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Merge pull request #1032 from splunk/appinspect

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app-inpspect issues
This commit is contained in:
Jose Enrique Hernandez
2020-12-15 21:38:22 -05:00
committed by GitHub
parent 54ce838484 1075e6b175
commit ffe4cbb019
34 changed files with 852 additions and 840 deletions
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lookups/prohibited_softwares.yml
+1 -1
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@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
description: A list of processes that have been marked as prohibited
filename: prohibited_processes.csv
filename: prohibited_softwares.csv
name: prohibited_softwares
package/default/analytic_stories.conf
+75 -75
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@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
#############
# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security-content
# On Date: 2020-12-09T22:57:13 UTC
# On Date: 2020-12-16T01:47:16 UTC
# Author: Splunk Security Research
# Contact: research@splunk.com
#############
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ version = 1
reference = ["https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-cloudtrail-now-tracks-cross-account-activity-to-its-origin/"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - aws detect attach to role policy - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect permanent key creation - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect role creation - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect sts assume role abuse - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect sts get session token abuse - Rule"]
mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1550"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity"]
data_models = []
providing_technologies = none
@@ -34,8 +34,8 @@ version = 1
reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 12", "CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1535"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP", "ID.AM"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Regions", "ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Instance Types", "ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User", "ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 AMIs", "ESCU - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Regions", "ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 AMIs", "ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User", "ESCU - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Instance Types"]
data_models = []
providing_technologies = none
description = Monitor your AWS EC2 instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or EC2 instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior.
@@ -53,8 +53,8 @@ version = 2
reference = ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonVPC/latest/UserGuide/VPC_Appendix_NACLs.html", "https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/how-to-help-prepare-for-ddos-attacks-by-reducing-your-attack-surface/"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 11", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.007"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "DE.DP", "PR.AC"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of Network ACL Activity by ARN", "ESCU - Baseline of blocked outbound traffic from AWS"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of blocked outbound traffic from AWS", "ESCU - Baseline of Network ACL Activity by ARN"]
data_models = []
providing_technologies = none
description = Monitor your AWS network infrastructure for bad configurations and malicious activity. Investigative searches help you probe deeper, when the facts warrant it.
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ version = 1
reference = ["https://aws.amazon.com/security-hub/features/"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for User - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN"]
support_searches = []
data_models = []
providing_technologies = none
@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ version = 1
reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From City", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Region", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Country"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From City", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Region", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Country", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources"]
data_models = []
providing_technologies = none
@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.p
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect API activity from users without MFA - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS API Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Security Group Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new API calls from user roles - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "DE.DP", "ID.AM", "PR.AC"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Create a list of approved AWS service accounts", "ESCU - Baseline of Security Group Activity by ARN", "ESCU - Baseline of API Calls per User ARN", "ESCU - Previously seen API call per user roles in CloudTrail"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of Security Group Activity by ARN", "ESCU - Create a list of approved AWS service accounts", "ESCU - Baseline of API Calls per User ARN", "ESCU - Previously seen API call per user roles in CloudTrail"]
data_models = []
providing_technologies = none
description = Detect and investigate dormant user accounts for your AWS environment that have become active again. Because inactive and ad-hoc accounts are common attack targets, it's critical to enable governance within your environment.
@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ version = 1
reference = []
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Excessive Account Lockouts From Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Excessive User Account Lockouts - Rule", "ESCU - Identify New User Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Short Lived Windows Accounts - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.002", "T1078.003", "T1136.001"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Excessive Account Lockouts Enrichment And Response", "ESCU - Get Logon Rights Modifications For User", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Logon Rights Modifications For Endpoint"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Logon Rights Modifications For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Logon Rights Modifications For User", "ESCU - Excessive Account Lockouts Enrichment And Response"]
support_searches = []
data_models = ["Change"]
providing_technologies = none
@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ version = 1
reference = ["https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs/blob/v3.2/dev/rules/REQUEST-944-APPLICATION-ATTACK-JAVA.conf"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Java Classes - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Content-Type Length - Rule", "ESCU - Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 18", "CIS 3", "CIS 4"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Delivery", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1082"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.RA", "PR.IP", "PR.MA", "PR.PT", "RS.MI"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Investigate Web POSTs From src", "ESCU - Investigate Suspicious Strings in HTTP Header"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate Web POSTs From src", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Investigate Suspicious Strings in HTTP Header"]
support_searches = []
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
providing_technologies = none
@@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ version = 1
reference = ["https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/inventory-of-authorized-and-unauthorized-devices/"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["PR.DS"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get First Occurrence and Last Occurrence of a MAC Address", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get First Occurrence and Last Occurrence of a MAC Address"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Count of assets by category"]
data_models = ["Network_Sessions"]
providing_technologies = none
@@ -182,7 +182,7 @@ version = 1
reference = ["https://www.zerofox.com/blog/what-is-digital-risk-monitoring/", "https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/consumer/family-safety/what-is-typosquatting/", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2016/06/explained-typosquatting/"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Delivery"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Email Info"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Email Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - DNSTwist Domain Names"]
data_models = ["Email", "Network_Resolution", "Web"]
providing_technologies = none
@@ -200,8 +200,8 @@ version = 1
reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 12", "CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1535"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP", "ID.AM"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Update", "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Initial", "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Destroyed", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Initial"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Update", "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Destroyed", "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Update"]
data_models = ["Change"]
providing_technologies = none
description = Monitor your cloud compute instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or compute instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior.
@@ -219,7 +219,7 @@ version = 1
reference = ["https://www.intego.com/mac-security-blog/osxcoldroot-and-the-rat-invasion/", "https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x2A.html", "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/coldroot-rat-still-undetectable-despite-being-uploaded-on-github-two-years-ago/"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection - Rule", "ESCU - Processes Tapping Keyboard Events - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 4", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
support_searches = []
data_models = []
providing_technologies = none
@@ -237,7 +237,7 @@ version = 1
reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Collection", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1074"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Email files written outside of the Outlook directory - Rule", "ESCU - Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts - Rule", "ESCU - Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious writes to System Volume Information - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036", "T1114.001", "T1114.002"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
support_searches = []
data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"]
providing_technologies = none
@@ -255,7 +255,7 @@ version = 1
reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Command_and_Control", "https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/feature/Command-and-control-servers-The-puppet-masters-that-govern-malware"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 11", "CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048", "T1048.003", "T1071.001", "T1071.004", "T1095"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.AC", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of blocked outbound traffic from AWS", "ESCU - Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK"]
data_models = ["Network_Resolution", "Network_Traffic"]
providing_technologies = none
@@ -289,7 +289,7 @@ version = 1
reference = ["https://github.com/splunk/cloud-datamodel-security-research"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - GCP GCR container uploaded - Rule", "ESCU - New container uploaded to AWS ECR - Rule"]
mappings = {"mitre_attack": ["T1525"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate AWS ECR container listing activity"]
investigative_searches = []
support_searches = []
data_models = []
providing_technologies = none
@@ -305,7 +305,7 @@ version = 3
reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1003", "https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for.html"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", "ESCU - Create Remote Thread into LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001", "T1003.002", "T1003.003", "T1059.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts", "ESCU - Investigate Previous Unseen User", "ESCU - Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts", "ESCU - Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts", "ESCU - Investigate Previous Unseen User"]
support_searches = []
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
providing_technologies = none
@@ -323,8 +323,8 @@ version = 2
reference = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Create local admin accounts using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Name Used by Dragonfly Threat Actors - Rule", "ESCU - Single Letter Process On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 16", "CIS 2", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.002", "T1053.005", "T1059.001", "T1059.003", "T1071.002", "T1112", "T1136.001", "T1543.003", "T1547.001", "T1562.004"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Process File Activity", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process File Activity", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments", "ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK"]
data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"]
providing_technologies = none
description = Monitor for suspicious activities associated with DHS Technical Alert US-CERT TA18-074A. Some of the activities that adversaries used in these compromises included spearfishing attacks, malware, watering-hole domains, many and more.
@@ -359,7 +359,7 @@ version = 1
reference = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/", "http://www.noip.com/blog/2014/07/11/dynamic-dns-can-use-2/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/08/04/detecting-dynamic-dns-domains-in-splunk.html"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS record changed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003", "T1071.004"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - DNS Hijack Enrichment", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - DNS Hijack Enrichment"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Discover DNS records"]
data_models = ["Network_Resolution"]
providing_technologies = none
@@ -399,7 +399,7 @@ version = 1
reference = ["https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/data-protection/", "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/dns/splunk-detect-dns-tunneling-37022", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect USB device insertion - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1071.004"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.DS", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
support_searches = []
data_models = ["Change_Analysis", "Network_Resolution"]
providing_technologies = none
@@ -431,8 +431,8 @@ version = 2
reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1089", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2015/11/vonteera-adware-uses-certificates-to-disable-anti-malware/", "https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Tools-Report.pdf"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Unload Sysmon Filter Driver - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112", "T1543.003", "T1553.004", "T1562.001", "T1562.004"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments", "ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK"]
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
providing_technologies = none
description = Looks for activities and techniques associated with the disabling of security tools on a Windows system, such as suspicious `reg.exe` processes, processes launching netsh, and many others.
@@ -447,7 +447,7 @@ version = 2
reference = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/", "http://www.noip.com/blog/2014/07/11/dynamic-dns-can-use-2/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/08/04/detecting-dynamic-dns-domains-in-splunk.html"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1071.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "DE.DP", "PR.IP"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic"]
support_searches = []
data_models = ["Network_Resolution", "Web"]
providing_technologies = none
@@ -463,8 +463,8 @@ version = 1
reference = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-201A", "https://www.first.org/resources/papers/conf2017/Advanced-Incident-Detection-and-Threat-Hunting-using-Sysmon-and-Splunk.pdf", "https://www.vkremez.com/2017/05/emotet-banking-trojan-malware-analysis.html"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 2", "CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Delivery", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.002", "T1059.003", "T1547.001", "T1566.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", "ESCU - Add Prohibited Processes to Enterprise Security"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK"]
data_models = ["Email", "Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"]
providing_technologies = none
description = Detect rarely used executables, specific registry paths that may confer malware survivability and persistence, instances where cmd.exe is used to launch script interpreters, and other indicators that the Emotet financial malware has compromised your environment.
@@ -515,8 +515,8 @@ version = 2
reference = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/HIDDEN-COBRA-North-Korean-Malicious-Cyber-Activity", "https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Destructive-Malware-Report.pdf"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious File Write - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 16", "CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001", "T1021.002", "T1059.001", "T1059.003", "T1071.002", "T1071.004"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Outbound Emails to Hidden Cobra Threat Actors", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments", "ESCU - Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Outbound Emails to Hidden Cobra Threat Actors", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments", "ESCU - Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK", "ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK"]
data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Resolution", "Network_Traffic"]
providing_technologies = none
description = Monitor for and investigate activities, including the creation or deletion of hidden shares and file writes, that may be evidence of infiltration by North Korean government-sponsored cybercriminals. Details of this activity were reported in DHS Report TA-18-149A.
@@ -534,7 +534,7 @@ version = 1
reference = ["https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2016/09/hosts-file-hijacks/"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Windows hosts file modification - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003", "T1071.004"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.AC", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
support_searches = []
data_models = ["Network_Resolution"]
providing_technologies = none
@@ -580,7 +580,7 @@ version = 1
reference = ["https://github.com/splunk/cloud-datamodel-security-research"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint - Rule"]
mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1526"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip"]
support_searches = []
data_models = []
providing_technologies = none
@@ -628,7 +628,7 @@ version = 2
reference = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/executive-perspective/2015/08/malware_lateral_move.html"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks - Rule", "ESCU - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16", "CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001", "T1053.005", "T1550.002", "T1558.003"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity"]
support_searches = []
data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"]
providing_technologies = none
@@ -648,7 +648,7 @@ version = 4
reference = ["https://blogs.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/malware-employs-powershell-to-infect-systems/", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Multiple Suspicious Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1027", "T1059.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
support_searches = []
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
providing_technologies = none
@@ -673,8 +673,8 @@ version = 1
reference = ["https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/03/04/tracking-locky-ransomware-using-carbon-black/"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Extended Period Without Successful Netbackup Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Unsuccessful Netbackup backups - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - All backup logs for host"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Monitor Unsuccessful Backups", "ESCU - Monitor Successful Backups"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - All backup logs for host", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Monitor Successful Backups", "ESCU - Monitor Unsuccessful Backups"]
data_models = []
providing_technologies = none
description = Address common concerns when monitoring your backup processes. These searches can help you reduce risks from ransomware, device theft, or denial of physical access to a host by backing up data on endpoints.
@@ -689,8 +689,8 @@ version = 1
reference = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 2"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["PR.DS"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Add Prohibited Processes to Enterprise Security"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
support_searches = []
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
providing_technologies = none
description = Identify and investigate prohibited/unauthorized software or processes that may be concealing malicious behavior within your environment.
@@ -724,8 +724,8 @@ version = 1
reference = ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/tn-archive/bb490939(v=technet.10)", "https://htmlpreview.github.io/?https://github.com/MatthewDemaske/blogbackup/blob/master/netshell.html", "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Processes created by netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.004"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments", "ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK"]
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
providing_technologies = none
description = Detect activities and various techniques associated with the abuse of `netsh.exe`, which can disable local firewall settings or set up a remote connection to a host from an infected system.
@@ -741,8 +741,8 @@ version = 2
reference = ["https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/orangeworm-targets-healthcare-us-europe-asia", "https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/healthcare-targeted-by-hacker/"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001", "T1059.003", "T1543.003", "T1569.002"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial", "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments", "ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update"]
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
providing_technologies = none
description = Detect activities and various techniques associated with the Orangeworm Attack Group, a group that frequently targets the healthcare industry.
@@ -784,7 +784,7 @@ version = 1
reference = ["https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/scope-of-mudcarp-attacks-highlight-1/", "http://blog.amossys.fr/badflick-is-not-so-bad.html"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001", "T1059.003", "T1547.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments", "ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK"]
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
providing_technologies = none
@@ -827,7 +827,7 @@ version = 1
reference = ["http://www.novetta.com/2015/02/advanced-methods-to-detect-advanced-cyber-attacks-protocol-abuse/"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048", "T1048.003", "T1071.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity"]
support_searches = []
data_models = ["Network_Resolution", "Network_Traffic"]
providing_technologies = none
@@ -843,8 +843,8 @@ version = 1
reference = ["https://www.carbonblack.com/2017/06/28/carbon-black-threat-research-technical-analysis-petya-notpetya-ransomware/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2017/06/27/closing-the-detection-to-mitigation-gap-or-to-petya-or-notpetya-whocares-.html"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 10", "CIS 12", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 6", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.002", "T1036", "T1047", "T1048", "T1053.005", "T1070", "T1070.001", "T1071.001", "T1485", "T1490", "T1547.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "DE.DP", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", "ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK", "ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK"]
data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"]
providing_technologies = none
description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to ransomware--spikes in SMB traffic, suspicious wevtutil usage, the presence of common ransomware extensions, and system processes run from unexpected locations, and many others.
@@ -925,8 +925,8 @@ version = 1
reference = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/an-in-depth-analysis-of-samsam-ransomware-and-boss-spider/", "https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2018/07/31/samsam-the-almost-6-million-ransomware/", "https://thehackernews.com/2018/07/samsam-ransomware-attacks.html"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Batch File Write to System32 - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - File with Samsam Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Samsam Test File Write - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 10", "CIS 12", "CIS 16", "CIS 18", "CIS 2", "CIS 3", "CIS 4", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Delivery", "Installation", "Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001", "T1021.002", "T1082", "T1204.002", "T1485", "T1486", "T1490"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "ID.RA", "PR.AC", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.MA", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Add Prohibited Processes to Enterprise Security"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity"]
support_searches = []
data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic", "Web"]
providing_technologies = none
description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the SamSam ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with SamSam, RDP brute force attacks, the presence of files with SamSam ransomware extensions, suspicious psexec use, and more.
@@ -987,7 +987,7 @@ version = 1
reference = ["https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-11409", "https://www.splunk.com/view/SP-CAAAP5E#VulnerabilityDescriptionsandRatings", "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44865/"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 18"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
support_searches = []
data_models = []
providing_technologies = none
@@ -1006,8 +1006,8 @@ version = 1
reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 12", "CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1535"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP", "ID.AM"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Regions", "ESCU - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User", "ESCU - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Regions", "ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User", "ESCU - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK", "ESCU - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK"]
data_models = []
providing_technologies = none
description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS EC2 instances for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as EC2 instances that originate from unusual locations or those launched by previously unseen users (among others). Included investigative searches will help you probe more deeply, when the information warrants it.
@@ -1023,7 +1023,7 @@ reference = ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integr
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new user AWS Console Login - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1535"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously seen users in CloudTrail", "ESCU - Update previously seen users in CloudTrail"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Update previously seen users in CloudTrail", "ESCU - Previously seen users in CloudTrail"]
data_models = ["Authentication"]
providing_technologies = none
description = Monitor your AWS authentication events using your CloudTrail logs. Searches within this Analytic Story will help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious logins.
@@ -1038,7 +1038,7 @@ version = 2
reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/security-data-protection/cloud/public-aws-s3-buckets-writable/"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect New Open S3 buckets - Rule", "ESCU - Detect S3 access from a new IP - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13", "CIS 14"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1530"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "DE.DP", "PR.AC", "PR.DS"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address", "ESCU - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of S3 Bucket deletion activity by ARN", "ESCU - Previously seen S3 bucket access by remote IP"]
data_models = []
providing_technologies = none
@@ -1056,7 +1056,7 @@ version = 1
reference = ["https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/hiding-cloudcobalt-strike-beacon-c2-using-amazon-apis/"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "nist": ["PR.AC"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of blocked outbound traffic from AWS"]
data_models = []
providing_technologies = none
@@ -1076,7 +1076,7 @@ reference = ["https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-cloudtrail-now-tracks-cr
detection_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by New User - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Users In CloudTrail - Update"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Users In CloudTrail - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail - Initial"]
data_models = ["Authentication"]
providing_technologies = none
description = Monitor your cloud authentication events. Searches within this Analytic Story leverage the recent cloud updates to the Authentication data model to help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious login activity.
@@ -1093,7 +1093,7 @@ reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.p
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP", "ID.AM"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Initial", "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Destroyed", "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Update"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Initial", "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Destroyed", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Update", "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched"]
data_models = ["Change"]
providing_technologies = none
description = Monitor your cloud infrastructure provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your cloud environment.
@@ -1126,7 +1126,7 @@ reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.p
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "DE.DP", "ID.AM", "PR.AC"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Update", "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Security Group API Calls Per User", "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls Per User"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Update", "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls Per User", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Initial", "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Security Group API Calls Per User"]
data_models = ["Change"]
providing_technologies = none
description = Detect and investigate suspicious activities by users and roles in your cloud environments.
@@ -1142,7 +1142,7 @@ version = 2
reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1059", "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/macro-malware", "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036", "T1059.001", "T1059.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments", "ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK"]
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
providing_technologies = none
@@ -1158,7 +1158,7 @@ version = 1
reference = ["http://blogs.splunk.com/2015/10/01/random-words-on-entropy-and-dns/", "http://www.darkreading.com/analytics/security-monitoring/got-malware-three-signs-revealed-in-dns-traffic/d/d-id/1139680", "https://live.paloaltonetworks.com/t5/Threat-Vulnerability-Articles/What-are-suspicious-DNS-queries/ta-p/71454"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003", "T1071.004"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK"]
data_models = ["Network_Resolution"]
providing_technologies = none
@@ -1174,7 +1174,7 @@ version = 1
reference = ["https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/06/26/phishing-hits-a-new-level-of-quality/"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 3", "CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.IP"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender", "ESCU - Get Email Info"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Email Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - DNSTwist Domain Names"]
data_models = ["Email", "UEBA"]
providing_technologies = none
@@ -1210,7 +1210,7 @@ version = 1
reference = ["https://redcanary.com/blog/windows-registry-attacks-threat-detection/", "https://medium.com/@mbromileyDFIR/malware-monday-aebb456356c5", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1170"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect mshta exe running scripts in command-line arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.003", "T1218.005", "T1547.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments", "ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK"]
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
providing_technologies = none
@@ -1228,7 +1228,7 @@ version = 1
reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1078", "https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Credential_stuffing", "https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/answer/What-is-a-password-spraying-attack-and-how-does-it-work"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentails From The Same IP - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Account Lockout Events - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Failed SSO Attempts - Rule", "ESCU - Okta User Logins From Multiple Cities - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by app", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address", "ESCU - Investigate User Activities In Okta"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate User Activities In Okta", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by app", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address"]
support_searches = []
data_models = []
providing_technologies = none
@@ -1246,7 +1246,7 @@ version = 2
reference = ["https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Graeber-Abusing-Windows-Management-Instrumentation-WMI-To-Build-A-Persistent%20Asynchronous-And-Fileless-Backdoor-wp.pdf", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/wmimplant_a_wmi_ba.html"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Process Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - Script Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Temporary Event Subscription - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047"], "nist": ["PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host"]
support_searches = []
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
providing_technologies = none
@@ -1264,7 +1264,7 @@ version = 1
reference = ["https://redcanary.com/blog/windows-registry-attacks-threat-detection/", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1112"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.001", "T1546.011", "T1546.012", "T1547.001", "T1547.010", "T1548.002", "T1564.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
support_searches = []
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
providing_technologies = none
@@ -1299,7 +1299,7 @@ version = 1
reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - EC2 Instance Modified With Previously Unseen User - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Modifications By User"]
data_models = []
providing_technologies = none
@@ -1316,7 +1316,7 @@ version = 2
reference = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/08/monitoring-windows-console-activity-part-two.html", "https://www.splunk.com/pdfs/technical-briefs/advanced-threat-detection-and-response-tech-brief.pdf", "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/logging/detecting-security-incidents-windows-workstation-event-logs-34262"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 2", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1016", "T1036", "T1204.002", "T1218.011"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK"]
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
providing_technologies = none
@@ -1350,7 +1350,7 @@ version = 1
reference = ["https://www.fbi.gov/scams-and-safety/common-fraud-schemes/internet-fraud", "https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2017-internet-crime-report-released-050718"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Web Fraud - Account Harvesting - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Anomalous User Clickspeed - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Password Sharing Across Accounts - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16", "CIS 6"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1136"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "DE.DP"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender", "ESCU - Get Web Session Information via session id"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Web Session Information via session id", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender"]
support_searches = []
data_models = []
providing_technologies = none
@@ -1387,7 +1387,7 @@ version = 1
reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Defense_Evasion"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112", "T1222.001", "T1548.002", "T1564.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
support_searches = []
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
providing_technologies = none
@@ -1403,7 +1403,7 @@ version = 1
reference = ["https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2013/12/file-extensions-2/", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1042"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Execution of File with Multiple Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036.003", "T1546.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
support_searches = []
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
providing_technologies = none
@@ -1423,7 +1423,7 @@ version = 2
reference = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/", "https://zeltser.com/security-incident-log-review-checklist/", "http://journeyintoir.blogspot.com/2013/01/re-introducing-usnjrnl.html"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 10", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070", "T1070.001", "T1490"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "DE.DP", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
support_searches = []
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
providing_technologies = none
@@ -1440,7 +1440,7 @@ version = 2
reference = ["http://www.fuzzysecurity.com/tutorials/19.html", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2010/07/malware-persistence-windows-registry.html", "http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/common-malware-persistence-mechanisms/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/fin7-shim-databases-persistence.html", "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dq2Hv7J9fvk"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005", "T1222.001", "T1543.003", "T1546.011", "T1547.001", "T1547.010", "T1564.001", "T1574.009", "T1574.011"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
support_searches = []
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
providing_technologies = none
@@ -1456,7 +1456,7 @@ version = 2
reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - Child Processes of Spoolsv exe - Rule", "ESCU - Overwriting Accessibility Binaries - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 2", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068", "T1204.002", "T1546.008", "T1546.012"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
support_searches = []
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
providing_technologies = none
@@ -1472,8 +1472,8 @@ version = 3
reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1050", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1031"]
detection_searches = ["ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule"]
mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543.003", "T1569.002", "T1574.011"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial"]
investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update"]
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
providing_technologies = none
description = Windows services are often used by attackers for persistence and the ability to load drivers or otherwise interact with the Windows kernel. This Analytic Story helps you monitor your environment for indications that Windows services are being modified or created in a suspicious manner.
package/default/collections.conf
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
#############
# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security-content
# On Date: 2020-12-09T22:57:13 UTC
# On Date: 2020-12-16T01:47:16 UTC
# Author: Splunk Security Research
# Contact: research@splunk.com
#############
package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_amazon_eks_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip.xml
+1 -1
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@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
<panel>
<table>
<search>
<query>sourcetype="aws:cloudwatchlogs:eks" sourceIPs{}=$src_ip$|rename sourceIPs{} as src_ip | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(user.username) values(requestURI) values(verb) values(userAgent) by source annotations.authorization.k8s.io/decision src_ip</query>
<query>sourcetype="aws:cloudwatchlogs:eks" |rename sourceIPs{} as src_ip |search src_ip=$src_ip$ | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(user.username) values(requestURI) values(verb) values(userAgent) by source annotations.authorization.k8s.io/decision src_ip</query>
</search>
<option name="drilldown">cell</option>
<option name="wrap">false</option>
package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn.xml
+1 -1
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@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
<panel>
<table>
<search>
<query>| search sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail | search user="$user$"| table _time userIdentity.type userIdentity.userName userIdentity.arn aws_account_id src awsRegion eventName eventType</query>
<query>| search sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail | search user=$user$| table _time userIdentity.type userIdentity.userName userIdentity.arn aws_account_id src awsRegion eventName eventType</query>
</search>
<option name="drilldown">cell</option>
<option name="wrap">false</option>
package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id.xml
+1 -1
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@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
<panel>
<table>
<search>
<query>| search sourcetype=aws:description id=$networkAclId$ | table id account_id vpc_id network_acl_entries{}.*</query>
<query>| search sourcetype=aws:description| rename id as networkAclId | search networkAclId=$networkAclId$ | table id account_id vpc_id network_acl_entries{}.*</query>
</search>
<option name="drilldown">cell</option>
<option name="wrap">false</option>
package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_aws_s3_bucket_details_via_bucketname.xml
+1 -1
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@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
<panel>
<table>
<search>
<query>| search sourcetype=aws:config resourceId=$bucketName$ | table resourceCreationTime resourceId awsRegion action aws_account_id supplementaryConfiguration.AccessControlList</query>
<query>| search sourcetype=aws:config | rename resourceId as bucketName |search bucketName=$bucketName$ | table resourceCreationTime bucketName vendor_region action aws_account_id supplementaryConfiguration.AccessControlList</query>
</search>
<option name="drilldown">cell</option>
<option name="wrap">false</option>
package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_gcp_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip.xml
+1 -1
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@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
<panel>
<table>
<search>
<query>sourcetype="google:gcp:pubsub:message" data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp={src_ip} | rename data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp as src_ip | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(data.protoPayload.methodName) as method_names values(data.protoPayload.resourceName) as resource_name values(data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerSuppliedUserAgent) as http_user_agent values(data.protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail) as user values(data.protoPayload.status.message) by src_ip data.resource.labels.cluster_name data.resource.type</query>
<query>sourcetype="google:gcp:pubsub:message" | rename data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp as src_ip | search src_ip =$src_ip$ | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(data.protoPayload.methodName) as method_names values(data.protoPayload.resourceName) as resource_name values(data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerSuppliedUserAgent) as http_user_agent values(data.protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail) as user values(data.protoPayload.status.message) by src_ip data.resource.labels.cluster_name data.resource.type</query>
</search>
<option name="drilldown">cell</option>
<option name="wrap">false</option>
package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio.xml
+1 -1
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@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
<panel>
<table>
<search>
<query>| tstats allow_old_summaries=true sum(All_Traffic.bytes_out) as "bytes_out" sum(All_Traffic.bytes_in) as "bytes_in" from datamodel=Network_Traffic where nodename=All_Traffic All_Traffic.dest_port=53 All_Traffic.src=$src_ip$ All_Traffic.dest=$dest_ip$ | eval ratio = (bytes_out/bytes_in) | table ratio</query>
<query>| tstats allow_old_summaries=true sum(All_Traffic.bytes_out) as "bytes_out" sum(All_Traffic.bytes_in) as "bytes_in" from datamodel=Network_Traffic where nodename=All_Traffic All_Traffic.dest_port=53 by All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest| `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | rename src as src_ip | rename dest as dest_ip | search src_ip=$src_ip$ | search dest_ip = $dest_ip | eval ratio = (bytes_out/bytes_in) | table ratio</query>
</search>
<option name="drilldown">cell</option>
<option name="wrap">false</option>
package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid.xml
+1 -1
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@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
<panel>
<table>
<search>
<query>| search sourcetype="aws:description" source="*:ec2_instances"| dedup id sortby -_time | search id=$instanceId$ | spath output=tags path=tags | eval tags=mvzip(key,value," = "), ip_address=if((ip_address == "null"),private_ip_address,ip_address) | table id, tags.Name, aws_account_id, placement, instance_type, key_name, ip_address, launch_time, state, vpc_id, subnet_id, tags | rename aws_account_id as "Account ID", id as ID, instance_type as Type, ip_address as "IP Address", key_name as "Key Pair", launch_time as "Launch Time", placement as "Availability Zone", state as State, subnet_id as Subnet, "tags.Name" as Name, vpc_id as VPC</query>
<query>| search sourcetype="aws:description" source="*:ec2_instances"| dedup id sortby -_time |rename id as instanceId| search instanceId=$instanceId$ | spath output=tags path=tags | eval tags=mvzip(key,value," = "), ip_address=if((ip_address == "null"),private_ip_address,ip_address) | table id, tags.Name, aws_account_id, placement, instance_type, key_name, ip_address, launch_time, state, vpc_id, subnet_id, tags | rename aws_account_id as "Account ID", id as ID, instance_type as Type, ip_address as "IP Address", key_name as "Key Pair", launch_time as "Launch Time", placement as "Availability Zone", state as State, subnet_id as Subnet, "tags.Name" as Name, vpc_id as VPC</query>
</search>
<option name="drilldown">cell</option>
<option name="wrap">false</option>
package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources.xml
+1 -1
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@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
<panel>
<table>
<search>
<query>|tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(All_Email.dest) as dest values(All_Email.recipient) as recepient min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count from datamodel=Email.All_Email by All_Email.src |`drop_dm_object_name(All_Email)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`</query>
<query>|tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(All_Email.dest) as dest values(All_Email.recipient) as recepient min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count from datamodel=Email.All_Email by All_Email.src |`drop_dm_object_name(All_Email)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search src=$src$</query>
</search>
<option name="drilldown">cell</option>
<option name="wrap">false</option>
package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_notable_history.xml
+1 -1
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@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
<panel>
<table>
<search>
<query>| search `notable` | search dest=$dest$ | table _time, rule_name, owner, priority, severity, status_description</query>
<query>| search `notable` | search dest=$dest$ | table _time, dest, rule_name, owner, priority, severity, status_description</query>
</search>
<option name="drilldown">cell</option>
<option name="wrap">false</option>
package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info.xml
+1 -1
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@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
<panel>
<table>
<search>
<query>| tstats `summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | search parent_process_name= $parent_process_name$ dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`</query>
<query>| tstats `summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | search parent_process_name= $parent_process_name$ |search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`</query>
</search>
<option name="drilldown">cell</option>
<option name="wrap">false</option>
package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_process_file_activity.xml
+1 -1
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@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
<panel>
<table>
<search>
<query>| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Filesystem.file_name) as file_name values(Filesystem.dest) as dest, values(Filesystem.process_name) as process_name from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.process_name Filesystem.file_path, Filesystem.action, _time | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | search dest=$dest$ process_name=$process_name$ sort _time | table _time, process_name, dest, action, file_name, file_path</query>
<query>| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Filesystem.file_name) as file_name values(Filesystem.dest) as dest, values(Filesystem.process_name) as process_name from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.process_name Filesystem.file_path, Filesystem.action, _time | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | search dest=$dest$ | search process_name=$process_name$ | table _time, process_name, dest, action, file_name, file_path</query>
</search>
<option name="drilldown">cell</option>
<option name="wrap">false</option>
package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_process_info.xml
+1 -1
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@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
<panel>
<table>
<search>
<query>| tstats `summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | search process_name= $process_name$ dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`</query>
<query>| tstats `summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | search process_name= $process_name$ | search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`</query>
</search>
<option name="drilldown">cell</option>
<option name="wrap">false</option>
package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity.xml
+1 -1
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@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
<panel>
<table>
<search>
<query>| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.process_name Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |search dest=$dest$| search [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Ports by Ports.process_id Ports.src Ports.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | search dest_port=$dest_port$ | rename src as dest]</query>
<query>| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.process_name Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search dest=$dest$ | join dest type=inner [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Ports by Ports.process_id Ports.src Ports.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | search dest_port=$dest_port$ | rename src as dest]</query>
</search>
<option name="drilldown">cell</option>
<option name="wrap">false</option>
package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic.xml
+1 -1
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@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
<panel>
<table>
<search>
<query>| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Ports where Ports.dest_port=53 by Ports.process_id Ports.src | `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | rename src as dest]</query>
<query>| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search dest = $dest$ | join dest type=inner [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Ports where Ports.dest_port=53 by Ports.process_id Ports.src | `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | rename src as dest]</query>
</search>
<option name="drilldown">cell</option>
<option name="wrap">false</option>
package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_sysmon_wmi_activity_for_host.xml
+1 -1
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@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
<panel>
<table>
<search>
<query>sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode&gt;18 EventCode&lt;22 host=$dest$ | rename host as dest | table _time, dest, user, Name, Operation, EventType, Type, Query, Consumer, Filter</query>
<query>sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode&gt;18 EventCode&lt;22 | rename host as dest | search dest=$dest$| table _time, dest, user, Name, Operation, EventType, Type, Query, Consumer, Filter</query>
</search>
<option name="drilldown">cell</option>
<option name="wrap">false</option>
package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name.xml
+1 -1
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@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
<panel>
<table>
<search>
<query>| search sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail vendor_region=$vendor_region$| rename requestParameters.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId as instanceId| stats values(eventName) by userName instanceId vendor_region</query>
<query>| search sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail vendor_region=$vendor_region$| rename requestParameters.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId as instanceId | stats values(eventName) by user instanceId vendor_region</query>
</search>
<option name="drilldown">cell</option>
<option name="wrap">false</option>
package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_failed_logins_for_multiple_destinations.xml
+1 -1
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@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
<panel>
<table>
<search>
<query>| tstats count `security_content_summariesonly` earliest(_time) as first_login latest(_time) as last_login dc(Authentication.dest) AS distinct_count_dest values(Authentication.dest) AS Authentication.dest values(Authentication.app) AS Authentication.app from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.action=failure by Authentication.user | where distinct_count_dest &gt; 1 | `security_content_ctime(first_login)` | `security_content_ctime(last_login)` | `drop_dm_object_name("Authentication")`</query>
<query>| tstats count `security_content_summariesonly` earliest(_time) as first_login latest(_time) as last_login dc(Authentication.dest) AS distinct_count_dest values(Authentication.dest) AS Authentication.dest values(Authentication.app) AS Authentication.app from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.action=failure by Authentication.user | where distinct_count_dest &gt; 1 | `security_content_ctime(first_login)` | `security_content_ctime(last_login)` | `drop_dm_object_name("Authentication")` | search user=$user$</query>
</search>
<option name="drilldown">cell</option>
<option name="wrap">false</option>
package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_hash_attempts.xml
+1 -1
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@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
<panel>
<table>
<search>
<query>`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4624 Logon_Type=9 AuthenticationPackageName=Negotiate | stats count earliest(_time) as first_login latest(_time) as last_login by src_user dest | `security_content_ctime(first_login)` | `security_content_ctime(last_login)`</query>
<query>`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4624 Logon_Type=9 AuthenticationPackageName=Negotiate | stats count earliest(_time) as first_login latest(_time) as last_login by src_user dest | `security_content_ctime(first_login)` | `security_content_ctime(last_login)` | search dest=$dest$</query>
</search>
<option name="drilldown">cell</option>
<option name="wrap">false</option>
package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_ticket_attempts.xml
+1 -1
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@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
<panel>
<table>
<search>
<query>`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4768 OR EventCode=4769 | rex field=user "(?&lt;new_user&gt;[^\@]+)" | stats count BY new_user, dest, EventCode | stats max(count) AS max_count sum(count) AS sum_count BY new_user, dest | where sum_count/max_count!=2 | rename new_user AS user</query>
<query>`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4768 OR EventCode=4769 | rex field=user "(?&lt;new_user&gt;[^\@]+)" | stats count BY new_user, dest, EventCode | stats max(count) AS max_count sum(count) AS sum_count BY new_user, dest| search dest=$dest$ | where sum_count/max_count!=2 | rename new_user AS user </query>
</search>
<option name="drilldown">cell</option>
<option name="wrap">false</option>
package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_previous_unseen_user.xml
+1 -1
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@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
<panel>
<table>
<search>
<query>| tstats count `security_content_summariesonly` earliest(_time) as first_login latest(_time) as last_login values(Authentication.dest) AS Authentication.dest values(Authentication.app) AS Authentication.app values(Authentication.action) AS Authentication.action from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.action=success by _time, Authentication.user | bucket _time span=30d | stats count min(first_login) as first_login max(last_login) as last_login values(Authentication.dest) AS Authentication.dest by Authentication.user | where count=1 | where first_login &gt;= relative_time(now(), "-30d") | `security_content_ctime(first_login)` | `security_content_ctime(last_login)` | `drop_dm_object_name("Authentication")`</query>
<query>| tstats count `security_content_summariesonly` earliest(_time) as first_login latest(_time) as last_login values(Authentication.dest) AS Authentication.dest values(Authentication.app) AS Authentication.app values(Authentication.action) AS Authentication.action from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.action=success by _time, Authentication.user | bucket _time span=30d | stats count min(first_login) as first_login max(last_login) as last_login values(Authentication.dest) AS Authentication.dest by Authentication.user | where count=1 | where first_login &gt;= relative_time(now(), "-30d") | `security_content_ctime(first_login)` | `security_content_ctime(last_login)` | `drop_dm_object_name("Authentication")` | search dest=$dest$</query>
</search>
<option name="drilldown">cell</option>
<option name="wrap">false</option>
package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications.xml
+1 -1
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@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
<panel>
<table>
<search>
<query>| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature_id=4624 Authentication.app=win:remote by Authentication.src Authentication.dest Authentication.app Authentication.user Authentication.signature Authentication.src_nt_domain | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name("Authentication")`| table firstTime lastTime src src_nt_domain dest user app count | sort count</query>
<query>| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature_id=4624 Authentication.app=win:remote by Authentication.src Authentication.dest Authentication.app Authentication.user Authentication.signature Authentication.src_nt_domain | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name("Authentication")` | search dest=$dest$ | table firstTime lastTime src src_nt_domain dest user app count | sort count</query>
</search>
<option name="drilldown">cell</option>
<option name="wrap">false</option>
package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_suspicious_strings_in_http_header.xml
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
<panel>
<table>
<search>
<query>| search sourcetype=stream:http src_ip="$src_ip$" dest_ip="$dest_ip$" | eval cs_content_type_length = len(cs_content_type) | search cs_content_type_length &gt; 100 | rex field="cs_content_type" (?&lt;suspicious_strings&gt;cmd.exe) | eval suspicious_strings_found=if(match(cs_content_type, "application"), "True", "False") | rename suspicious_strings_found AS "Suspicious Content-Type Found" | fields "Suspicious Content-Type Found", dest_ip, src_ip, suspicious_strings, cs_content_type, cs_content_type_length, url</query>
<query>| search sourcetype=stream:http | search src_ip=$src_ip$ | search dest_ip=$dest_ip$ | eval cs_content_type_length = len(cs_content_type) | search cs_content_type_length &gt; 100 | rex field="cs_content_type" (?&lt;suspicious_strings&gt;cmd.exe) | eval suspicious_strings_found=if(match(cs_content_type, "application"), "True", "False") | rename suspicious_strings_found AS "Suspicious Content-Type Found" | fields "Suspicious Content-Type Found", dest_ip, src_ip, suspicious_strings, cs_content_type, cs_content_type_length, url</query>
</search>
<option name="drilldown">cell</option>
<option name="wrap">false</option>
package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_web_posts_from_src.xml
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
<panel>
<table>
<search>
<query>| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Web.url) as url from datamodel=Web by Web.src,Web.http_user_agent,Web.http_method | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")`| where like(src, "$src$") and like(http_method, "POST")</query>
<query>| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Web.url) as url from datamodel=Web by Web.src,Web.http_user_agent,Web.http_method | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")`| search http_method, "POST" | search src=$src$</query>
</search>
<option name="drilldown">cell</option>
<option name="wrap">false</option>
package/default/es_investigations.conf
+181 -197
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package/default/macros.conf
+2 -2
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
#############
# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security-content
# On Date: 2020-12-09T22:57:13 UTC
# On Date: 2020-12-16T01:47:16 UTC
# Author: Splunk Security Research
# Contact: research@splunk.com
#############
@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ definition = | inputlookup prohibited_apps_launching_cmd | rename prohibited_app
description = This macro outputs a list of process that should not be the parent process of cmd.exe
[prohibited_softwares]
definition = lookup interesting_processes_lookup app as process_name OUTPUT is_prohibited | search is_prohibited=True
definition = lookup prohibited_softwares app as process_name OUTPUT is_prohibited | search is_prohibited=True
description = This macro limits the output to process_names that have been marked as prohibited
[ransomware_extensions]
package/default/savedsearches.conf
+277 -320
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package/default/transforms.conf
+9 -5
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
#############
# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security-content
# On Date: 2020-12-09T22:57:13 UTC
# On Date: 2020-12-16T01:47:16 UTC
# Author: Splunk Security Research
# Contact: research@splunk.com
#############
@@ -192,15 +192,19 @@ external_type = kvstore
# description = A table of users seen doing console logins, and the first and last time that the activity was observed
fields_list = _key, firstTime, lastTime, user, src, City, Region, Country
[prohibitedProcesses_lookup]
filename = prohibited_processes.csv
# description = A list of processes that have been marked as prohibited
[prohibited_apps_launching_cmd]
filename = prohibited_apps_launching_cmd.csv
# description = A list of processes that should not be launching cmd.exe
match_type = WILDCARD(prohibited_applications)
[prohibited_processes]
filename = prohibited_processes.csv
# description = A list of processes that have been marked as prohibited
[prohibited_softwares]
filename = prohibited_softwares.csv
# description = A list of processes that have been marked as prohibited
[ransomware_extensions_lookup]
filename = ransomware_extensions.csv
default_match = false
package/default/use_case_library.conf
+71 -86
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
#############
# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security-content
# On Date: 2020-12-09T22:57:13 UTC
# On Date: 2020-12-16T01:47:16 UTC
# Author: Splunk Security Research
# Contact: research@splunk.com
#############
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-cloudtrail-now-tracks-cross-account-activity-to-its-origin/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - aws detect sts assume role abuse - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect sts get session token abuse - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect attach to role policy - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect permanent key creation - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect role creation - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId"]
searches = ["ESCU - aws detect permanent key creation - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect sts assume role abuse - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect attach to role policy - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect sts get session token abuse - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect role creation - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
description = Track when a user assumes an IAM role in another AWS account to obtain cross-account access to services and resources in that account. Accessing new roles could be an indication of malicious activity.
narrative = Amazon Web Services (AWS) admins manage access to AWS resources and services across the enterprise using AWS's Identity and Access Management (IAM) functionality. IAM provides the ability to create and manage AWS users, groups, and roles-each with their own unique set of privileges and defined access to specific resources (such as EC2 instances, the AWS Management Console, API, or the command-line interface). Unlike conventional (human) users, IAM roles are assumable by anyone in the organization. They provide users with dynamically created temporary security credentials that expire within a set time period.\
Herein lies the rub. In between the time between when the temporary credentials are issued and when they expire is a period of opportunity, where a user could leverage the temporary credentials to wreak havoc-spin up or remove instances, create new users, elevate privileges, and other malicious activities-throughout the environment.\
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId"]
searches = ["ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN"]
description = Monitor your AWS EC2 instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or EC2 instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior.
narrative = Cryptomining is an intentionally difficult, resource-intensive business. Its complexity was designed into the process to ensure that the number of blocks mined each day would remain steady. So, it's par for the course that ambitious, but unscrupulous, miners make amassing the computing power of large enterprises--a practice known as cryptojacking--a top priority. \
Cryptojacking has attracted an increasing amount of media attention since its explosion in popularity in the fall of 2017. The attacks have moved from in-browser exploits and mobile phones to enterprise cloud services, such as Amazon Web Services (AWS). It's difficult to determine exactly how widespread the practice has become, since bad actors continually evolve their ability to escape detection, including employing unlisted endpoints, moderating their CPU usage, and hiding the mining pool's IP address behind a free CDN. \
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ version = 2
references = ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonVPC/latest/UserGuide/VPC_Appendix_NACLs.html", "https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/how-to-help-prepare-for-ddos-attacks-by-reducing-your-attack-surface/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId"]
searches = ["ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN"]
description = Monitor your AWS network infrastructure for bad configurations and malicious activity. Investigative searches help you probe deeper, when the facts warrant it.
narrative = AWS CloudTrail is an AWS service that helps you enable governance, compliance, and operational/risk auditing of your AWS account. Actions taken by a user, role, or an AWS service are recorded as events in CloudTrail. It is crucial for a company to monitor events and actions taken in the AWS Management Console, AWS Command Line Interface, and AWS SDKs and APIs to ensure that your servers are not vulnerable to attacks. This analytic story contains detection searches that leverage CloudTrail logs from AWS to check for bad configurations and malicious activity in your AWS network access controls.
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://aws.amazon.com/security-hub/features/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for User - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details"]
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for User - Rule", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN"]
description = This story is focused around detecting Security Hub alerts generated from AWS
narrative = AWS Security Hub collects and consolidates findings from AWS security services enabled in your environment, such as intrusion detection findings from Amazon GuardDuty, vulnerability scans from Amazon Inspector, S3 bucket policy findings from Amazon Macie, publicly accessible and cross-account resources from IAM Access Analyzer, and resources lacking WAF coverage from AWS Firewall Manager.
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From City", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Region", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Country"]
searches = ["ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From City", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Region", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Country", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest"]
description = Monitor your AWS provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your network.
narrative = Because most enterprise AWS activities originate from familiar geographic locations, monitoring for activity from unknown or unusual regions is an important security measure. This indicator can be especially useful in environments where it is impossible to whitelist specific IPs (because they vary).\
This Analytic Story was designed to provide you with flexibility in the precision you employ in specifying legitimate geographic regions. It can be as specific as an IP address or a city, or as broad as a region (think state) or an entire country. By determining how precise you want your geographical locations to be and monitoring for new locations that haven't previously accessed your environment, you can detect adversaries as they begin to probe your environment. Since there are legitimate reasons for activities from unfamiliar locations, this is not a standalone indicator. Nevertheless, location can be a relevant piece of information that you may wish to investigate further.
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://redlock.io/blog/cryptojacking-tesla"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Detect API activity from users without MFA - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS API Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new API calls from user roles - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Security Group Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field"]
searches = ["ESCU - Detect new API calls from user roles - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS API Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Security Group Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect API activity from users without MFA - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field"]
description = Detect and investigate dormant user accounts for your AWS environment that have become active again. Because inactive and ad-hoc accounts are common attack targets, it's critical to enable governance within your environment.
narrative = It seems obvious that it is critical to monitor and control the users who have access to your cloud infrastructure. Nevertheless, it's all too common for enterprises to lose track of ad-hoc accounts, leaving their servers vulnerable to attack. In fact, this was the very oversight that led to Tesla's cryptojacking attack in February, 2018.\
In addition to compromising the security of your data, when bad actors leverage your compute resources, it can incur monumental costs, since you will be billed for any new EC2 instances and increased bandwidth usage. \
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ version = 1
references = []
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Excessive Account Lockouts From Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Short Lived Windows Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Excessive User Account Lockouts - Rule", "ESCU - Identify New User Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Account Lockouts Enrichment And Response", "ESCU - Get Logon Rights Modifications For User", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Logon Rights Modifications For Endpoint"]
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Excessive User Account Lockouts - Rule", "ESCU - Identify New User Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Excessive Account Lockouts From Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Short Lived Windows Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Get Logon Rights Modifications For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Logon Rights Modifications For User", "ESCU - Excessive Account Lockouts Enrichment And Response"]
description = A common attack technique is to leverage user accounts to gain unauthorized access to the target's network. This Analytic Story minimizes opportunities for attack by helping you actively manage creation/use/dormancy/deletion--the lifecycle of system and application accounts.
narrative = Monitoring user accounts within your enterprise is a critical analytic function that helps ensure that credential and access policies/procedures are properly implemented and are being enforced. Proactive ad-hoc hunting, as well as routine monitoring, can ensure user or system accounts are not being abused by unauthorized individuals or processes. In the event of a network event or breach, user-authentication logs are a key resource in determining if or how an account might have been compromised or co-opted, leading to suspicious or malicious activity.
@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs/blob/v3.2/dev/rules/REQUEST-944-APPLICATION-ATTACK-JAVA.conf"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Unusually Long Content-Type Length - Rule", "ESCU - Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Java Classes - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Investigate Web POSTs From src", "ESCU - Investigate Suspicious Strings in HTTP Header"]
searches = ["ESCU - Unusually Long Content-Type Length - Rule", "ESCU - Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Java Classes - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Web POSTs From src", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Investigate Suspicious Strings in HTTP Header"]
description = Detect and investigate activities--such as unusually long `Content-Type` length, suspicious java classes and web servers executing suspicious processes--consistent with attempts to exploit Apache Struts vulnerabilities.
narrative = In March of 2017, a remote code-execution vulnerability in the Jakarta Multipart parser in Apache Struts, a widely used open-source framework for creating Java web applications, was disclosed and assigned to CVE-2017-5638. About two months later, hackers exploited the flaw to carry out the world's <a href=https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2017/09/07/nations-biggest-hacks-and-data-breaches-millions/644311001/> 5th largest data breach</a>. The target, credit giant Equifax, <a href=https://money.cnn.com/2017/09/16/technology/equifax-breach-security-hole/index.html>told investigators</a> that it had become aware of the vulnerability two months before the attack. \
The exploit involved manipulating the `Content-Type HTTP` header to execute commands embedded in the header.\
@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/inventory-of-authorized-and-unauthorized-devices/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address - Rule", "ESCU - Get First Occurrence and Last Occurrence of a MAC Address", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get First Occurrence and Last Occurrence of a MAC Address"]
description = Keep a careful inventory of every asset on your network to make it easier to detect rogue devices. Unauthorized/unmanaged devices could be an indication of malicious behavior that should be investigated further.
narrative = This Analytic Story is designed to help you develop a better understanding of what authorized and unauthorized devices are part of your enterprise. This story can help you better categorize and classify assets, providing critical business context and awareness of their assets during an incident. Information derived from this Analytic Story can be used to better inform and support other analytic stories. For successful detection, you will need to leverage the Assets and Identity Framework from Enterprise Security to populate your known assets.
@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://www.zerofox.com/blog/what-is-digital-risk-monitoring/", "https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/consumer/family-safety/what-is-typosquatting/", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2016/06/explained-typosquatting/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Email Info"]
searches = ["ESCU - Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Email Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender"]
description = Detect and investigate activity that may indicate that an adversary is using faux domains to mislead users into interacting with malicious infrastructure. Monitor DNS, email, and web traffic for permutations of your brand name.
narrative = While you can educate your users and customers about the risks and threats posed by typosquatting, phishing, and corporate espionage, human error is a persistent fact of life. Of course, your adversaries are all too aware of this reality and will happily leverage it for nefarious purposes whenever possible&#51;phishing with lookalike addresses, embedding faux command-and-control domains in malware, and hosting malicious content on domains that closely mimic your corporate servers. This is where brand monitoring comes in.\
You can use our adaptation of `DNSTwist`, together with the support searches in this Analytic Story, to generate permutations of specified brands and external domains. Splunk can monitor email, DNS requests, and web traffic for these permutations and provide you with early warnings and situational awareness--powerful elements of an effective defense.\
@@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId"]
searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest"]
description = Monitor your cloud compute instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or compute instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior.
narrative = Cryptomining is an intentionally difficult, resource-intensive business. Its complexity was designed into the process to ensure that the number of blocks mined each day would remain steady. So, it's par for the course that ambitious, but unscrupulous, miners make amassing the computing power of large enterprises--a practice known as cryptojacking--a top priority. \
Cryptojacking has attracted an increasing amount of media attention since its explosion in popularity in the fall of 2017. The attacks have moved from in-browser exploits and mobile phones to enterprise cloud services, such as Amazon Web Services (AWS), Google Cloud Platform (GCP), and Azure. It's difficult to determine exactly how widespread the practice has become, since bad actors continually evolve their ability to escape detection, including employing unlisted endpoints, moderating their CPU usage, and hiding the mining pool's IP address behind a free CDN. \
@@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://www.intego.com/mac-security-blog/osxcoldroot-and-the-rat-invasion/", "https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x2A.html", "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/coldroot-rat-still-undetectable-despite-being-uploaded-on-github-two-years-ago/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Jose Hernandez"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection - Rule", "ESCU - Processes Tapping Keyboard Events - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip"]
searches = ["ESCU - Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection - Rule", "ESCU - Processes Tapping Keyboard Events - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that relate to the ColdRoot Remote Access Trojan that affects MacOS. An example of some of these activities are changing sensative binaries in the MacOS sub-system, detecting process names and executables associated with the RAT, detecting when a keyboard tab is installed on a MacOS machine and more.
narrative = Conventional wisdom holds that Apple's MacOS operating system is significantly less vulnerable to attack than Windows machines. While that point is debatable, it is true that attacks against MacOS systems are much less common. However, this fact does not mean that Macs are impervious to breaches. To the contrary, research has shown that that Mac malware is increasing at an alarming rate. According to AV-test, in 2018, there were 86,865 new MacOS malware variants, up from 27,338 the year before&#151;a 31% increase. In contrast, the independent research firm found that new Windows malware had increased from 65.17M to 76.86M during that same period, less than half the rate of growth. The bottom line is that while the numbers look a lot smaller than Windows, it's definitely time to take Mac security more seriously.\
This Analytic Story addresses the ColdRoot remote access trojan (RAT), which was uploaded to Github in 2016, but was still escaping detection by the first quarter of 2018, when a new, more feature-rich variant was discovered masquerading as an Apple audio driver. Among other capabilities, the Pascal-based ColdRoot can heist passwords from users' keychains and remotely control infected machines without detection. In the initial report of his findings, Patrick Wardle, Chief Research Officer for Digita Security, explained that the new ColdRoot RAT could start and kill processes on the breached system, spawn new remote-desktop sessions, take screen captures and assemble them into a live stream of the victim's desktop, and more.\
@@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Collection", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1074"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin - Rule", "ESCU - Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server - Rule", "ESCU - Email files written outside of the Outlook directory - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious writes to System Volume Information - Rule", "ESCU - Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info"]
searches = ["ESCU - Email files written outside of the Outlook directory - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious writes to System Volume Information - Rule", "ESCU - Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server - Rule", "ESCU - Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
description = Monitor for and investigate activities--such as suspicious writes to the Windows Recycling Bin or email servers sending high amounts of traffic to specific hosts, for example--that may indicate that an adversary is harvesting and exfiltrating sensitive data.
narrative = A common adversary goal is to identify and exfiltrate data of value from a target organization. This data may include email conversations and addresses, confidential company information, links to network design/infrastructure, important dates, and so on.\
Attacks are composed of three activities: identification, collection, and staging data for exfiltration. Identification typically involves scanning systems and observing user activity. Collection can involve the transfer of large amounts of data from various repositories. Staging/preparation includes moving data to a central location and compressing (and optionally encoding and/or encrypting) it. All of these activities provide opportunities for defenders to identify their presence. \
@@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Command_and_Control", "https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/feature/Command-and-control-servers-The-puppet-masters-that-govern-malware"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId"]
searches = ["ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN"]
description = Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures leveraged by attackers to establish and operate command and control channels. Implants installed by attackers on compromised endpoints use these channels to receive instructions and send data back to the malicious operators.
narrative = Threat actors typically architect and implement an infrastructure to use in various ways during the course of their attack campaigns. In some cases, they leverage this infrastructure for scanning and performing reconnaissance activities. In others, they may use this infrastructure to launch actual attacks. One of the most important functions of this infrastructure is to establish servers that will communicate with implants on compromised endpoints. These servers establish a command and control channel that is used to proxy data between the compromised endpoint and the attacker. These channels relay commands from the attacker to the compromised endpoint and the output of those commands back to the attacker.\
Because this communication is so critical for an adversary, they often use techniques designed to hide the true nature of the communications. There are many different techniques used to establish and communicate over these channels. This Analytic Story provides searches that look for a variety of the techniques used for these channels, as well as indications that these channels are active, by examining logs associated with border control devices and network-access control lists.
@@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://github.com/splunk/cloud-datamodel-security-research"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - New container uploaded to AWS ECR - Rule", "ESCU - GCP GCR container uploaded - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate AWS ECR container listing activity"]
searches = ["ESCU - New container uploaded to AWS ECR - Rule", "ESCU - GCP GCR container uploaded - Rule"]
description = Use the searches in this story to monitor your Kubernetes registry repositories for upload, and deployment of potentially vulnerable, backdoor, or implanted containers. These searches provide information on source users, destination path, container names and repository names. The searches provide context to address Mitre T1525 which refers to container implantation upload to a company's repository either in Amazon Elastic Container Registry, Google Container Registry and Azure Container Registry.
narrative = Container Registrys provide a way for organizations to keep customized images of their development and infrastructure environment in private. However if these repositories are misconfigured or priviledge users credentials are compromise, attackers can potentially upload implanted containers which can be deployed across the organization. These searches allow operator to monitor who, when and what was uploaded to container registry.
@@ -223,7 +223,7 @@ version = 3
references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1003", "https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for.html"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell - Rule", "ESCU - Create Remote Thread into LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts", "ESCU - Investigate Previous Unseen User", "ESCU - Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts"]
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Create Remote Thread into LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts", "ESCU - Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts", "ESCU - Investigate Previous Unseen User"]
description = Uncover activity consistent with credential dumping, a technique wherein attackers compromise systems and attempt to obtain and exfiltrate passwords. The threat actors use these pilfered credentials to further escalate privileges and spread throughout a target environment. The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify attempts to credential dumping.
narrative = Credential dumping&#151;gathering credentials from a target system, often hashed or encrypted&#151;is a common attack technique. Even though the credentials may not be in plain text, an attacker can still exfiltrate the data and set to cracking it offline, on their own systems. The threat actors target a variety of sources to extract them, including the Security Accounts Manager (SAM), Local Security Authority (LSA), NTDS from Domain Controllers, or the Group Policy Preference (GPP) files.\
Once attackers obtain valid credentials, they use them to move throughout a target network with ease, discovering new systems and identifying assets of interest. Credentials obtained in this manner typically include those of privileged users, which may provide access to more sensitive information and system operations.\
@@ -236,7 +236,7 @@ version = 2
references = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Name Used by Dragonfly Threat Actors - Rule", "ESCU - Single Letter Process On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule", "ESCU - Create local admin accounts using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Process File Activity", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
searches = ["ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Name Used by Dragonfly Threat Actors - Rule", "ESCU - Create local admin accounts using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule", "ESCU - Single Letter Process On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process File Activity", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity"]
description = Monitor for suspicious activities associated with DHS Technical Alert US-CERT TA18-074A. Some of the activities that adversaries used in these compromises included spearfishing attacks, malware, watering-hole domains, many and more.
narrative = The frequency of nation-state cyber attacks has increased significantly over the last decade. Employing numerous tactics and techniques, these attacks continue to escalate in complexity. \
There is a wide range of motivations for these state-sponsored hacks, including stealing valuable corporate, military, or diplomatic data&#1151;all of which could confer advantages in various arenas. They may also target critical infrastructure. \
@@ -262,7 +262,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/", "http://www.noip.com/blog/2014/07/11/dynamic-dns-can-use-2/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/08/04/detecting-dynamic-dns-domains-in-splunk.html"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - DNS record changed - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Hijack Enrichment", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host"]
searches = ["ESCU - DNS record changed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - DNS Hijack Enrichment"]
description = Secure your environment against DNS hijacks with searches that help you detect and investigate unauthorized changes to DNS records.
narrative = Dubbed the Achilles heel of the Internet (see https://www.f5.com/labs/articles/threat-intelligence/dns-is-still-the-achilles-heel-of-the-internet-25613), DNS plays a critical role in routing web traffic but is notoriously vulnerable to attack. One reason is its distributed nature. It relies on unstructured connections between millions of clients and servers over inherently insecure protocols.\
The gravity and extent of the importance of securing DNS from attacks is undeniable. The fallout of compromised DNS can be disastrous. Not only can hackers bring down an entire business, they can intercept confidential information, emails, and login credentials, as well. \
@@ -292,7 +292,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/data-protection/", "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/dns/splunk-detect-dns-tunneling-37022", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Detect USB device insertion - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio"]
searches = ["ESCU - Detect USB device insertion - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
description = Fortify your data-protection arsenal--while continuing to ensure data confidentiality and integrity--with searches that monitor for and help you investigate possible signs of data exfiltration.
narrative = Attackers can leverage a variety of resources to compromise or exfiltrate enterprise data. Common exfiltration techniques include remote-access channels via low-risk, high-payoff active-collections operations and close-access operations using insiders and removable media. While this Analytic Story is not a comprehensive listing of all the methods by which attackers can exfiltrate data, it provides a useful starting point.
@@ -303,7 +303,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1003", "https://github.com/SecuraBV/CVE-2020-1472", "https://www.secura.com/blog/zero-logon", "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-1472"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Jose Hernandez, Stan Miskowicz, David Dorsey, Shannon Davis Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Zerologon via Zeek - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Computer Changed with Anonymous Account - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Computer Changed with Anonymous Account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Zerologon via Zeek - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
description = Uncover activity related to the execution of Zerologon CVE-2020-11472, a technique wherein attackers target a Microsoft Windows Domain Controller to reset its computer account password. The result from this attack is attackers can now provide themselves high privileges and take over Domain Controller. The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify attempts to reset Domain Controller Computer Account via exploit code remotely or via the use of tool Mimikatz as payload carrier.
narrative = This attack is a privilege escalation technique, where attacker targets a Netlogon secure channel connection to a domain controller, using Netlogon Remote Protocol (MS-NRPC). This vulnerability exposes vulnerable Windows Domain Controllers to be targeted via unaunthenticated RPC calls which eventually reset Domain Contoller computer account ($) providing the attacker the opportunity to exfil domain controller credential secrets and assign themselve high privileges that can lead to domain controller and potentially complete network takeover. The detection searches in this Analytic Story use Windows Event viewer events and Sysmon events to detect attack execution, these searches monitor access to the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process which is an indicator of the use of Mimikatz tool which has bee updated to carry this attack payload.
@@ -314,7 +314,7 @@ version = 2
references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1089", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2015/11/vonteera-adware-uses-certificates-to-disable-anti-malware/", "https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Tools-Report.pdf"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Unload Sysmon Filter Driver - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info"]
searches = ["ESCU - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store - Rule", "ESCU - Unload Sysmon Filter Driver - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
description = Looks for activities and techniques associated with the disabling of security tools on a Windows system, such as suspicious `reg.exe` processes, processes launching netsh, and many others.
narrative = Attackers employ a variety of tactics in order to avoid detection and operate without barriers. This often involves modifying the configuration of security tools to get around them or explicitly disabling them to prevent them from running. This Analytic Story includes searches that look for activity consistent with attackers attempting to disable various security mechanisms. Such activity may involve monitoring for suspicious registry activity, as this is where much of the configuration for Windows and various other programs reside, or explicitly attempting to shut down security-related services. Other times, attackers attempt various tricks to prevent specific programs from running, such as adding the certificates with which the security tools are signed to a blacklist (which would prevent them from running).
@@ -325,7 +325,7 @@ version = 2
references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/", "http://www.noip.com/blog/2014/07/11/dynamic-dns-can-use-2/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/08/04/detecting-dynamic-dns-domains-in-splunk.html"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host"]
searches = ["ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic"]
description = Detect and investigate hosts in your environment that may be communicating with dynamic domain providers. Attackers may leverage these services to help them avoid firewall blocks and blacklists.
narrative = Dynamic DNS services (DDNS) are legitimate low-cost or free services that allow users to rapidly update domain resolutions to IP infrastructure. While their usage can be benign, malicious actors can abuse DDNS to host harmful payloads or interactive-command-and-control infrastructure. These attackers will manually update or automate domain resolution changes by routing dynamic domains to IP addresses that circumvent firewall blocks and blacklists and frustrate a network defender's analytic and investigative processes. These searches will look for DNS queries made from within your infrastructure to suspicious dynamic domains and then investigate more deeply, when appropriate. While this list of top-level dynamic domains is not exhaustive, it can be dynamically updated as new suspicious dynamic domains are identified.
@@ -336,7 +336,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-201A", "https://www.first.org/resources/papers/conf2017/Advanced-Incident-Detection-and-Threat-Hunting-using-Sysmon-and-Splunk.pdf", "https://www.vkremez.com/2017/05/emotet-banking-trojan-malware-analysis.html"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources"]
searches = ["ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity"]
description = Detect rarely used executables, specific registry paths that may confer malware survivability and persistence, instances where cmd.exe is used to launch script interpreters, and other indicators that the Emotet financial malware has compromised your environment.
narrative = The trojan downloader known as Emotet first surfaced in 2014, when it was discovered targeting the banking industry to steal credentials. However, according to a joint technical alert (TA) issued by three government agencies (https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-201A), Emotet has evolved far beyond those beginnings to become what a ThreatPost article called a threat-delivery service(see https://threatpost.com/emotet-malware-evolves-beyond-banking-to-threat-delivery-service/134342/). For example, in early 2018, Emotet was found to be using its loader function to spread the Quakbot and Ransomware variants. \
According to the TA, the the malware continues to be among the most costly and destructive malware affecting the private and public sectors. Researchers have linked it to the threat group Mealybug, which has also been on the security communitys radar since 2014.\
@@ -360,7 +360,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/understanding-service-accounts"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - gcp detect oauth token abuse - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Detect gcploit framework - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Detect accounts with high risk roles by project - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Detect high risk permissions by resource and account - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
searches = ["ESCU - GCP Detect gcploit framework - Rule", "ESCU - gcp detect oauth token abuse - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Detect accounts with high risk roles by project - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Detect high risk permissions by resource and account - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
description = Track when a user assumes an IAM role in another GCP account to obtain cross-account access to services and resources in that account. Accessing new roles could be an indication of malicious activity.
narrative = Google Cloud Platform (GCP) admins manage access to GCP resources and services across the enterprise using GCP Identity and Access Management (IAM) functionality. IAM provides the ability to create and manage GCP users, groups, and roles-each with their own unique set of privileges and defined access to specific resources (such as Compute instances, the GCP Management Console, API, or the command-line interface). Unlike conventional (human) users, IAM roles are potentially assumable by anyone in the organization. They provide users with dynamically created temporary security credentials that expire within a set time period.\
In between the time between when the temporary credentials are issued and when they expire is a period of opportunity, where a user could leverage the temporary credentials to wreak havoc-spin up or remove instances, create new users, elevate privileges, and other malicious activities-throughout the environment.\
@@ -373,7 +373,7 @@ version = 2
references = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/HIDDEN-COBRA-North-Korean-Malicious-Cyber-Activity", "https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Destructive-Malware-Report.pdf"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious File Write - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Get Outbound Emails to Hidden Cobra Threat Actors", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources"]
searches = ["ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious File Write - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Outbound Emails to Hidden Cobra Threat Actors", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity"]
description = Monitor for and investigate activities, including the creation or deletion of hidden shares and file writes, that may be evidence of infiltration by North Korean government-sponsored cybercriminals. Details of this activity were reported in DHS Report TA-18-149A.
narrative = North Korea's government-sponsored "cyber army" has been slowly building momentum and gaining sophistication over the last 15 years or so. As a result, the group's activity, which the US government refers to as "Hidden Cobra," has surreptitiously crept onto the collective radar as a preeminent global threat.\
These state-sponsored actors are thought to be responsible for everything from a hack on a South Korean nuclear plant to an attack on Sony in anticipation of its release of the movie "The Interview" at the end of 2014. They're also notorious for cyberespionage. In recent years, the group seems to be focused on financial crimes, such as cryptojacking.\
@@ -387,7 +387,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2016/09/hosts-file-hijacks/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Windows hosts file modification - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host"]
searches = ["ESCU - Windows hosts file modification - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
description = Detect evidence of tactics used to redirect traffic from a host to a destination other than the one intended--potentially one that is part of an adversary's attack infrastructure. An example is redirecting communications regarding patches and updates or misleading users into visiting a malicious website.
narrative = Attackers will often attempt to manipulate client communications for nefarious purposes. In some cases, an attacker may endeavor to modify a local host file to redirect communications with resources (such as antivirus or system-update services) to prevent clients from receiving patches or updates. In other cases, an attacker might use this tactic to have the client connect to a site that looks like the intended site, but instead installs malware or collects information from the victim. Additionally, an attacker may redirect a victim in order to execute a MITM attack and observe communications.
@@ -398,7 +398,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["http://www.deependresearch.org/2016/04/jboss-exploits-view-from-victim.html"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
searches = ["ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
description = In March of 2016, adversaries were seen using JexBoss--an open-source utility used for testing and exploiting JBoss application servers. These searches help detect evidence of these attacks, such as network connections to external resources or web services spawning atypical child processes, among others.
narrative = This Analytic Story looks for probing and exploitation attempts targeting JBoss application servers. While the vulnerabilities associated with this story are rather dated, they were leveraged in a spring 2016 campaign in connection with the Samsam ransomware variant. Incidents involving this ransomware are unique, in that they begin with attacks against vulnerable services, rather than the phishing or drive-by attacks more common with ransomware. In this case, vulnerable JBoss applications appear to be the target of choice.\
It is helpful to understand how often a notable event generated by this story occurs, as well as the commonalities between some of these events, both of which may provide clues about whether this is a common occurrence of minimal concern or a rare event that may require more extensive investigation. It may also help to understand whether the issue is restricted to a single user/system or whether it is broader in scope.\
@@ -423,7 +423,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://github.com/splunk/cloud-datamodel-security-research"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
searches = ["ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip"]
description = This story addresses detection against Kubernetes cluster fingerprint scan and attack by providing information on items such as source ip, user agent, cluster names.
narrative = Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration platform contains sensitve information and management priviledges of production workloads, microservices and applications. These searches allow operator to detect suspicious unauthenticated requests from the internet to kubernetes cluster.
@@ -434,7 +434,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/approaching-kubernetes-security-detecting-kubernetes-scan-with-splunk.html"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
searches = ["ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
description = This story addresses detection and response of accounts acccesing Kubernetes cluster sensitive objects such as configmaps or secrets providing information on items such as user user, group. object, namespace and authorization reason.
narrative = Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration platform contains sensitive objects within its architecture, specifically configmaps and secrets, if accessed by an attacker can lead to further compromise. These searches allow operator to detect suspicious requests against Kubernetes sensitive objects.
@@ -445,7 +445,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/approaching-kubernetes-security-detecting-kubernetes-scan-with-splunk.html"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect RBAC authorizations by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect most active service accounts by pod namespace - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
searches = ["ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect most active service accounts by pod namespace - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect RBAC authorizations by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
description = This story addresses detection and response around Sensitive Role usage within a Kubernetes clusters against cluster resources and namespaces.
narrative = Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration platform contains sensitive roles within its architecture, specifically configmaps and secrets, if accessed by an attacker can lead to further compromise. These searches allow operator to detect suspicious requests against Kubernetes role activities
@@ -456,7 +456,7 @@ version = 2
references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/executive-perspective/2015/08/malware_lateral_move.html"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources"]
searches = ["ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ESCU - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity"]
description = Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures around how attackers move laterally within the enterprise. Because lateral movement can expose the adversary to detection, it should be an important focus for security analysts.
narrative = Once attackers gain a foothold within an enterprise, they will seek to expand their accesses and leverage techniques that facilitate lateral movement. Attackers will often spend quite a bit of time and effort moving laterally. Because lateral movement renders an attacker the most vulnerable to detection, it's an excellent focus for detection and investigation.\
Indications of lateral movement can include the abuse of system utilities (such as `psexec.exe`), unauthorized use of remote desktop services, `file/admin$` shares, WMI, PowerShell, pass-the-hash, or the abuse of scheduled tasks. Organizations must be extra vigilant in detecting lateral movement techniques and look for suspicious activity in and around high-value strategic network assets, such as Active Directory, which are often considered the primary target or "crown jewels" to a persistent threat actor.\
@@ -471,7 +471,7 @@ version = 4
references = ["https://blogs.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/malware-employs-powershell-to-infect-systems/", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Multiple Suspicious Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info"]
searches = ["ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Multiple Suspicious Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
description = Attackers are finding stealthy ways "live off the land," leveraging utilities and tools that come standard on the endpoint--such as PowerShell--to achieve their goals without downloading binary files. These searches can help you detect and investigate PowerShell command-line options that may be indicative of malicious intent.
narrative = The searches in this Analytic Story monitor for parameters often used for malicious purposes. It is helpful to understand how often the notable events generated by this story occur, as well as the commonalities between some of these events. These factors may provide clues about whether this is a common occurrence of minimal concern or a rare event that may require more extensive investigation. Likewise, it is important to determine whether the issue is restricted to a single user/system or is broader in scope.\
The following factors may assist you in determining whether the event is malicious: \
@@ -491,7 +491,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/03/04/tracking-locky-ransomware-using-carbon-black/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Unsuccessful Netbackup backups - Rule", "ESCU - Extended Period Without Successful Netbackup Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - All backup logs for host"]
searches = ["ESCU - Extended Period Without Successful Netbackup Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Unsuccessful Netbackup backups - Rule", "ESCU - All backup logs for host", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
description = Address common concerns when monitoring your backup processes. These searches can help you reduce risks from ransomware, device theft, or denial of physical access to a host by backing up data on endpoints.
narrative = Having backups is a standard best practice that helps ensure continuity of business operations. Having mature backup processes can also help you reduce the risks of many security-related incidents and streamline your response processes. The detection searches in this Analytic Story will help you identify systems that have backup failures, as well as systems that have not been backed up for an extended period of time. The story will also return the notable event history and all of the backup logs for an endpoint.
@@ -502,7 +502,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info"]
searches = ["ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
description = Identify and investigate prohibited/unauthorized software or processes that may be concealing malicious behavior within your environment.
narrative = It is critical to identify unauthorized software and processes running on enterprise endpoints and determine whether they are likely to be malicious. This Analytic Story requires the user to populate the Interesting Processes table within Enterprise Security with prohibited processes. An included support search will augment this data, adding information on processes thought to be malicious. This search requires data from endpoint detection-and-response solutions, endpoint data sources (such as Sysmon), or Windows Event Logs--assuming that the Active Directory administrator has enabled process tracking within the System Event Audit Logs.\
It is important to investigate any software identified as suspicious, in order to understand how it was installed or executed. Analyzing authentication logs or any historic notable events might elicit additional investigative leads of interest. For best results, schedule the search to run every two weeks.
@@ -527,7 +527,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/tn-archive/bb490939(v=technet.10)", "https://htmlpreview.github.io/?https://github.com/MatthewDemaske/blogbackup/blob/master/netshell.html", "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Processes created by netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info"]
searches = ["ESCU - Processes created by netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
description = Detect activities and various techniques associated with the abuse of `netsh.exe`, which can disable local firewall settings or set up a remote connection to a host from an infected system.
narrative = It is a common practice for attackers of all types to leverage native Windows tools and functionality to execute commands for malicious reasons. One such tool on Windows OS is `netsh.exe`,a command-line scripting utility that allows you to--either locally or remotely--display or modify the network configuration of a computer that is currently running. `Netsh.exe` can be used to discover and disable local firewall settings. It can also be used to set up a remote connection to a host from an infected system.\
To get started, run the detection search to identify parent processes of `netsh.exe`.
@@ -539,7 +539,7 @@ version = 2
references = ["https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/orangeworm-targets-healthcare-us-europe-asia", "https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/healthcare-targeted-by-hacker/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info"]
searches = ["ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
description = Detect activities and various techniques associated with the Orangeworm Attack Group, a group that frequently targets the healthcare industry.
narrative = In May of 2018, the attack group Orangeworm was implicated for installing a custom backdoor called Trojan.Kwampirs within large international healthcare corporations in the United States, Europe, and Asia. This malware provides the attackers with remote access to the target system, decrypting and extracting a copy of its main DLL payload from its resource section. Before writing the payload to disk, it inserts a randomly generated string into the middle of the decrypted payload in an attempt to evade hash-based detections.\
Awareness of the Orangeworm group first surfaced in January, 2015. It has conducted targeted attacks against related industries, as well, such as pharmaceuticals and healthcare IT solution providers.\
@@ -572,7 +572,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/scope-of-mudcarp-attacks-highlight-1/", "http://blog.amossys.fr/badflick-is-not-so-bad.html"]
maintainers = [{"company": "iDefense", "email": "-", "name": "iDefense Cyber Espionage Team"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info"]
searches = ["ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
description = Monitor your environment for suspicious behaviors that resemble the techniques employed by the MUDCARP threat group.
narrative = This story was created as a joint effort between iDefense and Splunk.\
iDefense analysts have recently discovered a Windows executable file that, upon execution, spoofs a decryption tool and then drops a file that appears to be the custom-built javascript backdoor, "Orz," which is associated with the threat actors known as MUDCARP (as well as "temp.Periscope" and "Leviathan"). The file is executed using Wscript.\
@@ -610,7 +610,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["http://www.novetta.com/2015/02/advanced-methods-to-detect-advanced-cyber-attacks-protocol-abuse/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
searches = ["ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity"]
description = Detect instances of prohibited network traffic allowed in the environment, as well as protocols running on non-standard ports. Both of these types of behaviors typically violate policy and can be leveraged by attackers.
narrative = A traditional security best practice is to control the ports, protocols, and services allowed within your environment. By limiting the services and protocols to those explicitly approved by policy, administrators can minimize the attack surface. The combined effect allows both network defenders and security controls to focus and not be mired in superfluous traffic or data types. Looking for deviations to policy can identify attacker activity that abuses services and protocols to run on alternate or non-standard ports in the attempt to avoid detection or frustrate forensic analysts.
@@ -621,7 +621,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://www.carbonblack.com/2017/06/28/carbon-black-threat-research-technical-analysis-petya-notpetya-ransomware/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2017/06/27/closing-the-detection-to-mitigation-gap-or-to-petya-or-notpetya-whocares-.html"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources"]
searches = ["ESCU - Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity"]
description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to ransomware--spikes in SMB traffic, suspicious wevtutil usage, the presence of common ransomware extensions, and system processes run from unexpected locations, and many others.
narrative = Ransomware is an ever-present risk to the enterprise, wherein an infected host encrypts business-critical data, holding it hostage until the victim pays the attacker a ransom. There are many types and varieties of ransomware that can affect an enterprise. Attackers can deploy ransomware to enterprises through spearphishing campaigns and driveby downloads, as well as through traditional remote service-based exploitation. In the case of the WannaCry campaign, there was self-propagating wormable functionality that was used to maximize infection. Fortunately, organizations can apply several techniques--such as those in this Analytic Story--to detect and or mitigate the effects of ransomware.
@@ -632,7 +632,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/s3-ransomware-part-1-attack-vector/", "https://github.com/d1vious/git-wild-hunt", "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PgzNib37g0M"]
maintainers = [{"company": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - AWS Detect Users creating keys with encrypt policy without MFA - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Detect Users with KMS keys performing encryption S3 - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
searches = ["ESCU - AWS Detect Users with KMS keys performing encryption S3 - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Detect Users creating keys with encrypt policy without MFA - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to ransomware. These searches include cloud related objects that may be targeted by malicious actors via cloud providers own encryption features.
narrative = Ransomware is an ever-present risk to the enterprise, wherein an infected host encrypts business-critical data, holding it hostage until the victim pays the attacker a ransom. There are many types and varieties of ransomware that can affect an enterprise.Cloud ransomware can be deployed by obtaining high privilege credentials from targeted users or resources.
@@ -643,7 +643,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/executive-perspective/2015/09/the_new_route_toper.html", "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/about/security-center/event-response/synful-knock.html"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Port Security Violation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rogue DHCP Server - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Login Attempts to Routers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Software Download To Network Device - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Traffic Mirroring - Rule", "ESCU - Detect ARP Poisoning - Rule", "ESCU - Detect IPv6 Network Infrastructure Threats - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Port Security Violation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Login Attempts to Routers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect IPv6 Network Infrastructure Threats - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rogue DHCP Server - Rule", "ESCU - Detect ARP Poisoning - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Traffic Mirroring - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Software Download To Network Device - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
description = Validate the security configuration of network infrastructure and verify that only authorized users and systems are accessing critical assets. Core routing and switching infrastructure are common strategic targets for attackers.
narrative = Networking devices, such as routers and switches, are often overlooked as resources that attackers will leverage to subvert an enterprise. Advanced threats actors have shown a proclivity to target these critical assets as a means to siphon and redirect network traffic, flash backdoored operating systems, and implement cryptographic weakened algorithms to more easily decrypt network traffic.\
This Analytic Story helps you gain a better understanding of how your network devices are interacting with your hosts. By compromising your network devices, attackers can obtain direct access to the company's internal infrastructure&#151; effectively increasing the attack surface and accessing private services/data.
@@ -655,7 +655,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/detecting-ryuk-using-splunk-attack-range.html", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/big-game-hunting-with-ryuk-another-lucrative-targeted-ransomware/", "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-302a"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Jose Hernandez"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Ryuk Test Files Detected - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Windows connhost exe started forcefully - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Security Account Manager Stopped - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
searches = ["ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Ryuk Test Files Detected - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - Windows connhost exe started forcefully - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Security Account Manager Stopped - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the Ryuk ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with Ryuk, Stopping Security Access Manager, DisableAntiSpyware registry key modification, suspicious psexec use, and more.
narrative = Cybersecurity Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) released Alert (AA20-302A) on October 28th called “Ransomware Activity Targeting the Healthcare and Public Health Sector.” This alert details TTPs associated with ongoing and possible imminent attacks against the Healthcare sector, and is a joint advisory in coordination with other U.S. Government agencies. The objective of these malicious campaigns is to infiltrate targets in named sectors and to drop ransomware payloads, which will likely cause disruption of service and increase risk of actual harm to the health and safety of patients at hospitals, even with the aggravant of an ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. This document specifically refers to several crimeware exploitation frameworks, emphasizing the use of Ryuk ransomware as payload. The Ryuk ransomware payload is not new. It has been well documented and identified in multiple variants. Payloads need a carrier, and for Ryuk it has often been exploitation frameworks such as Cobalt Strike, or popular crimeware frameworks such as Emotet or Trickbot.
@@ -678,7 +678,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/an-in-depth-analysis-of-samsam-ransomware-and-boss-spider/", "https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2018/07/31/samsam-the-almost-6-million-ransomware/", "https://thehackernews.com/2018/07/samsam-ransomware-attacks.html"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Batch File Write to System32 - Rule", "ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Samsam Test File Write - Rule", "ESCU - File with Samsam Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources"]
searches = ["ESCU - Batch File Write to System32 - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Samsam Test File Write - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - File with Samsam Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity"]
description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the SamSam ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with SamSam, RDP brute force attacks, the presence of files with SamSam ransomware extensions, suspicious psexec use, and more.
narrative = The first version of the SamSam ransomware (a.k.a. Samas or SamsamCrypt) was launched in 2015 by a group of Iranian threat actors. The malicious software has affected and continues to affect thousands of victims and has raised almost $6M in ransom.\
Although categorized under the heading of ransomware, SamSam campaigns have some importance distinguishing characteristics. Most notable is the fact that conventional ransomware is a numbers game. Perpetrators use a "spray-and-pray" approach with phishing campaigns or other mechanisms, charging a small ransom (typically under $1,000). The goal is to find a large number of victims willing to pay these mini-ransoms, adding up to a lucrative payday. They use relatively simple methods for infecting systems.\
@@ -725,7 +725,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-11409", "https://www.splunk.com/view/SP-CAAAP5E#VulnerabilityDescriptionsandRatings", "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44865/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip"]
searches = ["ESCU - Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
description = Reduce the risk of CVE-2018-11409, an information disclosure vulnerability within some older versions of Splunk Enterprise, with searches designed to help ensure that your Splunk system does not leak information to authenticated users.
narrative = Although there have been no reports of it being exploited, Splunk Enterprise versions through 7.0.1 reportedly have a vulnerability that may expose information through a REST endpoint (read more here: https://www.splunk.com/view/SP-CAAAP5E#VulnerabilityDescriptionsandRatings). NIST has included it in its vulnerability database (read more here: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-11409). The REST endpoint that exposes system information is also necessary for the proper operation of Splunk clustering and instrumentation. Customers should upgrade to the latest version to reduce the risk of this vulnerability.\
Splunk Enterprise exposes partial information about the host operating system, hardware, and Splunk license. Splunk Enterprise before 6.6.0 exposes this information without authentication. Splunk Enterprise 6.6.0 and later exposes this information only to authenticated Splunk users. Based on the information exposure, Splunk characterizes this issue as a low severity impact.\
@@ -739,7 +739,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId"]
searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest"]
description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS EC2 instances for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as EC2 instances that originate from unusual locations or those launched by previously unseen users (among others). Included investigative searches will help you probe more deeply, when the information warrants it.
narrative = AWS CloudTrail is an AWS service that helps you enable governance, compliance, and risk auditing within your AWS account. Actions taken by a user, role, or an AWS service are recorded as events in CloudTrail. It is crucial for a company to monitor events and actions taken in the AWS Console, AWS command-line interface, and AWS SDKs and APIs to ensure that your EC2 instances are not vulnerable to attacks. This Analytic Story identifies suspicious activities in your AWS EC2 instances and helps you respond and investigate those activities.
@@ -750,7 +750,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integration.html"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new user AWS Console Login - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN"]
searches = ["ESCU - Detect new user AWS Console Login - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN"]
description = Monitor your AWS authentication events using your CloudTrail logs. Searches within this Analytic Story will help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious logins.
narrative = It is important to monitor and control who has access to your AWS infrastructure. Detecting suspicious logins to your AWS infrastructure will provide good starting points for investigations. Abusive behaviors caused by compromised credentials can lead to direct monetary costs, as you will be billed for any EC2 instances created by the attacker.
@@ -761,7 +761,7 @@ version = 2
references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/security-data-protection/cloud/public-aws-s3-buckets-writable/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Detect S3 access from a new IP - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Open S3 buckets - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion - Rule", "ESCU - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name"]
searches = ["ESCU - Detect New Open S3 buckets - Rule", "ESCU - Detect S3 access from a new IP - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address", "ESCU - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN"]
description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS S3 buckets for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as detecting open S3 buckets and buckets being accessed from a new IP. The contextual and investigative searches will give you more information, when required.
narrative = As cloud computing has exploded, so has the number of creative attacks on virtual environments. And as the number-two cloud-service provider, Amazon Web Services (AWS) has certainly had its share.\
Amazon's "shared responsibility" model dictates that the company has responsibility for the environment outside of the VM and the customer is responsible for the security inside of the S3 container. As such, it's important to stay vigilant for activities that may belie suspicious behavior inside of your environment.\
@@ -774,7 +774,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/hiding-cloudcobalt-strike-beacon-c2-using-amazon-apis/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId"]
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN"]
description = Leverage these searches to monitor your AWS network traffic for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as a spike in blocked outbound traffic in your virtual private cloud (VPC).
narrative = A virtual private cloud (VPC) is an on-demand managed cloud-computing service that isolates computing resources for each client. Inside the VPC container, the environment resembles a physical network. \
Amazon's VPC service enables you to launch EC2 instances and leverage other Amazon resources. The traffic that flows in and out of this VPC can be controlled via network access-control rules and security groups. Amazon also has a feature called VPC Flow Logs that enables you to log IP traffic going to and from the network interfaces in your VPC. This data is stored using Amazon CloudWatch Logs.\
@@ -788,7 +788,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-cloudtrail-now-tracks-cross-account-activity-to-its-origin/", "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integration.html"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by New User - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field"]
searches = ["ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by New User - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field"]
description = Monitor your cloud authentication events. Searches within this Analytic Story leverage the recent cloud updates to the Authentication data model to help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious login activity.
narrative = It is important to monitor and control who has access to your cloud infrastructure. Detecting suspicious logins will provide good starting points for investigations. Abusive behaviors caused by compromised credentials can lead to direct monetary costs, as you will be billed for any compute activity whether legitimate or otherwise.\
This Analytic Story has data model versions of cloud searches leveraging Authentication data, including those looking for suspicious login activity, and cross-account activity for AWS.
@@ -800,7 +800,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed - Rule", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN"]
searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN"]
description = Monitor your cloud infrastructure provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your cloud environment.
narrative = Monitoring your cloud infrastructure logs allows you enable governance, compliance, and risk auditing. It is crucial for a company to monitor events and actions taken in the their cloud environments to ensure that your instances are not vulnerable to attacks. This Analytic Story identifies suspicious activities in your cloud compute instances and helps you respond and investigate those activities.
@@ -811,7 +811,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
searches = ["ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
description = Monitor your cloud infrastructure provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your cloud environment.
narrative = Because most enterprise cloud infrastructure activities originate from familiar geographic locations, monitoring for activity from unknown or unusual regions is an important security measure. This indicator can be especially useful in environments where it is impossible to whitelist specific IPs (because they vary).\
This Analytic Story was designed to provide you with flexibility in the precision you employ in specifying legitimate geographic regions. It can be as specific as an IP address or a city, or as broad as a region (think state) or an entire country. By determining how precise you want your geographical locations to be and monitoring for new locations that haven't previously accessed your environment, you can detect adversaries as they begin to probe your environment. Since there are legitimate reasons for activities from unfamiliar locations, this is not a standalone indicator. Nevertheless, location can be a relevant piece of information that you may wish to investigate further.
@@ -823,7 +823,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://redlock.io/blog/cryptojacking-tesla"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN"]
searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN"]
description = Detect and investigate suspicious activities by users and roles in your cloud environments.
narrative = It seems obvious that it is critical to monitor and control the users who have access to your cloud infrastructure. Nevertheless, it's all too common for enterprises to lose track of ad-hoc accounts, leaving their servers vulnerable to attack. In fact, this was the very oversight that led to Tesla's cryptojacking attack in February, 2018.\
In addition to compromising the security of your data, when bad actors leverage your compute resources, it can incur monumental costs, since you will be billed for any new instances and increased bandwidth usage.
@@ -835,7 +835,7 @@ version = 2
references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1059", "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/macro-malware", "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info"]
searches = ["ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
description = Leveraging the Windows command-line interface (CLI) is one of the most common attack techniques--one that is also detailed in the MITRE ATT&CK framework. Use this Analytic Story to help you identify unusual or suspicious use of the CLI on Windows systems.
narrative = The ability to execute arbitrary commands via the Windows CLI is a primary goal for the adversary. With access to the shell, an attacker can easily run scripts and interact with the target system. Often, attackers may only have limited access to the shell or may obtain access in unusual ways. In addition, malware may execute and interact with the CLI in ways that would be considered unusual and inconsistent with typical user activity. This provides defenders with opportunities to identify suspicious use and investigate, as appropriate. This Analytic Story contains various searches to help identify this suspicious activity, as well as others to aid you in deeper investigation.
@@ -846,7 +846,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["http://blogs.splunk.com/2015/10/01/random-words-on-entropy-and-dns/", "http://www.darkreading.com/analytics/security-monitoring/got-malware-three-signs-revealed-in-dns-traffic/d/d-id/1139680", "https://live.paloaltonetworks.com/t5/Threat-Vulnerability-Articles/What-are-suspicious-DNS-queries/ta-p/71454"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio"]
searches = ["ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
description = Attackers often attempt to hide within or otherwise abuse the domain name system (DNS). You can thwart attempts to manipulate this omnipresent protocol by monitoring for these types of abuses.
narrative = Although DNS is one of the fundamental underlying protocols that make the Internet work, it is often ignored (perhaps because of its complexity and effectiveness). However, attackers have discovered ways to abuse the protocol to meet their objectives. One potential abuse involves manipulating DNS to hijack traffic and redirect it to an IP address under the attacker's control. This could inadvertently send users intending to visit google.com, for example, to an unrelated malicious website. Another technique involves using the DNS protocol for command-and-control activities with the attacker's malicious code or to covertly exfiltrate data. The searches within this Analytic Story look for these types of abuses.
@@ -857,7 +857,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/06/26/phishing-hits-a-new-level-of-quality/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender", "ESCU - Get Email Info"]
searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly - Rule", "ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Get Email Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender"]
description = Email remains one of the primary means for attackers to gain an initial foothold within the modern enterprise. Detect and investigate suspicious emails in your environment with the help of the searches in this Analytic Story.
narrative = It is a common practice for attackers of all types to leverage targeted spearphishing campaigns and mass mailers to deliver weaponized email messages and attachments. Fortunately, there are a number of ways to monitor email data in Splunk to detect suspicious content.\
Once a phishing message has been detected, the next steps are to answer the following questions: \
@@ -872,7 +872,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://cloud.google.com/blog/products/gcp/4-steps-for-hardening-your-cloud-storage-buckets-taking-charge-of-your-security", "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/gcp/google-cloud-platform-gcp-bucket-enumeration/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Shannon Davis"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Detect GCP Storage access from a new IP - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Open GCP Storage Buckets - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
searches = ["ESCU - Detect New Open GCP Storage Buckets - Rule", "ESCU - Detect GCP Storage access from a new IP - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your GCP Storage buckets for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as detecting open storage buckets and buckets being accessed from a new IP. The contextual and investigative searches will give you more information, when required.
narrative = Similar to other cloud providers, GCP operates on a shared responsibility model. This means the end user, you, are responsible for setting appropriate access control lists and permissions on your GCP resources.\ This Analytics Story concentrates on detecting things like open storage buckets (both read and write) along with storage bucket access from unfamiliar users and IP addresses.
@@ -883,7 +883,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://redcanary.com/blog/windows-registry-attacks-threat-detection/", "https://medium.com/@mbromileyDFIR/malware-monday-aebb456356c5", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1170"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Detect mshta exe running scripts in command-line arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info"]
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect mshta exe running scripts in command-line arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe process to execute malicious code.
narrative = One common adversary tactic is to bypass application white-listing solutions via the mshta.exe process, which executes Microsoft HTML applications with the .hta suffix. In these cases, attackers use the trusted Windows utility to eproxy execution of malicious files, whether an .hta application, javascript, or VBScript.\
One example of a notable mshta.exe attack was the Kovter malware (https://medium.com/@mbromileyDFIR/malware-monday-aebb456356c5) that was implicated in ransomware and click-fraud attacks. Kovter utilized .hta to execute a series of javascript commands, each progressively more dangerous. According to the Mitre Parternship Network (https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1170), FIN7 has leveraged mshta.exe, as has the MuddyWater group, who used it to execute its POWERSTATS payload (which then used the utility to execute additional payloads).\
@@ -896,7 +896,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1078", "https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Credential_stuffing", "https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/answer/What-is-a-password-spraying-attack-and-how-does-it-work"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Okta Failed SSO Attempts - Rule", "ESCU - Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentails From The Same IP - Rule", "ESCU - Okta User Logins From Multiple Cities - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Account Lockout Events - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by app", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address", "ESCU - Investigate User Activities In Okta"]
searches = ["ESCU - Okta Account Lockout Events - Rule", "ESCU - Okta User Logins From Multiple Cities - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Failed SSO Attempts - Rule", "ESCU - Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentails From The Same IP - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate User Activities In Okta", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by app", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address"]
description = Monitor your Okta environment for suspicious activities. Due to the Covid outbreak, many users are migrating over to leverage cloud services more and more. Okta is a popular tool to manage multiple users and the web-based applications they need to stay productive. The searches in this story will help monitor your Okta environment for suspicious activities and associated user behaviors.
narrative = Okta is the leading single sign on (SSO) provider, allowing users to authenticate once to Okta, and from there access a variety of web-based applications. These applications are assigned to users and allow administrators to centrally manage which users are allowed to access which applications. It also provides centralized logging to help understand how the applications are used and by whom. \
While SSO is a major convenience for users, it also provides attackers with an opportunity. If the attacker can gain access to Okta, they can access a variety of applications. As such monitoring the environment is important. \
@@ -909,7 +909,7 @@ version = 2
references = ["https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Graeber-Abusing-Windows-Management-Instrumentation-WMI-To-Build-A-Persistent%20Asynchronous-And-Fileless-Backdoor-wp.pdf", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/wmimplant_a_wmi_ba.html"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Script Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Temporary Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - Process Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info"]
searches = ["ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - Process Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Script Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Temporary Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host"]
description = Attackers are increasingly abusing Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI), a framework and associated utilities available on all modern Windows operating systems. Because WMI can be leveraged to manage both local and remote systems, it is important to identify the processes executed and the user context within which the activity occurred.
narrative = WMI is a Microsoft infrastructure for management data and operations on Windows operating systems. It includes of a set of utilities that can be leveraged to manage both local and remote Windows systems. Attackers are increasingly turning to WMI abuse in their efforts to conduct nefarious tasks, such as reconnaissance, detection of antivirus and virtual machines, code execution, lateral movement, persistence, and data exfiltration. \
The detection searches included in this Analytic Story are used to look for suspicious use of WMI commands that attackers may leverage to interact with remote systems. The searches specifically look for the use of WMI to run processes on remote systems.\
@@ -922,7 +922,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://redcanary.com/blog/windows-registry-attacks-threat-detection/", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1112"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info"]
searches = ["ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
description = Monitor and detect registry changes initiated from remote locations, which can be a sign that an attacker has infiltrated your system.
narrative = Attackers are developing increasingly sophisticated techniques for hijacking target servers, while evading detection. One such technique that has become progressively more common is registry modification.\
The registry is a key component of the Windows operating system. It has a hierarchical database called "registry" that contains settings, options, and values for executables. Once the threat actor gains access to a machine, they can use reg.exe to modify their account to obtain administrator-level privileges, maintain persistence, and move laterally within the environment.\
@@ -935,7 +935,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://blog.rapid7.com/2020/04/02/dispelling-zoom-bugbears-what-you-need-to-know-about-the-latest-zoom-vulnerabilities/", "https://threatpost.com/two-zoom-zero-day-flaws-uncovered/154337/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Child Process of Zoom - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process File Activity"]
searches = ["ESCU - First Time Seen Child Process of Zoom - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process File Activity"]
description = Attackers are using Zoom as an vector to increase privileges on a sytems. This story detects new child processes of zoom and provides investigative actions for this detection.
narrative = Zoom is a leader in modern enterprise video communications and its usage has increased dramatically with a large amount of the population under stay-at-home orders due to the COVID-19 pandemic. With increased usage has come increased scrutiny and several security flaws have been found with this application on both Windows and macOS systems.\
Current detections focus on finding new child processes of this application on a per host basis. Investigative searches are included to gather information needed during an investigation.
@@ -947,7 +947,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - EC2 Instance Modified With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId"]
searches = ["ESCU - EC2 Instance Modified With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN"]
description = Identify unusual changes to your AWS EC2 instances that may indicate malicious activity. Modifications to your EC2 instances by previously unseen users is an example of an activity that may warrant further investigation.
narrative = A common attack technique is to infiltrate a cloud instance and make modifications. The adversary can then secure access to your infrastructure or hide their activities. So it's important to stay alert to changes that may indicate that your environment has been compromised. \
Searches within this Analytic Story can help you detect the presence of a threat by monitoring for EC2 instances that have been created or changed--either by users that have never previously performed these activities or by known users who modify or create instances in a way that have not been done before. This story also provides investigative searches that help you go deeper once you detect suspicious behavior.
@@ -959,7 +959,7 @@ version = 2
references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/08/monitoring-windows-console-activity-part-two.html", "https://www.splunk.com/pdfs/technical-briefs/advanced-threat-detection-and-response-tech-brief.pdf", "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/logging/detecting-security-incidents-windows-workstation-event-logs-34262"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule", "ESCU - Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info"]
searches = ["ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
description = Quickly identify systems running new or unusual processes in your environment that could be indicators of suspicious activity. Processes run from unusual locations, those with conspicuously long command lines, and rare executables are all examples of activities that may warrant deeper investigation.
narrative = Being able to profile a host's processes within your environment can help you more quickly identify processes that seem out of place when compared to the rest of the population of hosts or asset types.\
This Analytic Story lets you identify processes that are either a) not typically seen running or b) have some sort of suspicious command-line arguments associated with them. This Analytic Story will also help you identify the user running these processes and the associated process activity on the host.\
@@ -983,7 +983,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://www.fbi.gov/scams-and-safety/common-fraud-schemes/internet-fraud", "https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2017-internet-crime-report-released-050718"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Jim Apger"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Web Fraud - Account Harvesting - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Password Sharing Across Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Anomalous User Clickspeed - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender", "ESCU - Get Web Session Information via session id"]
searches = ["ESCU - Web Fraud - Anomalous User Clickspeed - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Account Harvesting - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Password Sharing Across Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Get Web Session Information via session id", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender"]
description = Monitor your environment for activity consistent with common attack techniques bad actors use when attempting to compromise web servers or other web-related assets.
narrative = The Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) defines Internet fraud as the use of Internet services or software with Internet access to defraud victims or to otherwise take advantage of them. According to the Bureau, Internet crime schemes are used to steal millions of dollars each year from victims and continue to plague the Internet through various methods. The agency includes phishing scams, data breaches, Denial of Service (DOS) attacks, email account compromise, malware, spoofing, and ransomware in this category.\
These crimes are not the fraud itself, but rather the attack techniques commonly employed by fraudsters in their pursuit of data that enables them to commit malicious actssuch as obtaining and using stolen credit cards. They represent a serious problem that is steadily increasing and not likely to go away anytime soon.\
@@ -1010,7 +1010,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Defense_Evasion"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info"]
searches = ["ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
description = Detect tactics used by malware to evade defenses on Windows endpoints. A few of these include suspicious `reg.exe` processes, files hidden with `attrib.exe` and disabling user-account control, among many others
narrative = Defense evasion is a tactic--identified in the MITRE ATT&CK framework--that adversaries employ in a variety of ways to bypass or defeat defensive security measures. There are many techniques enumerated by the MITRE ATT&CK framework that are applicable in this context. This Analytic Story includes searches designed to identify the use of such techniques on Windows platforms.
@@ -1021,7 +1021,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2013/12/file-extensions-2/", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1042"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Execution of File with Multiple Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info"]
searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule", "ESCU - Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Execution of File with Multiple Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
description = Detect and investigate suspected abuse of file extensions and Windows file associations. Some of the malicious behaviors involved may include inserting spaces before file extensions or prepending the file extension with a different one, among other techniques.
narrative = Attackers use a variety of techniques to entice users to run malicious code or to persist on an endpoint. One way to accomplish these goals is to leverage file extensions and the mechanism Windows uses to associate files with specific applications. \
Since its earliest days, Windows has used extensions to identify file types. Users have become familiar with these extensions and their application associations. For example, if users see that a file ends in `.doc` or `.docx`, they will assume that it is a Microsoft Word document and expect that double-clicking will open it using `winword.exe`. The user will typically also presume that the `.docx` file is safe. \
@@ -1036,7 +1036,7 @@ version = 2
references = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/", "https://zeltser.com/security-incident-log-review-checklist/", "http://journeyintoir.blogspot.com/2013/01/re-introducing-usnjrnl.html"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info"]
searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
description = Adversaries often try to cover their tracks by manipulating Windows logs. Use these searches to help you monitor for suspicious activity surrounding log files--an essential component of an effective defense.
narrative = Because attackers often modify system logs to cover their tracks and/or to thwart the investigative process, log monitoring is an industry-recognized best practice. While there are legitimate reasons to manipulate system logs, it is still worthwhile to keep track of who manipulated the logs, when they manipulated them, and in what way they manipulated them (determining which accesses, tools, or utilities were employed). Even if no malicious activity is detected, the knowledge of an attempt to manipulate system logs may be indicative of a broader security risk that should be thoroughly investigated.\
The Analytic Story gives users two different ways to detect manipulation of Windows Event Logs and one way to detect deletion of the Update Sequence Number (USN) Change Journal. The story helps determine the history of the host and the users who have accessed it. Finally, the story aides in investigation by retrieving all the information on the process that caused these events (if the process has been identified).
@@ -1048,7 +1048,7 @@ version = 2
references = ["http://www.fuzzysecurity.com/tutorials/19.html", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2010/07/malware-persistence-windows-registry.html", "http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/common-malware-persistence-mechanisms/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/fin7-shim-databases-persistence.html", "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dq2Hv7J9fvk"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Shim Database File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info"]
searches = ["ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
description = Monitor for activities and techniques associated with maintaining persistence on a Windows system--a sign that an adversary may have compromised your environment.
narrative = Maintaining persistence is one of the first steps taken by attackers after the initial compromise. Attackers leverage various custom and built-in tools to ensure survivability and persistent access within a compromised enterprise. This Analytic Story provides searches to help you identify various behaviors used by attackers to maintain persistent access to a Windows environment.
@@ -1059,7 +1059,7 @@ version = 2
references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Overwriting Accessibility Binaries - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Child Processes of Spoolsv exe - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info"]
searches = ["ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Child Processes of Spoolsv exe - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Overwriting Accessibility Binaries - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
description = Monitor for and investigate activities that may be associated with a Windows privilege-escalation attack, including unusual processes running on endpoints, modified registry keys, and more.
narrative = Privilege escalation is a "land-and-expand" technique, wherein an adversary gains an initial foothold on a host and then exploits its weaknesses to increase his privileges. The motivation is simple: certain actions on a Windows machine--such as installing software--may require higher-level privileges than those the attacker initially acquired. By increasing his privilege level, the attacker can gain the control required to carry out his malicious ends. This Analytic Story provides searches to detect and investigate behaviors that attackers may use to elevate their privileges in your environment.
@@ -1070,7 +1070,7 @@ version = 3
references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1050", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1031"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
spec_version = 3
searches = ["ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info"]
searches = ["ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
description = Windows services are often used by attackers for persistence and the ability to load drivers or otherwise interact with the Windows kernel. This Analytic Story helps you monitor your environment for indications that Windows services are being modified or created in a suspicious manner.
narrative = The Windows operating system uses a services architecture to allow for running code in the background, similar to a UNIX daemon. Attackers will often leverage Windows services for persistence, hiding in plain sight, seeking the ability to run privileged code that can interact with the kernel. In many cases, attackers will create a new service to host their malicious code. Attackers have also been observed modifying unnecessary or unused services to point to their own code, as opposed to what was intended. In these cases, attackers often use tools to create or modify services in ways that are not typical for most environments, providing opportunities for detection.
@@ -3995,14 +3995,6 @@ known_false_positives = not defined
earliest_time_offset = 14400
latest_time_offset = 0
[savedsearch://ESCU - Investigate AWS ECR container listing activity]
type = investigation
explanation = none
how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.You must also install Cloud Infrastructure Data Model.
known_false_positives = not defined
earliest_time_offset = 14400
latest_time_offset = 0
[savedsearch://ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field]
type = investigation
explanation = none
@@ -4110,13 +4102,6 @@ latest_time_offset = 0
### END RESPONSE TASKS ###
### BASELINES ###
[savedsearch://ESCU - Add Prohibited Processes to Enterprise Security]
type = support
explanation = This search takes the existing interesting process table from ES, filters out any existing additions added by ESCU and then updates the table with processes identified by ESCU that should be prohibited on your endpoints.
how_to_implement = This search should be run on each new install of ESCU.
known_false_positives = not defined
providing_technologies = none
[savedsearch://ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls Per User]
type = support
explanation = This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model for how many API calls are performed by each user. By default, the search uses the last 90 days of data to build the model and the model is rebuilt weekly. The model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search, which identifies subsequent outliers in the number of instances created in a small time window.
package/default/workflow_actions.conf
+4 -13
View File
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ link.method = get
[workbench_panel_gcp_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip]
label = Workbench - GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip
type = link
fields = src_user
fields = src_ip
display_location = field_menu
link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_gcp_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true
link.target = blank
@@ -249,15 +249,6 @@ link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@fie
link.target = blank
link.method = get
[workbench_panel_investigate_aws_ecr_container_listing_activity]
label = Workbench - Investigate AWS ECR container listing activity
type = link
fields = Compute.event_name
display_location = field_menu
link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_investigate_aws_ecr_container_listing_activity&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true
link.target = blank
link.method = get
[workbench_panel_investigate_aws_user_activities_by_user_field]
label = Workbench - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field
type = link
@@ -270,7 +261,7 @@ link.method = get
[workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name]
label = Workbench - Investigate AWS activities via region name
type = link
fields = awsRegion
fields = vendor_region
display_location = field_menu
link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true
link.target = blank
@@ -279,9 +270,9 @@ link.method = get
[workbench_panel_investigate_failed_logins_for_multiple_destinations]
label = Workbench - Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations
type = link
fields = dest
fields = user
display_location = field_menu
link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_investigate_failed_logins_for_multiple_destinations&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true
link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_identity=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_investigate_failed_logins_for_multiple_destinations&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true
link.target = blank
link.method = get
package/lookups/mitre_enrichment.csv
+207 -110
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,102 @@
mitre_id,technique,tactics,groups
T1205.001,Port Knocking,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Command And Control,no
T1059.008,Network Device CLI,Execution,no
T1602.002,Network Device Configuration Dump,Collection,no
T1542.005,TFTP Boot,Defense Evasion|Persistence,no
T1542.004,ROMMONkit,Defense Evasion|Persistence,no
T1602.001,SNMP (MIB Dump),Collection,no
T1602,Data from Configuration Repository,Collection,no
T1601.002,Downgrade System Image,Defense Evasion,no
T1601.001,Patch System Image,Defense Evasion,no
T1601,Modify System Image,Defense Evasion,no
T1600.002,Disable Crypto Hardware,Defense Evasion,no
T1600.001,Reduce Key Space,Defense Evasion,no
T1600,Weaken Encryption,Defense Evasion,no
T1556.004,Network Device Authentication,Credential Access|Defense Evasion,no
T1599.001,Network Address Translation Traversal,Defense Evasion,no
T1599,Network Boundary Bridging,Defense Evasion,no
T1020.001,Traffic Duplication,Exfiltration,no
T1557.002,ARP Cache Poisoning,Credential Access|Collection,Cleaver
T1588.006,Vulnerabilities,Resource Development,no
T1053.006,Systemd Timers,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
T1562.008,Disable Cloud Logs,Defense Evasion,no
T1547.012,Print Processors,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
T1598.003,Spearphishing Link,Reconnaissance,no
T1598.002,Spearphishing Attachment,Reconnaissance,no
T1598.001,Spearphishing Service,Reconnaissance,no
T1598,Phishing for Information,Reconnaissance,no
T1597.002,Purchase Technical Data,Reconnaissance,no
T1597.001,Threat Intel Vendors,Reconnaissance,no
T1597,Search Closed Sources,Reconnaissance,no
T1596.005,Scan Databases,Reconnaissance,no
T1596.004,CDNs,Reconnaissance,no
T1596.003,Digital Certificates,Reconnaissance,no
T1596.001,DNS/Passive DNS,Reconnaissance,no
T1596.002,WHOIS,Reconnaissance,no
T1596,Search Open Technical Databases,Reconnaissance,no
T1595.002,Vulnerability Scanning,Reconnaissance,no
T1595.001,Scanning IP Blocks,Reconnaissance,no
T1595,Active Scanning,Reconnaissance,no
T1594,Search Victim-Owned Websites,Reconnaissance,no
T1593.002,Search Engines,Reconnaissance,no
T1593.001,Social Media,Reconnaissance,no
T1593,Search Open Websites/Domains,Reconnaissance,no
T1592.004,Client Configurations,Reconnaissance,no
T1592.003,Firmware,Reconnaissance,no
T1592.002,Software,Reconnaissance,no
T1592.001,Hardware,Reconnaissance,no
T1592,Gather Victim Host Information,Reconnaissance,no
T1591.004,Identify Roles,Reconnaissance,no
T1591.003,Identify Business Tempo,Reconnaissance,no
T1591.001,Determine Physical Locations,Reconnaissance,no
T1591.002,Business Relationships,Reconnaissance,no
T1591,Gather Victim Org Information,Reconnaissance,no
T1590.006,Network Security Appliances,Reconnaissance,no
T1590.005,IP Addresses,Reconnaissance,no
T1590.004,Network Topology,Reconnaissance,no
T1590.003,Network Trust Dependencies,Reconnaissance,no
T1590.002,DNS,Reconnaissance,no
T1590.001,Domain Properties,Reconnaissance,no
T1590,Gather Victim Network Information,Reconnaissance,no
T1589.003,Employee Names,Reconnaissance,no
T1589.002,Email Addresses,Reconnaissance,no
T1589.001,Credentials,Reconnaissance,no
T1589,Gather Victim Identity Information,Reconnaissance,no
T1588.005,Exploits,Resource Development,no
T1588.004,Digital Certificates,Resource Development,no
T1588.003,Code Signing Certificates,Resource Development,Wizard Spider
T1588.002,Tool,Resource Development,no
T1588.001,Malware,Resource Development,Turla|APT1
T1588,Obtain Capabilities,Resource Development,no
T1587.004,Exploits,Resource Development,no
T1587.003,Digital Certificates,Resource Development,APT29|PROMETHIUM
T1587.002,Code Signing Certificates,Resource Development,PROMETHIUM|Patchwork
T1587.001,Malware,Resource Development,Turla|FIN7|Night Dragon|Cleaver
T1587,Develop Capabilities,Resource Development,no
T1586.002,Email Accounts,Resource Development,no
T1586.001,Social Media Accounts,Resource Development,no
T1586,Compromise Accounts,Resource Development,no
T1585.002,Email Accounts,Resource Development,APT1
T1585.001,Social Media Accounts,Resource Development,Cleaver
T1585,Establish Accounts,Resource Development,APT17
T1584.006,Web Services,Resource Development,Turla
T1584.005,Botnet,Resource Development,no
T1584.004,Server,Resource Development,Turla|APT16
T1584.003,Virtual Private Server,Resource Development,Turla
T1584.002,DNS Server,Resource Development,no
T1584.001,Domains,Resource Development,APT1
T1583.006,Web Services,Resource Development,APT17|APT29
T1583.005,Botnet,Resource Development,no
T1583.004,Server,Resource Development,no
T1583.003,Virtual Private Server,Resource Development,TEMP.Veles
T1583.002,DNS Server,Resource Development,no
T1584,Compromise Infrastructure,Resource Development,no
T1583.001,Domains,Resource Development,APT1|APT28
T1583,Acquire Infrastructure,Resource Development,no
T1564.007,VBA Stomping,Defense Evasion,no
T1558.004,AS-REP Roasting,Credential Access,no
T1580,Cloud Infrastructure Discovery,Discovery,no
T1218.012,Verclsid,Defense Evasion,no
T1205.001,Port Knocking,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Command And Control,PROMETHIUM
T1564.006,Run Virtual Instance,Defense Evasion,no
T1564.005,Hidden File System,Defense Evasion,Strider|Equation
T1556.003,Pluggable Authentication Modules,Credential Access|Defense Evasion,no
@@ -7,7 +104,7 @@ T1574.012,COR_PROFILER,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,Blue Moc
T1562.007,Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall,Defense Evasion,no
T1098.004,SSH Authorized Keys,Persistence,no
T1480.001,Environmental Keying,Defense Evasion,APT41|Equation
T1059.007,JavaScript/JScript,Execution,APT32|FIN7|Cobalt Group|Molerats|TA505|Silence|Leafminer
T1059.007,JavaScript/JScript,Execution,FIN6|APT32|FIN7|Cobalt Group|Molerats|TA505|Silence|Leafminer
T1578.004,Revert Cloud Instance,Defense Evasion,no
T1578.003,Delete Cloud Instance,Defense Evasion,no
T1578.001,Create Snapshot,Defense Evasion,no
@@ -24,13 +121,13 @@ T1546.015,Component Object Model Hijacking,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,APT2
T1071.004,DNS,Command And Control,APT39|Tropic Trooper|OilRig|Ke3chang|Cobalt Group|APT18|APT41|FIN7
T1071.003,Mail Protocols,Command And Control,APT32|SilverTerrier|APT28
T1071.002,File Transfer Protocols,Command And Control,APT41|SilverTerrier|Machete|Honeybee
T1071.001,Web Protocols,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|TA505|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Inception|APT41|SilverTerrier|Machete|APT28|WIRTE|APT33|FIN4|Night Dragon|APT18|APT38|Cobalt Group|APT19|Threat Group-3390|Rancor|Orangeworm|APT37|Ke3chang|Dark Caracal|Turla|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|OilRig|Magic Hound|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon
T1071.001,Web Protocols,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|TA505|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Inception|APT41|SilverTerrier|Machete|APT28|WIRTE|APT33|FIN4|Night Dragon|APT18|APT38|Threat Group-3390|Cobalt Group|APT37|Turla|APT19|Rancor|Orangeworm|Dark Caracal|Ke3chang|Lazarus Group|APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|OilRig|Magic Hound|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon
T1572,Protocol Tunneling,Command And Control,OilRig|Cobalt Group|FIN6
T1048.003,Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol,Exfiltration,APT32|APT33|Thrip|FIN8|OilRig|Lazarus Group
T1048.003,Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol,Exfiltration,Wizard Spider|FIN6|APT32|APT33|Thrip|FIN8|OilRig|Lazarus Group
T1048.002,Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol,Exfiltration,no
T1048.001,Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol,Exfiltration,no
T1001.003,Protocol Impersonation,Command And Control,Lazarus Group
T1001.002,Steganography,Command And Control,Axiom
T1001.002,Steganography,Command And Control,APT29|Axiom
T1001.001,Junk Data,Command And Control,APT28
T1132.002,Non-Standard Encoding,Command And Control,no
T1132.001,Standard Encoding,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|APT33|APT19|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork
@@ -39,20 +136,20 @@ T1090.003,Multi-hop Proxy,Command And Control,Inception|FIN4|APT29
T1090.002,External Proxy,Command And Control,APT39|Silence|Soft Cell|MuddyWater|APT3|FIN5|Lazarus Group|menuPass|APT28
T1090.001,Internal Proxy,Command And Control,APT39|Strider
T1102.003,One-Way Communication,Command And Control,Leviathan
T1102.002,Bidirectional Communication,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|APT39|APT12|Turla|FIN7|APT37|Magic Hound|Carbanak
T1102.002,Bidirectional Communication,Command And Control,APT29|Sandworm Team|APT39|APT12|Turla|FIN7|APT37|Magic Hound|Carbanak
T1102.001,Dead Drop Resolver,Command And Control,Rocke|APT41|BRONZE BUTLER|RTM|Patchwork
T1571,Non-Standard Port,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|Rocke|DarkVishnya|Silence|APT-C-36|Magic Hound|APT33|APT32|TEMP.Veles|Lazarus Group|FIN7
T1074.002,Remote Data Staging,Collection,Threat Group-3390|menuPass|FIN6|Night Dragon|FIN8
T1074.001,Local Data Staging,Collection,Machete|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|Patchwork|Dragonfly 2.0|Honeybee|Leviathan|APT3|FIN5|menuPass|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28
T1074.001,Local Data Staging,Collection,Machete|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|Patchwork|Honeybee|Dragonfly 2.0|Leviathan|FIN5|APT3|menuPass|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28
T1078.004,Cloud Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,APT33
T1564.004,NTFS File Attributes,Defense Evasion,APT32
T1564.003,Hidden Window,Defense Evasion,Gorgon Group|Deep Panda|DarkHydrus|CopyKittens|APT19|APT32|APT28|APT3|Magic Hound
T1078.003,Local Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,Tropic Trooper|FIN10|Stolen Pencil|APT32
T1078.002,Domain Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,TA505|APT3|Threat Group-1314
T1078.003,Local Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,PROMETHIUM|Tropic Trooper|FIN10|Stolen Pencil|APT32
T1078.002,Domain Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,Wizard Spider|APT29|TA505|APT3|Threat Group-1314
T1078.001,Default Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,no
T1564.002,Hidden Users,Defense Evasion,no
T1574.006,LD_PRELOAD,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,Rocke
T1574.002,DLL Side-Loading,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,BRONZE BUTLER|Naikon|APT41|Soft Cell|Tropic Trooper|Patchwork|APT19|APT32|APT3|menuPass|Threat Group-3390
T1574.002,DLL Side-Loading,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,BRONZE BUTLER|Naikon|APT41|Soft Cell|Tropic Trooper|APT19|Patchwork|APT32|APT3|menuPass|Threat Group-3390
T1574.001,DLL Search Order Hijacking,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,Whitefly|RTM|Threat Group-3390|menuPass
T1574.008,Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
T1574.007,Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
@@ -64,14 +161,14 @@ T1574,Hijack Execution Flow,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
T1069.001,Local Groups,Discovery,Turla|OilRig|admin@338
T1570,Lateral Tool Transfer,Lateral Movement,APT32|Wizard Spider|Turla|FIN10
T1568.003,DNS Calculation,Command And Control,APT12
T1204.002,Malicious File,Execution,Magic Hound|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|RTM|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|Machete|admin@338|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|BRONZE BUTLER|Cobalt Group|DarkHydrus|Gorgon Group|Patchwork|OilRig|Dark Caracal|MuddyWater|Lazarus Group|FIN7|APT32|Rancor|APT37|FIN8|APT28|Elderwood|TA459|APT29|Leviathan|menuPass|PLATINUM
T1204.001,Malicious Link,Execution,Patchwork|Windshift|APT32|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|TA505|OilRig|Machete|Leviathan|FIN8|FIN4|Elderwood|Dragonfly 2.0|Cobalt Group|APT39|Night Dragon|APT33|Turla
T1204.002,Malicious File,Execution,FIN6|PROMETHIUM|APT30|Magic Hound|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|RTM|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|Machete|admin@338|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|Cobalt Group|BRONZE BUTLER|DarkHydrus|APT32|Dark Caracal|FIN7|Gorgon Group|OilRig|MuddyWater|Lazarus Group|Patchwork|Rancor|TA459|APT28|FIN8|APT37|APT29|menuPass|Elderwood|Leviathan|PLATINUM
T1204.001,Malicious Link,Execution,Wizard Spider|Patchwork|Windshift|APT32|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|TA505|OilRig|Machete|Leviathan|FIN8|FIN4|Elderwood|Dragonfly 2.0|Cobalt Group|APT39|Night Dragon|APT33|Turla
T1195.003,Compromise Hardware Supply Chain,Initial Access,no
T1195.002,Compromise Software Supply Chain,Initial Access,Sandworm Team|APT41
T1195.002,Compromise Software Supply Chain,Initial Access,GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Dragonfly|Sandworm Team|APT41
T1195.001,Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools,Initial Access,no
T1568.001,Fast Flux DNS,Command And Control,TA505
T1568.001,Fast Flux DNS,Command And Control,Machete|TA505
T1052.001,Exfiltration over USB,Exfiltration,Tropic Trooper
T1569.002,Service Execution,Execution,Blue Mockingbird|APT39|APT41|Silence|FIN6|APT32|Honeybee|Ke3chang
T1569.002,Service Execution,Execution,Wizard Spider|Blue Mockingbird|APT39|APT41|Silence|FIN6|APT32|Honeybee|Ke3chang
T1569.001,Launchctl,Execution,no
T1569,System Services,Execution,no
T1568.002,Domain Generation Algorithms,Command And Control,APT41
@@ -79,22 +176,22 @@ T1568,Dynamic Resolution,Command And Control,no
T1011.001,Exfiltration Over Bluetooth,Exfiltration,no
T1567.002,Exfiltration to Cloud Storage,Exfiltration,Leviathan|Turla
T1567.001,Exfiltration to Code Repository,Exfiltration,no
T1059.006,Python,Execution,Rocke|BRONZE BUTLER|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|Machete
T1059.005,Visual Basic,Execution,APT33|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|Rancor|Patchwork|MuddyWater|Honeybee|FIN7|APT37|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|Turla|TA505|Silence|WIRTE|FIN4|Cobalt Group|Gorgon Group|Leviathan|TA459|Magic Hound
T1059.006,Python,Execution,APT29|Rocke|BRONZE BUTLER|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|Machete
T1059.005,Visual Basic,Execution,Lazarus Group|APT33|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|Rancor|Patchwork|MuddyWater|Honeybee|FIN7|APT37|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|Turla|TA505|Silence|WIRTE|FIN4|Cobalt Group|Gorgon Group|TA459|Leviathan|Magic Hound
T1059.004,Unix Shell,Execution,Rocke|APT41
T1059.003,Windows Command Shell,Execution,TA505|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|OilRig|Lazarus Group|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|FIN7|APT41|Soft Cell|Turla|Silence|APT32|APT39|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Dark Caracal|Gorgon Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Rancor|Ke3chang|APT37|Leviathan|FIN8|APT28|Magic Hound|Sowbug|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN10|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Gamaredon Group|Suckfly|Patchwork|Threat Group-1314|APT3|admin@338|APT1
T1059.003,Windows Command Shell,Execution,Wizard Spider|FIN6|TA505|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|OilRig|Lazarus Group|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|FIN7|APT41|Soft Cell|Turla|Silence|APT32|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Gorgon Group|Dark Caracal|Ke3chang|Dragonfly 2.0|Rancor|APT37|Leviathan|FIN8|APT28|Sowbug|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|FIN10|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Suckfly|Threat Group-1314|APT3|admin@338|APT1
T1059.002,AppleScript,Execution,no
T1059.001,PowerShell,Execution,Blue Mockingbird|APT39|DarkVishnya|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Inception|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|Soft Cell|TA505|WIRTE|TEMP.Veles|APT33|Gallmaker|Turla|APT19|DarkHydrus|APT28|Thrip|Gorgon Group|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Leviathan|TA459|FIN8|MuddyWater|Magic Hound|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|CopyKittens|APT32|FIN7|FIN10|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Poseidon Group|APT3|APT29|Deep Panda
T1059.001,PowerShell,Execution,Lazarus Group|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|APT39|DarkVishnya|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Inception|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|Soft Cell|TA505|WIRTE|TEMP.Veles|APT33|Gallmaker|Turla|Gorgon Group|APT19|DarkHydrus|APT28|Dragonfly 2.0|Thrip|Cobalt Group|Leviathan|TA459|MuddyWater|FIN8|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|CopyKittens|OilRig|FIN10|APT32|FIN7|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Poseidon Group|APT3|APT29|Deep Panda
T1567,Exfiltration Over Web Service,Exfiltration,no
T1497.003,Time Based Evasion,Defense Evasion|Discovery,no
T1497.002,User Activity Based Checks,Defense Evasion|Discovery,FIN7
T1497.001,System Checks,Defense Evasion|Discovery,Frankenstein
T1498.002,Reflection Amplification,Impact,no
T1498.001,Direct Network Flood,Impact,no
T1566.003,Spearphishing via Service,Initial Access,Magic Hound|Windshift|FIN6|OilRig|Dark Caracal
T1566.002,Spearphishing Link,Initial Access,Windshift|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|Machete|Kimsuky|TA505|Stolen Pencil|APT39|FIN4|APT32|Night Dragon|Turla|APT28|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|APT33|Elderwood|Leviathan|Magic Hound|Patchwork|APT29|FIN8
T1566.001,Spearphishing Attachment,Initial Access,Magic Hound|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Mofang|Wizard Spider|RTM|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|APT41|Machete|admin@338|Kimsuky|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|Tropic Trooper|Turla|Gorgon Group|Rancor|DarkHydrus|Cobalt Group|FIN7|OilRig|Lazarus Group|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|FIN8|MuddyWater|APT28|TA459|Leviathan|Patchwork|PLATINUM|Elderwood|APT29|APT37|menuPass
T1566,Phishing,Initial Access,no
T1566.003,Spearphishing via Service,Initial Access,Lazarus Group|Magic Hound|Windshift|FIN6|OilRig|Dark Caracal
T1566.002,Spearphishing Link,Initial Access,Wizard Spider|APT1|Windshift|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|Machete|Kimsuky|TA505|Stolen Pencil|APT39|FIN4|APT32|Night Dragon|OilRig|Turla|APT28|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|APT33|Elderwood|APT29|Leviathan|Patchwork|Magic Hound|FIN8
T1566.001,Spearphishing Attachment,Initial Access,APT1|FIN6|APT30|Magic Hound|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Mofang|Wizard Spider|RTM|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|APT41|Machete|admin@338|Kimsuky|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|Tropic Trooper|Turla|Cobalt Group|FIN7|OilRig|Gorgon Group|Rancor|DarkHydrus|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|Lazarus Group|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|MuddyWater|TA459|APT28|PLATINUM|Patchwork|Elderwood|APT29|Leviathan|APT37|menuPass
T1566,Phishing,Initial Access,GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Dragonfly
T1565.003,Runtime Data Manipulation,Impact,APT38
T1565.002,Transmitted Data Manipulation,Impact,APT38
T1565.001,Stored Data Manipulation,Impact,FIN4|APT38
@@ -104,18 +201,18 @@ T1564,Hide Artifacts,Defense Evasion,no
T1563.002,RDP Hijacking,Lateral Movement,no
T1563.001,SSH Hijacking,Lateral Movement,no
T1563,Remote Service Session Hijacking,Lateral Movement,no
T1518.001,Security Software Discovery,Discovery,Turla|Rocke|Frankenstein|The White Company|Cobalt Group|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|Tropic Trooper|FIN8|Patchwork|Naikon
T1518.001,Security Software Discovery,Discovery,Wizard Spider|Turla|Rocke|Frankenstein|The White Company|Cobalt Group|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|Tropic Trooper|FIN8|Patchwork|Naikon
T1069.003,Cloud Groups,Discovery,no
T1069.002,Domain Groups,Discovery,Turla|Wizard Spider|Inception|OilRig|FIN6|Dragonfly 2.0|Ke3chang
T1087.004,Cloud Account,Discovery,no
T1087.003,Email Account,Discovery,Sandworm Team|TA505
T1087.002,Domain Account,Discovery,Turla|Sandworm Team|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN6|Poseidon Group|Ke3chang
T1087.002,Domain Account,Discovery,Wizard Spider|Chimera|Turla|Sandworm Team|Dragonfly 2.0|BRONZE BUTLER|OilRig|menuPass|FIN6|Poseidon Group|Ke3chang
T1087.001,Local Account,Discovery,Turla|Poseidon Group|OilRig|Ke3chang|APT32|APT1|Threat Group-3390|APT3|admin@338
T1553.004,Install Root Certificate,Defense Evasion,no
T1562.004,Disable or Modify System Firewall,Defense Evasion,Rocke|Lazarus Group|Kimsuky|Dragonfly 2.0|Carbanak
T1562.003,HISTCONTROL,Defense Evasion,no
T1562.003,Impair Command History Logging,Defense Evasion,no
T1562.002,Disable Windows Event Logging,Defense Evasion,Threat Group-3390
T1562.001,Disable or Modify Tools,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Rocke|Kimsuky|Turla|Night Dragon|Gorgon Group|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda
T1562.001,Disable or Modify Tools,Defense Evasion,Wizard Spider|FIN6|Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Rocke|Kimsuky|Turla|Night Dragon|Gorgon Group|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda
T1562,Impair Defenses,Defense Evasion,no
T1003.004,LSA Secrets,Credential Access,OilRig|MuddyWater|menuPass|Leafminer|Ke3chang|Dragonfly 2.0|APT33|Threat Group-3390
T1003.005,Cached Domain Credentials,Credential Access,OilRig|MuddyWater|Leafminer|APT33
@@ -124,8 +221,8 @@ T1561.001,Disk Content Wipe,Impact,Lazarus Group
T1561,Disk Wipe,Impact,no
T1560.003,Archive via Custom Method,Collection,Lazarus Group|Kimsuky|CopyKittens|FIN6
T1560.002,Archive via Library,Collection,Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390
T1560.001,Archive via Utility,Collection,APT41|Soft Cell|Turla|Gallmaker|APT33|APT39|MuddyWater|Magic Hound|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|CopyKittens|APT3|Sowbug|menuPass|APT1|Ke3chang
T1560,Archive Collected Data,Collection,menuPass|APT32|Honeybee|Patchwork|APT28|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Ke3chang
T1560.001,Archive via Utility,Collection,Chimera|APT41|Soft Cell|Turla|Gallmaker|APT33|APT39|MuddyWater|Magic Hound|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|CopyKittens|APT3|Sowbug|menuPass|APT1|Ke3chang
T1560,Archive Collected Data,Collection,menuPass|APT32|Patchwork|Honeybee|APT28|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Ke3chang
T1499.004,Application or System Exploitation,Impact,no
T1499.003,Application Exhaustion Flood,Impact,no
T1499.002,Service Exhaustion Flood,Impact,no
@@ -142,60 +239,60 @@ T1134.002,Create Process with Token,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Turla|L
T1134.001,Token Impersonation/Theft,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,APT28
T1213.002,Sharepoint,Collection,Ke3chang|APT28
T1213.001,Confluence,Collection,no
T1555.003,Credentials from Web Browsers,Credential Access,Magic Hound|Sandworm Team|Inception|Stealth Falcon|OilRig|Leafminer|APT33|APT3|Kimsuky|TA505|Stolen Pencil|MuddyWater|APT37|Patchwork|Molerats
T1555.003,Credentials from Web Browsers,Credential Access,FIN6|Magic Hound|Sandworm Team|Inception|Stealth Falcon|OilRig|Leafminer|APT33|APT3|Kimsuky|TA505|Stolen Pencil|MuddyWater|APT37|Patchwork|Molerats
T1555.002,Securityd Memory,Credential Access,no
T1555.001,Keychain,Credential Access,no
T1559.002,Dynamic Data Exchange,Execution,Sharpshooter|TA505|MuddyWater|Gallmaker|Patchwork|Cobalt Group|APT37|APT28|FIN7
T1559.002,Dynamic Data Exchange,Execution,Sharpshooter|TA505|MuddyWater|Gallmaker|Patchwork|Cobalt Group|APT37|FIN7|APT28
T1559.001,Component Object Model,Execution,Gamaredon Group|MuddyWater
T1559,Inter-Process Communication,Execution,no
T1558.002,Silver Ticket,Credential Access,no
T1558.001,Golden Ticket,Credential Access,Ke3chang
T1558,Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets,Credential Access,no
T1557.001,LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay,Credential Access|Collection,no
T1557.001,LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay,Credential Access|Collection,Wizard Spider
T1557,Man-in-the-Middle,Credential Access|Collection,no
T1556.002,Password Filter DLL,Credential Access|Defense Evasion,Strider
T1556.001,Domain Controller Authentication,Credential Access|Defense Evasion,no
T1556.001,Domain Controller Authentication,Credential Access|Defense Evasion,Chimera
T1556,Modify Authentication Process,Credential Access|Defense Evasion,no
T1056.004,Credential API Hooking,Collection|Credential Access,PLATINUM
T1056.003,Web Portal Capture,Collection|Credential Access,no
T1056.002,GUI Input Capture,Collection|Credential Access,FIN4
T1056.001,Keylogging,Collection|Credential Access,APT32|Sandworm Team|APT39|APT41|Kimsuky|menuPass|Stolen Pencil|FIN4|APT38|Ke3chang|OilRig|PLATINUM|Sowbug|Magic Hound|Group5|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT3|Darkhotel|APT28
T1555,Credentials from Password Stores,Credential Access,APT39|OilRig|MuddyWater|Leafminer|APT33|Turla|Stealth Falcon
T1056.001,Keylogging,Collection|Credential Access,APT32|Sandworm Team|APT39|APT41|Kimsuky|menuPass|Stolen Pencil|FIN4|APT38|Ke3chang|OilRig|PLATINUM|Magic Hound|Sowbug|Group5|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT3|Darkhotel|APT28
T1555,Credentials from Password Stores,Credential Access,FIN6|APT39|OilRig|MuddyWater|Leafminer|APT33|Turla|Stealth Falcon
T1552.005,Cloud Instance Metadata API,Credential Access,no
T1003.008,/etc/passwd and /etc/shadow,Credential Access,no
T1003.007,Proc Filesystem,Credential Access,no
T1003.006,DCSync,Credential Access,no
T1558.003,Kerberoasting,Credential Access,no
T1558.003,Kerberoasting,Credential Access,Wizard Spider
T1552.006,Group Policy Preferences,Credential Access,APT33
T1003.003,NTDS,Credential Access,FIN6|Dragonfly 2.0
T1003.002,Security Account Manager,Credential Access,Threat Group-3390|Ke3chang|Soft Cell|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|menuPass
T1003.001,LSASS Memory,Credential Access,Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Blue Mockingbird|Silence|Threat Group-3390|Leviathan|APT41|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|Stolen Pencil|APT32|Lazarus Group|Leafminer|Magic Hound|MuddyWater|PLATINUM|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|OilRig|FIN6|APT3|APT28|APT1|Ke3chang|Cleaver
T1003.003,NTDS,Credential Access,Wizard Spider|Chimera|FIN6|Dragonfly 2.0
T1003.002,Security Account Manager,Credential Access,Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390|Ke3chang|Soft Cell|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|menuPass
T1003.001,LSASS Memory,Credential Access,Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Blue Mockingbird|Silence|Threat Group-3390|Leviathan|APT41|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|Stolen Pencil|APT32|Lazarus Group|Magic Hound|Leafminer|MuddyWater|FIN8|PLATINUM|BRONZE BUTLER|OilRig|FIN6|APT3|APT28|APT1|Ke3chang|Cleaver
T1110.004,Credential Stuffing,Credential Access,no
T1110.003,Password Spraying,Credential Access,APT33|Leafminer|Lazarus Group
T1110.002,Password Cracking,Credential Access,APT41|Dragonfly 2.0|APT3
T1110.001,Password Guessing,Credential Access,no
T1021.006,Windows Remote Management,Lateral Movement,Threat Group-3390
T1110.003,Password Spraying,Credential Access,APT28|APT33|Leafminer|Lazarus Group
T1110.002,Password Cracking,Credential Access,FIN6|APT41|Dragonfly 2.0|APT3
T1110.001,Password Guessing,Credential Access,APT28
T1021.006,Windows Remote Management,Lateral Movement,Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390
T1021.005,VNC,Lateral Movement,GCMAN
T1021.004,SSH,Lateral Movement,Rocke|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|OilRig|menuPass|GCMAN
T1021.003,Distributed Component Object Model,Lateral Movement,no
T1021.002,SMB/Windows Admin Shares,Lateral Movement,Blue Mockingbird|APT39|APT32|Orangeworm|FIN8|APT3|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-1314|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang
T1021.001,Remote Desktop Protocol,Lateral Movement,Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Stolen Pencil|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|APT3|OilRig|menuPass|FIN10|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|APT1|Axiom
T1021.002,SMB/Windows Admin Shares,Lateral Movement,Wizard Spider|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|APT39|APT32|Orangeworm|FIN8|APT3|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-1314|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang
T1021.001,Remote Desktop Protocol,Lateral Movement,Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Stolen Pencil|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|APT3|OilRig|menuPass|FIN10|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|APT1|Axiom
T1554,Compromise Client Software Binary,Persistence,no
T1036.006,Space after Filename,Defense Evasion,no
T1036.005,Match Legitimate Name or Location,Defense Evasion,Rocke|Sandworm Team|APT39|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Silence|APT41|menuPass|TEMP.Veles|MuddyWater|BRONZE BUTLER|Sowbug|APT32|Patchwork|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Carbanak|APT1
T1036.004,Masquerade Task or Service,Defense Evasion,Wizard Spider|APT-C-36|Carbanak|APT32|FIN6|FIN7
T1036.005,Match Legitimate Name or Location,Defense Evasion,Chimera|PROMETHIUM|Rocke|Sandworm Team|APT39|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Silence|APT41|menuPass|TEMP.Veles|MuddyWater|BRONZE BUTLER|Sowbug|APT32|Patchwork|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Carbanak|APT1
T1036.004,Masquerade Task or Service,Defense Evasion,Lazarus Group|PROMETHIUM|Wizard Spider|APT-C-36|Carbanak|APT32|FIN6|FIN7
T1036.003,Rename System Utilities,Defense Evasion,menuPass|APT32|Soft Cell|PLATINUM
T1036.002,Right-to-Left Override,Defense Evasion,BRONZE BUTLER|BlackTech|Ke3chang|Scarlet Mimic
T1036.001,Invalid Code Signature,Defense Evasion,Windshift
T1036.001,Invalid Code Signature,Defense Evasion,Windshift|APT37
T1553.003,SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking,Defense Evasion,no
T1553.002,Code Signing,Defense Evasion,Patchwork|Silence|APT41|FIN6|TA505|FIN7|Honeybee|Leviathan|APT37|CopyKittens|Winnti Group|Suckfly|Molerats|Darkhotel
T1553.002,Code Signing,Defense Evasion,Wizard Spider|PROMETHIUM|Patchwork|Silence|APT41|FIN6|TA505|FIN7|Honeybee|Leviathan|CopyKittens|Winnti Group|Suckfly|Molerats|Darkhotel
T1553.001,Gatekeeper Bypass,Defense Evasion,no
T1553,Subvert Trust Controls,Defense Evasion,no
T1027.003,Steganography,Defense Evasion,BRONZE BUTLER|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|APT37
T1027.002,Software Packing,Defense Evasion,TA505|Rocke|Soft Cell|The White Company|APT39|APT38|Dark Caracal|Elderwood|APT3|Patchwork|APT29|Night Dragon
T1027.001,Binary Padding,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|APT32|Leviathan|BRONZE BUTLER|Moafee
T1027.002,Software Packing,Defense Evasion,Lazarus Group|TA505|Rocke|Soft Cell|The White Company|APT39|APT38|Dark Caracal|Elderwood|APT3|Patchwork|APT29|Night Dragon
T1027.001,Binary Padding,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|APT32|Patchwork|Leviathan|BRONZE BUTLER|Moafee
T1222.002,Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification,Defense Evasion,Rocke|APT32
T1222.001,Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification,Defense Evasion,no
T1222.001,Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification,Defense Evasion,Wizard Spider
T1552.004,Private Keys,Credential Access,Rocke
T1552.003,Bash History,Credential Access,no
T1552.002,Credentials in Registry,Credential Access,APT32
@@ -204,7 +301,7 @@ T1552,Unsecured Credentials,Credential Access,no
T1216.001,PubPrn,Defense Evasion,APT32
T1070.006,Timestomp,Defense Evasion,Rocke|TEMP.Veles|APT32|Lazarus Group|APT28
T1070.005,Network Share Connection Removal,Defense Evasion,Threat Group-3390
T1070.004,File Deletion,Defense Evasion,Sandworm Team|Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Wizard Spider|APT41|Kimsuky|Silence|The White Company|TEMP.Veles|APT32|APT38|Patchwork|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|menuPass|FIN8|OilRig|FIN5|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|APT3|FIN10|APT28|Threat Group-3390|Group5|Lazarus Group|APT18|APT29
T1070.004,File Deletion,Defense Evasion,FIN6|Sandworm Team|Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Wizard Spider|APT41|Kimsuky|Silence|The White Company|TEMP.Veles|APT32|APT38|menuPass|Patchwork|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|OilRig|Magic Hound|FIN5|APT3|FIN10|Threat Group-3390|APT28|Group5|Lazarus Group|APT18|APT29
T1070.003,Clear Command History,Defense Evasion,APT41
T1550.004,Web Session Cookie,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,no
T1550.001,Application Access Token,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,APT28
@@ -213,22 +310,22 @@ T1550.002,Pass the Hash,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,Soft Cell|APT32|Night D
T1550,Use Alternate Authentication Material,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,no
T1548.004,Elevated Execution with Prompt,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
T1548.003,Sudo and Sudo Caching,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
T1548.002,Bypass User Access Control,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,APT37|MuddyWater|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|Threat Group-3390|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork|APT29
T1548.002,Bypass User Account Control,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,APT37|MuddyWater|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|Threat Group-3390|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork|APT29
T1548.001,Setuid and Setgid,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
T1548,Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
T1136.003,Cloud Account,Persistence,no
T1070.002,Clear Linux or Mac System Logs,Defense Evasion,Rocke
T1070.001,Clear Windows Event Logs,Defense Evasion,APT41|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|APT32|FIN8|FIN5|APT28
T1070.001,Clear Windows Event Logs,Defense Evasion,APT41|APT38|APT32|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|FIN5|APT28
T1136.002,Domain Account,Persistence,Soft Cell
T1136.001,Local Account,Persistence,APT39|APT41|Dragonfly 2.0|Leafminer|APT3
T1136.001,Local Account,Persistence,APT39|APT41|Leafminer|Dragonfly 2.0|APT3
T1547.011,Plist Modification,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
T1547.010,Port Monitors,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
T1547.009,Shortcut Modification,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,APT39|Darkhotel|APT29|Gorgon Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Leviathan|Lazarus Group
T1547.008,LSASS Driver,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
T1547.007,Re-opened Applications,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
T1547.006,Kernel Modules and Extensions,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
T1547.005,Security Support Provider,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
T1547.004,Winlogon Helper DLL,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Tropic Trooper|Turla
T1547.005,Security Support Provider,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Lazarus Group
T1547.004,Winlogon Helper DLL,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Wizard Spider|Tropic Trooper|Turla
T1547.003,Time Providers,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
T1546.014,Emond,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
T1546.013,PowerShell Profile,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,Turla
@@ -247,22 +344,22 @@ T1546.004,.bash_profile and .bashrc,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
T1546.003,Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,APT33|Blue Mockingbird|Turla|Leviathan|APT29
T1546.002,Screensaver,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
T1546.001,Change Default File Association,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,Kimsuky
T1547.001,Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Silence|RTM|Inception|APT41|Machete|Kimsuky|APT33|APT39|APT32|APT18|Turla|Dark Caracal|Cobalt Group|Honeybee|Threat Group-3390|Dragonfly 2.0|Gorgon Group|Ke3chang|APT19|Leviathan|MuddyWater|APT37|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|APT3|FIN10|FIN7|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT29|Darkhotel
T1547.001,Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Wizard Spider|PROMETHIUM|Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Silence|RTM|Inception|APT41|Machete|Kimsuky|APT33|APT39|APT32|APT18|Turla|Threat Group-3390|Dragonfly 2.0|Gorgon Group|Dark Caracal|Cobalt Group|Honeybee|APT19|Ke3chang|Leviathan|MuddyWater|APT37|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|APT3|FIN10|FIN7|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT29|Darkhotel
T1218.002,Control Panel,Defense Evasion,no
T1218.010,Regsvr32,Defense Evasion,Blue Mockingbird|Inception|WIRTE|Cobalt Group|APT19|Leviathan|APT32|Deep Panda
T1218.009,Regsvcs/Regasm,Defense Evasion,no
T1218.005,Mshta,Defense Evasion,Inception|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|FIN7
T1218.004,InstallUtil,Defense Evasion,no
T1218.005,Mshta,Defense Evasion,Lazarus Group|Inception|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|FIN7
T1218.004,InstallUtil,Defense Evasion,menuPass
T1218.001,Compiled HTML File,Defense Evasion,APT41|Silence|Lazarus Group|Dark Caracal|OilRig
T1218.003,CMSTP,Defense Evasion,Cobalt Group|MuddyWater
T1218.011,Rundll32,Defense Evasion,APT32|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|TA505|MuddyWater|APT29|APT19|CopyKittens|APT3|Carbanak|APT28
T1218.011,Rundll32,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|APT32|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|TA505|MuddyWater|APT29|APT19|CopyKittens|APT3|Carbanak|APT28
T1547,Boot or Logon Autostart Execution,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
T1546,Event Triggered Execution,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
T1098.003,Add Office 365 Global Administrator Role,Persistence,no
T1098.002,Exchange Email Delegate Permissions,Persistence,Magic Hound
T1098.001,Additional Azure Service Principal Credentials,Persistence,no
T1098.001,Additional Cloud Credentials,Persistence,no
T1543.004,Launch Daemon,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
T1543.003,Windows Service,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Blue Mockingbird|DarkVishnya|Wizard Spider|APT32|APT41|Kimsuky|Tropic Trooper|Cobalt Group|Ke3chang|Honeybee|FIN7|Threat Group-3390|APT19|APT3|Lazarus Group|Carbanak
T1543.003,Windows Service,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,PROMETHIUM|Blue Mockingbird|DarkVishnya|Wizard Spider|APT32|APT41|Kimsuky|Tropic Trooper|Ke3chang|Cobalt Group|Honeybee|Threat Group-3390|FIN7|APT19|APT3|Lazarus Group|Carbanak
T1543.002,Systemd Service,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Rocke
T1543.001,Launch Agent,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
T1037.005,Startup Items,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
@@ -277,7 +374,7 @@ T1055.005,Thread Local Storage,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
T1055.004,Asynchronous Procedure Call,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
T1055.003,Thread Execution Hijacking,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
T1055.002,Portable Executable Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Rocke|Gorgon Group
T1055.001,Dynamic-link Library Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,TA505|Turla|Tropic Trooper|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda
T1055.001,Dynamic-link Library Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Wizard Spider|TA505|Turla|Tropic Trooper|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda
T1037.003,Network Logon Script,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
T1543,Create or Modify System Process,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
T1037.002,Logon Script (Mac),Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
@@ -285,13 +382,13 @@ T1037.001,Logon Script (Windows),Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Cobalt Group|A
T1542.003,Bootkit,Persistence|Defense Evasion,APT41|Lazarus Group|APT28
T1542.002,Component Firmware,Persistence|Defense Evasion,Equation
T1542.001,System Firmware,Persistence|Defense Evasion,no
T1505.003,Web Shell,Persistence,Tropic Trooper|Soft Cell|Threat Group-3390|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|APT32|OilRig|Deep Panda
T1505.003,Web Shell,Persistence,Tropic Trooper|Soft Cell|Threat Group-3390|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|APT32|Deep Panda
T1505.002,Transport Agent,Persistence,no
T1505.001,SQL Stored Procedures,Persistence,no
T1053.003,Cron,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Rocke
T1053.004,Launchd,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
T1053.001,At (Linux),Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
T1053.005,Scheduled Task,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT-C-36|BRONZE BUTLER|APT41|Machete|Soft Cell|Silence|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|Patchwork|OilRig|Rancor|Cobalt Group|FIN8|menuPass|FIN10|APT32|FIN7|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|APT3|APT29
T1053.005,Scheduled Task,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT-C-36|BRONZE BUTLER|APT41|Machete|Soft Cell|Silence|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|OilRig|Rancor|Dragonfly 2.0|Cobalt Group|Patchwork|FIN8|FIN10|menuPass|APT32|FIN7|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|APT3|APT29
T1053.002,At (Windows),Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,BRONZE BUTLER|Threat Group-3390|APT18
T1542,Pre-OS Boot,Defense Evasion|Persistence,no
T1137.001,Office Template Macros,Persistence,MuddyWater
@@ -316,12 +413,12 @@ T1526,Cloud Service Discovery,Discovery,no
T1505,Server Software Component,Persistence,no
T1499,Endpoint Denial of Service,Impact,no
T1497,Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion,Defense Evasion|Discovery,no
T1498,Network Denial of Service,Impact,no
T1498,Network Denial of Service,Impact,APT28
T1496,Resource Hijacking,Impact,Blue Mockingbird|Rocke|APT41|Lazarus Group
T1495,Firmware Corruption,Impact,no
T1491,Defacement,Impact,no
T1490,Inhibit System Recovery,Impact,no
T1489,Service Stop,Impact,Lazarus Group
T1489,Service Stop,Impact,Wizard Spider|Lazarus Group
T1486,Data Encrypted for Impact,Impact,APT41|TA505|APT38
T1485,Data Destruction,Impact,Sandworm Team|Lazarus Group|APT38
T1484,Group Policy Modification,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
@@ -330,38 +427,38 @@ T1480,Execution Guardrails,Defense Evasion,no
T1222,File and Directory Permissions Modification,Defense Evasion,no
T1221,Template Injection,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|Frankenstein|Inception|APT28|Tropic Trooper|Dragonfly 2.0|DarkHydrus
T1220,XSL Script Processing,Defense Evasion,Cobalt Group
T1197,BITS Jobs,Defense Evasion|Persistence,Patchwork|APT41|Leviathan
T1217,Browser Bookmark Discovery,Discovery,no
T1213,Data from Information Repositories,Collection,Turla
T1189,Drive-by Compromise,Initial Access,Turla|Windshift|RTM|Darkhotel|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|BRONZE BUTLER|Leafminer|Dark Caracal|APT19|APT32|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|Elderwood|APT37|Patchwork|PLATINUM
T1203,Exploitation for Client Execution,Execution,Sandworm Team|MuddyWater|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT41|admin@338|Threat Group-3390|APT12|The White Company|APT33|APT32|APT28|Tropic Trooper|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Cobalt Group|APT37|Patchwork|Leviathan|Elderwood|TA459|APT29
T1189,Drive-by Compromise,Initial Access,Dragonfly|PROMETHIUM|Turla|Windshift|RTM|Darkhotel|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|BRONZE BUTLER|Leafminer|APT32|Lazarus Group|APT19|Dark Caracal|Threat Group-3390|Elderwood|APT37|Patchwork|PLATINUM
T1212,Exploitation for Credential Access,Credential Access,no
T1211,Exploitation for Defense Evasion,Defense Evasion,APT28
T1190,Exploit Public-Facing Application,Initial Access,Blue Mockingbird|Rocke|APT39|BlackTech|APT41|Soft Cell|Night Dragon|Axiom
T1210,Exploitation of Remote Services,Lateral Movement,Threat Group-3390|APT28
T1202,Indirect Command Execution,Defense Evasion,no
T1217,Browser Bookmark Discovery,Discovery,no
T1190,Exploit Public-Facing Application,Initial Access,APT28|APT29|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Blue Mockingbird|Rocke|APT39|BlackTech|APT41|Soft Cell|Night Dragon|Axiom
T1210,Exploitation of Remote Services,Lateral Movement,Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390|APT28
T1203,Exploitation for Client Execution,Execution,Sandworm Team|MuddyWater|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT41|admin@338|Threat Group-3390|APT12|The White Company|APT33|APT32|APT28|Tropic Trooper|Lazarus Group|Cobalt Group|BRONZE BUTLER|APT37|Patchwork|Leviathan|APT29|Elderwood|TA459
T1200,Hardware Additions,Initial Access,DarkVishnya
T1201,Password Policy Discovery,Discovery,Turla|OilRig
T1219,Remote Access Software,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|DarkVishnya|RTM|Kimsuky|Night Dragon|Thrip|Cobalt Group|Carbanak
T1202,Indirect Command Execution,Defense Evasion,no
T1207,Rogue Domain Controller,Defense Evasion,no
T1199,Trusted Relationship,Initial Access,APT28|menuPass
T1197,BITS Jobs,Defense Evasion|Persistence,Patchwork|APT41|Leviathan
T1211,Exploitation for Defense Evasion,Defense Evasion,APT28
T1219,Remote Access Software,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|DarkVishnya|RTM|Kimsuky|Night Dragon|Thrip|Cobalt Group|Carbanak
T1218,Signed Binary Proxy Execution,Defense Evasion,no
T1204,User Execution,Execution,no
T1213,Data from Information Repositories,Collection,FIN6|Turla
T1216,Signed Script Proxy Execution,Defense Evasion,no
T1201,Password Policy Discovery,Discovery,Turla|OilRig
T1204,User Execution,Execution,no
T1195,Supply Chain Compromise,Initial Access,Elderwood
T1205,Traffic Signaling,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Command And Control,no
T1199,Trusted Relationship,Initial Access,GOLD SOUTHFIELD|APT28|menuPass
T1176,Browser Extensions,Persistence,Kimsuky|Stolen Pencil
T1175,Component Object Model and Distributed COM,Lateral Movement|Execution,no
T1187,Forced Authentication,Credential Access,DarkHydrus|Dragonfly 2.0
T1185,Man in the Browser,Collection,no
T1134,Access Token Manipulation,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Blue Mockingbird
T1140,Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information,Defense Evasion,Rocke|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Molerats|Frankenstein|Turla|WIRTE|Darkhotel|Tropic Trooper|menuPass|Honeybee|Gorgon Group|APT19|Threat Group-3390|Leviathan|APT28|MuddyWater|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER
T1134,Access Token Manipulation,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,FIN6|Blue Mockingbird
T1136,Create Account,Persistence,no
T1140,Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information,Defense Evasion,Rocke|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Molerats|Frankenstein|Turla|WIRTE|Darkhotel|Tropic Trooper|menuPass|Honeybee|Threat Group-3390|APT19|Gorgon Group|Leviathan|MuddyWater|APT28|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER
T1149,LC_MAIN Hijacking,Defense Evasion,no
T1135,Network Share Discovery,Discovery,APT32|APT39|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT1|Dragonfly 2.0|Sowbug
T1137,Office Application Startup,Persistence,Gamaredon Group|APT32
T1153,Source,Execution,no
T1133,External Remote Services,Persistence|Initial Access,Sandworm Team|APT41|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|Night Dragon|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|Ke3chang|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|APT18
T1135,Network Share Discovery,Discovery,Wizard Spider|APT32|APT39|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT1|Dragonfly 2.0|Sowbug
T1133,External Remote Services,Persistence|Initial Access,Wizard Spider|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Chimera|Sandworm Team|APT41|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|Night Dragon|OilRig|Ke3chang|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|APT18
T1132,Data Encoding,Command And Control,no
T1129,Shared Modules,Execution,no
T1127,Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution,Defense Evasion,no
@@ -369,28 +466,28 @@ T1125,Video Capture,Collection,Silence|FIN7
T1124,System Time Discovery,Discovery,The White Company|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Turla
T1123,Audio Capture,Collection,APT37
T1120,Peripheral Device Discovery,Discovery,Turla|APT37|Gamaredon Group|Equation|APT28
T1119,Automated Collection,Collection,Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT1|APT28|Patchwork|OilRig|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|FIN6
T1119,Automated Collection,Collection,Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT1|APT28|Patchwork|OilRig|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|FIN6
T1115,Clipboard Data,Collection,APT39|APT38
T1114,Email Collection,Collection,no
T1113,Screen Capture,Collection,Gamaredon Group|APT39|Silence|MuddyWater|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|Dark Caracal|FIN7|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|Group5|APT28
T1112,Modify Registry,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|Turla|APT32|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|Threat Group-3390|Honeybee|Patchwork|Gorgon Group|FIN8
T1112,Modify Registry,Defense Evasion,Lazarus Group|Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|Turla|APT32|APT38|Patchwork|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|Threat Group-3390|Honeybee|Gorgon Group|FIN8
T1111,Two-Factor Authentication Interception,Credential Access,no
T1110,Brute Force,Credential Access,DarkVishnya|APT39|OilRig|FIN5|Turla
T1108,Redundant Access,Defense Evasion|Persistence,no
T1106,Native API,Execution,Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Turla|Silence|Gorgon Group|APT37
T1105,Ingress Tool Transfer,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Silence|APT-C-36|APT41|Soft Cell|TA505|WIRTE|APT33|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Rancor|Cobalt Group|Turla|Gorgon Group|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|APT37|FIN8|PLATINUM|Leviathan|Elderwood|Magic Hound|APT3|APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN7|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28
T1106,Native API,Execution,Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Turla|Silence|Gorgon Group|APT37
T1105,Ingress Tool Transfer,Command And Control,Chimera|Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Silence|APT-C-36|APT41|Soft Cell|TA505|WIRTE|APT33|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Rancor|Cobalt Group|Turla|Gorgon Group|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|APT37|FIN8|Leviathan|Elderwood|PLATINUM|APT3|Magic Hound|APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN7|menuPass|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28
T1104,Multi-Stage Channels,Command And Control,APT41|MuddyWater|APT3
T1102,Web Service,Command And Control,Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Inception|FIN6
T1098,Account Manipulation,Persistence,APT3|Dragonfly 2.0|Lazarus Group
T1095,Non-Application Layer Protocol,Command And Control,APT29|PLATINUM|APT3
T1102,Web Service,Command And Control,Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Inception|FIN6
T1098,Account Manipulation,Persistence,Dragonfly 2.0|APT3|Lazarus Group
T1095,Non-Application Layer Protocol,Command And Control,FIN6|APT29|PLATINUM|APT3
T1092,Communication Through Removable Media,Command And Control,APT28
T1091,Replication Through Removable Media,Lateral Movement|Initial Access,Tropic Trooper|Darkhotel|APT28
T1090,Proxy,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|APT41|Turla
T1090,Proxy,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|APT41|Turla
T1087,Account Discovery,Discovery,no
T1083,File and Directory Discovery,Discovery,Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Inception|APT41|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|APT18|Leafminer|Honeybee|Dark Caracal|Dragonfly 2.0|Magic Hound|Sowbug|BRONZE BUTLER|APT3|APT28|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
T1082,System Information Discovery,Discovery,Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|Honeybee|APT19|APT37|APT32|Magic Hound|OilRig|APT3|Sowbug|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
T1080,Taint Shared Content,Lateral Movement,BRONZE BUTLER|Darkhotel
T1078,Valid Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|APT39|FIN4|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|Leviathan|APT33|OilRig|FIN5|menuPass|APT28|FIN10|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390|APT18|PittyTiger|Carbanak
T1083,File and Directory Discovery,Discovery,Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Inception|APT41|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|APT18|Leafminer|Honeybee|Dragonfly 2.0|Dark Caracal|APT3|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|Sowbug|APT28|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
T1082,System Information Discovery,Discovery,Wizard Spider|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|APT19|APT32|Honeybee|APT37|Sowbug|OilRig|Magic Hound|APT3|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
T1080,Taint Shared Content,Lateral Movement,Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Darkhotel
T1078,Valid Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,Chimera|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|APT39|FIN4|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|Leviathan|APT33|OilRig|FIN5|APT28|menuPass|FIN10|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390|APT18|PittyTiger|Carbanak
T1074,Data Staged,Collection,Wizard Spider
T1072,Software Deployment Tools,Execution|Lateral Movement,Silence|APT32|Threat Group-1314
T1071,Application Layer Protocol,Command And Control,Rocke|Magic Hound|Dragonfly 2.0
@@ -400,34 +497,34 @@ T1068,Exploitation for Privilege Escalation,Privilege Escalation,Whitefly|APT33|
T1064,Scripting,Defense Evasion|Execution,no
T1062,Hypervisor,Persistence,no
T1061,Graphical User Interface,Execution,no
T1059,Command and Scripting Interpreter,Execution,APT32|Molerats|Whitefly|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|FIN7|OilRig|FIN5|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Ke3chang
T1059,Command and Scripting Interpreter,Execution,APT32|Molerats|Whitefly|APT39|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN7|OilRig|FIN5|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Ke3chang
T1057,Process Discovery,Discovery,Rocke|Frankenstein|Inception|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|APT38|Tropic Trooper|APT37|Honeybee|OilRig|APT3|Magic Hound|APT28|Winnti Group|Stealth Falcon|Poseidon Group|Lazarus Group|Molerats|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang
T1056,Input Capture,Collection|Credential Access,no
T1055,Process Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,APT32|Sharpshooter|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|Turla|Cobalt Group|APT37|Honeybee|PLATINUM
T1055,Process Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,APT32|Sharpshooter|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|Cobalt Group|APT37|Honeybee|Turla|PLATINUM
T1053,Scheduled Task/Job,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
T1052,Exfiltration Over Physical Medium,Exfiltration,no
T1051,Shared Webroot,Lateral Movement,no
T1049,System Network Connections Discovery,Discovery,Tropic Trooper|APT41|APT38|Soft Cell|APT32|APT1|OilRig|APT3|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
T1048,Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol,Exfiltration,no
T1047,Windows Management Instrumentation,Execution,Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT41|FIN6|Soft Cell|APT32|MuddyWater|OilRig|Threat Group-3390|FIN8|Leviathan|menuPass|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT29|Deep Panda
T1046,Network Service Scanning,Discovery,Rocke|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT39|APT32|Leafminer|OilRig|Cobalt Group|menuPass|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390
T1043,Commonly Used Port,Command And Control,Machete|OilRig|APT28|TEMP.Veles|Night Dragon|APT29|APT18|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN7|FIN8|APT37|Magic Hound|APT3|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390
T1047,Windows Management Instrumentation,Execution,Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT41|FIN6|Soft Cell|APT32|MuddyWater|OilRig|Threat Group-3390|Leviathan|FIN8|menuPass|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT29|Deep Panda
T1046,Network Service Scanning,Discovery,Rocke|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT39|APT32|Cobalt Group|Leafminer|OilRig|menuPass|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390
T1043,Commonly Used Port,Command And Control,OilRig|APT28|TEMP.Veles|Night Dragon|APT29|APT18|APT19|FIN7|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|APT37|Magic Hound|APT3|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390
T1041,Exfiltration Over C2 Channel,Exfiltration,Sandworm Team|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Kimsuky|Soft Cell|APT32|APT3|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Ke3chang
T1040,Network Sniffing,Credential Access|Discovery,Sandworm Team|DarkVishnya|APT33|Stolen Pencil|APT28
T1039,Data from Network Shared Drive,Collection,Sowbug|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass
T1039,Data from Network Shared Drive,Collection,Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Sowbug|menuPass
T1037,Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Rocke
T1036,Masquerading,Defense Evasion,Windshift|APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|Dragonfly 2.0
T1034,Path Interception,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
T1033,System Owner/User Discovery,Discovery,Frankenstein|APT41|Soft Cell|Tropic Trooper|APT39|MuddyWater|APT32|APT37|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|Magic Hound|FIN10|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3
T1033,System Owner/User Discovery,Discovery,Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT41|Soft Cell|Tropic Trooper|APT39|MuddyWater|APT32|APT37|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|Magic Hound|FIN10|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3
T1030,Data Transfer Size Limits,Exfiltration,Threat Group-3390
T1029,Scheduled Transfer,Exfiltration,no
T1027,Obfuscated Files or Information,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|APT41|Machete|Soft Cell|Turla|TA505|Silence|APT33|Night Dragon|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|APT29|APT18|Tropic Trooper|Cobalt Group|Patchwork|Leafminer|APT37|Threat Group-3390|Honeybee|Dark Caracal|menuPass|APT19|BlackOasis|FIN8|Leviathan|Elderwood|MuddyWater|FIN7|Magic Hound|OilRig|APT3|APT32|Group5|Dust Storm|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT28
T1027,Obfuscated Files or Information,Defense Evasion,FIN6|Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|APT41|Machete|Soft Cell|Turla|TA505|Silence|APT33|Night Dragon|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|APT29|APT18|Tropic Trooper|Honeybee|Leafminer|APT37|Dark Caracal|Patchwork|Threat Group-3390|APT19|menuPass|Cobalt Group|BlackOasis|Elderwood|FIN8|Leviathan|MuddyWater|FIN7|OilRig|Magic Hound|APT3|APT32|Group5|Dust Storm|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT28
T1026,Multiband Communication,Command And Control,Lazarus Group
T1025,Data from Removable Media,Collection,Machete|Turla|Gamaredon Group|APT28
T1021,Remote Services,Lateral Movement,no
T1020,Automated Exfiltration,Exfiltration,Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Honeybee
T1018,Remote System Discovery,Discovery,Sandworm Team|Rocke|Wizard Spider|Silence|Soft Cell|APT39|APT32|Deep Panda|Threat Group-3390|Dragonfly 2.0|Leafminer|Ke3chang|FIN8|APT3|FIN5|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN6|Turla
T1016,System Network Configuration Discovery,Discovery,Sandworm Team|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT41|Soft Cell|APT32|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|Magic Hound|OilRig|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3|Naikon|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
T1020,Automated Exfiltration,Exfiltration,Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Honeybee
T1018,Remote System Discovery,Discovery,Sandworm Team|Rocke|Wizard Spider|Silence|Soft Cell|APT39|APT32|Deep Panda|Threat Group-3390|Dragonfly 2.0|Ke3chang|Leafminer|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN5|APT3|menuPass|FIN6|Turla
T1016,System Network Configuration Discovery,Discovery,Wizard Spider|Sandworm Team|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT41|Soft Cell|APT32|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|Magic Hound|OilRig|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3|Naikon|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
T1014,Rootkit,Defense Evasion,Rocke|APT41|APT28|Winnti Group
T1012,Query Registry,Discovery,APT32|Dragonfly 2.0|Threat Group-3390|OilRig|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Turla
T1011,Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium,Exfiltration,no
@@ -435,6 +532,6 @@ T1010,Application Window Discovery,Discovery,Lazarus Group
T1008,Fallback Channels,Command And Control,APT41|OilRig|Lazarus Group
T1007,System Service Discovery,Discovery,BRONZE BUTLER|APT1|OilRig|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
T1006,Direct Volume Access,Defense Evasion,no
T1005,Data from Local System,Collection,Gamaredon Group|APT39|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|Soft Cell|Turla|menuPass|Dark Caracal|Dragonfly 2.0|Honeybee|APT37|APT28|APT3|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|Threat Group-3390|APT1|Ke3chang
T1005,Data from Local System,Collection,FIN6|Gamaredon Group|APT39|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|Soft Cell|Turla|menuPass|Dark Caracal|Honeybee|Dragonfly 2.0|APT37|APT28|BRONZE BUTLER|APT3|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|Threat Group-3390|APT1|Ke3chang
T1003,OS Credential Dumping,Credential Access,APT39|Frankenstein|APT32|APT28|Leviathan|Sowbug|Suckfly|Poseidon Group|Axiom
T1001,Data Obfuscation,Command And Control,Axiom
1 mitre_id technique tactics groups
2 T1205.001 T1059.008 Port Knocking Network Device CLI Defense Evasion|Persistence|Command And Control Execution no
3 T1602.002 Network Device Configuration Dump Collection no
4 T1542.005 TFTP Boot Defense Evasion|Persistence no
5 T1542.004 ROMMONkit Defense Evasion|Persistence no
6 T1602.001 SNMP (MIB Dump) Collection no
7 T1602 Data from Configuration Repository Collection no
8 T1601.002 Downgrade System Image Defense Evasion no
9 T1601.001 Patch System Image Defense Evasion no
10 T1601 Modify System Image Defense Evasion no
11 T1600.002 Disable Crypto Hardware Defense Evasion no
12 T1600.001 Reduce Key Space Defense Evasion no
13 T1600 Weaken Encryption Defense Evasion no
14 T1556.004 Network Device Authentication Credential Access|Defense Evasion no
15 T1599.001 Network Address Translation Traversal Defense Evasion no
16 T1599 Network Boundary Bridging Defense Evasion no
17 T1020.001 Traffic Duplication Exfiltration no
18 T1557.002 ARP Cache Poisoning Credential Access|Collection Cleaver
19 T1588.006 Vulnerabilities Resource Development no
20 T1053.006 Systemd Timers Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation no
21 T1562.008 Disable Cloud Logs Defense Evasion no
22 T1547.012 Print Processors Persistence|Privilege Escalation no
23 T1598.003 Spearphishing Link Reconnaissance no
24 T1598.002 Spearphishing Attachment Reconnaissance no
25 T1598.001 Spearphishing Service Reconnaissance no
26 T1598 Phishing for Information Reconnaissance no
27 T1597.002 Purchase Technical Data Reconnaissance no
28 T1597.001 Threat Intel Vendors Reconnaissance no
29 T1597 Search Closed Sources Reconnaissance no
30 T1596.005 Scan Databases Reconnaissance no
31 T1596.004 CDNs Reconnaissance no
32 T1596.003 Digital Certificates Reconnaissance no
33 T1596.001 DNS/Passive DNS Reconnaissance no
34 T1596.002 WHOIS Reconnaissance no
35 T1596 Search Open Technical Databases Reconnaissance no
36 T1595.002 Vulnerability Scanning Reconnaissance no
37 T1595.001 Scanning IP Blocks Reconnaissance no
38 T1595 Active Scanning Reconnaissance no
39 T1594 Search Victim-Owned Websites Reconnaissance no
40 T1593.002 Search Engines Reconnaissance no
41 T1593.001 Social Media Reconnaissance no
42 T1593 Search Open Websites/Domains Reconnaissance no
43 T1592.004 Client Configurations Reconnaissance no
44 T1592.003 Firmware Reconnaissance no
45 T1592.002 Software Reconnaissance no
46 T1592.001 Hardware Reconnaissance no
47 T1592 Gather Victim Host Information Reconnaissance no
48 T1591.004 Identify Roles Reconnaissance no
49 T1591.003 Identify Business Tempo Reconnaissance no
50 T1591.001 Determine Physical Locations Reconnaissance no
51 T1591.002 Business Relationships Reconnaissance no
52 T1591 Gather Victim Org Information Reconnaissance no
53 T1590.006 Network Security Appliances Reconnaissance no
54 T1590.005 IP Addresses Reconnaissance no
55 T1590.004 Network Topology Reconnaissance no
56 T1590.003 Network Trust Dependencies Reconnaissance no
57 T1590.002 DNS Reconnaissance no
58 T1590.001 Domain Properties Reconnaissance no
59 T1590 Gather Victim Network Information Reconnaissance no
60 T1589.003 Employee Names Reconnaissance no
61 T1589.002 Email Addresses Reconnaissance no
62 T1589.001 Credentials Reconnaissance no
63 T1589 Gather Victim Identity Information Reconnaissance no
64 T1588.005 Exploits Resource Development no
65 T1588.004 Digital Certificates Resource Development no
66 T1588.003 Code Signing Certificates Resource Development Wizard Spider
67 T1588.002 Tool Resource Development no
68 T1588.001 Malware Resource Development Turla|APT1
69 T1588 Obtain Capabilities Resource Development no
70 T1587.004 Exploits Resource Development no
71 T1587.003 Digital Certificates Resource Development APT29|PROMETHIUM
72 T1587.002 Code Signing Certificates Resource Development PROMETHIUM|Patchwork
73 T1587.001 Malware Resource Development Turla|FIN7|Night Dragon|Cleaver
74 T1587 Develop Capabilities Resource Development no
75 T1586.002 Email Accounts Resource Development no
76 T1586.001 Social Media Accounts Resource Development no
77 T1586 Compromise Accounts Resource Development no
78 T1585.002 Email Accounts Resource Development APT1
79 T1585.001 Social Media Accounts Resource Development Cleaver
80 T1585 Establish Accounts Resource Development APT17
81 T1584.006 Web Services Resource Development Turla
82 T1584.005 Botnet Resource Development no
83 T1584.004 Server Resource Development Turla|APT16
84 T1584.003 Virtual Private Server Resource Development Turla
85 T1584.002 DNS Server Resource Development no
86 T1584.001 Domains Resource Development APT1
87 T1583.006 Web Services Resource Development APT17|APT29
88 T1583.005 Botnet Resource Development no
89 T1583.004 Server Resource Development no
90 T1583.003 Virtual Private Server Resource Development TEMP.Veles
91 T1583.002 DNS Server Resource Development no
92 T1584 Compromise Infrastructure Resource Development no
93 T1583.001 Domains Resource Development APT1|APT28
94 T1583 Acquire Infrastructure Resource Development no
95 T1564.007 VBA Stomping Defense Evasion no
96 T1558.004 AS-REP Roasting Credential Access no
97 T1580 Cloud Infrastructure Discovery Discovery no
98 T1218.012 Verclsid Defense Evasion no
99 T1205.001 Port Knocking Defense Evasion|Persistence|Command And Control PROMETHIUM
100 T1564.006 Run Virtual Instance Defense Evasion no
101 T1564.005 Hidden File System Defense Evasion Strider|Equation
102 T1556.003 Pluggable Authentication Modules Credential Access|Defense Evasion no
104 T1562.007 Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall Defense Evasion no
105 T1098.004 SSH Authorized Keys Persistence no
106 T1480.001 Environmental Keying Defense Evasion APT41|Equation
107 T1059.007 JavaScript/JScript Execution APT32|FIN7|Cobalt Group|Molerats|TA505|Silence|Leafminer FIN6|APT32|FIN7|Cobalt Group|Molerats|TA505|Silence|Leafminer
108 T1578.004 Revert Cloud Instance Defense Evasion no
109 T1578.003 Delete Cloud Instance Defense Evasion no
110 T1578.001 Create Snapshot Defense Evasion no
121 T1071.004 DNS Command And Control APT39|Tropic Trooper|OilRig|Ke3chang|Cobalt Group|APT18|APT41|FIN7
122 T1071.003 Mail Protocols Command And Control APT32|SilverTerrier|APT28
123 T1071.002 File Transfer Protocols Command And Control APT41|SilverTerrier|Machete|Honeybee
124 T1071.001 Web Protocols Command And Control Sandworm Team|TA505|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Inception|APT41|SilverTerrier|Machete|APT28|WIRTE|APT33|FIN4|Night Dragon|APT18|APT38|Cobalt Group|APT19|Threat Group-3390|Rancor|Orangeworm|APT37|Ke3chang|Dark Caracal|Turla|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|OilRig|Magic Hound|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon Sandworm Team|TA505|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Inception|APT41|SilverTerrier|Machete|APT28|WIRTE|APT33|FIN4|Night Dragon|APT18|APT38|Threat Group-3390|Cobalt Group|APT37|Turla|APT19|Rancor|Orangeworm|Dark Caracal|Ke3chang|Lazarus Group|APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|OilRig|Magic Hound|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon
125 T1572 Protocol Tunneling Command And Control OilRig|Cobalt Group|FIN6
126 T1048.003 Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol Exfiltration APT32|APT33|Thrip|FIN8|OilRig|Lazarus Group Wizard Spider|FIN6|APT32|APT33|Thrip|FIN8|OilRig|Lazarus Group
127 T1048.002 Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol Exfiltration no
128 T1048.001 Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol Exfiltration no
129 T1001.003 Protocol Impersonation Command And Control Lazarus Group
130 T1001.002 Steganography Command And Control Axiom APT29|Axiom
131 T1001.001 Junk Data Command And Control APT28
132 T1132.002 Non-Standard Encoding Command And Control no
133 T1132.001 Standard Encoding Command And Control Sandworm Team|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|APT33|APT19|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork
136 T1090.002 External Proxy Command And Control APT39|Silence|Soft Cell|MuddyWater|APT3|FIN5|Lazarus Group|menuPass|APT28
137 T1090.001 Internal Proxy Command And Control APT39|Strider
138 T1102.003 One-Way Communication Command And Control Leviathan
139 T1102.002 Bidirectional Communication Command And Control Sandworm Team|APT39|APT12|Turla|FIN7|APT37|Magic Hound|Carbanak APT29|Sandworm Team|APT39|APT12|Turla|FIN7|APT37|Magic Hound|Carbanak
140 T1102.001 Dead Drop Resolver Command And Control Rocke|APT41|BRONZE BUTLER|RTM|Patchwork
141 T1571 Non-Standard Port Command And Control Sandworm Team|Rocke|DarkVishnya|Silence|APT-C-36|Magic Hound|APT33|APT32|TEMP.Veles|Lazarus Group|FIN7
142 T1074.002 Remote Data Staging Collection Threat Group-3390|menuPass|FIN6|Night Dragon|FIN8
143 T1074.001 Local Data Staging Collection Machete|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|Patchwork|Dragonfly 2.0|Honeybee|Leviathan|APT3|FIN5|menuPass|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28 Machete|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|Patchwork|Honeybee|Dragonfly 2.0|Leviathan|FIN5|APT3|menuPass|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28
144 T1078.004 Cloud Accounts Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access APT33
145 T1564.004 NTFS File Attributes Defense Evasion APT32
146 T1564.003 Hidden Window Defense Evasion Gorgon Group|Deep Panda|DarkHydrus|CopyKittens|APT19|APT32|APT28|APT3|Magic Hound
147 T1078.003 Local Accounts Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access Tropic Trooper|FIN10|Stolen Pencil|APT32 PROMETHIUM|Tropic Trooper|FIN10|Stolen Pencil|APT32
148 T1078.002 Domain Accounts Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access TA505|APT3|Threat Group-1314 Wizard Spider|APT29|TA505|APT3|Threat Group-1314
149 T1078.001 Default Accounts Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access no
150 T1564.002 Hidden Users Defense Evasion no
151 T1574.006 LD_PRELOAD Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion Rocke
152 T1574.002 DLL Side-Loading Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion BRONZE BUTLER|Naikon|APT41|Soft Cell|Tropic Trooper|Patchwork|APT19|APT32|APT3|menuPass|Threat Group-3390 BRONZE BUTLER|Naikon|APT41|Soft Cell|Tropic Trooper|APT19|Patchwork|APT32|APT3|menuPass|Threat Group-3390
153 T1574.001 DLL Search Order Hijacking Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion Whitefly|RTM|Threat Group-3390|menuPass
154 T1574.008 Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion no
155 T1574.007 Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion no
161 T1069.001 Local Groups Discovery Turla|OilRig|admin@338
162 T1570 Lateral Tool Transfer Lateral Movement APT32|Wizard Spider|Turla|FIN10
163 T1568.003 DNS Calculation Command And Control APT12
164 T1204.002 Malicious File Execution Magic Hound|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|RTM|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|Machete|admin@338|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|BRONZE BUTLER|Cobalt Group|DarkHydrus|Gorgon Group|Patchwork|OilRig|Dark Caracal|MuddyWater|Lazarus Group|FIN7|APT32|Rancor|APT37|FIN8|APT28|Elderwood|TA459|APT29|Leviathan|menuPass|PLATINUM FIN6|PROMETHIUM|APT30|Magic Hound|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|RTM|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|Machete|admin@338|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|Cobalt Group|BRONZE BUTLER|DarkHydrus|APT32|Dark Caracal|FIN7|Gorgon Group|OilRig|MuddyWater|Lazarus Group|Patchwork|Rancor|TA459|APT28|FIN8|APT37|APT29|menuPass|Elderwood|Leviathan|PLATINUM
165 T1204.001 Malicious Link Execution Patchwork|Windshift|APT32|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|TA505|OilRig|Machete|Leviathan|FIN8|FIN4|Elderwood|Dragonfly 2.0|Cobalt Group|APT39|Night Dragon|APT33|Turla Wizard Spider|Patchwork|Windshift|APT32|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|TA505|OilRig|Machete|Leviathan|FIN8|FIN4|Elderwood|Dragonfly 2.0|Cobalt Group|APT39|Night Dragon|APT33|Turla
166 T1195.003 Compromise Hardware Supply Chain Initial Access no
167 T1195.002 Compromise Software Supply Chain Initial Access Sandworm Team|APT41 GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Dragonfly|Sandworm Team|APT41
168 T1195.001 Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools Initial Access no
169 T1568.001 Fast Flux DNS Command And Control TA505 Machete|TA505
170 T1052.001 Exfiltration over USB Exfiltration Tropic Trooper
171 T1569.002 Service Execution Execution Blue Mockingbird|APT39|APT41|Silence|FIN6|APT32|Honeybee|Ke3chang Wizard Spider|Blue Mockingbird|APT39|APT41|Silence|FIN6|APT32|Honeybee|Ke3chang
172 T1569.001 Launchctl Execution no
173 T1569 System Services Execution no
174 T1568.002 Domain Generation Algorithms Command And Control APT41
176 T1011.001 Exfiltration Over Bluetooth Exfiltration no
177 T1567.002 Exfiltration to Cloud Storage Exfiltration Leviathan|Turla
178 T1567.001 Exfiltration to Code Repository Exfiltration no
179 T1059.006 Python Execution Rocke|BRONZE BUTLER|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|Machete APT29|Rocke|BRONZE BUTLER|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|Machete
180 T1059.005 Visual Basic Execution APT33|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|Rancor|Patchwork|MuddyWater|Honeybee|FIN7|APT37|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|Turla|TA505|Silence|WIRTE|FIN4|Cobalt Group|Gorgon Group|Leviathan|TA459|Magic Hound Lazarus Group|APT33|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|Rancor|Patchwork|MuddyWater|Honeybee|FIN7|APT37|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|Turla|TA505|Silence|WIRTE|FIN4|Cobalt Group|Gorgon Group|TA459|Leviathan|Magic Hound
181 T1059.004 Unix Shell Execution Rocke|APT41
182 T1059.003 Windows Command Shell Execution TA505|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|OilRig|Lazarus Group|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|FIN7|APT41|Soft Cell|Turla|Silence|APT32|APT39|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Dark Caracal|Gorgon Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Rancor|Ke3chang|APT37|Leviathan|FIN8|APT28|Magic Hound|Sowbug|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN10|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Gamaredon Group|Suckfly|Patchwork|Threat Group-1314|APT3|admin@338|APT1 Wizard Spider|FIN6|TA505|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|OilRig|Lazarus Group|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|FIN7|APT41|Soft Cell|Turla|Silence|APT32|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Gorgon Group|Dark Caracal|Ke3chang|Dragonfly 2.0|Rancor|APT37|Leviathan|FIN8|APT28|Sowbug|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|FIN10|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Suckfly|Threat Group-1314|APT3|admin@338|APT1
183 T1059.002 AppleScript Execution no
184 T1059.001 PowerShell Execution Blue Mockingbird|APT39|DarkVishnya|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Inception|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|Soft Cell|TA505|WIRTE|TEMP.Veles|APT33|Gallmaker|Turla|APT19|DarkHydrus|APT28|Thrip|Gorgon Group|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Leviathan|TA459|FIN8|MuddyWater|Magic Hound|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|CopyKittens|APT32|FIN7|FIN10|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Poseidon Group|APT3|APT29|Deep Panda Lazarus Group|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|APT39|DarkVishnya|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Inception|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|Soft Cell|TA505|WIRTE|TEMP.Veles|APT33|Gallmaker|Turla|Gorgon Group|APT19|DarkHydrus|APT28|Dragonfly 2.0|Thrip|Cobalt Group|Leviathan|TA459|MuddyWater|FIN8|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|CopyKittens|OilRig|FIN10|APT32|FIN7|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Poseidon Group|APT3|APT29|Deep Panda
185 T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service Exfiltration no
186 T1497.003 Time Based Evasion Defense Evasion|Discovery no
187 T1497.002 User Activity Based Checks Defense Evasion|Discovery FIN7
188 T1497.001 System Checks Defense Evasion|Discovery Frankenstein
189 T1498.002 Reflection Amplification Impact no
190 T1498.001 Direct Network Flood Impact no
191 T1566.003 Spearphishing via Service Initial Access Magic Hound|Windshift|FIN6|OilRig|Dark Caracal Lazarus Group|Magic Hound|Windshift|FIN6|OilRig|Dark Caracal
192 T1566.002 Spearphishing Link Initial Access Windshift|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|Machete|Kimsuky|TA505|Stolen Pencil|APT39|FIN4|APT32|Night Dragon|Turla|APT28|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|APT33|Elderwood|Leviathan|Magic Hound|Patchwork|APT29|FIN8 Wizard Spider|APT1|Windshift|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|Machete|Kimsuky|TA505|Stolen Pencil|APT39|FIN4|APT32|Night Dragon|OilRig|Turla|APT28|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|APT33|Elderwood|APT29|Leviathan|Patchwork|Magic Hound|FIN8
193 T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment Initial Access Magic Hound|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Mofang|Wizard Spider|RTM|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|APT41|Machete|admin@338|Kimsuky|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|Tropic Trooper|Turla|Gorgon Group|Rancor|DarkHydrus|Cobalt Group|FIN7|OilRig|Lazarus Group|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|FIN8|MuddyWater|APT28|TA459|Leviathan|Patchwork|PLATINUM|Elderwood|APT29|APT37|menuPass APT1|FIN6|APT30|Magic Hound|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Mofang|Wizard Spider|RTM|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|APT41|Machete|admin@338|Kimsuky|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|Tropic Trooper|Turla|Cobalt Group|FIN7|OilRig|Gorgon Group|Rancor|DarkHydrus|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|Lazarus Group|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|MuddyWater|TA459|APT28|PLATINUM|Patchwork|Elderwood|APT29|Leviathan|APT37|menuPass
194 T1566 Phishing Initial Access no GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Dragonfly
195 T1565.003 Runtime Data Manipulation Impact APT38
196 T1565.002 Transmitted Data Manipulation Impact APT38
197 T1565.001 Stored Data Manipulation Impact FIN4|APT38
201 T1563.002 RDP Hijacking Lateral Movement no
202 T1563.001 SSH Hijacking Lateral Movement no
203 T1563 Remote Service Session Hijacking Lateral Movement no
204 T1518.001 Security Software Discovery Discovery Turla|Rocke|Frankenstein|The White Company|Cobalt Group|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|Tropic Trooper|FIN8|Patchwork|Naikon Wizard Spider|Turla|Rocke|Frankenstein|The White Company|Cobalt Group|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|Tropic Trooper|FIN8|Patchwork|Naikon
205 T1069.003 Cloud Groups Discovery no
206 T1069.002 Domain Groups Discovery Turla|Wizard Spider|Inception|OilRig|FIN6|Dragonfly 2.0|Ke3chang
207 T1087.004 Cloud Account Discovery no
208 T1087.003 Email Account Discovery Sandworm Team|TA505
209 T1087.002 Domain Account Discovery Turla|Sandworm Team|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN6|Poseidon Group|Ke3chang Wizard Spider|Chimera|Turla|Sandworm Team|Dragonfly 2.0|BRONZE BUTLER|OilRig|menuPass|FIN6|Poseidon Group|Ke3chang
210 T1087.001 Local Account Discovery Turla|Poseidon Group|OilRig|Ke3chang|APT32|APT1|Threat Group-3390|APT3|admin@338
211 T1553.004 Install Root Certificate Defense Evasion no
212 T1562.004 Disable or Modify System Firewall Defense Evasion Rocke|Lazarus Group|Kimsuky|Dragonfly 2.0|Carbanak
213 T1562.003 HISTCONTROL Impair Command History Logging Defense Evasion no
214 T1562.002 Disable Windows Event Logging Defense Evasion Threat Group-3390
215 T1562.001 Disable or Modify Tools Defense Evasion Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Rocke|Kimsuky|Turla|Night Dragon|Gorgon Group|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda Wizard Spider|FIN6|Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Rocke|Kimsuky|Turla|Night Dragon|Gorgon Group|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda
216 T1562 Impair Defenses Defense Evasion no
217 T1003.004 LSA Secrets Credential Access OilRig|MuddyWater|menuPass|Leafminer|Ke3chang|Dragonfly 2.0|APT33|Threat Group-3390
218 T1003.005 Cached Domain Credentials Credential Access OilRig|MuddyWater|Leafminer|APT33
221 T1561 Disk Wipe Impact no
222 T1560.003 Archive via Custom Method Collection Lazarus Group|Kimsuky|CopyKittens|FIN6
223 T1560.002 Archive via Library Collection Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390
224 T1560.001 Archive via Utility Collection APT41|Soft Cell|Turla|Gallmaker|APT33|APT39|MuddyWater|Magic Hound|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|CopyKittens|APT3|Sowbug|menuPass|APT1|Ke3chang Chimera|APT41|Soft Cell|Turla|Gallmaker|APT33|APT39|MuddyWater|Magic Hound|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|CopyKittens|APT3|Sowbug|menuPass|APT1|Ke3chang
225 T1560 Archive Collected Data Collection menuPass|APT32|Honeybee|Patchwork|APT28|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Ke3chang menuPass|APT32|Patchwork|Honeybee|APT28|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Ke3chang
226 T1499.004 Application or System Exploitation Impact no
227 T1499.003 Application Exhaustion Flood Impact no
228 T1499.002 Service Exhaustion Flood Impact no
239 T1134.001 Token Impersonation/Theft Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation APT28
240 T1213.002 Sharepoint Collection Ke3chang|APT28
241 T1213.001 Confluence Collection no
242 T1555.003 Credentials from Web Browsers Credential Access Magic Hound|Sandworm Team|Inception|Stealth Falcon|OilRig|Leafminer|APT33|APT3|Kimsuky|TA505|Stolen Pencil|MuddyWater|APT37|Patchwork|Molerats FIN6|Magic Hound|Sandworm Team|Inception|Stealth Falcon|OilRig|Leafminer|APT33|APT3|Kimsuky|TA505|Stolen Pencil|MuddyWater|APT37|Patchwork|Molerats
243 T1555.002 Securityd Memory Credential Access no
244 T1555.001 Keychain Credential Access no
245 T1559.002 Dynamic Data Exchange Execution Sharpshooter|TA505|MuddyWater|Gallmaker|Patchwork|Cobalt Group|APT37|APT28|FIN7 Sharpshooter|TA505|MuddyWater|Gallmaker|Patchwork|Cobalt Group|APT37|FIN7|APT28
246 T1559.001 Component Object Model Execution Gamaredon Group|MuddyWater
247 T1559 Inter-Process Communication Execution no
248 T1558.002 Silver Ticket Credential Access no
249 T1558.001 Golden Ticket Credential Access Ke3chang
250 T1558 Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets Credential Access no
251 T1557.001 LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay Credential Access|Collection no Wizard Spider
252 T1557 Man-in-the-Middle Credential Access|Collection no
253 T1556.002 Password Filter DLL Credential Access|Defense Evasion Strider
254 T1556.001 Domain Controller Authentication Credential Access|Defense Evasion no Chimera
255 T1556 Modify Authentication Process Credential Access|Defense Evasion no
256 T1056.004 Credential API Hooking Collection|Credential Access PLATINUM
257 T1056.003 Web Portal Capture Collection|Credential Access no
258 T1056.002 GUI Input Capture Collection|Credential Access FIN4
259 T1056.001 Keylogging Collection|Credential Access APT32|Sandworm Team|APT39|APT41|Kimsuky|menuPass|Stolen Pencil|FIN4|APT38|Ke3chang|OilRig|PLATINUM|Sowbug|Magic Hound|Group5|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT3|Darkhotel|APT28 APT32|Sandworm Team|APT39|APT41|Kimsuky|menuPass|Stolen Pencil|FIN4|APT38|Ke3chang|OilRig|PLATINUM|Magic Hound|Sowbug|Group5|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT3|Darkhotel|APT28
260 T1555 Credentials from Password Stores Credential Access APT39|OilRig|MuddyWater|Leafminer|APT33|Turla|Stealth Falcon FIN6|APT39|OilRig|MuddyWater|Leafminer|APT33|Turla|Stealth Falcon
261 T1552.005 Cloud Instance Metadata API Credential Access no
262 T1003.008 /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow Credential Access no
263 T1003.007 Proc Filesystem Credential Access no
264 T1003.006 DCSync Credential Access no
265 T1558.003 Kerberoasting Credential Access no Wizard Spider
266 T1552.006 Group Policy Preferences Credential Access APT33
267 T1003.003 NTDS Credential Access FIN6|Dragonfly 2.0 Wizard Spider|Chimera|FIN6|Dragonfly 2.0
268 T1003.002 Security Account Manager Credential Access Threat Group-3390|Ke3chang|Soft Cell|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|menuPass Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390|Ke3chang|Soft Cell|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|menuPass
269 T1003.001 LSASS Memory Credential Access Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Blue Mockingbird|Silence|Threat Group-3390|Leviathan|APT41|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|Stolen Pencil|APT32|Lazarus Group|Leafminer|Magic Hound|MuddyWater|PLATINUM|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|OilRig|FIN6|APT3|APT28|APT1|Ke3chang|Cleaver Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Blue Mockingbird|Silence|Threat Group-3390|Leviathan|APT41|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|Stolen Pencil|APT32|Lazarus Group|Magic Hound|Leafminer|MuddyWater|FIN8|PLATINUM|BRONZE BUTLER|OilRig|FIN6|APT3|APT28|APT1|Ke3chang|Cleaver
270 T1110.004 Credential Stuffing Credential Access no
271 T1110.003 Password Spraying Credential Access APT33|Leafminer|Lazarus Group APT28|APT33|Leafminer|Lazarus Group
272 T1110.002 Password Cracking Credential Access APT41|Dragonfly 2.0|APT3 FIN6|APT41|Dragonfly 2.0|APT3
273 T1110.001 Password Guessing Credential Access no APT28
274 T1021.006 Windows Remote Management Lateral Movement Threat Group-3390 Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390
275 T1021.005 VNC Lateral Movement GCMAN
276 T1021.004 SSH Lateral Movement Rocke|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|OilRig|menuPass|GCMAN
277 T1021.003 Distributed Component Object Model Lateral Movement no
278 T1021.002 SMB/Windows Admin Shares Lateral Movement Blue Mockingbird|APT39|APT32|Orangeworm|FIN8|APT3|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-1314|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang Wizard Spider|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|APT39|APT32|Orangeworm|FIN8|APT3|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-1314|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang
279 T1021.001 Remote Desktop Protocol Lateral Movement Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Stolen Pencil|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|APT3|OilRig|menuPass|FIN10|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|APT1|Axiom Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Stolen Pencil|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|APT3|OilRig|menuPass|FIN10|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|APT1|Axiom
280 T1554 Compromise Client Software Binary Persistence no
281 T1036.006 Space after Filename Defense Evasion no
282 T1036.005 Match Legitimate Name or Location Defense Evasion Rocke|Sandworm Team|APT39|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Silence|APT41|menuPass|TEMP.Veles|MuddyWater|BRONZE BUTLER|Sowbug|APT32|Patchwork|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Carbanak|APT1 Chimera|PROMETHIUM|Rocke|Sandworm Team|APT39|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Silence|APT41|menuPass|TEMP.Veles|MuddyWater|BRONZE BUTLER|Sowbug|APT32|Patchwork|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Carbanak|APT1
283 T1036.004 Masquerade Task or Service Defense Evasion Wizard Spider|APT-C-36|Carbanak|APT32|FIN6|FIN7 Lazarus Group|PROMETHIUM|Wizard Spider|APT-C-36|Carbanak|APT32|FIN6|FIN7
284 T1036.003 Rename System Utilities Defense Evasion menuPass|APT32|Soft Cell|PLATINUM
285 T1036.002 Right-to-Left Override Defense Evasion BRONZE BUTLER|BlackTech|Ke3chang|Scarlet Mimic
286 T1036.001 Invalid Code Signature Defense Evasion Windshift Windshift|APT37
287 T1553.003 SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking Defense Evasion no
288 T1553.002 Code Signing Defense Evasion Patchwork|Silence|APT41|FIN6|TA505|FIN7|Honeybee|Leviathan|APT37|CopyKittens|Winnti Group|Suckfly|Molerats|Darkhotel Wizard Spider|PROMETHIUM|Patchwork|Silence|APT41|FIN6|TA505|FIN7|Honeybee|Leviathan|CopyKittens|Winnti Group|Suckfly|Molerats|Darkhotel
289 T1553.001 Gatekeeper Bypass Defense Evasion no
290 T1553 Subvert Trust Controls Defense Evasion no
291 T1027.003 Steganography Defense Evasion BRONZE BUTLER|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|APT37
292 T1027.002 Software Packing Defense Evasion TA505|Rocke|Soft Cell|The White Company|APT39|APT38|Dark Caracal|Elderwood|APT3|Patchwork|APT29|Night Dragon Lazarus Group|TA505|Rocke|Soft Cell|The White Company|APT39|APT38|Dark Caracal|Elderwood|APT3|Patchwork|APT29|Night Dragon
293 T1027.001 Binary Padding Defense Evasion Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|APT32|Leviathan|BRONZE BUTLER|Moafee Gamaredon Group|APT32|Patchwork|Leviathan|BRONZE BUTLER|Moafee
294 T1222.002 Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification Defense Evasion Rocke|APT32
295 T1222.001 Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification Defense Evasion no Wizard Spider
296 T1552.004 Private Keys Credential Access Rocke
297 T1552.003 Bash History Credential Access no
298 T1552.002 Credentials in Registry Credential Access APT32
301 T1216.001 PubPrn Defense Evasion APT32
302 T1070.006 Timestomp Defense Evasion Rocke|TEMP.Veles|APT32|Lazarus Group|APT28
303 T1070.005 Network Share Connection Removal Defense Evasion Threat Group-3390
304 T1070.004 File Deletion Defense Evasion Sandworm Team|Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Wizard Spider|APT41|Kimsuky|Silence|The White Company|TEMP.Veles|APT32|APT38|Patchwork|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|menuPass|FIN8|OilRig|FIN5|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|APT3|FIN10|APT28|Threat Group-3390|Group5|Lazarus Group|APT18|APT29 FIN6|Sandworm Team|Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Wizard Spider|APT41|Kimsuky|Silence|The White Company|TEMP.Veles|APT32|APT38|menuPass|Patchwork|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|OilRig|Magic Hound|FIN5|APT3|FIN10|Threat Group-3390|APT28|Group5|Lazarus Group|APT18|APT29
305 T1070.003 Clear Command History Defense Evasion APT41
306 T1550.004 Web Session Cookie Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement no
307 T1550.001 Application Access Token Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement APT28
310 T1550 Use Alternate Authentication Material Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement no
311 T1548.004 Elevated Execution with Prompt Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion no
312 T1548.003 Sudo and Sudo Caching Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion no
313 T1548.002 Bypass User Access Control Bypass User Account Control Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion APT37|MuddyWater|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|Threat Group-3390|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork|APT29
314 T1548.001 Setuid and Setgid Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion no
315 T1548 Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion no
316 T1136.003 Cloud Account Persistence no
317 T1070.002 Clear Linux or Mac System Logs Defense Evasion Rocke
318 T1070.001 Clear Windows Event Logs Defense Evasion APT41|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|APT32|FIN8|FIN5|APT28 APT41|APT38|APT32|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|FIN5|APT28
319 T1136.002 Domain Account Persistence Soft Cell
320 T1136.001 Local Account Persistence APT39|APT41|Dragonfly 2.0|Leafminer|APT3 APT39|APT41|Leafminer|Dragonfly 2.0|APT3
321 T1547.011 Plist Modification Persistence|Privilege Escalation no
322 T1547.010 Port Monitors Persistence|Privilege Escalation no
323 T1547.009 Shortcut Modification Persistence|Privilege Escalation APT39|Darkhotel|APT29|Gorgon Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Leviathan|Lazarus Group
324 T1547.008 LSASS Driver Persistence|Privilege Escalation no
325 T1547.007 Re-opened Applications Persistence|Privilege Escalation no
326 T1547.006 Kernel Modules and Extensions Persistence|Privilege Escalation no
327 T1547.005 Security Support Provider Persistence|Privilege Escalation no Lazarus Group
328 T1547.004 Winlogon Helper DLL Persistence|Privilege Escalation Tropic Trooper|Turla Wizard Spider|Tropic Trooper|Turla
329 T1547.003 Time Providers Persistence|Privilege Escalation no
330 T1546.014 Emond Privilege Escalation|Persistence no
331 T1546.013 PowerShell Profile Privilege Escalation|Persistence Turla
344 T1546.003 Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription Privilege Escalation|Persistence APT33|Blue Mockingbird|Turla|Leviathan|APT29
345 T1546.002 Screensaver Privilege Escalation|Persistence no
346 T1546.001 Change Default File Association Privilege Escalation|Persistence Kimsuky
347 T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder Persistence|Privilege Escalation Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Silence|RTM|Inception|APT41|Machete|Kimsuky|APT33|APT39|APT32|APT18|Turla|Dark Caracal|Cobalt Group|Honeybee|Threat Group-3390|Dragonfly 2.0|Gorgon Group|Ke3chang|APT19|Leviathan|MuddyWater|APT37|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|APT3|FIN10|FIN7|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT29|Darkhotel Wizard Spider|PROMETHIUM|Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Silence|RTM|Inception|APT41|Machete|Kimsuky|APT33|APT39|APT32|APT18|Turla|Threat Group-3390|Dragonfly 2.0|Gorgon Group|Dark Caracal|Cobalt Group|Honeybee|APT19|Ke3chang|Leviathan|MuddyWater|APT37|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|APT3|FIN10|FIN7|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT29|Darkhotel
348 T1218.002 Control Panel Defense Evasion no
349 T1218.010 Regsvr32 Defense Evasion Blue Mockingbird|Inception|WIRTE|Cobalt Group|APT19|Leviathan|APT32|Deep Panda
350 T1218.009 Regsvcs/Regasm Defense Evasion no
351 T1218.005 Mshta Defense Evasion Inception|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|FIN7 Lazarus Group|Inception|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|FIN7
352 T1218.004 InstallUtil Defense Evasion no menuPass
353 T1218.001 Compiled HTML File Defense Evasion APT41|Silence|Lazarus Group|Dark Caracal|OilRig
354 T1218.003 CMSTP Defense Evasion Cobalt Group|MuddyWater
355 T1218.011 Rundll32 Defense Evasion APT32|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|TA505|MuddyWater|APT29|APT19|CopyKittens|APT3|Carbanak|APT28 Gamaredon Group|APT32|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|TA505|MuddyWater|APT29|APT19|CopyKittens|APT3|Carbanak|APT28
356 T1547 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution Persistence|Privilege Escalation no
357 T1546 Event Triggered Execution Privilege Escalation|Persistence no
358 T1098.003 Add Office 365 Global Administrator Role Persistence no
359 T1098.002 Exchange Email Delegate Permissions Persistence Magic Hound
360 T1098.001 Additional Azure Service Principal Credentials Additional Cloud Credentials Persistence no
361 T1543.004 Launch Daemon Persistence|Privilege Escalation no
362 T1543.003 Windows Service Persistence|Privilege Escalation Blue Mockingbird|DarkVishnya|Wizard Spider|APT32|APT41|Kimsuky|Tropic Trooper|Cobalt Group|Ke3chang|Honeybee|FIN7|Threat Group-3390|APT19|APT3|Lazarus Group|Carbanak PROMETHIUM|Blue Mockingbird|DarkVishnya|Wizard Spider|APT32|APT41|Kimsuky|Tropic Trooper|Ke3chang|Cobalt Group|Honeybee|Threat Group-3390|FIN7|APT19|APT3|Lazarus Group|Carbanak
363 T1543.002 Systemd Service Persistence|Privilege Escalation Rocke
364 T1543.001 Launch Agent Persistence|Privilege Escalation no
365 T1037.005 Startup Items Persistence|Privilege Escalation no
374 T1055.004 Asynchronous Procedure Call Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation no
375 T1055.003 Thread Execution Hijacking Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation no
376 T1055.002 Portable Executable Injection Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation Rocke|Gorgon Group
377 T1055.001 Dynamic-link Library Injection Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation TA505|Turla|Tropic Trooper|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda Wizard Spider|TA505|Turla|Tropic Trooper|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda
378 T1037.003 Network Logon Script Persistence|Privilege Escalation no
379 T1543 Create or Modify System Process Persistence|Privilege Escalation no
380 T1037.002 Logon Script (Mac) Persistence|Privilege Escalation no
382 T1542.003 Bootkit Persistence|Defense Evasion APT41|Lazarus Group|APT28
383 T1542.002 Component Firmware Persistence|Defense Evasion Equation
384 T1542.001 System Firmware Persistence|Defense Evasion no
385 T1505.003 Web Shell Persistence Tropic Trooper|Soft Cell|Threat Group-3390|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|APT32|OilRig|Deep Panda Tropic Trooper|Soft Cell|Threat Group-3390|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|APT32|Deep Panda
386 T1505.002 Transport Agent Persistence no
387 T1505.001 SQL Stored Procedures Persistence no
388 T1053.003 Cron Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation Rocke
389 T1053.004 Launchd Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation no
390 T1053.001 At (Linux) Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation no
391 T1053.005 Scheduled Task Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT-C-36|BRONZE BUTLER|APT41|Machete|Soft Cell|Silence|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|Patchwork|OilRig|Rancor|Cobalt Group|FIN8|menuPass|FIN10|APT32|FIN7|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|APT3|APT29 Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT-C-36|BRONZE BUTLER|APT41|Machete|Soft Cell|Silence|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|OilRig|Rancor|Dragonfly 2.0|Cobalt Group|Patchwork|FIN8|FIN10|menuPass|APT32|FIN7|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|APT3|APT29
392 T1053.002 At (Windows) Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation BRONZE BUTLER|Threat Group-3390|APT18
393 T1542 Pre-OS Boot Defense Evasion|Persistence no
394 T1137.001 Office Template Macros Persistence MuddyWater
413 T1505 Server Software Component Persistence no
414 T1499 Endpoint Denial of Service Impact no
415 T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion Defense Evasion|Discovery no
416 T1498 Network Denial of Service Impact no APT28
417 T1496 Resource Hijacking Impact Blue Mockingbird|Rocke|APT41|Lazarus Group
418 T1495 Firmware Corruption Impact no
419 T1491 Defacement Impact no
420 T1490 Inhibit System Recovery Impact no
421 T1489 Service Stop Impact Lazarus Group Wizard Spider|Lazarus Group
422 T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact Impact APT41|TA505|APT38
423 T1485 Data Destruction Impact Sandworm Team|Lazarus Group|APT38
424 T1484 Group Policy Modification Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation no
427 T1222 File and Directory Permissions Modification Defense Evasion no
428 T1221 Template Injection Defense Evasion Gamaredon Group|Frankenstein|Inception|APT28|Tropic Trooper|Dragonfly 2.0|DarkHydrus
429 T1220 XSL Script Processing Defense Evasion Cobalt Group
430 T1197 T1189 BITS Jobs Drive-by Compromise Defense Evasion|Persistence Initial Access Patchwork|APT41|Leviathan Dragonfly|PROMETHIUM|Turla|Windshift|RTM|Darkhotel|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|BRONZE BUTLER|Leafminer|APT32|Lazarus Group|APT19|Dark Caracal|Threat Group-3390|Elderwood|APT37|Patchwork|PLATINUM
T1217 Browser Bookmark Discovery Discovery no
T1213 Data from Information Repositories Collection Turla
T1189 Drive-by Compromise Initial Access Turla|Windshift|RTM|Darkhotel|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|BRONZE BUTLER|Leafminer|Dark Caracal|APT19|APT32|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|Elderwood|APT37|Patchwork|PLATINUM
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution Execution Sandworm Team|MuddyWater|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT41|admin@338|Threat Group-3390|APT12|The White Company|APT33|APT32|APT28|Tropic Trooper|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Cobalt Group|APT37|Patchwork|Leviathan|Elderwood|TA459|APT29
431 T1212 Exploitation for Credential Access Credential Access no
432 T1211 T1217 Exploitation for Defense Evasion Browser Bookmark Discovery Defense Evasion Discovery APT28 no
433 T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application Initial Access Blue Mockingbird|Rocke|APT39|BlackTech|APT41|Soft Cell|Night Dragon|Axiom APT28|APT29|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Blue Mockingbird|Rocke|APT39|BlackTech|APT41|Soft Cell|Night Dragon|Axiom
434 T1210 Exploitation of Remote Services Lateral Movement Threat Group-3390|APT28 Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390|APT28
435 T1202 T1203 Indirect Command Execution Exploitation for Client Execution Defense Evasion Execution no Sandworm Team|MuddyWater|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT41|admin@338|Threat Group-3390|APT12|The White Company|APT33|APT32|APT28|Tropic Trooper|Lazarus Group|Cobalt Group|BRONZE BUTLER|APT37|Patchwork|Leviathan|APT29|Elderwood|TA459
436 T1200 Hardware Additions Initial Access DarkVishnya
437 T1201 T1202 Password Policy Discovery Indirect Command Execution Discovery Defense Evasion Turla|OilRig no
T1219 Remote Access Software Command And Control Sandworm Team|DarkVishnya|RTM|Kimsuky|Night Dragon|Thrip|Cobalt Group|Carbanak
438 T1207 Rogue Domain Controller Defense Evasion no
439 T1199 T1197 Trusted Relationship BITS Jobs Initial Access Defense Evasion|Persistence APT28|menuPass Patchwork|APT41|Leviathan
440 T1211 Exploitation for Defense Evasion Defense Evasion APT28
441 T1219 Remote Access Software Command And Control Sandworm Team|DarkVishnya|RTM|Kimsuky|Night Dragon|Thrip|Cobalt Group|Carbanak
442 T1218 Signed Binary Proxy Execution Defense Evasion no
443 T1204 T1213 User Execution Data from Information Repositories Execution Collection no FIN6|Turla
444 T1216 Signed Script Proxy Execution Defense Evasion no
445 T1201 Password Policy Discovery Discovery Turla|OilRig
446 T1204 User Execution Execution no
447 T1195 Supply Chain Compromise Initial Access Elderwood
448 T1205 Traffic Signaling Defense Evasion|Persistence|Command And Control no
449 T1199 Trusted Relationship Initial Access GOLD SOUTHFIELD|APT28|menuPass
450 T1176 Browser Extensions Persistence Kimsuky|Stolen Pencil
451 T1175 Component Object Model and Distributed COM Lateral Movement|Execution no
452 T1187 Forced Authentication Credential Access DarkHydrus|Dragonfly 2.0
453 T1185 Man in the Browser Collection no
454 T1134 T1140 Access Token Manipulation Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation Defense Evasion Blue Mockingbird Rocke|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Molerats|Frankenstein|Turla|WIRTE|Darkhotel|Tropic Trooper|menuPass|Honeybee|Gorgon Group|APT19|Threat Group-3390|Leviathan|APT28|MuddyWater|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER
455 T1134 Access Token Manipulation Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation FIN6|Blue Mockingbird
456 T1136 Create Account Persistence no
T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information Defense Evasion Rocke|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Molerats|Frankenstein|Turla|WIRTE|Darkhotel|Tropic Trooper|menuPass|Honeybee|Threat Group-3390|APT19|Gorgon Group|Leviathan|MuddyWater|APT28|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER
457 T1149 LC_MAIN Hijacking Defense Evasion no
T1135 Network Share Discovery Discovery APT32|APT39|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT1|Dragonfly 2.0|Sowbug
458 T1137 Office Application Startup Persistence Gamaredon Group|APT32
459 T1153 Source Execution no
460 T1133 T1135 External Remote Services Network Share Discovery Persistence|Initial Access Discovery Sandworm Team|APT41|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|Night Dragon|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|Ke3chang|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|APT18 Wizard Spider|APT32|APT39|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT1|Dragonfly 2.0|Sowbug
461 T1133 External Remote Services Persistence|Initial Access Wizard Spider|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Chimera|Sandworm Team|APT41|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|Night Dragon|OilRig|Ke3chang|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|APT18
462 T1132 Data Encoding Command And Control no
463 T1129 Shared Modules Execution no
464 T1127 Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution Defense Evasion no
466 T1124 System Time Discovery Discovery The White Company|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Turla
467 T1123 Audio Capture Collection APT37
468 T1120 Peripheral Device Discovery Discovery Turla|APT37|Gamaredon Group|Equation|APT28
469 T1119 Automated Collection Collection Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT1|APT28|Patchwork|OilRig|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|FIN6 Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT1|APT28|Patchwork|OilRig|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|FIN6
470 T1115 Clipboard Data Collection APT39|APT38
471 T1114 Email Collection Collection no
472 T1113 Screen Capture Collection Gamaredon Group|APT39|Silence|MuddyWater|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|Dark Caracal|FIN7|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|Group5|APT28
473 T1112 Modify Registry Defense Evasion Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|Turla|APT32|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|Threat Group-3390|Honeybee|Patchwork|Gorgon Group|FIN8 Lazarus Group|Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|Turla|APT32|APT38|Patchwork|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|Threat Group-3390|Honeybee|Gorgon Group|FIN8
474 T1111 Two-Factor Authentication Interception Credential Access no
475 T1110 Brute Force Credential Access DarkVishnya|APT39|OilRig|FIN5|Turla
476 T1108 Redundant Access Defense Evasion|Persistence no
477 T1106 Native API Execution Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Turla|Silence|Gorgon Group|APT37 Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Turla|Silence|Gorgon Group|APT37
478 T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer Command And Control Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Silence|APT-C-36|APT41|Soft Cell|TA505|WIRTE|APT33|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Rancor|Cobalt Group|Turla|Gorgon Group|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|APT37|FIN8|PLATINUM|Leviathan|Elderwood|Magic Hound|APT3|APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN7|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28 Chimera|Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Silence|APT-C-36|APT41|Soft Cell|TA505|WIRTE|APT33|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Rancor|Cobalt Group|Turla|Gorgon Group|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|APT37|FIN8|Leviathan|Elderwood|PLATINUM|APT3|Magic Hound|APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN7|menuPass|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28
479 T1104 Multi-Stage Channels Command And Control APT41|MuddyWater|APT3
480 T1102 Web Service Command And Control Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Inception|FIN6 Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Inception|FIN6
481 T1098 Account Manipulation Persistence APT3|Dragonfly 2.0|Lazarus Group Dragonfly 2.0|APT3|Lazarus Group
482 T1095 Non-Application Layer Protocol Command And Control APT29|PLATINUM|APT3 FIN6|APT29|PLATINUM|APT3
483 T1092 Communication Through Removable Media Command And Control APT28
484 T1091 Replication Through Removable Media Lateral Movement|Initial Access Tropic Trooper|Darkhotel|APT28
485 T1090 Proxy Command And Control Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|APT41|Turla Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|APT41|Turla
486 T1087 Account Discovery Discovery no
487 T1083 File and Directory Discovery Discovery Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Inception|APT41|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|APT18|Leafminer|Honeybee|Dark Caracal|Dragonfly 2.0|Magic Hound|Sowbug|BRONZE BUTLER|APT3|APT28|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Inception|APT41|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|APT18|Leafminer|Honeybee|Dragonfly 2.0|Dark Caracal|APT3|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|Sowbug|APT28|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
488 T1082 System Information Discovery Discovery Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|Honeybee|APT19|APT37|APT32|Magic Hound|OilRig|APT3|Sowbug|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang Wizard Spider|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|APT19|APT32|Honeybee|APT37|Sowbug|OilRig|Magic Hound|APT3|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
489 T1080 Taint Shared Content Lateral Movement BRONZE BUTLER|Darkhotel Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Darkhotel
490 T1078 Valid Accounts Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|APT39|FIN4|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|Leviathan|APT33|OilRig|FIN5|menuPass|APT28|FIN10|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390|APT18|PittyTiger|Carbanak Chimera|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|APT39|FIN4|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|Leviathan|APT33|OilRig|FIN5|APT28|menuPass|FIN10|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390|APT18|PittyTiger|Carbanak
491 T1074 Data Staged Collection Wizard Spider
492 T1072 Software Deployment Tools Execution|Lateral Movement Silence|APT32|Threat Group-1314
493 T1071 Application Layer Protocol Command And Control Rocke|Magic Hound|Dragonfly 2.0
497 T1064 Scripting Defense Evasion|Execution no
498 T1062 Hypervisor Persistence no
499 T1061 Graphical User Interface Execution no
500 T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter Execution APT32|Molerats|Whitefly|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|FIN7|OilRig|FIN5|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Ke3chang APT32|Molerats|Whitefly|APT39|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN7|OilRig|FIN5|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Ke3chang
501 T1057 Process Discovery Discovery Rocke|Frankenstein|Inception|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|APT38|Tropic Trooper|APT37|Honeybee|OilRig|APT3|Magic Hound|APT28|Winnti Group|Stealth Falcon|Poseidon Group|Lazarus Group|Molerats|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang
502 T1056 Input Capture Collection|Credential Access no
503 T1055 Process Injection Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation APT32|Sharpshooter|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|Turla|Cobalt Group|APT37|Honeybee|PLATINUM APT32|Sharpshooter|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|Cobalt Group|APT37|Honeybee|Turla|PLATINUM
504 T1053 Scheduled Task/Job Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation no
505 T1052 Exfiltration Over Physical Medium Exfiltration no
506 T1051 Shared Webroot Lateral Movement no
507 T1049 System Network Connections Discovery Discovery Tropic Trooper|APT41|APT38|Soft Cell|APT32|APT1|OilRig|APT3|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
508 T1048 Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol Exfiltration no
509 T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation Execution Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT41|FIN6|Soft Cell|APT32|MuddyWater|OilRig|Threat Group-3390|FIN8|Leviathan|menuPass|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT29|Deep Panda Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT41|FIN6|Soft Cell|APT32|MuddyWater|OilRig|Threat Group-3390|Leviathan|FIN8|menuPass|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT29|Deep Panda
510 T1046 Network Service Scanning Discovery Rocke|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT39|APT32|Leafminer|OilRig|Cobalt Group|menuPass|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390 Rocke|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT39|APT32|Cobalt Group|Leafminer|OilRig|menuPass|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390
511 T1043 Commonly Used Port Command And Control Machete|OilRig|APT28|TEMP.Veles|Night Dragon|APT29|APT18|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN7|FIN8|APT37|Magic Hound|APT3|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390 OilRig|APT28|TEMP.Veles|Night Dragon|APT29|APT18|APT19|FIN7|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|APT37|Magic Hound|APT3|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390
512 T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel Exfiltration Sandworm Team|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Kimsuky|Soft Cell|APT32|APT3|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Ke3chang
513 T1040 Network Sniffing Credential Access|Discovery Sandworm Team|DarkVishnya|APT33|Stolen Pencil|APT28
514 T1039 Data from Network Shared Drive Collection Sowbug|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Sowbug|menuPass
515 T1037 Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts Persistence|Privilege Escalation Rocke
516 T1036 Masquerading Defense Evasion Windshift|APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|Dragonfly 2.0
517 T1034 Path Interception Persistence|Privilege Escalation no
518 T1033 System Owner/User Discovery Discovery Frankenstein|APT41|Soft Cell|Tropic Trooper|APT39|MuddyWater|APT32|APT37|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|Magic Hound|FIN10|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3 Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT41|Soft Cell|Tropic Trooper|APT39|MuddyWater|APT32|APT37|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|Magic Hound|FIN10|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3
519 T1030 Data Transfer Size Limits Exfiltration Threat Group-3390
520 T1029 Scheduled Transfer Exfiltration no
521 T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information Defense Evasion Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|APT41|Machete|Soft Cell|Turla|TA505|Silence|APT33|Night Dragon|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|APT29|APT18|Tropic Trooper|Cobalt Group|Patchwork|Leafminer|APT37|Threat Group-3390|Honeybee|Dark Caracal|menuPass|APT19|BlackOasis|FIN8|Leviathan|Elderwood|MuddyWater|FIN7|Magic Hound|OilRig|APT3|APT32|Group5|Dust Storm|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT28 FIN6|Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|APT41|Machete|Soft Cell|Turla|TA505|Silence|APT33|Night Dragon|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|APT29|APT18|Tropic Trooper|Honeybee|Leafminer|APT37|Dark Caracal|Patchwork|Threat Group-3390|APT19|menuPass|Cobalt Group|BlackOasis|Elderwood|FIN8|Leviathan|MuddyWater|FIN7|OilRig|Magic Hound|APT3|APT32|Group5|Dust Storm|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT28
522 T1026 Multiband Communication Command And Control Lazarus Group
523 T1025 Data from Removable Media Collection Machete|Turla|Gamaredon Group|APT28
524 T1021 Remote Services Lateral Movement no
525 T1020 Automated Exfiltration Exfiltration Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Honeybee Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Honeybee
526 T1018 Remote System Discovery Discovery Sandworm Team|Rocke|Wizard Spider|Silence|Soft Cell|APT39|APT32|Deep Panda|Threat Group-3390|Dragonfly 2.0|Leafminer|Ke3chang|FIN8|APT3|FIN5|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN6|Turla Sandworm Team|Rocke|Wizard Spider|Silence|Soft Cell|APT39|APT32|Deep Panda|Threat Group-3390|Dragonfly 2.0|Ke3chang|Leafminer|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN5|APT3|menuPass|FIN6|Turla
527 T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery Discovery Sandworm Team|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT41|Soft Cell|APT32|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|Magic Hound|OilRig|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3|Naikon|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang Wizard Spider|Sandworm Team|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT41|Soft Cell|APT32|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|Magic Hound|OilRig|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3|Naikon|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
528 T1014 Rootkit Defense Evasion Rocke|APT41|APT28|Winnti Group
529 T1012 Query Registry Discovery APT32|Dragonfly 2.0|Threat Group-3390|OilRig|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Turla
530 T1011 Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium Exfiltration no
532 T1008 Fallback Channels Command And Control APT41|OilRig|Lazarus Group
533 T1007 System Service Discovery Discovery BRONZE BUTLER|APT1|OilRig|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
534 T1006 Direct Volume Access Defense Evasion no
535 T1005 Data from Local System Collection Gamaredon Group|APT39|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|Soft Cell|Turla|menuPass|Dark Caracal|Dragonfly 2.0|Honeybee|APT37|APT28|APT3|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|Threat Group-3390|APT1|Ke3chang FIN6|Gamaredon Group|APT39|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|Soft Cell|Turla|menuPass|Dark Caracal|Honeybee|Dragonfly 2.0|APT37|APT28|BRONZE BUTLER|APT3|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|Threat Group-3390|APT1|Ke3chang
536 T1003 OS Credential Dumping Credential Access APT39|Frankenstein|APT32|APT28|Leviathan|Sowbug|Suckfly|Poseidon Group|Axiom
537 T1001 Data Obfuscation Command And Control Axiom
response_tasks/get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic.yml
+1 -7
View File
@@ -14,13 +14,7 @@ inputs:
- dest
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) max(_time) as
lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.parent_process
Processes.process_name Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.process_id
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| search dest = $dest$
| join dest type=inner
Processes.process_name Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search dest = $dest$ | join dest type=inner
[| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Ports where
Ports.dest_port=53 by Ports.process_id Ports.src
| `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)`