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pyth0n1c
2022-02-07 09:39:49 -08:00
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parent ef67ffb311 e7be2fa870
commit ec321a27f7
7 changed files with 86 additions and 47 deletions
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detections/endpoint/auto_admin_logon_registry_entry.yml
+15 -8
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@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
name: Auto Admin Logon Registry Entry
id: 1379d2b8-0f18-11ec-8ca3-acde48001122
version: 1
date: '2021-09-06'
version: 2
date: '2020-01-28'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
type: TTP
datamodel:
@@ -12,12 +12,19 @@ description: this search is to detect a suspicious registry modification to impl
continue encrypting the whole network. This behavior is not a common practice and
really a suspicious TTP or alert need to be consider if found within then network
premise.
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= "*SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows
NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon*" AND Registry.registry_key_name=AutoAdminLogon AND
Registry.registry_value_name=1 by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name
Registry.registry_value_name Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `auto_admin_logon_registry_entry_filter`'
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry
where Registry.registry_path= "*SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon*"
AND Registry.registry_value_name=AutoAdminLogon
AND Registry.registry_value_data=1
by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data
| `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`
|rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
|rename process_guid as proc_guid
| fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name]
| table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name
| `auto_admin_logon_registry_entry_filter`'
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure
detections/endpoint/monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors.yml
+15 -8
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@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
name: Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors
id: f5f6af30-7ba7-4295-bfe9-07de87c01bbc
version: 2
date: '2020-11-23'
author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
version: 3
date: '2020-01-28'
author: Bhavin Patel, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
type: TTP
datamodel: []
description: This search looks for registry activity associated with modifications
@@ -10,11 +10,17 @@ description: This search looks for registry activity associated with modificatio
scenario, an attacker can load an arbitrary .dll into the print-monitor registry
by giving the full path name to the after.dll. The system will execute the .dll
with elevated (SYSTEM) permissions and will persist after reboot.
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.action=modified AND
Registry.registry_path="*CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Print\\Monitors*" by Registry.dest,
Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name
Registry.action | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors_filter`'
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry
where Registry.action=modified AND Registry.registry_path="*CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Print\\Monitors*"
by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data
| `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`
|rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
|rename process_guid as proc_guid
| fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name]
| table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name
| `monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors_filter`'
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data
that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model
in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response
@@ -41,6 +47,7 @@ tags:
- Stage:Privilege Escalation
dataset:
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.010/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.010/atomic_red_team/sysmon.log
impact: 80
kill_chain_phases:
- Actions on Objectives
detections/endpoint/registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases.yml
+13 -7
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@@ -1,17 +1,23 @@
name: Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases
id: f5f6af30-7aa7-4295-bfe9-07fe87c01bbb
version: 3
date: '2020-11-26'
author: Bhavin Patel, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
version: 4
date: '2020-01-28'
author: Bhavin Patel, Patrick Bareiss, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
type: TTP
datamodel: []
description: This search looks for registry activity associated with application compatibility
shims, which can be leveraged by attackers for various nefarious purposes.
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Registry.registry_key_name)
as registry_key_name min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry
where Registry.registry_path=*CurrentVersion\\AppCompatFlags\\Custom* OR Registry.registry_path=*CurrentVersion\\AppCompatFlags\\InstalledSDB*
by Registry.dest Registry.user | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases_filter`'
by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid
| `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`
|rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
|rename process_guid as proc_guid
| fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data]
| table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data
| `registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases_filter`'
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must populate the Change_Analysis
data model. This is typically populated via endpoint detection and response product,
such as Carbon Black or other endpoint data sources such as Sysmon. The data used
detections/endpoint/sdclt_uac_bypass.yml
+14 -8
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@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
name: Sdclt UAC Bypass
id: d71efbf6-da63-11eb-8c6e-acde48001122
version: 1
date: '2021-07-01'
version: 2
date: '2020-01-28'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
type: TTP
datamodel:
@@ -10,13 +10,19 @@ description: This search is to detect a suspicious sdclt.exe registry modificati
This technique is commonly seen when attacker try to bypassed UAC by using sdclt.exe
application by modifying some registry that sdclt.exe tries to open or query with
payload file path on it to be executed.
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path= "*\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\App
Paths\\control.exe*" OR Registry.registry_path= "*\\exefile\\shell\\runas\\command\\*")
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry
where (Registry.registry_path= "*\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\App Paths\\control.exe*"
OR Registry.registry_path= "*\\exefile\\shell\\runas\\command\\*")
(Registry.registry_value_name = "(Default)" OR Registry.registry_value_name = "IsolatedCommand")
by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name
Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `sdclt_uac_bypass_filter`'
by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data
| `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`
|rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
|rename process_guid as proc_guid
| fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name]
| table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name
| `sdclt_uac_bypass_filter`'
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
detections/endpoint/silentcleanup_uac_bypass.yml
+14 -7
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@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
name: SilentCleanup UAC Bypass
id: 56d7cfcc-da63-11eb-92d4-acde48001122
version: 1
date: '2021-07-01'
version: 2
date: '2020-01-28'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
type: TTP
datamodel:
@@ -10,11 +10,18 @@ description: This search is to detect a suspicious modification of registry that
related to UAC bypassed. This registry will be trigger once the attacker abuse the
silentcleanup task schedule to gain high privilege execution that will bypass User
control account.
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= "*\\Environment\\windir"
Registry.registry_value_name = "*.exe*" by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name
Registry.registry_value_name Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `silentcleanup_uac_bypass_filter`'
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry
where Registry.registry_path= "*\\Environment\\windir"
Registry.registry_value_data = "*.exe*"
by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`
|rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
|rename process_guid as proc_guid
| fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name]
| table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name
| `silentcleanup_uac_bypass_filter`'
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure
detections/endpoint/wsreset_uac_bypass.yml
+14 -8
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@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
name: WSReset UAC Bypass
id: 8b5901bc-da63-11eb-be43-acde48001122
version: 1
date: '2021-07-01'
version: 2
date: '2020-01-28'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
type: TTP
datamodel:
@@ -10,12 +10,18 @@ description: This search is to detect a suspicious modification of registry rela
to UAC bypass. This technique is to modify the registry in this detection, create
a registry value with the path of the payload and run WSreset.exe to bypass User
account Control.
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= "*\\AppX82a6gwre4fdg3bt635tn5ctqjf8msdd2\\Shell\\open\\command*"
(Registry.registry_value_name = "(Default)" OR Registry.registry_value_name = "DelegateExecute")
by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name
Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wsreset_uac_bypass_filter`'
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry
where Registry.registry_path= "*\\AppX82a6gwre4fdg3bt635tn5ctqjf8msdd2\\Shell\\open\\command*"
AND (Registry.registry_value_name = "(Default)" OR Registry.registry_value_name = "DelegateExecute")
by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`
|rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
|rename process_guid as proc_guid
| fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name]
| table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name
| `wsreset_uac_bypass_filter`'
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure
tests/endpoint/monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors.test.yml
+1 -1
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@@ -7,6 +7,6 @@ tests:
latest_time: 'now'
attack_data:
- file_name: windows-sysmon.log
data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.010/atomic_red_team/sysmon.log
source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
sourcetype: xmlwineventlog