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@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
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name: AWS CreateAccessKey
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id: 2a9b80d3-6340-4345-11ad-212bf3d0d111
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version: 2
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date: '2021-07-19'
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version: 3
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date: '2022-03-03'
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author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
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type: Hunting
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datamodel: []
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@@ -9,11 +9,16 @@ description: This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user A who has
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permission to create access keys, makes an API call to create access keys for another
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user B. Attackers have been know to use this technique for Privilege Escalation
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in case new victim(user B) has more permissions than old victim(user B)
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search: '`cloudtrail` eventName = CreateAccessKey userAgent !=console.amazonaws.com
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errorCode = success| search userIdentity.userName!=requestParameters.userName | stats
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count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by requestParameters.userName
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src eventName eventSource aws_account_id errorCode userAgent eventID awsRegion userIdentity.principalId
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user_arn | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|`aws_createaccesskey_filter`'
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search: '`cloudtrail` eventName = CreateAccessKey userAgent !=console.amazonaws.com errorCode = success
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| eval match=if(match(userIdentity.userName,requestParameters.userName),1,0)
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| search match=0
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| stats
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count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by requestParameters.userName
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src eventName eventSource aws_account_id errorCode userAgent eventID awsRegion userIdentity.principalId
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user_arn
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| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
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| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
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|`aws_createaccesskey_filter`'
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how_to_implement: You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This
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search works with AWS CloudTrail logs.
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known_false_positives: While this search has no known false positives, it is possible
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@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
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name: AWS UpdateLoginProfile
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id: 2a9b80d3-6a40-4115-11ad-212bf3d0d111
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version: 2
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date: '2021-07-19'
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version: 3
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date: '2022-03-03'
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author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
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type: TTP
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datamodel: []
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@@ -9,11 +9,16 @@ description: This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user A who has
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permission to update login profile, makes an API call to update login profile for
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another user B . Attackers have been know to use this technique for Privilege Escalation
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in case new victim(user B) has more permissions than old victim(user B)
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search: '`cloudtrail` eventName = UpdateLoginProfile userAgent !=console.amazonaws.com
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errorCode = success| search userIdentity.userName!=requestParameters.userName | stats
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count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by requestParameters.userName
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search: ' `cloudtrail` eventName = UpdateLoginProfile userAgent !=console.amazonaws.com errorCode = success
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| eval match=if(match(userIdentity.userName,requestParameters.userName), 1,0)
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| search match=0
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| stats
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count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by requestParameters.userName
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src eventName eventSource aws_account_id errorCode userAgent eventID awsRegion userIdentity.userName
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user_arn | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|`aws_updateloginprofile_filter`'
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user_arn
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| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
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| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
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| `aws_updateloginprofile_filter`'
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how_to_implement: You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This
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search works with AWS CloudTrail logs.
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known_false_positives: While this search has no known false positives, it is possible
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