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HVCI Disable and story
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name: Windows Impair Defenses Disable HVCI
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id: b061dfcc-f0aa-42cc-a6d4-a87f172acb79
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version: 1
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date: '2023-04-13'
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author: Michael Haag, Splunk
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status: production
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type: TTP
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data_source:
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- Sysmon Event ID 13
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description: The following analytic refers to a detection mechanism designed to identify when the Hypervisor-protected Code Integrity (HVCI) feature is disabled within the Windows registry. HVCI is a security feature in Windows 10 and Windows Server 2016 that helps protect the kernel and system processes from being tampered with by malicious code.
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HVCI relies on hardware-assisted virtualization and Microsoft's Hyper-V hypervisor to ensure that only kernel-mode code that has been signed by Microsoft or the system's hardware manufacturer can be executed. This prevents attackers from exploiting vulnerabilities to run unsigned code, like kernel-mode rootkits or other malicious software, at the kernel level.
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Disabling HVCI may expose the system to security risks and could be an indicator of a potential compromise or unauthorized activity. The analytic aims to detect and report events or configurations that lead to the disabling of HVCI.
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search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
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as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path = "*\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\DeviceGuard\\Scenarios\\HypervisorEnforcedCodeIntegrity\\Enabled" Registry.registry_value_data="0x00000000" by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name
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Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.action Registry.user
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Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
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| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_impair_defenses_disable_hvci_filter`'
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how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.
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known_false_positives: False positives will be limited to administrative scripts disabling HVCI. Filter as needed.
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references:
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- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/04/11/guidance-for-investigating-attacks-using-cve-2022-21894-the-blacklotus-campaign/
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tags:
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analytic_story:
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- BlackLotus Campaign
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- Windows Defense Evasion Tactics
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- Windows Registry Abuse
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asset_type: Endpoint
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atomic_guid:
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- 70bd71e6-eba4-4e00-92f7-617911dbe020
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confidence: 100
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impact: 70
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message: HVCI has been disabled on $dest$.
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mitre_attack_id:
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- T1562.001
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- T1562
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observable:
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- name: dest
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type: Endpoint
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role:
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- Victim
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product:
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- Splunk Enterprise
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- Splunk Enterprise Security
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- Splunk Cloud
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risk_score: 70
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security_domain: endpoint
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tests:
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- name: True Positive Test
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attack_data:
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- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/atomic_red_team/hvci_windows-sysmon.log
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source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
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sourcetype: xmlwineventlog
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name: BlackLotus Campaign
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id: 8eb0e418-a2b6-4327-a387-85c976662c8f
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version: 1
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date: '2023-04-14'
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author: Michael Haag, Splunk
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description: The first in-the-wild UEFI bootkit bypassing UEFI Secure Boot on fully updated UEFI systems is now a reality
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narrative: "The number of UEFI vulnerabilities discovered in recent years and the failures in patching them or revoking vulnerable binaries within a reasonable time window hasn't gone unnoticed by threat actors. As a result, the first publicly known UEFI bootkit bypassing the essential platform security feature UEFI Secure Boot is now a reality. present the first public analysis of this UEFI bootkit, which is capable of running on even fully-up-to-date Windows 11 systems with UEFI Secure Boot enabled. Functionality of the bootkit and its individual features leads us to believe that we are dealing with a bootkit known as BlackLotus, the UEFI bootkit being sold on hacking forums for $5,000 since at least October 2022. (ESET, 2023)
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The following content aims to aid defenders in detecting suspicious bootloaders and understanding the diverse techniques employed in this campaign."
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references:
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- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/04/11/guidance-for-investigating-attacks-using-cve-2022-21894-the-blacklotus-campaign/
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- https://www.welivesecurity.com/2023/03/01/blacklotus-uefi-bootkit-myth-confirmed/
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tags:
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analytic_story: BlackLotus Campaign
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category:
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- Adversary Tactics
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product:
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- Splunk Enterprise
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- Splunk Enterprise Security
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- Splunk Cloud
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usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
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