_or_port_mismatch_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
@@ -1655,10 +1423,6 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[registry_keys_used_for_persistence_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
@@ -1687,14 +1451,6 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[remote_registry_key_modifications_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[remote_wmi_command_attempt_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[resize_shadowstorage_volume_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
@@ -1763,10 +1519,6 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[scheduled_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[schtasks_run_task_on_demand_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
@@ -1815,18 +1567,10 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[spike_in_file_writes_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[splunk_enterprise_information_disclosure_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
@@ -1835,10 +1579,6 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[suspicious_changes_to_file_associations_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[suspicious_curl_network_connection_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
@@ -1851,18 +1591,10 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[suspicious_email___uba_anomaly_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[suspicious_email_attachment_extensions_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[suspicious_file_write_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[suspicious_gpupdate_no_command_line_arguments_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
@@ -1951,10 +1683,6 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[suspicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
@@ -1979,10 +1707,6 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[uncommon_processes_on_endpoint_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[unified_messaging_service_spawning_a_process_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
@@ -1991,14 +1715,6 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[unsuccessful_netbackup_backups_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[unusually_long_command_line_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
@@ -2091,14 +1807,6 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[windows_connhost_exe_started_forcefully_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[windows_hosts_file_modification_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[winword_spawning_cmd_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
@@ -2139,7 +1847,3 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[gcp_detect_oauth_token_abuse_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Vendored
+409
-425
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
+32
-960
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
+334
-210
@@ -1,59 +1,182 @@
|
||||
mitre_id,technique,tactics,groups
|
||||
T1205.001,Port Knocking,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Command And Control,no
|
||||
T1553.006,Code Signing Policy Modification,Defense Evasion,Turla|APT39
|
||||
T1614,System Location Discovery,Discovery,no
|
||||
T1613,Container and Resource Discovery,Discovery,no
|
||||
T1552.007,Container API,Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1612,Build Image on Host,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1611,Escape to Host,Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1204.003,Malicious Image,Execution,no
|
||||
T1053.007,Container Orchestration Job,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1610,Deploy Container,Defense Evasion|Execution,no
|
||||
T1609,Container Administration Command,Execution,no
|
||||
T1608.005,Link Target,Resource Development,Silent Librarian
|
||||
T1608.004,Drive-by Target,Resource Development,APT32|Threat Group-3390
|
||||
T1608.003,Install Digital Certificate,Resource Development,no
|
||||
T1608.002,Upload Tool,Resource Development,Threat Group-3390
|
||||
T1608.001,Upload Malware,Resource Development,APT32
|
||||
T1608,Stage Capabilities,Resource Development,no
|
||||
T1016.001,Internet Connection Discovery,Discovery,APT29|UNC2452|Turla
|
||||
T1553.005,Mark-of-the-Web Bypass,Defense Evasion,TA505
|
||||
T1555.005,Password Managers,Credential Access,Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao
|
||||
T1484.002,Domain Trust Modification,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,APT29|UNC2452
|
||||
T1484.001,Group Policy Modification,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Indrik Spider
|
||||
T1547.014,Active Setup,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1606.002,SAML Tokens,Credential Access,APT29|UNC2452
|
||||
T1606.001,Web Cookies,Credential Access,APT29|UNC2452
|
||||
T1606,Forge Web Credentials,Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1555.004,Windows Credential Manager,Credential Access,Stealth Falcon|OilRig|Turla
|
||||
T1059.008,Network Device CLI,Execution,no
|
||||
T1602.002,Network Device Configuration Dump,Collection,no
|
||||
T1542.005,TFTP Boot,Defense Evasion|Persistence,no
|
||||
T1542.004,ROMMONkit,Defense Evasion|Persistence,no
|
||||
T1602.001,SNMP (MIB Dump),Collection,no
|
||||
T1602,Data from Configuration Repository,Collection,no
|
||||
T1601.002,Downgrade System Image,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1601.001,Patch System Image,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1601,Modify System Image,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1600.002,Disable Crypto Hardware,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1600.001,Reduce Key Space,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1600,Weaken Encryption,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1556.004,Network Device Authentication,Credential Access|Defense Evasion|Persistence,no
|
||||
T1599.001,Network Address Translation Traversal,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1599,Network Boundary Bridging,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1020.001,Traffic Duplication,Exfiltration,no
|
||||
T1557.002,ARP Cache Poisoning,Credential Access|Collection,Cleaver
|
||||
T1588.006,Vulnerabilities,Resource Development,Sandworm Team
|
||||
T1053.006,Systemd Timers,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1562.008,Disable Cloud Logs,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1547.012,Print Processors,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1598.003,Spearphishing Link,Reconnaissance,Silent Librarian|Sidewinder|Sandworm Team|APT32|Kimsuky
|
||||
T1598.002,Spearphishing Attachment,Reconnaissance,Sidewinder
|
||||
T1598.001,Spearphishing Service,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1598,Phishing for Information,Reconnaissance,ZIRCONIUM|APT28
|
||||
T1597.002,Purchase Technical Data,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1597.001,Threat Intel Vendors,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1597,Search Closed Sources,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1596.005,Scan Databases,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1596.004,CDNs,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1596.003,Digital Certificates,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1596.001,DNS/Passive DNS,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1596.002,WHOIS,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1596,Search Open Technical Databases,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1595.002,Vulnerability Scanning,Reconnaissance,Volatile Cedar|APT28|Sandworm Team
|
||||
T1595.001,Scanning IP Blocks,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1595,Active Scanning,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1594,Search Victim-Owned Websites,Reconnaissance,Silent Librarian|Sandworm Team
|
||||
T1593.002,Search Engines,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1593.001,Social Media,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1593,Search Open Websites/Domains,Reconnaissance,Sandworm Team
|
||||
T1592.004,Client Configurations,Reconnaissance,HAFNIUM
|
||||
T1592.003,Firmware,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1592.002,Software,Reconnaissance,Sandworm Team
|
||||
T1592.001,Hardware,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1592,Gather Victim Host Information,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1591.004,Identify Roles,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1591.003,Identify Business Tempo,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1591.001,Determine Physical Locations,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1591.002,Business Relationships,Reconnaissance,Sandworm Team
|
||||
T1591,Gather Victim Org Information,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1590.006,Network Security Appliances,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1590.005,IP Addresses,Reconnaissance,HAFNIUM
|
||||
T1590.004,Network Topology,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1590.003,Network Trust Dependencies,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1590.002,DNS,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1590.001,Domain Properties,Reconnaissance,Sandworm Team
|
||||
T1590,Gather Victim Network Information,Reconnaissance,HAFNIUM
|
||||
T1589.003,Employee Names,Reconnaissance,Silent Librarian|Sandworm Team
|
||||
T1589.002,Email Addresses,Reconnaissance,TA551|MuddyWater|HAFNIUM|APT32|Silent Librarian|Sandworm Team
|
||||
T1589.001,Credentials,Reconnaissance,APT28|Magic Hound|Chimera
|
||||
T1589,Gather Victim Identity Information,Reconnaissance,APT32
|
||||
T1588.005,Exploits,Resource Development,no
|
||||
T1588.004,Digital Certificates,Resource Development,Lazarus Group|Silent Librarian
|
||||
T1588.003,Code Signing Certificates,Resource Development,Wizard Spider
|
||||
T1588.002,Tool,Resource Development,MuddyWater|Silent Librarian|GALLIUM|Sandworm Team
|
||||
T1588.001,Malware,Resource Development,Turla|APT1
|
||||
T1588,Obtain Capabilities,Resource Development,no
|
||||
T1587.004,Exploits,Resource Development,no
|
||||
T1587.003,Digital Certificates,Resource Development,APT29|PROMETHIUM
|
||||
T1587.002,Code Signing Certificates,Resource Development,PROMETHIUM|Patchwork
|
||||
T1587.001,Malware,Resource Development,APT29|Lazarus Group|UNC2452|Sandworm Team|Turla|FIN7|Night Dragon|Cleaver
|
||||
T1587,Develop Capabilities,Resource Development,Kimsuky
|
||||
T1586.002,Email Accounts,Resource Development,Magic Hound|Kimsuky
|
||||
T1586.001,Social Media Accounts,Resource Development,no
|
||||
T1586,Compromise Accounts,Resource Development,no
|
||||
T1585.002,Email Accounts,Resource Development,Magic Hound|Silent Librarian|Sandworm Team|APT1
|
||||
T1585.001,Social Media Accounts,Resource Development,Fox Kitten|Sandworm Team|APT32|Cleaver
|
||||
T1585,Establish Accounts,Resource Development,Fox Kitten|APT17
|
||||
T1584.006,Web Services,Resource Development,Turla
|
||||
T1584.005,Botnet,Resource Development,no
|
||||
T1584.004,Server,Resource Development,Indrik Spider|Turla|APT16
|
||||
T1584.003,Virtual Private Server,Resource Development,Turla
|
||||
T1584.002,DNS Server,Resource Development,no
|
||||
T1584.001,Domains,Resource Development,APT29|UNC2452|APT1
|
||||
T1583.006,Web Services,Resource Development,ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|HAFNIUM|Lazarus Group|Turla|APT32|APT17|APT29
|
||||
T1583.005,Botnet,Resource Development,no
|
||||
T1583.004,Server,Resource Development,GALLIUM|Sandworm Team
|
||||
T1583.003,Virtual Private Server,Resource Development,HAFNIUM|TEMP.Veles
|
||||
T1583.002,DNS Server,Resource Development,no
|
||||
T1584,Compromise Infrastructure,Resource Development,no
|
||||
T1583.001,Domains,Resource Development,APT29|Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|UNC2452|Lazarus Group|Silent Librarian|menuPass|Sandworm Team|APT32|Kimsuky|APT1|APT28
|
||||
T1583,Acquire Infrastructure,Resource Development,no
|
||||
T1564.007,VBA Stomping,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1558.004,AS-REP Roasting,Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1580,Cloud Infrastructure Discovery,Discovery,no
|
||||
T1218.012,Verclsid,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1205.001,Port Knocking,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Command And Control,PROMETHIUM
|
||||
T1564.006,Run Virtual Instance,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1564.005,Hidden File System,Defense Evasion,Strider|Equation
|
||||
T1556.003,Pluggable Authentication Modules,Credential Access|Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1556.003,Pluggable Authentication Modules,Credential Access|Defense Evasion|Persistence,no
|
||||
T1574.012,COR_PROFILER,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,Blue Mockingbird
|
||||
T1562.007,Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1098.004,SSH Authorized Keys,Persistence,no
|
||||
T1480.001,Environmental Keying,Defense Evasion,APT41|Equation
|
||||
T1059.007,JavaScript/JScript,Execution,APT32|FIN7|Cobalt Group|Molerats|TA505|Silence|Leafminer
|
||||
T1059.007,JavaScript,Execution,MuddyWater|Turla|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Evilnum|Kimsuky|FIN6|APT32|FIN7|Cobalt Group|Molerats|TA505|Silence|Leafminer
|
||||
T1578.004,Revert Cloud Instance,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1578.003,Delete Cloud Instance,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1578.001,Create Snapshot,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1578.002,Create Cloud Instance,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1127.001,MSBuild,Defense Evasion,Frankenstein
|
||||
T1027.005,Indicator Removal from Tools,Defense Evasion,Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|Patchwork|APT3|Turla|OilRig|Deep Panda
|
||||
T1027.005,Indicator Removal from Tools,Defense Evasion,Operation Wocao|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|Patchwork|APT3|Turla|OilRig|Deep Panda
|
||||
T1562.006,Indicator Blocking,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1573.002,Asymmetric Cryptography,Command And Control,Tropic Trooper|Cobalt Group|OilRig|FIN8|FIN6
|
||||
T1573.001,Symmetric Cryptography,Command And Control,Frankenstein|Inception|APT28|APT33|BRONZE BUTLER|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1573.002,Asymmetric Cryptography,Command And Control,Operation Wocao|Tropic Trooper|Cobalt Group|OilRig|FIN8|FIN6
|
||||
T1573.001,Symmetric Cryptography,Command And Control,Mustang Panda|Darkhotel|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Frankenstein|Inception|APT28|APT33|BRONZE BUTLER|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1573,Encrypted Channel,Command And Control,Tropic Trooper
|
||||
T1027.004,Compile After Delivery,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|Rocke|MuddyWater
|
||||
T1574.004,Dylib Hijacking,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1546.015,Component Object Model Hijacking,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,APT28
|
||||
T1071.004,DNS,Command And Control,APT39|Tropic Trooper|OilRig|Ke3chang|Cobalt Group|APT18|APT41|FIN7
|
||||
T1071.003,Mail Protocols,Command And Control,APT32|SilverTerrier|APT28
|
||||
T1071.002,File Transfer Protocols,Command And Control,APT41|SilverTerrier|Machete|Honeybee
|
||||
T1071.001,Web Protocols,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|TA505|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Inception|APT41|SilverTerrier|Machete|APT28|WIRTE|APT33|FIN4|Night Dragon|APT18|APT38|Cobalt Group|APT19|Threat Group-3390|Rancor|Orangeworm|APT37|Ke3chang|Dark Caracal|Turla|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|OilRig|Magic Hound|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon
|
||||
T1572,Protocol Tunneling,Command And Control,OilRig|Cobalt Group|FIN6
|
||||
T1048.003,Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol,Exfiltration,APT32|APT33|Thrip|FIN8|OilRig|Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1048.002,Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol,Exfiltration,no
|
||||
T1071.004,DNS,Command And Control,Chimera|APT39|Tropic Trooper|OilRig|Ke3chang|Cobalt Group|APT18|APT41|FIN7
|
||||
T1071.003,Mail Protocols,Command And Control,Turla|Kimsuky|APT32|SilverTerrier|APT28
|
||||
T1071.002,File Transfer Protocols,Command And Control,Kimsuky|APT41|SilverTerrier|Honeybee
|
||||
T1071.001,Web Protocols,Command And Control,APT29|Mustang Panda|Windshift|TA551|Higaisa|HAFNIUM|Sidewinder|Chimera|UNC2452|Sandworm Team|TA505|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Inception|APT41|SilverTerrier|APT28|WIRTE|APT33|FIN4|Night Dragon|APT18|APT38|Ke3chang|Orangeworm|APT19|Cobalt Group|Threat Group-3390|Rancor|APT37|Dark Caracal|Turla|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|APT32|OilRig|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon
|
||||
T1572,Protocol Tunneling,Command And Control,Chimera|Fox Kitten|OilRig|Cobalt Group|FIN6
|
||||
T1048.003,Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol,Exfiltration,Wizard Spider|FIN6|APT32|APT33|Thrip|FIN8|OilRig|Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1048.002,Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol,Exfiltration,APT29|UNC2452
|
||||
T1048.001,Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol,Exfiltration,no
|
||||
T1001.003,Protocol Impersonation,Command And Control,Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1001.002,Steganography,Command And Control,Axiom
|
||||
T1001.003,Protocol Impersonation,Command And Control,Higaisa|Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1001.002,Steganography,Command And Control,APT29|Axiom
|
||||
T1001.001,Junk Data,Command And Control,APT28
|
||||
T1132.002,Non-Standard Encoding,Command And Control,no
|
||||
T1132.001,Standard Encoding,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|APT33|APT19|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork
|
||||
T1132.001,Standard Encoding,Command And Control,HAFNIUM|TA551|Sandworm Team|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|APT33|APT19|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork
|
||||
T1090.004,Domain Fronting,Command And Control,APT29
|
||||
T1090.003,Multi-hop Proxy,Command And Control,Inception|FIN4|APT29
|
||||
T1090.002,External Proxy,Command And Control,APT39|Silence|Soft Cell|MuddyWater|APT3|FIN5|Lazarus Group|menuPass|APT28
|
||||
T1090.001,Internal Proxy,Command And Control,APT39|Strider
|
||||
T1090.003,Multi-hop Proxy,Command And Control,APT28|Operation Wocao|Inception|FIN4|APT29
|
||||
T1090.002,External Proxy,Command And Control,APT39|Silence|GALLIUM|MuddyWater|APT3|FIN5|Lazarus Group|menuPass|APT28
|
||||
T1090.001,Internal Proxy,Command And Control,APT29|Higaisa|UNC2452|Operation Wocao|APT39|Strider
|
||||
T1102.003,One-Way Communication,Command And Control,Leviathan
|
||||
T1102.002,Bidirectional Communication,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|APT39|APT12|Turla|FIN7|APT37|Magic Hound|Carbanak
|
||||
T1102.002,Bidirectional Communication,Command And Control,ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|APT28|APT29|Sandworm Team|APT39|APT12|FIN7|Turla|APT37|Magic Hound|Carbanak
|
||||
T1102.001,Dead Drop Resolver,Command And Control,Rocke|APT41|BRONZE BUTLER|RTM|Patchwork
|
||||
T1571,Non-Standard Port,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|Rocke|DarkVishnya|Silence|APT-C-36|Magic Hound|APT33|APT32|TEMP.Veles|Lazarus Group|FIN7
|
||||
T1074.002,Remote Data Staging,Collection,Threat Group-3390|menuPass|FIN6|Night Dragon|FIN8
|
||||
T1074.001,Local Data Staging,Collection,Machete|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|Patchwork|Dragonfly 2.0|Honeybee|Leviathan|APT3|FIN5|menuPass|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28
|
||||
T1074.002,Remote Data Staging,Collection,APT29|Chimera|UNC2452|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|FIN6|Night Dragon|FIN8
|
||||
T1074.001,Local Data Staging,Collection,Mustang Panda|Sidewinder|Chimera|Kimsuky|APT39|Operation Wocao|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|Patchwork|Honeybee|Dragonfly 2.0|Leviathan|APT3|FIN5|menuPass|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28
|
||||
T1078.004,Cloud Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,APT33
|
||||
T1564.004,NTFS File Attributes,Defense Evasion,APT32
|
||||
T1564.003,Hidden Window,Defense Evasion,Gorgon Group|Deep Panda|DarkHydrus|CopyKittens|APT19|APT32|APT28|APT3|Magic Hound
|
||||
T1078.003,Local Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,Tropic Trooper|FIN10|Stolen Pencil|APT32
|
||||
T1078.002,Domain Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,TA505|APT3|Threat Group-1314
|
||||
T1564.003,Hidden Window,Defense Evasion,Higaisa|Gorgon Group|Deep Panda|DarkHydrus|CopyKittens|APT19|APT32|APT28|APT3|Magic Hound
|
||||
T1078.003,Local Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,HAFNIUM|Turla|Operation Wocao|PROMETHIUM|Tropic Trooper|FIN10|Stolen Pencil|APT32
|
||||
T1078.002,Domain Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,Indrik Spider|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|APT29|TA505|APT3|Threat Group-1314
|
||||
T1078.001,Default Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,no
|
||||
T1564.002,Hidden Users,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1574.006,LD_PRELOAD,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,Rocke
|
||||
T1574.002,DLL Side-Loading,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,BRONZE BUTLER|Naikon|APT41|Soft Cell|Tropic Trooper|Patchwork|APT19|APT32|APT3|menuPass|Threat Group-3390
|
||||
T1574.001,DLL Search Order Hijacking,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,Whitefly|RTM|Threat Group-3390|menuPass
|
||||
T1574.006,Dynamic Linker Hijacking,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,APT41|Rocke
|
||||
T1574.002,DLL Side-Loading,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,Mustang Panda|Higaisa|BlackTech|Sidewinder|Chimera|BRONZE BUTLER|Naikon|APT41|GALLIUM|Tropic Trooper|Patchwork|APT19|APT32|APT3|menuPass|Threat Group-3390
|
||||
T1574.001,DLL Search Order Hijacking,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,Evilnum|APT41|Whitefly|RTM|Threat Group-3390|menuPass
|
||||
T1574.008,Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1574.007,Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1574.009,Path Interception by Unquoted Path,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
@@ -61,174 +184,174 @@ T1574.011,Services Registry Permissions Weakness,Persistence|Privilege Escalatio
|
||||
T1574.005,Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1574.010,Services File Permissions Weakness,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1574,Hijack Execution Flow,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1069.001,Local Groups,Discovery,Turla|OilRig|admin@338
|
||||
T1570,Lateral Tool Transfer,Lateral Movement,APT32|Wizard Spider|Turla|FIN10
|
||||
T1069.001,Local Groups,Discovery,Chimera|Operation Wocao|Turla|OilRig|admin@338
|
||||
T1570,Lateral Tool Transfer,Lateral Movement,Chimera|GALLIUM|Operation Wocao|APT32|Wizard Spider|Turla|FIN10
|
||||
T1568.003,DNS Calculation,Command And Control,APT12
|
||||
T1204.002,Malicious File,Execution,Magic Hound|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|RTM|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|Machete|admin@338|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|BRONZE BUTLER|Cobalt Group|DarkHydrus|Gorgon Group|Patchwork|OilRig|Dark Caracal|MuddyWater|Lazarus Group|FIN7|APT32|Rancor|APT37|FIN8|APT28|Elderwood|TA459|APT29|Leviathan|menuPass|PLATINUM
|
||||
T1204.001,Malicious Link,Execution,Patchwork|Windshift|APT32|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|TA505|OilRig|Machete|Leviathan|FIN8|FIN4|Elderwood|Dragonfly 2.0|Cobalt Group|APT39|Night Dragon|APT33|Turla
|
||||
T1204.002,Malicious File,Execution,Ajax Security Team|Mustang Panda|TA551|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Kimsuky|FIN6|PROMETHIUM|APT30|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|RTM|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|Machete|admin@338|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|Dragonfly 2.0|Dark Caracal|Cobalt Group|DarkHydrus|OilRig|Rancor|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN7|APT19|Patchwork|APT32|Gorgon Group|MuddyWater|Lazarus Group|APT37|TA459|Leviathan|APT29|APT28|FIN8|Elderwood|PLATINUM|menuPass
|
||||
T1204.001,Malicious Link,Execution,APT28|APT29|Mustang Panda|Sidewinder|ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|Evilnum|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|Patchwork|Windshift|APT32|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|TA505|OilRig|Machete|Leviathan|FIN8|FIN4|Elderwood|Dragonfly 2.0|Cobalt Group|APT39|Night Dragon|Turla|APT33
|
||||
T1195.003,Compromise Hardware Supply Chain,Initial Access,no
|
||||
T1195.002,Compromise Software Supply Chain,Initial Access,Sandworm Team|APT41
|
||||
T1195.002,Compromise Software Supply Chain,Initial Access,APT29|UNC2452|Cobalt Group|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Dragonfly|Sandworm Team|APT41
|
||||
T1195.001,Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools,Initial Access,no
|
||||
T1568.001,Fast Flux DNS,Command And Control,TA505
|
||||
T1052.001,Exfiltration over USB,Exfiltration,Tropic Trooper
|
||||
T1569.002,Service Execution,Execution,Blue Mockingbird|APT39|APT41|Silence|FIN6|APT32|Honeybee|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1568.001,Fast Flux DNS,Command And Control,menuPass|TA505
|
||||
T1052.001,Exfiltration over USB,Exfiltration,Mustang Panda|Tropic Trooper
|
||||
T1569.002,Service Execution,Execution,Chimera|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Blue Mockingbird|APT39|APT41|Silence|FIN6|APT32|Honeybee|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1569.001,Launchctl,Execution,no
|
||||
T1569,System Services,Execution,no
|
||||
T1568.002,Domain Generation Algorithms,Command And Control,APT41
|
||||
T1568,Dynamic Resolution,Command And Control,no
|
||||
T1568.002,Domain Generation Algorithms,Command And Control,TA551|APT41
|
||||
T1568,Dynamic Resolution,Command And Control,APT29|UNC2452
|
||||
T1011.001,Exfiltration Over Bluetooth,Exfiltration,no
|
||||
T1567.002,Exfiltration to Cloud Storage,Exfiltration,Leviathan|Turla
|
||||
T1567.002,Exfiltration to Cloud Storage,Exfiltration,ZIRCONIUM|HAFNIUM|Chimera|Leviathan|Turla
|
||||
T1567.001,Exfiltration to Code Repository,Exfiltration,no
|
||||
T1059.006,Python,Execution,Rocke|BRONZE BUTLER|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|Machete
|
||||
T1059.005,Visual Basic,Execution,APT33|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|Rancor|Patchwork|MuddyWater|Honeybee|FIN7|APT37|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|Turla|TA505|Silence|WIRTE|FIN4|Cobalt Group|Gorgon Group|Leviathan|TA459|Magic Hound
|
||||
T1059.006,Python,Execution,ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|Turla|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|APT29|Rocke|BRONZE BUTLER|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|Machete
|
||||
T1059.005,Visual Basic,Execution,Mustang Panda|Windshift|Higaisa|Sidewinder|APT39|Machete|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|APT33|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|Rancor|Patchwork|MuddyWater|Honeybee|FIN7|APT37|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|Turla|TA505|Silence|WIRTE|FIN4|Cobalt Group|Gorgon Group|Leviathan|TA459|Magic Hound
|
||||
T1059.004,Unix Shell,Execution,Rocke|APT41
|
||||
T1059.003,Windows Command Shell,Execution,TA505|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|OilRig|Lazarus Group|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|FIN7|APT41|Soft Cell|Turla|Silence|APT32|APT39|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Dark Caracal|Gorgon Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Rancor|Ke3chang|APT37|Leviathan|FIN8|APT28|Magic Hound|Sowbug|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN10|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Gamaredon Group|Suckfly|Patchwork|Threat Group-1314|APT3|admin@338|APT1
|
||||
T1059.003,Windows Command Shell,Execution,APT29|Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|TA551|Higaisa|Indrik Spider|Chimera|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|Machete|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|FIN6|TA505|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|OilRig|Lazarus Group|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|FIN7|APT41|GALLIUM|Turla|Silence|APT32|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|Rancor|Gorgon Group|Ke3chang|Dark Caracal|Leviathan|APT37|APT28|FIN8|Magic Hound|Sowbug|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN10|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Suckfly|Threat Group-1314|APT3|admin@338|APT1
|
||||
T1059.002,AppleScript,Execution,no
|
||||
T1059.001,PowerShell,Execution,Blue Mockingbird|APT39|DarkVishnya|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Inception|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|Soft Cell|TA505|WIRTE|TEMP.Veles|APT33|Gallmaker|Turla|APT19|DarkHydrus|APT28|Thrip|Gorgon Group|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Leviathan|TA459|FIN8|MuddyWater|Magic Hound|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|CopyKittens|APT32|FIN7|FIN10|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Poseidon Group|APT3|APT29|Deep Panda
|
||||
T1567,Exfiltration Over Web Service,Exfiltration,no
|
||||
T1059.001,PowerShell,Execution,Mustang Panda|Indrik Spider|HAFNIUM|Sidewinder|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Lazarus Group|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|APT39|DarkVishnya|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Inception|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|GALLIUM|TA505|WIRTE|TEMP.Veles|APT33|Gallmaker|APT28|Thrip|Cobalt Group|Turla|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|Gorgon Group|DarkHydrus|Leviathan|TA459|MuddyWater|FIN8|OilRig|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|CopyKittens|APT32|FIN10|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|FIN7|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Poseidon Group|APT3|APT29|Deep Panda
|
||||
T1567,Exfiltration Over Web Service,Exfiltration,APT28
|
||||
T1497.003,Time Based Evasion,Defense Evasion|Discovery,no
|
||||
T1497.002,User Activity Based Checks,Defense Evasion|Discovery,FIN7
|
||||
T1497.001,System Checks,Defense Evasion|Discovery,Frankenstein
|
||||
T1497.002,User Activity Based Checks,Defense Evasion|Discovery,Darkhotel|FIN7
|
||||
T1497.001,System Checks,Defense Evasion|Discovery,Darkhotel|Evilnum|Frankenstein
|
||||
T1498.002,Reflection Amplification,Impact,no
|
||||
T1498.001,Direct Network Flood,Impact,no
|
||||
T1566.003,Spearphishing via Service,Initial Access,Magic Hound|Windshift|FIN6|OilRig|Dark Caracal
|
||||
T1566.002,Spearphishing Link,Initial Access,Windshift|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|Machete|Kimsuky|TA505|Stolen Pencil|APT39|FIN4|APT32|Night Dragon|Turla|APT28|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|APT33|Elderwood|Leviathan|Magic Hound|Patchwork|APT29|FIN8
|
||||
T1566.001,Spearphishing Attachment,Initial Access,Magic Hound|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Mofang|Wizard Spider|RTM|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|APT41|Machete|admin@338|Kimsuky|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|Tropic Trooper|Turla|Gorgon Group|Rancor|DarkHydrus|Cobalt Group|FIN7|OilRig|Lazarus Group|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|FIN8|MuddyWater|APT28|TA459|Leviathan|Patchwork|PLATINUM|Elderwood|APT29|APT37|menuPass
|
||||
T1566,Phishing,Initial Access,no
|
||||
T1566.003,Spearphishing via Service,Initial Access,Ajax Security Team|Lazarus Group|Magic Hound|Windshift|FIN6|OilRig|Dark Caracal
|
||||
T1566.002,Spearphishing Link,Initial Access,Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|Sidewinder|Evilnum|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|APT1|Windshift|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|Machete|Kimsuky|TA505|Stolen Pencil|APT39|FIN4|APT32|Night Dragon|Cobalt Group|Turla|APT28|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|APT29|APT33|Leviathan|FIN8|Elderwood|Patchwork|Magic Hound
|
||||
T1566.001,Spearphishing Attachment,Initial Access,Ajax Security Team|Mustang Panda|TA551|Higaisa|Sidewinder|APT1|FIN6|APT30|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Mofang|Wizard Spider|RTM|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|APT41|Machete|admin@338|Kimsuky|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|Tropic Trooper|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|Cobalt Group|FIN7|APT19|Gorgon Group|Rancor|APT32|DarkHydrus|Lazarus Group|Dragonfly 2.0|MuddyWater|APT28|FIN8|Elderwood|APT37|menuPass|TA459|PLATINUM|APT29|Leviathan|Patchwork
|
||||
T1566,Phishing,Initial Access,GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Dragonfly
|
||||
T1565.003,Runtime Data Manipulation,Impact,APT38
|
||||
T1565.002,Transmitted Data Manipulation,Impact,APT38
|
||||
T1565.001,Stored Data Manipulation,Impact,FIN4|APT38
|
||||
T1565,Data Manipulation,Impact,no
|
||||
T1564.001,Hidden Files and Directories,Defense Evasion,Rocke|APT32|Tropic Trooper|APT28|Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1564.001,Hidden Files and Directories,Defense Evasion,Mustang Panda|Rocke|APT32|Tropic Trooper|APT28|Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1564,Hide Artifacts,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1563.002,RDP Hijacking,Lateral Movement,no
|
||||
T1563.001,SSH Hijacking,Lateral Movement,no
|
||||
T1563,Remote Service Session Hijacking,Lateral Movement,no
|
||||
T1518.001,Security Software Discovery,Discovery,Turla|Rocke|Frankenstein|The White Company|Cobalt Group|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|Tropic Trooper|FIN8|Patchwork|Naikon
|
||||
T1518.001,Security Software Discovery,Discovery,Windshift|Sidewinder|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Turla|Rocke|Frankenstein|The White Company|Cobalt Group|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|Tropic Trooper|FIN8|Patchwork|Naikon
|
||||
T1069.003,Cloud Groups,Discovery,no
|
||||
T1069.002,Domain Groups,Discovery,Turla|Wizard Spider|Inception|OilRig|FIN6|Dragonfly 2.0|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1069.002,Domain Groups,Discovery,Turla|Inception|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1087.004,Cloud Account,Discovery,no
|
||||
T1087.003,Email Account,Discovery,Sandworm Team|TA505
|
||||
T1087.002,Domain Account,Discovery,Turla|Sandworm Team|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN6|Poseidon Group|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1087.001,Local Account,Discovery,Turla|Poseidon Group|OilRig|Ke3chang|APT32|APT1|Threat Group-3390|APT3|admin@338
|
||||
T1087.002,Domain Account,Discovery,MuddyWater|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Chimera|Turla|Sandworm Team|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN6|Poseidon Group|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1087.001,Local Account,Discovery,Chimera|Fox Kitten|Turla|Poseidon Group|OilRig|Ke3chang|APT32|APT1|Threat Group-3390|APT3|admin@338
|
||||
T1553.004,Install Root Certificate,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1562.004,Disable or Modify System Firewall,Defense Evasion,Rocke|Lazarus Group|Kimsuky|Dragonfly 2.0|Carbanak
|
||||
T1562.003,HISTCONTROL,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1562.002,Disable Windows Event Logging,Defense Evasion,Threat Group-3390
|
||||
T1562.001,Disable or Modify Tools,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Rocke|Kimsuky|Turla|Night Dragon|Gorgon Group|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda
|
||||
T1562.004,Disable or Modify System Firewall,Defense Evasion,APT29|UNC2452|Operation Wocao|Rocke|Lazarus Group|Kimsuky|Dragonfly 2.0|Carbanak
|
||||
T1562.003,Impair Command History Logging,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1562.002,Disable Windows Event Logging,Defense Evasion,APT29|UNC2452|Threat Group-3390
|
||||
T1562.001,Disable or Modify Tools,Defense Evasion,APT29|MuddyWater|UNC2452|Wizard Spider|FIN6|Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Rocke|Kimsuky|Turla|Night Dragon|Gorgon Group|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda
|
||||
T1562,Impair Defenses,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1003.004,LSA Secrets,Credential Access,OilRig|MuddyWater|menuPass|Leafminer|Ke3chang|Dragonfly 2.0|APT33|Threat Group-3390
|
||||
T1003.005,Cached Domain Credentials,Credential Access,OilRig|MuddyWater|Leafminer|APT33
|
||||
T1561.002,Disk Structure Wipe,Impact,Sandworm Team|Lazarus Group|APT38|APT37
|
||||
T1561.001,Disk Content Wipe,Impact,Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1561,Disk Wipe,Impact,no
|
||||
T1560.003,Archive via Custom Method,Collection,Lazarus Group|Kimsuky|CopyKittens|FIN6
|
||||
T1560.003,Archive via Custom Method,Collection,Mustang Panda|Lazarus Group|Kimsuky|CopyKittens|FIN6
|
||||
T1560.002,Archive via Library,Collection,Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390
|
||||
T1560.001,Archive via Utility,Collection,APT41|Soft Cell|Turla|Gallmaker|APT33|APT39|MuddyWater|Magic Hound|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|CopyKittens|APT3|Sowbug|menuPass|APT1|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1560.001,Archive via Utility,Collection,APT29|Mustang Panda|HAFNIUM|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Chimera|APT41|GALLIUM|Turla|Gallmaker|APT33|APT39|MuddyWater|Magic Hound|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|CopyKittens|Sowbug|APT3|menuPass|APT1|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1560,Archive Collected Data,Collection,menuPass|APT32|Honeybee|Patchwork|APT28|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1499.004,Application or System Exploitation,Impact,no
|
||||
T1499.003,Application Exhaustion Flood,Impact,no
|
||||
T1499.002,Service Exhaustion Flood,Impact,no
|
||||
T1499.001,OS Exhaustion Flood,Impact,no
|
||||
T1491.002,External Defacement,Impact,no
|
||||
T1491.002,External Defacement,Impact,Sandworm Team
|
||||
T1491.001,Internal Defacement,Impact,Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1114.003,Email Forwarding Rule,Collection,no
|
||||
T1114.002,Remote Email Collection,Collection,APT1|FIN4|APT28|Dragonfly 2.0|Ke3chang|Leafminer
|
||||
T1114.001,Local Email Collection,Collection,Magic Hound|APT1
|
||||
T1114.003,Email Forwarding Rule,Collection,Silent Librarian|Kimsuky
|
||||
T1114.002,Remote Email Collection,Collection,APT29|HAFNIUM|Chimera|UNC2452|APT1|FIN4|Dragonfly 2.0|APT28|Leafminer|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1114.001,Local Email Collection,Collection,Chimera|Magic Hound|APT1
|
||||
T1134.005,SID-History Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1134.004,Parent PID Spoofing,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1134.003,Make and Impersonate Token,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1134.002,Create Process with Token,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Turla|Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1134.001,Token Impersonation/Theft,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,APT28
|
||||
T1213.002,Sharepoint,Collection,Ke3chang|APT28
|
||||
T1213.002,Sharepoint,Collection,Chimera|Ke3chang|APT28
|
||||
T1213.001,Confluence,Collection,no
|
||||
T1555.003,Credentials from Web Browsers,Credential Access,Magic Hound|Sandworm Team|Inception|Stealth Falcon|OilRig|Leafminer|APT33|APT3|Kimsuky|TA505|Stolen Pencil|MuddyWater|APT37|Patchwork|Molerats
|
||||
T1555.003,Credentials from Web Browsers,Credential Access,Ajax Security Team|ZIRCONIUM|FIN6|Sandworm Team|Inception|Stealth Falcon|OilRig|Leafminer|APT33|APT3|Kimsuky|TA505|Stolen Pencil|MuddyWater|APT37|Patchwork|Molerats
|
||||
T1555.002,Securityd Memory,Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1555.001,Keychain,Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1559.002,Dynamic Data Exchange,Execution,Sharpshooter|TA505|MuddyWater|Gallmaker|Patchwork|Cobalt Group|APT37|APT28|FIN7
|
||||
T1559.002,Dynamic Data Exchange,Execution,Sidewinder|Sharpshooter|TA505|MuddyWater|Gallmaker|Cobalt Group|Patchwork|APT37|APT28|FIN7
|
||||
T1559.001,Component Object Model,Execution,Gamaredon Group|MuddyWater
|
||||
T1559,Inter-Process Communication,Execution,no
|
||||
T1558.002,Silver Ticket,Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1558.001,Golden Ticket,Credential Access,Ke3chang
|
||||
T1558,Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets,Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1557.001,LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay,Credential Access|Collection,no
|
||||
T1557,Man-in-the-Middle,Credential Access|Collection,no
|
||||
T1556.002,Password Filter DLL,Credential Access|Defense Evasion,Strider
|
||||
T1556.001,Domain Controller Authentication,Credential Access|Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1556,Modify Authentication Process,Credential Access|Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1557.001,LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay,Credential Access|Collection,Wizard Spider
|
||||
T1557,Man-in-the-Middle,Credential Access|Collection,Kimsuky
|
||||
T1556.002,Password Filter DLL,Credential Access|Defense Evasion|Persistence,Strider
|
||||
T1556.001,Domain Controller Authentication,Credential Access|Defense Evasion|Persistence,Chimera
|
||||
T1556,Modify Authentication Process,Credential Access|Defense Evasion|Persistence,no
|
||||
T1056.004,Credential API Hooking,Collection|Credential Access,PLATINUM
|
||||
T1056.003,Web Portal Capture,Collection|Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1056.002,GUI Input Capture,Collection|Credential Access,FIN4
|
||||
T1056.001,Keylogging,Collection|Credential Access,APT32|Sandworm Team|APT39|APT41|Kimsuky|menuPass|Stolen Pencil|FIN4|APT38|Ke3chang|OilRig|PLATINUM|Sowbug|Magic Hound|Group5|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT3|Darkhotel|APT28
|
||||
T1555,Credentials from Password Stores,Credential Access,APT39|OilRig|MuddyWater|Leafminer|APT33|Turla|Stealth Falcon
|
||||
T1056.001,Keylogging,Collection|Credential Access,Ajax Security Team|Operation Wocao|APT32|Sandworm Team|APT39|APT41|Kimsuky|menuPass|Stolen Pencil|FIN4|APT38|OilRig|Ke3chang|PLATINUM|Sowbug|Magic Hound|Group5|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT3|Darkhotel|APT28
|
||||
T1555,Credentials from Password Stores,Credential Access,APT29|Evilnum|UNC2452|FIN6|APT39|OilRig|MuddyWater|Leafminer|APT33|Stealth Falcon
|
||||
T1552.005,Cloud Instance Metadata API,Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1003.008,/etc/passwd and /etc/shadow,Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1003.007,Proc Filesystem,Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1003.006,DCSync,Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1558.003,Kerberoasting,Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1003.006,DCSync,Credential Access,APT29|UNC2452|Operation Wocao
|
||||
T1558.003,Kerberoasting,Credential Access,APT29|UNC2452|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider
|
||||
T1552.006,Group Policy Preferences,Credential Access,APT33
|
||||
T1003.003,NTDS,Credential Access,FIN6|Dragonfly 2.0
|
||||
T1003.002,Security Account Manager,Credential Access,Threat Group-3390|Ke3chang|Soft Cell|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|menuPass
|
||||
T1003.001,LSASS Memory,Credential Access,Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Blue Mockingbird|Silence|Threat Group-3390|Leviathan|APT41|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|Stolen Pencil|APT32|Lazarus Group|Leafminer|Magic Hound|MuddyWater|PLATINUM|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|OilRig|FIN6|APT3|APT28|APT1|Ke3chang|Cleaver
|
||||
T1110.004,Credential Stuffing,Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1110.003,Password Spraying,Credential Access,APT33|Leafminer|Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1110.002,Password Cracking,Credential Access,APT41|Dragonfly 2.0|APT3
|
||||
T1110.001,Password Guessing,Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1021.006,Windows Remote Management,Lateral Movement,Threat Group-3390
|
||||
T1021.005,VNC,Lateral Movement,GCMAN
|
||||
T1021.004,SSH,Lateral Movement,Rocke|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|OilRig|menuPass|GCMAN
|
||||
T1003.003,NTDS,Credential Access,Mustang Panda|HAFNIUM|Fox Kitten|menuPass|Wizard Spider|Chimera|FIN6|Dragonfly 2.0
|
||||
T1003.002,Security Account Manager,Credential Access,Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390|Ke3chang|GALLIUM|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|menuPass
|
||||
T1003.001,LSASS Memory,Credential Access,HAFNIUM|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Blue Mockingbird|Silence|Threat Group-3390|Leviathan|APT41|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|Stolen Pencil|APT32|Leafminer|Magic Hound|Lazarus Group|PLATINUM|FIN8|MuddyWater|BRONZE BUTLER|OilRig|FIN6|APT3|APT28|APT1|Ke3chang|Cleaver
|
||||
T1110.004,Credential Stuffing,Credential Access,Chimera
|
||||
T1110.003,Password Spraying,Credential Access,Silent Librarian|Chimera|APT28|APT33|Leafminer|Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1110.002,Password Cracking,Credential Access,FIN6|APT41|Dragonfly 2.0|APT3
|
||||
T1110.001,Password Guessing,Credential Access,APT28
|
||||
T1021.006,Windows Remote Management,Lateral Movement,APT29|UNC2452|Chimera|Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390
|
||||
T1021.005,VNC,Lateral Movement,Fox Kitten|GCMAN
|
||||
T1021.004,SSH,Lateral Movement,Fox Kitten|Rocke|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|OilRig|menuPass|GCMAN
|
||||
T1021.003,Distributed Component Object Model,Lateral Movement,no
|
||||
T1021.002,SMB/Windows Admin Shares,Lateral Movement,Blue Mockingbird|APT39|APT32|Orangeworm|FIN8|APT3|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-1314|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1021.001,Remote Desktop Protocol,Lateral Movement,Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Stolen Pencil|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|APT3|OilRig|menuPass|FIN10|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|APT1|Axiom
|
||||
T1021.002,SMB/Windows Admin Shares,Lateral Movement,Fox Kitten|APT41|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|APT39|APT32|Orangeworm|FIN8|APT3|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-1314|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1021.001,Remote Desktop Protocol,Lateral Movement,Fox Kitten|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Stolen Pencil|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|APT3|OilRig|FIN10|menuPass|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|APT1|Axiom
|
||||
T1554,Compromise Client Software Binary,Persistence,no
|
||||
T1036.006,Space after Filename,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1036.005,Match Legitimate Name or Location,Defense Evasion,Rocke|Sandworm Team|APT39|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Silence|APT41|menuPass|TEMP.Veles|MuddyWater|BRONZE BUTLER|Sowbug|APT32|Patchwork|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Carbanak|APT1
|
||||
T1036.004,Masquerade Task or Service,Defense Evasion,Wizard Spider|APT-C-36|Carbanak|APT32|FIN6|FIN7
|
||||
T1036.003,Rename System Utilities,Defense Evasion,menuPass|APT32|Soft Cell|PLATINUM
|
||||
T1036.005,Match Legitimate Name or Location,Defense Evasion,APT29|Mustang Panda|Sidewinder|Darkhotel|Lazarus Group|Indrik Spider|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|Machete|Chimera|PROMETHIUM|Rocke|Sandworm Team|APT39|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Silence|APT41|menuPass|TEMP.Veles|MuddyWater|BRONZE BUTLER|Sowbug|APT32|Patchwork|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Carbanak|APT1
|
||||
T1036.004,Masquerade Task or Service,Defense Evasion,ZIRCONIUM|APT29|Higaisa|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|PROMETHIUM|Wizard Spider|APT-C-36|Carbanak|APT32|FIN6|FIN7
|
||||
T1036.003,Rename System Utilities,Defense Evasion,menuPass|APT32|GALLIUM
|
||||
T1036.002,Right-to-Left Override,Defense Evasion,BRONZE BUTLER|BlackTech|Ke3chang|Scarlet Mimic
|
||||
T1036.001,Invalid Code Signature,Defense Evasion,Windshift
|
||||
T1036.001,Invalid Code Signature,Defense Evasion,Windshift|APT37
|
||||
T1553.003,SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1553.002,Code Signing,Defense Evasion,Patchwork|Silence|APT41|FIN6|TA505|FIN7|Honeybee|Leviathan|APT37|CopyKittens|Winnti Group|Suckfly|Molerats|Darkhotel
|
||||
T1553.002,Code Signing,Defense Evasion,APT29|GALLIUM|UNC2452|Wizard Spider|Kimsuky|PROMETHIUM|Patchwork|Silence|APT41|FIN6|TA505|FIN7|Honeybee|Leviathan|CopyKittens|Winnti Group|Suckfly|Molerats|Darkhotel
|
||||
T1553.001,Gatekeeper Bypass,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1553,Subvert Trust Controls,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1027.003,Steganography,Defense Evasion,BRONZE BUTLER|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|APT37
|
||||
T1027.002,Software Packing,Defense Evasion,TA505|Rocke|Soft Cell|The White Company|APT39|APT38|Dark Caracal|Elderwood|APT3|Patchwork|APT29|Night Dragon
|
||||
T1027.001,Binary Padding,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|APT32|Leviathan|BRONZE BUTLER|Moafee
|
||||
T1027.003,Steganography,Defense Evasion,TA551|BRONZE BUTLER|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|APT37
|
||||
T1027.002,Software Packing,Defense Evasion,ZIRCONIUM|Lazarus Group|TA505|Rocke|GALLIUM|The White Company|APT39|APT38|Dark Caracal|Elderwood|APT3|Patchwork|APT29|Night Dragon
|
||||
T1027.001,Binary Padding,Defense Evasion,Mustang Panda|Higaisa|Gamaredon Group|APT32|Patchwork|Leviathan|BRONZE BUTLER|Moafee
|
||||
T1222.002,Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification,Defense Evasion,Rocke|APT32
|
||||
T1222.001,Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1552.004,Private Keys,Credential Access,Rocke
|
||||
T1222.001,Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification,Defense Evasion,Wizard Spider
|
||||
T1552.004,Private Keys,Credential Access,APT29|UNC2452|Operation Wocao|Rocke
|
||||
T1552.003,Bash History,Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1552.002,Credentials in Registry,Credential Access,APT32
|
||||
T1552.001,Credentials In Files,Credential Access,Leafminer|APT33|OilRig|TA505|Stolen Pencil|MuddyWater|APT3
|
||||
T1552.001,Credentials In Files,Credential Access,Fox Kitten|Leafminer|APT33|OilRig|TA505|Stolen Pencil|MuddyWater|APT3
|
||||
T1552,Unsecured Credentials,Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1216.001,PubPrn,Defense Evasion,APT32
|
||||
T1070.006,Timestomp,Defense Evasion,Rocke|TEMP.Veles|APT32|Lazarus Group|APT28
|
||||
T1070.006,Timestomp,Defense Evasion,APT29|UNC2452|Chimera|Kimsuky|Rocke|TEMP.Veles|APT32|Lazarus Group|APT28
|
||||
T1070.005,Network Share Connection Removal,Defense Evasion,Threat Group-3390
|
||||
T1070.004,File Deletion,Defense Evasion,Sandworm Team|Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Wizard Spider|APT41|Kimsuky|Silence|The White Company|TEMP.Veles|APT32|APT38|Patchwork|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|menuPass|FIN8|OilRig|FIN5|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|APT3|FIN10|APT28|Threat Group-3390|Group5|Lazarus Group|APT18|APT29
|
||||
T1070.004,File Deletion,Defense Evasion,APT39|Mustang Panda|Chimera|Evilnum|UNC2452|Operation Wocao|FIN6|Sandworm Team|Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Wizard Spider|APT41|Kimsuky|Silence|The White Company|TEMP.Veles|APT32|APT38|Honeybee|Patchwork|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|menuPass|FIN8|FIN5|BRONZE BUTLER|OilRig|APT3|Magic Hound|APT28|FIN10|Threat Group-3390|Group5|Lazarus Group|APT18|APT29
|
||||
T1070.003,Clear Command History,Defense Evasion,APT41
|
||||
T1550.004,Web Session Cookie,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,no
|
||||
T1550.004,Web Session Cookie,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,APT29|UNC2452
|
||||
T1550.001,Application Access Token,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,APT28
|
||||
T1550.003,Pass the Ticket,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|APT29
|
||||
T1550.002,Pass the Hash,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,Soft Cell|APT32|Night Dragon|APT28|APT1
|
||||
T1550,Use Alternate Authentication Material,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,no
|
||||
T1550.002,Pass the Hash,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,Chimera|Kimsuky|GALLIUM|APT32|Night Dragon|APT28|APT1
|
||||
T1550,Use Alternate Authentication Material,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,APT29|UNC2452
|
||||
T1548.004,Elevated Execution with Prompt,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1548.003,Sudo and Sudo Caching,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1548.002,Bypass User Access Control,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,APT37|MuddyWater|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|Threat Group-3390|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork|APT29
|
||||
T1548.002,Bypass User Account Control,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,Evilnum|APT37|MuddyWater|Cobalt Group|Honeybee|Threat Group-3390|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork|APT29
|
||||
T1548.001,Setuid and Setgid,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1548,Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1136.003,Cloud Account,Persistence,no
|
||||
T1070.002,Clear Linux or Mac System Logs,Defense Evasion,Rocke
|
||||
T1070.001,Clear Windows Event Logs,Defense Evasion,APT41|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|APT32|FIN8|FIN5|APT28
|
||||
T1136.002,Domain Account,Persistence,Soft Cell
|
||||
T1136.001,Local Account,Persistence,APT39|APT41|Dragonfly 2.0|Leafminer|APT3
|
||||
T1070.001,Clear Windows Event Logs,Defense Evasion,Chimera|Operation Wocao|APT41|APT38|APT32|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|FIN5|APT28
|
||||
T1136.002,Domain Account,Persistence,HAFNIUM|GALLIUM
|
||||
T1136.001,Local Account,Persistence,Fox Kitten|APT39|APT41|Dragonfly 2.0|Leafminer|APT3
|
||||
T1547.011,Plist Modification,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1547.010,Port Monitors,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1547.009,Shortcut Modification,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,APT39|Darkhotel|APT29|Gorgon Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Leviathan|Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1547.008,LSASS Driver,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1547.007,Re-opened Applications,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1547.006,Kernel Modules and Extensions,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1547.005,Security Support Provider,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1547.004,Winlogon Helper DLL,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Tropic Trooper|Turla
|
||||
T1547.005,Security Support Provider,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1547.004,Winlogon Helper DLL,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Wizard Spider|Tropic Trooper|Turla
|
||||
T1547.003,Time Providers,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1546.014,Emond,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
|
||||
T1546.013,PowerShell Profile,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,Turla
|
||||
@@ -236,38 +359,38 @@ T1546.012,Image File Execution Options Injection,Privilege Escalation|Persistenc
|
||||
T1218.008,Odbcconf,Defense Evasion,Cobalt Group
|
||||
T1546.011,Application Shimming,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,FIN7
|
||||
T1547.002,Authentication Package,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1546.010,AppInit DLLs,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
|
||||
T1546.010,AppInit DLLs,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,APT39
|
||||
T1546.009,AppCert DLLs,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,Honeybee
|
||||
T1218.007,Msiexec,Defense Evasion,TA505|Rancor
|
||||
T1546.008,Accessibility Features,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,APT41|APT3|APT29|Deep Panda|Axiom
|
||||
T1218.007,Msiexec,Defense Evasion,ZIRCONIUM|Molerats|Machete|TA505|Rancor
|
||||
T1546.008,Accessibility Features,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,Fox Kitten|APT41|APT3|APT29|Deep Panda|Axiom
|
||||
T1546.007,Netsh Helper DLL,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
|
||||
T1546.006,LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
|
||||
T1546.005,Trap,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
|
||||
T1546.004,.bash_profile and .bashrc,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
|
||||
T1546.003,Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,APT33|Blue Mockingbird|Turla|Leviathan|APT29
|
||||
T1546.004,Unix Shell Configuration Modification,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
|
||||
T1546.003,Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,Mustang Panda|UNC2452|APT33|Blue Mockingbird|Turla|Leviathan|APT29
|
||||
T1546.002,Screensaver,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
|
||||
T1546.001,Change Default File Association,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,Kimsuky
|
||||
T1547.001,Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Silence|RTM|Inception|APT41|Machete|Kimsuky|APT33|APT39|APT32|APT18|Turla|Dark Caracal|Cobalt Group|Honeybee|Threat Group-3390|Dragonfly 2.0|Gorgon Group|Ke3chang|APT19|Leviathan|MuddyWater|APT37|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|APT3|FIN10|FIN7|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT29|Darkhotel
|
||||
T1547.001,Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Windshift|Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Sidewinder|APT28|Wizard Spider|PROMETHIUM|Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Silence|RTM|Inception|APT41|Kimsuky|APT33|APT39|APT32|APT18|Dark Caracal|Threat Group-3390|Turla|Honeybee|APT19|Cobalt Group|Ke3chang|Dragonfly 2.0|Gorgon Group|Leviathan|APT37|MuddyWater|BRONZE BUTLER|APT3|Magic Hound|FIN10|FIN7|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT29|Darkhotel
|
||||
T1218.002,Control Panel,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1218.010,Regsvr32,Defense Evasion,Blue Mockingbird|Inception|WIRTE|Cobalt Group|APT19|Leviathan|APT32|Deep Panda
|
||||
T1218.010,Regsvr32,Defense Evasion,TA551|Blue Mockingbird|Inception|WIRTE|Cobalt Group|APT19|Leviathan|APT32|Deep Panda
|
||||
T1218.009,Regsvcs/Regasm,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1218.005,Mshta,Defense Evasion,Inception|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|FIN7
|
||||
T1218.004,InstallUtil,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1218.001,Compiled HTML File,Defense Evasion,APT41|Silence|Lazarus Group|Dark Caracal|OilRig
|
||||
T1218.005,Mshta,Defense Evasion,Mustang Panda|TA551|Sidewinder|Lazarus Group|Inception|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|FIN7
|
||||
T1218.004,InstallUtil,Defense Evasion,Mustang Panda|menuPass
|
||||
T1218.001,Compiled HTML File,Defense Evasion,APT41|Silence|Lazarus Group|OilRig|Dark Caracal
|
||||
T1218.003,CMSTP,Defense Evasion,Cobalt Group|MuddyWater
|
||||
T1218.011,Rundll32,Defense Evasion,APT32|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|TA505|MuddyWater|APT29|APT19|CopyKittens|APT3|Carbanak|APT28
|
||||
T1218.011,Rundll32,Defense Evasion,HAFNIUM|TA551|UNC2452|APT41|Gamaredon Group|APT32|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|TA505|MuddyWater|APT29|APT19|CopyKittens|APT3|Carbanak|APT28
|
||||
T1547,Boot or Logon Autostart Execution,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1546,Event Triggered Execution,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
|
||||
T1098.003,Add Office 365 Global Administrator Role,Persistence,no
|
||||
T1098.002,Exchange Email Delegate Permissions,Persistence,Magic Hound
|
||||
T1098.001,Additional Azure Service Principal Credentials,Persistence,no
|
||||
T1098.002,Exchange Email Delegate Permissions,Persistence,APT29|UNC2452|Magic Hound
|
||||
T1098.001,Additional Cloud Credentials,Persistence,APT29|UNC2452
|
||||
T1543.004,Launch Daemon,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1543.003,Windows Service,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Blue Mockingbird|DarkVishnya|Wizard Spider|APT32|APT41|Kimsuky|Tropic Trooper|Cobalt Group|Ke3chang|Honeybee|FIN7|Threat Group-3390|APT19|APT3|Lazarus Group|Carbanak
|
||||
T1543.003,Windows Service,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,PROMETHIUM|Blue Mockingbird|DarkVishnya|Wizard Spider|APT32|APT41|Kimsuky|Tropic Trooper|Cobalt Group|Ke3chang|FIN7|APT19|Threat Group-3390|Honeybee|APT3|Lazarus Group|Carbanak
|
||||
T1543.002,Systemd Service,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Rocke
|
||||
T1543.001,Launch Agent,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1037.005,Startup Items,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1037.004,Rc.common,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1055.012,Process Hollowing,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Gorgon Group|Patchwork
|
||||
T1037.004,RC Scripts,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1055.012,Process Hollowing,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Gorgon Group|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Patchwork
|
||||
T1055.013,Process Doppelgänging,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Leafminer
|
||||
T1055.011,Extra Window Memory Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1055.014,VDSO Hijacking,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
@@ -277,7 +400,7 @@ T1055.005,Thread Local Storage,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1055.004,Asynchronous Procedure Call,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1055.003,Thread Execution Hijacking,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1055.002,Portable Executable Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Rocke|Gorgon Group
|
||||
T1055.001,Dynamic-link Library Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,TA505|Turla|Tropic Trooper|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda
|
||||
T1055.001,Dynamic-link Library Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Wizard Spider|TA505|Turla|Tropic Trooper|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda
|
||||
T1037.003,Network Logon Script,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1543,Create or Modify System Process,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1037.002,Logon Script (Mac),Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
@@ -285,13 +408,13 @@ T1037.001,Logon Script (Windows),Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Cobalt Group|A
|
||||
T1542.003,Bootkit,Persistence|Defense Evasion,APT41|Lazarus Group|APT28
|
||||
T1542.002,Component Firmware,Persistence|Defense Evasion,Equation
|
||||
T1542.001,System Firmware,Persistence|Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1505.003,Web Shell,Persistence,Tropic Trooper|Soft Cell|Threat Group-3390|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|APT32|OilRig|Deep Panda
|
||||
T1505.003,Web Shell,Persistence,Sandworm Team|HAFNIUM|Volatile Cedar|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|Tropic Trooper|GALLIUM|Threat Group-3390|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|APT32|OilRig|Deep Panda
|
||||
T1505.002,Transport Agent,Persistence,no
|
||||
T1505.001,SQL Stored Procedures,Persistence,no
|
||||
T1053.003,Cron,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Rocke
|
||||
T1053.004,Launchd,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1053.001,At (Linux),Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1053.005,Scheduled Task,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT-C-36|BRONZE BUTLER|APT41|Machete|Soft Cell|Silence|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|Patchwork|OilRig|Rancor|Cobalt Group|FIN8|menuPass|FIN10|APT32|FIN7|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|APT3|APT29
|
||||
T1053.005,Scheduled Task,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Mustang Panda|Higaisa|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|Molerats|Machete|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT-C-36|BRONZE BUTLER|APT41|GALLIUM|Silence|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|Rancor|Cobalt Group|OilRig|Patchwork|FIN8|FIN7|menuPass|FIN10|APT32|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|APT3|APT29
|
||||
T1053.002,At (Windows),Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,BRONZE BUTLER|Threat Group-3390|APT18
|
||||
T1542,Pre-OS Boot,Defense Evasion|Persistence,no
|
||||
T1137.001,Office Template Macros,Persistence,MuddyWater
|
||||
@@ -301,140 +424,141 @@ T1137.005,Outlook Rules,Persistence,no
|
||||
T1137.006,Add-ins,Persistence,Naikon
|
||||
T1137.002,Office Test,Persistence,APT28
|
||||
T1531,Account Access Removal,Impact,no
|
||||
T1539,Steal Web Session Cookie,Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1539,Steal Web Session Cookie,Credential Access,Evilnum
|
||||
T1529,System Shutdown/Reboot,Impact,Lazarus Group|APT38|APT37
|
||||
T1518,Software Discovery,Discovery,BRONZE BUTLER|Tropic Trooper|Inception
|
||||
T1518,Software Discovery,Discovery,Mustang Panda|Windshift|MuddyWater|Windigo|Sidewinder|Operation Wocao|BRONZE BUTLER|Tropic Trooper|Inception
|
||||
T1547.013,XDG Autostart Entries,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1534,Internal Spearphishing,Lateral Movement,Gamaredon Group
|
||||
T1528,Steal Application Access Token,Credential Access,APT28
|
||||
T1535,Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1525,Implant Container Image,Persistence,no
|
||||
T1525,Implant Internal Image,Persistence,no
|
||||
T1538,Cloud Service Dashboard,Discovery,no
|
||||
T1530,Data from Cloud Storage Object,Collection,no
|
||||
T1530,Data from Cloud Storage Object,Collection,Fox Kitten
|
||||
T1578,Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1537,Transfer Data to Cloud Account,Exfiltration,no
|
||||
T1526,Cloud Service Discovery,Discovery,no
|
||||
T1505,Server Software Component,Persistence,no
|
||||
T1499,Endpoint Denial of Service,Impact,no
|
||||
T1497,Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion,Defense Evasion|Discovery,no
|
||||
T1498,Network Denial of Service,Impact,no
|
||||
T1499,Endpoint Denial of Service,Impact,Sandworm Team
|
||||
T1497,Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion,Defense Evasion|Discovery,Darkhotel
|
||||
T1498,Network Denial of Service,Impact,APT28
|
||||
T1496,Resource Hijacking,Impact,Blue Mockingbird|Rocke|APT41|Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1495,Firmware Corruption,Impact,no
|
||||
T1491,Defacement,Impact,no
|
||||
T1490,Inhibit System Recovery,Impact,no
|
||||
T1489,Service Stop,Impact,Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1486,Data Encrypted for Impact,Impact,APT41|TA505|APT38
|
||||
T1489,Service Stop,Impact,Wizard Spider|Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1486,Data Encrypted for Impact,Impact,Indrik Spider|APT41|TA505|APT38
|
||||
T1485,Data Destruction,Impact,Sandworm Team|Lazarus Group|APT38
|
||||
T1484,Group Policy Modification,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1482,Domain Trust Discovery,Discovery,Wizard Spider
|
||||
T1484,Domain Policy Modification,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1482,Domain Trust Discovery,Discovery,APT29|Chimera|UNC2452
|
||||
T1480,Execution Guardrails,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1222,File and Directory Permissions Modification,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1221,Template Injection,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|Frankenstein|Inception|APT28|Tropic Trooper|Dragonfly 2.0|DarkHydrus
|
||||
T1220,XSL Script Processing,Defense Evasion,Cobalt Group
|
||||
T1197,BITS Jobs,Defense Evasion|Persistence,Patchwork|APT41|Leviathan
|
||||
T1217,Browser Bookmark Discovery,Discovery,no
|
||||
T1213,Data from Information Repositories,Collection,Turla
|
||||
T1189,Drive-by Compromise,Initial Access,Turla|Windshift|RTM|Darkhotel|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|BRONZE BUTLER|Leafminer|Dark Caracal|APT19|APT32|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|Elderwood|APT37|Patchwork|PLATINUM
|
||||
T1203,Exploitation for Client Execution,Execution,Sandworm Team|MuddyWater|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT41|admin@338|Threat Group-3390|APT12|The White Company|APT33|APT32|APT28|Tropic Trooper|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Cobalt Group|APT37|Patchwork|Leviathan|Elderwood|TA459|APT29
|
||||
T1220,XSL Script Processing,Defense Evasion,Higaisa|Cobalt Group
|
||||
T1222,File and Directory Permissions Modification,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1189,Drive-by Compromise,Initial Access,Machete|Windigo|Dragonfly|PROMETHIUM|Turla|Windshift|RTM|Darkhotel|APT38|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Threat Group-3390|Dragonfly 2.0|APT32|Leafminer|APT19|Dark Caracal|Elderwood|Patchwork|PLATINUM|APT37
|
||||
T1207,Rogue Domain Controller,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1199,Trusted Relationship,Initial Access,Sandworm Team|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|APT28|menuPass
|
||||
T1197,BITS Jobs,Defense Evasion|Persistence,APT39|Patchwork|APT41|Leviathan
|
||||
T1217,Browser Bookmark Discovery,Discovery,Chimera|Fox Kitten
|
||||
T1213,Data from Information Repositories,Collection,Fox Kitten|FIN6|Turla
|
||||
T1212,Exploitation for Credential Access,Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1211,Exploitation for Defense Evasion,Defense Evasion,APT28
|
||||
T1190,Exploit Public-Facing Application,Initial Access,Blue Mockingbird|Rocke|APT39|BlackTech|APT41|Soft Cell|Night Dragon|Axiom
|
||||
T1210,Exploitation of Remote Services,Lateral Movement,Threat Group-3390|APT28
|
||||
T1202,Indirect Command Execution,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1200,Hardware Additions,Initial Access,DarkVishnya
|
||||
T1201,Password Policy Discovery,Discovery,Turla|OilRig
|
||||
T1219,Remote Access Software,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|DarkVishnya|RTM|Kimsuky|Night Dragon|Thrip|Cobalt Group|Carbanak
|
||||
T1207,Rogue Domain Controller,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1199,Trusted Relationship,Initial Access,APT28|menuPass
|
||||
T1218,Signed Binary Proxy Execution,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1202,Indirect Command Execution,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1201,Password Policy Discovery,Discovery,Chimera|Turla|OilRig
|
||||
T1190,Exploit Public-Facing Application,Initial Access,Volatile Cedar|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|APT28|APT29|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Blue Mockingbird|Rocke|APT39|BlackTech|APT41|GALLIUM|Night Dragon|Axiom
|
||||
T1210,Exploitation of Remote Services,Lateral Movement,Fox Kitten|menuPass|Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390|APT28
|
||||
T1219,Remote Access Software,Command And Control,Mustang Panda|MuddyWater|Evilnum|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Sandworm Team|DarkVishnya|RTM|Kimsuky|Night Dragon|Thrip|Cobalt Group|Carbanak
|
||||
T1195,Supply Chain Compromise,Initial Access,no
|
||||
T1204,User Execution,Execution,no
|
||||
T1216,Signed Script Proxy Execution,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1195,Supply Chain Compromise,Initial Access,Elderwood
|
||||
T1203,Exploitation for Client Execution,Execution,Mustang Panda|Darkhotel|Higaisa|HAFNIUM|Sidewinder|Sandworm Team|MuddyWater|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT41|admin@338|Threat Group-3390|APT12|The White Company|APT33|APT32|APT28|Tropic Trooper|BRONZE BUTLER|Cobalt Group|Lazarus Group|APT29|TA459|APT37|Leviathan|Patchwork|Elderwood
|
||||
T1218,Signed Binary Proxy Execution,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1205,Traffic Signaling,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Command And Control,no
|
||||
T1216,Signed Script Proxy Execution,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1176,Browser Extensions,Persistence,Kimsuky|Stolen Pencil
|
||||
T1175,Component Object Model and Distributed COM,Lateral Movement|Execution,no
|
||||
T1187,Forced Authentication,Credential Access,DarkHydrus|Dragonfly 2.0
|
||||
T1187,Forced Authentication,Credential Access,Dragonfly 2.0|DarkHydrus
|
||||
T1185,Man in the Browser,Collection,no
|
||||
T1134,Access Token Manipulation,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Blue Mockingbird
|
||||
T1134,Access Token Manipulation,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,FIN6|Blue Mockingbird
|
||||
T1136,Create Account,Persistence,no
|
||||
T1140,Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information,Defense Evasion,Rocke|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Molerats|Frankenstein|Turla|WIRTE|Darkhotel|Tropic Trooper|menuPass|Honeybee|Threat Group-3390|APT19|Gorgon Group|Leviathan|MuddyWater|APT28|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER
|
||||
T1149,LC_MAIN Hijacking,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1135,Network Share Discovery,Discovery,APT32|APT39|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT1|Dragonfly 2.0|Sowbug
|
||||
T1137,Office Application Startup,Persistence,Gamaredon Group|APT32
|
||||
T1140,Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information,Defense Evasion,APT39|APT29|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|UNC2452|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Molerats|Frankenstein|Turla|WIRTE|Darkhotel|Tropic Trooper|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Gorgon Group|Honeybee|APT19|Leviathan|MuddyWater|APT28|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER
|
||||
T1135,Network Share Discovery,Discovery,Chimera|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|APT32|APT39|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT1|Dragonfly 2.0|Sowbug
|
||||
T1153,Source,Execution,no
|
||||
T1133,External Remote Services,Persistence|Initial Access,Sandworm Team|APT41|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|Night Dragon|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|Ke3chang|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|APT18
|
||||
T1133,External Remote Services,Persistence|Initial Access,APT29|UNC2452|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Kimsuky|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Chimera|Sandworm Team|APT41|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|Night Dragon|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|Ke3chang|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|APT18
|
||||
T1132,Data Encoding,Command And Control,no
|
||||
T1129,Shared Modules,Execution,no
|
||||
T1127,Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1125,Video Capture,Collection,Silence|FIN7
|
||||
T1124,System Time Discovery,Discovery,The White Company|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Turla
|
||||
T1124,System Time Discovery,Discovery,Darkhotel|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Chimera|Operation Wocao|The White Company|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Turla
|
||||
T1123,Audio Capture,Collection,APT37
|
||||
T1120,Peripheral Device Discovery,Discovery,Turla|APT37|Gamaredon Group|Equation|APT28
|
||||
T1119,Automated Collection,Collection,Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT1|APT28|Patchwork|OilRig|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|FIN6
|
||||
T1115,Clipboard Data,Collection,APT39|APT38
|
||||
T1114,Email Collection,Collection,no
|
||||
T1113,Screen Capture,Collection,Gamaredon Group|APT39|Silence|MuddyWater|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|Dark Caracal|FIN7|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|Group5|APT28
|
||||
T1112,Modify Registry,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|Turla|APT32|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|Threat Group-3390|Honeybee|Patchwork|Gorgon Group|FIN8
|
||||
T1111,Two-Factor Authentication Interception,Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1110,Brute Force,Credential Access,DarkVishnya|APT39|OilRig|FIN5|Turla
|
||||
T1120,Peripheral Device Discovery,Discovery,Operation Wocao|Turla|APT37|Gamaredon Group|Equation|APT28
|
||||
T1119,Automated Collection,Collection,Mustang Panda|Sidewinder|Chimera|menuPass|Operation Wocao|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT1|APT28|Patchwork|OilRig|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|FIN6
|
||||
T1115,Clipboard Data,Collection,Operation Wocao|APT39|APT38
|
||||
T1114,Email Collection,Collection,Silent Librarian
|
||||
T1113,Screen Capture,Collection,GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Gamaredon Group|APT39|Silence|MuddyWater|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|Dark Caracal|FIN7|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|Group5|APT28
|
||||
T1112,Modify Registry,Defense Evasion,Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|Turla|APT32|APT38|Patchwork|Gorgon Group|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|Threat Group-3390|Honeybee|FIN8
|
||||
T1111,Two-Factor Authentication Interception,Credential Access,Chimera|Operation Wocao
|
||||
T1110,Brute Force,Credential Access,APT28|Fox Kitten|DarkVishnya|APT39|OilRig|FIN5|Turla
|
||||
T1108,Redundant Access,Defense Evasion|Persistence,no
|
||||
T1106,Native API,Execution,Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Turla|Silence|Gorgon Group|APT37
|
||||
T1105,Ingress Tool Transfer,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Silence|APT-C-36|APT41|Soft Cell|TA505|WIRTE|APT33|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Rancor|Cobalt Group|Turla|Gorgon Group|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|APT37|FIN8|PLATINUM|Leviathan|Elderwood|Magic Hound|APT3|APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN7|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28
|
||||
T1106,Native API,Execution,Higaisa|menuPass|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Turla|Silence|APT37|Gorgon Group
|
||||
T1105,Ingress Tool Transfer,Command And Control,HAFNIUM|APT29|Ajax Security Team|Mustang Panda|Windshift|Darkhotel|ZIRCONIUM|TA551|Volatile Cedar|Indrik Spider|Evilnum|Sidewinder|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|Kimsuky|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Silence|APT-C-36|APT41|GALLIUM|TA505|WIRTE|APT33|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Turla|OilRig|Rancor|Cobalt Group|Gorgon Group|Dragonfly 2.0|APT37|Elderwood|Leviathan|FIN8|PLATINUM|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|APT3|APT32|menuPass|FIN7|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28
|
||||
T1104,Multi-Stage Channels,Command And Control,APT41|MuddyWater|APT3
|
||||
T1102,Web Service,Command And Control,Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Inception|FIN6
|
||||
T1102,Web Service,Command And Control,Fox Kitten|Turla|APT32|Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Inception|FIN6
|
||||
T1098,Account Manipulation,Persistence,APT3|Dragonfly 2.0|Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1095,Non-Application Layer Protocol,Command And Control,APT29|PLATINUM|APT3
|
||||
T1095,Non-Application Layer Protocol,Command And Control,HAFNIUM|Operation Wocao|FIN6|APT29|PLATINUM|APT3
|
||||
T1092,Communication Through Removable Media,Command And Control,APT28
|
||||
T1091,Replication Through Removable Media,Lateral Movement|Initial Access,Tropic Trooper|Darkhotel|APT28
|
||||
T1090,Proxy,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|APT41|Turla
|
||||
T1087,Account Discovery,Discovery,no
|
||||
T1083,File and Directory Discovery,Discovery,Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Inception|APT41|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|APT18|Leafminer|Honeybee|Dark Caracal|Dragonfly 2.0|Magic Hound|Sowbug|BRONZE BUTLER|APT3|APT28|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1082,System Information Discovery,Discovery,Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|Honeybee|APT19|APT37|APT32|Magic Hound|OilRig|APT3|Sowbug|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1080,Taint Shared Content,Lateral Movement,BRONZE BUTLER|Darkhotel
|
||||
T1078,Valid Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|APT39|FIN4|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|Leviathan|APT33|OilRig|FIN5|menuPass|APT28|FIN10|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390|APT18|PittyTiger|Carbanak
|
||||
T1091,Replication Through Removable Media,Lateral Movement|Initial Access,Mustang Panda|Tropic Trooper|Darkhotel|APT28
|
||||
T1090,Proxy,Command And Control,Windigo|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|APT41|Turla
|
||||
T1087,Account Discovery,Discovery,APT29|UNC2452
|
||||
T1083,File and Directory Discovery,Discovery,APT29|Mustang Panda|Darkhotel|Windigo|Sidewinder|Chimera|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|menuPass|APT39|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Inception|APT41|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|APT18|Leafminer|Honeybee|Dragonfly 2.0|Dark Caracal|Sowbug|APT3|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|APT28|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1082,System Information Discovery,Discovery,APT29|Mustang Panda|Windshift|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Windigo|Sidewinder|UNC2452|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|APT32|APT37|Honeybee|APT19|Magic Hound|Sowbug|OilRig|APT3|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1080,Taint Shared Content,Lateral Movement,Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Darkhotel
|
||||
T1078,Valid Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,APT29|Silent Librarian|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|APT39|FIN4|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|APT33|Leviathan|FIN8|OilRig|FIN5|menuPass|APT28|FIN10|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390|APT18|PittyTiger|Carbanak
|
||||
T1074,Data Staged,Collection,Wizard Spider
|
||||
T1072,Software Deployment Tools,Execution|Lateral Movement,Silence|APT32|Threat Group-1314
|
||||
T1071,Application Layer Protocol,Command And Control,Rocke|Magic Hound|Dragonfly 2.0
|
||||
T1070,Indicator Removal on Host,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1069,Permission Groups Discovery,Discovery,TA505|APT3
|
||||
T1068,Exploitation for Privilege Escalation,Privilege Escalation,Whitefly|APT33|Cobalt Group|PLATINUM|FIN8|APT32|Threat Group-3390|FIN6|APT28
|
||||
T1070,Indicator Removal on Host,Defense Evasion,APT29|UNC2452
|
||||
T1069,Permission Groups Discovery,Discovery,APT29|UNC2452|TA505|APT3
|
||||
T1068,Exploitation for Privilege Escalation,Privilege Escalation,ZIRCONIUM|Turla|Whitefly|APT33|Cobalt Group|PLATINUM|FIN8|APT32|Threat Group-3390|FIN6|APT28
|
||||
T1064,Scripting,Defense Evasion|Execution,no
|
||||
T1062,Hypervisor,Persistence,no
|
||||
T1061,Graphical User Interface,Execution,no
|
||||
T1059,Command and Scripting Interpreter,Execution,APT32|Molerats|Whitefly|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|FIN7|OilRig|FIN5|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1057,Process Discovery,Discovery,Rocke|Frankenstein|Inception|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|APT38|Tropic Trooper|APT37|Honeybee|OilRig|APT3|Magic Hound|APT28|Winnti Group|Stealth Falcon|Poseidon Group|Lazarus Group|Molerats|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1056,Input Capture,Collection|Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1055,Process Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,APT32|Sharpshooter|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|Turla|Cobalt Group|APT37|Honeybee|PLATINUM
|
||||
T1059,Command and Scripting Interpreter,Execution,Windigo|Fox Kitten|APT32|Whitefly|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|FIN7|OilRig|FIN5|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1057,Process Discovery,Discovery,APT29|Mustang Panda|Windshift|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Chimera|UNC2452|Operation Wocao|Rocke|Frankenstein|Inception|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|APT38|Tropic Trooper|APT37|Honeybee|OilRig|APT3|Magic Hound|APT28|Winnti Group|Stealth Falcon|Poseidon Group|Lazarus Group|Molerats|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1056,Input Capture,Collection|Credential Access,APT39
|
||||
T1055,Process Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Operation Wocao|APT32|Sharpshooter|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|APT37|Cobalt Group|Turla|Honeybee|PLATINUM
|
||||
T1053,Scheduled Task/Job,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1052,Exfiltration Over Physical Medium,Exfiltration,no
|
||||
T1051,Shared Webroot,Lateral Movement,no
|
||||
T1049,System Network Connections Discovery,Discovery,Tropic Trooper|APT41|APT38|Soft Cell|APT32|APT1|OilRig|APT3|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1049,System Network Connections Discovery,Discovery,Mustang Panda|MuddyWater|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Tropic Trooper|APT41|APT38|GALLIUM|APT32|APT1|APT3|OilRig|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1048,Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol,Exfiltration,no
|
||||
T1047,Windows Management Instrumentation,Execution,Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT41|FIN6|Soft Cell|APT32|MuddyWater|OilRig|Threat Group-3390|FIN8|Leviathan|menuPass|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT29|Deep Panda
|
||||
T1046,Network Service Scanning,Discovery,Rocke|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT39|APT32|Leafminer|OilRig|Cobalt Group|menuPass|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390
|
||||
T1043,Commonly Used Port,Command And Control,Machete|OilRig|APT28|TEMP.Veles|Night Dragon|APT29|APT18|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN7|FIN8|APT37|Magic Hound|APT3|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390
|
||||
T1041,Exfiltration Over C2 Channel,Exfiltration,Sandworm Team|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Kimsuky|Soft Cell|APT32|APT3|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1040,Network Sniffing,Credential Access|Discovery,Sandworm Team|DarkVishnya|APT33|Stolen Pencil|APT28
|
||||
T1039,Data from Network Shared Drive,Collection,Sowbug|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass
|
||||
T1047,Windows Management Instrumentation,Execution,Mustang Panda|Windshift|UNC2452|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT41|FIN6|GALLIUM|APT32|MuddyWater|Threat Group-3390|OilRig|FIN8|Leviathan|menuPass|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT29|Deep Panda
|
||||
T1046,Network Service Scanning,Discovery,Chimera|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Rocke|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT39|APT32|Cobalt Group|OilRig|Leafminer|menuPass|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390
|
||||
T1043,Commonly Used Port,Command And Control,OilRig|APT28|TEMP.Veles|Night Dragon|APT29|APT18|APT19|FIN7|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|APT37|APT3|Magic Hound|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390
|
||||
T1041,Exfiltration Over C2 Channel,Exfiltration,ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Chimera|APT39|Operation Wocao|Sandworm Team|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Kimsuky|GALLIUM|APT32|APT3|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1040,Network Sniffing,Credential Access|Discovery,Kimsuky|Sandworm Team|DarkVishnya|APT33|Stolen Pencil|APT28
|
||||
T1039,Data from Network Shared Drive,Collection,Chimera|Fox Kitten|Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Sowbug|menuPass
|
||||
T1037,Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Rocke
|
||||
T1036,Masquerading,Defense Evasion,Windshift|APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|Dragonfly 2.0
|
||||
T1036,Masquerading,Defense Evasion,APT29|Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|TA551|UNC2452|Windshift|APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|PLATINUM|Dragonfly 2.0
|
||||
T1034,Path Interception,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1033,System Owner/User Discovery,Discovery,Frankenstein|APT41|Soft Cell|Tropic Trooper|APT39|MuddyWater|APT32|APT37|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|Magic Hound|FIN10|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3
|
||||
T1033,System Owner/User Discovery,Discovery,Windshift|ZIRCONIUM|Sidewinder|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT41|GALLIUM|Tropic Trooper|APT39|MuddyWater|Dragonfly 2.0|APT37|APT19|APT32|OilRig|Magic Hound|FIN10|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3
|
||||
T1030,Data Transfer Size Limits,Exfiltration,Threat Group-3390
|
||||
T1029,Scheduled Transfer,Exfiltration,no
|
||||
T1027,Obfuscated Files or Information,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|APT41|Machete|Soft Cell|Turla|TA505|Silence|APT33|Night Dragon|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|APT29|APT18|Tropic Trooper|Cobalt Group|Patchwork|Leafminer|APT37|Threat Group-3390|Honeybee|Dark Caracal|menuPass|APT19|BlackOasis|FIN8|Leviathan|Elderwood|MuddyWater|FIN7|Magic Hound|OilRig|APT3|APT32|Group5|Dust Storm|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT28
|
||||
T1029,Scheduled Transfer,Exfiltration,Higaisa
|
||||
T1027,Obfuscated Files or Information,Defense Evasion,APT39|Mustang Panda|Windshift|TA551|Higaisa|Sidewinder|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|FIN6|Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|APT41|GALLIUM|Turla|TA505|Silence|APT33|Night Dragon|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|APT29|APT18|Tropic Trooper|Cobalt Group|Patchwork|APT37|Honeybee|Dark Caracal|Leafminer|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|APT19|BlackOasis|FIN8|FIN7|Elderwood|MuddyWater|Leviathan|Magic Hound|OilRig|APT3|APT32|Group5|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|Putter Panda|APT28
|
||||
T1026,Multiband Communication,Command And Control,Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1025,Data from Removable Media,Collection,Machete|Turla|Gamaredon Group|APT28
|
||||
T1025,Data from Removable Media,Collection,Turla|Gamaredon Group|APT28
|
||||
T1021,Remote Services,Lateral Movement,no
|
||||
T1020,Automated Exfiltration,Exfiltration,Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Honeybee
|
||||
T1018,Remote System Discovery,Discovery,Sandworm Team|Rocke|Wizard Spider|Silence|Soft Cell|APT39|APT32|Deep Panda|Threat Group-3390|Dragonfly 2.0|Leafminer|Ke3chang|FIN8|APT3|FIN5|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN6|Turla
|
||||
T1016,System Network Configuration Discovery,Discovery,Sandworm Team|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT41|Soft Cell|APT32|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|Magic Hound|OilRig|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3|Naikon|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1020,Automated Exfiltration,Exfiltration,Sidewinder|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Honeybee
|
||||
T1018,Remote System Discovery,Discovery,APT29|UNC2452|Chimera|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Sandworm Team|Rocke|Wizard Spider|Silence|GALLIUM|APT39|APT32|Deep Panda|Dragonfly 2.0|Threat Group-3390|Leafminer|Ke3chang|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN5|APT3|menuPass|FIN6|Turla
|
||||
T1016,System Network Configuration Discovery,Discovery,ZIRCONIUM|Mustang Panda|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Sandworm Team|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT41|GALLIUM|APT32|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|Magic Hound|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3|Naikon|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1014,Rootkit,Defense Evasion,Rocke|APT41|APT28|Winnti Group
|
||||
T1012,Query Registry,Discovery,APT32|Dragonfly 2.0|Threat Group-3390|OilRig|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Turla
|
||||
T1012,Query Registry,Discovery,ZIRCONIUM|Chimera|Fox Kitten|APT39|Operation Wocao|APT32|Threat Group-3390|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Turla
|
||||
T1011,Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium,Exfiltration,no
|
||||
T1010,Application Window Discovery,Discovery,Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1008,Fallback Channels,Command And Control,APT41|OilRig|Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1007,System Service Discovery,Discovery,BRONZE BUTLER|APT1|OilRig|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1008,Fallback Channels,Command And Control,Carbanak|APT41|OilRig|Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1007,System Service Discovery,Discovery,Chimera|Operation Wocao|BRONZE BUTLER|APT1|OilRig|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1006,Direct Volume Access,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1005,Data from Local System,Collection,Gamaredon Group|APT39|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|Soft Cell|Turla|menuPass|Dark Caracal|Dragonfly 2.0|Honeybee|APT37|APT28|APT3|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|Threat Group-3390|APT1|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1005,Data from Local System,Collection,APT29|Windigo|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|FIN6|Gamaredon Group|APT39|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|GALLIUM|Turla|menuPass|Dragonfly 2.0|Dark Caracal|Honeybee|APT37|APT28|BRONZE BUTLER|APT3|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|Threat Group-3390|APT1|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1003,OS Credential Dumping,Credential Access,APT39|Frankenstein|APT32|APT28|Leviathan|Sowbug|Suckfly|Poseidon Group|Axiom
|
||||
T1001,Data Obfuscation,Command And Control,Axiom
|
||||
T1001,Data Obfuscation,Command And Control,Operation Wocao|Axiom
|
||||
|
||||
|
Reference in New Issue
Block a user