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splunk-security_content/detections/endpoint/possible_lateral_movement_powershell_spawn.yml
2023-09-15 10:58:38 -07:00

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YAML

name: Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn
id: cb909b3e-512b-11ec-aa31-3e22fbd008af
version: 1
date: '2023-04-14'
author: Mauricio Velazco, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: 'The following analytic is designed to identify possible lateral movement
attacks that involve the spawning of a PowerShell process as a child or grandchild
process of commonly abused processes. These processes include services.exe, wmiprsve.exe,
svchost.exe, wsmprovhost.exe, and mmc.exe.\
Such behavior is indicative of legitimate Windows features such as the Service Control
Manager, Windows Management Instrumentation, Task Scheduler, Windows Remote Management,
and the DCOM protocol being abused to start a process on a remote endpoint. This
behavior is often seen during lateral movement techniques where adversaries or red
teams abuse these services for lateral movement and remote code execution.'
data_source:
- Sysmon Event ID 1
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=wmiprvse.exe
OR Processes.parent_process_name=services.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=svchost.exe
OR Processes.parent_process_name=wsmprovhost.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=mmc.exe)
(Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR (Processes.process_name=cmd.exe AND Processes.process=*powershell.exe*)
OR Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR (Processes.process_name=cmd.exe AND Processes.process=*pwsh.exe*))
by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name
Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `possible_lateral_movement_powershell_spawn_filter`'
how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection
and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related
telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search,
you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process.
Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must
be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to
the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint`
data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field
names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: Legitimate applications may spawn PowerShell as a child process
of the the identified processes. Filter as needed.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003/
tags:
analytic_story:
- Active Directory Lateral Movement
- Malicious PowerShell
- Hermetic Wiper
- Data Destruction
- Scheduled Tasks
asset_type: Endpoint
confidence: 50
impact: 90
message: A PowerShell process was spawned as a child process of typically abused
processes on $dest$
mitre_attack_id:
- T1021
- T1021.003
- T1021.006
- T1047
- T1053.005
- T1543.003
- T1059.001
- T1218.014
observable:
- name: dest
type: Endpoint
role:
- Victim
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
required_fields:
- _time
- Processes.dest
- Processes.user
- Processes.parent_process_name
- Processes.parent_process
- Processes.original_file_name
- Processes.process_name
- Processes.process
- Processes.process_id
- Processes.parent_process_path
- Processes.process_path
- Processes.parent_process_id
risk_score: 45
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1543.003/lateral_movement_powershell/windows-sysmon.log
source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
sourcetype: xmlwineventlog