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@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@ def main(args):
|
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for test in tests:
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counter_tests=counter_tests+1
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|
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detection_coverage = "{:.0%}".format(counter_tests/counter_detection)
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|
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TEMPLATE_PATH = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), 'jinja2_templates')
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@@ -13,6 +13,6 @@
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<rect rx="3" width="105" height="20" fill="url(#a)"/>
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<g fill="#fff" text-anchor="middle" font-family="DejaVu Sans,Verdana,Geneva,sans-serif" font-size="11">
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||||
<text x="30" y="14">detections</text>
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||||
<text x="83" y="14">357</text>
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||||
<text x="83" y="14">440</text>
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</g>
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</svg>
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|
Before Width: | Height: | Size: 654 B After Width: | Height: | Size: 654 B |
@@ -13,6 +13,6 @@
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<rect rx="3" width="100" height="20" fill="url(#a)"/>
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<g fill="#fff" text-anchor="middle" font-family="DejaVu Sans,Verdana,Geneva,sans-serif" font-size="11">
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<text x="30" y="14">coverage</text>
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||||
<text x="80" y="14">83%</text>
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||||
<text x="80" y="14">100%</text>
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||||
</g>
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</svg>
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|
Before Width: | Height: | Size: 652 B After Width: | Height: | Size: 653 B |
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ references:
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tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- Suspicious Cloud User Activities
|
||||
automated_detection_testing: passed
|
||||
dataset:
|
||||
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1580/aws_iam_accessdenied_discovery_events/aws_iam_accessdenied_discovery_events.json
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||||
kill_chain_phases:
|
||||
@@ -44,4 +45,3 @@ tags:
|
||||
- errorCode
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- userIdentity.type
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security_domain: access
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||||
automated_detection_testing: passed
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -6,8 +6,11 @@ author: Michael Haag, Splunk
|
||||
type: batch
|
||||
datamodel: []
|
||||
description: The following detection identifies any malformed policy document exceptions
|
||||
with a status of `failure`. A malformed policy document exception occurs in instances where roles are attempted to be assumed, or brute forced. In a brute force attempt, using a tool like CloudSploit or Pacu, an attempt will look like `arn:aws:iam::111111111111:role/aws-service-role/rds.amazonaws.com/AWSServiceRoleForRDS`. Meaning, when an adversary is attempting to identify
|
||||
a role name, multiple failures will occur. This detection focuses on the errors of a remote attempt that is failing.
|
||||
with a status of `failure`. A malformed policy document exception occurs in instances
|
||||
where roles are attempted to be assumed, or brute forced. In a brute force attempt,
|
||||
using a tool like CloudSploit or Pacu, an attempt will look like `arn:aws:iam::111111111111:role/aws-service-role/rds.amazonaws.com/AWSServiceRoleForRDS`. Meaning,
|
||||
when an adversary is attempting to identify a role name, multiple failures will
|
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occur. This detection focuses on the errors of a remote attempt that is failing.
|
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search: '`cloudtrail` (errorCode=MalformedPolicyDocumentException) status=failure
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||||
(userAgent!=*.amazonaws.com) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as
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lastTime values(requestParameters.policyName) as policy_name by src eventName eventSource
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@@ -27,6 +30,7 @@ references:
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- AWS IAM Privilege Escalation
|
||||
automated_detection_testing: passed
|
||||
dataset:
|
||||
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1580/aws_iam_assume_role_policy_brute_force/aws_iam_assume_role_policy_brute_force.json
|
||||
kill_chain_phases:
|
||||
@@ -46,4 +50,3 @@ tags:
|
||||
- errorCode
|
||||
- requestParameters.policyName
|
||||
security_domain: access
|
||||
automated_detection_testing: passed
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ references:
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- AWS IAM Privilege Escalation
|
||||
automated_detection_testing: passed
|
||||
dataset:
|
||||
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1098/aws_iam_delete_policy/aws_iam_delete_policy.json
|
||||
kill_chain_phases:
|
||||
@@ -46,4 +47,3 @@ tags:
|
||||
- errorCode
|
||||
- requestParameters.policyArn
|
||||
security_domain: access
|
||||
automated_detection_testing: passed
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -5,9 +5,9 @@ date: '2021-04-01'
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author: Michael Haag, Splunk
|
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type: batch
|
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datamodel: []
|
||||
description: This detection identifies failure attempts to delete groups. We want to identify
|
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when a group is attempting to be deleted, but either access is denied, there is
|
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a conflict or there is no group. This is indicative of administrators performing
|
||||
description: This detection identifies failure attempts to delete groups. We want
|
||||
to identify when a group is attempting to be deleted, but either access is denied,
|
||||
there is a conflict or there is no group. This is indicative of administrators performing
|
||||
an action, but also could be suspicious behavior occurring. Review parallel IAM
|
||||
events - recently added users, new groups and so forth.
|
||||
search: '`cloudtrail` eventSource=iam.amazonaws.com eventName=DeleteGroup errorCode
|
||||
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ references:
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- AWS IAM Privilege Escalation
|
||||
automated_detection_testing: passed
|
||||
dataset:
|
||||
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1098/aws_iam_failure_group_deletion/aws_iam_failure_group_deletion.json
|
||||
kill_chain_phases:
|
||||
@@ -46,4 +47,3 @@ tags:
|
||||
- errorCode
|
||||
- requestParameters.groupName
|
||||
security_domain: identity
|
||||
automated_detection_testing: passed
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ references:
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- AWS IAM Privilege Escalation
|
||||
automated_detection_testing: passed
|
||||
dataset:
|
||||
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1098/aws_iam_successful_group_deletion/aws_iam_successful_group_deletion.json
|
||||
kill_chain_phases:
|
||||
@@ -45,4 +46,3 @@ tags:
|
||||
- errorCode
|
||||
- requestParameters.groupName
|
||||
security_domain: identity
|
||||
automated_detection_testing: passed
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ references:
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- Cobalt Strike
|
||||
automated_detection_testing: passed
|
||||
dataset:
|
||||
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon_dllhost.log
|
||||
kill_chain_phases:
|
||||
@@ -51,4 +52,3 @@ tags:
|
||||
- dest_port
|
||||
- process_path
|
||||
security_domain: endpoint
|
||||
automated_detection_testing: passed
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ references:
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- Spearphishing Attachments
|
||||
automated_detection_testing: passed
|
||||
dataset:
|
||||
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon.log
|
||||
kill_chain_phases:
|
||||
@@ -49,4 +50,3 @@ tags:
|
||||
- user
|
||||
- parent_process_id
|
||||
security_domain: endpoint
|
||||
automated_detection_testing: passed
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ references:
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- Spearphishing Attachments
|
||||
automated_detection_testing: passed
|
||||
dataset:
|
||||
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon.log
|
||||
kill_chain_phases:
|
||||
@@ -53,4 +54,3 @@ tags:
|
||||
- user
|
||||
- parent_process_id
|
||||
security_domain: endpoint
|
||||
automated_detection_testing: passed
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -20,8 +20,8 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint
|
||||
| regex process="(gpupdate\.exe.{0,4}$)" | join process_id [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
|
||||
count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Ports where Ports.dest_port !="0" by Ports.process_id
|
||||
Ports.dest Ports.dest_port| `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | rename dest as connection_to_CNC]
|
||||
| table _time dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process process_id connection_to_CNC
|
||||
dest_port | `gpupdate_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network_filter`'
|
||||
| table _time dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process process_id
|
||||
connection_to_CNC dest_port | `gpupdate_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network_filter`'
|
||||
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
|
||||
on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
|
||||
your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
|
||||
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ references:
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- Cobalt Strike
|
||||
automated_detection_testing: passed
|
||||
dataset:
|
||||
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log
|
||||
kill_chain_phases:
|
||||
@@ -52,4 +53,3 @@ tags:
|
||||
- dest_port
|
||||
- process_path
|
||||
security_domain: endpoint
|
||||
automated_detection_testing: passed
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -29,6 +29,9 @@ references:
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- Spearphishing Attachments
|
||||
automated_detection_testing: passed
|
||||
dataset:
|
||||
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/datasets/windows-sysmon.log
|
||||
kill_chain_phases:
|
||||
- Exploitation
|
||||
mitre_attack_id:
|
||||
@@ -46,6 +49,3 @@ tags:
|
||||
- Processes.user
|
||||
- Processes.process_id
|
||||
security_domain: endpoint
|
||||
automated_detection_testing: passed
|
||||
dataset:
|
||||
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/datasets/windows-sysmon.log
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -35,6 +35,9 @@ references:
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- Spearphishing Attachments
|
||||
automated_detection_testing: passed
|
||||
dataset:
|
||||
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/datasets/windows-sysmon.log
|
||||
kill_chain_phases:
|
||||
- Exploitation
|
||||
mitre_attack_id:
|
||||
@@ -54,6 +57,3 @@ tags:
|
||||
- ProcessGuid
|
||||
- _time
|
||||
security_domain: endpoint
|
||||
automated_detection_testing: passed
|
||||
dataset:
|
||||
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/datasets/windows-sysmon.log
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -28,6 +28,9 @@ references:
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- Spearphishing Attachments
|
||||
automated_detection_testing: passed
|
||||
dataset:
|
||||
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/datasets/windows-sysmon.log
|
||||
kill_chain_phases:
|
||||
- Exploitation
|
||||
mitre_attack_id:
|
||||
@@ -47,6 +50,3 @@ tags:
|
||||
- ProcessGuid
|
||||
- _time
|
||||
security_domain: endpoint
|
||||
automated_detection_testing: passed
|
||||
dataset:
|
||||
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/datasets/windows-sysmon.log
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -27,6 +27,9 @@ references:
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- Spearphishing Attachments
|
||||
automated_detection_testing: passed
|
||||
dataset:
|
||||
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/datasets2/windows-sysmon.log
|
||||
kill_chain_phases:
|
||||
- Exploitation
|
||||
mitre_attack_id:
|
||||
@@ -47,6 +50,3 @@ tags:
|
||||
- Computer
|
||||
- EventCode
|
||||
security_domain: endpoint
|
||||
automated_detection_testing: passed
|
||||
dataset:
|
||||
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/datasets2/windows-sysmon.log
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ references:
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- Spearphishing Attachments
|
||||
automated_detection_testing: passed
|
||||
dataset:
|
||||
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_icedid.log
|
||||
kill_chain_phases:
|
||||
@@ -54,4 +55,3 @@ tags:
|
||||
- user
|
||||
- parent_process_id
|
||||
security_domain: endpoint
|
||||
automated_detection_testing: passed
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -20,8 +20,8 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint
|
||||
| regex process="(rundll32\.exe.{0,4}$)" | join process_id [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
|
||||
count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Ports where Ports.dest_port !="0" by Ports.process_id
|
||||
Ports.dest Ports.dest_port| `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | rename dest as connection_to_CNC]
|
||||
| table _time dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process process_id connection_to_CNC
|
||||
dest_port | `rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network_filter`'
|
||||
| table _time dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process process_id
|
||||
connection_to_CNC dest_port | `rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network_filter`'
|
||||
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
|
||||
on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
|
||||
your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `port` node.
|
||||
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- Suspicious Rundll32 Activity
|
||||
- Cobalt Strike
|
||||
automated_detection_testing: passed
|
||||
dataset:
|
||||
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log
|
||||
kill_chain_phases:
|
||||
@@ -55,4 +56,3 @@ tags:
|
||||
- dest_port
|
||||
- process_path
|
||||
security_domain: endpoint
|
||||
automated_detection_testing: passed
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ references:
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- Cobalt Strike
|
||||
automated_detection_testing: passed
|
||||
dataset:
|
||||
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon_searchprotocolhost.log
|
||||
kill_chain_phases:
|
||||
@@ -50,4 +51,3 @@ tags:
|
||||
- dest_port
|
||||
- process_path
|
||||
security_domain: endpoint
|
||||
automated_detection_testing: passed
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -33,6 +33,9 @@ references:
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- Windows Persistence Techniques
|
||||
automated_detection_testing: passed
|
||||
dataset:
|
||||
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/tasksched/windows-security.log
|
||||
kill_chain_phases:
|
||||
- Exploitation
|
||||
mitre_attack_id:
|
||||
@@ -51,6 +54,3 @@ tags:
|
||||
- Hidden
|
||||
- Arguments
|
||||
security_domain: endpoint
|
||||
automated_detection_testing: passed
|
||||
dataset:
|
||||
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/tasksched/windows-security.log
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ tags:
|
||||
- Windows Persistence Techniques
|
||||
- Ransomware
|
||||
- Ryuk Ransomware
|
||||
automated_detection_testing: passed
|
||||
dataset:
|
||||
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log
|
||||
kill_chain_phases:
|
||||
@@ -63,4 +64,3 @@ tags:
|
||||
- Description
|
||||
- Command
|
||||
security_domain: endpoint
|
||||
automated_detection_testing: passed
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ tags:
|
||||
- Windows Persistence Techniques
|
||||
- Ransomware
|
||||
- Ryuk Ransomware
|
||||
automated_detection_testing: passed
|
||||
dataset:
|
||||
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/taskschedule/windows-security.log
|
||||
kill_chain_phases:
|
||||
@@ -63,4 +64,3 @@ tags:
|
||||
- Description
|
||||
- Command
|
||||
security_domain: endpoint
|
||||
automated_detection_testing: passed
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ references:
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- Spearphishing Attachments
|
||||
automated_detection_testing: passed
|
||||
dataset:
|
||||
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon.log
|
||||
kill_chain_phases:
|
||||
@@ -49,4 +50,3 @@ tags:
|
||||
- user
|
||||
- parent_process_id
|
||||
security_domain: endpoint
|
||||
automated_detection_testing: passed
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ references:
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- Spearphishing Attachments
|
||||
automated_detection_testing: passed
|
||||
dataset:
|
||||
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon.log
|
||||
kill_chain_phases:
|
||||
@@ -51,4 +52,3 @@ tags:
|
||||
- user
|
||||
- parent_process_id
|
||||
security_domain: endpoint
|
||||
automated_detection_testing: passed
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ references:
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- Spearphishing Attachment
|
||||
automated_detection_testing: passed
|
||||
dataset:
|
||||
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_wsh.log
|
||||
kill_chain_phases:
|
||||
@@ -51,4 +52,3 @@ tags:
|
||||
- user
|
||||
- parent_process_id
|
||||
security_domain: endpoint
|
||||
automated_detection_testing: passed
|
||||
|
||||
Vendored
+1
-1
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
|
||||
"id": {
|
||||
"group": null,
|
||||
"name": "DA-ESS-ContentUpdate",
|
||||
"version": "3.18.0"
|
||||
"version": "3.19.0"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"author": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
|
||||
+109
-109
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
||||
#############
|
||||
# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
|
||||
# On Date: 2021-04-14T19:13:35 UTC
|
||||
# On Date: 2021-04-22T21:35:40 UTC
|
||||
# Author: Splunk Security Research
|
||||
# Contact: research@splunk.com
|
||||
#############
|
||||
@@ -35,8 +35,8 @@ version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 12", "CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1535"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP", "ID.AM"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Instance Types", "ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 AMIs", "ESCU - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User", "ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Regions"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 AMIs", "ESCU - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Instance Types", "ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User", "ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Regions"]
|
||||
data_models = []
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
description = Monitor your AWS EC2 instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or EC2 instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior.
|
||||
@@ -53,8 +53,8 @@ modification_date = 2021-03-08
|
||||
id = ced74200-8465-4bc3-bd2c-22782eec6750
|
||||
version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation/", "https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/the-cloud-shadow-admin-threat-10-permissions-to-protect", "https://labs.bishopfox.com/tech-blog/privilege-escalation-in-aws"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Create Policy Version to allow all resources - Rule", "ESCU - AWS CreateAccessKey - Rule", "ESCU - AWS CreateLoginProfile - Rule", "ESCU - AWS SetDefaultPolicyVersion - Rule", "ESCU - AWS UpdateLoginProfile - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1136.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.DS"]}
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Create Policy Version to allow all resources - Rule", "ESCU - AWS CreateAccessKey - Rule", "ESCU - AWS CreateLoginProfile - Rule", "ESCU - AWS IAM Assume Role Policy Brute Force - Rule", "ESCU - AWS IAM Delete Policy - Rule", "ESCU - AWS IAM Failure Group Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - AWS SetDefaultPolicyVersion - Rule", "ESCU - AWS UpdateLoginProfile - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069.003", "T1078.004", "T1098", "T1110", "T1136.003", "T1580"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.DS"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = []
|
||||
support_searches = []
|
||||
data_models = []
|
||||
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ version = 2
|
||||
reference = ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonVPC/latest/UserGuide/VPC_Appendix_NACLs.html", "https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/how-to-help-prepare-for-ddos-attacks-by-reducing-your-attack-surface/"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 11", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.007"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "DE.DP", "PR.AC"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of blocked outbound traffic from AWS", "ESCU - Baseline of Network ACL Activity by ARN"]
|
||||
data_models = []
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From City - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Country - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Region - Response Task"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From City - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Country - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Region - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources"]
|
||||
data_models = []
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.p
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Excessive Security Scanning - Rule", "ESCU - Detect API activity from users without MFA - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS API Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Security Group Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new API calls from user roles - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 13", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1526"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "DE.DP", "ID.AM", "PR.AC", "PR.DS"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of API Calls per User ARN", "ESCU - Create a list of approved AWS service accounts", "ESCU - Baseline of Security Group Activity by ARN", "ESCU - Previously seen API call per user roles in CloudTrail"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously seen API call per user roles in CloudTrail", "ESCU - Baseline of API Calls per User ARN", "ESCU - Baseline of Security Group Activity by ARN", "ESCU - Create a list of approved AWS service accounts"]
|
||||
data_models = []
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
description = Detect and investigate dormant user accounts for your AWS environment that have become active again. Because inactive and ad-hoc accounts are common attack targets, it's critical to enable governance within your environment.
|
||||
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs/blob/v3.2/dev/rules/REQUEST-944-APPLICATION-ATTACK-JAVA.conf"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Java Classes - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Content-Type Length - Rule", "ESCU - Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 18", "CIS 3", "CIS 4", "CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Delivery", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1082"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.RA", "PR.IP", "PR.MA", "PR.PT", "RS.MI"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate Web POSTs From src - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Suspicious Strings in HTTP Header - Response Task"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate Suspicious Strings in HTTP Header - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Web POSTs From src - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = []
|
||||
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
@@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://www.zerofox.com/blog/what-is-digital-risk-monitoring/", "https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/consumer/family-safety/what-is-typosquatting/", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2016/06/explained-typosquatting/"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Delivery"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - DNSTwist Domain Names"]
|
||||
data_models = ["Email", "Network_Resolution", "Web"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
@@ -262,8 +262,8 @@ version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 12", "CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1535"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP", "ID.AM"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Initial", "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Update", "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Destroyed", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Initial"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Update", "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Update", "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Destroyed"]
|
||||
data_models = ["Change"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
description = Monitor your cloud compute instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or compute instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior.
|
||||
@@ -297,7 +297,7 @@ modification_date = 2021-02-16
|
||||
id = bcfd17e8-5461-400a-80a2-3b7d1459220c
|
||||
version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://www.cobaltstrike.com/", "https://www.infocyte.com/blog/2020/09/02/cobalt-strike-the-new-favorite-among-thieves/", "https://bluescreenofjeff.com/2017-01-24-how-to-write-malleable-c2-profiles-for-cobalt-strike/", "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2020/09/coverage-strikes-back-cobalt-strike-paper.html", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/unauthorized-access-of-fireeye-red-team-tools.html", "https://github.com/MichaelKoczwara/Awesome-CobaltStrike-Defence", "https://github.com/zer0yu/Awesome-CobaltStrike"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Cobalt Strike Named Pipes - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious DLLHost no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious GPUpdate no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 StartW - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious SearchProtocolHost no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious msbuild path - Rule"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Cobalt Strike Named Pipes - Rule", "ESCU - DLLHost with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - GPUpdate with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule", "ESCU - SearchProtocolHost with no Command Line with Network - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious DLLHost no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious GPUpdate no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 StartW - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious SearchProtocolHost no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious msbuild path - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036.003", "T1055", "T1127", "T1127.001", "T1218.010", "T1218.011"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = []
|
||||
support_searches = []
|
||||
@@ -325,7 +325,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://www.intego.com/mac-security-blog/osxcoldroot-and-the-rat-invasion/", "https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x2A.html", "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/coldroot-rat-still-undetectable-despite-being-uploaded-on-github-two-years-ago/"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection - Rule", "ESCU - Processes Tapping Keyboard Events - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 4", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Installation"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "DE.DP", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip - Response Task"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = []
|
||||
data_models = []
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
@@ -344,7 +344,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Collection", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1074"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Email files written outside of the Outlook directory - Rule", "ESCU - Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts - Rule", "ESCU - Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious writes to System Volume Information - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036", "T1114.001", "T1114.002"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = []
|
||||
data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
@@ -363,8 +363,8 @@ version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Command_and_Control", "https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/feature/Command-and-control-servers-The-puppet-masters-that-govern-malware"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 11", "CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048", "T1048.003", "T1071.001", "T1071.004", "T1095", "T1189"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.AC", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK", "ESCU - Baseline of blocked outbound traffic from AWS"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of blocked outbound traffic from AWS", "ESCU - Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK"]
|
||||
data_models = ["Network_Resolution", "Network_Traffic"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
description = Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures leveraged by attackers to establish and operate command and control channels. Implants installed by attackers on compromised endpoints use these channels to receive instructions and send data back to the malicious operators.
|
||||
@@ -414,9 +414,9 @@ modification_date = 2020-02-04
|
||||
id = 854d78bf-d0e2-4f4e-b05c-640905f86d7a
|
||||
version = 3
|
||||
reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1003", "https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for.html"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", "ESCU - Create Remote Thread into LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of lsass Dump with Taskmgr - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Ntdsutil Export NTDS - Rule", "ESCU - Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS - Rule"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", "ESCU - Create Remote Thread into LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of lsass Dump with Taskmgr - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Ntdsutil Export NTDS - Rule", "ESCU - Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001", "T1003.002", "T1003.003", "T1059.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Previous Unseen User - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts - Response Task"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Previous Unseen User - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = []
|
||||
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
@@ -435,8 +435,8 @@ version = 2
|
||||
reference = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Create local admin accounts using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Single Letter Process On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 16", "CIS 2", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.002", "T1053.005", "T1059.001", "T1059.003", "T1071.002", "T1112", "T1136.001", "T1204.002", "T1543.003", "T1547.001", "T1562.004"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process File Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments", "ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process File Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments"]
|
||||
data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
description = Monitor for suspicious activities associated with DHS Technical Alert US-CERT TA18-074A. Some of the activities that adversaries used in these compromises included spearfishing attacks, malware, watering-hole domains, many and more.
|
||||
@@ -473,7 +473,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/", "http://www.noip.com/blog/2014/07/11/dynamic-dns-can-use-2/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/08/04/detecting-dynamic-dns-domains-in-splunk.html"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS record changed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003", "T1071.004", "T1189"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - DNS Hijack Enrichment - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - DNS Hijack Enrichment - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Discover DNS records"]
|
||||
data_models = ["Network_Resolution"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
@@ -515,7 +515,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/data-protection/", "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/dns/splunk-detect-dns-tunneling-37022", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect USB device insertion - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003", "T1189"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.DS", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = []
|
||||
data_models = ["Change_Analysis", "Network_Resolution"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
@@ -566,8 +566,8 @@ version = 2
|
||||
reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1089", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2015/11/vonteera-adware-uses-certificates-to-disable-anti-malware/", "https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Tools-Report.pdf"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Unload Sysmon Filter Driver - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112", "T1543.003", "T1553.004", "T1562.001", "T1562.004"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments", "ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments"]
|
||||
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
description = Looks for activities and techniques associated with the disabling of security tools on a Windows system, such as suspicious `reg.exe` processes, processes launching netsh, and many others.
|
||||
@@ -600,7 +600,7 @@ version = 2
|
||||
reference = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/", "http://www.noip.com/blog/2014/07/11/dynamic-dns-can-use-2/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/08/04/detecting-dynamic-dns-domains-in-splunk.html"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1071.001", "T1189"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "DE.DP", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = []
|
||||
data_models = ["Network_Resolution", "Web"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
@@ -617,7 +617,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-201A", "https://www.first.org/resources/papers/conf2017/Advanced-Incident-Detection-and-Threat-Hunting-using-Sysmon-and-Splunk.pdf", "https://www.vkremez.com/2017/05/emotet-banking-trojan-malware-analysis.html"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of tools built by NirSoft - Rule", "ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 2", "CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Delivery", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.002", "T1059.003", "T1072", "T1547.001", "T1566.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK"]
|
||||
data_models = ["Email", "Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
@@ -670,7 +670,7 @@ modification_date = 2021-03-03
|
||||
id = beae2ab0-7c3f-11eb-8b63-acde48001122
|
||||
version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/detecting-hafnium-exchange-server-zero-day-activity-in-splunk.html", "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/03/02/active-exploitation-of-microsoft-exchange-zero-day-vulnerabilities/", "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/", "https://blog.rapid7.com/2021/03/03/rapid7s-insightidr-enables-detection-and-response-to-microsoft-exchange-0-day/"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Exchange Web Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Nishang PowershellTCPOneLine - Rule", "ESCU - Ntdsutil Export NTDS - Rule", "ESCU - Unified Messaging Service Spawning a Process - Rule", "ESCU - W3WP Spawning Shell - Rule"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Exchange Web Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Nishang PowershellTCPOneLine - Rule", "ESCU - Ntdsutil Export NTDS - Rule", "ESCU - Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Unified Messaging Service Spawning a Process - Rule", "ESCU - W3WP Spawning Shell - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001", "T1003.003", "T1021.002", "T1059.001", "T1114.002", "T1136.001", "T1190", "T1505.003"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = []
|
||||
support_searches = []
|
||||
@@ -691,8 +691,8 @@ version = 2
|
||||
reference = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/HIDDEN-COBRA-North-Korean-Malicious-Cyber-Activity", "https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Destructive-Malware-Report.pdf"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious File Write - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 16", "CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001", "T1021.002", "T1048.003", "T1059.001", "T1059.003", "T1070.005", "T1071.002", "T1071.004"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Outbound Emails to Hidden Cobra Threat Actors - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments", "ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Outbound Emails to Hidden Cobra Threat Actors - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments", "ESCU - Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK"]
|
||||
data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Resolution", "Network_Traffic"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
description = Monitor for and investigate activities, including the creation or deletion of hidden shares and file writes, that may be evidence of infiltration by North Korean government-sponsored cybercriminals. Details of this activity were reported in DHS Report TA-18-149A.
|
||||
@@ -711,7 +711,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2016/09/hosts-file-hijacks/"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Windows hosts file modification - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003", "T1071.004"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.AC", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = []
|
||||
data_models = ["Network_Resolution"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
@@ -776,7 +776,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://github.com/splunk/cloud-datamodel-security-research"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1526"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = []
|
||||
data_models = []
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
@@ -827,7 +827,7 @@ version = 2
|
||||
reference = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/executive-perspective/2015/08/malware_lateral_move.html"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks - Rule", "ESCU - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001", "T1053.005", "T1550.002", "T1558.003"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = []
|
||||
data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
@@ -846,9 +846,9 @@ modification_date = 2017-08-23
|
||||
id = 2c8ff66e-0b57-42af-8ad7-912438a403fc
|
||||
version = 4
|
||||
reference = ["https://blogs.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/malware-employs-powershell-to-infect-systems/", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadFile - Rule", "ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Multiple Suspicious Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques - Rule"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadFile - Rule", "ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Multiple Suspicious Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques - Rule", "ESCU - Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1027", "T1059.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = []
|
||||
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
@@ -874,8 +874,8 @@ version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/03/04/tracking-locky-ransomware-using-carbon-black/"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Extended Period Without Successful Netbackup Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Unsuccessful Netbackup backups - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - All backup logs for host - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Monitor Successful Backups", "ESCU - Monitor Unsuccessful Backups"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - All backup logs for host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Monitor Unsuccessful Backups", "ESCU - Monitor Successful Backups"]
|
||||
data_models = []
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
description = Address common concerns when monitoring your backup processes. These searches can help you reduce risks from ransomware, device theft, or denial of physical access to a host by backing up data on endpoints.
|
||||
@@ -891,7 +891,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 2"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Installation"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = []
|
||||
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
@@ -945,8 +945,8 @@ version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/tn-archive/bb490939(v=technet.10)", "https://htmlpreview.github.io/?https://github.com/MatthewDemaske/blogbackup/blob/master/netshell.html", "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Processes created by netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.004"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments", "ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments"]
|
||||
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
description = Detect activities and various techniques associated with the abuse of `netsh.exe`, which can disable local firewall settings or set up a remote connection to a host from an infected system.
|
||||
@@ -980,8 +980,8 @@ version = 2
|
||||
reference = ["https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/orangeworm-targets-healthcare-us-europe-asia", "https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/healthcare-targeted-by-hacker/"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 2", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001", "T1059.003", "T1543.003", "T1569.002"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments", "ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial", "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments"]
|
||||
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
description = Detect activities and various techniques associated with the Orangeworm Attack Group, a group that frequently targets the healthcare industry.
|
||||
@@ -991,30 +991,6 @@ Healthcare may be a promising target, because it is notoriously behind in techno
|
||||
This Analytic Story is designed to help you detect and investigate suspicious activities that may be indicative of an Orangeworm attack. One detection search looks for command-line arguments. Another monitors for uses of sc.exe, a non-essential Windows file that can manipulate Windows services. One of the investigative searches helps you get more information on web hosts that you suspect have been compromised.
|
||||
product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud']
|
||||
|
||||
[Phishing Payloads]
|
||||
category = Adversary Tactics
|
||||
creation_date = 2019-04-29
|
||||
modification_date = 2019-04-29
|
||||
id = 57226b40-94f3-4ce5-b101-a75f67759c27
|
||||
version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/spear-phishing-campaign-targets-ukraine-government.html"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Oulook exe writing a zip file - Rule", "ESCU - Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001", "T1566.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = []
|
||||
data_models = []
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
description = Detect signs of malicious payloads that may indicate that your environment has been breached via a phishing attack.
|
||||
narrative = Despite its simplicity, phishing remains the most pervasive and dangerous cyberthreat. In fact, research shows that as many as [91% of all successful attacks](https://digitalguardian.com/blog/91-percent-cyber-attacks-start-phishing-email-heres-how-protect-against-phishing) are initiated via a phishing email. \
|
||||
As most people know, these emails use fraudulent domains, [email scraping](https://www.cyberscoop.com/emotet-trojan-phishing-scraping-templates-cofense-geodo/), familiar contact names inserted as senders, and other tactics to lure targets into clicking a malicious link, opening an attachment with a [nefarious payload](https://www.cyberscoop.com/emotet-trojan-phishing-scraping-templates-cofense-geodo/), or entering sensitive personal information that perpetrators may intercept. This attack technique requires a relatively low level of skill and allows adversaries to easily cast a wide net. Worse, because its success relies on the gullibility of humans, it's impossible to completely "automate" it out of your environment. However, you can use ES and ESCU to detect and investigate potentially malicious payloads injected into your environment subsequent to a phishing attack. \
|
||||
While any kind of file may contain a malicious payload, some are more likely to be perceived as benign (and thus more often escape notice) by the average victim—especially when the attacker sends an email that seems to be from one of their contacts. An example is Microsoft Office files. Most corporate users are familiar with documents with the following suffixes: .doc/.docx (MS Word), .xls/.xlsx (MS Excel), and .ppt/.pptx (MS PowerPoint), so they may click without a second thought, slashing a hole in their organizations' security. \
|
||||
Following is a typical series of events, according to an [article by Trend Micro](https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/rising-trend-attackers-using-lnk-files-download-malware/):\
|
||||
1. Attacker sends a phishing email. Recipient downloads the attached file, which is typically a .docx or .zip file with an embedded .lnk file\
|
||||
1. The .lnk file executes a PowerShell script\
|
||||
1. Powershell executes a reverse shell, rendering the exploit successful </ol>As a side note, adversaries are likely to use a tool like Empire to craft and obfuscate payloads and their post-injection activities, such as [exfiltration, lateral movement, and persistence](https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire).\
|
||||
This Analytic Story focuses on detecting signs that a malicious payload has been injected into your environment. For example, one search detects outlook.exe writing a .zip file. Another looks for suspicious .lnk files launching processes.
|
||||
product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud']
|
||||
|
||||
[Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns]
|
||||
category = Adversary Tactics
|
||||
creation_date = 2020-01-22
|
||||
@@ -1024,8 +1000,8 @@ version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/scope-of-mudcarp-attacks-highlight-1/", "http://blog.amossys.fr/badflick-is-not-so-bad.html"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001", "T1059.003", "T1547.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments", "ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments"]
|
||||
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
description = Monitor your environment for suspicious behaviors that resemble the techniques employed by the MUDCARP threat group.
|
||||
@@ -1068,7 +1044,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["http://www.novetta.com/2015/02/advanced-methods-to-detect-advanced-cyber-attacks-protocol-abuse/"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048", "T1048.003", "T1071.001", "T1189"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.DS", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = []
|
||||
data_models = ["Network_Resolution", "Network_Traffic"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
@@ -1083,9 +1059,9 @@ modification_date = 2020-02-04
|
||||
id = cf309d0d-d4aa-4fbb-963d-1e79febd3756
|
||||
version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://www.carbonblack.com/2017/06/28/carbon-black-threat-research-technical-analysis-petya-notpetya-ransomware/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2017/06/27/closing-the-detection-to-mitigation-gap-or-to-petya-or-notpetya-whocares-.html"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 10", "CIS 12", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 6", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Delivery", "Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.002", "T1036.003", "T1047", "T1048", "T1053.005", "T1070", "T1070.001", "T1071.001", "T1485", "T1490", "T1547.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "DE.DP", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK", "ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK"]
|
||||
data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
@@ -1135,7 +1111,7 @@ modification_date = 2020-11-06
|
||||
id = 507edc74-13d5-4339-878e-b9744ded1f35
|
||||
version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/detecting-ryuk-using-splunk-attack-range.html", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/big-game-hunting-with-ryuk-another-lucrative-targeted-ransomware/", "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-302a"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Ryuk Test Files Detected - Rule", "ESCU - Ryuk Wake on LAN Command - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Security Account Manager Stopped - Rule", "ESCU - Windows connhost exe started forcefully - Rule"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Ryuk Test Files Detected - Rule", "ESCU - Ryuk Wake on LAN Command - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Security Account Manager Stopped - Rule", "ESCU - Windows connhost exe started forcefully - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 16", "CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Delivery", "Exploitation", "Lateral Movement", "Privilege Escalation", "Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001", "T1053.005", "T1059.003", "T1482", "T1485", "T1486", "T1489", "T1490", "T1562.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = []
|
||||
@@ -1172,7 +1148,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/an-in-depth-analysis-of-samsam-ransomware-and-boss-spider/", "https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2018/07/31/samsam-the-almost-6-million-ransomware/", "https://thehackernews.com/2018/07/samsam-ransomware-attacks.html"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Batch File Write to System32 - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - File with Samsam Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Samsam Test File Write - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 10", "CIS 12", "CIS 16", "CIS 18", "CIS 2", "CIS 3", "CIS 4", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Delivery", "Installation", "Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001", "T1021.002", "T1082", "T1204.002", "T1485", "T1486", "T1490"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "ID.RA", "PR.AC", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.MA", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = []
|
||||
data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic", "Web"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
@@ -1202,6 +1178,30 @@ description = Silver Sparrow, identified by Red Canary Intelligence, is a new fo
|
||||
narrative = Silver Sparrow works is a dropper and uses typical persistence mechanisms on a Mac. It is cross platform, covering both Intel and Apple M1 architecture. To this date, no implant has been downloaded for malicious purposes. During installation of the update.pkg or updater.pkg file, the malicious software utilizes JavaScript to generate files and scripts on disk for persistence.These files later download a implant from an S3 bucket every hour. This analytic assists with identifying different types of macOS malware families establishing LaunchAgent persistence. Per SentinelOne source, it is predicted that Silver Sparrow is likely selling itself as a mechanism to 3rd party “affiliates” or pay-per-install (PPI) partners, typically seen as commodity adware/malware. Additional indicators and behaviors may be found within the references.
|
||||
product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud']
|
||||
|
||||
[Spearphishing Attachments]
|
||||
category = Adversary Tactics
|
||||
creation_date = 2019-04-29
|
||||
modification_date = 2019-04-29
|
||||
id = 57226b40-94f3-4ce5-b101-a75f67759c27
|
||||
version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/spear-phishing-campaign-targets-ukraine-government.html"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Outlook exe writing a zip file - Rule", "ESCU - Excel Spawning PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Excel Spawning Windows Script Host - Rule", "ESCU - Office Application Spawn rundll32 process - Rule", "ESCU - Office Document Creating Schedule Task - Rule", "ESCU - Office Document Executing Macro Code - Rule", "ESCU - Office Document Spawned Child Process To Download - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning Rundll32 with no DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location - Rule", "ESCU - Winword Spawning Cmd - Rule", "ESCU - Winword Spawning PowerShell - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.002", "T1566.001", "T1566.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = []
|
||||
support_searches = []
|
||||
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
description = Detect signs of malicious payloads that may indicate that your environment has been breached via a phishing attack.
|
||||
narrative = Despite its simplicity, phishing remains the most pervasive and dangerous cyberthreat. In fact, research shows that as many as [91% of all successful attacks](https://digitalguardian.com/blog/91-percent-cyber-attacks-start-phishing-email-heres-how-protect-against-phishing) are initiated via a phishing email. \
|
||||
As most people know, these emails use fraudulent domains, [email scraping](https://www.cyberscoop.com/emotet-trojan-phishing-scraping-templates-cofense-geodo/), familiar contact names inserted as senders, and other tactics to lure targets into clicking a malicious link, opening an attachment with a [nefarious payload](https://www.cyberscoop.com/emotet-trojan-phishing-scraping-templates-cofense-geodo/), or entering sensitive personal information that perpetrators may intercept. This attack technique requires a relatively low level of skill and allows adversaries to easily cast a wide net. Worse, because its success relies on the gullibility of humans, it's impossible to completely "automate" it out of your environment. However, you can use ES and ESCU to detect and investigate potentially malicious payloads injected into your environment subsequent to a phishing attack. \
|
||||
While any kind of file may contain a malicious payload, some are more likely to be perceived as benign (and thus more often escape notice) by the average victim—especially when the attacker sends an email that seems to be from one of their contacts. An example is Microsoft Office files. Most corporate users are familiar with documents with the following suffixes: .doc/.docx (MS Word), .xls/.xlsx (MS Excel), and .ppt/.pptx (MS PowerPoint), so they may click without a second thought, slashing a hole in their organizations' security. \
|
||||
Following is a typical series of events, according to an [article by Trend Micro](https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/rising-trend-attackers-using-lnk-files-download-malware/):\
|
||||
1. Attacker sends a phishing email. Recipient downloads the attached file, which is typically a .docx or .zip file with an embedded .lnk file\
|
||||
1. The .lnk file executes a PowerShell script\
|
||||
1. Powershell executes a reverse shell, rendering the exploit successful </ol>As a side note, adversaries are likely to use a tool like Empire to craft and obfuscate payloads and their post-injection activities, such as [exfiltration, lateral movement, and persistence](https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire).\
|
||||
This Analytic Story focuses on detecting signs that a malicious payload has been injected into your environment. For example, one search detects outlook.exe writing a .zip file. Another looks for suspicious .lnk files launching processes.
|
||||
product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud']
|
||||
|
||||
[Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities]
|
||||
category = Vulnerability
|
||||
creation_date = 2018-01-08
|
||||
@@ -1254,7 +1254,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-11409", "https://www.splunk.com/view/SP-CAAAP5E#VulnerabilityDescriptionsandRatings", "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44865/"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 18", "CIS 3", "CIS 4"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "ID.RA", "PR.AC", "PR.IP", "PR.PT", "RS.MI"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip - Response Task"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = []
|
||||
data_models = []
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
@@ -1274,8 +1274,8 @@ version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 12", "CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1535"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP", "ID.AM"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK", "ESCU - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User", "ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Regions"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User", "ESCU - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK", "ESCU - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Regions"]
|
||||
data_models = []
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS EC2 instances for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as EC2 instances that originate from unusual locations or those launched by previously unseen users (among others). Included investigative searches will help you probe more deeply, when the information warrants it.
|
||||
@@ -1308,8 +1308,8 @@ version = 2
|
||||
reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/security-data-protection/cloud/public-aws-s3-buckets-writable/"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Open S3 buckets - Rule", "ESCU - Detect S3 access from a new IP - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13", "CIS 14"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1530"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "DE.DP", "PR.AC", "PR.DS"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of S3 Bucket deletion activity by ARN", "ESCU - Previously seen S3 bucket access by remote IP"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously seen S3 bucket access by remote IP", "ESCU - Baseline of S3 Bucket deletion activity by ARN"]
|
||||
data_models = []
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS S3 buckets for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as detecting open S3 buckets and buckets being accessed from a new IP. The contextual and investigative searches will give you more information, when required.
|
||||
@@ -1327,7 +1327,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/hiding-cloudcobalt-strike-beacon-c2-using-amazon-apis/"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of blocked outbound traffic from AWS"]
|
||||
data_models = []
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
@@ -1348,7 +1348,7 @@ reference = ["https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-cloudtrail-now-tracks-cr
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by New User - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP", "PR.AC", "PR.DS"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Users In CloudTrail - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Update"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Users In CloudTrail - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Initial"]
|
||||
data_models = ["Authentication"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
description = Monitor your cloud authentication events. Searches within this Analytic Story leverage the recent cloud updates to the Authentication data model to help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious login activity.
|
||||
@@ -1365,8 +1365,8 @@ version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP", "ID.AM"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Destroyed", "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Update"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Update", "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Destroyed"]
|
||||
data_models = ["Change"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
description = Monitor your cloud infrastructure provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your cloud environment.
|
||||
@@ -1383,7 +1383,7 @@ reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.p
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update"]
|
||||
data_models = ["Change"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
description = Monitor your cloud infrastructure provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your cloud environment.
|
||||
@@ -1398,10 +1398,10 @@ modification_date = 2020-09-04
|
||||
id = 1ed5ce7d-5469-4232-92af-89d1a3595b39
|
||||
version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://redlock.io/blog/cryptojacking-tesla"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "DE.DP", "ID.AM", "PR.AC"]}
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - AWS IAM AccessDenied Discovery Events - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1078.004", "T1580"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "DE.DP", "ID.AM", "PR.AC"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Security Group API Calls Per User", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Initial", "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls Per User"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls Per User", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Update", "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Security Group API Calls Per User"]
|
||||
data_models = ["Change"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
description = Detect and investigate suspicious activities by users and roles in your cloud environments.
|
||||
@@ -1418,8 +1418,8 @@ version = 2
|
||||
reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1059", "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/macro-malware", "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036.003", "T1059.001", "T1059.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments", "ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments"]
|
||||
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
description = Leveraging the Windows command-line interface (CLI) is one of the most common attack techniques--one that is also detailed in the MITRE ATT&CK framework. Use this Analytic Story to help you identify unusual or suspicious use of the CLI on Windows systems.
|
||||
@@ -1435,7 +1435,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["http://blogs.splunk.com/2015/10/01/random-words-on-entropy-and-dns/", "http://www.darkreading.com/analytics/security-monitoring/got-malware-three-signs-revealed-in-dns-traffic/d/d-id/1139680", "https://live.paloaltonetworks.com/t5/Threat-Vulnerability-Articles/What-are-suspicious-DNS-queries/ta-p/71454"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003", "T1071.004", "T1189"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK"]
|
||||
data_models = ["Network_Resolution"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
@@ -1452,7 +1452,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/06/26/phishing-hits-a-new-level-of-quality/"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 3", "CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.IP"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - DNSTwist Domain Names"]
|
||||
data_models = ["Email", "UEBA"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
@@ -1490,8 +1490,8 @@ version = 2
|
||||
reference = ["https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/", "https://redcanary.com/blog/windows-registry-attacks-threat-detection/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/005/", "https://medium.com/@mbromileyDFIR/malware-monday-aebb456356c5"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Detect mshta inline hta execution - Rule", "ESCU - Detect mshta renamed - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious mshta child process - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious mshta spawn - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.003", "T1218.005", "T1547.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments", "ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments"]
|
||||
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe process to execute malicious code.
|
||||
@@ -1519,7 +1519,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1078", "https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Credential_stuffing", "https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/answer/What-is-a-password-spraying-attack-and-how-does-it-work"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentials From The Same IP - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Account Lockout Events - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Failed SSO Attempts - Rule", "ESCU - Okta User Logins From Multiple Cities - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate User Activities In Okta - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by app - Response Task"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by app - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate User Activities In Okta - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = []
|
||||
data_models = []
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
@@ -1553,8 +1553,8 @@ modification_date = 2021-02-03
|
||||
id = 80a65487-854b-42f1-80a1-935e4c170694
|
||||
version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - advpack - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - setupapi - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - syssetup - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 StartW - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 dllregisterserver - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001", "T1036.003", "T1218.011"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - advpack - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - setupapi - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - syssetup - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 StartW - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 dllregisterserver - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001", "T1036.003", "T1218.011"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = []
|
||||
support_searches = []
|
||||
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
|
||||
@@ -1572,7 +1572,7 @@ version = 2
|
||||
reference = ["https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Graeber-Abusing-Windows-Management-Instrumentation-WMI-To-Build-A-Persistent%20Asynchronous-And-Fileless-Backdoor-wp.pdf", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/wmimplant_a_wmi_ba.html"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Process Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - Script Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Temporary Event Subscription - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047", "T1546.003"], "nist": ["PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = []
|
||||
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
@@ -1591,7 +1591,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://redcanary.com/blog/windows-registry-attacks-threat-detection/", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1112"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.001", "T1546.011", "T1546.012", "T1547.001", "T1547.010", "T1548.002", "T1564.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = []
|
||||
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
@@ -1676,7 +1676,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - EC2 Instance Modified With Previously Unseen User - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Modifications By User"]
|
||||
data_models = []
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
@@ -1694,7 +1694,7 @@ version = 2
|
||||
reference = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/08/monitoring-windows-console-activity-part-two.html", "https://www.splunk.com/pdfs/technical-briefs/advanced-threat-detection-and-response-tech-brief.pdf", "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/logging/detecting-security-incidents-windows-workstation-event-logs-34262"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 2", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1016", "T1036.003", "T1204.002", "T1218.011"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK"]
|
||||
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
@@ -1713,7 +1713,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://www.monkey.org/~dugsong/dsniff/"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Protocols passing authentication in cleartext - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 14", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Reconnaissance"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.AC", "PR.DS", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = []
|
||||
data_models = ["Network_Traffic"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
@@ -1730,7 +1730,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://www.fbi.gov/scams-and-safety/common-fraud-schemes/internet-fraud", "https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2017-internet-crime-report-released-050718"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Web Fraud - Account Harvesting - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Anomalous User Clickspeed - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Password Sharing Across Accounts - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16", "CIS 6"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1136"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "DE.DP"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Web Session Information via session id - Response Task"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Web Session Information via session id - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = []
|
||||
data_models = []
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
@@ -1769,7 +1769,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Defense_Evasion"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Disable Registry Tool - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Show Hidden Files - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Windows SmartScreen Protection - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling CMD Application - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling ControlPanel - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Firewall with Netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling FolderOptions Windows Feature - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling NoRun Windows App - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling SystemRestore In Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Task Manager - Rule", "ESCU - Eventvwr UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - FodHelper UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Delivery", "Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112", "T1222.001", "T1548.002", "T1562.001", "T1564.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = []
|
||||
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
@@ -1786,7 +1786,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2013/12/file-extensions-2/", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1042"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Execution of File with Multiple Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036.003", "T1546.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = []
|
||||
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
@@ -1807,7 +1807,7 @@ version = 2
|
||||
reference = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/", "https://zeltser.com/security-incident-log-review-checklist/", "http://journeyintoir.blogspot.com/2013/01/re-introducing-usnjrnl.html"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 10", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070", "T1070.001", "T1490"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "DE.DP", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = []
|
||||
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
@@ -1823,9 +1823,9 @@ modification_date = 2018-05-31
|
||||
id = 30874d4f-20a1-488f-85ec-5d52ef74e3f9
|
||||
version = 2
|
||||
reference = ["http://www.fuzzysecurity.com/tutorials/19.html", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2010/07/malware-persistence-windows-registry.html", "http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/common-malware-persistence-mechanisms/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/fin7-shim-databases-persistence.html", "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dq2Hv7J9fvk"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Certutil exe certificate extraction - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation", "Installation", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005", "T1222.001", "T1543.003", "T1546.011", "T1547.001", "T1547.010", "T1564.001", "T1574.009", "T1574.011"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Certutil exe certificate extraction - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Shedule Task with HTTP Command Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation", "Installation", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053", "T1053.005", "T1222.001", "T1543.003", "T1546.011", "T1547.001", "T1547.010", "T1564.001", "T1574.009", "T1574.011"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = []
|
||||
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
@@ -1842,7 +1842,7 @@ version = 2
|
||||
reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Child Processes of Spoolsv exe - Rule", "ESCU - Overwriting Accessibility Binaries - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 2", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068", "T1204.002", "T1546.008", "T1546.012"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.AC", "PR.DS", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = []
|
||||
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
@@ -1859,7 +1859,7 @@ version = 3
|
||||
reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1050", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1031"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 2", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543.003", "T1569.002", "T1574.011"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial"]
|
||||
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
|
||||
+542
-117
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
Vendored
+2
-2
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
|
||||
is_configured = false
|
||||
state = enabled
|
||||
state_change_requires_restart = false
|
||||
build = 25653
|
||||
build = 27110
|
||||
|
||||
[triggers]
|
||||
reload.analytic_stories = simple
|
||||
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ reload.content-version = simple
|
||||
|
||||
[launcher]
|
||||
author = Splunk
|
||||
version = 3.18.0
|
||||
version = 3.19.0
|
||||
description = Explore the Analytic Stories included with ES Content Updates.
|
||||
|
||||
[ui]
|
||||
|
||||
Vendored
+1
-1
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
||||
#############
|
||||
# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
|
||||
# On Date: 2021-04-14T19:13:35 UTC
|
||||
# On Date: 2021-04-22T21:35:40 UTC
|
||||
# Author: Splunk Security Research
|
||||
# Contact: research@splunk.com
|
||||
#############
|
||||
|
||||
+1
-1
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
|
||||
[content-version]
|
||||
version = 3.18.0
|
||||
version = 3.19.0
|
||||
|
||||
+58
-58
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ label = AWS Cryptomining
|
||||
description = Monitor your AWS EC2 instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or EC2 instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_aws_iam_privilege_escalation]
|
||||
label = AWS IAM Privilege Escalation
|
||||
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ label = AWS Network ACL Activity
|
||||
description = Monitor your AWS network infrastructure for bad configurations and malicious activity. Investigative searches help you probe deeper, when the facts warrant it.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_aws_security_hub_alerts]
|
||||
label = AWS Security Hub Alerts
|
||||
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ label = AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities
|
||||
description = Monitor your AWS provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your network.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_city___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_country___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_region___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_city___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_country___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_region___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_aws_user_monitoring]
|
||||
label = AWS User Monitoring
|
||||
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ label = Apache Struts Vulnerability
|
||||
description = Detect and investigate activities--such as unusually long `Content-Type` length, suspicious java classes and web servers executing suspicious processes--consistent with attempts to exploit Apache Struts vulnerabilities.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_posts_from_src___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_suspicious_strings_in_http_header___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_suspicious_strings_in_http_header___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_posts_from_src___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_asset_tracking]
|
||||
label = Asset Tracking
|
||||
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ label = Brand Monitoring
|
||||
description = Detect and investigate activity that may indicate that an adversary is using faux domains to mislead users into interacting with malicious infrastructure. Monitor DNS, email, and web traffic for permutations of your brand name.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_emails_from_specific_sender___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_email_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_email_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_emails_from_specific_sender___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_clop_ransomware]
|
||||
label = Clop Ransomware
|
||||
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ label = Cloud Cryptomining
|
||||
description = Monitor your cloud compute instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or compute instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_cloud_federated_credential_abuse]
|
||||
label = Cloud Federated Credential Abuse
|
||||
@@ -116,21 +116,21 @@ label = ColdRoot MacOS RAT
|
||||
description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that relate to the ColdRoot Remote Access Trojan that affects MacOS. An example of some of these activities are changing sensative binaries in the MacOS sub-system, detecting process names and executables associated with the RAT, detecting when a keyboard tab is installed on a MacOS machine and more.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_network_traffic_from_src_ip___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_network_traffic_from_src_ip___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_collection_and_staging]
|
||||
label = Collection and Staging
|
||||
description = Monitor for and investigate activities--such as suspicious writes to the Windows Recycling Bin or email servers sending high amounts of traffic to specific hosts, for example--that may indicate that an adversary is harvesting and exfiltrating sensitive data.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_command_and_control]
|
||||
label = Command and Control
|
||||
description = Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures leveraged by attackers to establish and operate command and control channels. Implants installed by attackers on compromised endpoints use these channels to receive instructions and send data back to the malicious operators.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_common_phishing_frameworks]
|
||||
label = Common Phishing Frameworks
|
||||
@@ -151,14 +151,14 @@ label = Credential Dumping
|
||||
description = Uncover activity consistent with credential dumping, a technique wherein attackers compromise systems and attempt to obtain and exfiltrate passwords. The threat actors use these pilfered credentials to further escalate privileges and spread throughout a target environment. The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify attempts to credential dumping.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_hash_attempts___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_previous_unseen_user___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_failed_logins_for_multiple_destinations___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_ticket_attempts___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_hash_attempts___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_ticket_attempts___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_failed_logins_for_multiple_destinations___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_previous_unseen_user___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_dhs_report_ta18_074a]
|
||||
label = DHS Report TA18-074A
|
||||
description = Monitor for suspicious activities associated with DHS Technical Alert US-CERT TA18-074A. Some of the activities that adversaries used in these compromises included spearfishing attacks, malware, watering-hole domains, many and more.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_file_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_file_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_dns_amplification_attacks]
|
||||
label = DNS Amplification Attacks
|
||||
@@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ label = DNS Hijacking
|
||||
description = Secure your environment against DNS hijacks with searches that help you detect and investigate unauthorized changes to DNS records.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_dns_hijack_enrichment___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_dns_hijack_enrichment___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_data_exfiltration]
|
||||
label = Data Exfiltration
|
||||
@@ -186,7 +186,7 @@ label = Data Protection
|
||||
description = Fortify your data-protection arsenal--while continuing to ensure data confidentiality and integrity--with searches that monitor for and help you investigate possible signs of data exfiltration.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_deobfuscate_decode_files_or_information]
|
||||
label = Deobfuscate-Decode Files or Information
|
||||
@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ label = Disabling Security Tools
|
||||
description = Looks for activities and techniques associated with the disabling of security tools on a Windows system, such as suspicious `reg.exe` processes, processes launching netsh, and many others.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_domain_trust_discovery]
|
||||
label = Domain Trust Discovery
|
||||
@@ -221,14 +221,14 @@ label = Dynamic DNS
|
||||
description = Detect and investigate hosts in your environment that may be communicating with dynamic domain providers. Attackers may leverage these services to help them avoid firewall blocks and deny lists.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_emotet_malware__dhs_report_ta18_201a_]
|
||||
label = Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A
|
||||
description = Detect rarely used executables, specific registry paths that may confer malware survivability and persistence, instances where cmd.exe is used to launch script interpreters, and other indicators that the Emotet financial malware has compromised your environment.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_f5_tmui_rce_cve_2020_5902]
|
||||
label = F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902
|
||||
@@ -256,14 +256,14 @@ label = Hidden Cobra Malware
|
||||
description = Monitor for and investigate activities, including the creation or deletion of hidden shares and file writes, that may be evidence of infiltration by North Korean government-sponsored cybercriminals. Details of this activity were reported in DHS Report TA-18-149A.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_outbound_emails_to_hidden_cobra_threat_actors___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_outbound_emails_to_hidden_cobra_threat_actors___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_host_redirection]
|
||||
label = Host Redirection
|
||||
description = Detect evidence of tactics used to redirect traffic from a host to a destination other than the one intended--potentially one that is part of an adversary's attack infrastructure. An example is redirecting communications regarding patches and updates or misleading users into visiting a malicious website.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_ingress_tool_transfer]
|
||||
label = Ingress Tool Transfer
|
||||
@@ -284,7 +284,7 @@ label = Kubernetes Scanning Activity
|
||||
description = This story addresses detection against Kubernetes cluster fingerprint scan and attack by providing information on items such as source ip, user agent, cluster names.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_gcp_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_amazon_eks_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_gcp_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_amazon_eks_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_kubernetes_sensitive_object_access_activity]
|
||||
label = Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity
|
||||
@@ -305,28 +305,28 @@ label = Lateral Movement
|
||||
description = Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures around how attackers move laterally within the enterprise. Because lateral movement can expose the adversary to detection, it should be an important focus for security analysts.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_malicious_powershell]
|
||||
label = Malicious PowerShell
|
||||
description = Attackers are finding stealthy ways "live off the land," leveraging utilities and tools that come standard on the endpoint--such as PowerShell--to achieve their goals without downloading binary files. These searches can help you detect and investigate PowerShell command-line options that may be indicative of malicious intent.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_monitor_backup_solution]
|
||||
label = Monitor Backup Solution
|
||||
description = Address common concerns when monitoring your backup processes. These searches can help you reduce risks from ransomware, device theft, or denial of physical access to a host by backing up data on endpoints.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_all_backup_logs_for_host___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_all_backup_logs_for_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_monitor_for_unauthorized_software]
|
||||
label = Monitor for Unauthorized Software
|
||||
description = Identify and investigate prohibited/unauthorized software or processes that may be concealing malicious behavior within your environment.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_monitor_for_updates]
|
||||
label = Monitor for Updates
|
||||
@@ -347,7 +347,7 @@ label = Netsh Abuse
|
||||
description = Detect activities and various techniques associated with the abuse of `netsh.exe`, which can disable local firewall settings or set up a remote connection to a host from an infected system.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_office_365_detections]
|
||||
label = Office 365 Detections
|
||||
@@ -361,35 +361,28 @@ label = Orangeworm Attack Group
|
||||
description = Detect activities and various techniques associated with the Orangeworm Attack Group, a group that frequently targets the healthcare industry.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_phishing_payloads]
|
||||
label = Phishing Payloads
|
||||
description = Detect signs of malicious payloads that may indicate that your environment has been breached via a phishing attack.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_possible_backdoor_activity_associated_with_mudcarp_espionage_campaigns]
|
||||
label = Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns
|
||||
description = Monitor your environment for suspicious behaviors that resemble the techniques employed by the MUDCARP threat group.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_prohibited_traffic_allowed_or_protocol_mismatch]
|
||||
label = Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch
|
||||
description = Detect instances of prohibited network traffic allowed in the environment, as well as protocols running on non-standard ports. Both of these types of behaviors typically violate policy and can be leveraged by attackers.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_ransomware]
|
||||
label = Ransomware
|
||||
description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to ransomware--spikes in SMB traffic, suspicious wevtutil usage, the presence of common ransomware extensions, and system processes run from unexpected locations, and many others.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_sysmon_wmi_activity_for_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_backup_logs_for_endpoint___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_sysmon_wmi_activity_for_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_backup_logs_for_endpoint___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_ransomware_cloud]
|
||||
label = Ransomware Cloud
|
||||
@@ -424,7 +417,7 @@ label = SamSam Ransomware
|
||||
description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the SamSam ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with SamSam, RDP brute force attacks, the presence of files with SamSam ransomware extensions, suspicious psexec use, and more.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_backup_logs_for_endpoint___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_backup_logs_for_endpoint___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_silver_sparrow]
|
||||
label = Silver Sparrow
|
||||
@@ -433,6 +426,13 @@ disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_spearphishing_attachments]
|
||||
label = Spearphishing Attachments
|
||||
description = Detect signs of malicious payloads that may indicate that your environment has been breached via a phishing attack.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerabilities]
|
||||
label = Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities
|
||||
description = Assess and mitigate your systems' vulnerability to Spectre and Meltdown exploitation with the searches in this Analytic Story.
|
||||
@@ -452,14 +452,14 @@ label = Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409
|
||||
description = Reduce the risk of CVE-2018-11409, an information disclosure vulnerability within some older versions of Splunk Enterprise, with searches designed to help ensure that your Splunk system does not leak information to authenticated users.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_network_traffic_from_src_ip___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_network_traffic_from_src_ip___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_aws_ec2_activities]
|
||||
label = Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities
|
||||
description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS EC2 instances for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as EC2 instances that originate from unusual locations or those launched by previously unseen users (among others). Included investigative searches will help you probe more deeply, when the information warrants it.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_aws_login_activities]
|
||||
label = Suspicious AWS Login Activities
|
||||
@@ -473,14 +473,14 @@ label = Suspicious AWS S3 Activities
|
||||
description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS S3 buckets for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as detecting open S3 buckets and buckets being accessed from a new IP. The contextual and investigative searches will give you more information, when required.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_s3_bucket_details_via_bucketname___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_s3_bucket_details_via_bucketname___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_aws_traffic]
|
||||
label = Suspicious AWS Traffic
|
||||
description = Leverage these searches to monitor your AWS network traffic for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as a spike in blocked outbound traffic in your virtual private cloud (VPC).
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_cloud_authentication_activities]
|
||||
label = Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities
|
||||
@@ -494,7 +494,7 @@ label = Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities
|
||||
description = Monitor your cloud infrastructure provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your cloud environment.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_cloud_provisioning_activities]
|
||||
label = Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities
|
||||
@@ -515,21 +515,21 @@ label = Suspicious Command-Line Executions
|
||||
description = Leveraging the Windows command-line interface (CLI) is one of the most common attack techniques--one that is also detailed in the MITRE ATT&CK framework. Use this Analytic Story to help you identify unusual or suspicious use of the CLI on Windows systems.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_dns_traffic]
|
||||
label = Suspicious DNS Traffic
|
||||
description = Attackers often attempt to hide within or otherwise abuse the domain name system (DNS). You can thwart attempts to manipulate this omnipresent protocol by monitoring for these types of abuses.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_emails]
|
||||
label = Suspicious Emails
|
||||
description = Email remains one of the primary means for attackers to gain an initial foothold within the modern enterprise. Detect and investigate suspicious emails in your environment with the help of the searches in this Analytic Story.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_emails_from_specific_sender___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_email_info___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_email_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_emails_from_specific_sender___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_gcp_storage_activities]
|
||||
label = Suspicious GCP Storage Activities
|
||||
@@ -543,14 +543,14 @@ label = Suspicious MSHTA Activity
|
||||
description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe process to execute malicious code.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_okta_activity]
|
||||
label = Suspicious Okta Activity
|
||||
description = Monitor your Okta environment for suspicious activities. Due to the Covid outbreak, many users are migrating over to leverage cloud services more and more. Okta is a popular tool to manage multiple users and the web-based applications they need to stay productive. The searches in this story will help monitor your Okta environment for suspicious activities and associated user behaviors.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_user_activities_in_okta___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_okta_activity_by_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_okta_activity_by_app___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_okta_activity_by_app___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_okta_activity_by_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_user_activities_in_okta___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_regsvr32_activity]
|
||||
label = Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity
|
||||
@@ -571,14 +571,14 @@ label = Suspicious WMI Use
|
||||
description = Attackers are increasingly abusing Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI), a framework and associated utilities available on all modern Windows operating systems. Because WMI can be leveraged to manage both local and remote systems, it is important to identify the processes executed and the user context within which the activity occurred.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_sysmon_wmi_activity_for_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_sysmon_wmi_activity_for_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_windows_registry_activities]
|
||||
label = Suspicious Windows Registry Activities
|
||||
description = Monitor and detect registry changes initiated from remote locations, which can be a sign that an attacker has infiltrated your system.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_zoom_child_processes]
|
||||
label = Suspicious Zoom Child Processes
|
||||
@@ -606,28 +606,28 @@ label = Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications
|
||||
description = Identify unusual changes to your AWS EC2 instances that may indicate malicious activity. Modifications to your EC2 instances by previously unseen users is an example of an activity that may warrant further investigation.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_unusual_processes]
|
||||
label = Unusual Processes
|
||||
description = Quickly identify systems running new or unusual processes in your environment that could be indicators of suspicious activity. Processes run from unusual locations, those with conspicuously long command lines, and rare executables are all examples of activities that may warrant deeper investigation.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_use_of_cleartext_protocols]
|
||||
label = Use of Cleartext Protocols
|
||||
description = Leverage searches that detect cleartext network protocols that may leak credentials or should otherwise be encrypted.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_web_fraud_detection]
|
||||
label = Web Fraud Detection
|
||||
description = Monitor your environment for activity consistent with common attack techniques bad actors use when attempting to compromise web servers or other web-related assets.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_emails_from_specific_sender___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_web_session_information_via_session_id___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_web_session_information_via_session_id___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_emails_from_specific_sender___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_windows_dns_sigred_cve_2020_1350]
|
||||
label = Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350
|
||||
@@ -641,42 +641,42 @@ label = Windows Defense Evasion Tactics
|
||||
description = Detect tactics used by malware to evade defenses on Windows endpoints. A few of these include suspicious `reg.exe` processes, files hidden with `attrib.exe` and disabling user-account control, among many others
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_windows_file_extension_and_association_abuse]
|
||||
label = Windows File Extension and Association Abuse
|
||||
description = Detect and investigate suspected abuse of file extensions and Windows file associations. Some of the malicious behaviors involved may include inserting spaces before file extensions or prepending the file extension with a different one, among other techniques.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_windows_log_manipulation]
|
||||
label = Windows Log Manipulation
|
||||
description = Adversaries often try to cover their tracks by manipulating Windows logs. Use these searches to help you monitor for suspicious activity surrounding log files--an essential component of an effective defense.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_windows_persistence_techniques]
|
||||
label = Windows Persistence Techniques
|
||||
description = Monitor for activities and techniques associated with maintaining persistence on a Windows system--a sign that an adversary may have compromised your environment.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_windows_privilege_escalation]
|
||||
label = Windows Privilege Escalation
|
||||
description = Monitor for and investigate activities that may be associated with a Windows privilege-escalation attack, including unusual processes running on endpoints, modified registry keys, and more.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_windows_service_abuse]
|
||||
label = Windows Service Abuse
|
||||
description = Windows services are often used by attackers for persistence and the ability to load drivers or otherwise interact with the Windows kernel. This Analytic Story helps you monitor your environment for indications that Windows services are being modified or created in a suspicious manner.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Vendored
+95
-7
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
||||
#############
|
||||
# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
|
||||
# On Date: 2021-04-14T19:13:35 UTC
|
||||
# On Date: 2021-04-22T21:35:40 UTC
|
||||
# Author: Splunk Security Research
|
||||
# Contact: research@splunk.com
|
||||
#############
|
||||
@@ -339,6 +339,26 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[aws_iam_accessdenied_discovery_events_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[aws_iam_assume_role_policy_brute_force_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[aws_iam_delete_policy_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[aws_iam_failure_group_deletion_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[aws_iam_successful_group_deletion_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
@@ -419,10 +439,6 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[attempt_to_set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[attempt_to_stop_security_service_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
@@ -571,6 +587,10 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[dllhost_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[dns_query_length_outliers___mltk_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
@@ -731,11 +751,11 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[detect_oulook_exe_writing_a__zip_file_filter]
|
||||
[detect_outbound_smb_traffic_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[detect_outbound_smb_traffic_filter]
|
||||
[detect_outlook_exe_writing_a_zip_file_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1015,6 +1035,14 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[excel_spawning_powershell_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[excel_spawning_windows_script_host_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[excessive_dns_failures_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
@@ -1075,6 +1103,10 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[gpupdate_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
@@ -1295,6 +1327,26 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[office_application_spawn_rundll32_process_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[office_document_creating_schedule_task_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[office_document_executing_macro_code_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[office_document_spawned_child_process_to_download_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[office_product_spawning_rundll32_with_no_dll_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[okta_account_lockout_events_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
@@ -1419,6 +1471,10 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[ryuk_test_files_detected_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
@@ -1467,6 +1523,18 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[searchprotocolhost_with_no_command_line_with_network_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[shedule_task_with_http_command_arguments_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[shim_database_file_creation_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
@@ -1703,6 +1771,14 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[winevent_scheduled_task_created_within_public_path_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[winevent_scheduled_task_created_to_spawn_shell_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[windows_adfind_exe_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
@@ -1727,6 +1803,18 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[winword_spawning_cmd_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[winword_spawning_powershell_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[winword_spawning_windows_script_host_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[aws_detect_attach_to_role_policy_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
Vendored
+946
-78
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
Vendored
+1
-1
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
||||
#############
|
||||
# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
|
||||
# On Date: 2021-04-14T19:13:35 UTC
|
||||
# On Date: 2021-04-22T21:35:40 UTC
|
||||
# Author: Splunk Security Research
|
||||
# Contact: research@splunk.com
|
||||
#############
|
||||
|
||||
+348
-120
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
+139
-241
@@ -1,107 +1,5 @@
|
||||
mitre_id,technique,tactics,groups
|
||||
T1484.002,Domain Trust Modification,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,UNC2452
|
||||
T1484.001,Group Policy Modification,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1606.002,SAML Tokens,Credential Access,UNC2452
|
||||
T1606.001,Web Cookies,Credential Access,UNC2452
|
||||
T1606,Forge Web Credentials,Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1059.008,Network Device CLI,Execution,no
|
||||
T1602.002,Network Device Configuration Dump,Collection,no
|
||||
T1542.005,TFTP Boot,Defense Evasion|Persistence,no
|
||||
T1542.004,ROMMONkit,Defense Evasion|Persistence,no
|
||||
T1602.001,SNMP (MIB Dump),Collection,no
|
||||
T1602,Data from Configuration Repository,Collection,no
|
||||
T1601.002,Downgrade System Image,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1601.001,Patch System Image,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1601,Modify System Image,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1600.002,Disable Crypto Hardware,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1600.001,Reduce Key Space,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1600,Weaken Encryption,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1556.004,Network Device Authentication,Credential Access|Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1599.001,Network Address Translation Traversal,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1599,Network Boundary Bridging,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1020.001,Traffic Duplication,Exfiltration,no
|
||||
T1557.002,ARP Cache Poisoning,Credential Access|Collection,Cleaver
|
||||
T1588.006,Vulnerabilities,Resource Development,no
|
||||
T1053.006,Systemd Timers,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1562.008,Disable Cloud Logs,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1547.012,Print Processors,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1598.003,Spearphishing Link,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1598.002,Spearphishing Attachment,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1598.001,Spearphishing Service,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1598,Phishing for Information,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1597.002,Purchase Technical Data,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1597.001,Threat Intel Vendors,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1597,Search Closed Sources,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1596.005,Scan Databases,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1596.004,CDNs,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1596.003,Digital Certificates,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1596.001,DNS/Passive DNS,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1596.002,WHOIS,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1596,Search Open Technical Databases,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1595.002,Vulnerability Scanning,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1595.001,Scanning IP Blocks,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1595,Active Scanning,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1594,Search Victim-Owned Websites,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1593.002,Search Engines,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1593.001,Social Media,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1593,Search Open Websites/Domains,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1592.004,Client Configurations,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1592.003,Firmware,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1592.002,Software,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1592.001,Hardware,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1592,Gather Victim Host Information,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1591.004,Identify Roles,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1591.003,Identify Business Tempo,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1591.001,Determine Physical Locations,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1591.002,Business Relationships,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1591,Gather Victim Org Information,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1590.006,Network Security Appliances,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1590.005,IP Addresses,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1590.004,Network Topology,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1590.003,Network Trust Dependencies,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1590.002,DNS,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1590.001,Domain Properties,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1590,Gather Victim Network Information,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1589.003,Employee Names,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1589.002,Email Addresses,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1589.001,Credentials,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1589,Gather Victim Identity Information,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1588.005,Exploits,Resource Development,no
|
||||
T1588.004,Digital Certificates,Resource Development,no
|
||||
T1588.003,Code Signing Certificates,Resource Development,Wizard Spider
|
||||
T1588.002,Tool,Resource Development,no
|
||||
T1588.001,Malware,Resource Development,Turla|APT1
|
||||
T1588,Obtain Capabilities,Resource Development,no
|
||||
T1587.004,Exploits,Resource Development,no
|
||||
T1587.003,Digital Certificates,Resource Development,APT29|PROMETHIUM
|
||||
T1587.002,Code Signing Certificates,Resource Development,PROMETHIUM|Patchwork
|
||||
T1587.001,Malware,Resource Development,UNC2452|Turla|FIN7|Night Dragon|Cleaver
|
||||
T1587,Develop Capabilities,Resource Development,no
|
||||
T1586.002,Email Accounts,Resource Development,no
|
||||
T1586.001,Social Media Accounts,Resource Development,no
|
||||
T1586,Compromise Accounts,Resource Development,no
|
||||
T1585.002,Email Accounts,Resource Development,APT1
|
||||
T1585.001,Social Media Accounts,Resource Development,Cleaver
|
||||
T1585,Establish Accounts,Resource Development,APT17
|
||||
T1584.006,Web Services,Resource Development,Turla
|
||||
T1584.005,Botnet,Resource Development,no
|
||||
T1584.004,Server,Resource Development,Turla|APT16
|
||||
T1584.003,Virtual Private Server,Resource Development,Turla
|
||||
T1584.002,DNS Server,Resource Development,no
|
||||
T1584.001,Domains,Resource Development,APT1
|
||||
T1583.006,Web Services,Resource Development,APT17|APT29
|
||||
T1583.005,Botnet,Resource Development,no
|
||||
T1583.004,Server,Resource Development,no
|
||||
T1583.003,Virtual Private Server,Resource Development,TEMP.Veles
|
||||
T1583.002,DNS Server,Resource Development,no
|
||||
T1584,Compromise Infrastructure,Resource Development,no
|
||||
T1583.001,Domains,Resource Development,APT1|APT28
|
||||
T1583,Acquire Infrastructure,Resource Development,no
|
||||
T1564.007,VBA Stomping,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1558.004,AS-REP Roasting,Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1580,Cloud Infrastructure Discovery,Discovery,no
|
||||
T1218.012,Verclsid,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1205.001,Port Knocking,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Command And Control,PROMETHIUM
|
||||
T1205.001,Port Knocking,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Command And Control,no
|
||||
T1564.006,Run Virtual Instance,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1564.005,Hidden File System,Defense Evasion,Strider|Equation
|
||||
T1556.003,Pluggable Authentication Modules,Credential Access|Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
@@ -109,7 +7,7 @@ T1574.012,COR_PROFILER,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,Blue Moc
|
||||
T1562.007,Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1098.004,SSH Authorized Keys,Persistence,no
|
||||
T1480.001,Environmental Keying,Defense Evasion,APT41|Equation
|
||||
T1059.007,JavaScript/JScript,Execution,FIN6|APT32|FIN7|Cobalt Group|Molerats|TA505|Silence|Leafminer
|
||||
T1059.007,JavaScript/JScript,Execution,APT32|FIN7|Cobalt Group|Molerats|TA505|Silence|Leafminer
|
||||
T1578.004,Revert Cloud Instance,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1578.003,Delete Cloud Instance,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1578.001,Create Snapshot,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
@@ -126,31 +24,31 @@ T1546.015,Component Object Model Hijacking,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,APT2
|
||||
T1071.004,DNS,Command And Control,APT39|Tropic Trooper|OilRig|Ke3chang|Cobalt Group|APT18|APT41|FIN7
|
||||
T1071.003,Mail Protocols,Command And Control,APT32|SilverTerrier|APT28
|
||||
T1071.002,File Transfer Protocols,Command And Control,APT41|SilverTerrier|Machete|Honeybee
|
||||
T1071.001,Web Protocols,Command And Control,UNC2452|Sandworm Team|TA505|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Inception|APT41|SilverTerrier|Machete|APT28|WIRTE|APT33|FIN4|Night Dragon|APT18|APT38|Threat Group-3390|Ke3chang|Dark Caracal|APT19|Cobalt Group|Rancor|Orangeworm|APT37|Turla|Lazarus Group|APT32|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|OilRig|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon
|
||||
T1071.001,Web Protocols,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|TA505|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Inception|APT41|SilverTerrier|Machete|APT28|WIRTE|APT33|FIN4|Night Dragon|APT18|APT38|Cobalt Group|APT19|Threat Group-3390|Rancor|Orangeworm|APT37|Ke3chang|Dark Caracal|Turla|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|OilRig|Magic Hound|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon
|
||||
T1572,Protocol Tunneling,Command And Control,OilRig|Cobalt Group|FIN6
|
||||
T1048.003,Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol,Exfiltration,Wizard Spider|FIN6|APT32|APT33|Thrip|FIN8|OilRig|Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1048.002,Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol,Exfiltration,UNC2452
|
||||
T1048.003,Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol,Exfiltration,APT32|APT33|Thrip|FIN8|OilRig|Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1048.002,Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol,Exfiltration,no
|
||||
T1048.001,Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol,Exfiltration,no
|
||||
T1001.003,Protocol Impersonation,Command And Control,Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1001.002,Steganography,Command And Control,APT29|Axiom
|
||||
T1001.002,Steganography,Command And Control,Axiom
|
||||
T1001.001,Junk Data,Command And Control,APT28
|
||||
T1132.002,Non-Standard Encoding,Command And Control,no
|
||||
T1132.001,Standard Encoding,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|APT33|APT19|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork
|
||||
T1090.004,Domain Fronting,Command And Control,APT29
|
||||
T1090.003,Multi-hop Proxy,Command And Control,Inception|FIN4|APT29
|
||||
T1090.002,External Proxy,Command And Control,APT39|Silence|Soft Cell|MuddyWater|APT3|FIN5|Lazarus Group|menuPass|APT28
|
||||
T1090.001,Internal Proxy,Command And Control,UNC2452|APT39|Strider
|
||||
T1090.001,Internal Proxy,Command And Control,APT39|Strider
|
||||
T1102.003,One-Way Communication,Command And Control,Leviathan
|
||||
T1102.002,Bidirectional Communication,Command And Control,APT29|Sandworm Team|APT39|APT12|Turla|FIN7|APT37|Magic Hound|Carbanak
|
||||
T1102.002,Bidirectional Communication,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|APT39|APT12|Turla|FIN7|APT37|Magic Hound|Carbanak
|
||||
T1102.001,Dead Drop Resolver,Command And Control,Rocke|APT41|BRONZE BUTLER|RTM|Patchwork
|
||||
T1571,Non-Standard Port,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|Rocke|DarkVishnya|Silence|APT-C-36|Magic Hound|APT33|APT32|TEMP.Veles|Lazarus Group|FIN7
|
||||
T1074.002,Remote Data Staging,Collection,UNC2452|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|FIN6|Night Dragon|FIN8
|
||||
T1074.001,Local Data Staging,Collection,Machete|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|Honeybee|Dragonfly 2.0|Patchwork|Leviathan|APT3|FIN5|menuPass|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28
|
||||
T1074.002,Remote Data Staging,Collection,Threat Group-3390|menuPass|FIN6|Night Dragon|FIN8
|
||||
T1074.001,Local Data Staging,Collection,Machete|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|Patchwork|Dragonfly 2.0|Honeybee|Leviathan|APT3|FIN5|menuPass|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28
|
||||
T1078.004,Cloud Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,APT33
|
||||
T1564.004,NTFS File Attributes,Defense Evasion,APT32
|
||||
T1564.003,Hidden Window,Defense Evasion,Gorgon Group|Deep Panda|DarkHydrus|CopyKittens|APT19|APT32|APT28|APT3|Magic Hound
|
||||
T1078.003,Local Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,PROMETHIUM|Tropic Trooper|FIN10|Stolen Pencil|APT32
|
||||
T1078.002,Domain Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,Wizard Spider|APT29|TA505|APT3|Threat Group-1314
|
||||
T1078.003,Local Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,Tropic Trooper|FIN10|Stolen Pencil|APT32
|
||||
T1078.002,Domain Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,TA505|APT3|Threat Group-1314
|
||||
T1078.001,Default Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,no
|
||||
T1564.002,Hidden Users,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1574.006,LD_PRELOAD,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,Rocke
|
||||
@@ -166,37 +64,37 @@ T1574,Hijack Execution Flow,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1069.001,Local Groups,Discovery,Turla|OilRig|admin@338
|
||||
T1570,Lateral Tool Transfer,Lateral Movement,APT32|Wizard Spider|Turla|FIN10
|
||||
T1568.003,DNS Calculation,Command And Control,APT12
|
||||
T1204.002,Malicious File,Execution,FIN6|PROMETHIUM|APT30|Magic Hound|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|RTM|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|Machete|admin@338|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|Dragonfly 2.0|Dark Caracal|FIN7|APT32|Cobalt Group|DarkHydrus|Patchwork|Rancor|MuddyWater|BRONZE BUTLER|APT19|Gorgon Group|OilRig|Lazarus Group|APT29|menuPass|TA459|FIN8|Elderwood|PLATINUM|Leviathan|APT37|APT28
|
||||
T1204.001,Malicious Link,Execution,Wizard Spider|Patchwork|Windshift|APT32|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|TA505|OilRig|Machete|Leviathan|FIN8|FIN4|Elderwood|Dragonfly 2.0|Cobalt Group|APT39|Night Dragon|APT33|Turla
|
||||
T1204.002,Malicious File,Execution,Magic Hound|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|RTM|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|Machete|admin@338|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|BRONZE BUTLER|Cobalt Group|DarkHydrus|Gorgon Group|Patchwork|OilRig|Dark Caracal|MuddyWater|Lazarus Group|FIN7|APT32|Rancor|APT37|FIN8|APT28|Elderwood|TA459|APT29|Leviathan|menuPass|PLATINUM
|
||||
T1204.001,Malicious Link,Execution,Patchwork|Windshift|APT32|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|TA505|OilRig|Machete|Leviathan|FIN8|FIN4|Elderwood|Dragonfly 2.0|Cobalt Group|APT39|Night Dragon|APT33|Turla
|
||||
T1195.003,Compromise Hardware Supply Chain,Initial Access,no
|
||||
T1195.002,Compromise Software Supply Chain,Initial Access,UNC2452|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Dragonfly|Sandworm Team|APT41
|
||||
T1195.002,Compromise Software Supply Chain,Initial Access,Sandworm Team|APT41
|
||||
T1195.001,Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools,Initial Access,no
|
||||
T1568.001,Fast Flux DNS,Command And Control,Machete|TA505
|
||||
T1568.001,Fast Flux DNS,Command And Control,TA505
|
||||
T1052.001,Exfiltration over USB,Exfiltration,Tropic Trooper
|
||||
T1569.002,Service Execution,Execution,Wizard Spider|Blue Mockingbird|APT39|APT41|Silence|FIN6|APT32|Ke3chang|Honeybee
|
||||
T1569.002,Service Execution,Execution,Blue Mockingbird|APT39|APT41|Silence|FIN6|APT32|Honeybee|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1569.001,Launchctl,Execution,no
|
||||
T1569,System Services,Execution,no
|
||||
T1568.002,Domain Generation Algorithms,Command And Control,APT41
|
||||
T1568,Dynamic Resolution,Command And Control,UNC2452
|
||||
T1568,Dynamic Resolution,Command And Control,no
|
||||
T1011.001,Exfiltration Over Bluetooth,Exfiltration,no
|
||||
T1567.002,Exfiltration to Cloud Storage,Exfiltration,Leviathan|Turla
|
||||
T1567.001,Exfiltration to Code Repository,Exfiltration,no
|
||||
T1059.006,Python,Execution,APT29|Rocke|BRONZE BUTLER|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|Machete
|
||||
T1059.005,Visual Basic,Execution,Lazarus Group|APT33|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|Rancor|Patchwork|MuddyWater|Honeybee|FIN7|APT37|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|Turla|TA505|Silence|WIRTE|FIN4|Gorgon Group|Cobalt Group|Leviathan|TA459|Magic Hound
|
||||
T1059.006,Python,Execution,Rocke|BRONZE BUTLER|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|Machete
|
||||
T1059.005,Visual Basic,Execution,APT33|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|Rancor|Patchwork|MuddyWater|Honeybee|FIN7|APT37|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|Turla|TA505|Silence|WIRTE|FIN4|Cobalt Group|Gorgon Group|Leviathan|TA459|Magic Hound
|
||||
T1059.004,Unix Shell,Execution,Rocke|APT41
|
||||
T1059.003,Windows Command Shell,Execution,UNC2452|Wizard Spider|FIN6|TA505|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|OilRig|Lazarus Group|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|FIN7|APT41|Soft Cell|Turla|Silence|APT32|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Gorgon Group|Ke3chang|Dragonfly 2.0|Rancor|Dark Caracal|APT37|APT28|Leviathan|FIN8|Sowbug|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|FIN10|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Suckfly|Threat Group-1314|APT3|admin@338|APT1
|
||||
T1059.003,Windows Command Shell,Execution,TA505|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|OilRig|Lazarus Group|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|FIN7|APT41|Soft Cell|Turla|Silence|APT32|APT39|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Dark Caracal|Gorgon Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Rancor|Ke3chang|APT37|Leviathan|FIN8|APT28|Magic Hound|Sowbug|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN10|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Gamaredon Group|Suckfly|Patchwork|Threat Group-1314|APT3|admin@338|APT1
|
||||
T1059.002,AppleScript,Execution,no
|
||||
T1059.001,PowerShell,Execution,UNC2452|Lazarus Group|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|APT39|DarkVishnya|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Inception|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|Soft Cell|TA505|WIRTE|TEMP.Veles|APT33|Gallmaker|Turla|APT19|DarkHydrus|APT28|Gorgon Group|Thrip|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Leviathan|TA459|MuddyWater|FIN8|Magic Hound|CopyKittens|BRONZE BUTLER|OilRig|FIN10|Threat Group-3390|APT32|FIN7|menuPass|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Poseidon Group|APT3|APT29|Deep Panda
|
||||
T1059.001,PowerShell,Execution,Blue Mockingbird|APT39|DarkVishnya|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Inception|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|Soft Cell|TA505|WIRTE|TEMP.Veles|APT33|Gallmaker|Turla|APT19|DarkHydrus|APT28|Thrip|Gorgon Group|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Leviathan|TA459|FIN8|MuddyWater|Magic Hound|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|CopyKittens|APT32|FIN7|FIN10|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Poseidon Group|APT3|APT29|Deep Panda
|
||||
T1567,Exfiltration Over Web Service,Exfiltration,no
|
||||
T1497.003,Time Based Evasion,Defense Evasion|Discovery,no
|
||||
T1497.002,User Activity Based Checks,Defense Evasion|Discovery,FIN7
|
||||
T1497.001,System Checks,Defense Evasion|Discovery,Frankenstein
|
||||
T1498.002,Reflection Amplification,Impact,no
|
||||
T1498.001,Direct Network Flood,Impact,no
|
||||
T1566.003,Spearphishing via Service,Initial Access,Lazarus Group|Magic Hound|Windshift|FIN6|OilRig|Dark Caracal
|
||||
T1566.002,Spearphishing Link,Initial Access,Wizard Spider|APT1|Windshift|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|Machete|Kimsuky|TA505|Stolen Pencil|APT39|FIN4|APT32|Night Dragon|APT28|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Turla|OilRig|APT33|Leviathan|Patchwork|Elderwood|APT29|Magic Hound|FIN8
|
||||
T1566.001,Spearphishing Attachment,Initial Access,APT1|FIN6|APT30|Magic Hound|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Mofang|Wizard Spider|RTM|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|APT41|Machete|admin@338|Kimsuky|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|Tropic Trooper|Turla|Lazarus Group|Cobalt Group|FIN7|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|Gorgon Group|Rancor|DarkHydrus|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|PLATINUM|MuddyWater|TA459|Leviathan|Elderwood|APT29|APT37|menuPass|APT28|Patchwork
|
||||
T1566,Phishing,Initial Access,GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Dragonfly
|
||||
T1566.003,Spearphishing via Service,Initial Access,Magic Hound|Windshift|FIN6|OilRig|Dark Caracal
|
||||
T1566.002,Spearphishing Link,Initial Access,Windshift|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|Machete|Kimsuky|TA505|Stolen Pencil|APT39|FIN4|APT32|Night Dragon|Turla|APT28|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|APT33|Elderwood|Leviathan|Magic Hound|Patchwork|APT29|FIN8
|
||||
T1566.001,Spearphishing Attachment,Initial Access,Magic Hound|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Mofang|Wizard Spider|RTM|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|APT41|Machete|admin@338|Kimsuky|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|Tropic Trooper|Turla|Gorgon Group|Rancor|DarkHydrus|Cobalt Group|FIN7|OilRig|Lazarus Group|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|FIN8|MuddyWater|APT28|TA459|Leviathan|Patchwork|PLATINUM|Elderwood|APT29|APT37|menuPass
|
||||
T1566,Phishing,Initial Access,no
|
||||
T1565.003,Runtime Data Manipulation,Impact,APT38
|
||||
T1565.002,Transmitted Data Manipulation,Impact,APT38
|
||||
T1565.001,Stored Data Manipulation,Impact,FIN4|APT38
|
||||
@@ -206,18 +104,18 @@ T1564,Hide Artifacts,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1563.002,RDP Hijacking,Lateral Movement,no
|
||||
T1563.001,SSH Hijacking,Lateral Movement,no
|
||||
T1563,Remote Service Session Hijacking,Lateral Movement,no
|
||||
T1518.001,Security Software Discovery,Discovery,Wizard Spider|Turla|Rocke|Frankenstein|The White Company|Cobalt Group|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|Tropic Trooper|FIN8|Patchwork|Naikon
|
||||
T1518.001,Security Software Discovery,Discovery,Turla|Rocke|Frankenstein|The White Company|Cobalt Group|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|Tropic Trooper|FIN8|Patchwork|Naikon
|
||||
T1069.003,Cloud Groups,Discovery,no
|
||||
T1069.002,Domain Groups,Discovery,Turla|Wizard Spider|Inception|OilRig|FIN6|Dragonfly 2.0|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1087.004,Cloud Account,Discovery,no
|
||||
T1087.003,Email Account,Discovery,Sandworm Team|TA505
|
||||
T1087.002,Domain Account,Discovery,Wizard Spider|Chimera|Turla|Sandworm Team|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN6|Poseidon Group|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1087.002,Domain Account,Discovery,Turla|Sandworm Team|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN6|Poseidon Group|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1087.001,Local Account,Discovery,Turla|Poseidon Group|OilRig|Ke3chang|APT32|APT1|Threat Group-3390|APT3|admin@338
|
||||
T1553.004,Install Root Certificate,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1562.004,Disable or Modify System Firewall,Defense Evasion,UNC2452|Rocke|Lazarus Group|Kimsuky|Dragonfly 2.0|Carbanak
|
||||
T1562.003,Impair Command History Logging,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1562.002,Disable Windows Event Logging,Defense Evasion,UNC2452|Threat Group-3390
|
||||
T1562.001,Disable or Modify Tools,Defense Evasion,UNC2452|Wizard Spider|FIN6|Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Rocke|Kimsuky|Turla|Night Dragon|Gorgon Group|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda
|
||||
T1562.004,Disable or Modify System Firewall,Defense Evasion,Rocke|Lazarus Group|Kimsuky|Dragonfly 2.0|Carbanak
|
||||
T1562.003,HISTCONTROL,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1562.002,Disable Windows Event Logging,Defense Evasion,Threat Group-3390
|
||||
T1562.001,Disable or Modify Tools,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Rocke|Kimsuky|Turla|Night Dragon|Gorgon Group|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda
|
||||
T1562,Impair Defenses,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1003.004,LSA Secrets,Credential Access,OilRig|MuddyWater|menuPass|Leafminer|Ke3chang|Dragonfly 2.0|APT33|Threat Group-3390
|
||||
T1003.005,Cached Domain Credentials,Credential Access,OilRig|MuddyWater|Leafminer|APT33
|
||||
@@ -226,8 +124,8 @@ T1561.001,Disk Content Wipe,Impact,Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1561,Disk Wipe,Impact,no
|
||||
T1560.003,Archive via Custom Method,Collection,Lazarus Group|Kimsuky|CopyKittens|FIN6
|
||||
T1560.002,Archive via Library,Collection,Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390
|
||||
T1560.001,Archive via Utility,Collection,UNC2452|Chimera|APT41|Soft Cell|Turla|Gallmaker|APT33|APT39|MuddyWater|Magic Hound|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|CopyKittens|Sowbug|APT3|menuPass|APT1|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1560,Archive Collected Data,Collection,menuPass|APT32|Patchwork|APT28|Dragonfly 2.0|Honeybee|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1560.001,Archive via Utility,Collection,APT41|Soft Cell|Turla|Gallmaker|APT33|APT39|MuddyWater|Magic Hound|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|CopyKittens|APT3|Sowbug|menuPass|APT1|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1560,Archive Collected Data,Collection,menuPass|APT32|Honeybee|Patchwork|APT28|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1499.004,Application or System Exploitation,Impact,no
|
||||
T1499.003,Application Exhaustion Flood,Impact,no
|
||||
T1499.002,Service Exhaustion Flood,Impact,no
|
||||
@@ -235,7 +133,7 @@ T1499.001,OS Exhaustion Flood,Impact,no
|
||||
T1491.002,External Defacement,Impact,no
|
||||
T1491.001,Internal Defacement,Impact,Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1114.003,Email Forwarding Rule,Collection,no
|
||||
T1114.002,Remote Email Collection,Collection,UNC2452|APT1|FIN4|Ke3chang|Leafminer|Dragonfly 2.0|APT28
|
||||
T1114.002,Remote Email Collection,Collection,APT1|FIN4|APT28|Dragonfly 2.0|Ke3chang|Leafminer
|
||||
T1114.001,Local Email Collection,Collection,Magic Hound|APT1
|
||||
T1134.005,SID-History Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1134.004,Parent PID Spoofing,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
@@ -244,93 +142,93 @@ T1134.002,Create Process with Token,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Turla|L
|
||||
T1134.001,Token Impersonation/Theft,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,APT28
|
||||
T1213.002,Sharepoint,Collection,Ke3chang|APT28
|
||||
T1213.001,Confluence,Collection,no
|
||||
T1555.003,Credentials from Web Browsers,Credential Access,FIN6|Magic Hound|Sandworm Team|Inception|Stealth Falcon|OilRig|Leafminer|APT33|APT3|Kimsuky|TA505|Stolen Pencil|MuddyWater|APT37|Patchwork|Molerats
|
||||
T1555.003,Credentials from Web Browsers,Credential Access,Magic Hound|Sandworm Team|Inception|Stealth Falcon|OilRig|Leafminer|APT33|APT3|Kimsuky|TA505|Stolen Pencil|MuddyWater|APT37|Patchwork|Molerats
|
||||
T1555.002,Securityd Memory,Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1555.001,Keychain,Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1559.002,Dynamic Data Exchange,Execution,Sharpshooter|TA505|MuddyWater|Gallmaker|Cobalt Group|Patchwork|APT37|FIN7|APT28
|
||||
T1559.002,Dynamic Data Exchange,Execution,Sharpshooter|TA505|MuddyWater|Gallmaker|Patchwork|Cobalt Group|APT37|APT28|FIN7
|
||||
T1559.001,Component Object Model,Execution,Gamaredon Group|MuddyWater
|
||||
T1559,Inter-Process Communication,Execution,no
|
||||
T1558.002,Silver Ticket,Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1558.001,Golden Ticket,Credential Access,Ke3chang
|
||||
T1558,Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets,Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1557.001,LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay,Credential Access|Collection,Wizard Spider
|
||||
T1557.001,LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay,Credential Access|Collection,no
|
||||
T1557,Man-in-the-Middle,Credential Access|Collection,no
|
||||
T1556.002,Password Filter DLL,Credential Access|Defense Evasion,Strider
|
||||
T1556.001,Domain Controller Authentication,Credential Access|Defense Evasion,Chimera
|
||||
T1556.001,Domain Controller Authentication,Credential Access|Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1556,Modify Authentication Process,Credential Access|Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1056.004,Credential API Hooking,Collection|Credential Access,PLATINUM
|
||||
T1056.003,Web Portal Capture,Collection|Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1056.002,GUI Input Capture,Collection|Credential Access,FIN4
|
||||
T1056.001,Keylogging,Collection|Credential Access,APT32|Sandworm Team|APT39|APT41|Kimsuky|menuPass|Stolen Pencil|FIN4|APT38|OilRig|Ke3chang|PLATINUM|Sowbug|Magic Hound|Group5|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT3|Darkhotel|APT28
|
||||
T1555,Credentials from Password Stores,Credential Access,UNC2452|FIN6|APT39|OilRig|MuddyWater|Leafminer|APT33|Turla|Stealth Falcon
|
||||
T1056.001,Keylogging,Collection|Credential Access,APT32|Sandworm Team|APT39|APT41|Kimsuky|menuPass|Stolen Pencil|FIN4|APT38|Ke3chang|OilRig|PLATINUM|Sowbug|Magic Hound|Group5|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT3|Darkhotel|APT28
|
||||
T1555,Credentials from Password Stores,Credential Access,APT39|OilRig|MuddyWater|Leafminer|APT33|Turla|Stealth Falcon
|
||||
T1552.005,Cloud Instance Metadata API,Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1003.008,/etc/passwd and /etc/shadow,Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1003.007,Proc Filesystem,Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1003.006,DCSync,Credential Access,UNC2452
|
||||
T1558.003,Kerberoasting,Credential Access,UNC2452|Wizard Spider
|
||||
T1003.006,DCSync,Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1558.003,Kerberoasting,Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1552.006,Group Policy Preferences,Credential Access,APT33
|
||||
T1003.003,NTDS,Credential Access,Wizard Spider|Chimera|FIN6|Dragonfly 2.0
|
||||
T1003.002,Security Account Manager,Credential Access,Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390|Ke3chang|Soft Cell|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|menuPass
|
||||
T1003.001,LSASS Memory,Credential Access,Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Blue Mockingbird|Silence|Threat Group-3390|Leviathan|APT41|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|Stolen Pencil|APT32|Leafminer|Lazarus Group|Magic Hound|MuddyWater|FIN8|PLATINUM|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN6|APT3|APT28|APT1|Ke3chang|Cleaver
|
||||
T1003.003,NTDS,Credential Access,FIN6|Dragonfly 2.0
|
||||
T1003.002,Security Account Manager,Credential Access,Threat Group-3390|Ke3chang|Soft Cell|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|menuPass
|
||||
T1003.001,LSASS Memory,Credential Access,Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Blue Mockingbird|Silence|Threat Group-3390|Leviathan|APT41|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|Stolen Pencil|APT32|Lazarus Group|Leafminer|Magic Hound|MuddyWater|PLATINUM|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|OilRig|FIN6|APT3|APT28|APT1|Ke3chang|Cleaver
|
||||
T1110.004,Credential Stuffing,Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1110.003,Password Spraying,Credential Access,APT28|APT33|Leafminer|Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1110.002,Password Cracking,Credential Access,FIN6|APT41|Dragonfly 2.0|APT3
|
||||
T1110.001,Password Guessing,Credential Access,APT28
|
||||
T1021.006,Windows Remote Management,Lateral Movement,UNC2452|Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390
|
||||
T1110.003,Password Spraying,Credential Access,APT33|Leafminer|Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1110.002,Password Cracking,Credential Access,APT41|Dragonfly 2.0|APT3
|
||||
T1110.001,Password Guessing,Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1021.006,Windows Remote Management,Lateral Movement,Threat Group-3390
|
||||
T1021.005,VNC,Lateral Movement,GCMAN
|
||||
T1021.004,SSH,Lateral Movement,Rocke|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|OilRig|menuPass|GCMAN
|
||||
T1021.003,Distributed Component Object Model,Lateral Movement,no
|
||||
T1021.002,SMB/Windows Admin Shares,Lateral Movement,Wizard Spider|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|APT39|APT32|Orangeworm|FIN8|APT3|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-1314|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1021.001,Remote Desktop Protocol,Lateral Movement,Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Stolen Pencil|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|APT3|OilRig|FIN10|menuPass|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|APT1|Axiom
|
||||
T1021.002,SMB/Windows Admin Shares,Lateral Movement,Blue Mockingbird|APT39|APT32|Orangeworm|FIN8|APT3|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-1314|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1021.001,Remote Desktop Protocol,Lateral Movement,Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Stolen Pencil|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|APT3|OilRig|menuPass|FIN10|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|APT1|Axiom
|
||||
T1554,Compromise Client Software Binary,Persistence,no
|
||||
T1036.006,Space after Filename,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1036.005,Match Legitimate Name or Location,Defense Evasion,UNC2452|Chimera|PROMETHIUM|Rocke|Sandworm Team|APT39|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Silence|APT41|menuPass|TEMP.Veles|MuddyWater|BRONZE BUTLER|Sowbug|APT32|Patchwork|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Carbanak|APT1
|
||||
T1036.004,Masquerade Task or Service,Defense Evasion,UNC2452|Lazarus Group|PROMETHIUM|Wizard Spider|APT-C-36|Carbanak|APT32|FIN6|FIN7
|
||||
T1036.005,Match Legitimate Name or Location,Defense Evasion,Rocke|Sandworm Team|APT39|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Silence|APT41|menuPass|TEMP.Veles|MuddyWater|BRONZE BUTLER|Sowbug|APT32|Patchwork|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Carbanak|APT1
|
||||
T1036.004,Masquerade Task or Service,Defense Evasion,Wizard Spider|APT-C-36|Carbanak|APT32|FIN6|FIN7
|
||||
T1036.003,Rename System Utilities,Defense Evasion,menuPass|APT32|Soft Cell|PLATINUM
|
||||
T1036.002,Right-to-Left Override,Defense Evasion,BRONZE BUTLER|BlackTech|Ke3chang|Scarlet Mimic
|
||||
T1036.001,Invalid Code Signature,Defense Evasion,Windshift|APT37
|
||||
T1036.001,Invalid Code Signature,Defense Evasion,Windshift
|
||||
T1553.003,SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1553.002,Code Signing,Defense Evasion,UNC2452|Wizard Spider|PROMETHIUM|Patchwork|Silence|APT41|FIN6|TA505|FIN7|Honeybee|Leviathan|CopyKittens|Winnti Group|Suckfly|Molerats|Darkhotel
|
||||
T1553.002,Code Signing,Defense Evasion,Patchwork|Silence|APT41|FIN6|TA505|FIN7|Honeybee|Leviathan|APT37|CopyKittens|Winnti Group|Suckfly|Molerats|Darkhotel
|
||||
T1553.001,Gatekeeper Bypass,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1553,Subvert Trust Controls,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1027.003,Steganography,Defense Evasion,BRONZE BUTLER|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|APT37
|
||||
T1027.002,Software Packing,Defense Evasion,Lazarus Group|TA505|Rocke|Soft Cell|The White Company|APT39|APT38|Dark Caracal|Elderwood|APT3|Patchwork|APT29|Night Dragon
|
||||
T1027.001,Binary Padding,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|APT32|Patchwork|Leviathan|BRONZE BUTLER|Moafee
|
||||
T1027.002,Software Packing,Defense Evasion,TA505|Rocke|Soft Cell|The White Company|APT39|APT38|Dark Caracal|Elderwood|APT3|Patchwork|APT29|Night Dragon
|
||||
T1027.001,Binary Padding,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|APT32|Leviathan|BRONZE BUTLER|Moafee
|
||||
T1222.002,Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification,Defense Evasion,Rocke|APT32
|
||||
T1222.001,Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification,Defense Evasion,Wizard Spider
|
||||
T1552.004,Private Keys,Credential Access,UNC2452|Rocke
|
||||
T1222.001,Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1552.004,Private Keys,Credential Access,Rocke
|
||||
T1552.003,Bash History,Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1552.002,Credentials in Registry,Credential Access,APT32
|
||||
T1552.001,Credentials In Files,Credential Access,Leafminer|APT33|OilRig|TA505|Stolen Pencil|MuddyWater|APT3
|
||||
T1552,Unsecured Credentials,Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1216.001,PubPrn,Defense Evasion,APT32
|
||||
T1070.006,Timestomp,Defense Evasion,UNC2452|Rocke|TEMP.Veles|APT32|Lazarus Group|APT28
|
||||
T1070.006,Timestomp,Defense Evasion,Rocke|TEMP.Veles|APT32|Lazarus Group|APT28
|
||||
T1070.005,Network Share Connection Removal,Defense Evasion,Threat Group-3390
|
||||
T1070.004,File Deletion,Defense Evasion,UNC2452|FIN6|Sandworm Team|Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Wizard Spider|APT41|Kimsuky|Silence|The White Company|TEMP.Veles|APT32|APT38|Honeybee|Patchwork|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|menuPass|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN5|APT3|OilRig|Magic Hound|FIN10|APT28|Threat Group-3390|Group5|Lazarus Group|APT18|APT29
|
||||
T1070.004,File Deletion,Defense Evasion,Sandworm Team|Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Wizard Spider|APT41|Kimsuky|Silence|The White Company|TEMP.Veles|APT32|APT38|Patchwork|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|menuPass|FIN8|OilRig|FIN5|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|APT3|FIN10|APT28|Threat Group-3390|Group5|Lazarus Group|APT18|APT29
|
||||
T1070.003,Clear Command History,Defense Evasion,APT41
|
||||
T1550.004,Web Session Cookie,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,UNC2452
|
||||
T1550.004,Web Session Cookie,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,no
|
||||
T1550.001,Application Access Token,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,APT28
|
||||
T1550.003,Pass the Ticket,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|APT29
|
||||
T1550.002,Pass the Hash,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,Soft Cell|APT32|Night Dragon|APT28|APT1
|
||||
T1550,Use Alternate Authentication Material,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,UNC2452
|
||||
T1550,Use Alternate Authentication Material,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,no
|
||||
T1548.004,Elevated Execution with Prompt,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1548.003,Sudo and Sudo Caching,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1548.002,Bypass User Account Control,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,APT37|MuddyWater|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|Threat Group-3390|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork|APT29
|
||||
T1548.002,Bypass User Access Control,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,APT37|MuddyWater|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|Threat Group-3390|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork|APT29
|
||||
T1548.001,Setuid and Setgid,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1548,Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1136.003,Cloud Account,Persistence,no
|
||||
T1070.002,Clear Linux or Mac System Logs,Defense Evasion,Rocke
|
||||
T1070.001,Clear Windows Event Logs,Defense Evasion,APT41|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|APT32|FIN8|FIN5|APT28
|
||||
T1136.002,Domain Account,Persistence,Soft Cell
|
||||
T1136.001,Local Account,Persistence,APT39|APT41|Leafminer|Dragonfly 2.0|APT3
|
||||
T1136.001,Local Account,Persistence,APT39|APT41|Dragonfly 2.0|Leafminer|APT3
|
||||
T1547.011,Plist Modification,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1547.010,Port Monitors,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1547.009,Shortcut Modification,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,APT39|Darkhotel|APT29|Gorgon Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Leviathan|Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1547.008,LSASS Driver,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1547.007,Re-opened Applications,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1547.006,Kernel Modules and Extensions,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1547.005,Security Support Provider,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1547.004,Winlogon Helper DLL,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Wizard Spider|Tropic Trooper|Turla
|
||||
T1547.005,Security Support Provider,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1547.004,Winlogon Helper DLL,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Tropic Trooper|Turla
|
||||
T1547.003,Time Providers,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1546.014,Emond,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
|
||||
T1546.013,PowerShell Profile,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,Turla
|
||||
@@ -346,30 +244,30 @@ T1546.007,Netsh Helper DLL,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
|
||||
T1546.006,LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
|
||||
T1546.005,Trap,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
|
||||
T1546.004,.bash_profile and .bashrc,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
|
||||
T1546.003,Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,UNC2452|APT33|Blue Mockingbird|Turla|Leviathan|APT29
|
||||
T1546.003,Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,APT33|Blue Mockingbird|Turla|Leviathan|APT29
|
||||
T1546.002,Screensaver,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
|
||||
T1546.001,Change Default File Association,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,Kimsuky
|
||||
T1547.001,Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Wizard Spider|PROMETHIUM|Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Silence|RTM|Inception|APT41|Machete|Kimsuky|APT33|APT39|APT32|APT18|Turla|Dark Caracal|Cobalt Group|Honeybee|APT19|Ke3chang|Threat Group-3390|Dragonfly 2.0|Gorgon Group|MuddyWater|APT37|Leviathan|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|APT3|FIN10|FIN7|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT29|Darkhotel
|
||||
T1547.001,Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Silence|RTM|Inception|APT41|Machete|Kimsuky|APT33|APT39|APT32|APT18|Turla|Dark Caracal|Cobalt Group|Honeybee|Threat Group-3390|Dragonfly 2.0|Gorgon Group|Ke3chang|APT19|Leviathan|MuddyWater|APT37|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|APT3|FIN10|FIN7|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT29|Darkhotel
|
||||
T1218.002,Control Panel,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1218.010,Regsvr32,Defense Evasion,Blue Mockingbird|Inception|WIRTE|APT19|Cobalt Group|Leviathan|APT32|Deep Panda
|
||||
T1218.010,Regsvr32,Defense Evasion,Blue Mockingbird|Inception|WIRTE|Cobalt Group|APT19|Leviathan|APT32|Deep Panda
|
||||
T1218.009,Regsvcs/Regasm,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1218.005,Mshta,Defense Evasion,Lazarus Group|Inception|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|FIN7
|
||||
T1218.004,InstallUtil,Defense Evasion,menuPass
|
||||
T1218.001,Compiled HTML File,Defense Evasion,APT41|Silence|OilRig|Lazarus Group|Dark Caracal
|
||||
T1218.005,Mshta,Defense Evasion,Inception|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|FIN7
|
||||
T1218.004,InstallUtil,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1218.001,Compiled HTML File,Defense Evasion,APT41|Silence|Lazarus Group|Dark Caracal|OilRig
|
||||
T1218.003,CMSTP,Defense Evasion,Cobalt Group|MuddyWater
|
||||
T1218.011,Rundll32,Defense Evasion,UNC2452|Gamaredon Group|APT32|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|TA505|MuddyWater|APT29|APT19|CopyKittens|APT3|Carbanak|APT28
|
||||
T1218.011,Rundll32,Defense Evasion,APT32|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|TA505|MuddyWater|APT29|APT19|CopyKittens|APT3|Carbanak|APT28
|
||||
T1547,Boot or Logon Autostart Execution,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1546,Event Triggered Execution,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
|
||||
T1098.003,Add Office 365 Global Administrator Role,Persistence,no
|
||||
T1098.002,Exchange Email Delegate Permissions,Persistence,UNC2452|Magic Hound
|
||||
T1098.001,Additional Cloud Credentials,Persistence,UNC2452
|
||||
T1098.002,Exchange Email Delegate Permissions,Persistence,Magic Hound
|
||||
T1098.001,Additional Azure Service Principal Credentials,Persistence,no
|
||||
T1543.004,Launch Daemon,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1543.003,Windows Service,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,PROMETHIUM|Blue Mockingbird|DarkVishnya|Wizard Spider|APT32|APT41|Kimsuky|Tropic Trooper|Threat Group-3390|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|Ke3chang|FIN7|APT19|APT3|Lazarus Group|Carbanak
|
||||
T1543.003,Windows Service,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Blue Mockingbird|DarkVishnya|Wizard Spider|APT32|APT41|Kimsuky|Tropic Trooper|Cobalt Group|Ke3chang|Honeybee|FIN7|Threat Group-3390|APT19|APT3|Lazarus Group|Carbanak
|
||||
T1543.002,Systemd Service,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Rocke
|
||||
T1543.001,Launch Agent,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1037.005,Startup Items,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1037.004,Rc.common,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1055.012,Process Hollowing,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,menuPass|Gorgon Group|Threat Group-3390|Patchwork
|
||||
T1055.012,Process Hollowing,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Gorgon Group|Patchwork
|
||||
T1055.013,Process Doppelgänging,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Leafminer
|
||||
T1055.011,Extra Window Memory Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1055.014,VDSO Hijacking,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
@@ -379,7 +277,7 @@ T1055.005,Thread Local Storage,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1055.004,Asynchronous Procedure Call,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1055.003,Thread Execution Hijacking,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1055.002,Portable Executable Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Rocke|Gorgon Group
|
||||
T1055.001,Dynamic-link Library Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Wizard Spider|TA505|Turla|Tropic Trooper|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda
|
||||
T1055.001,Dynamic-link Library Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,TA505|Turla|Tropic Trooper|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda
|
||||
T1037.003,Network Logon Script,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1543,Create or Modify System Process,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1037.002,Logon Script (Mac),Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
@@ -393,7 +291,7 @@ T1505.001,SQL Stored Procedures,Persistence,no
|
||||
T1053.003,Cron,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Rocke
|
||||
T1053.004,Launchd,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1053.001,At (Linux),Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1053.005,Scheduled Task,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,UNC2452|Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT-C-36|BRONZE BUTLER|APT41|Machete|Soft Cell|Silence|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|Cobalt Group|OilRig|Rancor|Dragonfly 2.0|Patchwork|FIN8|FIN7|APT32|menuPass|FIN10|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|APT3|APT29
|
||||
T1053.005,Scheduled Task,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT-C-36|BRONZE BUTLER|APT41|Machete|Soft Cell|Silence|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|Patchwork|OilRig|Rancor|Cobalt Group|FIN8|menuPass|FIN10|APT32|FIN7|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|APT3|APT29
|
||||
T1053.002,At (Windows),Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,BRONZE BUTLER|Threat Group-3390|APT18
|
||||
T1542,Pre-OS Boot,Defense Evasion|Persistence,no
|
||||
T1137.001,Office Template Macros,Persistence,MuddyWater
|
||||
@@ -418,52 +316,52 @@ T1526,Cloud Service Discovery,Discovery,no
|
||||
T1505,Server Software Component,Persistence,no
|
||||
T1499,Endpoint Denial of Service,Impact,no
|
||||
T1497,Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion,Defense Evasion|Discovery,no
|
||||
T1498,Network Denial of Service,Impact,APT28
|
||||
T1498,Network Denial of Service,Impact,no
|
||||
T1496,Resource Hijacking,Impact,Blue Mockingbird|Rocke|APT41|Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1495,Firmware Corruption,Impact,no
|
||||
T1491,Defacement,Impact,no
|
||||
T1490,Inhibit System Recovery,Impact,no
|
||||
T1489,Service Stop,Impact,Wizard Spider|Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1489,Service Stop,Impact,Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1486,Data Encrypted for Impact,Impact,APT41|TA505|APT38
|
||||
T1485,Data Destruction,Impact,Sandworm Team|Lazarus Group|APT38
|
||||
T1484,Domain Policy Modification,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1482,Domain Trust Discovery,Discovery,UNC2452|Wizard Spider
|
||||
T1484,Group Policy Modification,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1482,Domain Trust Discovery,Discovery,Wizard Spider
|
||||
T1480,Execution Guardrails,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1220,XSL Script Processing,Defense Evasion,Cobalt Group
|
||||
T1222,File and Directory Permissions Modification,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1221,Template Injection,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|Frankenstein|Inception|APT28|Tropic Trooper|Dragonfly 2.0|DarkHydrus
|
||||
T1203,Exploitation for Client Execution,Execution,Sandworm Team|MuddyWater|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT41|admin@338|Threat Group-3390|APT12|The White Company|APT33|APT32|APT28|Tropic Trooper|BRONZE BUTLER|Lazarus Group|Cobalt Group|APT29|Patchwork|Leviathan|APT37|Elderwood|TA459
|
||||
T1200,Hardware Additions,Initial Access,DarkVishnya
|
||||
T1202,Indirect Command Execution,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1213,Data from Information Repositories,Collection,FIN6|Turla
|
||||
T1207,Rogue Domain Controller,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1204,User Execution,Execution,no
|
||||
T1217,Browser Bookmark Discovery,Discovery,no
|
||||
T1190,Exploit Public-Facing Application,Initial Access,UNC2452|APT28|APT29|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Blue Mockingbird|Rocke|APT39|BlackTech|APT41|Soft Cell|Night Dragon|Axiom
|
||||
T1210,Exploitation of Remote Services,Lateral Movement,Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390|APT28
|
||||
T1220,XSL Script Processing,Defense Evasion,Cobalt Group
|
||||
T1197,BITS Jobs,Defense Evasion|Persistence,Patchwork|APT41|Leviathan
|
||||
T1217,Browser Bookmark Discovery,Discovery,no
|
||||
T1213,Data from Information Repositories,Collection,Turla
|
||||
T1189,Drive-by Compromise,Initial Access,Turla|Windshift|RTM|Darkhotel|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|BRONZE BUTLER|Leafminer|Dark Caracal|APT19|APT32|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|Elderwood|APT37|Patchwork|PLATINUM
|
||||
T1203,Exploitation for Client Execution,Execution,Sandworm Team|MuddyWater|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT41|admin@338|Threat Group-3390|APT12|The White Company|APT33|APT32|APT28|Tropic Trooper|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Cobalt Group|APT37|Patchwork|Leviathan|Elderwood|TA459|APT29
|
||||
T1212,Exploitation for Credential Access,Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1211,Exploitation for Defense Evasion,Defense Evasion,APT28
|
||||
T1190,Exploit Public-Facing Application,Initial Access,Blue Mockingbird|Rocke|APT39|BlackTech|APT41|Soft Cell|Night Dragon|Axiom
|
||||
T1210,Exploitation of Remote Services,Lateral Movement,Threat Group-3390|APT28
|
||||
T1202,Indirect Command Execution,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1200,Hardware Additions,Initial Access,DarkVishnya
|
||||
T1201,Password Policy Discovery,Discovery,Turla|OilRig
|
||||
T1219,Remote Access Software,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|DarkVishnya|RTM|Kimsuky|Night Dragon|Thrip|Cobalt Group|Carbanak
|
||||
T1207,Rogue Domain Controller,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1199,Trusted Relationship,Initial Access,APT28|menuPass
|
||||
T1218,Signed Binary Proxy Execution,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1204,User Execution,Execution,no
|
||||
T1216,Signed Script Proxy Execution,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1195,Supply Chain Compromise,Initial Access,Elderwood
|
||||
T1205,Traffic Signaling,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Command And Control,no
|
||||
T1189,Drive-by Compromise,Initial Access,Dragonfly|PROMETHIUM|Turla|Windshift|RTM|Darkhotel|APT38|Lazarus Group|APT32|Dark Caracal|Dragonfly 2.0|BRONZE BUTLER|Leafminer|APT19|Threat Group-3390|APT37|Patchwork|PLATINUM|Elderwood
|
||||
T1212,Exploitation for Credential Access,Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1219,Remote Access Software,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|DarkVishnya|RTM|Kimsuky|Night Dragon|Thrip|Cobalt Group|Carbanak
|
||||
T1211,Exploitation for Defense Evasion,Defense Evasion,APT28
|
||||
T1218,Signed Binary Proxy Execution,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1216,Signed Script Proxy Execution,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1199,Trusted Relationship,Initial Access,GOLD SOUTHFIELD|APT28|menuPass
|
||||
T1176,Browser Extensions,Persistence,Kimsuky|Stolen Pencil
|
||||
T1175,Component Object Model and Distributed COM,Lateral Movement|Execution,no
|
||||
T1187,Forced Authentication,Credential Access,DarkHydrus|Dragonfly 2.0
|
||||
T1185,Man in the Browser,Collection,no
|
||||
T1187,Forced Authentication,Credential Access,Dragonfly 2.0|DarkHydrus
|
||||
T1149,LC_MAIN Hijacking,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1134,Access Token Manipulation,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Blue Mockingbird
|
||||
T1136,Create Account,Persistence,no
|
||||
T1134,Access Token Manipulation,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,FIN6|Blue Mockingbird
|
||||
T1135,Network Share Discovery,Discovery,Wizard Spider|APT32|APT39|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT1|Dragonfly 2.0|Sowbug
|
||||
T1140,Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information,Defense Evasion,UNC2452|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Molerats|Frankenstein|Turla|WIRTE|Darkhotel|Tropic Trooper|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|Gorgon Group|APT19|Honeybee|Leviathan|MuddyWater|APT28|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER
|
||||
T1140,Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information,Defense Evasion,Rocke|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Molerats|Frankenstein|Turla|WIRTE|Darkhotel|Tropic Trooper|menuPass|Honeybee|Threat Group-3390|APT19|Gorgon Group|Leviathan|MuddyWater|APT28|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER
|
||||
T1149,LC_MAIN Hijacking,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1135,Network Share Discovery,Discovery,APT32|APT39|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT1|Dragonfly 2.0|Sowbug
|
||||
T1137,Office Application Startup,Persistence,Gamaredon Group|APT32
|
||||
T1153,Source,Execution,no
|
||||
T1133,External Remote Services,Persistence|Initial Access,Wizard Spider|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Chimera|Sandworm Team|APT41|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|Night Dragon|Ke3chang|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|APT18
|
||||
T1133,External Remote Services,Persistence|Initial Access,Sandworm Team|APT41|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|Night Dragon|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|Ke3chang|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|APT18
|
||||
T1132,Data Encoding,Command And Control,no
|
||||
T1129,Shared Modules,Execution,no
|
||||
T1127,Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
@@ -471,72 +369,72 @@ T1125,Video Capture,Collection,Silence|FIN7
|
||||
T1124,System Time Discovery,Discovery,The White Company|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Turla
|
||||
T1123,Audio Capture,Collection,APT37
|
||||
T1120,Peripheral Device Discovery,Discovery,Turla|APT37|Gamaredon Group|Equation|APT28
|
||||
T1119,Automated Collection,Collection,Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT1|APT28|Patchwork|FIN5|OilRig|Threat Group-3390|FIN6
|
||||
T1119,Automated Collection,Collection,Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT1|APT28|Patchwork|OilRig|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|FIN6
|
||||
T1115,Clipboard Data,Collection,APT39|APT38
|
||||
T1114,Email Collection,Collection,no
|
||||
T1113,Screen Capture,Collection,Gamaredon Group|APT39|Silence|MuddyWater|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN7|Dark Caracal|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|Group5|APT28
|
||||
T1112,Modify Registry,Defense Evasion,Lazarus Group|Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|Turla|APT32|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|Patchwork|APT19|Gorgon Group|Threat Group-3390|Honeybee|FIN8
|
||||
T1113,Screen Capture,Collection,Gamaredon Group|APT39|Silence|MuddyWater|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|Dark Caracal|FIN7|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|Group5|APT28
|
||||
T1112,Modify Registry,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|Turla|APT32|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|Threat Group-3390|Honeybee|Patchwork|Gorgon Group|FIN8
|
||||
T1111,Two-Factor Authentication Interception,Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1110,Brute Force,Credential Access,DarkVishnya|APT39|OilRig|FIN5|Turla
|
||||
T1108,Redundant Access,Defense Evasion|Persistence,no
|
||||
T1106,Native API,Execution,Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Turla|Silence|APT37|Gorgon Group
|
||||
T1105,Ingress Tool Transfer,Command And Control,UNC2452|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Silence|APT-C-36|APT41|Soft Cell|TA505|WIRTE|APT33|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Rancor|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|Cobalt Group|Turla|Gorgon Group|APT37|Leviathan|Elderwood|PLATINUM|FIN8|Magic Hound|APT32|APT3|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN7|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28
|
||||
T1106,Native API,Execution,Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Turla|Silence|Gorgon Group|APT37
|
||||
T1105,Ingress Tool Transfer,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Silence|APT-C-36|APT41|Soft Cell|TA505|WIRTE|APT33|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Rancor|Cobalt Group|Turla|Gorgon Group|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|APT37|FIN8|PLATINUM|Leviathan|Elderwood|Magic Hound|APT3|APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN7|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28
|
||||
T1104,Multi-Stage Channels,Command And Control,APT41|MuddyWater|APT3
|
||||
T1102,Web Service,Command And Control,Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Inception|FIN6
|
||||
T1102,Web Service,Command And Control,Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Inception|FIN6
|
||||
T1098,Account Manipulation,Persistence,APT3|Dragonfly 2.0|Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1095,Non-Application Layer Protocol,Command And Control,FIN6|APT29|PLATINUM|APT3
|
||||
T1095,Non-Application Layer Protocol,Command And Control,APT29|PLATINUM|APT3
|
||||
T1092,Communication Through Removable Media,Command And Control,APT28
|
||||
T1091,Replication Through Removable Media,Lateral Movement|Initial Access,Tropic Trooper|Darkhotel|APT28
|
||||
T1090,Proxy,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|APT41|Turla
|
||||
T1087,Account Discovery,Discovery,UNC2452
|
||||
T1083,File and Directory Discovery,Discovery,UNC2452|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Inception|APT41|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|APT18|Dragonfly 2.0|Leafminer|Honeybee|Dark Caracal|APT3|BRONZE BUTLER|Sowbug|Magic Hound|APT28|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1082,System Information Discovery,Discovery,UNC2452|Wizard Spider|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|APT37|Honeybee|APT19|APT32|Magic Hound|Sowbug|OilRig|APT3|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1080,Taint Shared Content,Lateral Movement,Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Darkhotel
|
||||
T1078,Valid Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,UNC2452|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|APT39|FIN4|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|Leviathan|APT33|FIN8|FIN5|OilRig|APT28|FIN10|menuPass|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390|APT18|PittyTiger|Carbanak
|
||||
T1090,Proxy,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|APT41|Turla
|
||||
T1087,Account Discovery,Discovery,no
|
||||
T1083,File and Directory Discovery,Discovery,Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Inception|APT41|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|APT18|Leafminer|Honeybee|Dark Caracal|Dragonfly 2.0|Magic Hound|Sowbug|BRONZE BUTLER|APT3|APT28|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1082,System Information Discovery,Discovery,Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|Honeybee|APT19|APT37|APT32|Magic Hound|OilRig|APT3|Sowbug|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1080,Taint Shared Content,Lateral Movement,BRONZE BUTLER|Darkhotel
|
||||
T1078,Valid Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|APT39|FIN4|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|Leviathan|APT33|OilRig|FIN5|menuPass|APT28|FIN10|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390|APT18|PittyTiger|Carbanak
|
||||
T1074,Data Staged,Collection,Wizard Spider
|
||||
T1072,Software Deployment Tools,Execution|Lateral Movement,Silence|APT32|Threat Group-1314
|
||||
T1071,Application Layer Protocol,Command And Control,Rocke|Magic Hound|Dragonfly 2.0
|
||||
T1070,Indicator Removal on Host,Defense Evasion,UNC2452
|
||||
T1069,Permission Groups Discovery,Discovery,UNC2452|TA505|APT3
|
||||
T1070,Indicator Removal on Host,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1069,Permission Groups Discovery,Discovery,TA505|APT3
|
||||
T1068,Exploitation for Privilege Escalation,Privilege Escalation,Whitefly|APT33|Cobalt Group|PLATINUM|FIN8|APT32|Threat Group-3390|FIN6|APT28
|
||||
T1064,Scripting,Defense Evasion|Execution,no
|
||||
T1062,Hypervisor,Persistence,no
|
||||
T1061,Graphical User Interface,Execution,no
|
||||
T1059,Command and Scripting Interpreter,Execution,APT32|Molerats|Whitefly|APT39|APT19|FIN7|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|FIN5|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1057,Process Discovery,Discovery,UNC2452|Rocke|Frankenstein|Inception|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|APT38|Tropic Trooper|APT37|Honeybee|OilRig|APT3|Magic Hound|APT28|Winnti Group|Stealth Falcon|Poseidon Group|Lazarus Group|Molerats|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1059,Command and Scripting Interpreter,Execution,APT32|Molerats|Whitefly|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|FIN7|OilRig|FIN5|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1057,Process Discovery,Discovery,Rocke|Frankenstein|Inception|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|APT38|Tropic Trooper|APT37|Honeybee|OilRig|APT3|Magic Hound|APT28|Winnti Group|Stealth Falcon|Poseidon Group|Lazarus Group|Molerats|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1056,Input Capture,Collection|Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1055,Process Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,APT32|Sharpshooter|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|Cobalt Group|APT37|Turla|Honeybee|PLATINUM
|
||||
T1055,Process Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,APT32|Sharpshooter|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|Turla|Cobalt Group|APT37|Honeybee|PLATINUM
|
||||
T1053,Scheduled Task/Job,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1052,Exfiltration Over Physical Medium,Exfiltration,no
|
||||
T1051,Shared Webroot,Lateral Movement,no
|
||||
T1049,System Network Connections Discovery,Discovery,Tropic Trooper|APT41|APT38|Soft Cell|APT32|APT1|OilRig|APT3|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1049,System Network Connections Discovery,Discovery,Tropic Trooper|APT41|APT38|Soft Cell|APT32|APT1|OilRig|APT3|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1048,Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol,Exfiltration,no
|
||||
T1047,Windows Management Instrumentation,Execution,UNC2452|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT41|FIN6|Soft Cell|APT32|MuddyWater|OilRig|Threat Group-3390|FIN8|Leviathan|menuPass|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT29|Deep Panda
|
||||
T1046,Network Service Scanning,Discovery,Rocke|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT39|APT32|Cobalt Group|Leafminer|OilRig|menuPass|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390
|
||||
T1043,Commonly Used Port,Command And Control,OilRig|APT28|TEMP.Veles|Night Dragon|APT29|APT18|FIN7|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|FIN8|APT37|APT3|Magic Hound|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390
|
||||
T1047,Windows Management Instrumentation,Execution,Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT41|FIN6|Soft Cell|APT32|MuddyWater|OilRig|Threat Group-3390|FIN8|Leviathan|menuPass|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT29|Deep Panda
|
||||
T1046,Network Service Scanning,Discovery,Rocke|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT39|APT32|Leafminer|OilRig|Cobalt Group|menuPass|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390
|
||||
T1043,Commonly Used Port,Command And Control,Machete|OilRig|APT28|TEMP.Veles|Night Dragon|APT29|APT18|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN7|FIN8|APT37|Magic Hound|APT3|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390
|
||||
T1041,Exfiltration Over C2 Channel,Exfiltration,Sandworm Team|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Kimsuky|Soft Cell|APT32|APT3|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1040,Network Sniffing,Credential Access|Discovery,Sandworm Team|DarkVishnya|APT33|Stolen Pencil|APT28
|
||||
T1039,Data from Network Shared Drive,Collection,Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Sowbug|menuPass
|
||||
T1039,Data from Network Shared Drive,Collection,Sowbug|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass
|
||||
T1037,Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Rocke
|
||||
T1036,Masquerading,Defense Evasion,UNC2452|Windshift|APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|Dragonfly 2.0
|
||||
T1036,Masquerading,Defense Evasion,Windshift|APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|Dragonfly 2.0
|
||||
T1034,Path Interception,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1033,System Owner/User Discovery,Discovery,Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT41|Soft Cell|Tropic Trooper|APT39|MuddyWater|APT32|APT37|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|Magic Hound|FIN10|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3
|
||||
T1033,System Owner/User Discovery,Discovery,Frankenstein|APT41|Soft Cell|Tropic Trooper|APT39|MuddyWater|APT32|APT37|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|Magic Hound|FIN10|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3
|
||||
T1030,Data Transfer Size Limits,Exfiltration,Threat Group-3390
|
||||
T1029,Scheduled Transfer,Exfiltration,no
|
||||
T1027,Obfuscated Files or Information,Defense Evasion,UNC2452|FIN6|Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|APT41|Machete|Soft Cell|Turla|TA505|Silence|APT33|Night Dragon|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|APT29|APT18|Tropic Trooper|menuPass|Honeybee|Patchwork|Threat Group-3390|APT19|Cobalt Group|Leafminer|APT37|Dark Caracal|FIN8|MuddyWater|FIN7|BlackOasis|Leviathan|Elderwood|OilRig|Magic Hound|APT3|APT32|Group5|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|Putter Panda|APT28
|
||||
T1027,Obfuscated Files or Information,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|APT41|Machete|Soft Cell|Turla|TA505|Silence|APT33|Night Dragon|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|APT29|APT18|Tropic Trooper|Cobalt Group|Patchwork|Leafminer|APT37|Threat Group-3390|Honeybee|Dark Caracal|menuPass|APT19|BlackOasis|FIN8|Leviathan|Elderwood|MuddyWater|FIN7|Magic Hound|OilRig|APT3|APT32|Group5|Dust Storm|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT28
|
||||
T1026,Multiband Communication,Command And Control,Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1025,Data from Removable Media,Collection,Machete|Turla|Gamaredon Group|APT28
|
||||
T1021,Remote Services,Lateral Movement,no
|
||||
T1020,Automated Exfiltration,Exfiltration,Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Honeybee
|
||||
T1018,Remote System Discovery,Discovery,UNC2452|Sandworm Team|Rocke|Wizard Spider|Silence|Soft Cell|APT39|APT32|Threat Group-3390|Dragonfly 2.0|Ke3chang|Leafminer|Deep Panda|FIN8|FIN5|APT3|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN6|Turla
|
||||
T1016,System Network Configuration Discovery,Discovery,Wizard Spider|Sandworm Team|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT41|Soft Cell|APT32|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|OilRig|Magic Hound|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3|Naikon|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1020,Automated Exfiltration,Exfiltration,Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Honeybee
|
||||
T1018,Remote System Discovery,Discovery,Sandworm Team|Rocke|Wizard Spider|Silence|Soft Cell|APT39|APT32|Deep Panda|Threat Group-3390|Dragonfly 2.0|Leafminer|Ke3chang|FIN8|APT3|FIN5|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN6|Turla
|
||||
T1016,System Network Configuration Discovery,Discovery,Sandworm Team|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT41|Soft Cell|APT32|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|Magic Hound|OilRig|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3|Naikon|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1014,Rootkit,Defense Evasion,Rocke|APT41|APT28|Winnti Group
|
||||
T1012,Query Registry,Discovery,APT32|Threat Group-3390|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Turla
|
||||
T1012,Query Registry,Discovery,APT32|Dragonfly 2.0|Threat Group-3390|OilRig|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Turla
|
||||
T1011,Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium,Exfiltration,no
|
||||
T1010,Application Window Discovery,Discovery,Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1008,Fallback Channels,Command And Control,APT41|OilRig|Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1007,System Service Discovery,Discovery,BRONZE BUTLER|APT1|OilRig|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1006,Direct Volume Access,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1005,Data from Local System,Collection,UNC2452|FIN6|Gamaredon Group|APT39|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|Soft Cell|Turla|menuPass|Dark Caracal|Dragonfly 2.0|Honeybee|APT28|APT37|APT3|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|Threat Group-3390|APT1|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1005,Data from Local System,Collection,Gamaredon Group|APT39|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|Soft Cell|Turla|menuPass|Dark Caracal|Dragonfly 2.0|Honeybee|APT37|APT28|APT3|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|Threat Group-3390|APT1|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1003,OS Credential Dumping,Credential Access,APT39|Frankenstein|APT32|APT28|Leviathan|Sowbug|Suckfly|Poseidon Group|Axiom
|
||||
T1001,Data Obfuscation,Command And Control,Axiom
|
||||
|
||||
|
Vendored
+1
-1
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
|
||||
"id": {
|
||||
"group": null,
|
||||
"name": "DA-ESS_AmazonWebServices_Content",
|
||||
"version": "3.18.0"
|
||||
"version": "3.19.0"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"author": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
|
||||
+14
-14
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
||||
#############
|
||||
# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
|
||||
# On Date: 2021-04-12T22:03:03 UTC
|
||||
# On Date: 2021-04-22T21:35:56 UTC
|
||||
# Author: Splunk Security Research
|
||||
# Contact: research@splunk.com
|
||||
#############
|
||||
@@ -14,8 +14,8 @@ modification_date = 2021-03-08
|
||||
id = ced74200-8465-4bc3-bd2c-22782eec6750
|
||||
version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation/", "https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/the-cloud-shadow-admin-threat-10-permissions-to-protect", "https://labs.bishopfox.com/tech-blog/privilege-escalation-in-aws"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Create Policy Version to allow all resources - Rule", "ESCU - AWS CreateAccessKey - Rule", "ESCU - AWS CreateLoginProfile - Rule", "ESCU - AWS SetDefaultPolicyVersion - Rule", "ESCU - AWS UpdateLoginProfile - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1136.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.DS"]}
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Create Policy Version to allow all resources - Rule", "ESCU - AWS CreateAccessKey - Rule", "ESCU - AWS CreateLoginProfile - Rule", "ESCU - AWS IAM Assume Role Policy Brute Force - Rule", "ESCU - AWS IAM Delete Policy - Rule", "ESCU - AWS IAM Failure Group Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - AWS SetDefaultPolicyVersion - Rule", "ESCU - AWS UpdateLoginProfile - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069.003", "T1078.004", "T1098", "T1110", "T1136.003", "T1580"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.DS"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = []
|
||||
support_searches = []
|
||||
data_models = []
|
||||
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ version = 2
|
||||
reference = ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonVPC/latest/UserGuide/VPC_Appendix_NACLs.html", "https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/how-to-help-prepare-for-ddos-attacks-by-reducing-your-attack-surface/"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.007"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = []
|
||||
data_models = []
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
@@ -68,8 +68,8 @@ version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 12", "CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1535"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP", "ID.AM"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Initial", "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Destroyed", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Initial", "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Update"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Destroyed", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Initial", "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Initial"]
|
||||
data_models = ["Change"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
description = Monitor your cloud compute instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or compute instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior.
|
||||
@@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ version = 2
|
||||
reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/security-data-protection/cloud/public-aws-s3-buckets-writable/"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Open S3 buckets - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1530"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.DS"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = []
|
||||
data_models = []
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ reference = ["https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-cloudtrail-now-tracks-cr
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by New User - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP", "PR.AC", "PR.DS"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Users In CloudTrail - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Initial"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Users In CloudTrail - Update"]
|
||||
data_models = ["Authentication"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
description = Monitor your cloud authentication events. Searches within this Analytic Story leverage the recent cloud updates to the Authentication data model to help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious login activity.
|
||||
@@ -193,8 +193,8 @@ version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP", "ID.AM"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Update", "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Destroyed", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Initial", "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched"]
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Destroyed", "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Initial"]
|
||||
data_models = ["Change"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
description = Monitor your cloud infrastructure provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your cloud environment.
|
||||
@@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.p
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = []
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial"]
|
||||
data_models = ["Change"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
description = Monitor your cloud infrastructure provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your cloud environment.
|
||||
@@ -226,10 +226,10 @@ modification_date = 2020-09-04
|
||||
id = 1ed5ce7d-5469-4232-92af-89d1a3595b39
|
||||
version = 1
|
||||
reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://redlock.io/blog/cryptojacking-tesla"]
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "DE.DP", "ID.AM", "PR.AC"]}
|
||||
detection_searches = ["ESCU - AWS IAM AccessDenied Discovery Events - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles - Rule"]
|
||||
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1078.004", "T1580"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "DE.DP", "ID.AM", "PR.AC"]}
|
||||
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Initial", "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Security Group API Calls Per User", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Update", "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls Per User"]
|
||||
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Update", "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Security Group API Calls Per User", "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls Per User", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Initial"]
|
||||
data_models = ["Change"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
description = Detect and investigate suspicious activities by users and roles in your cloud environments.
|
||||
|
||||
+72
-4799
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
Vendored
+2
-2
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
|
||||
is_configured = false
|
||||
state = enabled
|
||||
state_change_requires_restart = false
|
||||
build = 25386
|
||||
build = 27110
|
||||
|
||||
[triggers]
|
||||
reload.analytic_stories = simple
|
||||
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ reload.content-version = simple
|
||||
|
||||
[launcher]
|
||||
author = Splunk
|
||||
version = 3.18.0
|
||||
version = 3.19.0
|
||||
description = Explore the Analytic Stories included with Splunk Security Analytics for AWS Content
|
||||
|
||||
[ui]
|
||||
|
||||
Vendored
+1
-1
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
||||
#############
|
||||
# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
|
||||
# On Date: 2021-04-12T22:03:03 UTC
|
||||
# On Date: 2021-04-22T21:35:56 UTC
|
||||
# Author: Splunk Security Research
|
||||
# Contact: research@splunk.com
|
||||
#############
|
||||
|
||||
+1
-1
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
|
||||
[content-version]
|
||||
version = 3.18.0
|
||||
version = 3.19.0
|
||||
|
||||
+4
-4
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ label = AWS Network ACL Activity
|
||||
description = Monitor your AWS network infrastructure for bad configurations and malicious activity. Investigative searches help you probe deeper, when the facts warrant it.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_aws_security_hub_alerts]
|
||||
label = AWS Security Hub Alerts
|
||||
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ label = Cloud Cryptomining
|
||||
description = Monitor your cloud compute instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or compute instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_cloud_federated_credential_abuse]
|
||||
label = Cloud Federated Credential Abuse
|
||||
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ label = Suspicious AWS S3 Activities
|
||||
description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS S3 buckets for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as detecting open S3 buckets and buckets being accessed from a new IP. The contextual and investigative searches will give you more information, when required.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_s3_bucket_details_via_bucketname___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_s3_bucket_details_via_bucketname___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_cloud_authentication_activities]
|
||||
label = Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities
|
||||
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ label = Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities
|
||||
description = Monitor your cloud infrastructure provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your cloud environment.
|
||||
disabled = 0
|
||||
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task"]
|
||||
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task"]
|
||||
|
||||
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_cloud_provisioning_activities]
|
||||
label = Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities
|
||||
|
||||
Vendored
+25
-1
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
||||
#############
|
||||
# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
|
||||
# On Date: 2021-04-12T22:03:03 UTC
|
||||
# On Date: 2021-04-22T21:35:56 UTC
|
||||
# Author: Splunk Security Research
|
||||
# Contact: research@splunk.com
|
||||
#############
|
||||
@@ -315,6 +315,30 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[aws_excessive_security_scanning_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[aws_iam_accessdenied_discovery_events_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[aws_iam_assume_role_policy_brute_force_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[aws_iam_delete_policy_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[aws_iam_failure_group_deletion_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[aws_iam_successful_group_deletion_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
[aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports_filter]
|
||||
definition = search *
|
||||
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
+210
-1
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
||||
#############
|
||||
# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
|
||||
# On Date: 2021-04-12T22:03:03 UTC
|
||||
# On Date: 2021-04-22T21:35:56 UTC
|
||||
# Author: Splunk Security Research
|
||||
# Contact: research@splunk.com
|
||||
#############
|
||||
@@ -241,6 +241,215 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
|
||||
is_visible = false
|
||||
search = `cloudtrail` eventName=CopyObject requestParameters.x-amz-server-side-encryption="aws:kms" | rename requestParameters.bucketName AS bucket_name, requestParameters.x-amz-copy-source AS src_file, requestParameters.key AS dest_file | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(src_file) AS src_file values(dest_file) AS dest_file values(userAgent) AS userAgent values(region) AS region values(src) AS src by user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3_filter`
|
||||
|
||||
[ESCU - AWS Excessive Security Scanning - Rule]
|
||||
action.escu = 0
|
||||
action.escu.enabled = 1
|
||||
description = This search looks for CloudTrail events and analyse the amount of eventNames which starts with Describe by a single user. This indicates that this user scans the configuration of your AWS cloud environment.
|
||||
action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1526"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]}
|
||||
action.escu.data_models = []
|
||||
action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for CloudTrail events and analyse the amount of eventNames which starts with Describe by a single user. This indicates that this user scans the configuration of your AWS cloud environment.
|
||||
action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudtrail logs.
|
||||
action.escu.known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positives.
|
||||
action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-13
|
||||
action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-13
|
||||
action.escu.confidence = high
|
||||
action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Excessive Security Scanning - Rule
|
||||
action.escu.search_type = detection
|
||||
action.escu.product = ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
|
||||
action.escu.providing_technologies = []
|
||||
action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS User Monitoring"]
|
||||
action.risk = 1
|
||||
action.risk.param._risk_object = src
|
||||
action.risk.param._risk_object_type = system
|
||||
action.risk.param._risk_score = 20
|
||||
action.risk.param.verbose = 0
|
||||
cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
|
||||
dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
|
||||
dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
|
||||
action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
|
||||
action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - AWS Excessive Security Scanning - Rule
|
||||
action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS User Monitoring"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1526"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]}
|
||||
schedule_window = auto
|
||||
alert.digest_mode = 1
|
||||
disabled = false
|
||||
enableSched = 1
|
||||
counttype = number of events
|
||||
relation = greater than
|
||||
quantity = 0
|
||||
realtime_schedule = 0
|
||||
is_visible = false
|
||||
search = `cloudtrail` eventName=Describe* OR eventName=List* OR eventName=Get* | stats dc(eventName) as dc_events min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(eventName) as eventName values(src) as src values(userAgent) as userAgent by user userIdentity.arn | where dc_events > 50 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|`aws_excessive_security_scanning_filter`
|
||||
|
||||
[ESCU - AWS IAM AccessDenied Discovery Events - Rule]
|
||||
action.escu = 0
|
||||
action.escu.enabled = 1
|
||||
description = The following detection identifies excessive AccessDenied events within an hour timeframe. It is possible that an access key to AWS may have been stolen and is being misused to perform discovery events. In these instances, the access is not available with the key stolen therefore these events will be generated.
|
||||
action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1580"]}
|
||||
action.escu.data_models = []
|
||||
action.escu.eli5 = The following detection identifies excessive AccessDenied events within an hour timeframe. It is possible that an access key to AWS may have been stolen and is being misused to perform discovery events. In these instances, the access is not available with the key stolen therefore these events will be generated.
|
||||
action.escu.how_to_implement = The Splunk AWS Add-on and Splunk App for AWS is required to utilize this data. The search requires AWS Cloudtrail logs.
|
||||
action.escu.known_false_positives = It is possible to start this detection will need to be tuned by source IP or user. In addition, change the count values to an upper threshold to restrict false positives.
|
||||
action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-05
|
||||
action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-05
|
||||
action.escu.confidence = high
|
||||
action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS IAM AccessDenied Discovery Events - Rule
|
||||
action.escu.search_type = detection
|
||||
action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud", "Splunk Security Analytics for AWS"]
|
||||
action.escu.providing_technologies = []
|
||||
action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Cloud User Activities"]
|
||||
cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
|
||||
dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
|
||||
dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
|
||||
action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
|
||||
action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - AWS IAM AccessDenied Discovery Events - Rule
|
||||
action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud User Activities"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1580"]}
|
||||
schedule_window = auto
|
||||
alert.digest_mode = 1
|
||||
disabled = false
|
||||
enableSched = 1
|
||||
counttype = number of events
|
||||
relation = greater than
|
||||
quantity = 0
|
||||
realtime_schedule = 0
|
||||
is_visible = false
|
||||
search = `cloudtrail` (errorCode = "AccessDenied") user_type=IAMUser (userAgent!=*.amazonaws.com) | bucket _time span=1h | stats count as failures min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime, dc(eventName) as methods, dc(eventSource) as sources values(userIdentity.arn) by src_ip, userIdentity.arn, _time | where failures >= 5 and methods >= 1 and sources >= 1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_iam_accessdenied_discovery_events_filter`
|
||||
|
||||
[ESCU - AWS IAM Assume Role Policy Brute Force - Rule]
|
||||
action.escu = 0
|
||||
action.escu.enabled = 1
|
||||
description = The following detection identifies any malformed policy document exceptions with a status of `failure`. A malformed policy document exception occurs in instances where roles are attempted to be assumed, or brute forced. In a brute force attempt, using a tool like CloudSploit or Pacu, an attempt will look like `arn:aws:iam::111111111111:role/aws-service-role/rds.amazonaws.com/AWSServiceRoleForRDS`. Meaning, when an adversary is attempting to identify a role name, multiple failures will occur. This detection focuses on the errors of a remote attempt that is failing.
|
||||
action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1580", "T1110"]}
|
||||
action.escu.data_models = []
|
||||
action.escu.eli5 = The following detection identifies any malformed policy document exceptions with a status of `failure`. A malformed policy document exception occurs in instances where roles are attempted to be assumed, or brute forced. In a brute force attempt, using a tool like CloudSploit or Pacu, an attempt will look like `arn:aws:iam::111111111111:role/aws-service-role/rds.amazonaws.com/AWSServiceRoleForRDS`. Meaning, when an adversary is attempting to identify a role name, multiple failures will occur. This detection focuses on the errors of a remote attempt that is failing.
|
||||
action.escu.how_to_implement = The Splunk AWS Add-on and Splunk App for AWS is required to utilize this data. The search requires AWS Cloudtrail logs. Set the `where count` greater than a value to identify suspicious activity in your environment.
|
||||
action.escu.known_false_positives = This detection will require tuning to provide high fidelity detection capabilties. Tune based on src addresses (corporate offices, VPN terminations) or by groups of users.
|
||||
action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-01
|
||||
action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-01
|
||||
action.escu.confidence = high
|
||||
action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS IAM Assume Role Policy Brute Force - Rule
|
||||
action.escu.search_type = detection
|
||||
action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud", "Splunk Security Analytics for AWS"]
|
||||
action.escu.providing_technologies = []
|
||||
action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS IAM Privilege Escalation"]
|
||||
cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
|
||||
dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
|
||||
dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
|
||||
action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
|
||||
action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - AWS IAM Assume Role Policy Brute Force - Rule
|
||||
action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS IAM Privilege Escalation"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1580", "T1110"]}
|
||||
schedule_window = auto
|
||||
alert.digest_mode = 1
|
||||
disabled = false
|
||||
enableSched = 1
|
||||
counttype = number of events
|
||||
relation = greater than
|
||||
quantity = 0
|
||||
realtime_schedule = 0
|
||||
is_visible = false
|
||||
search = `cloudtrail` (errorCode=MalformedPolicyDocumentException) status=failure (userAgent!=*.amazonaws.com) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(requestParameters.policyName) as policy_name by src eventName eventSource aws_account_id errorCode requestParameters.policyDocument userAgent eventID awsRegion userIdentity.principalId user_arn | where count >= 2 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_iam_assume_role_policy_brute_force_filter`
|
||||
|
||||
[ESCU - AWS IAM Delete Policy - Rule]
|
||||
action.escu = 0
|
||||
action.escu.enabled = 1
|
||||
description = The following detection identifes when a policy is deleted on AWS. This does not identify whether successful or failed, but the error messages tell a story of suspicious attempts. There is a specific process to follow when deleting a policy. First, detach the policy from all users, groups, and roles that the policy is attached to, using DetachUserPolicy , DetachGroupPolicy , or DetachRolePolicy.
|
||||
action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1098"]}
|
||||
action.escu.data_models = []
|
||||
action.escu.eli5 = The following detection identifes when a policy is deleted on AWS. This does not identify whether successful or failed, but the error messages tell a story of suspicious attempts. There is a specific process to follow when deleting a policy. First, detach the policy from all users, groups, and roles that the policy is attached to, using DetachUserPolicy , DetachGroupPolicy , or DetachRolePolicy.
|
||||
action.escu.how_to_implement = The Splunk AWS Add-on and Splunk App for AWS is required to utilize this data. The search requires AWS Cloudtrail logs.
|
||||
action.escu.known_false_positives = This detection will require tuning to provide high fidelity detection capabilties. Tune based on src addresses (corporate offices, VPN terminations) or by groups of users. Not every user with AWS access should have permission to delete policies (least privilege). In addition, this may be saved seperately and tuned for failed or success attempts only.
|
||||
action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-01
|
||||
action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-01
|
||||
action.escu.confidence = high
|
||||
action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS IAM Delete Policy - Rule
|
||||
action.escu.search_type = detection
|
||||
action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud", "Splunk Security Analytics for AWS"]
|
||||
action.escu.providing_technologies = []
|
||||
action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS IAM Privilege Escalation"]
|
||||
cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
|
||||
dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
|
||||
dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
|
||||
action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
|
||||
action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - AWS IAM Delete Policy - Rule
|
||||
action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS IAM Privilege Escalation"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1098"]}
|
||||
schedule_window = auto
|
||||
alert.digest_mode = 1
|
||||
disabled = false
|
||||
enableSched = 1
|
||||
counttype = number of events
|
||||
relation = greater than
|
||||
quantity = 0
|
||||
realtime_schedule = 0
|
||||
is_visible = false
|
||||
search = `cloudtrail` eventName=DeletePolicy (userAgent!=*.amazonaws.com) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(requestParameters.policyArn) as policyArn by src eventName eventSource aws_account_id errorCode errorMessage userAgent eventID awsRegion userIdentity.principalId userIdentity.arn | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_iam_delete_policy_filter`
|
||||
|
||||
[ESCU - AWS IAM Failure Group Deletion - Rule]
|
||||
action.escu = 0
|
||||
action.escu.enabled = 1
|
||||
description = This detection identifies failure attempts to delete groups. We want to identify when a group is attempting to be deleted, but either access is denied, there is a conflict or there is no group. This is indicative of administrators performing an action, but also could be suspicious behavior occurring. Review parallel IAM events - recently added users, new groups and so forth.
|
||||
action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1098"]}
|
||||
action.escu.data_models = []
|
||||
action.escu.eli5 = This detection identifies failure attempts to delete groups. We want to identify when a group is attempting to be deleted, but either access is denied, there is a conflict or there is no group. This is indicative of administrators performing an action, but also could be suspicious behavior occurring. Review parallel IAM events - recently added users, new groups and so forth.
|
||||
action.escu.how_to_implement = The Splunk AWS Add-on and Splunk App for AWS is required to utilize this data. The search requires AWS Cloudtrail logs.
|
||||
action.escu.known_false_positives = This detection will require tuning to provide high fidelity detection capabilties. Tune based on src addresses (corporate offices, VPN terminations) or by groups of users. Not every user with AWS access should have permission to delete groups (least privilege).
|
||||
action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-01
|
||||
action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-01
|
||||
action.escu.confidence = high
|
||||
action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS IAM Failure Group Deletion - Rule
|
||||
action.escu.search_type = detection
|
||||
action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud", "Splunk Security Analytics for AWS"]
|
||||
action.escu.providing_technologies = []
|
||||
action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS IAM Privilege Escalation"]
|
||||
cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
|
||||
dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
|
||||
dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
|
||||
action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
|
||||
action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - AWS IAM Failure Group Deletion - Rule
|
||||
action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS IAM Privilege Escalation"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1098"]}
|
||||
schedule_window = auto
|
||||
alert.digest_mode = 1
|
||||
disabled = false
|
||||
enableSched = 1
|
||||
counttype = number of events
|
||||
relation = greater than
|
||||
quantity = 0
|
||||
realtime_schedule = 0
|
||||
is_visible = false
|
||||
search = `cloudtrail` eventSource=iam.amazonaws.com eventName=DeleteGroup errorCode IN (NoSuchEntityException,DeleteConflictException, AccessDenied) (userAgent!=*.amazonaws.com) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(requestParameters.groupName) as group_name by src eventName eventSource aws_account_id errorCode errorMessage userAgent eventID awsRegion userIdentity.principalId user_arn | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_iam_failure_group_deletion_filter`
|
||||
|
||||
[ESCU - AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion - Rule]
|
||||
action.escu = 0
|
||||
action.escu.enabled = 1
|
||||
description = The following query uses IAM events to track the success of a group being deleted on AWS. This is typically not indicative of malicious behavior, but a precurser to additional events thay may unfold. Review parallel IAM events - recently added users, new groups and so forth. Inversely, review failed attempts in a similar manner.
|
||||
action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069.003", "T1098"]}
|
||||
action.escu.data_models = []
|
||||
action.escu.eli5 = The following query uses IAM events to track the success of a group being deleted on AWS. This is typically not indicative of malicious behavior, but a precurser to additional events thay may unfold. Review parallel IAM events - recently added users, new groups and so forth. Inversely, review failed attempts in a similar manner.
|
||||
action.escu.how_to_implement = The Splunk AWS Add-on and Splunk App for AWS is required to utilize this data. The search requires AWS Cloudtrail logs.
|
||||
action.escu.known_false_positives = This detection will require tuning to provide high fidelity detection capabilties. Tune based on src addresses (corporate offices, VPN terminations) or by groups of users. Not every user with AWS access should have permission to delete groups (least privilege).
|
||||
action.escu.creation_date = 2021-03-31
|
||||
action.escu.modification_date = 2021-03-31
|
||||
action.escu.confidence = high
|
||||
action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion - Rule
|
||||
action.escu.search_type = detection
|
||||
action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud", "Splunk Security Analytics for AWS"]
|
||||
action.escu.providing_technologies = []
|
||||
action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS IAM Privilege Escalation"]
|
||||
cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
|
||||
dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
|
||||
dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
|
||||
action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
|
||||
action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion - Rule
|
||||
action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS IAM Privilege Escalation"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069.003", "T1098"]}
|
||||
schedule_window = auto
|
||||
alert.digest_mode = 1
|
||||
disabled = false
|
||||
enableSched = 1
|
||||
counttype = number of events
|
||||
relation = greater than
|
||||
quantity = 0
|
||||
realtime_schedule = 0
|
||||
is_visible = false
|
||||
search = `cloudtrail` eventSource=iam.amazonaws.com eventName=DeleteGroup errorCode=success (userAgent!=*.amazonaws.com) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(requestParameters.groupName) by src eventName eventSource errorCode user_agent awsRegion userIdentity.principalId user_arn | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_iam_successful_group_deletion_filter`
|
||||
|
||||
[ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports - Rule]
|
||||
action.escu = 0
|
||||
action.escu.enabled = 1
|
||||
|
||||
Vendored
+1
-1
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
||||
#############
|
||||
# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
|
||||
# On Date: 2021-04-12T22:03:03 UTC
|
||||
# On Date: 2021-04-22T21:35:56 UTC
|
||||
# Author: Splunk Security Research
|
||||
# Contact: research@splunk.com
|
||||
#############
|
||||
|
||||
+71
-11
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
||||
#############
|
||||
# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
|
||||
# On Date: 2021-04-12T22:03:03 UTC
|
||||
# On Date: 2021-04-22T21:35:56 UTC
|
||||
# Author: Splunk Security Research
|
||||
# Contact: research@splunk.com
|
||||
#############
|
||||
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation/", "https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/the-cloud-shadow-admin-threat-10-permissions-to-protect", "https://labs.bishopfox.com/tech-blog/privilege-escalation-in-aws"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - AWS Create Policy Version to allow all resources - Rule", "ESCU - AWS UpdateLoginProfile - Rule", "ESCU - AWS SetDefaultPolicyVersion - Rule", "ESCU - AWS CreateAccessKey - Rule", "ESCU - AWS CreateLoginProfile - Rule"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - AWS IAM Failure Group Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - AWS CreateLoginProfile - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Create Policy Version to allow all resources - Rule", "ESCU - AWS IAM Delete Policy - Rule", "ESCU - AWS SetDefaultPolicyVersion - Rule", "ESCU - AWS UpdateLoginProfile - Rule", "ESCU - AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - AWS IAM Assume Role Policy Brute Force - Rule", "ESCU - AWS CreateAccessKey - Rule"]
|
||||
description = This analytic story contains detections that query your AWS Cloudtrail for activities related to privilege escalation.
|
||||
narrative = Amazon Web Services provides a neat feature called Identity and Access Management (IAM) that enables organizations to manage various AWS services and resources in a secure way. All IAM users have roles, groups and policies associated with them which governs and sets permissions to allow a user to access specific restrictions.\
|
||||
However, if these IAM policies are misconfigured and have specific combinations of weak permissions; it can allow attackers to escalate their privileges and further compromise the organization. Rhino Security Labs have published comprehensive blogs detailing various AWS Escalation methods. By using this as an inspiration, Splunk’s research team wants to highlight how these attack vectors look in AWS Cloudtrail logs and provide you with detection queries to uncover these potentially malicious events via this Analytic Story. \
|
||||
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ version = 2
|
||||
references = ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonVPC/latest/UserGuide/VPC_Appendix_NACLs.html", "https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/how-to-help-prepare-for-ddos-attacks-by-reducing-your-attack-surface/"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports - Rule", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Monitor your AWS network infrastructure for bad configurations and malicious activity. Investigative searches help you probe deeper, when the facts warrant it.
|
||||
narrative = AWS CloudTrail is an AWS service that helps you enable governance, compliance, and operational/risk auditing of your AWS account. Actions taken by a user, role, or an AWS service are recorded as events in CloudTrail. It is crucial for a company to monitor events and actions taken in the AWS Management Console, AWS Command Line Interface, and AWS SDKs and APIs to ensure that your servers are not vulnerable to attacks. This analytic story contains detection searches that leverage CloudTrail logs from AWS to check for bad configurations and malicious activity in your AWS network access controls.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Monitor your cloud compute instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or compute instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior.
|
||||
narrative = Cryptomining is an intentionally difficult, resource-intensive business. Its complexity was designed into the process to ensure that the number of blocks mined each day would remain steady. So, it's par for the course that ambitious, but unscrupulous, miners make amassing the computing power of large enterprises--a practice known as cryptojacking--a top priority. \
|
||||
Cryptojacking has attracted an increasing amount of media attention since its explosion in popularity in the fall of 2017. The attacks have moved from in-browser exploits and mobile phones to enterprise cloud services, such as Amazon Web Services (AWS), Google Cloud Platform (GCP), and Azure. It's difficult to determine exactly how widespread the practice has become, since bad actors continually evolve their ability to escape detection, including employing unlisted endpoints, moderating their CPU usage, and hiding the mining pool's IP address behind a free CDN. \
|
||||
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/golden-saml-newly-discovered-attack-technique-forges-authentication-to-cloud-apps", "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf", "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - O365 Excessive SSO logon errors - Rule", "ESCU - AWS SAML Update identity provider - Rule", "ESCU - O365 New Federated Domain Added - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Added Service Principal - Rule", "ESCU - AWS SAML Access by Provider User and Principal - Rule"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - O365 Excessive SSO logon errors - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User - Rule", "ESCU - AWS SAML Access by Provider User and Principal - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Added Service Principal - Rule", "ESCU - AWS SAML Update identity provider - Rule", "ESCU - O365 New Federated Domain Added - Rule"]
|
||||
description = This analytical story addresses events that indicate abuse of cloud federated credentials. These credentials are usually extracted from endpoint desktop or servers specially those servers that provide federation services such as Windows Active Directory Federation Services. Identity Federation relies on objects such as Oauth2 tokens, cookies or SAML assertions in order to provide seamless access between cloud and perimeter environments. If these objects are either hijacked or forged then attackers will be able to pivot into victim's cloud environements.
|
||||
narrative = This story is composed of detection searches based on endpoint that addresses the use of Mimikatz, Escalation of Privileges and Abnormal processes that may indicate the extraction of Federated directory objects such as passwords, Oauth2 tokens, certificates and keys. Cloud environment (AWS, Azure) related events are also addressed in specific cloud environment detection searches.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://i.blackhat.com/USA-20/Thursday/us-20-Bienstock-My-Cloud-Is-APTs-Cloud-Investigating-And-Defending-Office-365.pdf"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Patrick Bareiss"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - O365 Disable MFA - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Excessive SSO logon errors - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Excessive Authentication Failures Alert - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Bypass MFA via Trusted IP - Rule", "ESCU - O365 PST export alert - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious Rights Delegation - Rule", "ESCU - O365 New Federated Domain Added - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Added Service Principal - Rule"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - O365 Excessive SSO logon errors - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious Rights Delegation - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User - Rule", "ESCU - O365 PST export alert - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Excessive Authentication Failures Alert - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Bypass MFA via Trusted IP - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Disable MFA - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Added Service Principal - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding - Rule", "ESCU - O365 New Federated Domain Added - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding - Rule"]
|
||||
description = This story is focused around detecting Office 365 Attacks.
|
||||
narrative = More and more companies are using Microsofts Office 365 cloud offering. Therefore, we see more and more attacks against Office 365. This story provides various detections for Office 365 attacks.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integration.html"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Monitor your AWS authentication events using your CloudTrail logs. Searches within this Analytic Story will help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious logins.
|
||||
narrative = It is important to monitor and control who has access to your AWS infrastructure. Detecting suspicious logins to your AWS infrastructure will provide good starting points for investigations. Abusive behaviors caused by compromised credentials can lead to direct monetary costs, as you will be billed for any EC2 instances created by the attacker.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ version = 2
|
||||
references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/security-data-protection/cloud/public-aws-s3-buckets-writable/"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Detect New Open S3 buckets - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Open S3 buckets - Rule", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS S3 buckets for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as detecting open S3 buckets and buckets being accessed from a new IP. The contextual and investigative searches will give you more information, when required.
|
||||
narrative = As cloud computing has exploded, so has the number of creative attacks on virtual environments. And as the number-two cloud-service provider, Amazon Web Services (AWS) has certainly had its share.\
|
||||
Amazon's "shared responsibility" model dictates that the company has responsibility for the environment outside of the VM and the customer is responsible for the security inside of the S3 container. As such, it's important to stay vigilant for activities that may belie suspicious behavior inside of your environment.\
|
||||
@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-cloudtrail-now-tracks-cross-account-activity-to-its-origin/", "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integration.html"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by New User - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by New User - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Monitor your cloud authentication events. Searches within this Analytic Story leverage the recent cloud updates to the Authentication data model to help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious login activity.
|
||||
narrative = It is important to monitor and control who has access to your cloud infrastructure. Detecting suspicious logins will provide good starting points for investigations. Abusive behaviors caused by compromised credentials can lead to direct monetary costs, as you will be billed for any compute activity whether legitimate or otherwise.\
|
||||
This Analytic Story has data model versions of cloud searches leveraging Authentication data, including those looking for suspicious login activity, and cross-account activity for AWS.
|
||||
@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Monitor your cloud infrastructure provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your cloud environment.
|
||||
narrative = Monitoring your cloud infrastructure logs allows you enable governance, compliance, and risk auditing. It is crucial for a company to monitor events and actions taken in the their cloud environments to ensure that your instances are not vulnerable to attacks. This Analytic Story identifies suspicious activities in your cloud compute instances and helps you respond and investigate those activities.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://redlock.io/blog/cryptojacking-tesla"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - AWS IAM AccessDenied Discovery Events - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Detect and investigate suspicious activities by users and roles in your cloud environments.
|
||||
narrative = It seems obvious that it is critical to monitor and control the users who have access to your cloud infrastructure. Nevertheless, it's all too common for enterprises to lose track of ad-hoc accounts, leaving their servers vulnerable to attack. In fact, this was the very oversight that led to Tesla's cryptojacking attack in February, 2018.\
|
||||
In addition to compromising the security of your data, when bad actors leverage your compute resources, it can incur monumental costs, since you will be billed for any new instances and increased bandwidth usage.
|
||||
@@ -223,6 +223,66 @@ annotations = {"mitre_attack": ["T1486"]}
|
||||
known_false_positives = bucket with S3 encryption
|
||||
providing_technologies = []
|
||||
|
||||
[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Excessive Security Scanning - Rule]
|
||||
type = detection
|
||||
asset_type = AWS Account
|
||||
confidence = medium
|
||||
explanation = This search looks for CloudTrail events and analyse the amount of eventNames which starts with Describe by a single user. This indicates that this user scans the configuration of your AWS cloud environment.
|
||||
how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudtrail logs.
|
||||
annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1526"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]}
|
||||
known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positives.
|
||||
providing_technologies = []
|
||||
|
||||
[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS IAM AccessDenied Discovery Events - Rule]
|
||||
type = detection
|
||||
asset_type =
|
||||
confidence = medium
|
||||
explanation = The following detection identifies excessive AccessDenied events within an hour timeframe. It is possible that an access key to AWS may have been stolen and is being misused to perform discovery events. In these instances, the access is not available with the key stolen therefore these events will be generated.
|
||||
how_to_implement = The Splunk AWS Add-on and Splunk App for AWS is required to utilize this data. The search requires AWS Cloudtrail logs.
|
||||
annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1580"]}
|
||||
known_false_positives = It is possible to start this detection will need to be tuned by source IP or user. In addition, change the count values to an upper threshold to restrict false positives.
|
||||
providing_technologies = []
|
||||
|
||||
[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS IAM Assume Role Policy Brute Force - Rule]
|
||||
type = detection
|
||||
asset_type =
|
||||
confidence = medium
|
||||
explanation = The following detection identifies any malformed policy document exceptions with a status of `failure`. A malformed policy document exception occurs in instances where roles are attempted to be assumed, or brute forced. In a brute force attempt, using a tool like CloudSploit or Pacu, an attempt will look like `arn:aws:iam::111111111111:role/aws-service-role/rds.amazonaws.com/AWSServiceRoleForRDS`. Meaning, when an adversary is attempting to identify a role name, multiple failures will occur. This detection focuses on the errors of a remote attempt that is failing.
|
||||
how_to_implement = The Splunk AWS Add-on and Splunk App for AWS is required to utilize this data. The search requires AWS Cloudtrail logs. Set the `where count` greater than a value to identify suspicious activity in your environment.
|
||||
annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1580", "T1110"]}
|
||||
known_false_positives = This detection will require tuning to provide high fidelity detection capabilties. Tune based on src addresses (corporate offices, VPN terminations) or by groups of users.
|
||||
providing_technologies = []
|
||||
|
||||
[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS IAM Delete Policy - Rule]
|
||||
type = detection
|
||||
asset_type =
|
||||
confidence = medium
|
||||
explanation = The following detection identifes when a policy is deleted on AWS. This does not identify whether successful or failed, but the error messages tell a story of suspicious attempts. There is a specific process to follow when deleting a policy. First, detach the policy from all users, groups, and roles that the policy is attached to, using DetachUserPolicy , DetachGroupPolicy , or DetachRolePolicy.
|
||||
how_to_implement = The Splunk AWS Add-on and Splunk App for AWS is required to utilize this data. The search requires AWS Cloudtrail logs.
|
||||
annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1098"]}
|
||||
known_false_positives = This detection will require tuning to provide high fidelity detection capabilties. Tune based on src addresses (corporate offices, VPN terminations) or by groups of users. Not every user with AWS access should have permission to delete policies (least privilege). In addition, this may be saved seperately and tuned for failed or success attempts only.
|
||||
providing_technologies = []
|
||||
|
||||
[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS IAM Failure Group Deletion - Rule]
|
||||
type = detection
|
||||
asset_type =
|
||||
confidence = medium
|
||||
explanation = This detection identifies failure attempts to delete groups. We want to identify when a group is attempting to be deleted, but either access is denied, there is a conflict or there is no group. This is indicative of administrators performing an action, but also could be suspicious behavior occurring. Review parallel IAM events - recently added users, new groups and so forth.
|
||||
how_to_implement = The Splunk AWS Add-on and Splunk App for AWS is required to utilize this data. The search requires AWS Cloudtrail logs.
|
||||
annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1098"]}
|
||||
known_false_positives = This detection will require tuning to provide high fidelity detection capabilties. Tune based on src addresses (corporate offices, VPN terminations) or by groups of users. Not every user with AWS access should have permission to delete groups (least privilege).
|
||||
providing_technologies = []
|
||||
|
||||
[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion - Rule]
|
||||
type = detection
|
||||
asset_type =
|
||||
confidence = medium
|
||||
explanation = The following query uses IAM events to track the success of a group being deleted on AWS. This is typically not indicative of malicious behavior, but a precurser to additional events thay may unfold. Review parallel IAM events - recently added users, new groups and so forth. Inversely, review failed attempts in a similar manner.
|
||||
how_to_implement = The Splunk AWS Add-on and Splunk App for AWS is required to utilize this data. The search requires AWS Cloudtrail logs.
|
||||
annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069.003", "T1098"]}
|
||||
known_false_positives = This detection will require tuning to provide high fidelity detection capabilties. Tune based on src addresses (corporate offices, VPN terminations) or by groups of users. Not every user with AWS access should have permission to delete groups (least privilege).
|
||||
providing_technologies = []
|
||||
|
||||
[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports - Rule]
|
||||
type = detection
|
||||
asset_type = AWS Instance
|
||||
|
||||
+139
-241
@@ -1,107 +1,5 @@
|
||||
mitre_id,technique,tactics,groups
|
||||
T1484.002,Domain Trust Modification,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,UNC2452
|
||||
T1484.001,Group Policy Modification,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1606.002,SAML Tokens,Credential Access,UNC2452
|
||||
T1606.001,Web Cookies,Credential Access,UNC2452
|
||||
T1606,Forge Web Credentials,Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1059.008,Network Device CLI,Execution,no
|
||||
T1602.002,Network Device Configuration Dump,Collection,no
|
||||
T1542.005,TFTP Boot,Defense Evasion|Persistence,no
|
||||
T1542.004,ROMMONkit,Defense Evasion|Persistence,no
|
||||
T1602.001,SNMP (MIB Dump),Collection,no
|
||||
T1602,Data from Configuration Repository,Collection,no
|
||||
T1601.002,Downgrade System Image,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1601.001,Patch System Image,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1601,Modify System Image,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1600.002,Disable Crypto Hardware,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1600.001,Reduce Key Space,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1600,Weaken Encryption,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1556.004,Network Device Authentication,Credential Access|Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1599.001,Network Address Translation Traversal,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1599,Network Boundary Bridging,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1020.001,Traffic Duplication,Exfiltration,no
|
||||
T1557.002,ARP Cache Poisoning,Credential Access|Collection,Cleaver
|
||||
T1588.006,Vulnerabilities,Resource Development,no
|
||||
T1053.006,Systemd Timers,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1562.008,Disable Cloud Logs,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1547.012,Print Processors,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1598.003,Spearphishing Link,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1598.002,Spearphishing Attachment,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1598.001,Spearphishing Service,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1598,Phishing for Information,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1597.002,Purchase Technical Data,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1597.001,Threat Intel Vendors,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1597,Search Closed Sources,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1596.005,Scan Databases,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1596.004,CDNs,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1596.003,Digital Certificates,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1596.001,DNS/Passive DNS,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1596.002,WHOIS,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1596,Search Open Technical Databases,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1595.002,Vulnerability Scanning,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1595.001,Scanning IP Blocks,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1595,Active Scanning,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1594,Search Victim-Owned Websites,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1593.002,Search Engines,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1593.001,Social Media,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1593,Search Open Websites/Domains,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1592.004,Client Configurations,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1592.003,Firmware,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1592.002,Software,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1592.001,Hardware,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1592,Gather Victim Host Information,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1591.004,Identify Roles,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1591.003,Identify Business Tempo,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1591.001,Determine Physical Locations,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1591.002,Business Relationships,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1591,Gather Victim Org Information,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1590.006,Network Security Appliances,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1590.005,IP Addresses,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1590.004,Network Topology,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1590.003,Network Trust Dependencies,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1590.002,DNS,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1590.001,Domain Properties,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1590,Gather Victim Network Information,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1589.003,Employee Names,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1589.002,Email Addresses,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1589.001,Credentials,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1589,Gather Victim Identity Information,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1588.005,Exploits,Resource Development,no
|
||||
T1588.004,Digital Certificates,Resource Development,no
|
||||
T1588.003,Code Signing Certificates,Resource Development,Wizard Spider
|
||||
T1588.002,Tool,Resource Development,no
|
||||
T1588.001,Malware,Resource Development,Turla|APT1
|
||||
T1588,Obtain Capabilities,Resource Development,no
|
||||
T1587.004,Exploits,Resource Development,no
|
||||
T1587.003,Digital Certificates,Resource Development,APT29|PROMETHIUM
|
||||
T1587.002,Code Signing Certificates,Resource Development,PROMETHIUM|Patchwork
|
||||
T1587.001,Malware,Resource Development,UNC2452|Turla|FIN7|Night Dragon|Cleaver
|
||||
T1587,Develop Capabilities,Resource Development,no
|
||||
T1586.002,Email Accounts,Resource Development,no
|
||||
T1586.001,Social Media Accounts,Resource Development,no
|
||||
T1586,Compromise Accounts,Resource Development,no
|
||||
T1585.002,Email Accounts,Resource Development,APT1
|
||||
T1585.001,Social Media Accounts,Resource Development,Cleaver
|
||||
T1585,Establish Accounts,Resource Development,APT17
|
||||
T1584.006,Web Services,Resource Development,Turla
|
||||
T1584.005,Botnet,Resource Development,no
|
||||
T1584.004,Server,Resource Development,Turla|APT16
|
||||
T1584.003,Virtual Private Server,Resource Development,Turla
|
||||
T1584.002,DNS Server,Resource Development,no
|
||||
T1584.001,Domains,Resource Development,APT1
|
||||
T1583.006,Web Services,Resource Development,APT17|APT29
|
||||
T1583.005,Botnet,Resource Development,no
|
||||
T1583.004,Server,Resource Development,no
|
||||
T1583.003,Virtual Private Server,Resource Development,TEMP.Veles
|
||||
T1583.002,DNS Server,Resource Development,no
|
||||
T1584,Compromise Infrastructure,Resource Development,no
|
||||
T1583.001,Domains,Resource Development,APT1|APT28
|
||||
T1583,Acquire Infrastructure,Resource Development,no
|
||||
T1564.007,VBA Stomping,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1558.004,AS-REP Roasting,Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1580,Cloud Infrastructure Discovery,Discovery,no
|
||||
T1218.012,Verclsid,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1205.001,Port Knocking,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Command And Control,PROMETHIUM
|
||||
T1205.001,Port Knocking,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Command And Control,no
|
||||
T1564.006,Run Virtual Instance,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1564.005,Hidden File System,Defense Evasion,Strider|Equation
|
||||
T1556.003,Pluggable Authentication Modules,Credential Access|Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
@@ -109,7 +7,7 @@ T1574.012,COR_PROFILER,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,Blue Moc
|
||||
T1562.007,Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1098.004,SSH Authorized Keys,Persistence,no
|
||||
T1480.001,Environmental Keying,Defense Evasion,APT41|Equation
|
||||
T1059.007,JavaScript/JScript,Execution,FIN6|APT32|FIN7|Cobalt Group|Molerats|TA505|Silence|Leafminer
|
||||
T1059.007,JavaScript/JScript,Execution,APT32|FIN7|Cobalt Group|Molerats|TA505|Silence|Leafminer
|
||||
T1578.004,Revert Cloud Instance,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1578.003,Delete Cloud Instance,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1578.001,Create Snapshot,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
@@ -126,31 +24,31 @@ T1546.015,Component Object Model Hijacking,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,APT2
|
||||
T1071.004,DNS,Command And Control,APT39|Tropic Trooper|OilRig|Ke3chang|Cobalt Group|APT18|APT41|FIN7
|
||||
T1071.003,Mail Protocols,Command And Control,APT32|SilverTerrier|APT28
|
||||
T1071.002,File Transfer Protocols,Command And Control,APT41|SilverTerrier|Machete|Honeybee
|
||||
T1071.001,Web Protocols,Command And Control,UNC2452|Sandworm Team|TA505|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Inception|APT41|SilverTerrier|Machete|APT28|WIRTE|APT33|FIN4|Night Dragon|APT18|APT38|Threat Group-3390|Ke3chang|Dark Caracal|APT19|Cobalt Group|Rancor|Orangeworm|APT37|Turla|Lazarus Group|APT32|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|OilRig|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon
|
||||
T1071.001,Web Protocols,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|TA505|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Inception|APT41|SilverTerrier|Machete|APT28|WIRTE|APT33|FIN4|Night Dragon|APT18|APT38|Cobalt Group|APT19|Threat Group-3390|Rancor|Orangeworm|APT37|Ke3chang|Dark Caracal|Turla|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|OilRig|Magic Hound|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon
|
||||
T1572,Protocol Tunneling,Command And Control,OilRig|Cobalt Group|FIN6
|
||||
T1048.003,Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol,Exfiltration,Wizard Spider|FIN6|APT32|APT33|Thrip|FIN8|OilRig|Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1048.002,Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol,Exfiltration,UNC2452
|
||||
T1048.003,Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol,Exfiltration,APT32|APT33|Thrip|FIN8|OilRig|Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1048.002,Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol,Exfiltration,no
|
||||
T1048.001,Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol,Exfiltration,no
|
||||
T1001.003,Protocol Impersonation,Command And Control,Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1001.002,Steganography,Command And Control,APT29|Axiom
|
||||
T1001.002,Steganography,Command And Control,Axiom
|
||||
T1001.001,Junk Data,Command And Control,APT28
|
||||
T1132.002,Non-Standard Encoding,Command And Control,no
|
||||
T1132.001,Standard Encoding,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|APT33|APT19|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork
|
||||
T1090.004,Domain Fronting,Command And Control,APT29
|
||||
T1090.003,Multi-hop Proxy,Command And Control,Inception|FIN4|APT29
|
||||
T1090.002,External Proxy,Command And Control,APT39|Silence|Soft Cell|MuddyWater|APT3|FIN5|Lazarus Group|menuPass|APT28
|
||||
T1090.001,Internal Proxy,Command And Control,UNC2452|APT39|Strider
|
||||
T1090.001,Internal Proxy,Command And Control,APT39|Strider
|
||||
T1102.003,One-Way Communication,Command And Control,Leviathan
|
||||
T1102.002,Bidirectional Communication,Command And Control,APT29|Sandworm Team|APT39|APT12|Turla|FIN7|APT37|Magic Hound|Carbanak
|
||||
T1102.002,Bidirectional Communication,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|APT39|APT12|Turla|FIN7|APT37|Magic Hound|Carbanak
|
||||
T1102.001,Dead Drop Resolver,Command And Control,Rocke|APT41|BRONZE BUTLER|RTM|Patchwork
|
||||
T1571,Non-Standard Port,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|Rocke|DarkVishnya|Silence|APT-C-36|Magic Hound|APT33|APT32|TEMP.Veles|Lazarus Group|FIN7
|
||||
T1074.002,Remote Data Staging,Collection,UNC2452|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|FIN6|Night Dragon|FIN8
|
||||
T1074.001,Local Data Staging,Collection,Machete|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|Honeybee|Dragonfly 2.0|Patchwork|Leviathan|APT3|FIN5|menuPass|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28
|
||||
T1074.002,Remote Data Staging,Collection,Threat Group-3390|menuPass|FIN6|Night Dragon|FIN8
|
||||
T1074.001,Local Data Staging,Collection,Machete|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|Patchwork|Dragonfly 2.0|Honeybee|Leviathan|APT3|FIN5|menuPass|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28
|
||||
T1078.004,Cloud Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,APT33
|
||||
T1564.004,NTFS File Attributes,Defense Evasion,APT32
|
||||
T1564.003,Hidden Window,Defense Evasion,Gorgon Group|Deep Panda|DarkHydrus|CopyKittens|APT19|APT32|APT28|APT3|Magic Hound
|
||||
T1078.003,Local Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,PROMETHIUM|Tropic Trooper|FIN10|Stolen Pencil|APT32
|
||||
T1078.002,Domain Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,Wizard Spider|APT29|TA505|APT3|Threat Group-1314
|
||||
T1078.003,Local Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,Tropic Trooper|FIN10|Stolen Pencil|APT32
|
||||
T1078.002,Domain Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,TA505|APT3|Threat Group-1314
|
||||
T1078.001,Default Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,no
|
||||
T1564.002,Hidden Users,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1574.006,LD_PRELOAD,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,Rocke
|
||||
@@ -166,37 +64,37 @@ T1574,Hijack Execution Flow,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1069.001,Local Groups,Discovery,Turla|OilRig|admin@338
|
||||
T1570,Lateral Tool Transfer,Lateral Movement,APT32|Wizard Spider|Turla|FIN10
|
||||
T1568.003,DNS Calculation,Command And Control,APT12
|
||||
T1204.002,Malicious File,Execution,FIN6|PROMETHIUM|APT30|Magic Hound|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|RTM|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|Machete|admin@338|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|Dragonfly 2.0|Dark Caracal|FIN7|APT32|Cobalt Group|DarkHydrus|Patchwork|Rancor|MuddyWater|BRONZE BUTLER|APT19|Gorgon Group|OilRig|Lazarus Group|APT29|menuPass|TA459|FIN8|Elderwood|PLATINUM|Leviathan|APT37|APT28
|
||||
T1204.001,Malicious Link,Execution,Wizard Spider|Patchwork|Windshift|APT32|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|TA505|OilRig|Machete|Leviathan|FIN8|FIN4|Elderwood|Dragonfly 2.0|Cobalt Group|APT39|Night Dragon|APT33|Turla
|
||||
T1204.002,Malicious File,Execution,Magic Hound|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|RTM|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|Machete|admin@338|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|BRONZE BUTLER|Cobalt Group|DarkHydrus|Gorgon Group|Patchwork|OilRig|Dark Caracal|MuddyWater|Lazarus Group|FIN7|APT32|Rancor|APT37|FIN8|APT28|Elderwood|TA459|APT29|Leviathan|menuPass|PLATINUM
|
||||
T1204.001,Malicious Link,Execution,Patchwork|Windshift|APT32|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|TA505|OilRig|Machete|Leviathan|FIN8|FIN4|Elderwood|Dragonfly 2.0|Cobalt Group|APT39|Night Dragon|APT33|Turla
|
||||
T1195.003,Compromise Hardware Supply Chain,Initial Access,no
|
||||
T1195.002,Compromise Software Supply Chain,Initial Access,UNC2452|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Dragonfly|Sandworm Team|APT41
|
||||
T1195.002,Compromise Software Supply Chain,Initial Access,Sandworm Team|APT41
|
||||
T1195.001,Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools,Initial Access,no
|
||||
T1568.001,Fast Flux DNS,Command And Control,Machete|TA505
|
||||
T1568.001,Fast Flux DNS,Command And Control,TA505
|
||||
T1052.001,Exfiltration over USB,Exfiltration,Tropic Trooper
|
||||
T1569.002,Service Execution,Execution,Wizard Spider|Blue Mockingbird|APT39|APT41|Silence|FIN6|APT32|Ke3chang|Honeybee
|
||||
T1569.002,Service Execution,Execution,Blue Mockingbird|APT39|APT41|Silence|FIN6|APT32|Honeybee|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1569.001,Launchctl,Execution,no
|
||||
T1569,System Services,Execution,no
|
||||
T1568.002,Domain Generation Algorithms,Command And Control,APT41
|
||||
T1568,Dynamic Resolution,Command And Control,UNC2452
|
||||
T1568,Dynamic Resolution,Command And Control,no
|
||||
T1011.001,Exfiltration Over Bluetooth,Exfiltration,no
|
||||
T1567.002,Exfiltration to Cloud Storage,Exfiltration,Leviathan|Turla
|
||||
T1567.001,Exfiltration to Code Repository,Exfiltration,no
|
||||
T1059.006,Python,Execution,APT29|Rocke|BRONZE BUTLER|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|Machete
|
||||
T1059.005,Visual Basic,Execution,Lazarus Group|APT33|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|Rancor|Patchwork|MuddyWater|Honeybee|FIN7|APT37|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|Turla|TA505|Silence|WIRTE|FIN4|Gorgon Group|Cobalt Group|Leviathan|TA459|Magic Hound
|
||||
T1059.006,Python,Execution,Rocke|BRONZE BUTLER|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|Machete
|
||||
T1059.005,Visual Basic,Execution,APT33|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|Rancor|Patchwork|MuddyWater|Honeybee|FIN7|APT37|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|Turla|TA505|Silence|WIRTE|FIN4|Cobalt Group|Gorgon Group|Leviathan|TA459|Magic Hound
|
||||
T1059.004,Unix Shell,Execution,Rocke|APT41
|
||||
T1059.003,Windows Command Shell,Execution,UNC2452|Wizard Spider|FIN6|TA505|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|OilRig|Lazarus Group|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|FIN7|APT41|Soft Cell|Turla|Silence|APT32|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Gorgon Group|Ke3chang|Dragonfly 2.0|Rancor|Dark Caracal|APT37|APT28|Leviathan|FIN8|Sowbug|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|FIN10|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Suckfly|Threat Group-1314|APT3|admin@338|APT1
|
||||
T1059.003,Windows Command Shell,Execution,TA505|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|OilRig|Lazarus Group|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|FIN7|APT41|Soft Cell|Turla|Silence|APT32|APT39|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Dark Caracal|Gorgon Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Rancor|Ke3chang|APT37|Leviathan|FIN8|APT28|Magic Hound|Sowbug|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN10|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Gamaredon Group|Suckfly|Patchwork|Threat Group-1314|APT3|admin@338|APT1
|
||||
T1059.002,AppleScript,Execution,no
|
||||
T1059.001,PowerShell,Execution,UNC2452|Lazarus Group|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|APT39|DarkVishnya|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Inception|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|Soft Cell|TA505|WIRTE|TEMP.Veles|APT33|Gallmaker|Turla|APT19|DarkHydrus|APT28|Gorgon Group|Thrip|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Leviathan|TA459|MuddyWater|FIN8|Magic Hound|CopyKittens|BRONZE BUTLER|OilRig|FIN10|Threat Group-3390|APT32|FIN7|menuPass|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Poseidon Group|APT3|APT29|Deep Panda
|
||||
T1059.001,PowerShell,Execution,Blue Mockingbird|APT39|DarkVishnya|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Inception|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|Soft Cell|TA505|WIRTE|TEMP.Veles|APT33|Gallmaker|Turla|APT19|DarkHydrus|APT28|Thrip|Gorgon Group|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Leviathan|TA459|FIN8|MuddyWater|Magic Hound|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|CopyKittens|APT32|FIN7|FIN10|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Poseidon Group|APT3|APT29|Deep Panda
|
||||
T1567,Exfiltration Over Web Service,Exfiltration,no
|
||||
T1497.003,Time Based Evasion,Defense Evasion|Discovery,no
|
||||
T1497.002,User Activity Based Checks,Defense Evasion|Discovery,FIN7
|
||||
T1497.001,System Checks,Defense Evasion|Discovery,Frankenstein
|
||||
T1498.002,Reflection Amplification,Impact,no
|
||||
T1498.001,Direct Network Flood,Impact,no
|
||||
T1566.003,Spearphishing via Service,Initial Access,Lazarus Group|Magic Hound|Windshift|FIN6|OilRig|Dark Caracal
|
||||
T1566.002,Spearphishing Link,Initial Access,Wizard Spider|APT1|Windshift|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|Machete|Kimsuky|TA505|Stolen Pencil|APT39|FIN4|APT32|Night Dragon|APT28|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Turla|OilRig|APT33|Leviathan|Patchwork|Elderwood|APT29|Magic Hound|FIN8
|
||||
T1566.001,Spearphishing Attachment,Initial Access,APT1|FIN6|APT30|Magic Hound|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Mofang|Wizard Spider|RTM|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|APT41|Machete|admin@338|Kimsuky|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|Tropic Trooper|Turla|Lazarus Group|Cobalt Group|FIN7|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|Gorgon Group|Rancor|DarkHydrus|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|PLATINUM|MuddyWater|TA459|Leviathan|Elderwood|APT29|APT37|menuPass|APT28|Patchwork
|
||||
T1566,Phishing,Initial Access,GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Dragonfly
|
||||
T1566.003,Spearphishing via Service,Initial Access,Magic Hound|Windshift|FIN6|OilRig|Dark Caracal
|
||||
T1566.002,Spearphishing Link,Initial Access,Windshift|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|Machete|Kimsuky|TA505|Stolen Pencil|APT39|FIN4|APT32|Night Dragon|Turla|APT28|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|APT33|Elderwood|Leviathan|Magic Hound|Patchwork|APT29|FIN8
|
||||
T1566.001,Spearphishing Attachment,Initial Access,Magic Hound|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Mofang|Wizard Spider|RTM|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|APT41|Machete|admin@338|Kimsuky|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|Tropic Trooper|Turla|Gorgon Group|Rancor|DarkHydrus|Cobalt Group|FIN7|OilRig|Lazarus Group|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|FIN8|MuddyWater|APT28|TA459|Leviathan|Patchwork|PLATINUM|Elderwood|APT29|APT37|menuPass
|
||||
T1566,Phishing,Initial Access,no
|
||||
T1565.003,Runtime Data Manipulation,Impact,APT38
|
||||
T1565.002,Transmitted Data Manipulation,Impact,APT38
|
||||
T1565.001,Stored Data Manipulation,Impact,FIN4|APT38
|
||||
@@ -206,18 +104,18 @@ T1564,Hide Artifacts,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1563.002,RDP Hijacking,Lateral Movement,no
|
||||
T1563.001,SSH Hijacking,Lateral Movement,no
|
||||
T1563,Remote Service Session Hijacking,Lateral Movement,no
|
||||
T1518.001,Security Software Discovery,Discovery,Wizard Spider|Turla|Rocke|Frankenstein|The White Company|Cobalt Group|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|Tropic Trooper|FIN8|Patchwork|Naikon
|
||||
T1518.001,Security Software Discovery,Discovery,Turla|Rocke|Frankenstein|The White Company|Cobalt Group|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|Tropic Trooper|FIN8|Patchwork|Naikon
|
||||
T1069.003,Cloud Groups,Discovery,no
|
||||
T1069.002,Domain Groups,Discovery,Turla|Wizard Spider|Inception|OilRig|FIN6|Dragonfly 2.0|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1087.004,Cloud Account,Discovery,no
|
||||
T1087.003,Email Account,Discovery,Sandworm Team|TA505
|
||||
T1087.002,Domain Account,Discovery,Wizard Spider|Chimera|Turla|Sandworm Team|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN6|Poseidon Group|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1087.002,Domain Account,Discovery,Turla|Sandworm Team|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN6|Poseidon Group|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1087.001,Local Account,Discovery,Turla|Poseidon Group|OilRig|Ke3chang|APT32|APT1|Threat Group-3390|APT3|admin@338
|
||||
T1553.004,Install Root Certificate,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1562.004,Disable or Modify System Firewall,Defense Evasion,UNC2452|Rocke|Lazarus Group|Kimsuky|Dragonfly 2.0|Carbanak
|
||||
T1562.003,Impair Command History Logging,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1562.002,Disable Windows Event Logging,Defense Evasion,UNC2452|Threat Group-3390
|
||||
T1562.001,Disable or Modify Tools,Defense Evasion,UNC2452|Wizard Spider|FIN6|Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Rocke|Kimsuky|Turla|Night Dragon|Gorgon Group|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda
|
||||
T1562.004,Disable or Modify System Firewall,Defense Evasion,Rocke|Lazarus Group|Kimsuky|Dragonfly 2.0|Carbanak
|
||||
T1562.003,HISTCONTROL,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1562.002,Disable Windows Event Logging,Defense Evasion,Threat Group-3390
|
||||
T1562.001,Disable or Modify Tools,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Rocke|Kimsuky|Turla|Night Dragon|Gorgon Group|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda
|
||||
T1562,Impair Defenses,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1003.004,LSA Secrets,Credential Access,OilRig|MuddyWater|menuPass|Leafminer|Ke3chang|Dragonfly 2.0|APT33|Threat Group-3390
|
||||
T1003.005,Cached Domain Credentials,Credential Access,OilRig|MuddyWater|Leafminer|APT33
|
||||
@@ -226,8 +124,8 @@ T1561.001,Disk Content Wipe,Impact,Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1561,Disk Wipe,Impact,no
|
||||
T1560.003,Archive via Custom Method,Collection,Lazarus Group|Kimsuky|CopyKittens|FIN6
|
||||
T1560.002,Archive via Library,Collection,Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390
|
||||
T1560.001,Archive via Utility,Collection,UNC2452|Chimera|APT41|Soft Cell|Turla|Gallmaker|APT33|APT39|MuddyWater|Magic Hound|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|CopyKittens|Sowbug|APT3|menuPass|APT1|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1560,Archive Collected Data,Collection,menuPass|APT32|Patchwork|APT28|Dragonfly 2.0|Honeybee|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1560.001,Archive via Utility,Collection,APT41|Soft Cell|Turla|Gallmaker|APT33|APT39|MuddyWater|Magic Hound|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|CopyKittens|APT3|Sowbug|menuPass|APT1|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1560,Archive Collected Data,Collection,menuPass|APT32|Honeybee|Patchwork|APT28|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1499.004,Application or System Exploitation,Impact,no
|
||||
T1499.003,Application Exhaustion Flood,Impact,no
|
||||
T1499.002,Service Exhaustion Flood,Impact,no
|
||||
@@ -235,7 +133,7 @@ T1499.001,OS Exhaustion Flood,Impact,no
|
||||
T1491.002,External Defacement,Impact,no
|
||||
T1491.001,Internal Defacement,Impact,Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1114.003,Email Forwarding Rule,Collection,no
|
||||
T1114.002,Remote Email Collection,Collection,UNC2452|APT1|FIN4|Ke3chang|Leafminer|Dragonfly 2.0|APT28
|
||||
T1114.002,Remote Email Collection,Collection,APT1|FIN4|APT28|Dragonfly 2.0|Ke3chang|Leafminer
|
||||
T1114.001,Local Email Collection,Collection,Magic Hound|APT1
|
||||
T1134.005,SID-History Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1134.004,Parent PID Spoofing,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
@@ -244,93 +142,93 @@ T1134.002,Create Process with Token,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Turla|L
|
||||
T1134.001,Token Impersonation/Theft,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,APT28
|
||||
T1213.002,Sharepoint,Collection,Ke3chang|APT28
|
||||
T1213.001,Confluence,Collection,no
|
||||
T1555.003,Credentials from Web Browsers,Credential Access,FIN6|Magic Hound|Sandworm Team|Inception|Stealth Falcon|OilRig|Leafminer|APT33|APT3|Kimsuky|TA505|Stolen Pencil|MuddyWater|APT37|Patchwork|Molerats
|
||||
T1555.003,Credentials from Web Browsers,Credential Access,Magic Hound|Sandworm Team|Inception|Stealth Falcon|OilRig|Leafminer|APT33|APT3|Kimsuky|TA505|Stolen Pencil|MuddyWater|APT37|Patchwork|Molerats
|
||||
T1555.002,Securityd Memory,Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1555.001,Keychain,Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1559.002,Dynamic Data Exchange,Execution,Sharpshooter|TA505|MuddyWater|Gallmaker|Cobalt Group|Patchwork|APT37|FIN7|APT28
|
||||
T1559.002,Dynamic Data Exchange,Execution,Sharpshooter|TA505|MuddyWater|Gallmaker|Patchwork|Cobalt Group|APT37|APT28|FIN7
|
||||
T1559.001,Component Object Model,Execution,Gamaredon Group|MuddyWater
|
||||
T1559,Inter-Process Communication,Execution,no
|
||||
T1558.002,Silver Ticket,Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1558.001,Golden Ticket,Credential Access,Ke3chang
|
||||
T1558,Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets,Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1557.001,LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay,Credential Access|Collection,Wizard Spider
|
||||
T1557.001,LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay,Credential Access|Collection,no
|
||||
T1557,Man-in-the-Middle,Credential Access|Collection,no
|
||||
T1556.002,Password Filter DLL,Credential Access|Defense Evasion,Strider
|
||||
T1556.001,Domain Controller Authentication,Credential Access|Defense Evasion,Chimera
|
||||
T1556.001,Domain Controller Authentication,Credential Access|Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1556,Modify Authentication Process,Credential Access|Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1056.004,Credential API Hooking,Collection|Credential Access,PLATINUM
|
||||
T1056.003,Web Portal Capture,Collection|Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1056.002,GUI Input Capture,Collection|Credential Access,FIN4
|
||||
T1056.001,Keylogging,Collection|Credential Access,APT32|Sandworm Team|APT39|APT41|Kimsuky|menuPass|Stolen Pencil|FIN4|APT38|OilRig|Ke3chang|PLATINUM|Sowbug|Magic Hound|Group5|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT3|Darkhotel|APT28
|
||||
T1555,Credentials from Password Stores,Credential Access,UNC2452|FIN6|APT39|OilRig|MuddyWater|Leafminer|APT33|Turla|Stealth Falcon
|
||||
T1056.001,Keylogging,Collection|Credential Access,APT32|Sandworm Team|APT39|APT41|Kimsuky|menuPass|Stolen Pencil|FIN4|APT38|Ke3chang|OilRig|PLATINUM|Sowbug|Magic Hound|Group5|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT3|Darkhotel|APT28
|
||||
T1555,Credentials from Password Stores,Credential Access,APT39|OilRig|MuddyWater|Leafminer|APT33|Turla|Stealth Falcon
|
||||
T1552.005,Cloud Instance Metadata API,Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1003.008,/etc/passwd and /etc/shadow,Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1003.007,Proc Filesystem,Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1003.006,DCSync,Credential Access,UNC2452
|
||||
T1558.003,Kerberoasting,Credential Access,UNC2452|Wizard Spider
|
||||
T1003.006,DCSync,Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1558.003,Kerberoasting,Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1552.006,Group Policy Preferences,Credential Access,APT33
|
||||
T1003.003,NTDS,Credential Access,Wizard Spider|Chimera|FIN6|Dragonfly 2.0
|
||||
T1003.002,Security Account Manager,Credential Access,Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390|Ke3chang|Soft Cell|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|menuPass
|
||||
T1003.001,LSASS Memory,Credential Access,Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Blue Mockingbird|Silence|Threat Group-3390|Leviathan|APT41|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|Stolen Pencil|APT32|Leafminer|Lazarus Group|Magic Hound|MuddyWater|FIN8|PLATINUM|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN6|APT3|APT28|APT1|Ke3chang|Cleaver
|
||||
T1003.003,NTDS,Credential Access,FIN6|Dragonfly 2.0
|
||||
T1003.002,Security Account Manager,Credential Access,Threat Group-3390|Ke3chang|Soft Cell|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|menuPass
|
||||
T1003.001,LSASS Memory,Credential Access,Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Blue Mockingbird|Silence|Threat Group-3390|Leviathan|APT41|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|Stolen Pencil|APT32|Lazarus Group|Leafminer|Magic Hound|MuddyWater|PLATINUM|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|OilRig|FIN6|APT3|APT28|APT1|Ke3chang|Cleaver
|
||||
T1110.004,Credential Stuffing,Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1110.003,Password Spraying,Credential Access,APT28|APT33|Leafminer|Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1110.002,Password Cracking,Credential Access,FIN6|APT41|Dragonfly 2.0|APT3
|
||||
T1110.001,Password Guessing,Credential Access,APT28
|
||||
T1021.006,Windows Remote Management,Lateral Movement,UNC2452|Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390
|
||||
T1110.003,Password Spraying,Credential Access,APT33|Leafminer|Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1110.002,Password Cracking,Credential Access,APT41|Dragonfly 2.0|APT3
|
||||
T1110.001,Password Guessing,Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1021.006,Windows Remote Management,Lateral Movement,Threat Group-3390
|
||||
T1021.005,VNC,Lateral Movement,GCMAN
|
||||
T1021.004,SSH,Lateral Movement,Rocke|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|OilRig|menuPass|GCMAN
|
||||
T1021.003,Distributed Component Object Model,Lateral Movement,no
|
||||
T1021.002,SMB/Windows Admin Shares,Lateral Movement,Wizard Spider|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|APT39|APT32|Orangeworm|FIN8|APT3|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-1314|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1021.001,Remote Desktop Protocol,Lateral Movement,Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Stolen Pencil|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|APT3|OilRig|FIN10|menuPass|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|APT1|Axiom
|
||||
T1021.002,SMB/Windows Admin Shares,Lateral Movement,Blue Mockingbird|APT39|APT32|Orangeworm|FIN8|APT3|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-1314|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1021.001,Remote Desktop Protocol,Lateral Movement,Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Stolen Pencil|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|APT3|OilRig|menuPass|FIN10|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|APT1|Axiom
|
||||
T1554,Compromise Client Software Binary,Persistence,no
|
||||
T1036.006,Space after Filename,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1036.005,Match Legitimate Name or Location,Defense Evasion,UNC2452|Chimera|PROMETHIUM|Rocke|Sandworm Team|APT39|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Silence|APT41|menuPass|TEMP.Veles|MuddyWater|BRONZE BUTLER|Sowbug|APT32|Patchwork|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Carbanak|APT1
|
||||
T1036.004,Masquerade Task or Service,Defense Evasion,UNC2452|Lazarus Group|PROMETHIUM|Wizard Spider|APT-C-36|Carbanak|APT32|FIN6|FIN7
|
||||
T1036.005,Match Legitimate Name or Location,Defense Evasion,Rocke|Sandworm Team|APT39|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Silence|APT41|menuPass|TEMP.Veles|MuddyWater|BRONZE BUTLER|Sowbug|APT32|Patchwork|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Carbanak|APT1
|
||||
T1036.004,Masquerade Task or Service,Defense Evasion,Wizard Spider|APT-C-36|Carbanak|APT32|FIN6|FIN7
|
||||
T1036.003,Rename System Utilities,Defense Evasion,menuPass|APT32|Soft Cell|PLATINUM
|
||||
T1036.002,Right-to-Left Override,Defense Evasion,BRONZE BUTLER|BlackTech|Ke3chang|Scarlet Mimic
|
||||
T1036.001,Invalid Code Signature,Defense Evasion,Windshift|APT37
|
||||
T1036.001,Invalid Code Signature,Defense Evasion,Windshift
|
||||
T1553.003,SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1553.002,Code Signing,Defense Evasion,UNC2452|Wizard Spider|PROMETHIUM|Patchwork|Silence|APT41|FIN6|TA505|FIN7|Honeybee|Leviathan|CopyKittens|Winnti Group|Suckfly|Molerats|Darkhotel
|
||||
T1553.002,Code Signing,Defense Evasion,Patchwork|Silence|APT41|FIN6|TA505|FIN7|Honeybee|Leviathan|APT37|CopyKittens|Winnti Group|Suckfly|Molerats|Darkhotel
|
||||
T1553.001,Gatekeeper Bypass,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1553,Subvert Trust Controls,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1027.003,Steganography,Defense Evasion,BRONZE BUTLER|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|APT37
|
||||
T1027.002,Software Packing,Defense Evasion,Lazarus Group|TA505|Rocke|Soft Cell|The White Company|APT39|APT38|Dark Caracal|Elderwood|APT3|Patchwork|APT29|Night Dragon
|
||||
T1027.001,Binary Padding,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|APT32|Patchwork|Leviathan|BRONZE BUTLER|Moafee
|
||||
T1027.002,Software Packing,Defense Evasion,TA505|Rocke|Soft Cell|The White Company|APT39|APT38|Dark Caracal|Elderwood|APT3|Patchwork|APT29|Night Dragon
|
||||
T1027.001,Binary Padding,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|APT32|Leviathan|BRONZE BUTLER|Moafee
|
||||
T1222.002,Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification,Defense Evasion,Rocke|APT32
|
||||
T1222.001,Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification,Defense Evasion,Wizard Spider
|
||||
T1552.004,Private Keys,Credential Access,UNC2452|Rocke
|
||||
T1222.001,Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1552.004,Private Keys,Credential Access,Rocke
|
||||
T1552.003,Bash History,Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1552.002,Credentials in Registry,Credential Access,APT32
|
||||
T1552.001,Credentials In Files,Credential Access,Leafminer|APT33|OilRig|TA505|Stolen Pencil|MuddyWater|APT3
|
||||
T1552,Unsecured Credentials,Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1216.001,PubPrn,Defense Evasion,APT32
|
||||
T1070.006,Timestomp,Defense Evasion,UNC2452|Rocke|TEMP.Veles|APT32|Lazarus Group|APT28
|
||||
T1070.006,Timestomp,Defense Evasion,Rocke|TEMP.Veles|APT32|Lazarus Group|APT28
|
||||
T1070.005,Network Share Connection Removal,Defense Evasion,Threat Group-3390
|
||||
T1070.004,File Deletion,Defense Evasion,UNC2452|FIN6|Sandworm Team|Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Wizard Spider|APT41|Kimsuky|Silence|The White Company|TEMP.Veles|APT32|APT38|Honeybee|Patchwork|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|menuPass|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN5|APT3|OilRig|Magic Hound|FIN10|APT28|Threat Group-3390|Group5|Lazarus Group|APT18|APT29
|
||||
T1070.004,File Deletion,Defense Evasion,Sandworm Team|Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Wizard Spider|APT41|Kimsuky|Silence|The White Company|TEMP.Veles|APT32|APT38|Patchwork|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|menuPass|FIN8|OilRig|FIN5|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|APT3|FIN10|APT28|Threat Group-3390|Group5|Lazarus Group|APT18|APT29
|
||||
T1070.003,Clear Command History,Defense Evasion,APT41
|
||||
T1550.004,Web Session Cookie,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,UNC2452
|
||||
T1550.004,Web Session Cookie,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,no
|
||||
T1550.001,Application Access Token,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,APT28
|
||||
T1550.003,Pass the Ticket,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|APT29
|
||||
T1550.002,Pass the Hash,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,Soft Cell|APT32|Night Dragon|APT28|APT1
|
||||
T1550,Use Alternate Authentication Material,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,UNC2452
|
||||
T1550,Use Alternate Authentication Material,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,no
|
||||
T1548.004,Elevated Execution with Prompt,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1548.003,Sudo and Sudo Caching,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1548.002,Bypass User Account Control,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,APT37|MuddyWater|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|Threat Group-3390|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork|APT29
|
||||
T1548.002,Bypass User Access Control,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,APT37|MuddyWater|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|Threat Group-3390|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork|APT29
|
||||
T1548.001,Setuid and Setgid,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1548,Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1136.003,Cloud Account,Persistence,no
|
||||
T1070.002,Clear Linux or Mac System Logs,Defense Evasion,Rocke
|
||||
T1070.001,Clear Windows Event Logs,Defense Evasion,APT41|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|APT32|FIN8|FIN5|APT28
|
||||
T1136.002,Domain Account,Persistence,Soft Cell
|
||||
T1136.001,Local Account,Persistence,APT39|APT41|Leafminer|Dragonfly 2.0|APT3
|
||||
T1136.001,Local Account,Persistence,APT39|APT41|Dragonfly 2.0|Leafminer|APT3
|
||||
T1547.011,Plist Modification,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1547.010,Port Monitors,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1547.009,Shortcut Modification,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,APT39|Darkhotel|APT29|Gorgon Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Leviathan|Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1547.008,LSASS Driver,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1547.007,Re-opened Applications,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1547.006,Kernel Modules and Extensions,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1547.005,Security Support Provider,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1547.004,Winlogon Helper DLL,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Wizard Spider|Tropic Trooper|Turla
|
||||
T1547.005,Security Support Provider,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1547.004,Winlogon Helper DLL,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Tropic Trooper|Turla
|
||||
T1547.003,Time Providers,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1546.014,Emond,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
|
||||
T1546.013,PowerShell Profile,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,Turla
|
||||
@@ -346,30 +244,30 @@ T1546.007,Netsh Helper DLL,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
|
||||
T1546.006,LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
|
||||
T1546.005,Trap,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
|
||||
T1546.004,.bash_profile and .bashrc,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
|
||||
T1546.003,Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,UNC2452|APT33|Blue Mockingbird|Turla|Leviathan|APT29
|
||||
T1546.003,Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,APT33|Blue Mockingbird|Turla|Leviathan|APT29
|
||||
T1546.002,Screensaver,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
|
||||
T1546.001,Change Default File Association,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,Kimsuky
|
||||
T1547.001,Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Wizard Spider|PROMETHIUM|Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Silence|RTM|Inception|APT41|Machete|Kimsuky|APT33|APT39|APT32|APT18|Turla|Dark Caracal|Cobalt Group|Honeybee|APT19|Ke3chang|Threat Group-3390|Dragonfly 2.0|Gorgon Group|MuddyWater|APT37|Leviathan|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|APT3|FIN10|FIN7|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT29|Darkhotel
|
||||
T1547.001,Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Silence|RTM|Inception|APT41|Machete|Kimsuky|APT33|APT39|APT32|APT18|Turla|Dark Caracal|Cobalt Group|Honeybee|Threat Group-3390|Dragonfly 2.0|Gorgon Group|Ke3chang|APT19|Leviathan|MuddyWater|APT37|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|APT3|FIN10|FIN7|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT29|Darkhotel
|
||||
T1218.002,Control Panel,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1218.010,Regsvr32,Defense Evasion,Blue Mockingbird|Inception|WIRTE|APT19|Cobalt Group|Leviathan|APT32|Deep Panda
|
||||
T1218.010,Regsvr32,Defense Evasion,Blue Mockingbird|Inception|WIRTE|Cobalt Group|APT19|Leviathan|APT32|Deep Panda
|
||||
T1218.009,Regsvcs/Regasm,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1218.005,Mshta,Defense Evasion,Lazarus Group|Inception|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|FIN7
|
||||
T1218.004,InstallUtil,Defense Evasion,menuPass
|
||||
T1218.001,Compiled HTML File,Defense Evasion,APT41|Silence|OilRig|Lazarus Group|Dark Caracal
|
||||
T1218.005,Mshta,Defense Evasion,Inception|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|FIN7
|
||||
T1218.004,InstallUtil,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1218.001,Compiled HTML File,Defense Evasion,APT41|Silence|Lazarus Group|Dark Caracal|OilRig
|
||||
T1218.003,CMSTP,Defense Evasion,Cobalt Group|MuddyWater
|
||||
T1218.011,Rundll32,Defense Evasion,UNC2452|Gamaredon Group|APT32|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|TA505|MuddyWater|APT29|APT19|CopyKittens|APT3|Carbanak|APT28
|
||||
T1218.011,Rundll32,Defense Evasion,APT32|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|TA505|MuddyWater|APT29|APT19|CopyKittens|APT3|Carbanak|APT28
|
||||
T1547,Boot or Logon Autostart Execution,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1546,Event Triggered Execution,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
|
||||
T1098.003,Add Office 365 Global Administrator Role,Persistence,no
|
||||
T1098.002,Exchange Email Delegate Permissions,Persistence,UNC2452|Magic Hound
|
||||
T1098.001,Additional Cloud Credentials,Persistence,UNC2452
|
||||
T1098.002,Exchange Email Delegate Permissions,Persistence,Magic Hound
|
||||
T1098.001,Additional Azure Service Principal Credentials,Persistence,no
|
||||
T1543.004,Launch Daemon,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1543.003,Windows Service,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,PROMETHIUM|Blue Mockingbird|DarkVishnya|Wizard Spider|APT32|APT41|Kimsuky|Tropic Trooper|Threat Group-3390|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|Ke3chang|FIN7|APT19|APT3|Lazarus Group|Carbanak
|
||||
T1543.003,Windows Service,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Blue Mockingbird|DarkVishnya|Wizard Spider|APT32|APT41|Kimsuky|Tropic Trooper|Cobalt Group|Ke3chang|Honeybee|FIN7|Threat Group-3390|APT19|APT3|Lazarus Group|Carbanak
|
||||
T1543.002,Systemd Service,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Rocke
|
||||
T1543.001,Launch Agent,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1037.005,Startup Items,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1037.004,Rc.common,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1055.012,Process Hollowing,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,menuPass|Gorgon Group|Threat Group-3390|Patchwork
|
||||
T1055.012,Process Hollowing,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Gorgon Group|Patchwork
|
||||
T1055.013,Process Doppelgänging,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Leafminer
|
||||
T1055.011,Extra Window Memory Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1055.014,VDSO Hijacking,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
@@ -379,7 +277,7 @@ T1055.005,Thread Local Storage,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1055.004,Asynchronous Procedure Call,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1055.003,Thread Execution Hijacking,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1055.002,Portable Executable Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Rocke|Gorgon Group
|
||||
T1055.001,Dynamic-link Library Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Wizard Spider|TA505|Turla|Tropic Trooper|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda
|
||||
T1055.001,Dynamic-link Library Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,TA505|Turla|Tropic Trooper|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda
|
||||
T1037.003,Network Logon Script,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1543,Create or Modify System Process,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1037.002,Logon Script (Mac),Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
@@ -393,7 +291,7 @@ T1505.001,SQL Stored Procedures,Persistence,no
|
||||
T1053.003,Cron,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Rocke
|
||||
T1053.004,Launchd,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1053.001,At (Linux),Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1053.005,Scheduled Task,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,UNC2452|Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT-C-36|BRONZE BUTLER|APT41|Machete|Soft Cell|Silence|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|Cobalt Group|OilRig|Rancor|Dragonfly 2.0|Patchwork|FIN8|FIN7|APT32|menuPass|FIN10|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|APT3|APT29
|
||||
T1053.005,Scheduled Task,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT-C-36|BRONZE BUTLER|APT41|Machete|Soft Cell|Silence|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|Patchwork|OilRig|Rancor|Cobalt Group|FIN8|menuPass|FIN10|APT32|FIN7|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|APT3|APT29
|
||||
T1053.002,At (Windows),Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,BRONZE BUTLER|Threat Group-3390|APT18
|
||||
T1542,Pre-OS Boot,Defense Evasion|Persistence,no
|
||||
T1137.001,Office Template Macros,Persistence,MuddyWater
|
||||
@@ -418,52 +316,52 @@ T1526,Cloud Service Discovery,Discovery,no
|
||||
T1505,Server Software Component,Persistence,no
|
||||
T1499,Endpoint Denial of Service,Impact,no
|
||||
T1497,Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion,Defense Evasion|Discovery,no
|
||||
T1498,Network Denial of Service,Impact,APT28
|
||||
T1498,Network Denial of Service,Impact,no
|
||||
T1496,Resource Hijacking,Impact,Blue Mockingbird|Rocke|APT41|Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1495,Firmware Corruption,Impact,no
|
||||
T1491,Defacement,Impact,no
|
||||
T1490,Inhibit System Recovery,Impact,no
|
||||
T1489,Service Stop,Impact,Wizard Spider|Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1489,Service Stop,Impact,Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1486,Data Encrypted for Impact,Impact,APT41|TA505|APT38
|
||||
T1485,Data Destruction,Impact,Sandworm Team|Lazarus Group|APT38
|
||||
T1484,Domain Policy Modification,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1482,Domain Trust Discovery,Discovery,UNC2452|Wizard Spider
|
||||
T1484,Group Policy Modification,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1482,Domain Trust Discovery,Discovery,Wizard Spider
|
||||
T1480,Execution Guardrails,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1220,XSL Script Processing,Defense Evasion,Cobalt Group
|
||||
T1222,File and Directory Permissions Modification,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1221,Template Injection,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|Frankenstein|Inception|APT28|Tropic Trooper|Dragonfly 2.0|DarkHydrus
|
||||
T1203,Exploitation for Client Execution,Execution,Sandworm Team|MuddyWater|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT41|admin@338|Threat Group-3390|APT12|The White Company|APT33|APT32|APT28|Tropic Trooper|BRONZE BUTLER|Lazarus Group|Cobalt Group|APT29|Patchwork|Leviathan|APT37|Elderwood|TA459
|
||||
T1200,Hardware Additions,Initial Access,DarkVishnya
|
||||
T1202,Indirect Command Execution,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1213,Data from Information Repositories,Collection,FIN6|Turla
|
||||
T1207,Rogue Domain Controller,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1204,User Execution,Execution,no
|
||||
T1217,Browser Bookmark Discovery,Discovery,no
|
||||
T1190,Exploit Public-Facing Application,Initial Access,UNC2452|APT28|APT29|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Blue Mockingbird|Rocke|APT39|BlackTech|APT41|Soft Cell|Night Dragon|Axiom
|
||||
T1210,Exploitation of Remote Services,Lateral Movement,Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390|APT28
|
||||
T1220,XSL Script Processing,Defense Evasion,Cobalt Group
|
||||
T1197,BITS Jobs,Defense Evasion|Persistence,Patchwork|APT41|Leviathan
|
||||
T1217,Browser Bookmark Discovery,Discovery,no
|
||||
T1213,Data from Information Repositories,Collection,Turla
|
||||
T1189,Drive-by Compromise,Initial Access,Turla|Windshift|RTM|Darkhotel|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|BRONZE BUTLER|Leafminer|Dark Caracal|APT19|APT32|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|Elderwood|APT37|Patchwork|PLATINUM
|
||||
T1203,Exploitation for Client Execution,Execution,Sandworm Team|MuddyWater|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT41|admin@338|Threat Group-3390|APT12|The White Company|APT33|APT32|APT28|Tropic Trooper|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Cobalt Group|APT37|Patchwork|Leviathan|Elderwood|TA459|APT29
|
||||
T1212,Exploitation for Credential Access,Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1211,Exploitation for Defense Evasion,Defense Evasion,APT28
|
||||
T1190,Exploit Public-Facing Application,Initial Access,Blue Mockingbird|Rocke|APT39|BlackTech|APT41|Soft Cell|Night Dragon|Axiom
|
||||
T1210,Exploitation of Remote Services,Lateral Movement,Threat Group-3390|APT28
|
||||
T1202,Indirect Command Execution,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1200,Hardware Additions,Initial Access,DarkVishnya
|
||||
T1201,Password Policy Discovery,Discovery,Turla|OilRig
|
||||
T1219,Remote Access Software,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|DarkVishnya|RTM|Kimsuky|Night Dragon|Thrip|Cobalt Group|Carbanak
|
||||
T1207,Rogue Domain Controller,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1199,Trusted Relationship,Initial Access,APT28|menuPass
|
||||
T1218,Signed Binary Proxy Execution,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1204,User Execution,Execution,no
|
||||
T1216,Signed Script Proxy Execution,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1195,Supply Chain Compromise,Initial Access,Elderwood
|
||||
T1205,Traffic Signaling,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Command And Control,no
|
||||
T1189,Drive-by Compromise,Initial Access,Dragonfly|PROMETHIUM|Turla|Windshift|RTM|Darkhotel|APT38|Lazarus Group|APT32|Dark Caracal|Dragonfly 2.0|BRONZE BUTLER|Leafminer|APT19|Threat Group-3390|APT37|Patchwork|PLATINUM|Elderwood
|
||||
T1212,Exploitation for Credential Access,Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1219,Remote Access Software,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|DarkVishnya|RTM|Kimsuky|Night Dragon|Thrip|Cobalt Group|Carbanak
|
||||
T1211,Exploitation for Defense Evasion,Defense Evasion,APT28
|
||||
T1218,Signed Binary Proxy Execution,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1216,Signed Script Proxy Execution,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1199,Trusted Relationship,Initial Access,GOLD SOUTHFIELD|APT28|menuPass
|
||||
T1176,Browser Extensions,Persistence,Kimsuky|Stolen Pencil
|
||||
T1175,Component Object Model and Distributed COM,Lateral Movement|Execution,no
|
||||
T1187,Forced Authentication,Credential Access,DarkHydrus|Dragonfly 2.0
|
||||
T1185,Man in the Browser,Collection,no
|
||||
T1187,Forced Authentication,Credential Access,Dragonfly 2.0|DarkHydrus
|
||||
T1149,LC_MAIN Hijacking,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1134,Access Token Manipulation,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Blue Mockingbird
|
||||
T1136,Create Account,Persistence,no
|
||||
T1134,Access Token Manipulation,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,FIN6|Blue Mockingbird
|
||||
T1135,Network Share Discovery,Discovery,Wizard Spider|APT32|APT39|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT1|Dragonfly 2.0|Sowbug
|
||||
T1140,Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information,Defense Evasion,UNC2452|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Molerats|Frankenstein|Turla|WIRTE|Darkhotel|Tropic Trooper|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|Gorgon Group|APT19|Honeybee|Leviathan|MuddyWater|APT28|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER
|
||||
T1140,Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information,Defense Evasion,Rocke|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Molerats|Frankenstein|Turla|WIRTE|Darkhotel|Tropic Trooper|menuPass|Honeybee|Threat Group-3390|APT19|Gorgon Group|Leviathan|MuddyWater|APT28|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER
|
||||
T1149,LC_MAIN Hijacking,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1135,Network Share Discovery,Discovery,APT32|APT39|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT1|Dragonfly 2.0|Sowbug
|
||||
T1137,Office Application Startup,Persistence,Gamaredon Group|APT32
|
||||
T1153,Source,Execution,no
|
||||
T1133,External Remote Services,Persistence|Initial Access,Wizard Spider|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Chimera|Sandworm Team|APT41|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|Night Dragon|Ke3chang|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|APT18
|
||||
T1133,External Remote Services,Persistence|Initial Access,Sandworm Team|APT41|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|Night Dragon|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|Ke3chang|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|APT18
|
||||
T1132,Data Encoding,Command And Control,no
|
||||
T1129,Shared Modules,Execution,no
|
||||
T1127,Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
@@ -471,72 +369,72 @@ T1125,Video Capture,Collection,Silence|FIN7
|
||||
T1124,System Time Discovery,Discovery,The White Company|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Turla
|
||||
T1123,Audio Capture,Collection,APT37
|
||||
T1120,Peripheral Device Discovery,Discovery,Turla|APT37|Gamaredon Group|Equation|APT28
|
||||
T1119,Automated Collection,Collection,Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT1|APT28|Patchwork|FIN5|OilRig|Threat Group-3390|FIN6
|
||||
T1119,Automated Collection,Collection,Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT1|APT28|Patchwork|OilRig|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|FIN6
|
||||
T1115,Clipboard Data,Collection,APT39|APT38
|
||||
T1114,Email Collection,Collection,no
|
||||
T1113,Screen Capture,Collection,Gamaredon Group|APT39|Silence|MuddyWater|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN7|Dark Caracal|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|Group5|APT28
|
||||
T1112,Modify Registry,Defense Evasion,Lazarus Group|Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|Turla|APT32|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|Patchwork|APT19|Gorgon Group|Threat Group-3390|Honeybee|FIN8
|
||||
T1113,Screen Capture,Collection,Gamaredon Group|APT39|Silence|MuddyWater|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|Dark Caracal|FIN7|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|Group5|APT28
|
||||
T1112,Modify Registry,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|Turla|APT32|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|Threat Group-3390|Honeybee|Patchwork|Gorgon Group|FIN8
|
||||
T1111,Two-Factor Authentication Interception,Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1110,Brute Force,Credential Access,DarkVishnya|APT39|OilRig|FIN5|Turla
|
||||
T1108,Redundant Access,Defense Evasion|Persistence,no
|
||||
T1106,Native API,Execution,Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Turla|Silence|APT37|Gorgon Group
|
||||
T1105,Ingress Tool Transfer,Command And Control,UNC2452|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Silence|APT-C-36|APT41|Soft Cell|TA505|WIRTE|APT33|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Rancor|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|Cobalt Group|Turla|Gorgon Group|APT37|Leviathan|Elderwood|PLATINUM|FIN8|Magic Hound|APT32|APT3|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN7|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28
|
||||
T1106,Native API,Execution,Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Turla|Silence|Gorgon Group|APT37
|
||||
T1105,Ingress Tool Transfer,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Silence|APT-C-36|APT41|Soft Cell|TA505|WIRTE|APT33|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Rancor|Cobalt Group|Turla|Gorgon Group|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|APT37|FIN8|PLATINUM|Leviathan|Elderwood|Magic Hound|APT3|APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN7|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28
|
||||
T1104,Multi-Stage Channels,Command And Control,APT41|MuddyWater|APT3
|
||||
T1102,Web Service,Command And Control,Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Inception|FIN6
|
||||
T1102,Web Service,Command And Control,Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Inception|FIN6
|
||||
T1098,Account Manipulation,Persistence,APT3|Dragonfly 2.0|Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1095,Non-Application Layer Protocol,Command And Control,FIN6|APT29|PLATINUM|APT3
|
||||
T1095,Non-Application Layer Protocol,Command And Control,APT29|PLATINUM|APT3
|
||||
T1092,Communication Through Removable Media,Command And Control,APT28
|
||||
T1091,Replication Through Removable Media,Lateral Movement|Initial Access,Tropic Trooper|Darkhotel|APT28
|
||||
T1090,Proxy,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|APT41|Turla
|
||||
T1087,Account Discovery,Discovery,UNC2452
|
||||
T1083,File and Directory Discovery,Discovery,UNC2452|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Inception|APT41|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|APT18|Dragonfly 2.0|Leafminer|Honeybee|Dark Caracal|APT3|BRONZE BUTLER|Sowbug|Magic Hound|APT28|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1082,System Information Discovery,Discovery,UNC2452|Wizard Spider|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|APT37|Honeybee|APT19|APT32|Magic Hound|Sowbug|OilRig|APT3|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1080,Taint Shared Content,Lateral Movement,Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Darkhotel
|
||||
T1078,Valid Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,UNC2452|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|APT39|FIN4|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|Leviathan|APT33|FIN8|FIN5|OilRig|APT28|FIN10|menuPass|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390|APT18|PittyTiger|Carbanak
|
||||
T1090,Proxy,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|APT41|Turla
|
||||
T1087,Account Discovery,Discovery,no
|
||||
T1083,File and Directory Discovery,Discovery,Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Inception|APT41|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|APT18|Leafminer|Honeybee|Dark Caracal|Dragonfly 2.0|Magic Hound|Sowbug|BRONZE BUTLER|APT3|APT28|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1082,System Information Discovery,Discovery,Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|Honeybee|APT19|APT37|APT32|Magic Hound|OilRig|APT3|Sowbug|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1080,Taint Shared Content,Lateral Movement,BRONZE BUTLER|Darkhotel
|
||||
T1078,Valid Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|APT39|FIN4|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|Leviathan|APT33|OilRig|FIN5|menuPass|APT28|FIN10|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390|APT18|PittyTiger|Carbanak
|
||||
T1074,Data Staged,Collection,Wizard Spider
|
||||
T1072,Software Deployment Tools,Execution|Lateral Movement,Silence|APT32|Threat Group-1314
|
||||
T1071,Application Layer Protocol,Command And Control,Rocke|Magic Hound|Dragonfly 2.0
|
||||
T1070,Indicator Removal on Host,Defense Evasion,UNC2452
|
||||
T1069,Permission Groups Discovery,Discovery,UNC2452|TA505|APT3
|
||||
T1070,Indicator Removal on Host,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1069,Permission Groups Discovery,Discovery,TA505|APT3
|
||||
T1068,Exploitation for Privilege Escalation,Privilege Escalation,Whitefly|APT33|Cobalt Group|PLATINUM|FIN8|APT32|Threat Group-3390|FIN6|APT28
|
||||
T1064,Scripting,Defense Evasion|Execution,no
|
||||
T1062,Hypervisor,Persistence,no
|
||||
T1061,Graphical User Interface,Execution,no
|
||||
T1059,Command and Scripting Interpreter,Execution,APT32|Molerats|Whitefly|APT39|APT19|FIN7|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|FIN5|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1057,Process Discovery,Discovery,UNC2452|Rocke|Frankenstein|Inception|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|APT38|Tropic Trooper|APT37|Honeybee|OilRig|APT3|Magic Hound|APT28|Winnti Group|Stealth Falcon|Poseidon Group|Lazarus Group|Molerats|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1059,Command and Scripting Interpreter,Execution,APT32|Molerats|Whitefly|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|FIN7|OilRig|FIN5|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1057,Process Discovery,Discovery,Rocke|Frankenstein|Inception|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|APT38|Tropic Trooper|APT37|Honeybee|OilRig|APT3|Magic Hound|APT28|Winnti Group|Stealth Falcon|Poseidon Group|Lazarus Group|Molerats|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1056,Input Capture,Collection|Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1055,Process Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,APT32|Sharpshooter|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|Cobalt Group|APT37|Turla|Honeybee|PLATINUM
|
||||
T1055,Process Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,APT32|Sharpshooter|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|Turla|Cobalt Group|APT37|Honeybee|PLATINUM
|
||||
T1053,Scheduled Task/Job,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1052,Exfiltration Over Physical Medium,Exfiltration,no
|
||||
T1051,Shared Webroot,Lateral Movement,no
|
||||
T1049,System Network Connections Discovery,Discovery,Tropic Trooper|APT41|APT38|Soft Cell|APT32|APT1|OilRig|APT3|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1049,System Network Connections Discovery,Discovery,Tropic Trooper|APT41|APT38|Soft Cell|APT32|APT1|OilRig|APT3|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1048,Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol,Exfiltration,no
|
||||
T1047,Windows Management Instrumentation,Execution,UNC2452|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT41|FIN6|Soft Cell|APT32|MuddyWater|OilRig|Threat Group-3390|FIN8|Leviathan|menuPass|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT29|Deep Panda
|
||||
T1046,Network Service Scanning,Discovery,Rocke|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT39|APT32|Cobalt Group|Leafminer|OilRig|menuPass|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390
|
||||
T1043,Commonly Used Port,Command And Control,OilRig|APT28|TEMP.Veles|Night Dragon|APT29|APT18|FIN7|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|FIN8|APT37|APT3|Magic Hound|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390
|
||||
T1047,Windows Management Instrumentation,Execution,Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT41|FIN6|Soft Cell|APT32|MuddyWater|OilRig|Threat Group-3390|FIN8|Leviathan|menuPass|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT29|Deep Panda
|
||||
T1046,Network Service Scanning,Discovery,Rocke|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT39|APT32|Leafminer|OilRig|Cobalt Group|menuPass|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390
|
||||
T1043,Commonly Used Port,Command And Control,Machete|OilRig|APT28|TEMP.Veles|Night Dragon|APT29|APT18|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN7|FIN8|APT37|Magic Hound|APT3|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390
|
||||
T1041,Exfiltration Over C2 Channel,Exfiltration,Sandworm Team|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Kimsuky|Soft Cell|APT32|APT3|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1040,Network Sniffing,Credential Access|Discovery,Sandworm Team|DarkVishnya|APT33|Stolen Pencil|APT28
|
||||
T1039,Data from Network Shared Drive,Collection,Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Sowbug|menuPass
|
||||
T1039,Data from Network Shared Drive,Collection,Sowbug|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass
|
||||
T1037,Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Rocke
|
||||
T1036,Masquerading,Defense Evasion,UNC2452|Windshift|APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|Dragonfly 2.0
|
||||
T1036,Masquerading,Defense Evasion,Windshift|APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|Dragonfly 2.0
|
||||
T1034,Path Interception,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1033,System Owner/User Discovery,Discovery,Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT41|Soft Cell|Tropic Trooper|APT39|MuddyWater|APT32|APT37|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|Magic Hound|FIN10|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3
|
||||
T1033,System Owner/User Discovery,Discovery,Frankenstein|APT41|Soft Cell|Tropic Trooper|APT39|MuddyWater|APT32|APT37|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|Magic Hound|FIN10|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3
|
||||
T1030,Data Transfer Size Limits,Exfiltration,Threat Group-3390
|
||||
T1029,Scheduled Transfer,Exfiltration,no
|
||||
T1027,Obfuscated Files or Information,Defense Evasion,UNC2452|FIN6|Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|APT41|Machete|Soft Cell|Turla|TA505|Silence|APT33|Night Dragon|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|APT29|APT18|Tropic Trooper|menuPass|Honeybee|Patchwork|Threat Group-3390|APT19|Cobalt Group|Leafminer|APT37|Dark Caracal|FIN8|MuddyWater|FIN7|BlackOasis|Leviathan|Elderwood|OilRig|Magic Hound|APT3|APT32|Group5|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|Putter Panda|APT28
|
||||
T1027,Obfuscated Files or Information,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|APT41|Machete|Soft Cell|Turla|TA505|Silence|APT33|Night Dragon|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|APT29|APT18|Tropic Trooper|Cobalt Group|Patchwork|Leafminer|APT37|Threat Group-3390|Honeybee|Dark Caracal|menuPass|APT19|BlackOasis|FIN8|Leviathan|Elderwood|MuddyWater|FIN7|Magic Hound|OilRig|APT3|APT32|Group5|Dust Storm|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT28
|
||||
T1026,Multiband Communication,Command And Control,Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1025,Data from Removable Media,Collection,Machete|Turla|Gamaredon Group|APT28
|
||||
T1021,Remote Services,Lateral Movement,no
|
||||
T1020,Automated Exfiltration,Exfiltration,Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Honeybee
|
||||
T1018,Remote System Discovery,Discovery,UNC2452|Sandworm Team|Rocke|Wizard Spider|Silence|Soft Cell|APT39|APT32|Threat Group-3390|Dragonfly 2.0|Ke3chang|Leafminer|Deep Panda|FIN8|FIN5|APT3|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN6|Turla
|
||||
T1016,System Network Configuration Discovery,Discovery,Wizard Spider|Sandworm Team|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT41|Soft Cell|APT32|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|OilRig|Magic Hound|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3|Naikon|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1020,Automated Exfiltration,Exfiltration,Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Honeybee
|
||||
T1018,Remote System Discovery,Discovery,Sandworm Team|Rocke|Wizard Spider|Silence|Soft Cell|APT39|APT32|Deep Panda|Threat Group-3390|Dragonfly 2.0|Leafminer|Ke3chang|FIN8|APT3|FIN5|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN6|Turla
|
||||
T1016,System Network Configuration Discovery,Discovery,Sandworm Team|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT41|Soft Cell|APT32|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|Magic Hound|OilRig|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3|Naikon|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1014,Rootkit,Defense Evasion,Rocke|APT41|APT28|Winnti Group
|
||||
T1012,Query Registry,Discovery,APT32|Threat Group-3390|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Turla
|
||||
T1012,Query Registry,Discovery,APT32|Dragonfly 2.0|Threat Group-3390|OilRig|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Turla
|
||||
T1011,Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium,Exfiltration,no
|
||||
T1010,Application Window Discovery,Discovery,Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1008,Fallback Channels,Command And Control,APT41|OilRig|Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1007,System Service Discovery,Discovery,BRONZE BUTLER|APT1|OilRig|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1006,Direct Volume Access,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1005,Data from Local System,Collection,UNC2452|FIN6|Gamaredon Group|APT39|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|Soft Cell|Turla|menuPass|Dark Caracal|Dragonfly 2.0|Honeybee|APT28|APT37|APT3|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|Threat Group-3390|APT1|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1005,Data from Local System,Collection,Gamaredon Group|APT39|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|Soft Cell|Turla|menuPass|Dark Caracal|Dragonfly 2.0|Honeybee|APT37|APT28|APT3|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|Threat Group-3390|APT1|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1003,OS Credential Dumping,Credential Access,APT39|Frankenstein|APT32|APT28|Leviathan|Sowbug|Suckfly|Poseidon Group|Axiom
|
||||
T1001,Data Obfuscation,Command And Control,Axiom
|
||||
|
||||
|
+2591
-173
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
+2452
-180
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
+28864
-21472
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
+11968
-7744
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
+21197
-14509
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
+7816
-7464
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
+118
-52
@@ -384,8 +384,16 @@ Cobalt Strike is threat emulation software. Red teams and penetration testers us
|
||||
|
||||
* [Cobalt Strike Named Pipes](detections.md#cobalt-strike-named-pipes)
|
||||
|
||||
* [DLLHost with no Command Line Arguments with Network](detections.md#dllhost-with-no-command-line-arguments-with-network)
|
||||
|
||||
* [Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass](detections.md#detect-regsvr32-application-control-bypass)
|
||||
|
||||
* [GPUpdate with no Command Line Arguments with Network](detections.md#gpupdate-with-no-command-line-arguments-with-network)
|
||||
|
||||
* [Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network](detections.md#rundll32-with-no-command-line-arguments-with-network)
|
||||
|
||||
* [SearchProtocolHost with no Command Line with Network](detections.md#searchprotocolhost-with-no-command-line-with-network)
|
||||
|
||||
* [Suspicious DLLHost no Command Line Arguments](detections.md#suspicious-dllhost-no-command-line-arguments)
|
||||
|
||||
* [Suspicious GPUpdate no Command Line Arguments](detections.md#suspicious-gpupdate-no-command-line-arguments)
|
||||
@@ -409,9 +417,9 @@ Cobalt Strike is threat emulation software. Red teams and penetration testers us
|
||||
| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|
|
||||
| T1055 | Process Injection | Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation |
|
||||
| T1218.010 | Regsvr32 | Defense Evasion |
|
||||
| T1218.011 | Rundll32 | Defense Evasion |
|
||||
| T1127.001 | MSBuild | Defense Evasion |
|
||||
| T1036.003 | Rename System Utilities | Defense Evasion |
|
||||
| T1218.011 | Rundll32 | Defense Evasion |
|
||||
| T1127 | Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution | Defense Evasion |
|
||||
|
||||
#### Kill Chain Phase
|
||||
@@ -628,8 +636,6 @@ Uncover activity consistent with credential dumping, a technique wherein attacke
|
||||
|
||||
* [Assessment of Credential Strength via DSInternals modules](detections.md#assessment-of-credential-strength-via-dsinternals-modules)
|
||||
|
||||
* [Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass](detections.md#attempt-to-set-default-powershell-execution-policy-to-unrestricted-or-bypass)
|
||||
|
||||
* [Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe](detections.md#attempted-credential-dump-from-registry-via-reg-exe)
|
||||
|
||||
* [Create Remote Thread into LSASS](detections.md#create-remote-thread-into-lsass)
|
||||
@@ -680,6 +686,8 @@ Uncover activity consistent with credential dumping, a technique wherein attacke
|
||||
|
||||
* [Ntdsutil Export NTDS](detections.md#ntdsutil-export-ntds)
|
||||
|
||||
* [Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass](detections.md#set-default-powershell-execution-policy-to-unrestricted-or-bypass)
|
||||
|
||||
* [Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS](detections.md#unsigned-image-loaded-by-lsass)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -703,11 +711,11 @@ Uncover activity consistent with credential dumping, a technique wherein attacke
|
||||
| T1087 | Account Discovery | Discovery |
|
||||
| T1201 | Password Policy Discovery | Discovery |
|
||||
| T1552 | Unsecured Credentials | Credential Access |
|
||||
| T1059.001 | PowerShell | Execution |
|
||||
| T1003.002 | Security Account Manager | Credential Access |
|
||||
| T1003 | OS Credential Dumping | Credential Access |
|
||||
| T1003.003 | NTDS | Credential Access |
|
||||
| T1558.003 | Kerberoasting | Credential Access |
|
||||
| T1059.001 | PowerShell | Execution |
|
||||
|
||||
#### Kill Chain Phase
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1066,8 +1074,6 @@ HAFNIUM group was identified by Microsoft as exploiting 4 Microsoft Exchange CVE
|
||||
|
||||
* [Any Powershell DownloadString](detections.md#any-powershell-downloadstring)
|
||||
|
||||
* [Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass](detections.md#attempt-to-set-default-powershell-execution-policy-to-unrestricted-or-bypass)
|
||||
|
||||
* [Detect Exchange Web Shell](detections.md#detect-exchange-web-shell)
|
||||
|
||||
* [Detect New Local Admin account](detections.md#detect-new-local-admin-account)
|
||||
@@ -1090,6 +1096,8 @@ HAFNIUM group was identified by Microsoft as exploiting 4 Microsoft Exchange CVE
|
||||
|
||||
* [Ntdsutil Export NTDS](detections.md#ntdsutil-export-ntds)
|
||||
|
||||
* [Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass](detections.md#set-default-powershell-execution-policy-to-unrestricted-or-bypass)
|
||||
|
||||
* [Unified Messaging Service Spawning a Process](detections.md#unified-messaging-service-spawning-a-process)
|
||||
|
||||
* [W3WP Spawning Shell](detections.md#w3wp-spawning-shell)
|
||||
@@ -1265,8 +1273,6 @@ Attackers are finding stealthy ways "live off the land," leveraging utilities an
|
||||
|
||||
* [Any Powershell DownloadString](detections.md#any-powershell-downloadstring)
|
||||
|
||||
* [Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass](detections.md#attempt-to-set-default-powershell-execution-policy-to-unrestricted-or-bypass)
|
||||
|
||||
* [Credential Extraction indicative of use of DSInternals credential conversion modules](detections.md#credential-extraction-indicative-of-use-of-dsinternals-credential-conversion-modules)
|
||||
|
||||
* [Credential Extraction indicative of use of DSInternals modules](detections.md#credential-extraction-indicative-of-use-of-dsinternals-modules)
|
||||
@@ -1289,6 +1295,8 @@ Attackers are finding stealthy ways "live off the land," leveraging utilities an
|
||||
|
||||
* [Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques](detections.md#malicious-powershell-process-with-obfuscation-techniques)
|
||||
|
||||
* [Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass](detections.md#set-default-powershell-execution-policy-to-unrestricted-or-bypass)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#### ATT&CK
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1414,48 +1422,6 @@ _version_: 2
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### Phishing Payloads
|
||||
Detect signs of malicious payloads that may indicate that your environment has been breached via a phishing attack.
|
||||
|
||||
- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud
|
||||
- **Datamodel**:
|
||||
- **ATT&CK**: [T1566.001](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566.001/), [T1566.002](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566.002/)
|
||||
- **Last Updated**: 2019-04-29
|
||||
|
||||
<details>
|
||||
<summary>details</summary>
|
||||
|
||||
#### Detection Profile
|
||||
|
||||
* [Detect Oulook exe writing a zip file](detections.md#detect-oulook-exe-writing-a--zip-file)
|
||||
|
||||
* [Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location](detections.md#process-creating-lnk-file-in-suspicious-location)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#### ATT&CK
|
||||
|
||||
| ID | Technique | Tactic |
|
||||
| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|
|
||||
| T1566.001 | Spearphishing Attachment | Initial Access |
|
||||
| T1566.002 | Spearphishing Link | Initial Access |
|
||||
|
||||
#### Kill Chain Phase
|
||||
|
||||
* Actions on Objectives
|
||||
|
||||
* Installation
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#### Reference
|
||||
|
||||
* https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/spear-phishing-campaign-targets-ukraine-government.html
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
_version_: 1
|
||||
</details>
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns
|
||||
Monitor your environment for suspicious behaviors that resemble the techniques employed by the MUDCARP threat group.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1588,6 +1554,69 @@ Silver Sparrow, identified by Red Canary Intelligence, is a new forward looking
|
||||
* https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/5-things-you-need-to-know-about-silver-sparrow/
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
_version_: 1
|
||||
</details>
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### Spearphishing Attachments
|
||||
Detect signs of malicious payloads that may indicate that your environment has been breached via a phishing attack.
|
||||
|
||||
- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud
|
||||
- **Datamodel**: Endpoint
|
||||
- **ATT&CK**: [T1003.002](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003.002/), [T1566.001](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566.001/), [T1566.002](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566.002/)
|
||||
- **Last Updated**: 2019-04-29
|
||||
|
||||
<details>
|
||||
<summary>details</summary>
|
||||
|
||||
#### Detection Profile
|
||||
|
||||
* [Detect Outlook exe writing a zip file](detections.md#detect-outlook-exe-writing-a-zip-file)
|
||||
|
||||
* [Excel Spawning PowerShell](detections.md#excel-spawning-powershell)
|
||||
|
||||
* [Excel Spawning Windows Script Host](detections.md#excel-spawning-windows-script-host)
|
||||
|
||||
* [Office Application Spawn rundll32 process](detections.md#office-application-spawn-rundll32-process)
|
||||
|
||||
* [Office Document Creating Schedule Task](detections.md#office-document-creating-schedule-task)
|
||||
|
||||
* [Office Document Executing Macro Code](detections.md#office-document-executing-macro-code)
|
||||
|
||||
* [Office Document Spawned Child Process To Download](detections.md#office-document-spawned-child-process-to-download)
|
||||
|
||||
* [Office Product Spawning Rundll32 with no DLL](detections.md#office-product-spawning-rundll32-with-no-dll)
|
||||
|
||||
* [Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location](detections.md#process-creating-lnk-file-in-suspicious-location)
|
||||
|
||||
* [Winword Spawning Cmd](detections.md#winword-spawning-cmd)
|
||||
|
||||
* [Winword Spawning PowerShell](detections.md#winword-spawning-powershell)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#### ATT&CK
|
||||
|
||||
| ID | Technique | Tactic |
|
||||
| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|
|
||||
| T1566.001 | Spearphishing Attachment | Initial Access |
|
||||
| T1003.002 | Security Account Manager | Credential Access |
|
||||
| T1566.002 | Spearphishing Link | Initial Access |
|
||||
|
||||
#### Kill Chain Phase
|
||||
|
||||
* Actions on Objectives
|
||||
|
||||
* Exploitation
|
||||
|
||||
* Installation
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#### Reference
|
||||
|
||||
* https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/spear-phishing-campaign-targets-ukraine-government.html
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
_version_: 1
|
||||
</details>
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2027,6 +2056,8 @@ Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage rundll32.exe to exe
|
||||
|
||||
* [Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL](detections.md#dump-lsass-via-comsvcs-dll)
|
||||
|
||||
* [Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network](detections.md#rundll32-with-no-command-line-arguments-with-network)
|
||||
|
||||
* [Suspicious Rundll32 Rename](detections.md#suspicious-rundll32-rename)
|
||||
|
||||
* [Suspicious Rundll32 StartW](detections.md#suspicious-rundll32-startw)
|
||||
@@ -2048,6 +2079,8 @@ Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage rundll32.exe to exe
|
||||
|
||||
* Actions on Objectives
|
||||
|
||||
* Exploitation
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#### Reference
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2643,12 +2676,18 @@ Monitor for activities and techniques associated with maintaining persistence on
|
||||
|
||||
* [Setting Credentials via PowerSploit modules](detections.md#setting-credentials-via-powersploit-modules)
|
||||
|
||||
* [Shedule Task with HTTP Command Arguments](detections.md#shedule-task-with-http-command-arguments)
|
||||
|
||||
* [Shim Database File Creation](detections.md#shim-database-file-creation)
|
||||
|
||||
* [Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters](detections.md#shim-database-installation-with-suspicious-parameters)
|
||||
|
||||
* [Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory](detections.md#suspicious-scheduled-task-from-public-directory)
|
||||
|
||||
* [WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path](detections.md#winevent-scheduled-task-created-within-public-path)
|
||||
|
||||
* [WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell](detections.md#winevent-scheduled-task-created-to-spawn-shell)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#### ATT&CK
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -3169,7 +3208,7 @@ This analytic story contains detections that query your AWS Cloudtrail for activ
|
||||
|
||||
- **Product**: Splunk Security Analytics for AWS, Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud
|
||||
- **Datamodel**:
|
||||
- **ATT&CK**: [T1078.004](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078.004/), [T1136.003](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136.003/)
|
||||
- **ATT&CK**: [T1069.003](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069.003/), [T1078.004](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078.004/), [T1098](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/), [T1110](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/), [T1136.003](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136.003/), [T1580](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1580/)
|
||||
- **Last Updated**: 2021-03-08
|
||||
|
||||
<details>
|
||||
@@ -3183,6 +3222,14 @@ This analytic story contains detections that query your AWS Cloudtrail for activ
|
||||
|
||||
* [AWS CreateLoginProfile](detections.md#aws-createloginprofile)
|
||||
|
||||
* [AWS IAM Assume Role Policy Brute Force](detections.md#aws-iam-assume-role-policy-brute-force)
|
||||
|
||||
* [AWS IAM Delete Policy](detections.md#aws-iam-delete-policy)
|
||||
|
||||
* [AWS IAM Failure Group Deletion](detections.md#aws-iam-failure-group-deletion)
|
||||
|
||||
* [AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion](detections.md#aws-iam-successful-group-deletion)
|
||||
|
||||
* [AWS SetDefaultPolicyVersion](detections.md#aws-setdefaultpolicyversion)
|
||||
|
||||
* [AWS UpdateLoginProfile](detections.md#aws-updateloginprofile)
|
||||
@@ -3194,11 +3241,17 @@ This analytic story contains detections that query your AWS Cloudtrail for activ
|
||||
| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|
|
||||
| T1078.004 | Cloud Accounts | Defense Evasion, Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation |
|
||||
| T1136.003 | Cloud Account | Persistence |
|
||||
| T1580 | Cloud Infrastructure Discovery | Discovery |
|
||||
| T1110 | Brute Force | Credential Access |
|
||||
| T1098 | Account Manipulation | Persistence |
|
||||
| T1069.003 | Cloud Groups | Discovery |
|
||||
|
||||
#### Kill Chain Phase
|
||||
|
||||
* Actions on Objectives
|
||||
|
||||
* Reconnaissance
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#### Reference
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -4116,7 +4169,7 @@ Detect and investigate suspicious activities by users and roles in your cloud en
|
||||
|
||||
- **Product**: Splunk Security Analytics for AWS, Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud
|
||||
- **Datamodel**: Change
|
||||
- **ATT&CK**: [T1078](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/), [T1078.004](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078.004/)
|
||||
- **ATT&CK**: [T1078](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/), [T1078.004](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078.004/), [T1580](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1580/)
|
||||
- **Last Updated**: 2020-09-04
|
||||
|
||||
<details>
|
||||
@@ -4124,6 +4177,8 @@ Detect and investigate suspicious activities by users and roles in your cloud en
|
||||
|
||||
#### Detection Profile
|
||||
|
||||
* [AWS IAM AccessDenied Discovery Events](detections.md#aws-iam-accessdenied-discovery-events)
|
||||
|
||||
* [Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls](detections.md#abnormally-high-number-of-cloud-infrastructure-api-calls)
|
||||
|
||||
* [Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls](detections.md#abnormally-high-number-of-cloud-security-group-api-calls)
|
||||
@@ -4135,6 +4190,7 @@ Detect and investigate suspicious activities by users and roles in your cloud en
|
||||
|
||||
| ID | Technique | Tactic |
|
||||
| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|
|
||||
| T1580 | Cloud Infrastructure Discovery | Discovery |
|
||||
| T1078.004 | Cloud Accounts | Defense Evasion, Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation |
|
||||
| T1078 | Valid Accounts | Defense Evasion, Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation |
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -4142,6 +4198,8 @@ Detect and investigate suspicious activities by users and roles in your cloud en
|
||||
|
||||
* Actions on Objectives
|
||||
|
||||
* Reconnaissance
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#### Reference
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -4729,6 +4787,10 @@ Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities th
|
||||
|
||||
* [WBAdmin Delete System Backups](detections.md#wbadmin-delete-system-backups)
|
||||
|
||||
* [WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path](detections.md#winevent-scheduled-task-created-within-public-path)
|
||||
|
||||
* [WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell](detections.md#winevent-scheduled-task-created-to-spawn-shell)
|
||||
|
||||
* [Windows Event Log Cleared](detections.md#windows-event-log-cleared)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -4855,6 +4917,10 @@ Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities th
|
||||
|
||||
* [WBAdmin Delete System Backups](detections.md#wbadmin-delete-system-backups)
|
||||
|
||||
* [WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path](detections.md#winevent-scheduled-task-created-within-public-path)
|
||||
|
||||
* [WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell](detections.md#winevent-scheduled-task-created-to-spawn-shell)
|
||||
|
||||
* [Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry](detections.md#windows-disableantispyware-registry)
|
||||
|
||||
* [Windows Security Account Manager Stopped](detections.md#windows-security-account-manager-stopped)
|
||||
|
||||
+156
-72
@@ -455,7 +455,7 @@ Cobalt Strike is threat emulation software. Red teams and penetration testers us
|
||||
|
||||
* '''Product''': Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud
|
||||
* '''Datamodel''': Endpoint
|
||||
* '''ATT&CK''': [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/ T1055], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218.010/ T1218.010], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127.001/ T1127.001], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036.003/ T1036.003], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218.011/ T1218.011], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/ T1127]
|
||||
* '''ATT&CK''': [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/ T1055], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218.010/ T1218.010], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218.011/ T1218.011], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127.001/ T1127.001], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036.003/ T1036.003], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/ T1127]
|
||||
* '''Last Updated''': 2021-02-16
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="toccolours mw-collapsible mw-collapsed">
|
||||
@@ -465,8 +465,16 @@ Cobalt Strike is threat emulation software. Red teams and penetration testers us
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Cobalt_strike_named_pipes|Cobalt Strike Named Pipes]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Dllhost_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network|DLLHost with no Command Line Arguments with Network]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass|Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Gpupdate_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network|GPUpdate with no Command Line Arguments with Network]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network|Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Searchprotocolhost_with_no_command_line_with_network|SearchProtocolHost with no Command Line with Network]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Suspicious_dllhost_no_command_line_arguments|Suspicious DLLHost no Command Line Arguments]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Suspicious_gpupdate_no_command_line_arguments|Suspicious GPUpdate no Command Line Arguments]]
|
||||
@@ -499,6 +507,10 @@ Cobalt Strike is threat emulation software. Red teams and penetration testers us
|
||||
| Regsvr32
|
||||
| Defense Evasion
|
||||
|-
|
||||
| T1218.011
|
||||
| Rundll32
|
||||
| Defense Evasion
|
||||
|-
|
||||
| T1127.001
|
||||
| MSBuild
|
||||
| Defense Evasion
|
||||
@@ -507,10 +519,6 @@ Cobalt Strike is threat emulation software. Red teams and penetration testers us
|
||||
| Rename System Utilities
|
||||
| Defense Evasion
|
||||
|-
|
||||
| T1218.011
|
||||
| Rundll32
|
||||
| Defense Evasion
|
||||
|-
|
||||
| T1127
|
||||
| Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution
|
||||
| Defense Evasion
|
||||
@@ -761,7 +769,7 @@ Uncover activity consistent with credential dumping, a technique wherein attacke
|
||||
|
||||
* '''Product''': Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud
|
||||
* '''Datamodel''': Endpoint
|
||||
* '''ATT&CK''': [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003.001/ T1003.001], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/ T1055], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068/ T1068], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/ T1078], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/ T1098], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/ T1134], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/ T1543], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/ T1547], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/ T1548], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1554/ T1554], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/ T1556], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/ T1558], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/ T1555], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/ T1087], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1201/ T1201], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/ T1552], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059.001/ T1059.001], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003.002/ T1003.002], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/ T1003], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003.003/ T1003.003], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558.003/ T1558.003]
|
||||
* '''ATT&CK''': [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003.001/ T1003.001], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/ T1055], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068/ T1068], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/ T1078], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/ T1098], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/ T1134], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/ T1543], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/ T1547], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/ T1548], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1554/ T1554], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/ T1556], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/ T1558], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/ T1555], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/ T1087], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1201/ T1201], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/ T1552], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003.002/ T1003.002], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/ T1003], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003.003/ T1003.003], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558.003/ T1558.003], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059.001/ T1059.001]
|
||||
* '''Last Updated''': 2020-02-04
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="toccolours mw-collapsible mw-collapsed">
|
||||
@@ -777,8 +785,6 @@ Uncover activity consistent with credential dumping, a technique wherein attacke
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Assessment_of_credential_strength_via_dsinternals_modules|Assessment of Credential Strength via DSInternals modules]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Attempt_to_set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass|Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe|Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Create_remote_thread_into_lsass|Create Remote Thread into LSASS]]
|
||||
@@ -829,6 +835,8 @@ Uncover activity consistent with credential dumping, a technique wherein attacke
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Ntdsutil_export_ntds|Ntdsutil Export NTDS]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass|Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass|Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS]]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -903,10 +911,6 @@ Uncover activity consistent with credential dumping, a technique wherein attacke
|
||||
| Unsecured Credentials
|
||||
| Credential Access
|
||||
|-
|
||||
| T1059.001
|
||||
| PowerShell
|
||||
| Execution
|
||||
|-
|
||||
| T1003.002
|
||||
| Security Account Manager
|
||||
| Credential Access
|
||||
@@ -922,6 +926,10 @@ Uncover activity consistent with credential dumping, a technique wherein attacke
|
||||
| T1558.003
|
||||
| Kerberoasting
|
||||
| Credential Access
|
||||
|-
|
||||
| T1059.001
|
||||
| PowerShell
|
||||
| Execution
|
||||
|}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1375,8 +1383,6 @@ HAFNIUM group was identified by Microsoft as exploiting 4 Microsoft Exchange CVE
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Any_powershell_downloadstring|Any Powershell DownloadString]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Attempt_to_set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass|Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Detect_exchange_web_shell|Detect Exchange Web Shell]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Detect_new_local_admin_account|Detect New Local Admin account]]
|
||||
@@ -1399,6 +1405,8 @@ HAFNIUM group was identified by Microsoft as exploiting 4 Microsoft Exchange CVE
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Ntdsutil_export_ntds|Ntdsutil Export NTDS]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass|Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Unified_messaging_service_spawning_a_process|Unified Messaging Service Spawning a Process]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#W3wp_spawning_shell|W3WP Spawning Shell]]
|
||||
@@ -1670,8 +1678,6 @@ Attackers are finding stealthy ways "live off the land," leveraging utilities an
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Any_powershell_downloadstring|Any Powershell DownloadString]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Attempt_to_set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass|Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Credential_extraction_indicative_of_use_of_dsinternals_credential_conversion_modules|Credential Extraction indicative of use of DSInternals credential conversion modules]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Credential_extraction_indicative_of_use_of_dsinternals_modules|Credential Extraction indicative of use of DSInternals modules]]
|
||||
@@ -1694,6 +1700,8 @@ Attackers are finding stealthy ways "live off the land," leveraging utilities an
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques|Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass|Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass]]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
====ATT&CK====
|
||||
@@ -1907,59 +1915,6 @@ Sunburst is a trojanized updates to SolarWinds Orion IT monitoring and managemen
|
||||
|
||||
----
|
||||
|
||||
===Phishing payloads===
|
||||
Detect signs of malicious payloads that may indicate that your environment has been breached via a phishing attack.
|
||||
|
||||
* '''Product''': Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud
|
||||
* '''Datamodel''':
|
||||
* '''ATT&CK''': [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566.001/ T1566.001], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566.002/ T1566.002]
|
||||
* '''Last Updated''': 2019-04-29
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="toccolours mw-collapsible mw-collapsed">
|
||||
<div class="mw-collapsible-content">
|
||||
|
||||
====Detection Profile====
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Detect_oulook_exe_writing_a__zip_file|Detect Oulook exe writing a zip file]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location|Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location]]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
====ATT&CK====
|
||||
{|
|
||||
! style="text-align:left;"| ID
|
||||
! Technique
|
||||
! Tactic
|
||||
|-
|
||||
| T1566.001
|
||||
| Spearphishing Attachment
|
||||
| Initial Access
|
||||
|-
|
||||
| T1566.002
|
||||
| Spearphishing Link
|
||||
| Initial Access
|
||||
|}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
====Kill Chain Phase====
|
||||
|
||||
* Actions on Objectives
|
||||
|
||||
* Installation
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
====Reference====
|
||||
|
||||
* https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/spear-phishing-campaign-targets-ukraine-government.html
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
''version'': 1
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
----
|
||||
|
||||
===Possible backdoor activity associated with mudcarp espionage campaigns===
|
||||
Monitor your environment for suspicious behaviors that resemble the techniques employed by the MUDCARP threat group.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2127,6 +2082,83 @@ Silver Sparrow, identified by Red Canary Intelligence, is a new forward looking
|
||||
* https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/5-things-you-need-to-know-about-silver-sparrow/
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
''version'': 1
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
----
|
||||
|
||||
===Spearphishing attachments===
|
||||
Detect signs of malicious payloads that may indicate that your environment has been breached via a phishing attack.
|
||||
|
||||
* '''Product''': Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud
|
||||
* '''Datamodel''': Endpoint
|
||||
* '''ATT&CK''': [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566.001/ T1566.001], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003.002/ T1003.002], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566.002/ T1566.002]
|
||||
* '''Last Updated''': 2019-04-29
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="toccolours mw-collapsible mw-collapsed">
|
||||
<div class="mw-collapsible-content">
|
||||
|
||||
====Detection Profile====
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Detect_outlook_exe_writing_a_zip_file|Detect Outlook exe writing a zip file]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Excel_spawning_powershell|Excel Spawning PowerShell]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Excel_spawning_windows_script_host|Excel Spawning Windows Script Host]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Office_application_spawn_rundll32_process|Office Application Spawn rundll32 process]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Office_document_creating_schedule_task|Office Document Creating Schedule Task]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Office_document_executing_macro_code|Office Document Executing Macro Code]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Office_document_spawned_child_process_to_download|Office Document Spawned Child Process To Download]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Office_product_spawning_rundll32_with_no_dll|Office Product Spawning Rundll32 with no DLL]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location|Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Winword_spawning_cmd|Winword Spawning Cmd]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Winword_spawning_powershell|Winword Spawning PowerShell]]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
====ATT&CK====
|
||||
{|
|
||||
! style="text-align:left;"| ID
|
||||
! Technique
|
||||
! Tactic
|
||||
|-
|
||||
| T1566.001
|
||||
| Spearphishing Attachment
|
||||
| Initial Access
|
||||
|-
|
||||
| T1003.002
|
||||
| Security Account Manager
|
||||
| Credential Access
|
||||
|-
|
||||
| T1566.002
|
||||
| Spearphishing Link
|
||||
| Initial Access
|
||||
|}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
====Kill Chain Phase====
|
||||
|
||||
* Actions on Objectives
|
||||
|
||||
* Exploitation
|
||||
|
||||
* Installation
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
====Reference====
|
||||
|
||||
* https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/spear-phishing-campaign-targets-ukraine-government.html
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
''version'': 1
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
@@ -2670,6 +2702,8 @@ Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage rundll32.exe to exe
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll|Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network|Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Suspicious_rundll32_rename|Suspicious Rundll32 Rename]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Suspicious_rundll32_startw|Suspicious Rundll32 StartW]]
|
||||
@@ -2704,6 +2738,8 @@ Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage rundll32.exe to exe
|
||||
|
||||
* Actions on Objectives
|
||||
|
||||
* Exploitation
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
====Reference====
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -3522,12 +3558,18 @@ Monitor for activities and techniques associated with maintaining persistence on
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Setting_credentials_via_powersploit_modules|Setting Credentials via PowerSploit modules]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Shedule_task_with_http_command_arguments|Shedule Task with HTTP Command Arguments]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Shim_database_file_creation|Shim Database File Creation]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters|Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Suspicious_scheduled_task_from_public_directory|Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Winevent_scheduled_task_created_within_public_path|WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Winevent_scheduled_task_created_to_spawn_shell|WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell]]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
====ATT&CK====
|
||||
@@ -4186,7 +4228,7 @@ This analytic story contains detections that query your AWS Cloudtrail for activ
|
||||
|
||||
* '''Product''': Splunk Security Analytics for AWS, Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud
|
||||
* '''Datamodel''':
|
||||
* '''ATT&CK''': [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078.004/ T1078.004], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136.003/ T1136.003]
|
||||
* '''ATT&CK''': [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078.004/ T1078.004], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136.003/ T1136.003], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1580/ T1580], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/ T1110], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/ T1098], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069.003/ T1069.003]
|
||||
* '''Last Updated''': 2021-03-08
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="toccolours mw-collapsible mw-collapsed">
|
||||
@@ -4200,6 +4242,14 @@ This analytic story contains detections that query your AWS Cloudtrail for activ
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Aws_createloginprofile|AWS CreateLoginProfile]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Aws_iam_assume_role_policy_brute_force|AWS IAM Assume Role Policy Brute Force]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Aws_iam_delete_policy|AWS IAM Delete Policy]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Aws_iam_failure_group_deletion|AWS IAM Failure Group Deletion]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Aws_iam_successful_group_deletion|AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Aws_setdefaultpolicyversion|AWS SetDefaultPolicyVersion]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Aws_updateloginprofile|AWS UpdateLoginProfile]]
|
||||
@@ -4219,6 +4269,22 @@ This analytic story contains detections that query your AWS Cloudtrail for activ
|
||||
| T1136.003
|
||||
| Cloud Account
|
||||
| Persistence
|
||||
|-
|
||||
| T1580
|
||||
| Cloud Infrastructure Discovery
|
||||
| Discovery
|
||||
|-
|
||||
| T1110
|
||||
| Brute Force
|
||||
| Credential Access
|
||||
|-
|
||||
| T1098
|
||||
| Account Manipulation
|
||||
| Persistence
|
||||
|-
|
||||
| T1069.003
|
||||
| Cloud Groups
|
||||
| Discovery
|
||||
|}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -4226,6 +4292,8 @@ This analytic story contains detections that query your AWS Cloudtrail for activ
|
||||
|
||||
* Actions on Objectives
|
||||
|
||||
* Reconnaissance
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
====Reference====
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -5304,7 +5372,7 @@ Detect and investigate suspicious activities by users and roles in your cloud en
|
||||
|
||||
* '''Product''': Splunk Security Analytics for AWS, Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud
|
||||
* '''Datamodel''': Change
|
||||
* '''ATT&CK''': [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078.004/ T1078.004], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/ T1078]
|
||||
* '''ATT&CK''': [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1580/ T1580], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078.004/ T1078.004], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/ T1078]
|
||||
* '''Last Updated''': 2020-09-04
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="toccolours mw-collapsible mw-collapsed">
|
||||
@@ -5312,6 +5380,8 @@ Detect and investigate suspicious activities by users and roles in your cloud en
|
||||
|
||||
====Detection Profile====
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Aws_iam_accessdenied_discovery_events|AWS IAM AccessDenied Discovery Events]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls|Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls|Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls]]
|
||||
@@ -5326,6 +5396,10 @@ Detect and investigate suspicious activities by users and roles in your cloud en
|
||||
! Technique
|
||||
! Tactic
|
||||
|-
|
||||
| T1580
|
||||
| Cloud Infrastructure Discovery
|
||||
| Discovery
|
||||
|-
|
||||
| T1078.004
|
||||
| Cloud Accounts
|
||||
| Defense Evasion, Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation
|
||||
@@ -5340,6 +5414,8 @@ Detect and investigate suspicious activities by users and roles in your cloud en
|
||||
|
||||
* Actions on Objectives
|
||||
|
||||
* Reconnaissance
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
====Reference====
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -6106,6 +6182,10 @@ Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities th
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Wbadmin_delete_system_backups|WBAdmin Delete System Backups]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Winevent_scheduled_task_created_within_public_path|WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Winevent_scheduled_task_created_to_spawn_shell|WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Windows_event_log_cleared|Windows Event Log Cleared]]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -6296,6 +6376,10 @@ Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities th
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Wbadmin_delete_system_backups|WBAdmin Delete System Backups]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Winevent_scheduled_task_created_within_public_path|WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Winevent_scheduled_task_created_to_spawn_shell|WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Windows_disableantispyware_registry|Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Windows_security_account_manager_stopped|Windows Security Account Manager Stopped]]
|
||||
@@ -6997,7 +7081,7 @@ Reduce the risk of CVE-2018-11409, an information disclosure vulnerability withi
|
||||
''
|
||||
#############
|
||||
# Automatically generated by doc_gen.py in https://github.com/splunk/security_content
|
||||
# On Date: 2021-04-15 19:33:38.229931 UTC
|
||||
# On Date: 2021-04-22 21:48:48.069505 UTC
|
||||
# Author: Splunk Security Research
|
||||
# Contact: research@splunk.com
|
||||
#############
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
|
||||
name: First Time Seen Child Process of Zoom Unit Test
|
||||
tests:
|
||||
- name: First Time Seen Child Process of Zoom
|
||||
file: endpoint/first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom.yml
|
||||
pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0'
|
||||
earliest_time: '-24h'
|
||||
latest_time: 'now'
|
||||
attack_data:
|
||||
- file_name: windows-sysmon.log
|
||||
data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1068/zoom_child_process/windows-sysmon.log
|
||||
source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
|
||||
sourcetype: xmlwineventlog
|
||||
@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
|
||||
name: IPv6 Network Infrastructure Threats
|
||||
tests:
|
||||
- name: Detect IPv6 Network Infrastructure Threats
|
||||
file: experimental/network/detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats.yml
|
||||
pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0'
|
||||
earliest_time: '-24h'
|
||||
latest_time: 'now'
|
||||
attack_data:
|
||||
- file_name: cisco_ios.log
|
||||
data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1557.002/cisco_ios/cisco_ios.log
|
||||
source: udp:514
|
||||
sourcetype: cisco:ios
|
||||
@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
|
||||
name: Detect SNICat SNI Exfiltration Unit Test
|
||||
tests:
|
||||
- name: Detect SNICat SNI Exfiltration
|
||||
file: experimental/network/detect_snicat_sni_exfiltration.yml
|
||||
pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0'
|
||||
earliest_time: '-24h'
|
||||
latest_time: 'now'
|
||||
attack_data:
|
||||
- file_name: zeek-ssl.log
|
||||
data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1041/zeek_ssl/zeek_ssl.log
|
||||
source: zeek-ssl.log
|
||||
sourcetype: bro:ssl:json
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user