Merge branch 'develop' into security_hub_response

2026-06-08 17:32:49 +00:00 · 2020-06-24 17:22:16 -07:00
parent c812c56d87 23e86ec9ad
commit e2fa17ebde
41 changed files with 916 additions and 702 deletions
@@ -86,40 +86,6 @@ jobs:
          webhook: '${SLACK_WEBHOOK}'
          fail_only: true
        
-  test-links:
-    executor: content-executor
-    steps:
-      - run:
-          name: checkout repo
-          command: |
-            if [[ ! -z "${CIRCLE_PULL_REQUEST}" &&  ! -z "${CIRCLE_PR_NUMBER}" ]]; then
-                git clone https://${GITHUB_TOKEN}@github.com/splunk/security-content.git
-                cd security-content
-                git fetch origin pull/${CIRCLE_PR_NUMBER}/head:${CIRCLE_BRANCH}
-                git checkout ${CIRCLE_BRANCH}
-            elif [ "${CIRCLE_BRANCH}" == "" ]; then
-                git clone https://${GITHUB_TOKEN}@github.com/splunk/security-content.git
-            else
-                git clone --branch ${CIRCLE_BRANCH} https://${GITHUB_TOKEN}@github.com/splunk/security-content.git
-            fi
-      - run: *apt-install
-      - run:
-          name: check for broken links using liche
-          command: |
-            echo 'export GOROOT=~/.go' >> $BASH_ENV
-            echo 'export PATH=$GOROOT/bin:$PATH' >> $BASH_ENV
-            echo 'export GOPATH=~/go' >> $BASH_ENV
-            echo 'export PATH=$GOPATH/bin:$PATH' >> $BASH_ENV
-            echo 'export GO111MODULE="on"' >> $BASH_ENV
-            source $BASH_ENV
-            go get -u github.com/raviqqe/liche
-            cd security-content
-            liche docs/stories_categories.md -v -t 60
-            liche README.md -v -t 60
-      - slack/status:
-          webhook: '${SLACK_WEBHOOK}'
-          fail_only: true
-        
  build-sources:
    executor: content-executor
    steps:
@@ -422,17 +388,6 @@ jobs:
        
 workflows:
  version: 2.1
-  test-dead-links:
-    triggers:
-      - schedule:
-          cron: "0 0 * * *"
-          filters:
-            branches:
-              only:
-                - master
-                - develop
-    jobs:
-      - test-links
  validate-and-build:
    jobs:
      - validate-content:
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ curl -s https://content.splunkresearch.com | jq
 }
 ```

-#### [GitHub Workflow](https://github.com/splunk/security-content/wiki/2.-Installation-and-Usage)
+#### [GitHub Workflow](https://github.com/splunk/security-content/wiki/Installation-and-Usage)
 Create your customized version of Security Content by forking this project and following this guide.

 # What's in an Analytic Story?
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ Download and install the latest version of [Splunk Analytic Story Execution]


 # Writing Content
-Before you begin, follow the steps to install **dependencies and pre-commit hooks** under ["Developing"](https://github.com/splunk/security-content#developing).
+Before you begin, follow the steps to install **dependencies and pre-commit hooks** under [Developing Content](https://github.com/splunk/security-content/wiki/Developing-Content).

 # Security Content

@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ Before you begin, follow the steps to install **dependencies and pre-commit hook
 * [bin/](bin/): All binaries required to produce and test content

 # Contribution
-We welcome feedback and contributions from the community! Please see our [contribution guidelines](docs/CONTRIBUTING.md) for more information on how to get involved.
+We welcome feedback and contributions from the community! Please see our [contributing to the project](https://github.com/splunk/security-content/wiki/Contributing-to-the-Project) for more information on how to get involved.

 ## Support
 Please use the [GitHub Issue Tracker](https://github.com/splunk/security-content/issues) to submit bugs or request features.
@@ -1,17 +1,16 @@
 name: Previously Seen Running Windows Services
 id: 64ce0ade-cb01-4678-bddd-d31c0b175394
-version: 2
-date: '2020-01-13'
+version: 3
+date: '2020-06-15'
 description: This collects the services that have been started across your entire
  enterprise.
 how_to_implement: While this search does not require you to adhere to Splunk CIM,
  you must be ingesting your Windows security-event logs for it to execute successfully.
  Please ensure that the Splunk Add-on for Microsoft Windows is version 5.0.0 or above.
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
-search: '`wineventlog_system` signature_id=7036 | rename param1 as service_name |
+search: '`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7036 | rename param1 as service_name |
  rename param2 as action | search action="running" | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime,
-  latest(_time) as lastTime by service_name | outputlookup previously_seen_running_windows_services
-  | stats count'
+  latest(_time) as lastTime by service_name | outputlookup previously_seen_running_windows_services'
 tags:
  analytics_story:
  - Orangeworm Attack Group
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+name: Previously seen users in CloudTrail - DM
+id: 0a87ecf9-dc6a-43af-861a-205e75a09bf5
+version: 1
+date: '2020-05-28'
+description: This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console,
+  then creates a baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country
+  we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by username, within the last 30
+  days.
+how_to_implement: You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later)
+  and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model  
+  for cloud use cases. Validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_users_console_logins.csv`,
+  which is a lookup file created by this support search.
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication
+  where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src
+  | iplocation Authentication.src | rename Authentication.user as user Authentication.src as src
+  | table user src City Region Country firstTime lastTime | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins.csv | stats count'
+tags:
+  analytics_story:
+  - Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities
+  detections:
+  - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country
+  - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region
+  - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City
+  - Detect new user AWS Console Login - DM
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+name: Update previously seen users in CloudTrail - DM
+id: 66ff71c2-7e01-47dd-a041-906688c9d322
+version: 1
+date: '2020-05-28'
+description: This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console,
+  then updates the baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country
+  we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by user, within the last hour.
+how_to_implement: You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later)
+  and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model
+  for cloud use cases. Validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_users_console_logins.csv`,
+  which is a lookup file created by this support search.
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+search: '| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from
+      datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user
+      Authenticaiton.src | iplocation Authentication.src | rename Authentication.user as user
+      Authentciation.src as src | table user src City Region Country firstTime lastTime
+      | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_users_console_logins.csv | stats min(firstTime) as
+      firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by user src City Region Country
+      | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins.csv'
+tags:
+  analytics_story:
+  - Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities
+  detections:
+  - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country
+  - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region
+  - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City
+  - Detect new user AWS Console Login - DM
@@ -15,8 +15,7 @@ author: David Dorsey, Splunk
 search: '`cloudtrail` eventName=AssumeRole | spath output=requestingAccountId path=userIdentity.accountId
  | spath output=requestedAccountId path=resources{}.accountId | search requestingAccountId=*
  | where requestingAccountId != requestedAccountId | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity
-  | multireport [| stats min(eval(coalesce(firstTime, _time)))
-  as firstTime max(eval(coalesce(lastTime, _time)))
+  | multireport [| stats min(eval(coalesce(firstTime, _time))) as firstTime max(eval(coalesce(lastTime, _time)))
  as lastTime by requestingAccountId, requestedAccountId | outputlookup previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity
  | where fact=fiction] [| eventstats min(eval(coalesce(firstTime, _time))) as firstTime, 
  max(eval(coalesce(lastTime, _time))) as lastTime by requestingAccountId, requestedAccountId | where firstTime
@@ -4,20 +4,15 @@ version: 1
 date: '2019-12-10'
 description: This search detects the use of wmic and Powershell to create a shadow
  copy.
-how_to_implement: You must enable Powershell scriptblock logging in order to detect
-  this attack.This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`. We strongly recommend
-  that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype,
-  etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations
-  for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to
-  filter out known false positives.
 type: ESCU
 references:
 - https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf
 author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
-search: '`sysmon` Message=*win32_shadowcopy* Message=*Create* | stats count min(_time)
-  as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dvc User EventCode Message | rename User
-  as user, dvc as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
-  | `creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell_filter` '
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
+  where Processes.process_name=wmic* OR Processes.process_name=powershell* Processes.process=*shadowcopy* Processes.process=*create*
+  by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest
+  | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
+  | `creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell_filter`'
 known_false_positives: Legtimate administrator usage of wmic to create a shadow copy.
 tags:
  analytics_story:
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ known_false_positives: When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, thi
 tags:
  analytics_story:
  - Suspicious AWS Login Activities
+  - Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities
  kill_chain_phases:
  - Actions on Objectives
  mitre_attack_id:
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ known_false_positives: When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, thi
 tags:
  analytics_story:
  - Suspicious AWS Login Activities
+  - Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities
  kill_chain_phases:
  - Actions on Objectives
  mitre_attack_id:
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ known_false_positives: When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, thi
 tags:
  analytics_story:
  - Suspicious AWS Login Activities
+  - Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities
  kill_chain_phases:
  - Actions on Objectives
  mitre_attack_id:
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+name: Detect new user AWS Console Login - DM
+id: bc91a8cd-35e7-4bb2-6140-e756cc46fd71
+version: 1
+date: '2020-05-28'
+description: This search looks for CloudTrail events wherein a console login event
+  by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup
+  file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console.
+  The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within
+  the last hour
+how_to_implement: You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later)
+  and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model
+  for cloud use cases. Run the "Previously seen users in CloudTrail" support search only once to
+  create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run "Update
+  previously seen users in CloudTrail" hourly (or more frequently depending on how
+  often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines.
+type: ESCU
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+search: "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_users_console_logins.csv | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by user | eval userStatus=if(firstTime >=relative_time(now(), '-70m@m'), 'First Time Logging into AWS Console','Previously Seen User')| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `detect_new_user_aws_console_login___dm_filter`"
+known_false_positives: When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this
+  activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user
+  activity is legitimate.
+tags:
+  analytics_story:
+  - Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  cis20:
+  - CIS 16
+  nist:
+  - DE.DP
+  - DE.AE
+  security_domain: network
+  asset_type: AWS Instance
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 name: First Time Seen Running Windows Service
 id: 823136f2-d755-4b6d-ae04-372b486a5808
-version: 2
-date: '2020-01-13'
+version: 3
+date: '2020-06-15'
 description: This search looks for the first time a Windows service is seen running
  in your environment.
 how_to_implement: While this search does not require you to adhere to Splunk CIM,
@@ -12,9 +12,9 @@ how_to_implement: While this search does not require you to adhere to Splunk CIM
 type: ESCU
 references: []
 author: David Dorsey, Splunk
-search: '`wineventlog_system` signature_id=7036 | rename param1 as service_name |
+search: '`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7036 | rename param1 as service_name |
  rename param2 as action | search action="running" [ search `wineventlog_system`
-  signature_id=7036 | rename param1 as service_name | rename param2 as action | search
+  EventCode=7036 | rename param1 as service_name | rename param2 as action | search
  action="running" | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime
  by service_name | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_running_windows_services
  | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by service_name |
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+name: Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption 
+id: 5cc67381-44fa-4111-8a37-7a230943f027
+version: 1
+date: '2020-06-11'
+description: This search detects a potential kerberoasting attack via service principal name requests
+how_to_implement: You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, and include the windows security event logs that contain kerberos
+type: ESCU
+references:
+  - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1208/T1208.md
+  - https://www.trimarcsecurity.com/post/trimarcresearch-detecting-kerberoasting-activity
+author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk
+search: '`wineventlog_security` EventID=4769 TicketOptions=0x40810000 TicketEncryptionType=0x17 
+| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(ServiceName) values(TargetUserName) values(user)  by TargetDomainName 
+| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
+| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` 
+| `kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption_filter`'
+known_false_positives: Older systems that support kerberos RC4 by default NetApp may generate false positives
+tags:
+  analytics_story:
+  - Lateral Movement
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1208
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Actions on Objectives
+  cis20:
+  - CIS 8
+  - CIS 16
+  nist:
+  - DE.CM
+  security_domain: endpoint
+  asset_type: Endpoint
@@ -1,25 +1,18 @@
 name: Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys
 id: 8470d755-0c13-45b3-bd63-387a373c10cf
-version: 2
-date: '2019-03-01'
+version: 3
+date: '2020-06-15'
 description: The search looks for reg.exe modifying registry keys that define Windows
  services and their configurations.
-how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
-  on registry changes that include the name of the process responsible for the changes
-  from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Registry`
-  nodes.
 type: ESCU
 references: []
 author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
-search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
-  as lastTime values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.parent_process_name)
-  as parent_process_name values(Processes.user) as user FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
-  where Processes.process_name = reg.exe by Processes.process_id Processes.dest |
-  `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
-  | join [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Registry.registry_path)
-  as registry_path count  FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path="*\\services\\*"
-  by Registry.process_id Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Registry")` | table
-  process_id dest registry_path] | `reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys_filter`'
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Processes.process_name) as process_name
+  values(Processes.parent_process_name) as parent_process_name values(Processes.user) as user FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
+  where Processes.process_name=reg.exe Processes.process=*reg* Processes.process=*add* Processes.process=*Services*
+  by Processes.process_id Processes.dest Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")`
+  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
+  | `reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys_filter`'
 known_false_positives: It is unusual for a service to be created or modified by directly
  manipulating the registry. However, there may be legitimate instances of this behavior.
  It is important to validate and investigate, as appropriate.
@@ -28,9 +21,7 @@ tags:
  - Windows Service Abuse
  - Windows Persistence Techniques
  mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1050
-  - T1031
-  - T1089
+  - T1058
  kill_chain_phases:
  - Installation
  cis20:
@@ -1,14 +1,9 @@
 name: Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services
 id: f0c693d8-2a89-4ce7-80b4-98fea4c3ea6d
-version: 2
-date: '2019-02-27'
+version: 3
+date: '2020-06-15'
 description: This search looks for arguments to sc.exe indicating the creation or
  modification of a Windows service.
-how_to_implement: You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your
-  hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be
-  ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints.
-  The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data
-  model.
 type: ESCU
 references: []
 author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
@@ -30,8 +25,6 @@ tags:
  - Disabling Security Tools
  mitre_attack_id:
  - T1050
-  - T1031
-  - T1089
  kill_chain_phases:
  - Installation
  cis20:
@@ -1,130 +0,0 @@
-# Contributing to the Project
-
-This document is the single source of truth on how to contribute to this codebase. Please feel free to browse the open issues and file new ones. All feedback is welcome!
-
----
-
-## Topics
-
-* [Prerequisites](#prerequisites)
-    * [Contributor License Agreement](#contributor-license-agreement)
-    * [Code of Conduct](#code-of-conduct)
-    * [Setup Development Environment](#setup-development-environment)
-* [Contribution Workflow](#contribution-workflow)
-    * [Feature Requests and Bug Reports](#feature-requests-and-bug-reports)
-    * [Fixing Issues](#fixing-issues)
-    * [Pull Requests](#pull-requests)
-    * [Code Review](#code-review)
-    * [Documentation](#documentation)
-* [Maintainers](#maintainers)
-
----
-
-## Prerequisites
-When contributing to this repository, please first discuss the change you wish to make via a GitHub issue, Slack message, email, or via other channels with the owners of this repository.
-
-##### Contributor License Agreement
-At the moment, we can only accept pull requests submitted from either:
-* Splunk employees or
-* Individuals that have signed our contributors' agreement
-
-If you wish to be a contributing member of our community, please see the agreement [for individuals](https://www.splunk.com/goto/individualcontributions) or [for organizations](https://www.splunk.com/goto/contributions).
-
-##### Code of Conduct
-Please make sure to read and observe our [Code of Conduct](contributing/code-of-conduct.md). Please follow it in all of your interactions involving the project.
-
-##### Setup Development Environment
-see [Developing section](https://github.com/splunk/security-content#developing)
-
-## Contribution Workflow
-Help is always welcome! For example, documentation can always use improvement. There's always code that can be clarified, functionality that can be extended, and tests to be added to guarantee behavior. If you see something you think should be fixed, don't be afraid to own it.
-
-##### Feature Requests and Bug Reports
-Have ideas on improvements? See something that needs work? While the community encourages everyone to contribute code, it is also appreciated when someone reports an issue. Please report any issues or bugs you find through [GitHub's issue tracker](https://github.com/splunk/security-content/issues). 
-
-If you are reporting a bug, please include:
-
-* Your operating system name and version
-* Any details about your local setup that might be helpful in troubleshooting (ex. Python interpreter version, Splunk version, etc.)
-* Detailed steps to reproduce the bug
-
-We'd also like to hear about your propositions and suggestions. Feel free to submit them as issues and:
-
-* Explain in detail how they should work
-* Note that keeping the scope as narrow as possible will make the suggestion easier to implement
-
-##### Fixing Issues
-Look through our [issue tracker](https://github.com/splunk/security-content/issues) to find problems to fix! Feel free to comment and tag corresponding stakeholders or full-time maintainers of this project with any questions or concerns.
-
-##### Pull Requests
-What is a "pull request"? It informs the project's core developers about the changes you want to review and merge. Once you submit a pull request, it enters a stage of code review where you and others can discuss its potential modifications and maybe even add more commits to it later on. 
-
-If you want to learn more, please consult this [tutorial on how pull requests work](https://help.github.com/articles/using-pull-requests/) in the [GitHub Help Center](https://help.github.com/).
-
-Here's an overview of how you can make a pull request against this project:
-
-1. Fork the [analytic\_story\_execution GitHub repository](https://github.com/splunk/security-content/issues)
-2. Clone your fork using git and create a branch off of develop
-
-    ```
-    $ git clone git@github.com:YOUR_GITHUB_USERNAME/security-content.git
-    $ cd security-content
-
-    # This project uses 'develop' for all development activity, so create your branch off that
-    $ git checkout -b your-bugfix-branch-name develop
-    ```
-    
-3. Make your changes, commit, and push (once your tests have passed)
-
-    ```
-    $ cd security-content
-    $ git commit -m "<insert helpful commit message>"
-    $ git push 
-    ```
-    
-4. Submit a pull request through the GitHub website, using the changes from your forked codebase
-
-##### Code Review
-There are two aspects of code review: giving and receiving.
-
-To make it easier for your PR to receive reviews, keep in mind that the reviewers will need you to:
-* Follow the project coding conventions
-* Write good commit messages
-* Break large changes into a logical series of smaller patches which individually make easily understandable changes, and in aggregate solve a broader issue
-
-Reviewers, the people providing the review, are highly encouraged to revisit the [Code of Conduct](contributing/code-of-conduct.md) and must go above and beyond to promote a collaborative, respectful community.
-
-When reviewing PRs from others, [The Gentle Art of Patch Review](http://sage.thesharps.us/2014/09/01/the-gentle-art-of-patch-review/) suggests an iterative series of focuses designed to lead new contributors to positive collaboration, such as:
-
-* Is the idea behind the contribution sound?
-* Is the contribution architected correctly?
-* Is the contribution polished?
-
-For this project, we require at least one approval. A build from our continuous integration system must also be successful off of your branch. Please note that any new changes made with your existing pull request during review will automatically unapprove and retrigger another build/round of tests.
-
-##### Documentation
-We can always use improvements to our documentation! Anyone can contribute to these docs--whether you’re new to the project, you’ve been around a long time, or if you just can’t stand seeing typos. 
-
-Here's what's needed?
-
-1. More complementary documentation. Have you something unclear?
-2. More examples or generic templates that others can use.
-3. Blog posts, articles, and such are all very appreciated.
-
-You can also edit documentation files directly in the GitHub web interface, without creating a local copy. This can be convenient for small typos or grammar fixes.
-
-## Maintainers
-
-If you need help, feel free to tag one of the active maintainers of this project in a post or comment. We'll do our best to reach out to you as quickly as we can.
-
-```
-# Active maintainers marked with (*)
-
-(*) Bhavin Patel
-(*) David Dorsey
-(*) Jose Hernandez
-(*) Rico Valdez
-(*) Patrick Bareib
-(*) Brianna Blacet
-```
-
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ curl -s https://content.splunkresearch.com | jq
 Once you've installed our [app](https://github.com/splunk/security-content/releases), we recommend using our Analytic Story Execution App [(ASX)](https://github.com/splunk/analytics_story_execution) to execute and schedule all of the detections a story automatically.   

 ## Test Out The Detections
-The [attack_range](https://http://github.com/splunk/attack_range) project allows you to spin up an enviroment and launch attacks against it to test the detections. 
+The [attack_range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range) project allows you to spin up an enviroment and launch attacks against it to test the detections. 

 ## Questions?
 If you get stuck or need help with any of our tools, see our [support options](https://github.com/splunk/security-content#support). 
@@ -32,21 +32,21 @@ If you want to help the rest of the security community by sharing your own detec


 ## Content Parts
-* [stories/](stories/): All Analytic Stories
-* [detections/](detections/): Splunk Enterprise, Splunk UBA, and Splunk Phantom detections that power Analytic Stories
-* [response_tasks/](response_tasks/): Splunk Enterprise and Splunk Phantom investigative searches and playbooks employed by Analytic Stories
-* [responses/](responses/): Automated Splunk Enterprise and Splunk Phantom responses triggered by Analytic Stories
-* [baselines/](baselines/): Splunk Phantom and Splunk Enterprise baseline searches needed to support detection searches in Analytic Stories
+* [stories/](https://github.com/splunk/security-content/tree/develop/stories): All Analytic Stories
+* [detections/](https://github.com/splunk/security-content/tree/develop/detections): Splunk Enterprise, Splunk UBA, and Splunk Phantom detections that power Analytic Stories
+* [response_tasks/](https://github.com/splunk/security-content/tree/develop/response_tasks): Splunk Enterprise and Splunk Phantom investigative searches and playbooks employed by Analytic Stories
+* [responses/](https://github.com/splunk/security-content/tree/develop/responses): Automated Splunk Enterprise and Splunk Phantom responses triggered by Analytic Stories
+* [baselines/](https://github.com/splunk/security-content/tree/develop/baselines): Splunk Phantom and Splunk Enterprise baseline searches needed to support detection searches in Analytic Stories

 #### Content Spec Files
-* [stories](docs/spec/stories.spec.md) 
-* [detections](docs/spec/detections.spec.md)
-* [deployments](docs/spec/deployments.spec.md)
-* [responses](docs/spec/responses.spec.md)
-* [response_tasks](docs/spec/response_tasks.spec.md)
-* [baselines](docs/spec/baselines.spec.md)
-* [lookups](docs/spec/lookups.spec.md)
-* [macros](docs/spec/macros.spec.md)
+* [stories](https://github.com/splunk/security-content/blob/develop/docs/spec/stories.spec.md) 
+* [detections](https://github.com/splunk/security-content/blob/develop/docs/spec/detections.spec.md)
+* [deployments](https://github.com/splunk/security-content/blob/develop/docs/spec/deployments.spec.md)
+* [responses](https://github.com/splunk/security-content/blob/develop/docs/spec/responses.spec.md)
+* [response_tasks](https://github.com/splunk/security-content/blob/develop/docs/spec/response_tasks.spec.md)
+* [baselines](https://github.com/splunk/security-content/blob/develop/docs/spec/baselines.spec.md)
+* [lookups](https://github.com/splunk/security-content/blob/develop/docs/spec/lookups.spec.md)
+* [macros](https://github.com/splunk/security-content/blob/develop/docs/spec/macros.spec.md)



@@ -1,73 +0,0 @@
-## Code of Conduct
-
-### Our Pledge
-
-In the interest of fostering an open and welcoming environment, we as
-contributors and maintainers pledge to making participation in our project and
-our community a harassment-free experience for everyone, regardless of age, body
-size, disability, ethnicity, gender identity and expression, level of experience,
-nationality, personal appearance, race, religion, or sexual identity and
-orientation.
-
-### Our Standards
-
-Examples of behavior that contributes to creating a positive environment
-include:
-
-* Using welcoming and inclusive language
-* Being respectful of differing viewpoints and experiences
-* Gracefully accepting constructive criticism
-* Focusing on what is best for the community
-* Showing empathy towards other community members
-
-Examples of unacceptable behavior by participants include:
-
-* The use of sexualized language or imagery and unwelcome sexual attention or
-advances
-* Trolling, insulting/derogatory comments, and personal or political attacks
-* Public or private harassment
-* Publishing others' private information, such as a physical or electronic address, without explicit permission
-* Other conduct which could reasonably be considered inappropriate in a professional setting
-
-### Our Responsibilities
-
-Project maintainers are responsible for clarifying the standards of acceptable
-behavior and are expected to take appropriate and fair corrective action in
-response to any instances of unacceptable behavior.
-
-Project maintainers have the right and responsibility to remove, edit, or
-reject comments, commits, code, wiki edits, issues, and other contributions
-that are not aligned to this Code of Conduct, or to ban temporarily or
-permanently any contributor for other behaviors that they deem inappropriate,
-threatening, offensive, or harmful.
-
-### Scope
-
-This Code of Conduct applies both within project spaces and in public spaces
-when an individual is representing the project or its community. Examples of
-representing a project or community include using an official project e-mail
-address, posting via an official social media account, or acting as an appointed
-representative at an online or offline event. Representation of a project may be
-further defined and clarified by project maintainers.
-
-### Enforcement
-
-Instances of abusive, harassing, or otherwise unacceptable behavior may be
-reported by contacting the project team at support@splunk.com. All
-complaints will be reviewed and investigated and will result in a response that
-is deemed necessary and appropriate to the circumstances. The project team is
-obligated to maintain confidentiality with regard to the reporter of an incident.
-Further details of specific enforcement policies may be posted separately.
-
-Project maintainers who do not follow or enforce the Code of Conduct in good
-faith may face temporary or permanent repercussions as determined by other
-members of the project's leadership.
-
-### Attribution
-
-This Code of Conduct is adapted from the [Contributor Covenant][homepage], version 1.4,
-available at [http://contributor-covenant.org/version/1/4][version]
-
-[homepage]: http://contributor-covenant.org
-[version]: http://contributor-covenant.org/version/1/4/
-
@@ -229,7 +229,7 @@ To get started, run the detection search to identify parent processes of `netsh.
 * PR.PT

 ====References====
-* https://technet.microsoft.com/library/bb490939.aspx
+* https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/tn-archive/bb490939(v=technet.10)
 * https://htmlpreview.github.io/?https://github.com/MatthewDemaske/blogbackup/blob/master/netshell.html
 * http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html

@@ -549,7 +549,6 @@ Attackers employ a variety of tactics in order to avoid detection and operate wi
 ====Tags====

 =====ATT&CK=====
-* T1031
 * T1050
 * T1059
 * T1089
@@ -663,6 +662,7 @@ If there is evidence of lateral movement, it is imperative for analysts to colle

 ====Detections====
 * Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks
+* Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption
 * Remote Desktop Network Traffic
 * Remote Desktop Process Running On System
 * Schtasks scheduling job on remote system
@@ -677,6 +677,7 @@ If there is evidence of lateral movement, it is imperative for analysts to colle
 * T1053
 * T1075
 * T1076
+* T1208

 =====Kill Chain Phases=====
 * Actions on Objectives
@@ -684,10 +685,12 @@ If there is evidence of lateral movement, it is imperative for analysts to colle
 =====CIS=====
 * CIS 16
 * CIS 3
+* CIS 8
 * CIS 9

 =====NIST=====
 * DE.AE
+* DE.CM
 * PR.AC
 * PR.IP

@@ -1491,10 +1494,9 @@ Maintaining persistence is one of the first steps taken by attackers after the i
 ====Tags====

 =====ATT&CK=====
-* T1031
 * T1050
 * T1053
-* T1089
+* T1058
 * T1103
 * T1131
 * T1138
@@ -2521,6 +2523,51 @@ version = 1
 </div>
 </div>

+===Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities===
+
+Monitor your cloud authentication events. Searches within this Analytic Story leverage the recent cloud updates to the Authentication data model to help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious login activity. 
+
+<div class="toccolours mw-collapsible">
+<div class="mw-collapsible-content">
+
+====Narrative====
+It is important to monitor and control who has access to your cloud infrastructure. Detecting suspicious logins will provide good starting points for investigations. Abusive behaviors caused by compromised credentials can lead to direct monetary costs, as you will be billed for any compute activity whether legitimate or otherwise.\
+This Analytic Story has data model versions of cloud searches leveraging Authentication data, including those looking for suspicious login activity, and cross-account activity for AWS.
+
+====Detections====
+* Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City
+* Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country
+* Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region
+* Detect new user AWS Console Login - DM
+
+====Data Models====
+* Authentication
+
+====Tags====
+
+=====ATT&CK=====
+
+=====Kill Chain Phases=====
+* Actions on Objectives
+
+=====CIS=====
+* CIS 16
+
+=====NIST=====
+* DE.AE
+* DE.DP
+
+====References====
+* https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-cloudtrail-now-tracks-cross-account-activity-to-its-origin/
+* https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integration.html
+
+date = 2020-06-04
+
+version = 1
+
+</div>
+</div>
+
 ===Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications===

 Identify unusual changes to your AWS EC2 instances that may indicate malicious activity. Modifications to your EC2 instances by previously unseen users is an example of an activity that may warrant further investigation.
@@ -2643,7 +2690,6 @@ Suspicious activities--spikes in SMB traffic, processes that launch netsh (to mo
 ====Tags====

 =====ATT&CK=====
-* T1031
 * T1043
 * T1050
 * T1053
@@ -2904,10 +2950,8 @@ This Analytic Story is designed to help you detect and investigate suspicious ac
 ====Tags====

 =====ATT&CK=====
-* T1031
 * T1050
 * T1059
-* T1089

 =====Kill Chain Phases=====
 * Actions on Objectives
@@ -3233,9 +3277,8 @@ The Windows operating system uses a services architecture to allow for running c
 ====Tags====

 =====ATT&CK=====
-* T1031
 * T1050
-* T1089
+* T1058

 =====Kill Chain Phases=====
 * Actions on Objectives
@@ -231,7 +231,7 @@ To get started, run the detection search to identify parent processes of `netsh.
 * PR.PT

 ##### References
-* https://technet.microsoft.com/library/bb490939.aspx
+* https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/tn-archive/bb490939(v=technet.10)
 * https://htmlpreview.github.io/?https://github.com/MatthewDemaske/blogbackup/blob/master/netshell.html
 * http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html

@@ -561,7 +561,6 @@ Attackers employ a variety of tactics in order to avoid detection and operate wi
 #### Mappings

 ##### ATT&CK
-* T1031
 * T1050
 * T1059
 * T1089
@@ -663,6 +662,7 @@ If there is evidence of lateral movement, it is imperative for analysts to colle

 #### Detections
 * Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks
+* Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption
 * Remote Desktop Network Traffic
 * Remote Desktop Process Running On System
 * Schtasks scheduling job on remote system
@@ -677,6 +677,7 @@ If there is evidence of lateral movement, it is imperative for analysts to colle
 * T1053
 * T1075
 * T1076
+* T1208

 ##### Kill Chain Phases
 * Actions on Objectives
@@ -684,10 +685,12 @@ If there is evidence of lateral movement, it is imperative for analysts to colle
 ###### CIS
 * CIS 16
 * CIS 3
+* CIS 8
 * CIS 9

 ##### NIST
 * DE.AE
+* DE.CM
 * PR.AC
 * PR.IP

@@ -1401,10 +1404,9 @@ Maintaining persistence is one of the first steps taken by attackers after the i
 #### Mappings

 ##### ATT&CK
-* T1031
 * T1050
 * T1053
-* T1089
+* T1058
 * T1103
 * T1131
 * T1138
@@ -1808,6 +1810,8 @@ Various legacy protocols operate by default in the clear, without the protection

 * [Suspicious AWS Traffic](#Suspicious-AWS-Traffic)

+* [Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities](#Suspicious-Cloud-Authentication-Activities)
+
 * [Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications](#Unusual-AWS-EC2-Modifications)

 ### AWS Cross Account Activity
@@ -2332,6 +2336,45 @@ The searches in this Analytic Story will monitor your AWS network traffic for ev
 ##### References
 * https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/hiding-cloudcobalt-strike-beacon-c2-using-amazon-apis/

+### Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities
+* id = 6380ebbb-55c5-4fce-b754-01fd565fb73c
+* date = 2020-06-04
+* version = 1
+
+#### Description
+Monitor your cloud authentication events. Searches within this Analytic Story leverage the recent cloud updates to the Authentication data model to help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious login activity. 
+
+#### Narrative
+It is important to monitor and control who has access to your cloud infrastructure. Detecting suspicious logins will provide good starting points for investigations. Abusive behaviors caused by compromised credentials can lead to direct monetary costs, as you will be billed for any compute activity whether legitimate or otherwise.\
+This Analytic Story has data model versions of cloud searches leveraging Authentication data, including those looking for suspicious login activity, and cross-account activity for AWS.
+
+#### Detections
+* Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City
+* Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country
+* Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region
+* Detect new user AWS Console Login - DM
+
+#### Data Models
+* Authentication
+
+#### Mappings
+
+##### ATT&CK
+
+##### Kill Chain Phases
+* Actions on Objectives
+
+###### CIS
+* CIS 16
+
+##### NIST
+* DE.AE
+* DE.DP
+
+##### References
+* https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-cloudtrail-now-tracks-cross-account-activity-to-its-origin/
+* https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integration.html
+
 ### Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications
 * id = 73de57ef-0dfc-411f-b1e7-fa24428aeae0
 * date = 2018-04-09
@@ -2465,7 +2508,6 @@ Suspicious activities--spikes in SMB traffic, processes that launch netsh (to mo
 #### Mappings

 ##### ATT&CK
-* T1031
 * T1043
 * T1050
 * T1053
@@ -2702,10 +2744,8 @@ This Analytic Story is designed to help you detect and investigate suspicious ac
 #### Mappings

 ##### ATT&CK
-* T1031
 * T1050
 * T1059
-* T1089

 ##### Kill Chain Phases
 * Actions on Objectives
@@ -3001,9 +3041,8 @@ The Windows operating system uses a services architecture to allow for running c
 #### Mappings

 ##### ATT&CK
-* T1031
 * T1050
-* T1089
+* T1058

 ##### Kill Chain Phases
 * Actions on Objectives
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+definition: search *
+description: Use this macro to add additional filters
+name: aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account___dm_filter
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+definition: search *
+description: Use this macro to add additional filters
+name: detect_new_user_aws_console_login___dm_filter
@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
-definition: summariesonly=true allow_old_summaries=true
+definition: summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true
 description: search data model's summaries only 
 name: security_content_summariesonly
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
    "id": {
      "group": null, 
      "name": "DA-ESS-ContentUpdate", 
-      "version": "3.0.1"
+      "version": "3.0.2"
    }, 
    "author": [
      {
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security-content
-# On Date: 2020-06-04T22:46:46 UTC
+# On Date: 2020-06-18T19:50:40 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Security Research
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-cloudtrail-now-tracks-cross-account-activity-to-its-origin/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.AE"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By Source User"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By Source User", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId"]
 support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity"]
 data_models = []
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -34,8 +34,8 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 12", "CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP", "ID.AM"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN"]
-support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Instance Types", "ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Regions", "ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User", "ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 AMIs"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table"]
+support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User", "ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 AMIs", "ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Regions", "ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Instance Types"]
 data_models = []
 providing_technologies = none
 description = Monitor your AWS EC2 instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or EC2 instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior.
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ version = 2
 reference = ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonVPC/latest/UserGuide/VPC_Appendix_NACLs.html", "https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/how-to-help-prepare-for-ddos-attacks-by-reducing-your-attack-surface/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 11", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "DE.DP", "PR.AC"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of Network ACL Activity by ARN", "ESCU - Baseline of blocked outbound traffic from AWS"]
 data_models = []
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://redlock.io/blog/cryptojacking-tesla"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect API activity from users without MFA - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS API Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Security Group Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new API calls from user roles - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "DE.DP", "ID.AM", "PR.AC"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Notable Info"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field"]
 support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of Security Group Activity by ARN", "ESCU - Previously seen API call per user roles in CloudTrail", "ESCU - Baseline of API Calls per User ARN", "ESCU - Create a list of approved AWS service accounts"]
 data_models = []
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = []
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Excessive Account Lockouts From Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Excessive User Account Lockouts - Rule", "ESCU - Identify New User Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Short Lived Windows Accounts - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1136"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Logon Rights Modifications For User", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Logon Rights Modifications For Endpoint"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Logon Rights Modifications For User", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Logon Rights Modifications For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Change"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs/blob/v3.2/dev/rules/REQUEST-944-APPLICATION-ATTACK-JAVA.conf"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Java Classes - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Content-Type Length - Rule", "ESCU - Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 18", "CIS 3", "CIS 4"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Delivery", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1082"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.RA", "PR.IP", "PR.MA", "PR.PT", "RS.MI"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Investigate Suspicious Strings in HTTP Header", "ESCU - Investigate Web POSTs From src", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate Web POSTs From src", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Investigate Suspicious Strings in HTTP Header", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/inventory-of-authorized-and-unauthorized-devices/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["PR.DS"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get First Occurrence and Last Occurrence of a MAC Address"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get First Occurrence and Last Occurrence of a MAC Address", "ESCU - Get Notable Info"]
 support_searches = ["ESCU - Count of assets by category"]
 data_models = ["Network_Sessions"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://www.zerofox.com/blog/what-is-digital-risk-monitoring/", "https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/consumer/family-safety/what-is-typosquatting/", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2016/06/explained-typosquatting/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Delivery"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender", "ESCU - Get Email Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Email Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender"]
 support_searches = ["ESCU - DNSTwist Domain Names"]
 data_models = ["Email", "Network_Resolution", "Web"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -184,8 +184,8 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Started In Previously Unused Region - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 12", "CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP", "ID.AM"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Investigate Cloud Compute Instance Activities", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Investigate User Activities In All Cloud Regions", "ESCU - Investigate User Activities In Single Cloud Region"]
-support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Regions", "ESCU - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Investigate User Activities In Single Cloud Region", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Investigate Cloud Compute Instance Activities", "ESCU - Investigate User Activities In All Cloud Regions", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table"]
+support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Regions", "ESCU - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User"]
 data_models = ["Cloud_Infrastructure"]
 providing_technologies = none
 description = Monitor your cloud compute instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or compute instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior.
@@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://www.intego.com/mac-security-blog/osxcoldroot-and-the-rat-invasion/", "https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x2A.html", "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/coldroot-rat-still-undetectable-despite-being-uploaded-on-github-two-years-ago/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection - Rule", "ESCU - Processes Tapping Keyboard Events - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 4", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From src ip"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From src ip", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = []
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Collection", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1074"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Email files written outside of the Outlook directory - Rule", "ESCU - Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts - Rule", "ESCU - Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious writes to System Volume Information - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1043", "T1074", "T1114"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -239,8 +239,8 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Command_and_Control", "https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/feature/Command-and-control-servers-The-puppet-masters-that-govern-malware"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 11", "CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1043", "T1048", "T1095"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.AC", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN"]
-support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK", "ESCU - Baseline of blocked outbound traffic from AWS"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
+support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of blocked outbound traffic from AWS", "ESCU - Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK"]
 data_models = ["Network_Resolution", "Network_Traffic"]
 providing_technologies = none
 description = Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures leveraged by attackers to establish and operate command and control channels. Implants installed by attackers on compromised endpoints use these channels to receive instructions and send data back to the malicious operators.
@@ -289,7 +289,7 @@ version = 3
 reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1003", "https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for.html"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", "ESCU - Create Remote Thread into LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003", "T1064", "T1086"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts", "ESCU - Investigate Previous Unseen User", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts", "ESCU - Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts", "ESCU - Investigate Previous Unseen User", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts", "ESCU - Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -306,8 +306,8 @@ id = 0c016e5c-88be-4e2c-8c6c-c2b55b4fb4ef
 version = 2
 reference = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Create local admin accounts using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Name Used by Dragonfly Threat Actors - Rule", "ESCU - Single Letter Process On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule"]
-mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 16", "CIS 2", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1031", "T1043", "T1050", "T1053", "T1059", "T1064", "T1078", "T1086", "T1089", "T1103", "T1112", "T1131"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Process Registry Activity", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process File Activity"]
+mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 16", "CIS 2", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1043", "T1050", "T1053", "T1059", "T1064", "T1078", "T1086", "T1089", "T1103", "T1112", "T1131"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process File Activity", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Registry Activity", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments", "ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK"]
 data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -326,7 +326,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA13-088A", "https://www.imperva.com/learn/application-security/dns-amplification/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Large Volume of DNS ANY Queries - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Network_Resolution"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -367,7 +367,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/data-protection/", "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/dns/splunk-detect-dns-tunneling-37022", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect USB device insertion - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1043"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.DS", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Change_Analysis", "Network_Resolution"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -382,8 +382,8 @@ id = fcc27099-46a0-46b0-a271-5c7dab56b6f1
 version = 2
 reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1089", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2015/11/vonteera-adware-uses-certificates-to-disable-anti-malware/", "https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Tools-Report.pdf"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Unload Sysmon Filter Driver - Rule"]
-mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1031", "T1050", "T1059", "T1089", "T1112"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
+mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1050", "T1059", "T1089", "T1112"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments", "ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK"]
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -399,7 +399,7 @@ version = 2
 reference = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/", "http://www.noip.com/blog/2014/07/11/dynamic-dns-can-use-2/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/08/04/detecting-dynamic-dns-domains-in-splunk.html"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1041"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "DE.DP", "PR.IP"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From src ip"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From src ip", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Network_Resolution", "Web"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -415,7 +415,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-201A", "https://www.first.org/resources/papers/conf2017/Advanced-Incident-Detection-and-Threat-Hunting-using-Sysmon-and-Splunk.pdf", "https://www.vkremez.com/2017/05/emotet-banking-trojan-malware-analysis.html"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of tools built by NirSoft - Rule", "ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 2", "CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Delivery", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1043", "T1059", "T1072", "T1087", "T1103", "T1131"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Update Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Update Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 support_searches = ["ESCU - Add Prohibited Processes to Enterprise Security", "ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK"]
 data_models = ["Email", "Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -433,8 +433,8 @@ version = 2
 reference = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/HIDDEN-COBRA-North-Korean-Malicious-Cyber-Activity", "https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Destructive-Malware-Report.pdf"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious File Write - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 16", "CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1043", "T1059", "T1064", "T1076"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications"]
-support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments", "ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
+support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments", "ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", "ESCU - Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK"]
 data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Resolution", "Network_Traffic"]
 providing_technologies = none
 description = Monitor for and investigate activities, including the creation or deletion of hidden shares and file writes, that may be evidence of infiltration by North Korean government-sponsored cybercriminals. Details of this activity were reported in DHS Report TA-18-149A.
@@ -452,7 +452,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2016/09/hosts-file-hijacks/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Windows hosts file modification - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.AC", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Network_Resolution"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -468,7 +468,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["http://www.deependresearch.org/2016/04/jboss-exploits-view-from-victim.html"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 18"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1082"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Web"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -498,7 +498,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://github.com/splunk/cloud-datamodel-security-research"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint - Rule"]
 mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = []
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -544,9 +544,9 @@ modification_date = 2020-02-04
 id = 399d65dc-1f08-499b-a259-aad9051f38ad
 version = 2
 reference = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/executive-perspective/2015/08/malware_lateral_move.html"]
-detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule"]
-mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16", "CIS 3", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053", "T1075", "T1076"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications"]
+detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks - Rule", "ESCU - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule"]
+mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16", "CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053", "T1075", "T1076", "T1208"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]}
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -566,7 +566,7 @@ version = 4
 reference = ["https://blogs.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/malware-employs-powershell-to-infect-systems/", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Multiple Suspicious Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1064", "T1086"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -591,7 +591,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/03/04/tracking-locky-ransomware-using-carbon-black/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Extended Period Without Successful Netbackup Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Unsuccessful Netbackup backups - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - All backup logs for host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - All backup logs for host", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 support_searches = ["ESCU - Monitor Successful Backups", "ESCU - Monitor Unsuccessful Backups"]
 data_models = []
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -607,7 +607,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 2"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["PR.DS"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Update Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Update Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 support_searches = ["ESCU - Add Prohibited Processes to Enterprise Security"]
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -639,10 +639,10 @@ creation_date = 2017-01-05
 modification_date = 2017-01-05
 id = 2b1800dd-92f9-47ec-a981-fdf1351e5f65
 version = 1
-reference = ["https://technet.microsoft.com/library/bb490939.aspx", "https://htmlpreview.github.io/?https://github.com/MatthewDemaske/blogbackup/blob/master/netshell.html", "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html"]
+reference = ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/tn-archive/bb490939(v=technet.10)", "https://htmlpreview.github.io/?https://github.com/MatthewDemaske/blogbackup/blob/master/netshell.html", "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Processes created by netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1089"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments", "ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK"]
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -658,9 +658,9 @@ id = bb9f5ed2-916e-4364-bb6d-97c370efcf52
 version = 2
 reference = ["https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/orangeworm-targets-healthcare-us-europe-asia", "https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/healthcare-targeted-by-hacker/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule"]
-mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1031", "T1050", "T1059", "T1064", "T1089"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
-support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services", "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments"]
+mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1050", "T1059", "T1064"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
+support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments", "ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services"]
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
 description = Detect activities and various techniques associated with the Orangeworm Attack Group, a group that frequently targets the healthcare industry.
@@ -702,7 +702,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/scope-of-mudcarp-attacks-highlight-1/", "http://blog.amossys.fr/badflick-is-not-so-bad.html"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1064", "T1086", "T1103", "T1131"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments"]
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -745,7 +745,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["http://www.novetta.com/2015/02/advanced-methods-to-detect-advanced-cyber-attacks-protocol-abuse/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1043", "T1048"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Network_Resolution", "Network_Traffic"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -761,7 +761,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://www.carbonblack.com/2017/06/28/carbon-black-threat-research-technical-analysis-petya-notpetya-ransomware/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2017/06/27/closing-the-detection-to-mitigation-gap-or-to-petya-or-notpetya-whocares-.html"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 10", "CIS 12", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 6", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036", "T1043", "T1047", "T1048", "T1053", "T1070", "T1103", "T1131"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "DE.DP", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Update Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Update Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint"]
 support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK", "ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK"]
 data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -777,7 +777,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/executive-perspective/2015/09/the_new_route_toper.html", "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/about/security-center/event-response/synful-knock.html"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect New Login Attempts to Routers - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Authentication"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -794,7 +794,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/66.html", "https://www.incapsula.com/web-application-security/sql-injection.html"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - SQL Injection with Long URLs - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 18"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1043"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Web"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -811,7 +811,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/an-in-depth-analysis-of-samsam-ransomware-and-boss-spider/", "https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2018/07/31/samsam-the-almost-6-million-ransomware/", "https://thehackernews.com/2018/07/samsam-ransomware-attacks.html"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Batch File Write to System32 - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - File with Samsam Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Samsam Test File Write - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 10", "CIS 12", "CIS 16", "CIS 18", "CIS 2", "CIS 3", "CIS 4", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Delivery", "Installation", "Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1076", "T1082"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "ID.RA", "PR.AC", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.MA", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Update Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Update Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint"]
 support_searches = ["ESCU - Add Prohibited Processes to Enterprise Security"]
 data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic", "Web"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -832,7 +832,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://meltdownattack.com/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Spectre and Meltdown Vulnerable Systems - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 4"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 support_searches = ["ESCU - Systems Ready for Spectre-Meltdown Windows Patch"]
 data_models = ["Vulnerabilities"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -873,7 +873,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-11409", "https://www.splunk.com/view/SP-CAAAP5E#VulnerabilityDescriptionsandRatings", "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44865/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 18"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From src ip"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From src ip", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = []
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -892,8 +892,8 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 12", "CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP", "ID.AM"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN"]
-support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Regions", "ESCU - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table"]
+support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User", "ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Regions", "ESCU - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK"]
 data_models = []
 providing_technologies = none
 description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS EC2 instances for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as EC2 instances that originate from unusual locations or those launched by previously unseen users (among others). Included investigative searches will help you probe more deeply, when the information warrants it.
@@ -909,7 +909,7 @@ reference = ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integr
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new user AWS Console Login - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP"]}
 investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN"]
-support_searches = ["ESCU - Update previously seen users in CloudTrail", "ESCU - Previously seen users in CloudTrail"]
+support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously seen users in CloudTrail", "ESCU - Update previously seen users in CloudTrail"]
 data_models = []
 providing_technologies = none
 description = Monitor your AWS authentication events using your CloudTrail logs. Searches within this Analytic Story will help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious logins. 
@@ -924,7 +924,7 @@ version = 2
 reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/security-data-protection/cloud/public-aws-s3-buckets-writable/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect New Open S3 buckets - Rule", "ESCU - Detect S3 access from a new IP - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13", "CIS 14"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "DE.DP", "PR.AC", "PR.DS"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName"]
 support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of S3 Bucket deletion activity by ARN", "ESCU - Previously seen S3 bucket access by remote IP"]
 data_models = []
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -942,7 +942,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/hiding-cloudcobalt-strike-beacon-c2-using-amazon-apis/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "nist": ["PR.AC"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of blocked outbound traffic from AWS"]
 data_models = []
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -952,6 +952,23 @@ Amazon's VPC service enables you to launch EC2 instances and leverage other Amaz
 Attackers may abuse the AWS infrastructure with insecure VPCs so they can co-opt AWS resources for command-and-control nodes, data exfiltration, and more. Once an EC2 instance is compromised, an attacker may initiate outbound network connections for malicious reasons. Monitoring these network traffic behaviors is crucial for understanding the type of traffic flowing in and out of your network and to alert you to suspicious activities.\
 The searches in this Analytic Story will monitor your AWS network traffic for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors.

+[Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities]
+category =  Cloud Security
+creation_date = 2020-06-04
+modification_date = 2020-06-04
+id = 6380ebbb-55c5-4fce-b754-01fd565fb73c
+version = 1
+reference = ["https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-cloudtrail-now-tracks-cross-account-activity-to-its-origin/", "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integration.html"]
+detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new user AWS Console Login - DM - Rule"]
+mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP"]}
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field"]
+support_searches = ["ESCU - Update previously seen users in CloudTrail - DM", "ESCU - Previously seen users in CloudTrail - DM"]
+data_models = ["Authentication"]
+providing_technologies = none
+description = Monitor your cloud authentication events. Searches within this Analytic Story leverage the recent cloud updates to the Authentication data model to help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious login activity. 
+narrative = It is important to monitor and control who has access to your cloud infrastructure. Detecting suspicious logins will provide good starting points for investigations. Abusive behaviors caused by compromised credentials can lead to direct monetary costs, as you will be billed for any compute activity whether legitimate or otherwise.\
+This Analytic Story has data model versions of cloud searches leveraging Authentication data, including those looking for suspicious login activity, and cross-account activity for AWS.
+
 [Suspicious Command-Line Executions]
 category =  Adversary Tactics
 creation_date = 2020-02-03
@@ -961,7 +978,7 @@ version = 2
 reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1059", "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/macro-malware", "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036", "T1059", "T1064"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments"]
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -977,7 +994,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["http://blogs.splunk.com/2015/10/01/random-words-on-entropy-and-dns/", "http://www.darkreading.com/analytics/security-monitoring/got-malware-three-signs-revealed-in-dns-traffic/d/d-id/1139680", "https://live.paloaltonetworks.com/t5/Threat-Vulnerability-Articles/What-are-suspicious-DNS-queries/ta-p/71454"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1043", "T1048"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK"]
 data_models = ["Network_Resolution"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -993,7 +1010,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/06/26/phishing-hits-a-new-level-of-quality/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 3", "CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.IP"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender", "ESCU - Get Email Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Email Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender"]
 support_searches = ["ESCU - DNSTwist Domain Names"]
 data_models = ["Email", "UEBA"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -1013,7 +1030,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://redcanary.com/blog/windows-registry-attacks-threat-detection/", "https://medium.com/@mbromileyDFIR/malware-monday-aebb456356c5", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1170"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect mshta exe running scripts in command-line arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1103", "T1131"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments"]
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -1031,7 +1048,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1078", "https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Credential_stuffing", "https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/answer/What-is-a-password-spraying-attack-and-how-does-it-work"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentails From The Same IP - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Account Lockout Events - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Failed SSO Attempts - Rule", "ESCU - Okta User Logins From Multiple Cities - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate User Activities In Okta", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by app"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate User Activities In Okta", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by app", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = []
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -1049,7 +1066,7 @@ version = 2
 reference = ["https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Graeber-Abusing-Windows-Management-Instrumentation-WMI-To-Build-A-Persistent%20Asynchronous-And-Fileless-Backdoor-wp.pdf", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/wmimplant_a_wmi_ba.html"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Process Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - Script Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Temporary Event Subscription - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047", "T1084"], "nist": ["PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -1067,7 +1084,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://redcanary.com/blog/windows-registry-attacks-threat-detection/", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1112"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1015", "T1042", "T1103", "T1112", "T1131", "T1138"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -1085,7 +1102,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://blog.rapid7.com/2020/04/02/dispelling-zoom-bugbears-what-you-need-to-know-about-the-latest-zoom-vulnerabilities/", "https://threatpost.com/two-zoom-zero-day-flaws-uncovered/154337/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Child Process of Zoom - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1068"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Registry Activity", "ESCU - Get Process File Activity"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Registry Activity", "ESCU - Get Process File Activity", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint"]
 support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Initial"]
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -1102,7 +1119,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - EC2 Instance Modified With Previously Unseen User - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId"]
 support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Modifications By User"]
 data_models = []
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -1119,7 +1136,7 @@ version = 2
 reference = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/08/monitoring-windows-console-activity-part-two.html", "https://www.splunk.com/pdfs/technical-briefs/advanced-threat-detection-and-response-tech-brief.pdf", "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/logging/detecting-security-incidents-windows-workstation-event-logs-34262"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 2", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1015", "T1036", "T1085"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK"]
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -1137,7 +1154,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://www.monkey.org/~dugsong/dsniff/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Protocols passing authentication in cleartext - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 14"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["PR.DS"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Network_Traffic"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -1153,7 +1170,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://www.fbi.gov/scams-and-safety/common-fraud-schemes/internet-fraud", "https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2017-internet-crime-report-released-050718"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Web Fraud - Account Harvesting - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Anomalous User Clickspeed - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Password Sharing Across Accounts - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16", "CIS 6"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1136"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "DE.DP"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Web Session Information via session id", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Web Session Information via session id", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = []
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -1174,7 +1191,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Defense_Evasion"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1089", "T1112"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -1190,7 +1207,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2013/12/file-extensions-2/", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1042"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Execution of File with Multiple Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1042"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -1210,7 +1227,7 @@ version = 2
 reference = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/", "https://zeltser.com/security-incident-log-review-checklist/", "http://journeyintoir.blogspot.com/2013/01/re-introducing-usnjrnl.html"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 10", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "DE.DP", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -1226,8 +1243,8 @@ id = 30874d4f-20a1-488f-85ec-5d52ef74e3f9
 version = 2
 reference = ["http://www.fuzzysecurity.com/tutorials/19.html", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2010/07/malware-persistence-windows-registry.html", "http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/common-malware-persistence-mechanisms/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/fin7-shim-databases-persistence.html", "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dq2Hv7J9fvk"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters - Rule"]
-mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1031", "T1050", "T1053", "T1089", "T1103", "T1131", "T1138"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities"]
+mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1050", "T1053", "T1058", "T1103", "T1131", "T1138"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -1243,7 +1260,7 @@ version = 2
 reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Child Processes of Spoolsv exe - Rule", "ESCU - Overwriting Accessibility Binaries - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 2", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1015", "T1068"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -1258,8 +1275,8 @@ id = 6dbd810e-f66d-414b-8dfc-e46de55cbfe2
 version = 3
 reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1050", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1031"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule"]
-mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1031", "T1050", "T1089"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
+mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1050", "T1058"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services"]
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security-content
-# On Date: 2020-06-04T22:46:46 UTC
+# On Date: 2020-06-18T19:50:40 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Security Research
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-cloudtrail-now-tracks-cross-account-activity-to-its-origin/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By Source User"]
+searches = ["ESCU - AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By Source User", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId"]
 description = Track when a user assumes an IAM role in another AWS account to obtain cross-account access to services and resources in that account. Accessing new roles could be an indication of malicious activity.
 narrative = Amazon Web Services (AWS) admins manage access to AWS resources and services across the enterprise using AWS's Identity and Access Management (IAM) functionality. IAM provides the ability to create and manage AWS users, groups, and roles-each with their own unique set of privileges and defined access to specific resources (such as EC2 instances, the AWS Management Console, API, or the command-line interface). Unlike conventional (human) users, IAM roles are assumable by anyone in the organization. They provide users with dynamically created temporary security credentials that expire within a set time period.\
 Herein lies the rub. In between the time between when the temporary credentials are issued and when they expire is a period of opportunity, where a user could leverage the temporary credentials to wreak havoc-spin up or remove instances, create new users, elevate privileges, and other malicious activities-throughout the environment.\
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI - Rule", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN"]
+searches = ["ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table"]
 description = Monitor your AWS EC2 instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or EC2 instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior.
 narrative = Cryptomining is an intentionally difficult, resource-intensive business. Its complexity was designed into the process to ensure that the number of blocks mined each day would remain steady. So, it's par for the course that ambitious, but unscrupulous, miners make amassing the computing power of large enterprises--a practice known as cryptojacking--a top priority. \
 Cryptojacking has attracted an increasing amount of media attention since its explosion in popularity in the fall of 2017. The attacks have moved from in-browser exploits and mobile phones to enterprise cloud services, such as Amazon Web Services (AWS). It's difficult to determine exactly how widespread the practice has become, since bad actors continually evolve their ability to escape detection, including employing unlisted endpoints, moderating their CPU usage, and hiding the mining pool's IP address behind a free CDN. \
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonVPC/latest/UserGuide/VPC_Appendix_NACLs.html", "https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/how-to-help-prepare-for-ddos-attacks-by-reducing-your-attack-surface/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 description = Monitor your AWS network infrastructure for bad configurations and malicious activity. Investigative searches help you probe deeper, when the facts warrant it.
 narrative = AWS CloudTrail is an AWS service that helps you enable governance, compliance, and operational/risk auditing of your AWS account. Actions taken by a user, role, or an AWS service are recorded as events in CloudTrail. It is crucial for a company to monitor events and actions taken in the AWS Management Console, AWS Command Line Interface, and AWS SDKs and APIs to ensure that your servers are not vulnerable to attacks. This analytic story contains detection searches that leverage CloudTrail logs from AWS to check for bad configurations and malicious activity in your AWS network access controls.

@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Country", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From City", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Region", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address"]
+searches = ["ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Country", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From City", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Region", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address"]
 description = Monitor your AWS provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your network.
 narrative = Because most enterprise AWS activities originate from familiar geographic locations, monitoring for activity from unknown or unusual regions is an important security measure. This indicator can be especially useful in environments where it is impossible to whitelist specific IPs (because they vary).\
 This Analytic Story was designed to provide you with flexibility in the precision you employ in specifying legitimate geographic regions. It can be as specific as an IP address or a city, or as broad as a region (think state) or an entire country. By determining how precise you want your geographical locations to be and monitoring for new locations that haven't previously accessed your environment, you can detect adversaries as they begin to probe your environment. Since there are legitimate reasons for activities from unfamiliar locations, this is not a standalone indicator. Nevertheless, location can be a relevant piece of information that you may wish to investigate further.
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://redlock.io/blog/cryptojacking-tesla"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in Security Group Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS API Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect API activity from users without MFA - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new API calls from user roles - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Notable Info"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in Security Group Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new API calls from user roles - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS API Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Detect API activity from users without MFA - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field"]
 description = Detect and investigate dormant user accounts for your AWS environment that have become active again. Because inactive and ad-hoc accounts are common attack targets, it's critical to enable governance within your environment.
 narrative = It seems obvious that it is critical to monitor and control the users who have access to your cloud infrastructure. Nevertheless, it's all too common for enterprises to lose track of ad-hoc accounts, leaving their servers vulnerable to attack. In fact, this was the very oversight that led to Tesla's cryptojacking attack in February, 2018.\
 In addition to compromising the security of your data, when bad actors leverage your compute resources, it can incur monumental costs, since you will be billed for any new EC2 instances and increased bandwidth usage. \
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ version = 1
 references = []
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect Excessive User Account Lockouts - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Excessive Account Lockouts From Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Identify New User Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Short Lived Windows Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Logon Rights Modifications For User", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Logon Rights Modifications For Endpoint"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Short Lived Windows Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Excessive User Account Lockouts - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Excessive Account Lockouts From Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Identify New User Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Get Logon Rights Modifications For User", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Logon Rights Modifications For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 description = A common attack technique is to leverage user accounts to gain unauthorized access to the target's network. This Analytic Story minimizes opportunities for attack by helping you actively manage creation/use/dormancy/deletion--the lifecycle of system and application accounts.
 narrative = Monitoring user accounts within your enterprise is a critical analytic function that helps ensure that credential and access policies/procedures are properly implemented and are being enforced. Proactive ad-hoc hunting, as well as routine monitoring, can ensure user or system accounts are not being abused by unauthorized individuals or processes. In the event of a network event or breach, user-authentication logs are a key resource in determining if or how an account might have been compromised or co-opted, leading to suspicious or malicious activity.

@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs/blob/v3.2/dev/rules/REQUEST-944-APPLICATION-ATTACK-JAVA.conf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Java Classes - Rule", "ESCU - Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Content-Type Length - Rule", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Investigate Suspicious Strings in HTTP Header", "ESCU - Investigate Web POSTs From src", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Unusually Long Content-Type Length - Rule", "ESCU - Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Java Classes - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Web POSTs From src", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Investigate Suspicious Strings in HTTP Header", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 description = Detect and investigate activities--such as unusually long `Content-Type` length, suspicious java classes and web servers executing suspicious processes--consistent with attempts to exploit Apache Struts vulnerabilities.
 narrative = In March of 2017, a remote code-execution vulnerability in the Jakarta Multipart parser in Apache Struts, a widely used open-source framework for creating Java web applications, was disclosed and assigned to CVE-2017-5638. About two months later, hackers exploited the flaw to carry out the world's <a href=https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2017/09/07/nations-biggest-hacks-and-data-breaches-millions/644311001/> 5th largest data breach</a>. The target, credit giant Equifax, <a href=https://money.cnn.com/2017/09/16/technology/equifax-breach-security-hole/index.html>told investigators</a> that it had become aware of the vulnerability two months before the attack. \
 The exploit involved manipulating the `Content-Type HTTP` header to execute commands embedded in the header.\
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/inventory-of-authorized-and-unauthorized-devices/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get First Occurrence and Last Occurrence of a MAC Address"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get First Occurrence and Last Occurrence of a MAC Address", "ESCU - Get Notable Info"]
 description = Keep a careful inventory of every asset on your network to make it easier to detect rogue devices. Unauthorized/unmanaged devices could be an indication of malicious behavior that should be investigated further.
 narrative = This Analytic Story is designed to help you develop a better understanding of what authorized and unauthorized devices are part of your enterprise. This story can help you better categorize and classify assets, providing critical business context and awareness of their assets during an incident. Information derived from this Analytic Story can be used to better inform and support other analytic stories. For successful detection, you will need to leverage the Assets and Identity Framework from Enterprise Security to populate your known assets.

@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.zerofox.com/blog/what-is-digital-risk-monitoring/", "https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/consumer/family-safety/what-is-typosquatting/", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2016/06/explained-typosquatting/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender", "ESCU - Get Email Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Email Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender"]
 description = Detect and investigate activity that may indicate that an adversary is using faux domains to mislead users into interacting with malicious infrastructure. Monitor DNS, email, and web traffic for permutations of your brand name.
 narrative = While you can educate your users and customers about the risks and threats posed by typosquatting, phishing, and corporate espionage, human error is a persistent fact of life. Of course, your adversaries are all too aware of this reality and will happily leverage it for nefarious purposes whenever possible&#51;phishing with lookalike addresses, embedding faux command-and-control domains in malware, and hosting malicious content on domains that closely mimic your corporate servers. This is where brand monitoring comes in.\
 You can use our adaptation of `DNSTwist`, together with the support searches in this Analytic Story, to generate permutations of specified brands and external domains. Splunk can monitor email, DNS requests, and web traffic for these permutations and provide you with early warnings and situational awareness--powerful elements of an effective defense.\
@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Started In Previously Unused Region - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Investigate Cloud Compute Instance Activities", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Investigate User Activities In All Cloud Regions", "ESCU - Investigate User Activities In Single Cloud Region"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Started In Previously Unused Region - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Investigate User Activities In Single Cloud Region", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Investigate Cloud Compute Instance Activities", "ESCU - Investigate User Activities In All Cloud Regions", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table"]
 description = Monitor your cloud compute instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or compute instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior.
 narrative = Cryptomining is an intentionally difficult, resource-intensive business. Its complexity was designed into the process to ensure that the number of blocks mined each day would remain steady. So, it's par for the course that ambitious, but unscrupulous, miners make amassing the computing power of large enterprises--a practice known as cryptojacking--a top priority. \
 Cryptojacking has attracted an increasing amount of media attention since its explosion in popularity in the fall of 2017. The attacks have moved from in-browser exploits and mobile phones to enterprise cloud services, such as Amazon Web Services (AWS), Google Cloud Platform (GCP), and Azure. It's difficult to determine exactly how widespread the practice has become, since bad actors continually evolve their ability to escape detection, including employing unlisted endpoints, moderating their CPU usage, and hiding the mining pool's IP address behind a free CDN. \
@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.intego.com/mac-security-blog/osxcoldroot-and-the-rat-invasion/", "https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x2A.html", "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/coldroot-rat-still-undetectable-despite-being-uploaded-on-github-two-years-ago/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Jose Hernandez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection - Rule", "ESCU - Processes Tapping Keyboard Events - Rule", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From src ip"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Processes Tapping Keyboard Events - Rule", "ESCU - Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From src ip", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that relate to the ColdRoot Remote Access Trojan that affects MacOS. An example of some of these activities are changing sensative binaries in the MacOS sub-system, detecting process names and executables associated with the RAT, detecting when a keyboard tab is installed on a MacOS machine and more.
 narrative = Conventional wisdom holds that Apple's MacOS operating system is significantly less vulnerable to attack than Windows machines. While that point is debatable, it is true that attacks against MacOS systems are much less common. However, this fact does not mean that Macs are impervious to breaches. To the contrary, research has shown that that Mac malware is increasing at an alarming rate. According to AV-test, in 2018, there were 86,865 new MacOS malware variants, up from 27,338 the year before&#151;a 31% increase. In contrast, the independent research firm found that new Windows malware had increased from 65.17M to 76.86M during that same period, less than half the rate of growth. The bottom line is that while the numbers look a lot smaller than Windows, it's definitely time to take Mac security more seriously.\
 This Analytic Story addresses the ColdRoot remote access trojan (RAT), which was uploaded to Github in 2016, but was still escaping detection by the first quarter of 2018, when a new, more feature-rich variant was discovered masquerading as an Apple audio driver. Among other capabilities, the Pascal-based ColdRoot can heist passwords from users' keychains and remotely control infected machines without detection. In the initial report of his findings, Patrick Wardle, Chief Research Officer for Digita Security, explained that the new ColdRoot RAT could start and kill processes on the breached system, spawn new remote-desktop sessions, take screen captures and assemble them into a live stream of the victim's desktop, and more.\
@@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Collection", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1074"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious writes to System Volume Information - Rule", "ESCU - Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server - Rule", "ESCU - Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts - Rule", "ESCU - Email files written outside of the Outlook directory - Rule", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin - Rule", "ESCU - Email files written outside of the Outlook directory - Rule", "ESCU - Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server - Rule", "ESCU - Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious writes to System Volume Information - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 description = Monitor for and investigate activities--such as suspicious writes to the Windows Recycling Bin or email servers sending high amounts of traffic to specific hosts, for example--that may indicate that an adversary is harvesting and exfiltrating sensitive data. 
 narrative = A common adversary goal is to identify and exfiltrate data of value from a target organization. This data may include email conversations and addresses, confidential company information, links to network design/infrastructure, important dates, and so on.\
 Attacks are composed of three activities: identification, collection, and staging data for exfiltration. Identification typically involves scanning systems and observing user activity. Collection can involve the transfer of large amounts of data from various repositories. Staging/preparation includes moving data to a central location and compressing (and optionally encoding and/or encrypting) it. All of these activities provide opportunities for defenders to identify their presence. \
@@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Command_and_Control", "https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/feature/Command-and-control-servers-The-puppet-masters-that-govern-malware"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 description = Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures leveraged by attackers to establish and operate command and control channels. Implants installed by attackers on compromised endpoints use these channels to receive instructions and send data back to the malicious operators.
 narrative = Threat actors typically architect and implement an infrastructure to use in various ways during the course of their attack campaigns. In some cases, they leverage this infrastructure for scanning and performing reconnaissance activities. In others, they may use this infrastructure to launch actual attacks. One of the most important functions of this infrastructure is to establish servers that will communicate with implants on compromised endpoints. These servers establish a command and control channel that is used to proxy data between the compromised endpoint and the attacker. These channels relay commands from the attacker to the compromised endpoint and the output of those commands back to the attacker.\
 Because this communication is so critical for an adversary, they often use techniques designed to hide the true nature of the communications. There are many different techniques used to establish and communicate over these channels. This Analytic Story provides searches that look for a variety of the techniques used for these channels, as well as indications that these channels are active, by examining logs associated with border control devices and network-access control lists.
@@ -201,7 +201,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://github.com/splunk/cloud-datamodel-security-research"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - GCP GCR container uploaded - Rule", "ESCU - New container uploaded to AWS ECR - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate AWS ECR container listing activity"]
+searches = ["ESCU - New container uploaded to AWS ECR - Rule", "ESCU - GCP GCR container uploaded - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate AWS ECR container listing activity"]
 description = Use the searches in this story to monitor your Kubernetes registry repositories for upload, and deployment of potentially vulnerable, backdoor, or implanted containers. These searches provide information on source users, destination path, container names and repository names. The searches provide context to address Mitre T1525 which refers to container implantation upload to a company's repository either in Amazon Elastic Container Registry, Google Container Registry and Azure Container Registry.
 narrative = Container Registrys provide a way for organizations to keep customized images of their development and infrastructure environment in private. However if these repositories are misconfigured or priviledge users credentials are compromise, attackers can potentially upload implanted containers which can be deployed across the organization. These searches allow operator to monitor who, when and what was uploaded to container registry.

@@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ version = 3
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1003", "https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Create Remote Thread into LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell - Rule", "ESCU - Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts", "ESCU - Investigate Previous Unseen User", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts", "ESCU - Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell - Rule", "ESCU - Create Remote Thread into LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts", "ESCU - Investigate Previous Unseen User", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts", "ESCU - Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations"]
 description = Uncover activity consistent with credential dumping, a technique wherein attackers compromise systems and attempt to obtain and exfiltrate passwords. The threat actors use these pilfered credentials to further escalate privileges and spread throughout a target environment. The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify attempts to credential dumping.
 narrative = Credential dumping&#151;gathering credentials from a target system, often hashed or encrypted&#151;is a common attack technique. Even though the credentials may not be in plain text, an attacker can still exfiltrate the data and set to cracking it offline, on their own systems. The threat actors target a variety of sources to extract them, including the Security Accounts Manager (SAM), Local Security Authority (LSA), NTDS from Domain Controllers, or the Group Policy Preference (GPP) files.\
 Once attackers obtain valid credentials, they use them to move throughout a target network with ease, discovering new systems and identifying assets of interest. Credentials obtained in this manner typically include those of privileged users, which may provide access to more sensitive information and system operations.\
@@ -225,7 +225,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Single Letter Process On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Name Used by Dragonfly Threat Actors - Rule", "ESCU - Create local admin accounts using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Process Registry Activity", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process File Activity"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Create local admin accounts using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Name Used by Dragonfly Threat Actors - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Single Letter Process On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process File Activity", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Registry Activity", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 description = Monitor for suspicious activities associated with DHS Technical Alert US-CERT TA18-074A. Some of the activities that adversaries used in these compromises included spearfishing attacks, malware, watering-hole domains, many and more.
 narrative = The frequency of nation-state cyber attacks has increased significantly over the last decade. Employing numerous tactics and techniques, these attacks continue to escalate in complexity. \
 There is a wide range of motivations for these state-sponsored hacks, including stealing valuable corporate, military, or diplomatic data&#1151;all of which could confer advantages in various arenas. They may also target critical infrastructure. \
@@ -239,7 +239,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA13-088A", "https://www.imperva.com/learn/application-security/dns-amplification/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Large Volume of DNS ANY Queries - Rule", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Large Volume of DNS ANY Queries - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 description = DNS poses a serious threat as a Denial of Service (DOS) amplifier, if it responds to `ANY` queries. This Analytic Story can help you detect attackers who may be abusing your company's DNS infrastructure to launch amplification attacks, causing Denial of Service to other victims.
 narrative = The Domain Name System (DNS) is the protocol used to map domain names to IP addresses. It has been proven to work very well for its intended function. However if DNS is misconfigured, servers can be abused by attackers to levy amplification or redirection attacks against victims. Because DNS responses to `ANY` queries are so much larger than the queries themselves--and can be made with a UDP packet, which does not require a handshake--attackers can spoof the source address of the packet and cause much more data to be sent to the victim than if they sent the traffic themselves. The `ANY` requests are will be larger than normal DNS server requests, due to the fact that the server provides significant details, such as MX records and associated IP addresses. A large volume of this traffic can result in a DOS on the victim's machine. This misconfiguration leads to two possible victims, the first being the DNS servers participating in an attack and the other being the hosts that are the targets of the DOS attack.\
 The search in this story can help you to detect if attackers are abusing your company's DNS infrastructure to launch DNS amplification attacks causing Denial of Service to other victims.
@@ -251,7 +251,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/", "http://www.noip.com/blog/2014/07/11/dynamic-dns-can-use-2/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/08/04/detecting-dynamic-dns-domains-in-splunk.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS record changed - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host"]
+searches = ["ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS record changed - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host"]
 description = Secure your environment against DNS hijacks with searches that help you detect and investigate unauthorized changes to DNS records.
 narrative = Dubbed the Achilles heel of the Internet (see https://www.f5.com/labs/articles/threat-intelligence/dns-is-still-the-achilles-heel-of-the-internet-25613), DNS plays a critical role in routing web traffic but is notoriously vulnerable to attack. One reason is its distributed nature. It relies on unstructured connections between millions of clients and servers over inherently insecure protocols.\
 The gravity and extent of the importance of securing DNS from attacks is undeniable. The fallout of compromised DNS can be disastrous. Not only can hackers bring down an entire business, they can intercept confidential information, emails, and login credentials, as well. \
@@ -270,7 +270,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/data-protection/", "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/dns/splunk-detect-dns-tunneling-37022", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect USB device insertion - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect USB device insertion - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 description = Fortify your data-protection arsenal--while continuing to ensure data confidentiality and integrity--with searches that monitor for and help you investigate possible signs of data exfiltration.
 narrative = Attackers can leverage a variety of resources to compromise or exfiltrate enterprise data. Common exfiltration techniques include remote-access channels via low-risk, high-payoff active-collections operations and close-access operations using insiders and removable media. While this Analytic Story is not a comprehensive listing of all the methods by which attackers can exfiltrate data, it provides a useful starting point.

@@ -281,7 +281,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1089", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2015/11/vonteera-adware-uses-certificates-to-disable-anti-malware/", "https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Tools-Report.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store - Rule", "ESCU - Unload Sysmon Filter Driver - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Unload Sysmon Filter Driver - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 description = Looks for activities and techniques associated with the disabling of security tools on a Windows system, such as suspicious `reg.exe` processes, processes launching netsh, and many others.
 narrative = Attackers employ a variety of tactics in order to avoid detection and operate without barriers. This often involves modifying the configuration of security tools to get around them or explicitly disabling them to prevent them from running. This Analytic Story includes searches that look for activity consistent with attackers attempting to disable various security mechanisms. Such activity may involve monitoring for suspicious registry activity, as this is where much of the configuration for Windows and various other programs reside, or explicitly attempting to shut down security-related services. Other times, attackers attempt various tricks to prevent specific programs from running, such as adding the certificates with which the security tools are signed to a blacklist (which would prevent them from running).

@@ -292,7 +292,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/", "http://www.noip.com/blog/2014/07/11/dynamic-dns-can-use-2/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/08/04/detecting-dynamic-dns-domains-in-splunk.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From src ip"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From src ip", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 description = Detect and investigate hosts in your environment that may be communicating with dynamic domain providers. Attackers may leverage these services to help them avoid firewall blocks and blacklists.
 narrative = Dynamic DNS services (DDNS) are legitimate low-cost or free services that allow users to rapidly update domain resolutions to IP infrastructure. While their usage can be benign, malicious actors can abuse DDNS to host harmful payloads or interactive-command-and-control infrastructure. These attackers will manually update or automate domain resolution changes by routing dynamic domains to IP addresses that circumvent firewall blocks and blacklists and frustrate a network defender's analytic and investigative processes. These searches will look for DNS queries made from within your infrastructure to suspicious dynamic domains and then investigate more deeply, when appropriate. While this list of top-level dynamic domains is not exhaustive, it can be dynamically updated as new suspicious dynamic domains are identified.

@@ -303,7 +303,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-201A", "https://www.first.org/resources/papers/conf2017/Advanced-Incident-Detection-and-Threat-Hunting-using-Sysmon-and-Splunk.pdf", "https://www.vkremez.com/2017/05/emotet-banking-trojan-malware-analysis.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detection of tools built by NirSoft - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Update Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint"]
+searches = ["ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of tools built by NirSoft - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Update Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 description = Detect rarely used executables, specific registry paths that may confer malware survivability and persistence, instances where cmd.exe is used to launch script interpreters, and other indicators that the Emotet financial malware has compromised your environment.
 narrative = The trojan downloader known as Emotet first surfaced in 2014, when it was discovered targeting the banking industry to steal credentials. However, according to a joint technical alert (TA) issued by three government agencies (https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-201A), Emotet has evolved far beyond those beginnings to become what a ThreatPost article called a threat-delivery service(see https://threatpost.com/emotet-malware-evolves-beyond-banking-to-threat-delivery-service/134342/).  For example, in early 2018, Emotet was found to be using its loader function to spread the Quakbot and Ransomware variants. \
 According to the TA, the the malware continues to be among the most costly and destructive malware affecting the private and public sectors. Researchers have linked it to the threat group Mealybug, which has also been on the security communitys radar since 2014.\
@@ -316,7 +316,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/HIDDEN-COBRA-North-Korean-Malicious-Cyber-Activity", "https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Destructive-Malware-Report.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious File Write - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious File Write - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 description = Monitor for and investigate activities, including the creation or deletion of hidden shares and file writes, that may be evidence of infiltration by North Korean government-sponsored cybercriminals. Details of this activity were reported in DHS Report TA-18-149A.
 narrative = North Korea's government-sponsored "cyber army" has been slowly building momentum and gaining sophistication over the last 15 years or so. As a result, the group's activity, which the US government refers to as "Hidden Cobra," has surreptitiously crept onto the collective radar as a preeminent global threat.\
 These state-sponsored actors are thought to be responsible for everything from a hack on a South Korean nuclear plant to an attack on Sony in anticipation of its release of the movie "The Interview" at the end of 2014. They're also notorious for cyberespionage. In recent years, the group seems to be focused on financial crimes, such as cryptojacking.\
@@ -330,7 +330,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2016/09/hosts-file-hijacks/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Windows hosts file modification - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host"]
+searches = ["ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Windows hosts file modification - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 description = Detect evidence of tactics used to redirect traffic from a host to a destination other than the one intended--potentially one that is part of an adversary's attack infrastructure. An example is redirecting communications regarding patches and updates or misleading users into visiting a malicious website.
 narrative = Attackers will often attempt to manipulate client communications for nefarious purposes. In some cases, an attacker may endeavor to modify a local host file to redirect communications with resources (such as antivirus or system-update services) to prevent clients from receiving patches or updates. In other cases, an attacker might use this tactic to have the client connect to a site that looks like the intended site, but instead installs malware or collects information from the victim. Additionally, an attacker may redirect a victim in order to execute a MITM attack and observe communications.

@@ -341,7 +341,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["http://www.deependresearch.org/2016/04/jboss-exploits-view-from-victim.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 description = In March of 2016, adversaries were seen using JexBoss--an open-source utility used for testing and exploiting JBoss application servers. These searches help detect evidence of these attacks, such as network connections to external resources or web services spawning atypical child processes, among others.
 narrative = This Analytic Story looks for probing and exploitation attempts targeting JBoss application servers. While the vulnerabilities associated with this story are rather dated, they were leveraged in a spring 2016 campaign in connection with the Samsam ransomware variant. Incidents involving this ransomware are unique, in that they begin with attacks against vulnerable services, rather than the phishing or drive-by attacks more common with ransomware. In this case, vulnerable JBoss applications appear to be the target of choice.\
 It is helpful to understand how often a notable event generated by this story occurs, as well as the commonalities between some of these events, both of which may provide clues about whether this is a common occurrence of minimal concern or a rare event that may require more extensive investigation. It may also help to understand whether the issue is restricted to a single user/system or whether it is broader in scope.\
@@ -366,7 +366,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://github.com/splunk/cloud-datamodel-security-research"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip"]
+searches = ["ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 description = This story addresses detection against Kubernetes cluster fingerprint scan and attack by providing information on items such as source ip, user agent, cluster names.
 narrative = Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration platform contains sensitve information and management priviledges of production workloads, microservices and applications. These searches allow operator to detect suspicious unauthenticated requests from the internet to kubernetes cluster.

@@ -388,7 +388,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/approaching-kubernetes-security-detecting-kubernetes-scan-with-splunk.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect most active service accounts by pod namespace - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect most active service accounts by pod namespace - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info"]
 description = This story addresses detection and response around Sensitive Role usage within a Kubernetes clusters against cluster resources and namespaces.
 narrative = Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration platform contains sensitive roles within its architecture, specifically configmaps and secrets, if accessed by an attacker can lead to further compromise. These searches allow operator to detect suspicious requests against Kubernetes role activities

@@ -399,7 +399,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/executive-perspective/2015/08/malware_lateral_move.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 description = Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures around how attackers move laterally within the enterprise. Because lateral movement can expose the adversary to detection, it should be an important focus for security analysts.
 narrative = Once attackers gain a foothold within an enterprise, they will seek to expand their accesses and leverage techniques that facilitate lateral movement. Attackers will often spend quite a bit of time and effort moving laterally. Because lateral movement renders an attacker the most vulnerable to detection, it's an excellent focus for detection and investigation.\
 Indications of lateral movement can include the abuse of system utilities (such as `psexec.exe`), unauthorized use of remote desktop services, `file/admin$` shares, WMI, PowerShell, pass-the-hash, or the abuse of scheduled tasks. Organizations must be extra vigilant in detecting lateral movement techniques and look for suspicious activity in and around high-value strategic network assets, such as Active Directory, which are often considered the primary target or "crown jewels" to a persistent threat actor.\
@@ -414,7 +414,7 @@ version = 4
 references = ["https://blogs.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/malware-employs-powershell-to-infect-systems/", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Multiple Suspicious Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Multiple Suspicious Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 description = Attackers are finding stealthy ways "live off the land," leveraging utilities and tools that come standard on the endpoint--such as PowerShell--to achieve their goals without downloading binary files. These searches can help you detect and investigate PowerShell command-line options that may be indicative of malicious intent.
 narrative = The searches in this Analytic Story monitor for parameters often used for malicious purposes. It is helpful to understand how often the notable events generated by this story occur, as well as the commonalities between some of these events. These factors may provide clues about whether this is a common occurrence of minimal concern or a rare event that may require more extensive investigation. Likewise, it is important to determine whether the issue is restricted to a single user/system or is broader in scope.\
 The following factors may assist you in determining whether the event is malicious: \
@@ -434,7 +434,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/03/04/tracking-locky-ransomware-using-carbon-black/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Unsuccessful Netbackup backups - Rule", "ESCU - Extended Period Without Successful Netbackup Backups - Rule", "ESCU - All backup logs for host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Unsuccessful Netbackup backups - Rule", "ESCU - Extended Period Without Successful Netbackup Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - All backup logs for host", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 description = Address common concerns when monitoring your backup processes. These searches can help you reduce risks from ransomware, device theft, or denial of physical access to a host by backing up data on endpoints.
 narrative = Having backups is a standard best practice that helps ensure continuity of business operations.  Having mature backup processes can also help you reduce the risks of many security-related incidents and streamline your response processes. The detection searches in this Analytic Story will help you identify systems that have backup failures, as well as systems that have not been backed up for an extended period of time. The story will also return the notable event history and all of the backup logs for an endpoint.

@@ -445,7 +445,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Update Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Update Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 description = Identify and investigate prohibited/unauthorized software or processes that may be concealing malicious behavior within your environment. 
 narrative = It is critical to identify unauthorized software and processes running on enterprise endpoints and determine whether they are likely to be malicious. This Analytic Story requires the user to populate the Interesting Processes table within Enterprise Security with prohibited processes. An included support search will augment this data, adding information on processes thought to be malicious. This search requires data from endpoint detection-and-response solutions, endpoint data sources (such as Sysmon), or Windows Event Logs--assuming that the Active Directory administrator has enabled process tracking within the System Event Audit Logs.\
 It is important to investigate any software identified as suspicious, in order to understand how it was installed or executed. Analyzing authentication logs or any historic notable events might elicit additional investigative leads of interest. For best results, schedule the search to run every two weeks. 
@@ -467,10 +467,10 @@ Microsoft releases updates for Windows systems on a monthly cadence. They should
 category = Abuse
 last_updated = 2017-01-05
 version = 1
-references = ["https://technet.microsoft.com/library/bb490939.aspx", "https://htmlpreview.github.io/?https://github.com/MatthewDemaske/blogbackup/blob/master/netshell.html", "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html"]
+references = ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/tn-archive/bb490939(v=technet.10)", "https://htmlpreview.github.io/?https://github.com/MatthewDemaske/blogbackup/blob/master/netshell.html", "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Processes created by netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Processes created by netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 description = Detect activities and various techniques associated with the abuse of `netsh.exe`, which can disable local firewall settings or set up a remote connection to a host from an infected system.
 narrative = It is a common practice for attackers of all types to leverage native Windows tools and functionality to execute commands for malicious reasons. One such tool on Windows OS is `netsh.exe`,a command-line scripting utility that allows you to--either locally or remotely--display or modify the network configuration of a computer that is currently running. `Netsh.exe` can be used to discover and disable local firewall settings. It can also be used to set up a remote connection to a host from an infected system.\
 To get started, run the detection search to identify parent processes of `netsh.exe`.
@@ -482,7 +482,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/orangeworm-targets-healthcare-us-europe-asia", "https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/healthcare-targeted-by-hacker/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
+searches = ["ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 description = Detect activities and various techniques associated with the Orangeworm Attack Group, a group that frequently targets the healthcare industry.
 narrative = In May of 2018, the attack group Orangeworm was implicated for installing a custom backdoor called Trojan.Kwampirs within large international healthcare corporations in the United States, Europe, and Asia. This malware provides the attackers with remote access to the target system, decrypting and extracting a copy of its main DLL payload from its resource section. Before writing the payload to disk, it inserts a randomly generated string into the middle of the decrypted payload in an attempt to evade hash-based detections.\
 Awareness of the Orangeworm group first surfaced in January, 2015. It has conducted targeted attacks against related industries, as well, such as pharmaceuticals and healthcare IT solution providers.\
@@ -497,7 +497,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/spear-phishing-campaign-targets-ukraine-government.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Splunk Research Team"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect Oulook exe writing a  zip file - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious LNK file launching a process - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious LNK file launching a process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Oulook exe writing a  zip file - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info"]
 description = Detect signs of malicious payloads that may indicate that your environment has been breached via a phishing attack.
 narrative = Despite its simplicity, phishing remains the most pervasive and dangerous cyberthreat. In fact, research shows that as many as [91% of all successful attacks](https://digitalguardian.com/blog/91-percent-cyber-attacks-start-phishing-email-heres-how-protect-against-phishing) are initiated via a phishing email. \
 As most people know, these emails use fraudulent domains, [email scraping](https://www.cyberscoop.com/emotet-trojan-phishing-scraping-templates-cofense-geodo/), familiar contact names inserted as senders, and other tactics to lure targets into clicking a malicious link, opening an attachment with a [nefarious payload](https://www.cyberscoop.com/emotet-trojan-phishing-scraping-templates-cofense-geodo/), or entering sensitive personal information that perpetrators may intercept. This attack technique requires a relatively low level of skill and allows adversaries to easily cast a wide net. Worse, because its success relies on the gullibility of humans, it's impossible to completely "automate" it out of your environment. However, you can use ES and ESCU to detect and investigate potentially malicious payloads injected into your environment subsequent to a phishing attack. \
@@ -515,7 +515,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/scope-of-mudcarp-attacks-highlight-1/", "http://blog.amossys.fr/badflick-is-not-so-bad.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "iDefense", "email": "-", "name": "iDefense Cyber Espionage Team"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 description = Monitor your environment for suspicious behaviors that resemble the techniques employed by the MUDCARP threat group.
 narrative = This story was created as a joint effort between iDefense and Splunk.\
 iDefense analysts have recently discovered a Windows executable file that, upon execution, spoofs a decryption tool and then drops a file that appears to be the custom-built javascript backdoor, "Orz," which is associated with the threat actors known as MUDCARP (as well as "temp.Periscope" and "Leviathan"). The file is executed using Wscript.\
@@ -553,7 +553,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["http://www.novetta.com/2015/02/advanced-methods-to-detect-advanced-cyber-attacks-protocol-abuse/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host"]
+searches = ["ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 description = Detect instances of prohibited network traffic allowed in the environment, as well as protocols running on non-standard ports. Both of these types of behaviors typically violate policy and can be leveraged by attackers.
 narrative = A traditional security best practice is to control the ports, protocols, and services allowed within your environment. By limiting the services and protocols to those explicitly approved by policy, administrators can minimize the attack surface. The combined effect allows both network defenders and security controls to focus and not be mired in superfluous traffic or data types. Looking for deviations to policy can identify attacker activity that abuses services and protocols to run on alternate or non-standard ports in the attempt to avoid detection or frustrate forensic analysts.

@@ -564,7 +564,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.carbonblack.com/2017/06/28/carbon-black-threat-research-technical-analysis-petya-notpetya-ransomware/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2017/06/27/closing-the-detection-to-mitigation-gap-or-to-petya-or-notpetya-whocares-.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Update Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Update Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint"]
 description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to ransomware--spikes in SMB traffic, suspicious wevtutil usage, the presence of common ransomware extensions, and system processes run from unexpected locations, and many others.
 narrative = Ransomware is an ever-present risk to the enterprise, wherein an infected host encrypts business-critical data, holding it hostage until the victim pays the attacker a ransom. There are many types and varieties of ransomware that can affect an enterprise. Attackers can deploy ransomware to enterprises through spearphishing campaigns and driveby downloads, as well as through traditional remote service-based exploitation. In the case of the WannaCry campaign, there was self-propagating wormable functionality that was used to maximize infection. Fortunately, organizations can apply several techniques--such as those in this Analytic Story--to detect and or mitigate the effects of ransomware.

@@ -575,7 +575,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/executive-perspective/2015/09/the_new_route_toper.html", "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/about/security-center/event-response/synful-knock.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect New Login Attempts to Routers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect New Login Attempts to Routers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 description = Validate the security configuration of network infrastructure and verify that only authorized users and systems are accessing critical assets. Core routing and switching infrastructure are common strategic targets for attackers.
 narrative = Networking devices, such as routers and switches, are often overlooked as resources that attackers will leverage to subvert an enterprise. Advanced threats actors have shown a proclivity to target these critical assets as a means to siphon and redirect network traffic, flash backdoored operating systems, and implement cryptographic weakened algorithms to more easily decrypt network traffic.\
 This Analytic Story helps you gain a better understanding of how your network devices are interacting with your hosts. By compromising your network devices, attackers can obtain direct access to the company's internal infrastructure&#151; effectively increasing the attack surface and accessing private services/data.
@@ -587,7 +587,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/66.html", "https://www.incapsula.com/web-application-security/sql-injection.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - SQL Injection with Long URLs - Rule", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
+searches = ["ESCU - SQL Injection with Long URLs - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to help you detect structured query language (SQL) injection attempts characterized by long URLs that contain malicious parameters.
 narrative = It is very common for attackers to inject SQL parameters into vulnerable web applications, which then interpret the malicious SQL statements.\
 This Analytic Story contains a search designed to identify attempts by attackers to leverage this technique to compromise a host and gain a foothold in the target environment.
@@ -599,7 +599,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/an-in-depth-analysis-of-samsam-ransomware-and-boss-spider/", "https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2018/07/31/samsam-the-almost-6-million-ransomware/", "https://thehackernews.com/2018/07/samsam-ransomware-attacks.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Samsam Test File Write - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - File with Samsam Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Batch File Write to System32 - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Update Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Batch File Write to System32 - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - File with Samsam Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Samsam Test File Write - Rule", "ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Update Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint"]
 description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the SamSam ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with SamSam, RDP brute force attacks, the presence of files with SamSam ransomware extensions, suspicious psexec use, and more.
 narrative = The first version of the SamSam ransomware (a.k.a. Samas or SamsamCrypt) was launched in 2015 by a group of Iranian threat actors. The malicious software has affected and continues to affect thousands of victims and has raised almost $6M in ransom.\
 Although categorized under the heading of ransomware, SamSam campaigns have some importance distinguishing characteristics. Most notable is the fact that conventional ransomware is a numbers game. Perpetrators use a "spray-and-pray" approach with phishing campaigns or other mechanisms, charging a small ransom (typically under $1,000). The goal is to find a large number of victims willing to pay these mini-ransoms, adding up to a lucrative payday. They use relatively simple methods for infecting systems.\
@@ -615,7 +615,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://meltdownattack.com/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Spectre and Meltdown Vulnerable Systems - Rule", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Spectre and Meltdown Vulnerable Systems - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 description = Assess and mitigate your systems' vulnerability to Spectre and Meltdown exploitation with the searches in this Analytic Story.
 narrative = Meltdown and Spectre exploit critical vulnerabilities in modern CPUs that allow unintended access to data in memory. This Analytic Story will help you identify the systems can be patched for these vulnerabilities, as well as those that still need to be patched.

@@ -646,7 +646,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-11409", "https://www.splunk.com/view/SP-CAAAP5E#VulnerabilityDescriptionsandRatings", "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44865/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure - Rule", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From src ip"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From src ip", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 description = Reduce the risk of CVE-2018-11409, an information disclosure vulnerability within some older versions of Splunk Enterprise, with searches designed to help ensure that your Splunk system does not leak information to authenticated users.
 narrative = Although there have been no reports of it being exploited, Splunk Enterprise versions through 7.0.1 reportedly have a vulnerability that may expose information through a REST endpoint (read more here: https://www.splunk.com/view/SP-CAAAP5E#VulnerabilityDescriptionsandRatings). NIST has included it in its vulnerability database (read more here: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-11409). The REST endpoint that exposes system information is also necessary for the proper operation of Splunk clustering and instrumentation. Customers should upgrade to the latest version to reduce the risk of this vulnerability.\
 Splunk Enterprise exposes partial information about the host operating system, hardware, and Splunk license. Splunk Enterprise before 6.6.0 exposes this information without authentication. Splunk Enterprise 6.6.0 and later exposes this information only to authenticated Splunk users. Based on the information exposure, Splunk characterizes this issue as a low severity impact.\
@@ -660,7 +660,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table"]
 description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS EC2 instances for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as EC2 instances that originate from unusual locations or those launched by previously unseen users (among others). Included investigative searches will help you probe more deeply, when the information warrants it.
 narrative = AWS CloudTrail is an AWS service that helps you enable governance, compliance, and risk auditing within your AWS account. Actions taken by a user, role, or an AWS service are recorded as events in CloudTrail. It is crucial for a company to monitor events and actions taken in the AWS Console, AWS command-line interface, and AWS SDKs and APIs to ensure that your EC2 instances are not vulnerable to attacks. This Analytic Story identifies suspicious activities in your AWS EC2 instances and helps you respond and investigate those activities.

@@ -671,7 +671,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integration.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new user AWS Console Login - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new user AWS Console Login - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN"]
 description = Monitor your AWS authentication events using your CloudTrail logs. Searches within this Analytic Story will help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious logins. 
 narrative = It is important to monitor and control who has access to your AWS infrastructure. Detecting suspicious logins to your AWS infrastructure will provide good starting points for investigations. Abusive behaviors caused by compromised credentials can lead to direct monetary costs, as you will be billed for any EC2 instances created by the attacker.

@@ -682,7 +682,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/security-data-protection/cloud/public-aws-s3-buckets-writable/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect New Open S3 buckets - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Detect S3 access from a new IP - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect New Open S3 buckets - Rule", "ESCU - Detect S3 access from a new IP - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName"]
 description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS S3 buckets for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as detecting open S3 buckets and buckets being accessed from a new IP. The contextual and investigative searches will give you more information, when required.
 narrative = As cloud computing has exploded, so has the number of creative attacks on virtual environments. And as the number-two cloud-service provider, Amazon Web Services (AWS) has certainly had its share.\
 Amazon's "shared responsibility" model dictates that the company has responsibility for the environment outside of the VM and the customer is responsible for the security inside of the S3 container. As such, it's important to stay vigilant for activities that may belie suspicious behavior inside of your environment.\
@@ -695,13 +695,25 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/hiding-cloudcobalt-strike-beacon-c2-using-amazon-apis/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 description = Leverage these searches to monitor your AWS network traffic for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as a spike in blocked outbound traffic in your virtual private cloud (VPC).
 narrative = A virtual private cloud (VPC) is an on-demand managed cloud-computing service that isolates computing resources for each client. Inside the VPC container, the environment resembles a physical network. \
 Amazon's VPC service enables you to launch EC2 instances and leverage other Amazon resources. The traffic that flows in and out of this VPC can be controlled via network access-control rules and security groups. Amazon also has a feature called VPC Flow Logs that enables you to log IP traffic going to and from the network interfaces in your VPC. This data is stored using Amazon CloudWatch Logs.\
 Attackers may abuse the AWS infrastructure with insecure VPCs so they can co-opt AWS resources for command-and-control nodes, data exfiltration, and more. Once an EC2 instance is compromised, an attacker may initiate outbound network connections for malicious reasons. Monitoring these network traffic behaviors is crucial for understanding the type of traffic flowing in and out of your network and to alert you to suspicious activities.\
 The searches in this Analytic Story will monitor your AWS network traffic for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors.

+[analytic_story://Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities]
+category = Cloud Security
+last_updated = 2020-06-04
+version = 1
+references = ["https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-cloudtrail-now-tracks-cross-account-activity-to-its-origin/", "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integration.html"]
+maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
+spec_version = 3
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect new user AWS Console Login - DM - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field"]
+description = Monitor your cloud authentication events. Searches within this Analytic Story leverage the recent cloud updates to the Authentication data model to help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious login activity. 
+narrative = It is important to monitor and control who has access to your cloud infrastructure. Detecting suspicious logins will provide good starting points for investigations. Abusive behaviors caused by compromised credentials can lead to direct monetary costs, as you will be billed for any compute activity whether legitimate or otherwise.\
+This Analytic Story has data model versions of cloud searches leveraging Authentication data, including those looking for suspicious login activity, and cross-account activity for AWS.
+
 [analytic_story://Suspicious Command-Line Executions]
 category = Adversary Tactics
 last_updated = 2020-02-03
@@ -709,7 +721,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1059", "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/macro-malware", "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 description = Leveraging the Windows command-line interface (CLI) is one of the most common attack techniques--one that is also detailed in the MITRE ATT&CK framework. Use this Analytic Story to help you identify unusual or suspicious use of the CLI on Windows systems.
 narrative = The ability to execute arbitrary commands via the Windows CLI is a primary goal for the adversary. With access to the shell, an attacker can easily run scripts and interact with the target system. Often, attackers may only have limited access to the shell or may obtain access in unusual ways. In addition, malware may execute and interact with the CLI in ways that would be considered unusual and inconsistent with typical user activity. This provides defenders with opportunities to identify suspicious use and investigate, as appropriate. This Analytic Story contains various searches to help identify this suspicious activity, as well as others to aid you in deeper investigation.

@@ -720,7 +732,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["http://blogs.splunk.com/2015/10/01/random-words-on-entropy-and-dns/", "http://www.darkreading.com/analytics/security-monitoring/got-malware-three-signs-revealed-in-dns-traffic/d/d-id/1139680", "https://live.paloaltonetworks.com/t5/Threat-Vulnerability-Articles/What-are-suspicious-DNS-queries/ta-p/71454"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host"]
+searches = ["ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 description = Attackers often attempt to hide within or otherwise abuse the domain name system (DNS). You can thwart attempts to manipulate this omnipresent protocol by monitoring for these types of abuses.
 narrative = Although DNS is one of the fundamental underlying protocols that make the Internet work, it is often ignored (perhaps because of its complexity and effectiveness).  However, attackers have discovered ways to abuse the protocol to meet their objectives. One potential abuse involves manipulating DNS to hijack traffic and redirect it to an IP address under the attacker's control. This could inadvertently send users intending to visit google.com, for example, to an unrelated malicious website. Another technique involves using the DNS protocol for command-and-control activities with the attacker's malicious code or to covertly exfiltrate data. The searches within this Analytic Story look for these types of abuses.

@@ -731,7 +743,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/06/26/phishing-hits-a-new-level-of-quality/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender", "ESCU - Get Email Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly - Rule", "ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Email Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender"]
 description = Email remains one of the primary means for attackers to gain an initial foothold within the modern enterprise. Detect and investigate suspicious emails in your environment with the help of the searches in this Analytic Story.
 narrative = It is a common practice for attackers of all types to leverage targeted spearphishing campaigns and mass mailers to deliver weaponized email messages and attachments. Fortunately, there are a number of ways to monitor email data in Splunk to detect suspicious content.\
 Once a phishing message has been detected, the next steps are to answer the following questions: \
@@ -746,7 +758,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://redcanary.com/blog/windows-registry-attacks-threat-detection/", "https://medium.com/@mbromileyDFIR/malware-monday-aebb456356c5", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1170"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect mshta exe running scripts in command-line arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect mshta exe running scripts in command-line arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe process to execute malicious code.
 narrative = One common adversary tactic is to bypass application white-listing solutions via the mshta.exe process, which executes Microsoft HTML applications with the .hta suffix. In these cases, attackers use the trusted Windows utility to eproxy execution of malicious files, whether an .hta application, javascript, or VBScript.\
 One example of a notable mshta.exe attack was the Kovter malware (https://medium.com/@mbromileyDFIR/malware-monday-aebb456356c5) that was implicated in ransomware and click-fraud attacks. Kovter utilized .hta to execute a series of javascript commands, each progressively more dangerous. According to the Mitre Parternship Network (https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1170), FIN7 has leveraged mshta.exe, as has the MuddyWater group, who used it to execute its POWERSTATS payload (which then used the utility to execute additional payloads).\
@@ -759,7 +771,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1078", "https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Credential_stuffing", "https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/answer/What-is-a-password-spraying-attack-and-how-does-it-work"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentails From The Same IP - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Account Lockout Events - Rule", "ESCU - Okta User Logins From Multiple Cities - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Failed SSO Attempts - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate User Activities In Okta", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by app"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Okta Failed SSO Attempts - Rule", "ESCU - Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentails From The Same IP - Rule", "ESCU - Okta User Logins From Multiple Cities - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Account Lockout Events - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate User Activities In Okta", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by app", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address"]
 description = Monitor your Okta environment for suspicious activities. Due to the Covid outbreak, many users are migrating over to leverage cloud services more and more. Okta is a popular tool to manage multiple users and the web-based applications they need to stay productive. The searches in this story will help monitor your Okta environment for suspicious activities and associated user behaviors.
 narrative = Okta is the leading single sign on (SSO) provider, allowing users to authenticate once to Okta, and from there access a variety of web-based applications. These applications are assigned to users and allow administrators to centrally manage which users are allowed to access which applications. It also provides centralized logging to help understand how the applications are used and by whom. \
 While SSO is a major convenience for users, it also provides attackers with an opportunity. If the attacker can gain access to Okta, they can access a variety of applications. As such monitoring the environment is important. \
@@ -772,7 +784,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Graeber-Abusing-Windows-Management-Instrumentation-WMI-To-Build-A-Persistent%20Asynchronous-And-Fileless-Backdoor-wp.pdf", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/wmimplant_a_wmi_ba.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Script Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Process Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Temporary Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host"]
+searches = ["ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon - Rule", "ESCU - Process Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Script Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Temporary Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 description = Attackers are increasingly abusing Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI), a framework and associated utilities available on all modern Windows operating systems. Because WMI can be leveraged to manage both local and remote systems, it is important to identify the processes executed and the user context within which the activity occurred.
 narrative = WMI is a Microsoft infrastructure for management data and operations on Windows operating systems. It includes of a set of utilities that can be leveraged to manage both local and remote Windows systems. Attackers are increasingly turning to WMI abuse in their efforts to conduct nefarious tasks, such as reconnaissance, detection of antivirus and virtual machines, code execution, lateral movement, persistence, and data exfiltration. \
 The detection searches included in this Analytic Story are used to look for suspicious use of WMI commands that attackers may leverage to interact with remote systems. The searches specifically look for the use of WMI to run processes on remote systems.\
@@ -785,7 +797,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://redcanary.com/blog/windows-registry-attacks-threat-detection/", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1112"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 description = Monitor and detect registry changes initiated from remote locations, which can be a sign that an attacker has infiltrated your system.
 narrative = Attackers are developing increasingly sophisticated techniques for hijacking target servers, while evading detection. One such technique that has become progressively more common is registry modification.\
 The registry is a key component of the Windows operating system. It has a hierarchical database called "registry" that contains settings, options, and values for executables. Once the threat actor gains access to a machine, they can use reg.exe to modify their account to obtain administrator-level privileges, maintain persistence, and move laterally within the environment.\
@@ -798,7 +810,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://blog.rapid7.com/2020/04/02/dispelling-zoom-bugbears-what-you-need-to-know-about-the-latest-zoom-vulnerabilities/", "https://threatpost.com/two-zoom-zero-day-flaws-uncovered/154337/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - First Time Seen Child Process of Zoom - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Registry Activity", "ESCU - Get Process File Activity"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Child Process of Zoom - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Registry Activity", "ESCU - Get Process File Activity", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint"]
 description = Attackers are using Zoom as an vector to increase privileges on a sytems. This story detects new child processes of zoom and provides investigative actions for this detection.
 narrative = Zoom is a leader in modern enterprise video communications and its usage has increased dramatically with a large amount of the population under stay-at-home orders due to the COVID-19 pandemic. With increased usage has come increased scrutiny and several security flaws have been found with this application on both Windows and macOS systems.\
 Current detections focus on finding new child processes of this application on a per host basis. Investigative searches are included to gather information needed during an investigation.
@@ -810,7 +822,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - EC2 Instance Modified With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
+searches = ["ESCU - EC2 Instance Modified With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId"]
 description = Identify unusual changes to your AWS EC2 instances that may indicate malicious activity. Modifications to your EC2 instances by previously unseen users is an example of an activity that may warrant further investigation.
 narrative = A common attack technique is to infiltrate a cloud instance and make modifications. The adversary can then secure access to your infrastructure or hide their activities. So it's important to stay alert to changes that may indicate that your environment has been compromised. \
 Searches within this Analytic Story can help you detect the presence of a threat by monitoring for EC2 instances that have been created or changed--either by users that have never previously performed these activities or by known users who modify or create instances in a way that have not been done before. This story also provides investigative searches that help you go deeper once you detect suspicious behavior.
@@ -822,7 +834,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/08/monitoring-windows-console-activity-part-two.html", "https://www.splunk.com/pdfs/technical-briefs/advanced-threat-detection-and-response-tech-brief.pdf", "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/logging/detecting-security-incidents-windows-workstation-event-logs-34262"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule", "ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 description = Quickly identify systems running new or unusual processes in your environment that could be indicators of suspicious activity. Processes run from unusual locations, those with conspicuously long command lines, and rare executables are all examples of activities that may warrant deeper investigation.
 narrative = Being able to profile a host's processes within your environment can help you more quickly identify processes that seem out of place when compared to the rest of the population of hosts or asset types.\
 This Analytic Story lets you identify processes that are either a) not typically seen running or b) have some sort of suspicious command-line arguments associated with them. This Analytic Story will also help you identify the user running these processes and the associated process activity on the host.\
@@ -835,7 +847,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.monkey.org/~dugsong/dsniff/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Protocols passing authentication in cleartext - Rule", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Protocols passing authentication in cleartext - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 description = Leverage searches that detect cleartext network protocols that may leak credentials or should otherwise be encrypted.
 narrative = Various legacy protocols operate by default in the clear, without the protections of encryption. This potentially leaks sensitive information that can be exploited by passively sniffing network traffic. Depending on the protocol, this information could be highly sensitive, or could allow for session hijacking. In addition, these protocols send authentication information, which would allow for the harvesting of usernames and passwords that could potentially be used to authenticate and compromise secondary systems.

@@ -846,7 +858,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.fbi.gov/scams-and-safety/common-fraud-schemes/internet-fraud", "https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2017-internet-crime-report-released-050718"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Jim Apger"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Web Fraud - Password Sharing Across Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Anomalous User Clickspeed - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Account Harvesting - Rule", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Web Session Information via session id", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Web Fraud - Password Sharing Across Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Account Harvesting - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Anomalous User Clickspeed - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Web Session Information via session id", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender"]
 description = Monitor your environment for activity consistent with common attack techniques bad actors use when attempting to compromise web servers or other web-related assets.
 narrative = The Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) defines Internet fraud as the use of Internet services or software with Internet access to defraud victims or to otherwise take advantage of them. According to the Bureau, Internet crime schemes are used to steal millions of dollars each year from victims and continue to plague the Internet through various methods. The agency includes phishing scams, data breaches, Denial of Service (DOS) attacks, email account compromise, malware, spoofing, and ransomware in this category.\
 These crimes are not the fraud itself, but rather the attack techniques commonly employed by fraudsters in their pursuit of data that enables them to commit malicious actssuch as obtaining and using stolen credit cards. They represent a serious problem that is steadily increasing and not likely to go away anytime soon.\
@@ -862,7 +874,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Defense_Evasion"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 description = Detect tactics used by malware to evade defenses on Windows endpoints. A few of these include suspicious `reg.exe` processes, files hidden with `attrib.exe` and disabling user-account control, among many others 
 narrative = Defense evasion is a tactic--identified in the MITRE ATT&CK framework--that adversaries employ in a variety of ways to bypass or defeat defensive security measures. There are many techniques enumerated by the MITRE ATT&CK framework that are applicable in this context. This Analytic Story includes searches designed to identify the use of such techniques on Windows platforms.

@@ -873,7 +885,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2013/12/file-extensions-2/", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1042"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule", "ESCU - Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Execution of File with Multiple Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Execution of File with Multiple Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 description = Detect and investigate suspected abuse of file extensions and Windows file associations. Some of the malicious behaviors involved may include inserting spaces before file extensions or prepending the file extension with a different one, among other techniques.
 narrative = Attackers use a variety of techniques to entice users to run malicious code or to persist on an endpoint. One way to accomplish these goals is to leverage file extensions and the mechanism Windows uses to associate files with specific applications. \
 Since its earliest days, Windows has used extensions to identify file types. Users have become familiar with these extensions and their application associations. For example, if users see that a file ends in `.doc` or `.docx`, they will assume that it is a Microsoft Word document and expect that double-clicking will open it using `winword.exe`. The user will typically also presume that the `.docx` file is safe. \
@@ -888,7 +900,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/", "https://zeltser.com/security-incident-log-review-checklist/", "http://journeyintoir.blogspot.com/2013/01/re-introducing-usnjrnl.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint"]
+searches = ["ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 description = Adversaries often try to cover their tracks by manipulating Windows logs. Use these searches to help you monitor for suspicious activity surrounding log files--an essential component of an effective defense.
 narrative = Because attackers often modify system logs to cover their tracks and/or to thwart the investigative process, log monitoring is an industry-recognized best practice. While there are legitimate reasons to manipulate system logs, it is still worthwhile to keep track of who manipulated the logs, when they manipulated them, and in what way they manipulated them (determining which accesses, tools, or utilities were employed). Even if no malicious activity is detected, the knowledge of an attempt to manipulate system logs may be indicative of a broader security risk that should be thoroughly investigated.\
 The Analytic Story gives users two different ways to detect manipulation of Windows Event Logs and one way to detect deletion of the Update Sequence Number (USN) Change Journal. The story helps determine the history of the host and the users who have accessed it. Finally, the story aides in investigation by retrieving all the information on the process that caused these events (if the process has been identified).
@@ -900,7 +912,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["http://www.fuzzysecurity.com/tutorials/19.html", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2010/07/malware-persistence-windows-registry.html", "http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/common-malware-persistence-mechanisms/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/fin7-shim-databases-persistence.html", "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dq2Hv7J9fvk"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 description = Monitor for activities and techniques associated with maintaining persistence on a Windows system--a sign that an adversary may have compromised your environment.
 narrative = Maintaining persistence is one of the first steps taken by attackers after the initial compromise. Attackers leverage various custom and built-in tools to ensure survivability and persistent access within a compromised enterprise. This Analytic Story provides searches to help you identify various behaviors used by attackers to maintain persistent access to a Windows environment.

@@ -911,7 +923,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Child Processes of Spoolsv exe - Rule", "ESCU - Overwriting Accessibility Binaries - Rule", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Overwriting Accessibility Binaries - Rule", "ESCU - Child Processes of Spoolsv exe - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 description = Monitor for and investigate activities that may be associated with a Windows privilege-escalation attack, including unusual processes running on endpoints, modified registry keys, and more.
 narrative = Privilege escalation is a "land-and-expand" technique, wherein an adversary gains an initial foothold on a host and then exploits its weaknesses to increase his privileges. The motivation is simple: certain actions on a Windows machine--such as installing software--may require higher-level privileges than those the attacker initially acquired. By increasing his privilege level, the attacker can gain the control required to carry out his malicious ends. This Analytic Story provides searches to detect and investigate behaviors that attackers may use to elevate their privileges in your environment.

@@ -922,7 +934,7 @@ version = 3
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1050", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1031"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 description = Windows services are often used by attackers for persistence and the ability to load drivers or otherwise interact with the Windows kernel. This Analytic Story helps you monitor your environment for indications that Windows services are being modified or created in a suspicious manner.
 narrative = The Windows operating system uses a services architecture to allow for running code in the background, similar to a UNIX daemon. Attackers will often leverage Windows services for persistence, hiding in plain sight, seeking the ability to run privileged code that can interact with the kernel. In many cases, attackers will create a new service to host their malicious code. Attackers have also been observed modifying unnecessary or unused services to point to their own code, as opposed to what was intended. In these cases, attackers often use tools to create or modify services in ways that are not typical for most environments, providing opportunities for detection.

@@ -1758,6 +1770,16 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate.
 providing_technologies = []

+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect new user AWS Console Login - DM - Rule]
+type = detection
+asset_type = AWS Instance
+confidence = medium
+explanation = This search looks for CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour
+how_to_implement = You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Run the "Previously seen users in CloudTrail" support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run "Update previously seen users in CloudTrail" hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines.
+annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]}
+known_false_positives = When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate.
+providing_technologies = []
+
 [savedsearch://ESCU - Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
@@ -2032,6 +2054,16 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]
 known_false_positives = If the Identity_Management data model is not updated regularly, this search could give you false positive alerts. Please consider this and investigate appropriately.
 providing_technologies = []

+[savedsearch://ESCU - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule]
+type = detection
+asset_type = Endpoint
+confidence = medium
+explanation = This search detects a potential kerberoasting attack via service principal name requests
+how_to_implement = You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, and include the windows security event logs that contain kerberos
+annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1208"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
+known_false_positives = Older systems that support kerberos RC4 by default NetApp may generate false positives
+providing_technologies = []
+
 [savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster
@@ -2397,8 +2429,8 @@ type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
 explanation = The search looks for reg.exe modifying registry keys that define Windows services and their configurations.
-how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on registry changes that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Registry` nodes.
-annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1050", "T1031", "T1089"], "nist": ["PR.IP", "PR.PT", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "DE.CM"]}
+how_to_implement = none
+annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1058"], "nist": ["PR.IP", "PR.PT", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "DE.CM"]}
 known_false_positives = It is unusual for a service to be created or modified by directly manipulating the registry. However, there may be legitimate instances of this behavior. It is important to validate and investigate, as appropriate.
 providing_technologies = []

@@ -2560,8 +2592,8 @@ type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
 explanation = This search looks for arguments to sc.exe indicating the creation or modification of a Windows service.
-how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model.
-annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1050", "T1031", "T1089"], "nist": ["PR.IP", "PR.PT", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "DE.CM"]}
+how_to_implement = none
+annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1050"], "nist": ["PR.IP", "PR.PT", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "DE.CM"]}
 known_false_positives = Using sc.exe to manipulate Windows services is uncommon. However, there may be legitimate instances of this behavior. It is important to validate and investigate as appropriate.
 providing_technologies = []

@@ -3823,6 +3855,13 @@ how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or lat
 known_false_positives = not defined
 providing_technologies = none

+[savedsearch://ESCU - Previously seen users in CloudTrail - DM]
+type = support
+explanation = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then creates a baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by username, within the last 30 days.
+how_to_implement = You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_users_console_logins.csv`, which is a lookup file created by this support search.
+known_false_positives = not defined
+providing_technologies = none
+
 [savedsearch://ESCU - Systems Ready for Spectre-Meltdown Windows Patch]
 type = support
 explanation = Some AV applications can cause the Spectre/Meltdown patch for Windows not to install successfully. This registry key is supposed to be created by the AV engine when it has been patched to be able to handle the Windows patch. If this key has been written, the system can then be patched for Spectre and Meltdown.
@@ -3837,6 +3876,13 @@ how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or lat
 known_false_positives = not defined
 providing_technologies = none

+[savedsearch://ESCU - Update previously seen users in CloudTrail - DM]
+type = support
+explanation = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then updates the baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by user, within the last hour.
+how_to_implement = You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_users_console_logins.csv`, which is a lookup file created by this support search.
+known_false_positives = not defined
+providing_technologies = none
+
 [savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Updates Install Failures]
 type = support
 explanation = This search is intended to give you a feel for how often Windows updates fail to install in your environment. Fluctuations in these numbers will allow you to determine when you should be concerned.
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 is_configured = false
 state = enabled
 state_change_requires_restart = false
-build = 5971
+build = 6257

 [triggers]
 reload.analytic_stories = simple
@@ -12,7 +12,6 @@ reload.usage_searches = simple
 reload.use_case_library = simple
 reload.correlationsearches = simple
 reload.analyticstories = simple
-reload.ui-tour = simple
 reload.governance = simple
 reload.managed_configurations = simple
 reload.postprocess = simple
@@ -20,7 +19,7 @@ reload.content-version = simple

 [launcher]
 author = Splunk
-version = 3.0.1
+version = 3.0.2
 description = Explore the Analytic Stories included with ES Content Updates.

 [ui]
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security-content
-# On Date: 2020-06-04T22:46:46 UTC
+# On Date: 2020-06-18T19:50:40 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Security Research
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
 [content-version]
-version = 3.0.1
+version = 3.0.2
@@ -3,19 +3,19 @@
 label = AWS Cross Account Activity
 description = Track when a user assumes an IAM role in another AWS account to obtain cross-account access to services and resources in that account. Accessing new roles could be an indication of malicious activity.
 disabled = 0
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_accesskeyid", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_source_user"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_source_user", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_accesskeyid"]

 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_aws_cryptomining]
 label = AWS Cryptomining
 description = Monitor your AWS EC2 instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or EC2 instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior.
 disabled = 0
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table"]

 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_aws_network_acl_activity]
 label = AWS Network ACL Activity
 description = Monitor your AWS network infrastructure for bad configurations and malicious activity. Investigative searches help you probe deeper, when the facts warrant it.
 disabled = 0
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint"]

 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_aws_suspicious_provisioning_activities]
 label = AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities
@@ -27,55 +27,55 @@ panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_country", "panel://
 label = AWS User Monitoring
 description = Detect and investigate dormant user accounts for your AWS environment that have become active again. Because inactive and ad-hoc accounts are common attack targets, it's critical to enable governance within your environment.
 disabled = 0
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_user_activities_by_user_field", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_user_activities_by_user_field"]

 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_account_monitoring_and_controls]
 label = Account Monitoring and Controls
 description = A common attack technique is to leverage user accounts to gain unauthorized access to the target's network. This Analytic Story minimizes opportunities for attack by helping you actively manage creation/use/dormancy/deletion--the lifecycle of system and application accounts.
 disabled = 0
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_logon_rights_modifications_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_logon_rights_modifications_for_endpoint"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_logon_rights_modifications_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_logon_rights_modifications_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint"]

 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_apache_struts_vulnerability]
 label = Apache Struts Vulnerability
 description = Detect and investigate activities--such as unusually long `Content-Type` length, suspicious java classes and web servers executing suspicious processes--consistent with attempts to exploit Apache Struts vulnerabilities.
 disabled = 0
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_suspicious_strings_in_http_header", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_posts_from_src", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_posts_from_src", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_suspicious_strings_in_http_header", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint"]

 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_asset_tracking]
 label = Asset Tracking
 description = Keep a careful inventory of every asset on your network to make it easier to detect rogue devices. Unauthorized/unmanaged devices could be an indication of malicious behavior that should be investigated further.
 disabled = 0
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_first_occurrence_and_last_occurrence_of_a_mac_address"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_first_occurrence_and_last_occurrence_of_a_mac_address", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info"]

 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_brand_monitoring]
 label = Brand Monitoring
 description = Detect and investigate activity that may indicate that an adversary is using faux domains to mislead users into interacting with malicious infrastructure. Monitor DNS, email, and web traffic for permutations of your brand name.
 disabled = 0
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic", "panel://workbench_panel_get_emails_from_specific_sender", "panel://workbench_panel_get_email_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_email_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_emails_from_specific_sender"]

 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_cloud_cryptomining]
 label = Cloud Cryptomining
 description = Monitor your cloud compute instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or compute instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior.
 disabled = 0
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_cloud_compute_instance_activities", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_user_activities_in_all_cloud_regions", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_user_activities_in_single_cloud_region"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_user_activities_in_single_cloud_region", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_cloud_compute_instance_activities", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_user_activities_in_all_cloud_regions", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table"]

 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_coldroot_macos_rat]
 label = ColdRoot MacOS RAT
 description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that relate to the ColdRoot Remote Access Trojan that affects MacOS. An example of some of these activities are changing sensative binaries in the MacOS sub-system, detecting process names and executables associated with the RAT, detecting when a keyboard tab is installed on a MacOS machine and more.
 disabled = 0
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_network_traffic_from_src_ip", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_vulnerability_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_src_ip"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_network_traffic_from_src_ip", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_vulnerability_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_src_ip", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint"]

 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_collection_and_staging]
 label = Collection and Staging
 description = Monitor for and investigate activities--such as suspicious writes to the Windows Recycling Bin or email servers sending high amounts of traffic to specific hosts, for example--that may indicate that an adversary is harvesting and exfiltrating sensitive data. 
 disabled = 0
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint"]

 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_command_and_control]
 label = Command and Control
 description = Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures leveraged by attackers to establish and operate command and control channels. Implants installed by attackers on compromised endpoints use these channels to receive instructions and send data back to the malicious operators.
 disabled = 0
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint"]

 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_common_phishing_frameworks]
 label = Common Phishing Frameworks
@@ -93,19 +93,19 @@ panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_ecr_container_listing_activit
 label = Credential Dumping
 description = Uncover activity consistent with credential dumping, a technique wherein attackers compromise systems and attempt to obtain and exfiltrate passwords. The threat actors use these pilfered credentials to further escalate privileges and spread throughout a target environment. The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify attempts to credential dumping.
 disabled = 0
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_hash_attempts", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_previous_unseen_user", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_ticket_attempts", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_failed_logins_for_multiple_destinations"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_ticket_attempts", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_previous_unseen_user", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_hash_attempts", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_failed_logins_for_multiple_destinations"]

 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_dhs_report_ta18_074a]
 label = DHS Report TA18-074A
 description = Monitor for suspicious activities associated with DHS Technical Alert US-CERT TA18-074A. Some of the activities that adversaries used in these compromises included spearfishing attacks, malware, watering-hole domains, many and more.
 disabled = 0
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_registry_activity", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_registry_activities", "panel://workbench_panel_get_vulnerability_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_file_activity"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_file_activity", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity", "panel://workbench_panel_get_registry_activities", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_registry_activity", "panel://workbench_panel_get_vulnerability_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint"]

 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_dns_amplification_attacks]
 label = DNS Amplification Attacks
 description = DNS poses a serious threat as a Denial of Service (DOS) amplifier, if it responds to `ANY` queries. This Analytic Story can help you detect attackers who may be abusing your company's DNS infrastructure to launch amplification attacks, causing Denial of Service to other victims.
 disabled = 0
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint"]

 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_dns_hijacking]
 label = DNS Hijacking
@@ -117,49 +117,49 @@ panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host"]
 label = Data Protection
 description = Fortify your data-protection arsenal--while continuing to ensure data confidentiality and integrity--with searches that monitor for and help you investigate possible signs of data exfiltration.
 disabled = 0
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint"]

 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_disabling_security_tools]
 label = Disabling Security Tools
 description = Looks for activities and techniques associated with the disabling of security tools on a Windows system, such as suspicious `reg.exe` processes, processes launching netsh, and many others.
 disabled = 0
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint"]

 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_dynamic_dns]
 label = Dynamic DNS
 description = Detect and investigate hosts in your environment that may be communicating with dynamic domain providers. Attackers may leverage these services to help them avoid firewall blocks and blacklists.
 disabled = 0
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_src_ip"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_src_ip", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint"]

 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_emotet_malware__dhs_report_ta18_201a_]
 label = Emotet Malware  DHS Report TA18-201A 
 description = Detect rarely used executables, specific registry paths that may confer malware survivability and persistence, instances where cmd.exe is used to launch script interpreters, and other indicators that the Emotet financial malware has compromised your environment.
 disabled = 0
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_update_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_registry_activities", "panel://workbench_panel_get_vulnerability_logs_for_endpoint"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_registry_activities", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_update_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_vulnerability_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint"]

 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_hidden_cobra_malware]
 label = Hidden Cobra Malware
 description = Monitor for and investigate activities, including the creation or deletion of hidden shares and file writes, that may be evidence of infiltration by North Korean government-sponsored cybercriminals. Details of this activity were reported in DHS Report TA-18-149A.
 disabled = 0
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_vulnerability_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_vulnerability_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint"]

 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_host_redirection]
 label = Host Redirection
 description = Detect evidence of tactics used to redirect traffic from a host to a destination other than the one intended--potentially one that is part of an adversary's attack infrastructure. An example is redirecting communications regarding patches and updates or misleading users into visiting a malicious website.
 disabled = 0
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint"]

 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_jboss_vulnerability]
 label = JBoss Vulnerability
 description = In March of 2016, adversaries were seen using JexBoss--an open-source utility used for testing and exploiting JBoss application servers. These searches help detect evidence of these attacks, such as network connections to external resources or web services spawning atypical child processes, among others.
 disabled = 0
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_vulnerability_logs_for_endpoint"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_vulnerability_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint"]

 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_kubernetes_scanning_activity]
 label = Kubernetes Scanning Activity
 description = This story addresses detection against Kubernetes cluster fingerprint scan and attack by providing information on items such as source ip, user agent, cluster names.
 disabled = 0
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_amazon_eks_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_gcp_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_amazon_eks_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip", "panel://workbench_panel_gcp_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint"]

 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_kubernetes_sensitive_object_access_activity]
 label = Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity
@@ -177,25 +177,25 @@ panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info"]
 label = Lateral Movement
 description = Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures around how attackers move laterally within the enterprise. Because lateral movement can expose the adversary to detection, it should be an important focus for security analysts.
 disabled = 0
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint"]

 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_malicious_powershell]
 label = Malicious PowerShell
 description = Attackers are finding stealthy ways "live off the land," leveraging utilities and tools that come standard on the endpoint--such as PowerShell--to achieve their goals without downloading binary files. These searches can help you detect and investigate PowerShell command-line options that may be indicative of malicious intent.
 disabled = 0
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint"]

 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_monitor_backup_solution]
 label = Monitor Backup Solution
 description = Address common concerns when monitoring your backup processes. These searches can help you reduce risks from ransomware, device theft, or denial of physical access to a host by backing up data on endpoints.
 disabled = 0
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_all_backup_logs_for_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_all_backup_logs_for_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint"]

 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_monitor_for_unauthorized_software]
 label = Monitor for Unauthorized Software
 description = Identify and investigate prohibited/unauthorized software or processes that may be concealing malicious behavior within your environment. 
 disabled = 0
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_update_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_vulnerability_logs_for_endpoint"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_update_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_vulnerability_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint"]

 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_monitor_for_updates]
 label = Monitor for Updates
@@ -207,13 +207,13 @@ panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_pane
 label = Netsh Abuse
 description = Detect activities and various techniques associated with the abuse of `netsh.exe`, which can disable local firewall settings or set up a remote connection to a host from an infected system.
 disabled = 0
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint"]

 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_orangeworm_attack_group]
 label = Orangeworm Attack Group
 description = Detect activities and various techniques associated with the Orangeworm Attack Group, a group that frequently targets the healthcare industry.
 disabled = 0
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint"]

 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_phishing_payloads]
 label = Phishing Payloads
@@ -225,43 +225,43 @@ panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info"]
 label = Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns
 description = Monitor your environment for suspicious behaviors that resemble the techniques employed by the MUDCARP threat group.
 disabled = 0
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_registry_activities"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_registry_activities", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint"]

 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_prohibited_traffic_allowed_or_protocol_mismatch]
 label = Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch
 description = Detect instances of prohibited network traffic allowed in the environment, as well as protocols running on non-standard ports. Both of these types of behaviors typically violate policy and can be leveraged by attackers.
 disabled = 0
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint"]

 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_ransomware]
 label = Ransomware
 description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to ransomware--spikes in SMB traffic, suspicious wevtutil usage, the presence of common ransomware extensions, and system processes run from unexpected locations, and many others.
 disabled = 0
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_update_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_backup_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_registry_activities", "panel://workbench_panel_get_vulnerability_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_sysmon_wmi_activity_for_host"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_registry_activities", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_update_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_vulnerability_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_sysmon_wmi_activity_for_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_backup_logs_for_endpoint"]

 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_router_and_infrastructure_security]
 label = Router and Infrastructure Security
 description = Validate the security configuration of network infrastructure and verify that only authorized users and systems are accessing critical assets. Core routing and switching infrastructure are common strategic targets for attackers.
 disabled = 0
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint"]

 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_sql_injection]
 label = SQL Injection
 description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to help you detect structured query language (SQL) injection attempts characterized by long URLs that contain malicious parameters.
 disabled = 0
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint"]

 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_samsam_ransomware]
 label = SamSam Ransomware
 description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the SamSam ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with SamSam, RDP brute force attacks, the presence of files with SamSam ransomware extensions, suspicious psexec use, and more.
 disabled = 0
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_update_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_backup_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_vulnerability_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_host", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_update_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_vulnerability_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_backup_logs_for_endpoint"]

 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerabilities]
 label = Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities
 description = Assess and mitigate your systems' vulnerability to Spectre and Meltdown exploitation with the searches in this Analytic Story.
 disabled = 0
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint"]

 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_splunk_enterprise_vulnerability]
 label = Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability
@@ -273,13 +273,13 @@ panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_pane
 label = Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409
 description = Reduce the risk of CVE-2018-11409, an information disclosure vulnerability within some older versions of Splunk Enterprise, with searches designed to help ensure that your Splunk system does not leak information to authenticated users.
 disabled = 0
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_network_traffic_from_src_ip", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_src_ip"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_network_traffic_from_src_ip", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_src_ip", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint"]

 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_aws_ec2_activities]
 label = Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities
 description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS EC2 instances for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as EC2 instances that originate from unusual locations or those launched by previously unseen users (among others). Included investigative searches will help you probe more deeply, when the information warrants it.
 disabled = 0
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table"]

 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_aws_login_activities]
 label = Suspicious AWS Login Activities
@@ -291,121 +291,127 @@ panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn"]
 label = Suspicious AWS S3 Activities
 description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS S3 buckets for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as detecting open S3 buckets and buckets being accessed from a new IP. The contextual and investigative searches will give you more information, when required.
 disabled = 0
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_s3_bucket_details_via_bucketname"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_s3_bucket_details_via_bucketname"]

 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_aws_traffic]
 label = Suspicious AWS Traffic
 description = Leverage these searches to monitor your AWS network traffic for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as a spike in blocked outbound traffic in your virtual private cloud (VPC).
 disabled = 0
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint"]
+
+[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_cloud_authentication_activities]
+label = Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities
+description = Monitor your cloud authentication events. Searches within this Analytic Story leverage the recent cloud updates to the Authentication data model to help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious login activity. 
+disabled = 0
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_user_activities_by_user_field"]

 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_command_line_executions]
 label = Suspicious Command-Line Executions
 description = Leveraging the Windows command-line interface (CLI) is one of the most common attack techniques--one that is also detailed in the MITRE ATT&CK framework. Use this Analytic Story to help you identify unusual or suspicious use of the CLI on Windows systems.
 disabled = 0
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_registry_activities"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_registry_activities", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint"]

 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_dns_traffic]
 label = Suspicious DNS Traffic
 description = Attackers often attempt to hide within or otherwise abuse the domain name system (DNS). You can thwart attempts to manipulate this omnipresent protocol by monitoring for these types of abuses.
 disabled = 0
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint"]

 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_emails]
 label = Suspicious Emails
 description = Email remains one of the primary means for attackers to gain an initial foothold within the modern enterprise. Detect and investigate suspicious emails in your environment with the help of the searches in this Analytic Story.
 disabled = 0
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_emails_from_specific_sender", "panel://workbench_panel_get_email_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_email_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_emails_from_specific_sender"]

 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_mshta_activity]
 label = Suspicious MSHTA Activity
 description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe process to execute malicious code.
 disabled = 0
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_registry_activities"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_registry_activities", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint"]

 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_okta_activity]
 label = Suspicious Okta Activity
 description = Monitor your Okta environment for suspicious activities. Due to the Covid outbreak, many users are migrating over to leverage cloud services more and more. Okta is a popular tool to manage multiple users and the web-based applications they need to stay productive. The searches in this story will help monitor your Okta environment for suspicious activities and associated user behaviors.
 disabled = 0
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_user_activities_in_okta", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_okta_activity_by_ip_address", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_okta_activity_by_app"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_user_activities_in_okta", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_okta_activity_by_app", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_okta_activity_by_ip_address"]

 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_wmi_use]
 label = Suspicious WMI Use
 description = Attackers are increasingly abusing Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI), a framework and associated utilities available on all modern Windows operating systems. Because WMI can be leveraged to manage both local and remote systems, it is important to identify the processes executed and the user context within which the activity occurred.
 disabled = 0
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_sysmon_wmi_activity_for_host"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_sysmon_wmi_activity_for_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint"]

 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_windows_registry_activities]
 label = Suspicious Windows Registry Activities
 description = Monitor and detect registry changes initiated from remote locations, which can be a sign that an attacker has infiltrated your system.
 disabled = 0
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_registry_activities"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_registry_activities", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint"]

 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_zoom_child_processes]
 label = Suspicious Zoom Child Processes
 description = Attackers are using Zoom as an vector to increase privileges on a sytems. This story detects new child processes of zoom and provides investigative actions for this detection.
 disabled = 0
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_registry_activity", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_file_activity"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_registry_activity", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_file_activity", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint"]

 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_unusual_aws_ec2_modifications]
 label = Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications
 description = Identify unusual changes to your AWS EC2 instances that may indicate malicious activity. Modifications to your EC2 instances by previously unseen users is an example of an activity that may warrant further investigation.
 disabled = 0
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid"]

 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_unusual_processes]
 label = Unusual Processes
 description = Quickly identify systems running new or unusual processes in your environment that could be indicators of suspicious activity. Processes run from unusual locations, those with conspicuously long command lines, and rare executables are all examples of activities that may warrant deeper investigation.
 disabled = 0
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint"]

 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_use_of_cleartext_protocols]
 label = Use of Cleartext Protocols
 description = Leverage searches that detect cleartext network protocols that may leak credentials or should otherwise be encrypted.
 disabled = 0
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint"]

 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_web_fraud_detection]
 label = Web Fraud Detection
 description = Monitor your environment for activity consistent with common attack techniques bad actors use when attempting to compromise web servers or other web-related assets.
 disabled = 0
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_emails_from_specific_sender", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_web_session_information_via_session_id", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_web_session_information_via_session_id", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_emails_from_specific_sender"]

 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_windows_defense_evasion_tactics]
 label = Windows Defense Evasion Tactics
 description = Detect tactics used by malware to evade defenses on Windows endpoints. A few of these include suspicious `reg.exe` processes, files hidden with `attrib.exe` and disabling user-account control, among many others 
 disabled = 0
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_registry_activities"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_registry_activities", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint"]

 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_windows_file_extension_and_association_abuse]
 label = Windows File Extension and Association Abuse
 description = Detect and investigate suspected abuse of file extensions and Windows file associations. Some of the malicious behaviors involved may include inserting spaces before file extensions or prepending the file extension with a different one, among other techniques.
 disabled = 0
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_registry_activities"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_registry_activities", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint"]

 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_windows_log_manipulation]
 label = Windows Log Manipulation
 description = Adversaries often try to cover their tracks by manipulating Windows logs. Use these searches to help you monitor for suspicious activity surrounding log files--an essential component of an effective defense.
 disabled = 0
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_vulnerability_logs_for_endpoint"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_vulnerability_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint"]

 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_windows_persistence_techniques]
 label = Windows Persistence Techniques
 description = Monitor for activities and techniques associated with maintaining persistence on a Windows system--a sign that an adversary may have compromised your environment.
 disabled = 0
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_registry_activities"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_registry_activities", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint"]

 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_windows_privilege_escalation]
 label = Windows Privilege Escalation
 description = Monitor for and investigate activities that may be associated with a Windows privilege-escalation attack, including unusual processes running on endpoints, modified registry keys, and more.
 disabled = 0
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_registry_activities"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_registry_activities", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint"]

 [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_windows_service_abuse]
 label = Windows Service Abuse
 description = Windows services are often used by attackers for persistence and the ability to load drivers or otherwise interact with the Windows kernel. This Analytic Story helps you monitor your environment for indications that Windows services are being modified or created in a suspicious manner.
 disabled = 0
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint"]



@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security-content
-# On Date: 2020-06-04T22:46:46 UTC
+# On Date: 2020-06-18T19:50:40 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Security Research
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
@@ -10,6 +10,10 @@
 definition = sourcetype="aws:cloudwatchlogs:eks"
 description = customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.

+[aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account___dm_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Use this macro to add additional filters
+
 [aws_s3_accesslogs]
 definition = sourcetype=aws:s3:accesslogs
 description = customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.
@@ -50,6 +54,10 @@ description = customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcet
 definition = search *
 description = Use this macro to add additional filter for create or delete windows shares

+[detect_new_user_aws_console_login___dm_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Use this macro to add additional filters
+
 [dynamic_dns_providers]
 definition = lookup update=true dynamic_dns_providers_default dynamic_dns_domains as query OUTPUTNEW isDynDNS_default | lookup update=true dynamic_dns_providers_local dynamic_dns_domains as query OUTPUTNEW isDynDNS_local| eval isDynDNS = coalesce(isDynDNS_default, isDynDNS_local)|fields - isDynDNS_default, isDynDNS_local| search isDynDNS=True
 description = This macro limits the output of the query field to dynamic dns domains. It looks up the domains in a file provided by Splunk and one intended to be updated by the end user.
@@ -208,7 +216,7 @@ definition = convert timeformat="%m/%d/%Y %H:%M:%S" ctime($field$)
 description = convert epoch time to string

 [security_content_summariesonly]
-definition = summariesonly=true allow_old_summaries=true
+definition = summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true
 description = search data model's summaries only

 [security_group_api_calls]
@@ -559,6 +567,10 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
 definition = search *
 description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 

+[detect_new_user_aws_console_login___dm_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 
+
 [detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery_filter]
 definition = search *
 description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 
@@ -667,6 +679,10 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
 definition = search *
 description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 

+[kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 
+
 [kubernetes_azure_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account_filter]
 definition = search *
 description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. 
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security-content
-# On Date: 2020-06-04T22:46:46 UTC
+# On Date: 2020-06-18T19:50:40 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Security Research
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
@@ -1689,7 +1689,7 @@ action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
-action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious AWS Login Activities"]
+action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious AWS Login Activities", "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities"]
 cron_schedule = */30 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -30m
 dispatch.latest_time = now
@@ -1729,7 +1729,7 @@ action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
-action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious AWS Login Activities"]
+action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious AWS Login Activities", "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities"]
 cron_schedule = */30 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -30m
 dispatch.latest_time = now
@@ -1769,7 +1769,7 @@ action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
-action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious AWS Login Activities"]
+action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious AWS Login Activities", "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities"]
 cron_schedule = */30 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -30m
 dispatch.latest_time = now
@@ -3133,6 +3133,46 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` eventName=ConsoleLogin | rename userIdentity.arn as user | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by user | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_users_console_logins.csv  | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by user | eval userStatus=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), "-70m@m"), "First Time Logging into AWS Console","Previously Seen User") | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| where userStatus ="First Time Logging into AWS Console"  | `detect_new_user_aws_console_login_filter`

+[ESCU - Detect new user AWS Console Login - DM - Rule]
+action.escu = 0
+action.escu.enabled = 1
+description = This search looks for CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour
+action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]}
+action.escu.data_models = ["Authentication"]
+action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour
+action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Run the "Previously seen users in CloudTrail" support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run "Update previously seen users in CloudTrail" hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines.
+action.escu.known_false_positives = When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate.
+action.escu.creation_date = 2020-05-28
+action.escu.modification_date = 2020-05-28
+action.escu.confidence = high
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect new user AWS Console Login - DM - Rule
+action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.providing_technologies = []
+action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities"]
+cron_schedule = */30 * * * *
+dispatch.earliest_time = -30m
+dispatch.latest_time = now
+action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect new user AWS Console Login - DM - Rule
+schedule_window = auto
+action.notable = 1
+action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user']
+action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour
+action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect new user AWS Console Login - DM
+action.notable.param.security_domain = network
+action.notable.param.severity = high
+alert.digest_mode = 1
+action.escu.earliest_time_offset = 3600
+action.escu.latest_time_offset = 86400
+disabled = true
+enableSched = 1
+counttype = number of events
+relation = greater than
+quantity = 0
+realtime_schedule = 0
+is_visible = false
+search = | tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_users_console_logins.csv | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by user | eval userStatus=if(firstTime >=relative_time(now(), '-70m@m'), 'First Time Logging into AWS Console','Previously Seen User')| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `detect_new_user_aws_console_login___dm_filter`
+
 [ESCU - Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
@@ -3941,8 +3981,8 @@ action.escu.data_models = []
 action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for the first time a Windows service is seen running in your environment.
 action.escu.how_to_implement = While this search does not require you to adhere to Splunk CIM, you must be ingesting your Windows security-event logs in order for this search to execute successfully. The support search, `Previously Seen Running Windows Services`, should be run before this search to create the baseline of known Windows services. Please ensure that the Splunk Add-on for Microsoft Windows is version 5.0.0 or above.
 action.escu.known_false_positives = A previously unseen service is not necessarily malicious. Verify that the service is legitimate and that was installed by a legitimate process.
-action.escu.creation_date = 2020-01-13
-action.escu.modification_date = 2020-01-13
+action.escu.creation_date = 2020-06-15
+action.escu.modification_date = 2020-06-15
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
@@ -3970,7 +4010,7 @@ relation = greater than
 quantity = 0
 realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
-search = `wineventlog_system` signature_id=7036 | rename param1 as service_name | rename param2 as action | search action="running" [ search `wineventlog_system` signature_id=7036 | rename param1 as service_name | rename param2 as action | search action="running" | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime by service_name | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_running_windows_services | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by service_name | outputlookup previously_seen_running_windows_services| eval serviceStatus=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(),"-60m@m"), "First time seen Windows service","Previously seen Windows service") | where serviceStatus="First time seen Windows service"| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table service_name]| table _time dest service_name | `first_time_seen_running_windows_service_filter`
+search = `wineventlog_system` EventCode=7036 | rename param1 as service_name | rename param2 as action | search action="running" [ search `wineventlog_system` EventCode=7036 | rename param1 as service_name | rename param2 as action | search action="running" | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime by service_name | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_running_windows_services | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by service_name | outputlookup previously_seen_running_windows_services| eval serviceStatus=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(),"-60m@m"), "First time seen Windows service","Previously seen Windows service") | where serviceStatus="First time seen Windows service"| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table service_name]| table _time dest service_name | `first_time_seen_running_windows_service_filter`

 [ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
@@ -4208,6 +4248,45 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | from datamodel Identity_Management.All_Identities  | eval empStatus=case((now()-startDate)<604800, "Accounts created in last week") | search empStatus="Accounts created in last week"| `security_content_ctime(endDate)` | `security_content_ctime(startDate)`| table identity empStatus endDate startDate | `identify_new_user_accounts_filter`

+[ESCU - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule]
+action.escu = 0
+action.escu.enabled = 1
+description = This search detects a potential kerberoasting attack via service principal name requests
+action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1208"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
+action.escu.data_models = []
+action.escu.eli5 = This search detects a potential kerberoasting attack via service principal name requests
+action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, and include the windows security event logs that contain kerberos
+action.escu.known_false_positives = Older systems that support kerberos RC4 by default NetApp may generate false positives
+action.escu.creation_date = 2020-06-11
+action.escu.modification_date = 2020-06-11
+action.escu.confidence = high
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule
+action.escu.search_type = detection
+action.escu.providing_technologies = []
+action.escu.analytic_story = ["Lateral Movement"]
+cron_schedule = */30 * * * *
+dispatch.earliest_time = -30m
+dispatch.latest_time = now
+action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule
+schedule_window = auto
+action.notable = 1
+action.notable.param.rule_description = This search detects a potential kerberoasting attack via service principal name requests
+action.notable.param.rule_title = Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption
+action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint
+action.notable.param.severity = high
+alert.digest_mode = 1
+action.escu.earliest_time_offset = 3600
+action.escu.latest_time_offset = 86400
+disabled = true
+enableSched = 1
+counttype = number of events
+relation = greater than
+quantity = 0
+realtime_schedule = 0
+is_visible = false
+search = `wineventlog_security` EventID=4769 TicketOptions=0x40810000 TicketEncryptionType=0x17 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(ServiceName) values(TargetUserName) values(user)  by TargetDomainName | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption_filter`
+
 [ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
@@ -5633,13 +5712,13 @@ search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The search looks for reg.exe modifying registry keys that define Windows services and their configurations.
-action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1050", "T1031", "T1089"], "nist": ["PR.IP", "PR.PT", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "DE.CM"]}
+action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1058"], "nist": ["PR.IP", "PR.PT", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "DE.CM"]}
 action.escu.data_models = []
 action.escu.eli5 = The search looks for reg.exe modifying registry keys that define Windows services and their configurations.
-action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on registry changes that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Registry` nodes.
+action.escu.how_to_implement = none
 action.escu.known_false_positives = It is unusual for a service to be created or modified by directly manipulating the registry. However, there may be legitimate instances of this behavior. It is important to validate and investigate, as appropriate.
-action.escu.creation_date = 2019-03-01
-action.escu.modification_date = 2019-03-01
+action.escu.creation_date = 2020-06-15
+action.escu.modification_date = 2020-06-15
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
@@ -5667,7 +5746,7 @@ relation = greater than
 quantity = 0
 realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
-search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.parent_process_name) as parent_process_name values(Processes.user) as user FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = reg.exe by Processes.process_id Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | join [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Registry.registry_path) as registry_path count  FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path="*\\services\\*" by Registry.process_id Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Registry")` | table process_id dest registry_path] | `reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys_filter`
+search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.parent_process_name) as parent_process_name values(Processes.user) as user FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=reg.exe Processes.process=*reg* Processes.process=*add* Processes.process=*Services* by Processes.process_id Processes.dest Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys_filter`

 [ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
@@ -6275,13 +6354,13 @@ search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search looks for arguments to sc.exe indicating the creation or modification of a Windows service.
-action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1050", "T1031", "T1089"], "nist": ["PR.IP", "PR.PT", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "DE.CM"]}
+action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1050"], "nist": ["PR.IP", "PR.PT", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "DE.CM"]}
 action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for arguments to sc.exe indicating the creation or modification of a Windows service.
-action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model.
+action.escu.how_to_implement = none
 action.escu.known_false_positives = Using sc.exe to manipulate Windows services is uncommon. However, there may be legitimate instances of this behavior. It is important to validate and investigate as appropriate.
-action.escu.creation_date = 2019-02-27
-action.escu.modification_date = 2019-02-27
+action.escu.creation_date = 2020-06-15
+action.escu.modification_date = 2020-06-15
 action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
@@ -7426,7 +7505,7 @@ relation = greater than
 quantity = 0
 realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
-search = `sysmon` EventID=7 Image=*lsass.exe Signed=false | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, Image, ImageLoaded, Signed, SHA1 | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `unsigned_image_loaded_by_LSAS`unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass_filter` 
+search = `sysmon` EventID=7 Image=*lsass.exe Signed=false | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, Image, ImageLoaded, Signed, SHA1 | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass_filter` 

 [ESCU - Unsuccessful Netbackup backups - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
@@ -8599,8 +8678,8 @@ action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services
 description = This collects the services that have been started across your entire enterprise.
-action.escu.creation_date = 2020-01-13
-action.escu.modification_date = 2020-01-13
+action.escu.creation_date = 2020-06-15
+action.escu.modification_date = 2020-06-15
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Orangeworm Attack Group", "Windows Service Abuse"]
 action.escu.data_models = []
 dispatch.earliest_time = -30m
@@ -8611,7 +8690,7 @@ action.escu.eli5 = This collects the services that have been started across your
 action.escu.how_to_implement = While this search does not require you to adhere to Splunk CIM, you must be ingesting your Windows security-event logs for it to execute successfully. Please ensure that the Splunk Add-on for Microsoft Windows is version 5.0.0 or above.
 disabled = true
 is_visible = false
-search = `wineventlog_system` signature_id=7036 | rename param1 as service_name | rename param2 as action | search action="running" | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime by service_name | outputlookup previously_seen_running_windows_services | stats count
+search = `wineventlog_system` EventCode=7036 | rename param1 as service_name | rename param2 as action | search action="running" | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime by service_name | outputlookup previously_seen_running_windows_services

 [ESCU - Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Initial]
 action.escu = 0
@@ -8733,6 +8812,26 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` eventName=ConsoleLogin | rename userIdentity.arn as user | iplocation src | eval City=if(City LIKE "",src,City),Region=if(Region LIKE "",src,Region) | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by user src City Region Country | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins.csv | stats count

+[ESCU - Previously seen users in CloudTrail - DM]
+action.escu = 0
+action.escu.enabled = 1
+action.escu.search_type = support
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Previously seen users in CloudTrail - DM
+description = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then creates a baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by username, within the last 30 days.
+action.escu.creation_date = 2020-05-28
+action.escu.modification_date = 2020-05-28
+action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities"]
+action.escu.data_models = ["Authentication"]
+dispatch.earliest_time = -30m
+dispatch.latest_time = now
+schedule_window = auto
+action.escu.providing_technologies = []
+action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then creates a baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by username, within the last 30 days.
+action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_users_console_logins.csv`, which is a lookup file created by this support search.
+disabled = true
+is_visible = false
+search = | tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src | iplocation Authentication.src | rename Authentication.user as user Authentication.src as src | table user src City Region Country firstTime lastTime | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins.csv | stats count
+
 [ESCU - Systems Ready for Spectre-Meltdown Windows Patch]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
@@ -8773,6 +8872,26 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` eventName=ConsoleLogin | rename userIdentity.arn as user | iplocation src | eval City=if(City LIKE "",src,City),Region=if(Region LIKE "",src,Region) | stats earliest(_time) AS firstTime latest(_time) AS lastTime by user src City Region Country | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_users_console_logins.csv | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by user src City Region Country | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins.csv

+[ESCU - Update previously seen users in CloudTrail - DM]
+action.escu = 0
+action.escu.enabled = 1
+action.escu.search_type = support
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Update previously seen users in CloudTrail - DM
+description = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then updates the baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by user, within the last hour.
+action.escu.creation_date = 2020-05-28
+action.escu.modification_date = 2020-05-28
+action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities"]
+action.escu.data_models = ["Authentication"]
+dispatch.earliest_time = -30m
+dispatch.latest_time = now
+schedule_window = auto
+action.escu.providing_technologies = []
+action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then updates the baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by user, within the last hour.
+action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_users_console_logins.csv`, which is a lookup file created by this support search.
+disabled = true
+is_visible = false
+search = | tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authenticaiton.src | iplocation Authentication.src | rename Authentication.user as user Authentciation.src as src | table user src City Region Country firstTime lastTime | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_users_console_logins.csv | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by user src City Region Country | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins.csv
+
 [ESCU - Windows Updates Install Failures]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
@@ -9371,7 +9490,7 @@ action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get Notable History
 description = This search queries the notable index and returns all the Notable Events for the particular destination host, giving the analyst an overview of the incidents that may have occurred with the host under investigation.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2017-09-20
 action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-20
-action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Cross Account Activity", "AWS Cryptomining", "AWS Network ACL Activity", "AWS User Monitoring", "Account Monitoring and Controls", "Apache Struts Vulnerability", "Asset Tracking", "Brand Monitoring", "Cloud Cryptomining", "ColdRoot MacOS RAT", "Collection and Staging", "Command and Control", "DHS Report TA18-074A", "DNS Amplification Attacks", "Data Protection", "Disabling Security Tools", "Dynamic DNS", "Emotet Malware  DHS Report TA18-201A ", "Hidden Cobra Malware", "Host Redirection", "JBoss Vulnerability", "Kubernetes Scanning Activity", "Lateral Movement", "Malicious PowerShell", "Monitor Backup Solution", "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", "Monitor for Updates", "Netsh Abuse", "Orangeworm Attack Group", "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", "Ransomware", "Router and Infrastructure Security", "SQL Injection", "SamSam Ransomware", "Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities", "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability", "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409", "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", "Suspicious AWS Traffic", "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", "Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Suspicious Emails", "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", "Suspicious WMI Use", "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", "Unusual Processes", "Use of Cleartext Protocols", "Web Fraud Detection", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", "Windows Log Manipulation", "Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation", "Windows Service Abuse"]
+action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Cross Account Activity", "AWS Cryptomining", "AWS Network ACL Activity", "AWS User Monitoring", "Account Monitoring and Controls", "Apache Struts Vulnerability", "Asset Tracking", "Brand Monitoring", "Cloud Cryptomining", "ColdRoot MacOS RAT", "Collection and Staging", "Command and Control", "DHS Report TA18-074A", "DNS Amplification Attacks", "Data Protection", "Disabling Security Tools", "Dynamic DNS", "Emotet Malware  DHS Report TA18-201A ", "Hidden Cobra Malware", "Host Redirection", "JBoss Vulnerability", "Kubernetes Scanning Activity", "Lateral Movement", "Malicious PowerShell", "Monitor Backup Solution", "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", "Monitor for Updates", "Netsh Abuse", "Orangeworm Attack Group", "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", "Ransomware", "Router and Infrastructure Security", "SQL Injection", "SamSam Ransomware", "Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities", "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability", "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409", "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", "Suspicious AWS Traffic", "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities", "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", "Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Suspicious Emails", "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", "Suspicious WMI Use", "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", "Unusual Processes", "Use of Cleartext Protocols", "Web Fraud Detection", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", "Windows Log Manipulation", "Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation", "Windows Service Abuse"]
 action.escu.earliest_time_offset = 3600
 action.escu.latest_time_offset = 86400
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
@@ -9749,7 +9868,7 @@ action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user fi
 description = This search lists all the logged CloudTrail activities by a specific user and will create a table containing the source of the user, the region of the activity, the name and type of the event, the action taken, and the user's identity information.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-03-12
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-03-12
-action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS User Monitoring"]
+action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS User Monitoring", "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities"]
 action.escu.earliest_time_offset = 3600
 action.escu.latest_time_offset = 86400
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security-content
-# On Date: 2020-06-04T22:46:46 UTC
+# On Date: 2020-06-18T19:50:40 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Security Research
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security-content
-# On Date: 2020-06-04T22:46:46 UTC
+# On Date: 2020-06-18T19:50:40 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Security Research
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-cloudtrail-now-tracks-cross-account-activity-to-its-origin/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By Source User"]
+searches = ["ESCU - AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By Source User", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId"]
 description = Track when a user assumes an IAM role in another AWS account to obtain cross-account access to services and resources in that account. Accessing new roles could be an indication of malicious activity.
 narrative = Amazon Web Services (AWS) admins manage access to AWS resources and services across the enterprise using AWS's Identity and Access Management (IAM) functionality. IAM provides the ability to create and manage AWS users, groups, and roles-each with their own unique set of privileges and defined access to specific resources (such as EC2 instances, the AWS Management Console, API, or the command-line interface). Unlike conventional (human) users, IAM roles are assumable by anyone in the organization. They provide users with dynamically created temporary security credentials that expire within a set time period.\
 Herein lies the rub. In between the time between when the temporary credentials are issued and when they expire is a period of opportunity, where a user could leverage the temporary credentials to wreak havoc-spin up or remove instances, create new users, elevate privileges, and other malicious activities-throughout the environment.\
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI - Rule", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN"]
+searches = ["ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table"]
 description = Monitor your AWS EC2 instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or EC2 instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior.
 narrative = Cryptomining is an intentionally difficult, resource-intensive business. Its complexity was designed into the process to ensure that the number of blocks mined each day would remain steady. So, it's par for the course that ambitious, but unscrupulous, miners make amassing the computing power of large enterprises--a practice known as cryptojacking--a top priority. \
 Cryptojacking has attracted an increasing amount of media attention since its explosion in popularity in the fall of 2017. The attacks have moved from in-browser exploits and mobile phones to enterprise cloud services, such as Amazon Web Services (AWS). It's difficult to determine exactly how widespread the practice has become, since bad actors continually evolve their ability to escape detection, including employing unlisted endpoints, moderating their CPU usage, and hiding the mining pool's IP address behind a free CDN. \
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonVPC/latest/UserGuide/VPC_Appendix_NACLs.html", "https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/how-to-help-prepare-for-ddos-attacks-by-reducing-your-attack-surface/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 description = Monitor your AWS network infrastructure for bad configurations and malicious activity. Investigative searches help you probe deeper, when the facts warrant it.
 narrative = AWS CloudTrail is an AWS service that helps you enable governance, compliance, and operational/risk auditing of your AWS account. Actions taken by a user, role, or an AWS service are recorded as events in CloudTrail. It is crucial for a company to monitor events and actions taken in the AWS Management Console, AWS Command Line Interface, and AWS SDKs and APIs to ensure that your servers are not vulnerable to attacks. This analytic story contains detection searches that leverage CloudTrail logs from AWS to check for bad configurations and malicious activity in your AWS network access controls.

@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Country", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From City", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Region", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address"]
+searches = ["ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Country", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From City", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Region", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address"]
 description = Monitor your AWS provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your network.
 narrative = Because most enterprise AWS activities originate from familiar geographic locations, monitoring for activity from unknown or unusual regions is an important security measure. This indicator can be especially useful in environments where it is impossible to whitelist specific IPs (because they vary).\
 This Analytic Story was designed to provide you with flexibility in the precision you employ in specifying legitimate geographic regions. It can be as specific as an IP address or a city, or as broad as a region (think state) or an entire country. By determining how precise you want your geographical locations to be and monitoring for new locations that haven't previously accessed your environment, you can detect adversaries as they begin to probe your environment. Since there are legitimate reasons for activities from unfamiliar locations, this is not a standalone indicator. Nevertheless, location can be a relevant piece of information that you may wish to investigate further.
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://redlock.io/blog/cryptojacking-tesla"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in Security Group Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS API Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect API activity from users without MFA - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new API calls from user roles - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Notable Info"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in Security Group Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new API calls from user roles - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS API Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Detect API activity from users without MFA - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field"]
 description = Detect and investigate dormant user accounts for your AWS environment that have become active again. Because inactive and ad-hoc accounts are common attack targets, it's critical to enable governance within your environment.
 narrative = It seems obvious that it is critical to monitor and control the users who have access to your cloud infrastructure. Nevertheless, it's all too common for enterprises to lose track of ad-hoc accounts, leaving their servers vulnerable to attack. In fact, this was the very oversight that led to Tesla's cryptojacking attack in February, 2018.\
 In addition to compromising the security of your data, when bad actors leverage your compute resources, it can incur monumental costs, since you will be billed for any new EC2 instances and increased bandwidth usage. \
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ version = 1
 references = []
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect Excessive User Account Lockouts - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Excessive Account Lockouts From Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Identify New User Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Short Lived Windows Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Logon Rights Modifications For User", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Logon Rights Modifications For Endpoint"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Short Lived Windows Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Excessive User Account Lockouts - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Excessive Account Lockouts From Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Identify New User Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Get Logon Rights Modifications For User", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Logon Rights Modifications For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 description = A common attack technique is to leverage user accounts to gain unauthorized access to the target's network. This Analytic Story minimizes opportunities for attack by helping you actively manage creation/use/dormancy/deletion--the lifecycle of system and application accounts.
 narrative = Monitoring user accounts within your enterprise is a critical analytic function that helps ensure that credential and access policies/procedures are properly implemented and are being enforced. Proactive ad-hoc hunting, as well as routine monitoring, can ensure user or system accounts are not being abused by unauthorized individuals or processes. In the event of a network event or breach, user-authentication logs are a key resource in determining if or how an account might have been compromised or co-opted, leading to suspicious or malicious activity.

@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs/blob/v3.2/dev/rules/REQUEST-944-APPLICATION-ATTACK-JAVA.conf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Java Classes - Rule", "ESCU - Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Content-Type Length - Rule", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Investigate Suspicious Strings in HTTP Header", "ESCU - Investigate Web POSTs From src", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Unusually Long Content-Type Length - Rule", "ESCU - Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Java Classes - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Web POSTs From src", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Investigate Suspicious Strings in HTTP Header", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 description = Detect and investigate activities--such as unusually long `Content-Type` length, suspicious java classes and web servers executing suspicious processes--consistent with attempts to exploit Apache Struts vulnerabilities.
 narrative = In March of 2017, a remote code-execution vulnerability in the Jakarta Multipart parser in Apache Struts, a widely used open-source framework for creating Java web applications, was disclosed and assigned to CVE-2017-5638. About two months later, hackers exploited the flaw to carry out the world's <a href=https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2017/09/07/nations-biggest-hacks-and-data-breaches-millions/644311001/> 5th largest data breach</a>. The target, credit giant Equifax, <a href=https://money.cnn.com/2017/09/16/technology/equifax-breach-security-hole/index.html>told investigators</a> that it had become aware of the vulnerability two months before the attack. \
 The exploit involved manipulating the `Content-Type HTTP` header to execute commands embedded in the header.\
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/inventory-of-authorized-and-unauthorized-devices/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get First Occurrence and Last Occurrence of a MAC Address"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get First Occurrence and Last Occurrence of a MAC Address", "ESCU - Get Notable Info"]
 description = Keep a careful inventory of every asset on your network to make it easier to detect rogue devices. Unauthorized/unmanaged devices could be an indication of malicious behavior that should be investigated further.
 narrative = This Analytic Story is designed to help you develop a better understanding of what authorized and unauthorized devices are part of your enterprise. This story can help you better categorize and classify assets, providing critical business context and awareness of their assets during an incident. Information derived from this Analytic Story can be used to better inform and support other analytic stories. For successful detection, you will need to leverage the Assets and Identity Framework from Enterprise Security to populate your known assets.

@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.zerofox.com/blog/what-is-digital-risk-monitoring/", "https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/consumer/family-safety/what-is-typosquatting/", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2016/06/explained-typosquatting/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender", "ESCU - Get Email Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Email Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender"]
 description = Detect and investigate activity that may indicate that an adversary is using faux domains to mislead users into interacting with malicious infrastructure. Monitor DNS, email, and web traffic for permutations of your brand name.
 narrative = While you can educate your users and customers about the risks and threats posed by typosquatting, phishing, and corporate espionage, human error is a persistent fact of life. Of course, your adversaries are all too aware of this reality and will happily leverage it for nefarious purposes whenever possible&#51;phishing with lookalike addresses, embedding faux command-and-control domains in malware, and hosting malicious content on domains that closely mimic your corporate servers. This is where brand monitoring comes in.\
 You can use our adaptation of `DNSTwist`, together with the support searches in this Analytic Story, to generate permutations of specified brands and external domains. Splunk can monitor email, DNS requests, and web traffic for these permutations and provide you with early warnings and situational awareness--powerful elements of an effective defense.\
@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Started In Previously Unused Region - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Investigate Cloud Compute Instance Activities", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Investigate User Activities In All Cloud Regions", "ESCU - Investigate User Activities In Single Cloud Region"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Started In Previously Unused Region - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Investigate User Activities In Single Cloud Region", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Investigate Cloud Compute Instance Activities", "ESCU - Investigate User Activities In All Cloud Regions", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table"]
 description = Monitor your cloud compute instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or compute instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior.
 narrative = Cryptomining is an intentionally difficult, resource-intensive business. Its complexity was designed into the process to ensure that the number of blocks mined each day would remain steady. So, it's par for the course that ambitious, but unscrupulous, miners make amassing the computing power of large enterprises--a practice known as cryptojacking--a top priority. \
 Cryptojacking has attracted an increasing amount of media attention since its explosion in popularity in the fall of 2017. The attacks have moved from in-browser exploits and mobile phones to enterprise cloud services, such as Amazon Web Services (AWS), Google Cloud Platform (GCP), and Azure. It's difficult to determine exactly how widespread the practice has become, since bad actors continually evolve their ability to escape detection, including employing unlisted endpoints, moderating their CPU usage, and hiding the mining pool's IP address behind a free CDN. \
@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.intego.com/mac-security-blog/osxcoldroot-and-the-rat-invasion/", "https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x2A.html", "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/coldroot-rat-still-undetectable-despite-being-uploaded-on-github-two-years-ago/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Jose Hernandez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection - Rule", "ESCU - Processes Tapping Keyboard Events - Rule", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From src ip"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Processes Tapping Keyboard Events - Rule", "ESCU - Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From src ip", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that relate to the ColdRoot Remote Access Trojan that affects MacOS. An example of some of these activities are changing sensative binaries in the MacOS sub-system, detecting process names and executables associated with the RAT, detecting when a keyboard tab is installed on a MacOS machine and more.
 narrative = Conventional wisdom holds that Apple's MacOS operating system is significantly less vulnerable to attack than Windows machines. While that point is debatable, it is true that attacks against MacOS systems are much less common. However, this fact does not mean that Macs are impervious to breaches. To the contrary, research has shown that that Mac malware is increasing at an alarming rate. According to AV-test, in 2018, there were 86,865 new MacOS malware variants, up from 27,338 the year before&#151;a 31% increase. In contrast, the independent research firm found that new Windows malware had increased from 65.17M to 76.86M during that same period, less than half the rate of growth. The bottom line is that while the numbers look a lot smaller than Windows, it's definitely time to take Mac security more seriously.\
 This Analytic Story addresses the ColdRoot remote access trojan (RAT), which was uploaded to Github in 2016, but was still escaping detection by the first quarter of 2018, when a new, more feature-rich variant was discovered masquerading as an Apple audio driver. Among other capabilities, the Pascal-based ColdRoot can heist passwords from users' keychains and remotely control infected machines without detection. In the initial report of his findings, Patrick Wardle, Chief Research Officer for Digita Security, explained that the new ColdRoot RAT could start and kill processes on the breached system, spawn new remote-desktop sessions, take screen captures and assemble them into a live stream of the victim's desktop, and more.\
@@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Collection", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1074"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious writes to System Volume Information - Rule", "ESCU - Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server - Rule", "ESCU - Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts - Rule", "ESCU - Email files written outside of the Outlook directory - Rule", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin - Rule", "ESCU - Email files written outside of the Outlook directory - Rule", "ESCU - Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server - Rule", "ESCU - Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious writes to System Volume Information - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 description = Monitor for and investigate activities--such as suspicious writes to the Windows Recycling Bin or email servers sending high amounts of traffic to specific hosts, for example--that may indicate that an adversary is harvesting and exfiltrating sensitive data. 
 narrative = A common adversary goal is to identify and exfiltrate data of value from a target organization. This data may include email conversations and addresses, confidential company information, links to network design/infrastructure, important dates, and so on.\
 Attacks are composed of three activities: identification, collection, and staging data for exfiltration. Identification typically involves scanning systems and observing user activity. Collection can involve the transfer of large amounts of data from various repositories. Staging/preparation includes moving data to a central location and compressing (and optionally encoding and/or encrypting) it. All of these activities provide opportunities for defenders to identify their presence. \
@@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Command_and_Control", "https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/feature/Command-and-control-servers-The-puppet-masters-that-govern-malware"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 description = Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures leveraged by attackers to establish and operate command and control channels. Implants installed by attackers on compromised endpoints use these channels to receive instructions and send data back to the malicious operators.
 narrative = Threat actors typically architect and implement an infrastructure to use in various ways during the course of their attack campaigns. In some cases, they leverage this infrastructure for scanning and performing reconnaissance activities. In others, they may use this infrastructure to launch actual attacks. One of the most important functions of this infrastructure is to establish servers that will communicate with implants on compromised endpoints. These servers establish a command and control channel that is used to proxy data between the compromised endpoint and the attacker. These channels relay commands from the attacker to the compromised endpoint and the output of those commands back to the attacker.\
 Because this communication is so critical for an adversary, they often use techniques designed to hide the true nature of the communications. There are many different techniques used to establish and communicate over these channels. This Analytic Story provides searches that look for a variety of the techniques used for these channels, as well as indications that these channels are active, by examining logs associated with border control devices and network-access control lists.
@@ -201,7 +201,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://github.com/splunk/cloud-datamodel-security-research"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - GCP GCR container uploaded - Rule", "ESCU - New container uploaded to AWS ECR - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate AWS ECR container listing activity"]
+searches = ["ESCU - New container uploaded to AWS ECR - Rule", "ESCU - GCP GCR container uploaded - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate AWS ECR container listing activity"]
 description = Use the searches in this story to monitor your Kubernetes registry repositories for upload, and deployment of potentially vulnerable, backdoor, or implanted containers. These searches provide information on source users, destination path, container names and repository names. The searches provide context to address Mitre T1525 which refers to container implantation upload to a company's repository either in Amazon Elastic Container Registry, Google Container Registry and Azure Container Registry.
 narrative = Container Registrys provide a way for organizations to keep customized images of their development and infrastructure environment in private. However if these repositories are misconfigured or priviledge users credentials are compromise, attackers can potentially upload implanted containers which can be deployed across the organization. These searches allow operator to monitor who, when and what was uploaded to container registry.

@@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ version = 3
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1003", "https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Create Remote Thread into LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell - Rule", "ESCU - Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts", "ESCU - Investigate Previous Unseen User", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts", "ESCU - Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell - Rule", "ESCU - Create Remote Thread into LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts", "ESCU - Investigate Previous Unseen User", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts", "ESCU - Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations"]
 description = Uncover activity consistent with credential dumping, a technique wherein attackers compromise systems and attempt to obtain and exfiltrate passwords. The threat actors use these pilfered credentials to further escalate privileges and spread throughout a target environment. The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify attempts to credential dumping.
 narrative = Credential dumping&#151;gathering credentials from a target system, often hashed or encrypted&#151;is a common attack technique. Even though the credentials may not be in plain text, an attacker can still exfiltrate the data and set to cracking it offline, on their own systems. The threat actors target a variety of sources to extract them, including the Security Accounts Manager (SAM), Local Security Authority (LSA), NTDS from Domain Controllers, or the Group Policy Preference (GPP) files.\
 Once attackers obtain valid credentials, they use them to move throughout a target network with ease, discovering new systems and identifying assets of interest. Credentials obtained in this manner typically include those of privileged users, which may provide access to more sensitive information and system operations.\
@@ -225,7 +225,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Single Letter Process On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Name Used by Dragonfly Threat Actors - Rule", "ESCU - Create local admin accounts using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Process Registry Activity", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process File Activity"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Create local admin accounts using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Name Used by Dragonfly Threat Actors - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Single Letter Process On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process File Activity", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Registry Activity", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 description = Monitor for suspicious activities associated with DHS Technical Alert US-CERT TA18-074A. Some of the activities that adversaries used in these compromises included spearfishing attacks, malware, watering-hole domains, many and more.
 narrative = The frequency of nation-state cyber attacks has increased significantly over the last decade. Employing numerous tactics and techniques, these attacks continue to escalate in complexity. \
 There is a wide range of motivations for these state-sponsored hacks, including stealing valuable corporate, military, or diplomatic data&#1151;all of which could confer advantages in various arenas. They may also target critical infrastructure. \
@@ -239,7 +239,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA13-088A", "https://www.imperva.com/learn/application-security/dns-amplification/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Large Volume of DNS ANY Queries - Rule", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Large Volume of DNS ANY Queries - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 description = DNS poses a serious threat as a Denial of Service (DOS) amplifier, if it responds to `ANY` queries. This Analytic Story can help you detect attackers who may be abusing your company's DNS infrastructure to launch amplification attacks, causing Denial of Service to other victims.
 narrative = The Domain Name System (DNS) is the protocol used to map domain names to IP addresses. It has been proven to work very well for its intended function. However if DNS is misconfigured, servers can be abused by attackers to levy amplification or redirection attacks against victims. Because DNS responses to `ANY` queries are so much larger than the queries themselves--and can be made with a UDP packet, which does not require a handshake--attackers can spoof the source address of the packet and cause much more data to be sent to the victim than if they sent the traffic themselves. The `ANY` requests are will be larger than normal DNS server requests, due to the fact that the server provides significant details, such as MX records and associated IP addresses. A large volume of this traffic can result in a DOS on the victim's machine. This misconfiguration leads to two possible victims, the first being the DNS servers participating in an attack and the other being the hosts that are the targets of the DOS attack.\
 The search in this story can help you to detect if attackers are abusing your company's DNS infrastructure to launch DNS amplification attacks causing Denial of Service to other victims.
@@ -251,7 +251,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/", "http://www.noip.com/blog/2014/07/11/dynamic-dns-can-use-2/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/08/04/detecting-dynamic-dns-domains-in-splunk.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS record changed - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host"]
+searches = ["ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS record changed - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host"]
 description = Secure your environment against DNS hijacks with searches that help you detect and investigate unauthorized changes to DNS records.
 narrative = Dubbed the Achilles heel of the Internet (see https://www.f5.com/labs/articles/threat-intelligence/dns-is-still-the-achilles-heel-of-the-internet-25613), DNS plays a critical role in routing web traffic but is notoriously vulnerable to attack. One reason is its distributed nature. It relies on unstructured connections between millions of clients and servers over inherently insecure protocols.\
 The gravity and extent of the importance of securing DNS from attacks is undeniable. The fallout of compromised DNS can be disastrous. Not only can hackers bring down an entire business, they can intercept confidential information, emails, and login credentials, as well. \
@@ -270,7 +270,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/data-protection/", "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/dns/splunk-detect-dns-tunneling-37022", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect USB device insertion - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect USB device insertion - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 description = Fortify your data-protection arsenal--while continuing to ensure data confidentiality and integrity--with searches that monitor for and help you investigate possible signs of data exfiltration.
 narrative = Attackers can leverage a variety of resources to compromise or exfiltrate enterprise data. Common exfiltration techniques include remote-access channels via low-risk, high-payoff active-collections operations and close-access operations using insiders and removable media. While this Analytic Story is not a comprehensive listing of all the methods by which attackers can exfiltrate data, it provides a useful starting point.

@@ -281,7 +281,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1089", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2015/11/vonteera-adware-uses-certificates-to-disable-anti-malware/", "https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Tools-Report.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store - Rule", "ESCU - Unload Sysmon Filter Driver - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Unload Sysmon Filter Driver - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 description = Looks for activities and techniques associated with the disabling of security tools on a Windows system, such as suspicious `reg.exe` processes, processes launching netsh, and many others.
 narrative = Attackers employ a variety of tactics in order to avoid detection and operate without barriers. This often involves modifying the configuration of security tools to get around them or explicitly disabling them to prevent them from running. This Analytic Story includes searches that look for activity consistent with attackers attempting to disable various security mechanisms. Such activity may involve monitoring for suspicious registry activity, as this is where much of the configuration for Windows and various other programs reside, or explicitly attempting to shut down security-related services. Other times, attackers attempt various tricks to prevent specific programs from running, such as adding the certificates with which the security tools are signed to a blacklist (which would prevent them from running).

@@ -292,7 +292,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/", "http://www.noip.com/blog/2014/07/11/dynamic-dns-can-use-2/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/08/04/detecting-dynamic-dns-domains-in-splunk.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From src ip"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From src ip", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 description = Detect and investigate hosts in your environment that may be communicating with dynamic domain providers. Attackers may leverage these services to help them avoid firewall blocks and blacklists.
 narrative = Dynamic DNS services (DDNS) are legitimate low-cost or free services that allow users to rapidly update domain resolutions to IP infrastructure. While their usage can be benign, malicious actors can abuse DDNS to host harmful payloads or interactive-command-and-control infrastructure. These attackers will manually update or automate domain resolution changes by routing dynamic domains to IP addresses that circumvent firewall blocks and blacklists and frustrate a network defender's analytic and investigative processes. These searches will look for DNS queries made from within your infrastructure to suspicious dynamic domains and then investigate more deeply, when appropriate. While this list of top-level dynamic domains is not exhaustive, it can be dynamically updated as new suspicious dynamic domains are identified.

@@ -303,7 +303,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-201A", "https://www.first.org/resources/papers/conf2017/Advanced-Incident-Detection-and-Threat-Hunting-using-Sysmon-and-Splunk.pdf", "https://www.vkremez.com/2017/05/emotet-banking-trojan-malware-analysis.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detection of tools built by NirSoft - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Update Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint"]
+searches = ["ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of tools built by NirSoft - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Update Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 description = Detect rarely used executables, specific registry paths that may confer malware survivability and persistence, instances where cmd.exe is used to launch script interpreters, and other indicators that the Emotet financial malware has compromised your environment.
 narrative = The trojan downloader known as Emotet first surfaced in 2014, when it was discovered targeting the banking industry to steal credentials. However, according to a joint technical alert (TA) issued by three government agencies (https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-201A), Emotet has evolved far beyond those beginnings to become what a ThreatPost article called a threat-delivery service(see https://threatpost.com/emotet-malware-evolves-beyond-banking-to-threat-delivery-service/134342/).  For example, in early 2018, Emotet was found to be using its loader function to spread the Quakbot and Ransomware variants. \
 According to the TA, the the malware continues to be among the most costly and destructive malware affecting the private and public sectors. Researchers have linked it to the threat group Mealybug, which has also been on the security communitys radar since 2014.\
@@ -316,7 +316,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/HIDDEN-COBRA-North-Korean-Malicious-Cyber-Activity", "https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Destructive-Malware-Report.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious File Write - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious File Write - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 description = Monitor for and investigate activities, including the creation or deletion of hidden shares and file writes, that may be evidence of infiltration by North Korean government-sponsored cybercriminals. Details of this activity were reported in DHS Report TA-18-149A.
 narrative = North Korea's government-sponsored "cyber army" has been slowly building momentum and gaining sophistication over the last 15 years or so. As a result, the group's activity, which the US government refers to as "Hidden Cobra," has surreptitiously crept onto the collective radar as a preeminent global threat.\
 These state-sponsored actors are thought to be responsible for everything from a hack on a South Korean nuclear plant to an attack on Sony in anticipation of its release of the movie "The Interview" at the end of 2014. They're also notorious for cyberespionage. In recent years, the group seems to be focused on financial crimes, such as cryptojacking.\
@@ -330,7 +330,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2016/09/hosts-file-hijacks/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Windows hosts file modification - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host"]
+searches = ["ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Windows hosts file modification - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 description = Detect evidence of tactics used to redirect traffic from a host to a destination other than the one intended--potentially one that is part of an adversary's attack infrastructure. An example is redirecting communications regarding patches and updates or misleading users into visiting a malicious website.
 narrative = Attackers will often attempt to manipulate client communications for nefarious purposes. In some cases, an attacker may endeavor to modify a local host file to redirect communications with resources (such as antivirus or system-update services) to prevent clients from receiving patches or updates. In other cases, an attacker might use this tactic to have the client connect to a site that looks like the intended site, but instead installs malware or collects information from the victim. Additionally, an attacker may redirect a victim in order to execute a MITM attack and observe communications.

@@ -341,7 +341,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["http://www.deependresearch.org/2016/04/jboss-exploits-view-from-victim.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 description = In March of 2016, adversaries were seen using JexBoss--an open-source utility used for testing and exploiting JBoss application servers. These searches help detect evidence of these attacks, such as network connections to external resources or web services spawning atypical child processes, among others.
 narrative = This Analytic Story looks for probing and exploitation attempts targeting JBoss application servers. While the vulnerabilities associated with this story are rather dated, they were leveraged in a spring 2016 campaign in connection with the Samsam ransomware variant. Incidents involving this ransomware are unique, in that they begin with attacks against vulnerable services, rather than the phishing or drive-by attacks more common with ransomware. In this case, vulnerable JBoss applications appear to be the target of choice.\
 It is helpful to understand how often a notable event generated by this story occurs, as well as the commonalities between some of these events, both of which may provide clues about whether this is a common occurrence of minimal concern or a rare event that may require more extensive investigation. It may also help to understand whether the issue is restricted to a single user/system or whether it is broader in scope.\
@@ -366,7 +366,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://github.com/splunk/cloud-datamodel-security-research"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip"]
+searches = ["ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 description = This story addresses detection against Kubernetes cluster fingerprint scan and attack by providing information on items such as source ip, user agent, cluster names.
 narrative = Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration platform contains sensitve information and management priviledges of production workloads, microservices and applications. These searches allow operator to detect suspicious unauthenticated requests from the internet to kubernetes cluster.

@@ -388,7 +388,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/approaching-kubernetes-security-detecting-kubernetes-scan-with-splunk.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect most active service accounts by pod namespace - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect most active service accounts by pod namespace - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info"]
 description = This story addresses detection and response around Sensitive Role usage within a Kubernetes clusters against cluster resources and namespaces.
 narrative = Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration platform contains sensitive roles within its architecture, specifically configmaps and secrets, if accessed by an attacker can lead to further compromise. These searches allow operator to detect suspicious requests against Kubernetes role activities

@@ -399,7 +399,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/executive-perspective/2015/08/malware_lateral_move.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 description = Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures around how attackers move laterally within the enterprise. Because lateral movement can expose the adversary to detection, it should be an important focus for security analysts.
 narrative = Once attackers gain a foothold within an enterprise, they will seek to expand their accesses and leverage techniques that facilitate lateral movement. Attackers will often spend quite a bit of time and effort moving laterally. Because lateral movement renders an attacker the most vulnerable to detection, it's an excellent focus for detection and investigation.\
 Indications of lateral movement can include the abuse of system utilities (such as `psexec.exe`), unauthorized use of remote desktop services, `file/admin$` shares, WMI, PowerShell, pass-the-hash, or the abuse of scheduled tasks. Organizations must be extra vigilant in detecting lateral movement techniques and look for suspicious activity in and around high-value strategic network assets, such as Active Directory, which are often considered the primary target or "crown jewels" to a persistent threat actor.\
@@ -414,7 +414,7 @@ version = 4
 references = ["https://blogs.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/malware-employs-powershell-to-infect-systems/", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Multiple Suspicious Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Multiple Suspicious Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 description = Attackers are finding stealthy ways "live off the land," leveraging utilities and tools that come standard on the endpoint--such as PowerShell--to achieve their goals without downloading binary files. These searches can help you detect and investigate PowerShell command-line options that may be indicative of malicious intent.
 narrative = The searches in this Analytic Story monitor for parameters often used for malicious purposes. It is helpful to understand how often the notable events generated by this story occur, as well as the commonalities between some of these events. These factors may provide clues about whether this is a common occurrence of minimal concern or a rare event that may require more extensive investigation. Likewise, it is important to determine whether the issue is restricted to a single user/system or is broader in scope.\
 The following factors may assist you in determining whether the event is malicious: \
@@ -434,7 +434,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/03/04/tracking-locky-ransomware-using-carbon-black/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Unsuccessful Netbackup backups - Rule", "ESCU - Extended Period Without Successful Netbackup Backups - Rule", "ESCU - All backup logs for host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Unsuccessful Netbackup backups - Rule", "ESCU - Extended Period Without Successful Netbackup Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - All backup logs for host", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 description = Address common concerns when monitoring your backup processes. These searches can help you reduce risks from ransomware, device theft, or denial of physical access to a host by backing up data on endpoints.
 narrative = Having backups is a standard best practice that helps ensure continuity of business operations.  Having mature backup processes can also help you reduce the risks of many security-related incidents and streamline your response processes. The detection searches in this Analytic Story will help you identify systems that have backup failures, as well as systems that have not been backed up for an extended period of time. The story will also return the notable event history and all of the backup logs for an endpoint.

@@ -445,7 +445,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Update Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Update Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 description = Identify and investigate prohibited/unauthorized software or processes that may be concealing malicious behavior within your environment. 
 narrative = It is critical to identify unauthorized software and processes running on enterprise endpoints and determine whether they are likely to be malicious. This Analytic Story requires the user to populate the Interesting Processes table within Enterprise Security with prohibited processes. An included support search will augment this data, adding information on processes thought to be malicious. This search requires data from endpoint detection-and-response solutions, endpoint data sources (such as Sysmon), or Windows Event Logs--assuming that the Active Directory administrator has enabled process tracking within the System Event Audit Logs.\
 It is important to investigate any software identified as suspicious, in order to understand how it was installed or executed. Analyzing authentication logs or any historic notable events might elicit additional investigative leads of interest. For best results, schedule the search to run every two weeks. 
@@ -467,10 +467,10 @@ Microsoft releases updates for Windows systems on a monthly cadence. They should
 category = Abuse
 last_updated = 2017-01-05
 version = 1
-references = ["https://technet.microsoft.com/library/bb490939.aspx", "https://htmlpreview.github.io/?https://github.com/MatthewDemaske/blogbackup/blob/master/netshell.html", "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html"]
+references = ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/tn-archive/bb490939(v=technet.10)", "https://htmlpreview.github.io/?https://github.com/MatthewDemaske/blogbackup/blob/master/netshell.html", "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Processes created by netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Processes created by netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 description = Detect activities and various techniques associated with the abuse of `netsh.exe`, which can disable local firewall settings or set up a remote connection to a host from an infected system.
 narrative = It is a common practice for attackers of all types to leverage native Windows tools and functionality to execute commands for malicious reasons. One such tool on Windows OS is `netsh.exe`,a command-line scripting utility that allows you to--either locally or remotely--display or modify the network configuration of a computer that is currently running. `Netsh.exe` can be used to discover and disable local firewall settings. It can also be used to set up a remote connection to a host from an infected system.\
 To get started, run the detection search to identify parent processes of `netsh.exe`.
@@ -482,7 +482,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/orangeworm-targets-healthcare-us-europe-asia", "https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/healthcare-targeted-by-hacker/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
+searches = ["ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 description = Detect activities and various techniques associated with the Orangeworm Attack Group, a group that frequently targets the healthcare industry.
 narrative = In May of 2018, the attack group Orangeworm was implicated for installing a custom backdoor called Trojan.Kwampirs within large international healthcare corporations in the United States, Europe, and Asia. This malware provides the attackers with remote access to the target system, decrypting and extracting a copy of its main DLL payload from its resource section. Before writing the payload to disk, it inserts a randomly generated string into the middle of the decrypted payload in an attempt to evade hash-based detections.\
 Awareness of the Orangeworm group first surfaced in January, 2015. It has conducted targeted attacks against related industries, as well, such as pharmaceuticals and healthcare IT solution providers.\
@@ -497,7 +497,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/spear-phishing-campaign-targets-ukraine-government.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Splunk Research Team"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect Oulook exe writing a  zip file - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious LNK file launching a process - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious LNK file launching a process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Oulook exe writing a  zip file - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info"]
 description = Detect signs of malicious payloads that may indicate that your environment has been breached via a phishing attack.
 narrative = Despite its simplicity, phishing remains the most pervasive and dangerous cyberthreat. In fact, research shows that as many as [91% of all successful attacks](https://digitalguardian.com/blog/91-percent-cyber-attacks-start-phishing-email-heres-how-protect-against-phishing) are initiated via a phishing email. \
 As most people know, these emails use fraudulent domains, [email scraping](https://www.cyberscoop.com/emotet-trojan-phishing-scraping-templates-cofense-geodo/), familiar contact names inserted as senders, and other tactics to lure targets into clicking a malicious link, opening an attachment with a [nefarious payload](https://www.cyberscoop.com/emotet-trojan-phishing-scraping-templates-cofense-geodo/), or entering sensitive personal information that perpetrators may intercept. This attack technique requires a relatively low level of skill and allows adversaries to easily cast a wide net. Worse, because its success relies on the gullibility of humans, it's impossible to completely "automate" it out of your environment. However, you can use ES and ESCU to detect and investigate potentially malicious payloads injected into your environment subsequent to a phishing attack. \
@@ -515,7 +515,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/scope-of-mudcarp-attacks-highlight-1/", "http://blog.amossys.fr/badflick-is-not-so-bad.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "iDefense", "email": "-", "name": "iDefense Cyber Espionage Team"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 description = Monitor your environment for suspicious behaviors that resemble the techniques employed by the MUDCARP threat group.
 narrative = This story was created as a joint effort between iDefense and Splunk.\
 iDefense analysts have recently discovered a Windows executable file that, upon execution, spoofs a decryption tool and then drops a file that appears to be the custom-built javascript backdoor, "Orz," which is associated with the threat actors known as MUDCARP (as well as "temp.Periscope" and "Leviathan"). The file is executed using Wscript.\
@@ -553,7 +553,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["http://www.novetta.com/2015/02/advanced-methods-to-detect-advanced-cyber-attacks-protocol-abuse/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host"]
+searches = ["ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 description = Detect instances of prohibited network traffic allowed in the environment, as well as protocols running on non-standard ports. Both of these types of behaviors typically violate policy and can be leveraged by attackers.
 narrative = A traditional security best practice is to control the ports, protocols, and services allowed within your environment. By limiting the services and protocols to those explicitly approved by policy, administrators can minimize the attack surface. The combined effect allows both network defenders and security controls to focus and not be mired in superfluous traffic or data types. Looking for deviations to policy can identify attacker activity that abuses services and protocols to run on alternate or non-standard ports in the attempt to avoid detection or frustrate forensic analysts.

@@ -564,7 +564,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.carbonblack.com/2017/06/28/carbon-black-threat-research-technical-analysis-petya-notpetya-ransomware/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2017/06/27/closing-the-detection-to-mitigation-gap-or-to-petya-or-notpetya-whocares-.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Update Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Update Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint"]
 description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to ransomware--spikes in SMB traffic, suspicious wevtutil usage, the presence of common ransomware extensions, and system processes run from unexpected locations, and many others.
 narrative = Ransomware is an ever-present risk to the enterprise, wherein an infected host encrypts business-critical data, holding it hostage until the victim pays the attacker a ransom. There are many types and varieties of ransomware that can affect an enterprise. Attackers can deploy ransomware to enterprises through spearphishing campaigns and driveby downloads, as well as through traditional remote service-based exploitation. In the case of the WannaCry campaign, there was self-propagating wormable functionality that was used to maximize infection. Fortunately, organizations can apply several techniques--such as those in this Analytic Story--to detect and or mitigate the effects of ransomware.

@@ -575,7 +575,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/executive-perspective/2015/09/the_new_route_toper.html", "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/about/security-center/event-response/synful-knock.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect New Login Attempts to Routers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect New Login Attempts to Routers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 description = Validate the security configuration of network infrastructure and verify that only authorized users and systems are accessing critical assets. Core routing and switching infrastructure are common strategic targets for attackers.
 narrative = Networking devices, such as routers and switches, are often overlooked as resources that attackers will leverage to subvert an enterprise. Advanced threats actors have shown a proclivity to target these critical assets as a means to siphon and redirect network traffic, flash backdoored operating systems, and implement cryptographic weakened algorithms to more easily decrypt network traffic.\
 This Analytic Story helps you gain a better understanding of how your network devices are interacting with your hosts. By compromising your network devices, attackers can obtain direct access to the company's internal infrastructure&#151; effectively increasing the attack surface and accessing private services/data.
@@ -587,7 +587,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/66.html", "https://www.incapsula.com/web-application-security/sql-injection.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - SQL Injection with Long URLs - Rule", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
+searches = ["ESCU - SQL Injection with Long URLs - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to help you detect structured query language (SQL) injection attempts characterized by long URLs that contain malicious parameters.
 narrative = It is very common for attackers to inject SQL parameters into vulnerable web applications, which then interpret the malicious SQL statements.\
 This Analytic Story contains a search designed to identify attempts by attackers to leverage this technique to compromise a host and gain a foothold in the target environment.
@@ -599,7 +599,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/an-in-depth-analysis-of-samsam-ransomware-and-boss-spider/", "https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2018/07/31/samsam-the-almost-6-million-ransomware/", "https://thehackernews.com/2018/07/samsam-ransomware-attacks.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Samsam Test File Write - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - File with Samsam Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Batch File Write to System32 - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Update Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Batch File Write to System32 - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - File with Samsam Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Samsam Test File Write - Rule", "ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Update Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint"]
 description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the SamSam ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with SamSam, RDP brute force attacks, the presence of files with SamSam ransomware extensions, suspicious psexec use, and more.
 narrative = The first version of the SamSam ransomware (a.k.a. Samas or SamsamCrypt) was launched in 2015 by a group of Iranian threat actors. The malicious software has affected and continues to affect thousands of victims and has raised almost $6M in ransom.\
 Although categorized under the heading of ransomware, SamSam campaigns have some importance distinguishing characteristics. Most notable is the fact that conventional ransomware is a numbers game. Perpetrators use a "spray-and-pray" approach with phishing campaigns or other mechanisms, charging a small ransom (typically under $1,000). The goal is to find a large number of victims willing to pay these mini-ransoms, adding up to a lucrative payday. They use relatively simple methods for infecting systems.\
@@ -615,7 +615,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://meltdownattack.com/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Spectre and Meltdown Vulnerable Systems - Rule", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Spectre and Meltdown Vulnerable Systems - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 description = Assess and mitigate your systems' vulnerability to Spectre and Meltdown exploitation with the searches in this Analytic Story.
 narrative = Meltdown and Spectre exploit critical vulnerabilities in modern CPUs that allow unintended access to data in memory. This Analytic Story will help you identify the systems can be patched for these vulnerabilities, as well as those that still need to be patched.

@@ -646,7 +646,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-11409", "https://www.splunk.com/view/SP-CAAAP5E#VulnerabilityDescriptionsandRatings", "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44865/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure - Rule", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From src ip"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From src ip", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 description = Reduce the risk of CVE-2018-11409, an information disclosure vulnerability within some older versions of Splunk Enterprise, with searches designed to help ensure that your Splunk system does not leak information to authenticated users.
 narrative = Although there have been no reports of it being exploited, Splunk Enterprise versions through 7.0.1 reportedly have a vulnerability that may expose information through a REST endpoint (read more here: https://www.splunk.com/view/SP-CAAAP5E#VulnerabilityDescriptionsandRatings). NIST has included it in its vulnerability database (read more here: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-11409). The REST endpoint that exposes system information is also necessary for the proper operation of Splunk clustering and instrumentation. Customers should upgrade to the latest version to reduce the risk of this vulnerability.\
 Splunk Enterprise exposes partial information about the host operating system, hardware, and Splunk license. Splunk Enterprise before 6.6.0 exposes this information without authentication. Splunk Enterprise 6.6.0 and later exposes this information only to authenticated Splunk users. Based on the information exposure, Splunk characterizes this issue as a low severity impact.\
@@ -660,7 +660,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table"]
 description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS EC2 instances for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as EC2 instances that originate from unusual locations or those launched by previously unseen users (among others). Included investigative searches will help you probe more deeply, when the information warrants it.
 narrative = AWS CloudTrail is an AWS service that helps you enable governance, compliance, and risk auditing within your AWS account. Actions taken by a user, role, or an AWS service are recorded as events in CloudTrail. It is crucial for a company to monitor events and actions taken in the AWS Console, AWS command-line interface, and AWS SDKs and APIs to ensure that your EC2 instances are not vulnerable to attacks. This Analytic Story identifies suspicious activities in your AWS EC2 instances and helps you respond and investigate those activities.

@@ -671,7 +671,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integration.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new user AWS Console Login - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new user AWS Console Login - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN"]
 description = Monitor your AWS authentication events using your CloudTrail logs. Searches within this Analytic Story will help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious logins. 
 narrative = It is important to monitor and control who has access to your AWS infrastructure. Detecting suspicious logins to your AWS infrastructure will provide good starting points for investigations. Abusive behaviors caused by compromised credentials can lead to direct monetary costs, as you will be billed for any EC2 instances created by the attacker.

@@ -682,7 +682,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/security-data-protection/cloud/public-aws-s3-buckets-writable/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect New Open S3 buckets - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Detect S3 access from a new IP - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect New Open S3 buckets - Rule", "ESCU - Detect S3 access from a new IP - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName"]
 description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS S3 buckets for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as detecting open S3 buckets and buckets being accessed from a new IP. The contextual and investigative searches will give you more information, when required.
 narrative = As cloud computing has exploded, so has the number of creative attacks on virtual environments. And as the number-two cloud-service provider, Amazon Web Services (AWS) has certainly had its share.\
 Amazon's "shared responsibility" model dictates that the company has responsibility for the environment outside of the VM and the customer is responsible for the security inside of the S3 container. As such, it's important to stay vigilant for activities that may belie suspicious behavior inside of your environment.\
@@ -695,13 +695,25 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/hiding-cloudcobalt-strike-beacon-c2-using-amazon-apis/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 description = Leverage these searches to monitor your AWS network traffic for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as a spike in blocked outbound traffic in your virtual private cloud (VPC).
 narrative = A virtual private cloud (VPC) is an on-demand managed cloud-computing service that isolates computing resources for each client. Inside the VPC container, the environment resembles a physical network. \
 Amazon's VPC service enables you to launch EC2 instances and leverage other Amazon resources. The traffic that flows in and out of this VPC can be controlled via network access-control rules and security groups. Amazon also has a feature called VPC Flow Logs that enables you to log IP traffic going to and from the network interfaces in your VPC. This data is stored using Amazon CloudWatch Logs.\
 Attackers may abuse the AWS infrastructure with insecure VPCs so they can co-opt AWS resources for command-and-control nodes, data exfiltration, and more. Once an EC2 instance is compromised, an attacker may initiate outbound network connections for malicious reasons. Monitoring these network traffic behaviors is crucial for understanding the type of traffic flowing in and out of your network and to alert you to suspicious activities.\
 The searches in this Analytic Story will monitor your AWS network traffic for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors.

+[analytic_story://Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities]
+category = Cloud Security
+last_updated = 2020-06-04
+version = 1
+references = ["https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-cloudtrail-now-tracks-cross-account-activity-to-its-origin/", "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integration.html"]
+maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
+spec_version = 3
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect new user AWS Console Login - DM - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field"]
+description = Monitor your cloud authentication events. Searches within this Analytic Story leverage the recent cloud updates to the Authentication data model to help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious login activity. 
+narrative = It is important to monitor and control who has access to your cloud infrastructure. Detecting suspicious logins will provide good starting points for investigations. Abusive behaviors caused by compromised credentials can lead to direct monetary costs, as you will be billed for any compute activity whether legitimate or otherwise.\
+This Analytic Story has data model versions of cloud searches leveraging Authentication data, including those looking for suspicious login activity, and cross-account activity for AWS.
+
 [analytic_story://Suspicious Command-Line Executions]
 category = Adversary Tactics
 last_updated = 2020-02-03
@@ -709,7 +721,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1059", "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/macro-malware", "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 description = Leveraging the Windows command-line interface (CLI) is one of the most common attack techniques--one that is also detailed in the MITRE ATT&CK framework. Use this Analytic Story to help you identify unusual or suspicious use of the CLI on Windows systems.
 narrative = The ability to execute arbitrary commands via the Windows CLI is a primary goal for the adversary. With access to the shell, an attacker can easily run scripts and interact with the target system. Often, attackers may only have limited access to the shell or may obtain access in unusual ways. In addition, malware may execute and interact with the CLI in ways that would be considered unusual and inconsistent with typical user activity. This provides defenders with opportunities to identify suspicious use and investigate, as appropriate. This Analytic Story contains various searches to help identify this suspicious activity, as well as others to aid you in deeper investigation.

@@ -720,7 +732,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["http://blogs.splunk.com/2015/10/01/random-words-on-entropy-and-dns/", "http://www.darkreading.com/analytics/security-monitoring/got-malware-three-signs-revealed-in-dns-traffic/d/d-id/1139680", "https://live.paloaltonetworks.com/t5/Threat-Vulnerability-Articles/What-are-suspicious-DNS-queries/ta-p/71454"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host"]
+searches = ["ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 description = Attackers often attempt to hide within or otherwise abuse the domain name system (DNS). You can thwart attempts to manipulate this omnipresent protocol by monitoring for these types of abuses.
 narrative = Although DNS is one of the fundamental underlying protocols that make the Internet work, it is often ignored (perhaps because of its complexity and effectiveness).  However, attackers have discovered ways to abuse the protocol to meet their objectives. One potential abuse involves manipulating DNS to hijack traffic and redirect it to an IP address under the attacker's control. This could inadvertently send users intending to visit google.com, for example, to an unrelated malicious website. Another technique involves using the DNS protocol for command-and-control activities with the attacker's malicious code or to covertly exfiltrate data. The searches within this Analytic Story look for these types of abuses.

@@ -731,7 +743,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/06/26/phishing-hits-a-new-level-of-quality/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender", "ESCU - Get Email Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly - Rule", "ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Email Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender"]
 description = Email remains one of the primary means for attackers to gain an initial foothold within the modern enterprise. Detect and investigate suspicious emails in your environment with the help of the searches in this Analytic Story.
 narrative = It is a common practice for attackers of all types to leverage targeted spearphishing campaigns and mass mailers to deliver weaponized email messages and attachments. Fortunately, there are a number of ways to monitor email data in Splunk to detect suspicious content.\
 Once a phishing message has been detected, the next steps are to answer the following questions: \
@@ -746,7 +758,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://redcanary.com/blog/windows-registry-attacks-threat-detection/", "https://medium.com/@mbromileyDFIR/malware-monday-aebb456356c5", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1170"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect mshta exe running scripts in command-line arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect mshta exe running scripts in command-line arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe process to execute malicious code.
 narrative = One common adversary tactic is to bypass application white-listing solutions via the mshta.exe process, which executes Microsoft HTML applications with the .hta suffix. In these cases, attackers use the trusted Windows utility to eproxy execution of malicious files, whether an .hta application, javascript, or VBScript.\
 One example of a notable mshta.exe attack was the Kovter malware (https://medium.com/@mbromileyDFIR/malware-monday-aebb456356c5) that was implicated in ransomware and click-fraud attacks. Kovter utilized .hta to execute a series of javascript commands, each progressively more dangerous. According to the Mitre Parternship Network (https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1170), FIN7 has leveraged mshta.exe, as has the MuddyWater group, who used it to execute its POWERSTATS payload (which then used the utility to execute additional payloads).\
@@ -759,7 +771,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1078", "https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Credential_stuffing", "https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/answer/What-is-a-password-spraying-attack-and-how-does-it-work"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentails From The Same IP - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Account Lockout Events - Rule", "ESCU - Okta User Logins From Multiple Cities - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Failed SSO Attempts - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate User Activities In Okta", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by app"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Okta Failed SSO Attempts - Rule", "ESCU - Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentails From The Same IP - Rule", "ESCU - Okta User Logins From Multiple Cities - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Account Lockout Events - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate User Activities In Okta", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by app", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address"]
 description = Monitor your Okta environment for suspicious activities. Due to the Covid outbreak, many users are migrating over to leverage cloud services more and more. Okta is a popular tool to manage multiple users and the web-based applications they need to stay productive. The searches in this story will help monitor your Okta environment for suspicious activities and associated user behaviors.
 narrative = Okta is the leading single sign on (SSO) provider, allowing users to authenticate once to Okta, and from there access a variety of web-based applications. These applications are assigned to users and allow administrators to centrally manage which users are allowed to access which applications. It also provides centralized logging to help understand how the applications are used and by whom. \
 While SSO is a major convenience for users, it also provides attackers with an opportunity. If the attacker can gain access to Okta, they can access a variety of applications. As such monitoring the environment is important. \
@@ -772,7 +784,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Graeber-Abusing-Windows-Management-Instrumentation-WMI-To-Build-A-Persistent%20Asynchronous-And-Fileless-Backdoor-wp.pdf", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/wmimplant_a_wmi_ba.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Script Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Process Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Temporary Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host"]
+searches = ["ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon - Rule", "ESCU - Process Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Script Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Temporary Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 description = Attackers are increasingly abusing Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI), a framework and associated utilities available on all modern Windows operating systems. Because WMI can be leveraged to manage both local and remote systems, it is important to identify the processes executed and the user context within which the activity occurred.
 narrative = WMI is a Microsoft infrastructure for management data and operations on Windows operating systems. It includes of a set of utilities that can be leveraged to manage both local and remote Windows systems. Attackers are increasingly turning to WMI abuse in their efforts to conduct nefarious tasks, such as reconnaissance, detection of antivirus and virtual machines, code execution, lateral movement, persistence, and data exfiltration. \
 The detection searches included in this Analytic Story are used to look for suspicious use of WMI commands that attackers may leverage to interact with remote systems. The searches specifically look for the use of WMI to run processes on remote systems.\
@@ -785,7 +797,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://redcanary.com/blog/windows-registry-attacks-threat-detection/", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1112"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 description = Monitor and detect registry changes initiated from remote locations, which can be a sign that an attacker has infiltrated your system.
 narrative = Attackers are developing increasingly sophisticated techniques for hijacking target servers, while evading detection. One such technique that has become progressively more common is registry modification.\
 The registry is a key component of the Windows operating system. It has a hierarchical database called "registry" that contains settings, options, and values for executables. Once the threat actor gains access to a machine, they can use reg.exe to modify their account to obtain administrator-level privileges, maintain persistence, and move laterally within the environment.\
@@ -798,7 +810,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://blog.rapid7.com/2020/04/02/dispelling-zoom-bugbears-what-you-need-to-know-about-the-latest-zoom-vulnerabilities/", "https://threatpost.com/two-zoom-zero-day-flaws-uncovered/154337/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - First Time Seen Child Process of Zoom - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Registry Activity", "ESCU - Get Process File Activity"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Child Process of Zoom - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Registry Activity", "ESCU - Get Process File Activity", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint"]
 description = Attackers are using Zoom as an vector to increase privileges on a sytems. This story detects new child processes of zoom and provides investigative actions for this detection.
 narrative = Zoom is a leader in modern enterprise video communications and its usage has increased dramatically with a large amount of the population under stay-at-home orders due to the COVID-19 pandemic. With increased usage has come increased scrutiny and several security flaws have been found with this application on both Windows and macOS systems.\
 Current detections focus on finding new child processes of this application on a per host basis. Investigative searches are included to gather information needed during an investigation.
@@ -810,7 +822,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - EC2 Instance Modified With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
+searches = ["ESCU - EC2 Instance Modified With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId"]
 description = Identify unusual changes to your AWS EC2 instances that may indicate malicious activity. Modifications to your EC2 instances by previously unseen users is an example of an activity that may warrant further investigation.
 narrative = A common attack technique is to infiltrate a cloud instance and make modifications. The adversary can then secure access to your infrastructure or hide their activities. So it's important to stay alert to changes that may indicate that your environment has been compromised. \
 Searches within this Analytic Story can help you detect the presence of a threat by monitoring for EC2 instances that have been created or changed--either by users that have never previously performed these activities or by known users who modify or create instances in a way that have not been done before. This story also provides investigative searches that help you go deeper once you detect suspicious behavior.
@@ -822,7 +834,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/08/monitoring-windows-console-activity-part-two.html", "https://www.splunk.com/pdfs/technical-briefs/advanced-threat-detection-and-response-tech-brief.pdf", "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/logging/detecting-security-incidents-windows-workstation-event-logs-34262"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule", "ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 description = Quickly identify systems running new or unusual processes in your environment that could be indicators of suspicious activity. Processes run from unusual locations, those with conspicuously long command lines, and rare executables are all examples of activities that may warrant deeper investigation.
 narrative = Being able to profile a host's processes within your environment can help you more quickly identify processes that seem out of place when compared to the rest of the population of hosts or asset types.\
 This Analytic Story lets you identify processes that are either a) not typically seen running or b) have some sort of suspicious command-line arguments associated with them. This Analytic Story will also help you identify the user running these processes and the associated process activity on the host.\
@@ -835,7 +847,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.monkey.org/~dugsong/dsniff/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Protocols passing authentication in cleartext - Rule", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Protocols passing authentication in cleartext - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 description = Leverage searches that detect cleartext network protocols that may leak credentials or should otherwise be encrypted.
 narrative = Various legacy protocols operate by default in the clear, without the protections of encryption. This potentially leaks sensitive information that can be exploited by passively sniffing network traffic. Depending on the protocol, this information could be highly sensitive, or could allow for session hijacking. In addition, these protocols send authentication information, which would allow for the harvesting of usernames and passwords that could potentially be used to authenticate and compromise secondary systems.

@@ -846,7 +858,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.fbi.gov/scams-and-safety/common-fraud-schemes/internet-fraud", "https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2017-internet-crime-report-released-050718"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Jim Apger"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Web Fraud - Password Sharing Across Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Anomalous User Clickspeed - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Account Harvesting - Rule", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Web Session Information via session id", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Web Fraud - Password Sharing Across Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Account Harvesting - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Anomalous User Clickspeed - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Web Session Information via session id", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender"]
 description = Monitor your environment for activity consistent with common attack techniques bad actors use when attempting to compromise web servers or other web-related assets.
 narrative = The Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) defines Internet fraud as the use of Internet services or software with Internet access to defraud victims or to otherwise take advantage of them. According to the Bureau, Internet crime schemes are used to steal millions of dollars each year from victims and continue to plague the Internet through various methods. The agency includes phishing scams, data breaches, Denial of Service (DOS) attacks, email account compromise, malware, spoofing, and ransomware in this category.\
 These crimes are not the fraud itself, but rather the attack techniques commonly employed by fraudsters in their pursuit of data that enables them to commit malicious actssuch as obtaining and using stolen credit cards. They represent a serious problem that is steadily increasing and not likely to go away anytime soon.\
@@ -862,7 +874,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Defense_Evasion"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 description = Detect tactics used by malware to evade defenses on Windows endpoints. A few of these include suspicious `reg.exe` processes, files hidden with `attrib.exe` and disabling user-account control, among many others 
 narrative = Defense evasion is a tactic--identified in the MITRE ATT&CK framework--that adversaries employ in a variety of ways to bypass or defeat defensive security measures. There are many techniques enumerated by the MITRE ATT&CK framework that are applicable in this context. This Analytic Story includes searches designed to identify the use of such techniques on Windows platforms.

@@ -873,7 +885,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2013/12/file-extensions-2/", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1042"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule", "ESCU - Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Execution of File with Multiple Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Execution of File with Multiple Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 description = Detect and investigate suspected abuse of file extensions and Windows file associations. Some of the malicious behaviors involved may include inserting spaces before file extensions or prepending the file extension with a different one, among other techniques.
 narrative = Attackers use a variety of techniques to entice users to run malicious code or to persist on an endpoint. One way to accomplish these goals is to leverage file extensions and the mechanism Windows uses to associate files with specific applications. \
 Since its earliest days, Windows has used extensions to identify file types. Users have become familiar with these extensions and their application associations. For example, if users see that a file ends in `.doc` or `.docx`, they will assume that it is a Microsoft Word document and expect that double-clicking will open it using `winword.exe`. The user will typically also presume that the `.docx` file is safe. \
@@ -888,7 +900,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/", "https://zeltser.com/security-incident-log-review-checklist/", "http://journeyintoir.blogspot.com/2013/01/re-introducing-usnjrnl.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint"]
+searches = ["ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 description = Adversaries often try to cover their tracks by manipulating Windows logs. Use these searches to help you monitor for suspicious activity surrounding log files--an essential component of an effective defense.
 narrative = Because attackers often modify system logs to cover their tracks and/or to thwart the investigative process, log monitoring is an industry-recognized best practice. While there are legitimate reasons to manipulate system logs, it is still worthwhile to keep track of who manipulated the logs, when they manipulated them, and in what way they manipulated them (determining which accesses, tools, or utilities were employed). Even if no malicious activity is detected, the knowledge of an attempt to manipulate system logs may be indicative of a broader security risk that should be thoroughly investigated.\
 The Analytic Story gives users two different ways to detect manipulation of Windows Event Logs and one way to detect deletion of the Update Sequence Number (USN) Change Journal. The story helps determine the history of the host and the users who have accessed it. Finally, the story aides in investigation by retrieving all the information on the process that caused these events (if the process has been identified).
@@ -900,7 +912,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["http://www.fuzzysecurity.com/tutorials/19.html", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2010/07/malware-persistence-windows-registry.html", "http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/common-malware-persistence-mechanisms/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/fin7-shim-databases-persistence.html", "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dq2Hv7J9fvk"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 description = Monitor for activities and techniques associated with maintaining persistence on a Windows system--a sign that an adversary may have compromised your environment.
 narrative = Maintaining persistence is one of the first steps taken by attackers after the initial compromise. Attackers leverage various custom and built-in tools to ensure survivability and persistent access within a compromised enterprise. This Analytic Story provides searches to help you identify various behaviors used by attackers to maintain persistent access to a Windows environment.

@@ -911,7 +923,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Child Processes of Spoolsv exe - Rule", "ESCU - Overwriting Accessibility Binaries - Rule", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Overwriting Accessibility Binaries - Rule", "ESCU - Child Processes of Spoolsv exe - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 description = Monitor for and investigate activities that may be associated with a Windows privilege-escalation attack, including unusual processes running on endpoints, modified registry keys, and more.
 narrative = Privilege escalation is a "land-and-expand" technique, wherein an adversary gains an initial foothold on a host and then exploits its weaknesses to increase his privileges. The motivation is simple: certain actions on a Windows machine--such as installing software--may require higher-level privileges than those the attacker initially acquired. By increasing his privilege level, the attacker can gain the control required to carry out his malicious ends. This Analytic Story provides searches to detect and investigate behaviors that attackers may use to elevate their privileges in your environment.

@@ -922,7 +934,7 @@ version = 3
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1050", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1031"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"]
 description = Windows services are often used by attackers for persistence and the ability to load drivers or otherwise interact with the Windows kernel. This Analytic Story helps you monitor your environment for indications that Windows services are being modified or created in a suspicious manner.
 narrative = The Windows operating system uses a services architecture to allow for running code in the background, similar to a UNIX daemon. Attackers will often leverage Windows services for persistence, hiding in plain sight, seeking the ability to run privileged code that can interact with the kernel. In many cases, attackers will create a new service to host their malicious code. Attackers have also been observed modifying unnecessary or unused services to point to their own code, as opposed to what was intended. In these cases, attackers often use tools to create or modify services in ways that are not typical for most environments, providing opportunities for detection.

@@ -1758,6 +1770,16 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate.
 providing_technologies = []

+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect new user AWS Console Login - DM - Rule]
+type = detection
+asset_type = AWS Instance
+confidence = medium
+explanation = This search looks for CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour
+how_to_implement = You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Run the "Previously seen users in CloudTrail" support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run "Update previously seen users in CloudTrail" hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines.
+annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]}
+known_false_positives = When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate.
+providing_technologies = []
+
 [savedsearch://ESCU - Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
@@ -2032,6 +2054,16 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]
 known_false_positives = If the Identity_Management data model is not updated regularly, this search could give you false positive alerts. Please consider this and investigate appropriately.
 providing_technologies = []

+[savedsearch://ESCU - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule]
+type = detection
+asset_type = Endpoint
+confidence = medium
+explanation = This search detects a potential kerberoasting attack via service principal name requests
+how_to_implement = You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, and include the windows security event logs that contain kerberos
+annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1208"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
+known_false_positives = Older systems that support kerberos RC4 by default NetApp may generate false positives
+providing_technologies = []
+
 [savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster
@@ -2397,8 +2429,8 @@ type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
 explanation = The search looks for reg.exe modifying registry keys that define Windows services and their configurations.
-how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on registry changes that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Registry` nodes.
-annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1050", "T1031", "T1089"], "nist": ["PR.IP", "PR.PT", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "DE.CM"]}
+how_to_implement = none
+annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1058"], "nist": ["PR.IP", "PR.PT", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "DE.CM"]}
 known_false_positives = It is unusual for a service to be created or modified by directly manipulating the registry. However, there may be legitimate instances of this behavior. It is important to validate and investigate, as appropriate.
 providing_technologies = []

@@ -2560,8 +2592,8 @@ type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
 explanation = This search looks for arguments to sc.exe indicating the creation or modification of a Windows service.
-how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model.
-annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1050", "T1031", "T1089"], "nist": ["PR.IP", "PR.PT", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "DE.CM"]}
+how_to_implement = none
+annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1050"], "nist": ["PR.IP", "PR.PT", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "DE.CM"]}
 known_false_positives = Using sc.exe to manipulate Windows services is uncommon. However, there may be legitimate instances of this behavior. It is important to validate and investigate as appropriate.
 providing_technologies = []

@@ -3823,6 +3855,13 @@ how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or lat
 known_false_positives = not defined
 providing_technologies = none

+[savedsearch://ESCU - Previously seen users in CloudTrail - DM]
+type = support
+explanation = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then creates a baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by username, within the last 30 days.
+how_to_implement = You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_users_console_logins.csv`, which is a lookup file created by this support search.
+known_false_positives = not defined
+providing_technologies = none
+
 [savedsearch://ESCU - Systems Ready for Spectre-Meltdown Windows Patch]
 type = support
 explanation = Some AV applications can cause the Spectre/Meltdown patch for Windows not to install successfully. This registry key is supposed to be created by the AV engine when it has been patched to be able to handle the Windows patch. If this key has been written, the system can then be patched for Spectre and Meltdown.
@@ -3837,6 +3876,13 @@ how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or lat
 known_false_positives = not defined
 providing_technologies = none

+[savedsearch://ESCU - Update previously seen users in CloudTrail - DM]
+type = support
+explanation = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then updates the baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by user, within the last hour.
+how_to_implement = You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_users_console_logins.csv`, which is a lookup file created by this support search.
+known_false_positives = not defined
+providing_technologies = none
+
 [savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Updates Install Failures]
 type = support
 explanation = This search is intended to give you a feel for how often Windows updates fail to install in your environment. Fluctuations in these numbers will allow you to determine when you should be concerned.
@@ -53,49 +53,49 @@ T1196,Control Panel Items,Defense Evasion|Execution,no
 T1214,Credentials in Registry,Credential Access,Soft Cell
 T1207,DCShadow,Defense Evasion,no
 T1213,Data from Information Repositories,Collection,Ke3chang|APT28
-T1212,Exploitation for Credential Access,Credential Access,no
+T1189,Drive-by Compromise,Initial Access,Darkhotel|APT38|Lazarus Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Leafminer|BRONZE BUTLER|APT19|Dark Caracal|Threat Group-3390|APT32|Elderwood|APT37|Patchwork|PLATINUM
 T1190,Exploit Public-Facing Application,Initial Access,Soft Cell|Night Dragon|Axiom
-T1210,Exploitation of Remote Services,Lateral Movement,Threat Group-3390|APT28
-T1189,Drive-by Compromise,Initial Access,Darkhotel|APT38|Lazarus Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Leafminer|BRONZE BUTLER|Dark Caracal|Threat Group-3390|APT32|APT19|Elderwood|Patchwork|APT37|PLATINUM
+T1212,Exploitation for Credential Access,Credential Access,no
+T1203,Exploitation for Client Execution,Execution,APT41|admin@338|Threat Group-3390|APT12|The White Company|APT33|APT32|APT28|Tropic Trooper|BRONZE BUTLER|Lazarus Group|Cobalt Group|APT37|Leviathan|APT29|Patchwork|TA459|Elderwood
 T1211,Exploitation for Defense Evasion,Defense Evasion,APT28
-T1203,Exploitation for Client Execution,Execution,APT41|admin@338|Threat Group-3390|APT12|The White Company|APT33|APT32|APT28|Tropic Trooper|BRONZE BUTLER|Lazarus Group|Cobalt Group|APT37|APT29|Patchwork|Leviathan|Elderwood|TA459
-T1215,Kernel Modules and Extensions,Persistence,no
+T1210,Exploitation of Remote Services,Lateral Movement,Threat Group-3390|APT28
 T1200,Hardware Additions,Initial Access,no
-T1208,Kerberoasting,Credential Access,no
 T1202,Indirect Command Execution,Defense Evasion,no
+T1208,Kerberoasting,Credential Access,no
+T1215,Kernel Modules and Extensions,Persistence,no
+T1198,SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking,Defense Evasion|Persistence,no
+T1194,Spearphishing via Service,Initial Access,FIN6|OilRig|Dark Caracal|Magic Hound
+T1192,Spearphishing Link,Initial Access,Machete|Kimsuky|TA505|Stolen Pencil|APT39|FIN4|APT32|Night Dragon|APT28|Turla|Cobalt Group|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|APT33|Elderwood|APT29|Leviathan|Magic Hound|Patchwork|FIN8
+T1206,Sudo Caching,Privilege Escalation,no
+T1195,Supply Chain Compromise,Initial Access,APT41|Elderwood
 T1201,Password Policy Discovery,Discovery,OilRig
 T1205,Port Knocking,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Command And Control,no
-T1198,SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking,Defense Evasion|Persistence,no
 T1218,Signed Binary Proxy Execution,Defense Evasion|Execution,TA505|Rancor|Cobalt Group
-T1194,Spearphishing via Service,Initial Access,FIN6|OilRig|Dark Caracal|Magic Hound
-T1192,Spearphishing Link,Initial Access,Machete|Kimsuky|TA505|Stolen Pencil|APT39|FIN4|APT32|Night Dragon|APT28|Turla|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|APT33|Elderwood|Patchwork|APT29|Leviathan|Magic Hound|FIN8
-T1195,Supply Chain Compromise,Initial Access,APT41|Elderwood
 T1219,Remote Access Tools,Command And Control,Kimsuky|Night Dragon|Thrip|Cobalt Group|Carbanak
-T1206,Sudo Caching,Privilege Escalation,no
-T1199,Trusted Relationship,Initial Access,APT28|menuPass
 T1216,Signed Script Proxy Execution,Defense Evasion|Execution,APT32
-T1193,Spearphishing Attachment,Initial Access,APT41|Machete|admin@338|Kimsuky|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|Tropic Trooper|Turla|Gorgon Group|Rancor|DarkHydrus|Lazarus Group|OilRig|Cobalt Group|FIN7|BRONZE BUTLER|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|APT32|FIN8|MuddyWater|APT28|TA459|Elderwood|APT37|APT29|Patchwork|Leviathan|Magic Hound|menuPass|PLATINUM
+T1193,Spearphishing Attachment,Initial Access,APT41|Machete|admin@338|Kimsuky|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|Tropic Trooper|Turla|Gorgon Group|Rancor|Lazarus Group|DarkHydrus|Cobalt Group|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|APT19|FIN7|Dragonfly 2.0|APT32|MuddyWater|TA459|APT28|FIN8|APT29|Patchwork|Elderwood|APT37|menuPass|Leviathan|Magic Hound|PLATINUM
+T1199,Trusted Relationship,Initial Access,APT28|menuPass
 T1209,Time Providers,Persistence,no
-T1204,User Execution,Execution,Machete|admin@338|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Night Dragon|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|Dragonfly 2.0|APT33|APT19|BRONZE BUTLER|Dark Caracal|Cobalt Group|FIN7|DarkHydrus|Turla|Gorgon Group|Patchwork|OilRig|Lazarus Group|APT32|MuddyWater|Rancor|APT37|APT28|APT29|menuPass|FIN8|TA459|Elderwood|Magic Hound|Leviathan|PLATINUM
+T1204,User Execution,Execution,Machete|admin@338|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Night Dragon|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|APT33|APT19|BRONZE BUTLER|Cobalt Group|Dark Caracal|DarkHydrus|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN7|Turla|Gorgon Group|Lazarus Group|APT32|OilRig|Patchwork|MuddyWater|Rancor|APT37|APT29|FIN8|APT28|menuPass|TA459|Magic Hound|Leviathan|Elderwood|PLATINUM
 T1182,AppCert DLLs,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Honeybee
 T1176,Browser Extensions,Persistence,Kimsuky|Stolen Pencil
 T1175,Component Object Model and Distributed COM,Lateral Movement|Execution,MuddyWater
 T1172,Domain Fronting,Command And Control,APT29
-T1181,Extra Window Memory Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
 T1173,Dynamic Data Exchange,Execution,TA505|MuddyWater|Gallmaker|Patchwork|Cobalt Group|APT37|APT28|FIN7
+T1181,Extra Window Memory Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
 T1187,Forced Authentication,Credential Access,DarkHydrus|Dragonfly 2.0
 T1179,Hooking,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Credential Access,PLATINUM
-T1177,LSASS Driver,Execution|Persistence,no
-T1188,Multi-hop Proxy,Command And Control,FIN4|APT29
 T1183,Image File Execution Options Injection,Privilege Escalation|Persistence|Defense Evasion,TEMP.Veles
 T1171,LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and Relay,Credential Access,no
+T1177,LSASS Driver,Execution|Persistence,no
 T1185,Man in the Browser,Collection,no
 T1170,Mshta,Defense Evasion|Execution,Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|FIN7
+T1188,Multi-hop Proxy,Command And Control,FIN4|APT29
 T1180,Screensaver,Persistence,no
 T1174,Password Filter DLL,Credential Access,no
-T1184,SSH Hijacking,Lateral Movement,no
-T1178,SID-History Injection,Privilege Escalation,no
 T1186,Process Doppelgänging,Defense Evasion,no
+T1178,SID-History Injection,Privilege Escalation,no
+T1184,SSH Hijacking,Lateral Movement,no
 T1156,.bash_profile and .bashrc,Persistence,no
 T1134,Access Token Manipulation,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Turla|Lazarus Group|APT28
 T1155,AppleScript,Execution|Lateral Movement,no
@@ -103,35 +103,35 @@ T1138,Application Shimming,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,FIN7
 T1139,Bash History,Credential Access,no
 T1146,Clear Command History,Defense Evasion,APT41
 T1136,Create Account,Persistence,APT41|Soft Cell|Dragonfly 2.0|Leafminer|APT3
-T1140,Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information,Defense Evasion,Turla|WIRTE|Darkhotel|Tropic Trooper|Honeybee|menuPass|Gorgon Group|Threat Group-3390|APT19|Leviathan|MuddyWater|APT28|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER
+T1140,Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information,Defense Evasion,Turla|WIRTE|Darkhotel|Tropic Trooper|menuPass|Honeybee|Gorgon Group|Threat Group-3390|APT19|Leviathan|MuddyWater|APT28|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER
 T1157,Dylib Hijacking,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
+T1144,Gatekeeper Bypass,Defense Evasion,no
 T1148,HISTCONTROL,Defense Evasion,no
+T1158,Hidden Files and Directories,Defense Evasion|Persistence,APT32|Tropic Trooper|APT28|Lazarus Group
 T1147,Hidden Users,Defense Evasion,no
 T1143,Hidden Window,Defense Evasion,Gorgon Group|Deep Panda|DarkHydrus|CopyKittens|APT19|APT32|APT28|APT3|Magic Hound
 T1141,Input Prompt,Credential Access,FIN4
-T1149,LC_MAIN Hijacking,Defense Evasion,no
-T1152,Launchctl,Defense Evasion|Execution|Persistence,no
-T1162,Login Item,Persistence,no
-T1137,Office Application Startup,Persistence,APT32|APT28
-T1144,Gatekeeper Bypass,Defense Evasion,no
-T1158,Hidden Files and Directories,Defense Evasion|Persistence,APT32|Tropic Trooper|APT28|Lazarus Group
 T1161,LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition,Persistence,no
-T1168,Local Job Scheduling,Persistence|Execution,no
-T1160,Launch Daemon,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
+T1149,LC_MAIN Hijacking,Defense Evasion,no
 T1142,Keychain,Credential Access,no
 T1159,Launch Agent,Persistence,no
-T1163,Rc.common,Persistence,no
+T1152,Launchctl,Defense Evasion|Execution|Persistence,no
+T1160,Launch Daemon,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
+T1168,Local Job Scheduling,Persistence|Execution,no
+T1162,Login Item,Persistence,no
 T1135,Network Share Discovery,Discovery,APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT1|Dragonfly 2.0|Sowbug
-T1151,Space after Filename,Defense Evasion|Execution,no
 T1150,Plist Modification,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
 T1145,Private Keys,Credential Access,no
 T1167,Securityd Memory,Credential Access,no
 T1166,Setuid and Setgid,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
+T1165,Startup Items,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
+T1137,Office Application Startup,Persistence,APT32|APT28
+T1163,Rc.common,Persistence,no
 T1153,Source,Execution,no
 T1164,Re-opened Applications,Persistence,no
-T1154,Trap,Execution|Persistence,no
-T1165,Startup Items,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
+T1151,Space after Filename,Defense Evasion|Execution,no
 T1169,Sudo,Privilege Escalation,no
+T1154,Trap,Execution|Persistence,no
 T1133,External Remote Services,Persistence|Initial Access,APT41|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|Night Dragon|OilRig|Ke3chang|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|APT18
 T1132,Data Encoding,Command And Control,APT33|APT19|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork
 T1131,Authentication Package,Persistence,no
@@ -151,19 +151,19 @@ T1118,InstallUtil,Defense Evasion|Execution,no
 T1117,Regsvr32,Defense Evasion|Execution,WIRTE|APT19|Cobalt Group|Leviathan|APT32|Deep Panda
 T1116,Code Signing,Defense Evasion,APT41|FIN6|TA505|FIN7|Honeybee|APT37|Leviathan|CopyKittens|Winnti Group|Suckfly|Molerats|Darkhotel
 T1115,Clipboard Data,Collection,APT38
-T1114,Email Collection,Collection,FIN4|APT28|Dragonfly 2.0|Magic Hound|Ke3chang|Leafminer|APT1
-T1113,Screen Capture,Collection,Silence|MuddyWater|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|Dark Caracal|FIN7|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|Group5|APT28
-T1112,Modify Registry,Defense Evasion,APT41|Turla|APT32|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|Patchwork|Threat Group-3390|Honeybee|Gorgon Group|FIN8
+T1114,Email Collection,Collection,FIN4|APT28|Dragonfly 2.0|Ke3chang|Magic Hound|Leafminer|APT1
+T1113,Screen Capture,Collection,Silence|MuddyWater|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN7|Dark Caracal|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|Group5|APT28
+T1112,Modify Registry,Defense Evasion,APT41|Turla|APT32|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|Patchwork|Threat Group-3390|APT19|Honeybee|Gorgon Group|FIN8
 T1111,Two-Factor Authentication Interception,Credential Access,no
 T1110,Brute Force,Credential Access,APT41|APT33|Leafminer|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|APT3|Lazarus Group|Turla
 T1109,Component Firmware,Defense Evasion|Persistence,Equation
 T1108,Redundant Access,Defense Evasion|Persistence,Stolen Pencil|Cobalt Group|Leafminer|APT3|FIN5|OilRig|Threat Group-3390
-T1107,File Deletion,Defense Evasion,APT41|Kimsuky|Silence|The White Company|TEMP.Veles|APT32|APT38|Honeybee|Patchwork|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|menuPass|FIN8|OilRig|FIN5|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|APT3|FIN10|APT28|Threat Group-3390|Group5|Lazarus Group|APT18|APT29
+T1107,File Deletion,Defense Evasion,APT41|Kimsuky|Silence|The White Company|TEMP.Veles|APT32|APT38|Patchwork|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|menuPass|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|FIN5|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|APT3|FIN10|Threat Group-3390|APT28|Group5|Lazarus Group|APT18|APT29
 T1106,Execution through API,Execution,Turla|Silence|APT37|Gorgon Group
-T1105,Remote File Copy,Command And Control|Lateral Movement,Soft Cell|TA505|WIRTE|APT33|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Turla|Rancor|Cobalt Group|Gorgon Group|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|APT37|FIN8|Leviathan|PLATINUM|Elderwood|Magic Hound|APT3|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|FIN7|menuPass|FIN10|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28
+T1105,Remote File Copy,Command And Control|Lateral Movement,Soft Cell|TA505|WIRTE|APT33|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Turla|Gorgon Group|Rancor|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|FIN8|APT37|PLATINUM|Leviathan|Elderwood|Magic Hound|APT3|APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN7|menuPass|FIN10|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28
 T1104,Multi-Stage Channels,Command And Control,MuddyWater|APT3
 T1103,AppInit DLLs,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
-T1102,Web Service,Command And Control|Defense Evasion,APT41|APT12|FIN6|Turla|FIN7|BRONZE BUTLER|Leviathan|APT37|Magic Hound|RTM|Patchwork|Carbanak
+T1102,Web Service,Command And Control|Defense Evasion,APT41|APT12|FIN6|Turla|FIN7|BRONZE BUTLER|APT37|Leviathan|Magic Hound|RTM|Patchwork|Carbanak
 T1101,Security Support Provider,Persistence,no
 T1100,Web Shell,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Soft Cell|Threat Group-3390|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|APT32|OilRig|Deep Panda
 T1099,Timestomp,Defense Evasion,TEMP.Veles|APT32|Lazarus Group|APT28
@@ -176,50 +176,50 @@ T1093,Process Hollowing,Defense Evasion,menuPass|Gorgon Group|Patchwork
 T1092,Communication Through Removable Media,Command And Control,APT28
 T1091,Replication Through Removable Media,Lateral Movement|Initial Access,Darkhotel|APT28
 T1090,Connection Proxy,Command And Control|Defense Evasion,APT41|Soft Cell|Turla|APT39|MuddyWater|APT3|Lazarus Group|menuPass|Strider|APT28
-T1089,Disabling Security Tools,Defense Evasion,Kimsuky|Turla|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|Gorgon Group|Threat Group-3390|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|Carbanak
+T1089,Disabling Security Tools,Defense Evasion,Kimsuky|Turla|Night Dragon|Gorgon Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Threat Group-3390|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|Carbanak
 T1088,Bypass User Account Control,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,APT37|MuddyWater|Honeybee|Threat Group-3390|Cobalt Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork|APT29
-T1087,Account Discovery,Discovery,APT32|APT1|Dragonfly 2.0|BRONZE BUTLER|OilRig|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|FIN6|Poseidon Group|APT3|admin@338|Ke3chang
-T1086,PowerShell,Execution,APT41|Kimsuky|Soft Cell|TA505|WIRTE|TEMP.Veles|APT33|Gallmaker|Turla|APT19|DarkHydrus|APT28|Thrip|Dragonfly 2.0|Cobalt Group|Gorgon Group|Leviathan|TA459|FIN8|MuddyWater|CopyKittens|OilRig|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|FIN10|FIN7|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Poseidon Group|APT3|APT29|Deep Panda
+T1087,Account Discovery,Discovery,APT32|APT1|Dragonfly 2.0|BRONZE BUTLER|OilRig|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|FIN6|Poseidon Group|APT3|admin@338|Ke3chang
+T1086,PowerShell,Execution,APT41|Kimsuky|Soft Cell|TA505|WIRTE|TEMP.Veles|APT33|Gallmaker|Turla|Dragonfly 2.0|DarkHydrus|Thrip|Cobalt Group|APT19|Gorgon Group|APT28|Leviathan|TA459|MuddyWater|FIN8|CopyKittens|OilRig|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|FIN10|FIN7|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Poseidon Group|APT3|APT29|Deep Panda
 T1085,Rundll32,Defense Evasion|Execution,TA505|MuddyWater|APT29|APT19|CopyKittens|APT3|Carbanak|APT28
 T1084,Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription,Persistence,Turla|Leviathan|APT29
-T1083,File and Directory Discovery,Discovery,Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|APT18|Leafminer|Dragonfly 2.0|Dark Caracal|Honeybee|Magic Hound|APT3|Sowbug|BRONZE BUTLER|APT28|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
-T1082,System Information Discovery,Discovery,Kimsuky|Tropic Trooper|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|APT37|APT19|Honeybee|APT32|OilRig|Magic Hound|APT3|Sowbug|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
+T1083,File and Directory Discovery,Discovery,Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|APT18|Dragonfly 2.0|Dark Caracal|Leafminer|Honeybee|APT3|Sowbug|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|APT28|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
+T1082,System Information Discovery,Discovery,Kimsuky|Tropic Trooper|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|APT37|Honeybee|APT19|APT32|OilRig|APT3|Magic Hound|Sowbug|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
 T1081,Credentials in Files,Credential Access,OilRig|Kimsuky|Turla|TA505|Stolen Pencil|MuddyWater|APT3
 T1080,Taint Shared Content,Lateral Movement,Darkhotel
 T1079,Multilayer Encryption,Command And Control,no
-T1078,Valid Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,APT41|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|APT39|Stolen Pencil|FIN4|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|APT33|Leviathan|APT3|FIN5|OilRig|menuPass|APT28|FIN10|APT32|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-1314|Threat Group-3390|APT18|PittyTiger|Carbanak
+T1078,Valid Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,APT41|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|APT39|Stolen Pencil|FIN4|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|APT33|Leviathan|APT3|FIN5|OilRig|menuPass|APT28|APT32|FIN10|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-1314|Threat Group-3390|APT18|PittyTiger|Carbanak
 T1077,Windows Admin Shares,Lateral Movement,APT32|Orangeworm|FIN8|APT3|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-1314|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang
-T1076,Remote Desktop Protocol,Lateral Movement,APT41|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Stolen Pencil|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|APT3|OilRig|menuPass|FIN10|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|APT1|Axiom
+T1076,Remote Desktop Protocol,Lateral Movement,APT41|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Stolen Pencil|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|APT3|OilRig|FIN10|menuPass|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|APT1|Axiom
 T1075,Pass the Hash,Lateral Movement,Soft Cell|APT32|Night Dragon|APT28|APT1
 T1074,Data Staged,Collection,Machete|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|Night Dragon|Honeybee|Patchwork|Dragonfly 2.0|Leviathan|FIN8|APT3|FIN5|menuPass|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28
 T1073,DLL Side-Loading,Defense Evasion,APT41|Soft Cell|Tropic Trooper|Patchwork|APT19|APT32|APT3|menuPass|Threat Group-3390
 T1072,Third-party Software,Execution|Lateral Movement,Threat Group-1314
-T1071,Standard Application Layer Protocol,Command And Control,APT41|Machete|WIRTE|APT33|FIN4|Night Dragon|APT18|SilverTerrier|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|Cobalt Group|FIN7|Threat Group-3390|APT37|Rancor|Orangeworm|Turla|Honeybee|Ke3chang|Dark Caracal|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|OilRig|APT32|Magic Hound|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|APT28
+T1071,Standard Application Layer Protocol,Command And Control,APT41|Machete|WIRTE|APT33|FIN4|Night Dragon|APT18|SilverTerrier|APT38|APT19|Cobalt Group|FIN7|Dragonfly 2.0|APT37|Threat Group-3390|Turla|Orangeworm|Honeybee|Ke3chang|Rancor|Dark Caracal|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|OilRig|APT32|Magic Hound|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|APT28
 T1070,Indicator Removal on Host,Defense Evasion,APT41|APT29|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|APT32|FIN8|FIN5|APT28
 T1069,Permission Groups Discovery,Discovery,FIN6|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|APT3|admin@338|Ke3chang
 T1068,Exploitation for Privilege Escalation,Privilege Escalation,APT33|Cobalt Group|PLATINUM|FIN8|APT32|Threat Group-3390|FIN6|APT28
 T1067,Bootkit,Persistence,APT41|Lazarus Group|APT28
 T1066,Indicator Removal from Tools,Defense Evasion,Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|Patchwork|APT3|Turla|OilRig|Deep Panda
 T1065,Uncommonly Used Port,Command And Control,TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT32|Gorgon Group|Magic Hound|Group5|Lazarus Group|APT3
-T1064,Scripting,Defense Evasion|Execution,Machete|Turla|TA505|Silence|WIRTE|APT39|FIN4|APT32|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|Dark Caracal|Lazarus Group|menuPass|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|Leafminer|Rancor|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|APT37|Ke3chang|FIN7|Gorgon Group|Patchwork|MuddyWater|Leviathan|FIN8|TA459|APT28|Magic Hound|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN5|FIN10|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|APT3|APT29|Deep Panda|APT1
+T1064,Scripting,Defense Evasion|Execution,Machete|Turla|TA505|Silence|WIRTE|APT39|FIN4|APT32|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|Dark Caracal|Lazarus Group|APT19|menuPass|Leafminer|Rancor|Dragonfly 2.0|Cobalt Group|FIN7|APT37|Ke3chang|Patchwork|Honeybee|Gorgon Group|MuddyWater|Leviathan|TA459|FIN8|APT28|Magic Hound|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN5|FIN10|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|APT3|APT29|Deep Panda|APT1
 T1063,Security Software Discovery,Discovery,The White Company|Cobalt Group|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|Tropic Trooper|FIN8|Patchwork|Naikon
 T1062,Hypervisor,Persistence,no
 T1061,Graphical User Interface,Execution,APT3
-T1060,Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder,Persistence,APT41|Machete|Kimsuky|APT33|APT39|APT32|APT18|Turla|APT19|Cobalt Group|Honeybee|Dark Caracal|Ke3chang|Threat Group-3390|Dragonfly 2.0|Gorgon Group|MuddyWater|APT37|Leviathan|BRONZE BUTLER|APT3|Magic Hound|FIN10|FIN7|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT29|Darkhotel
-T1059,Command-Line Interface,Execution,APT41|Soft Cell|Turla|Silence|APT32|Cobalt Group|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|Gorgon Group|APT28|FIN7|Rancor|Honeybee|Leviathan|APT37|FIN8|Magic Hound|Sowbug|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|Suckfly|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-1314|APT3|admin@338|APT1|Ke3chang
+T1060,Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder,Persistence,APT41|Machete|Kimsuky|APT33|APT39|APT32|APT18|Turla|APT19|Threat Group-3390|Dark Caracal|Ke3chang|Cobalt Group|Honeybee|Dragonfly 2.0|Gorgon Group|MuddyWater|APT37|Leviathan|APT3|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|FIN10|FIN7|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT29|Darkhotel
+T1059,Command-Line Interface,Execution,APT41|Soft Cell|Turla|Silence|APT32|Cobalt Group|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|APT28|Gorgon Group|FIN7|Honeybee|Rancor|APT37|Leviathan|FIN8|Magic Hound|Sowbug|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|Suckfly|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-1314|APT3|admin@338|APT1|Ke3chang
 T1058,Service Registry Permissions Weakness,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
 T1057,Process Discovery,Discovery,Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|APT38|Tropic Trooper|APT37|Honeybee|OilRig|APT3|Magic Hound|APT28|Winnti Group|Stealth Falcon|Poseidon Group|Lazarus Group|Molerats|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang
 T1056,Input Capture,Collection|Credential Access,APT41|Kimsuky|menuPass|Stolen Pencil|FIN4|APT38|OilRig|Ke3chang|PLATINUM|Sowbug|Magic Hound|Group5|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT3|Darkhotel|APT28
 T1055,Process Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,APT41|Kimsuky|Tropic Trooper|Gorgon Group|Turla|Threat Group-3390|APT37|Cobalt Group|Honeybee|Lazarus Group|PLATINUM|Putter Panda
 T1054,Indicator Blocking,Defense Evasion,no
-T1053,Scheduled Task,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,APT41|Machete|Soft Cell|Silence|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Patchwork|OilRig|Rancor|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN10|APT32|FIN7|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Threat Group-3390|APT18|APT3|APT29
+T1053,Scheduled Task,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,APT41|Machete|Soft Cell|Silence|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|Rancor|Patchwork|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN10|APT32|FIN7|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Threat Group-3390|APT18|APT3|APT29
 T1052,Exfiltration Over Physical Medium,Exfiltration,no
 T1051,Shared Webroot,Lateral Movement,no
-T1050,New Service,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Kimsuky|Tropic Trooper|Cobalt Group|Ke3chang|FIN7|APT32|Threat Group-3390|APT3|Lazarus Group|Carbanak
+T1050,New Service,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Kimsuky|Tropic Trooper|Cobalt Group|Threat Group-3390|FIN7|APT32|Ke3chang|APT3|Lazarus Group|Carbanak
 T1049,System Network Connections Discovery,Discovery,APT41|APT38|Soft Cell|APT32|APT1|OilRig|APT3|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
 T1048,Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol,Exfiltration,Turla|APT33|Thrip|FIN8|OilRig|Lazarus Group
 T1047,Windows Management Instrumentation,Execution,APT41|FIN6|Soft Cell|APT32|MuddyWater|OilRig|Threat Group-3390|Leviathan|FIN8|menuPass|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT29|Deep Panda
-T1046,Network Service Scanning,Discovery,APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT39|APT32|Leafminer|Cobalt Group|OilRig|menuPass|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390
+T1046,Network Service Scanning,Discovery,APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT39|APT32|Cobalt Group|OilRig|Leafminer|menuPass|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390
 T1045,Software Packing,Defense Evasion,Soft Cell|The White Company|APT39|APT38|Dark Caracal|Elderwood|APT3|Group5|Patchwork|APT29|Night Dragon
 T1044,File System Permissions Weakness,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
 T1043,Commonly Used Port,Command And Control,Machete|OilRig|APT28|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT32|Night Dragon|APT29|APT18|Tropic Trooper|APT19|FIN7|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|APT37|Magic Hound|APT3|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390
@@ -232,17 +232,17 @@ T1037,Logon Scripts,Lateral Movement|Persistence,Cobalt Group|APT28
 T1036,Masquerading,Defense Evasion,APT41|Soft Cell|PLATINUM|Ke3chang|Scarlet Mimic|menuPass|FIN6|TEMP.Veles|Dragonfly 2.0|MuddyWater|BRONZE BUTLER|Sowbug|FIN7|APT32|Patchwork|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Carbanak|APT1
 T1035,Service Execution,Execution,Silence|FIN6|APT32|Honeybee|Ke3chang
 T1034,Path Interception,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
-T1033,System Owner/User Discovery,Discovery,APT41|Soft Cell|Tropic Trooper|APT39|MuddyWater|APT32|APT37|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|Magic Hound|OilRig|FIN10|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3
+T1033,System Owner/User Discovery,Discovery,APT41|Soft Cell|Tropic Trooper|APT39|MuddyWater|APT37|APT32|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|Magic Hound|OilRig|FIN10|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3
 T1032,Standard Cryptographic Protocol,Command And Control,Machete|APT33|Tropic Trooper|Cobalt Group|OilRig|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Taidoor
 T1031,Modify Existing Service,Persistence,APT41|APT32|Honeybee|APT19
 T1030,Data Transfer Size Limits,Exfiltration,Threat Group-3390
 T1029,Scheduled Transfer,Exfiltration,no
 T1028,Windows Remote Management,Execution|Lateral Movement,Threat Group-3390
-T1027,Obfuscated Files or Information,Defense Evasion,Machete|Soft Cell|Turla|TA505|Silence|APT33|Night Dragon|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|APT29|APT18|Tropic Trooper|menuPass|Patchwork|Cobalt Group|APT37|Threat Group-3390|Leafminer|Honeybee|Dark Caracal|APT19|FIN8|BlackOasis|Elderwood|Leviathan|MuddyWater|FIN7|Magic Hound|APT3|OilRig|APT32|Group5|Dust Storm|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT28
+T1027,Obfuscated Files or Information,Defense Evasion,Machete|Soft Cell|Turla|TA505|Silence|APT33|Night Dragon|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|APT29|APT18|Tropic Trooper|menuPass|Patchwork|Leafminer|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|APT37|Threat Group-3390|Dark Caracal|APT19|FIN8|BlackOasis|Leviathan|Elderwood|MuddyWater|FIN7|APT3|Magic Hound|OilRig|APT32|Group5|Dust Storm|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT28
 T1026,Multiband Communication,Command And Control,Lazarus Group
 T1025,Data from Removable Media,Collection,Machete|Turla|Gamaredon Group|APT28
 T1024,Custom Cryptographic Protocol,Command And Control,APT28|BRONZE BUTLER|Lazarus Group
-T1023,Shortcut Modification,Persistence,APT39|Darkhotel|APT29|Gorgon Group|FIN7|Dragonfly 2.0|Leviathan|Lazarus Group
+T1023,Shortcut Modification,Persistence,APT39|Darkhotel|APT29|FIN7|Gorgon Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Leviathan|Lazarus Group
 T1022,Data Encrypted,Exfiltration,Kimsuky|Soft Cell|Turla|menuPass|APT32|Patchwork|Honeybee|CopyKittens|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|Ke3chang
 T1021,Remote Services,Lateral Movement,TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|OilRig|menuPass|GCMAN
 T1020,Automated Exfiltration,Exfiltration,Honeybee
@@ -263,5 +263,5 @@ T1006,File System Logical Offsets,Defense Evasion,no
 T1005,Data from Local System,Collection,Kimsuky|Soft Cell|Turla|menuPass|Dark Caracal|Dragonfly 2.0|Honeybee|APT37|APT28|APT3|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|Threat Group-3390|APT1|Ke3chang
 T1004,Winlogon Helper DLL,Persistence,Tropic Trooper|Turla
 T1003,Credential Dumping,Credential Access,APT41|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|APT33|Leviathan|APT39|Stolen Pencil|APT32|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|Leafminer|Lazarus Group|Magic Hound|APT37|MuddyWater|PLATINUM|FIN8|Sowbug|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN5|OilRig|menuPass|Strider|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Suckfly|FIN6|Poseidon Group|Threat Group-3390|APT3|Molerats|APT28|APT1|Ke3chang|Cleaver|Axiom
-T1002,Data Compressed,Exfiltration,APT41|Soft Cell|Gallmaker|APT33|APT32|APT39|MuddyWater|Honeybee|Magic Hound|APT28|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|CopyKittens|Sowbug|APT3|menuPass|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT1|Ke3chang
+T1002,Data Compressed,Exfiltration,APT41|Soft Cell|Gallmaker|APT33|APT32|APT39|MuddyWater|Honeybee|APT28|Magic Hound|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|CopyKittens|Sowbug|APT3|menuPass|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT1|Ke3chang
 T1001,Data Obfuscation,Command And Control,APT28|Axiom
@@ -2,36 +2,36 @@ antlr4-python3-runtime==4.8
 aspy.yaml==1.3.0
 attackcti==0.3.2
 attrs==19.3.0
-certifi==2020.4.5.2
+certifi==2020.6.20
 cfgv==3.1.0
 chardet==3.0.4
 configparser==5.0.0
 contextlib2==0.6.0.post1
-identify==1.4.19
+identify==1.4.20
 idna==2.9
 importlib-metadata==1.6.1
-importlib-resources==2.0.0
+importlib-resources==2.0.1
 Jinja2==2.11.2
 jsonschema==3.2.0
 MarkupSafe==1.1.1
-more-itertools==8.3.0
+more-itertools==8.4.0
 nodeenv==1.4.0
 pathlib2==2.3.5
-pre-commit==2.4.0
+pre-commit==2.5.1
 pyrsistent==0.16.0
 python-dateutil==2.8.1
 pytz==2020.1
 PyYAML==5.3.1
-requests==2.23.0
+requests==2.24.0
 scandir==1.10.0
 semantic-version==2.8.5
 simplejson==3.17.0
 six==1.15.0
 stix2==1.4.0
 stix2-patterns==1.3.0
-taxii2-client==2.0.0
-toml==0.10.0
+taxii2-client==2.1.0
+toml==0.10.1
 typing==3.7.4.1
 urllib3==1.25.9
-virtualenv==20.0.21
+virtualenv==20.0.25
 zipp==3.1.0
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 name: AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN
-id: bc91a8cd-35e7-4bb2-6140-e756cc46fd71
+id: bc91a8cd-35e7-4bb2-6140-e756cc46fd72
 version: 2
 date: '2019-04-30'
 description: This search lists all the logged CloudTrail activities by a specific
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ tags:
  - Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities
  - Suspicious AWS S3 Activities
  - Suspicious AWS Traffic
+  - Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities
  - Suspicious Command-Line Executions
  - Suspicious DNS Traffic
  - Suspicious Emails
@@ -17,3 +17,4 @@ search: '| search sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail user=$user$ | table _time userIdenti
 tags:
  analytics_story:
  - AWS User Monitoring
+  - Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ narrative: 'It is a common practice for attackers of all types to leverage nativ
 author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
 type: ESCU
 references:
- https://technet.microsoft.com/library/bb490939.aspx
+- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/tn-archive/bb490939(v=technet.10)
 - https://htmlpreview.github.io/?https://github.com/MatthewDemaske/blogbackup/blob/master/netshell.html
 - http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html
 tags:
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+
+name: Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities
+id: 6380ebbb-55c5-4fce-b754-01fd565fb73c
+version: 1
+date: '2020-06-04'
+description: 'Monitor your cloud authentication events. Searches within this Analytic Story leverage 
+  the recent cloud updates to the Authentication data model to help you stay aware of and investigate
+  suspicious login activity. '
+narrative: 'It is important to monitor and control who has access to your cloud infrastructure.
+  Detecting suspicious logins will provide good starting points for investigations. Abusive behaviors
+  caused by compromised credentials can lead to direct monetary costs, as you will be billed for any 
+  compute activity whether legitimate or otherwise.\
+
+  This Analytic Story has data model versions of cloud searches leveraging Authentication data, 
+  including those looking for suspicious login activity, and cross-account activity for AWS.'
+author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
+type: ESCU
+references:
+- https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-cloudtrail-now-tracks-cross-account-activity-to-its-origin/
+- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integration.html
+tags:
+  analytics_story: Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities
+  usecase: Security Monitoring
+  category:
+  - Cloud Security
+
+