pkexec

Deprecating two detections that identified all rundll32 executions.
Added linux pkexec pwnkit detection.

detections/deprecated/suspicious_rundll32_rename.yml

@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
 name: Suspicious Rundll32 Rename
 id: 7360137f-abad-473e-8189-acbdaa34d114
-version: 3
-date: '2021-02-04'
+version: 4
+date: '2022-02-01'
 author: Michael Haag, Splunk
 type: Hunting
 datamodel:
 - Endpoint
-description: The following analytic identifies renamed instances of rundll32.exe executing.
+description: The following hunting analytic identifies renamed instances of rundll32.exe executing.
   rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. During
   investigation, validate it is the legitimate rundll32.exe executing and what script
   content it is loading. This query relies on the original filename or internal name

detections/endpoint/linux_pkexec_privilege_escalation.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+name: Linux pkexec Privilege Escalation
+id: 03e22c1c-8086-11ec-ac2e-acde48001122
+version: 1
+date: '2022-01-28'
+author: Michael Haag, Splunk
+type: TTP
+datamodel:
+  - Endpoint
+description: 'The following analytic identifies `pkexec` spawning with no command-line arguments. A vulnerability in Polkit''s pkexec component identified as CVE-2021-4034 (PwnKit) which is present in the default configuration of all major Linux distributions and can be exploited to gain full root privileges on the system.'
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=pkexec by _time Processes.dest Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_path
+  | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` 
+  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` 
+  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
+  | regex process="(^.{1}$)" 
+  | `linux_pkexec_privilege_escalation_filter`'
+how_to_implement: 'Depending on the EDR product in use, there are multiple ways to "null" the command-line field, Processes.process. Two that may be useful `process="(^.{0}$)"` or `| where isnull(process)`. To generate data for this behavior, Sysmon for Linux was utilized.
+  To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.'
+known_false_positives: False positives may be present, filter as needed.
+references:
+  - https://www.reddit.com/r/crowdstrike/comments/sdfeig/20220126_cool_query_friday_hunting_pwnkit_local/
+  - https://linux.die.net/man/1/pkexec
+  - https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/linux-system-service-bug-gives-root-on-all-major-distros-exploit-released/
+  - https://access.redhat.com/security/security-updates/#/?q=polkit&p=1&sort=portal_publication_date%20desc&rows=10&portal_advisory_type=Security%20Advisory&documentKind=PortalProduct
+tags:
+  cve:
+  - CVE-2021-4034
+  analytic_story:
+  - Linux Privilege Escalation
+  dataset: 
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1068/zoom_child_process/linux-sysmon.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Exploitation
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1068
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  required_fields:
+  - _time
+  - Processes.dest
+  - Processes.user
+  - Processes.parent_process_name #parent process name
+  - Processes.parent_process #parent cmdline
+  - Processes.original_file_name
+  - Processes.process_name #process name
+  - Processes.process #process cmdline
+  - Processes.process_id
+  - Processes.parent_process_path
+  - Processes.process_path
+  - Processes.parent_process_id
+  security_domain: endpoint
+  impact: 80
+  confidence: 70
+  # (impact * confidence)/100
+  risk_score: 56
+  context:
+  - Source:Endpoint
+  - Stage:Defense Evasion
+  message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ related to a local privilege escalation in polkit pkexec. 
+  observable:
+  - name: user
+    type: User
+    role:
+    - Victim
+  - name: dest
+    type: Hostname
+    role:
+    - Victim
+  - name: parent_process_name
+    type: Parent Process
+    role:
+    - Parent Process
+  - name: process_name
+    type: Process
+    role:
+    - Child Process

tests/endpoint/linux_pkexec_privilege_escalation.test.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+name: Linux pkexec Privilege Escalation Unit Test
+tests:
+- name: Linux pkexec Privilege Escalation 
+  file: endpoint/linux_pkexec_privilege_escalation.yml
+  pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0'
+  earliest_time: '-24h'
+  latest_time: 'now'
+  attack_data:
+  - file_name: linux-sysmon.log
+    data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1068/pkexec/linux-sysmon.log
+    source: Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational
+    sourcetype: sysmon_linux

tests/endpoint/rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal.test.yml

@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-name: RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal Unit Test
-tests:
-- name: RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal
-  file: endpoint/rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal.yml
-  pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0'
-  earliest_time: '-24h'
-  latest_time: 'now'
-  attack_data:
-  - file_name: windows-sysmon.log
-    data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
-    source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
-    sourcetype: xmlwineventlog

tests/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_rename.test.yml

@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-name: Suspicious rundll32 rename unit test
-tests:
-- name: Detect Renamed rundll32.exe Rename
-  file: endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_rename.yml
-  pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0'
-  earliest_time: '-24h'
-  latest_time: 'now'
-  attack_data:
-  - file_name: windows-sysmon.log
-    data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
-    source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
-    sourcetype: xmlwineventlog