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Author SHA1 Message Date
Varun Sharma 8179787a07 Update README.md 2024-07-18 07:16:17 -07:00
Varun Sharma 2e68376bb4 Update README.md 2024-07-17 07:46:13 -07:00
Varun Sharma 2f8fdd6ef1 Update README 2024-07-16 23:45:56 -07:00
Varun Sharma db4f4f7db4 Update README.md 2024-07-16 22:06:00 -07:00
Varun Sharma 89a22060dd Merge branch 'rc-10' of https://github.com/step-security/harden-runner into rc-10 2024-07-16 17:57:31 -07:00
Varun Sharma a39c9c61a0 Update README.md 2024-07-16 17:57:20 -07:00
Varun Sharma d11c81735f Merge branch 'main' into rc-10 2024-07-16 17:53:50 -07:00
Varun Sharma 18ed1aac15 Update README 2024-07-16 17:49:42 -07:00
Varun Sharma ffd223efc6 Update braces dependency to resolve security issue 2024-07-15 23:05:08 -07:00
Varun Sharma b7ce92e2e0 Update agent version 2024-06-20 06:16:01 -07:00
Varun Sharma dd3159323d Update dist 2024-06-20 06:16:01 -07:00
h0x0er d9c4c1a667 bump agent version
Signed-off-by: h0x0er <jatink843@protonmail.com>
2024-06-20 06:16:01 -07:00
h0x0er 5287c5b36f build changes
Signed-off-by: h0x0er <jatink843@protonmail.com>
2024-06-20 06:16:01 -07:00
h0x0er 91b4878145 bump tls agent version
Signed-off-by: h0x0er <jatink843@protonmail.com>
2024-06-20 06:16:01 -07:00
h0x0er 08947d3b5b otk: added one-time-key logic
Signed-off-by: h0x0er <jatink843@protonmail.com>
2024-06-20 06:16:00 -07:00
42 changed files with 52374 additions and 125143 deletions
+1 -1
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@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ jobs:
permissions:
contents: write
steps:
- uses: step-security/harden-runner@5c7944e73c4c2a096b17a9cb74d65b6c2bbafbde # v1
- uses: step-security/harden-runner@17d0e2bd7d51742c71671bd19fa12bdc9d40a3d6 # v1
with:
egress-policy: audit
allowed-endpoints:
+23
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@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
name: Code Review
on:
pull_request:
permissions:
contents: read
jobs:
code-review:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
permissions:
contents: read
pull-requests: read
steps:
- name: Harden Runner
uses: step-security/harden-runner@17d0e2bd7d51742c71671bd19fa12bdc9d40a3d6 # v2.8.1
with:
disable-sudo: true
egress-policy: block
allowed-endpoints: >
api.github.com:443
int.api.stepsecurity.io:443
- name: Code Review
uses: step-security/ai-codewise@int
+4 -4
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@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ jobs:
steps:
- name: Harden Runner
uses: step-security/harden-runner@5c7944e73c4c2a096b17a9cb74d65b6c2bbafbde
uses: step-security/harden-runner@17d0e2bd7d51742c71671bd19fa12bdc9d40a3d6
with:
egress-policy: audit # TODO: change to 'egress-policy: block' after couple of runs
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ jobs:
# Initializes the CodeQL tools for scanning.
- name: Initialize CodeQL
uses: github/codeql-action/init@5d4e8d1aca955e8d8589aabd499c5cae939e33c7
uses: github/codeql-action/init@cdcdbb579706841c47f7063dda365e292e5cad7a
with:
languages: ${{ matrix.language }}
# If you wish to specify custom queries, you can do so here or in a config file.
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ jobs:
# Autobuild attempts to build any compiled languages (C/C++, C#, or Java).
# If this step fails, then you should remove it and run the build manually (see below)
- name: Autobuild
uses: github/codeql-action/autobuild@5d4e8d1aca955e8d8589aabd499c5cae939e33c7
uses: github/codeql-action/autobuild@cdcdbb579706841c47f7063dda365e292e5cad7a
# ℹ️ Command-line programs to run using the OS shell.
# 📚 https://git.io/JvXDl
@@ -75,4 +75,4 @@ jobs:
# make release
- name: Perform CodeQL Analysis
uses: github/codeql-action/analyze@5d4e8d1aca955e8d8589aabd499c5cae939e33c7
uses: github/codeql-action/analyze@cdcdbb579706841c47f7063dda365e292e5cad7a
+1 -1
View File
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ jobs:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- name: Harden Runner
uses: step-security/harden-runner@5c7944e73c4c2a096b17a9cb74d65b6c2bbafbde # v2.9.1
uses: step-security/harden-runner@17d0e2bd7d51742c71671bd19fa12bdc9d40a3d6 # v2.8.1
with:
egress-policy: audit
@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
name: 'Publish Immutable Action Version'
on:
release:
types: [published]
permissions:
contents: read
jobs:
publish:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
permissions:
contents: read
id-token: write
packages: write
steps:
- name: Harden the runner (Audit all outbound calls)
uses: step-security/harden-runner@cb605e52c26070c328afc4562f0b4ada7618a84e # v2.10.4
with:
egress-policy: audit
- name: Checking out
uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Publish
id: publish
uses: actions/publish-immutable-action@0.0.4
+2 -2
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@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ jobs:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- name: Harden Runner
uses: step-security/harden-runner@5c7944e73c4c2a096b17a9cb74d65b6c2bbafbde
uses: step-security/harden-runner@17d0e2bd7d51742c71671bd19fa12bdc9d40a3d6
with:
egress-policy: audit # TODO: change to 'egress-policy: block' after couple of runs
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ jobs:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- name: Harden Runner
uses: step-security/harden-runner@5c7944e73c4c2a096b17a9cb74d65b6c2bbafbde
uses: step-security/harden-runner@17d0e2bd7d51742c71671bd19fa12bdc9d40a3d6
with:
egress-policy: audit # TODO: change to 'egress-policy: block' after couple of runs
+1 -1
View File
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ jobs:
permissions:
contents: write
steps:
- uses: step-security/harden-runner@5c7944e73c4c2a096b17a9cb74d65b6c2bbafbde
- uses: step-security/harden-runner@17d0e2bd7d51742c71671bd19fa12bdc9d40a3d6
with:
egress-policy: audit
allowed-endpoints:
-179
View File
@@ -1,179 +0,0 @@
name: RunsOn Tests
on:
workflow_dispatch:
permissions:
contents: read
jobs:
test-host-outbound:
runs-on:
- runs-on=${{ github.run_id }}
- runner=2cpu-linux-x64
- image=ubuntu24-stepsecurity-x64
steps:
- name: Harden Runner
uses: step-security/harden-runner@rc
with:
egress-policy: audit
allowed-endpoints: >
github.com:443
goreleaser.com:443
- name: Checkout code
uses: actions/checkout@v3
- name: Run outbound calls from host
run: |
start_time=$(date +%s)
end_time=$((start_time + 90)) # 5 minutes = 300 seconds
while [ $(date +%s) -lt $end_time ]; do
curl -I https://www.google.com
curl -I https://goreleaser.com
sleep 10 # wait 10 seconds between calls
done
test-docker-outbound:
runs-on:
- runs-on=${{ github.run_id }}
- runner=2cpu-linux-x64
- image=ubuntu24-stepsecurity-x64
steps:
- name: Harden Runner
uses: step-security/harden-runner@rc
with:
egress-policy: block
allowed-endpoints: >
archive.ubuntu.com:80
github.com:443
goreleaser.com:443
production.cloudflare.docker.com:443
docker-images-prod.6aa30f8b08e16409b46e0173d6de2f56.r2.cloudflarestorage.com:443
*.docker.io:443
security.ubuntu.com:80
- name: Checkout code
uses: actions/checkout@v3
- name: Run outbound calls from within Docker container
continue-on-error: true
run: |
# Start the container
docker run --rm -d --name test-container ubuntu:latest sleep 90
# Install curl in the container
docker exec test-container apt-get update
docker exec test-container apt-get install -y curl
# Print /etc/resolv.conf from the container
docker exec test-container cat /etc/resolv.conf
# Make outbound calls
for i in {1..9}; do
docker exec test-container curl -I https://www.google.com
docker exec test-container curl -I https://goreleaser.com
sleep 10 # wait 10 seconds between calls
done
# Stop the container
docker stop test-container
test-docker-build-outbound:
runs-on:
- runs-on=${{ github.run_id }}
- runner=2cpu-linux-x64
- image=ubuntu24-stepsecurity-x64
steps:
- name: Harden Runner
uses: step-security/harden-runner@rc
with:
egress-policy: audit
allowed-endpoints: >
archive.ubuntu.com:80
auth.docker.io:443
github.com:443
goreleaser.com:443
production.cloudflare.docker.com:443
docker-images-prod.6aa30f8b08e16409b46e0173d6de2f56.r2.cloudflarestorage.com:443
registry-1.docker.io:443
security.ubuntu.com:80
- name: Checkout code
uses: actions/checkout@v3
- name: Build Docker image and test outbound calls during build
continue-on-error: true
run: |
# Create a Dockerfile that installs curl and makes outbound calls
cat <<EOF > Dockerfile
FROM ubuntu:latest
RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y curl
RUN for i in {1..9}; do curl -I https://www.google.com && curl -I https://goreleaser.com; sleep 10; done
EOF
# Build the Docker image
docker build -t test-image .
# Print /etc/resolv.conf from the build container (temporary container used during build)
container_id=$(docker create test-image)
docker start $container_id
docker exec $container_id cat /etc/resolv.conf
docker stop $container_id
docker rm $container_id
- name: Print Docker logs with journalctl
run: |
sudo journalctl -u docker.service --no-pager
shell: bash
test-long-running-docker:
runs-on:
- runs-on=${{ github.run_id }}
- runner=2cpu-linux-x64
- image=ubuntu24-stepsecurity-x64
steps:
- name: Harden Runner
uses: step-security/harden-runner@rc
with:
egress-policy: block
allowed-endpoints: >
archive.ubuntu.com:80
auth.docker.io:443
github.com:443
goreleaser.com:443
production.cloudflare.docker.com:443
registry-1.docker.io:443
docker-images-prod.6aa30f8b08e16409b46e0173d6de2f56.r2.cloudflarestorage.com:443
security.ubuntu.com:80
- name: Checkout code
uses: actions/checkout@v3
- name: Run long-running Docker container with outbound calls
continue-on-error: true
run: |
# Start the long-running container
docker run --rm -d --name long-running-container ubuntu:latest bash -c "
apt-get update && apt-get install -y curl &&
while true; do
curl -I https://www.google.com;
curl -I https://goreleaser.com;
sleep 10;
done
"
# Print /etc/resolv.conf from the container
docker exec long-running-container cat /etc/resolv.conf
# Let the container run for 5 minutes
sleep 90
# Stop the container
docker stop long-running-container
+4 -4
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@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ jobs:
steps:
- name: Harden Runner
uses: step-security/harden-runner@5c7944e73c4c2a096b17a9cb74d65b6c2bbafbde # v2.9.1
uses: step-security/harden-runner@17d0e2bd7d51742c71671bd19fa12bdc9d40a3d6 # v2.8.1
with:
egress-policy: audit
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ jobs:
persist-credentials: false
- name: "Run analysis"
uses: ossf/scorecard-action@62b2cac7ed8198b15735ed49ab1e5cf35480ba46 # tag=v1.1.1
uses: ossf/scorecard-action@dc50aa9510b46c811795eb24b2f1ba02a914e534 # tag=v1.1.1
with:
results_file: results.sarif
results_format: sarif
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ jobs:
# Upload the results as artifacts (optional). Commenting out will disable uploads of run results in SARIF
# format to the repository Actions tab.
- name: "Upload artifact"
uses: actions/upload-artifact@4cec3d8aa04e39d1a68397de0c4cd6fb9dce8ec1 # tag=v4.6.1
uses: actions/upload-artifact@0b2256b8c012f0828dc542b3febcab082c67f72b # tag=v3.0.0
with:
name: SARIF file
path: results.sarif
@@ -62,6 +62,6 @@ jobs:
# Upload the results to GitHub's code scanning dashboard.
- name: "Upload to code-scanning"
uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@5d4e8d1aca955e8d8589aabd499c5cae939e33c7 # tag=v1.0.26
uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@cdcdbb579706841c47f7063dda365e292e5cad7a # tag=v1.0.26
with:
sarif_file: results.sarif
+2 -31
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@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ jobs:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- name: Harden Runner
uses: step-security/harden-runner@5c7944e73c4c2a096b17a9cb74d65b6c2bbafbde # v2.9.1
uses: step-security/harden-runner@17d0e2bd7d51742c71671bd19fa12bdc9d40a3d6 # v2.8.1
with:
disable-sudo: true
egress-policy: audit
@@ -39,37 +39,8 @@ jobs:
run: npm test -- --coverage
- uses: codecov/codecov-action@eaaf4bedf32dbdc6b720b63067d99c4d77d6047d # v3.1.4
- name: Publish Test Results
uses: step-security/publish-unit-test-result-action@e88bfc6c0dffc68a1067d63526c80c81f248da11 # v2.20.0
uses: step-security/publish-unit-test-result-action@v1
if: always()
with:
files: |
reports/*.xml
build-check:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- name: Harden Runner
uses: step-security/harden-runner@5c7944e73c4c2a096b17a9cb74d65b6c2bbafbde # v2.9.1
with:
disable-sudo: true
egress-policy: audit
allowed-endpoints: >
github.com:443
registry.npmjs.org:443
- name: Checkout
uses: actions/checkout@b4ffde65f46336ab88eb53be808477a3936bae11 # v4.1.1
- name: Install Dependencies
run: npm ci
- name: Run build
run: npm run build
- name: Check for changes in dist
run: |
if [[ `git status --porcelain dist` ]]; then
echo "Changes detected in dist directory after build:"
git status --porcelain dist
git diff dist
exit 1
else
echo "No changes in dist directory - build is clean"
fi
+322 -143
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@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
<p align="center">
<picture>
<source media="(prefers-color-scheme: light)" srcset="images/harden-runner-new.png" width="400">
<img alt="Dark Banner" src="images/harden-runner-new.png" width="400">
<source media="(prefers-color-scheme: light)" srcset="images/banner.png" width="400">
<img alt="Dark Banner" src="images/banner-dark.png" width="400">
</picture>
</p>
@@ -13,131 +13,54 @@
</div>
# Harden-Runner
## Table of Contents
Corporate laptops and production servers typically have robust security monitoring in place to reduce risk and meet compliance requirements. However, CI/CD runners, which handle sensitive information like secrets for cloud environments and create production builds, often lack such security measures. This oversight has led to significant supply chain attacks, including the SolarWinds and Codecov breaches.
- [Introduction](#introduction)
- [3,500+ open source projects use Harden-Runner](#3500-open-source-projects-use-harden-runner)
- [Trusted By](#trusted-by)
- [Case Studies](#case-studies)
- [Why use Harden-Runner](#why-use-harden-runner)
- [Getting Started](#getting-started)
- [Hardening GitHub-Hosted Runners](#hardening-github-hosted-runners)
- [Hands-On Tutorials](#hands-on-tutorials)
- [Support for Private Repositories](#support-for-private-repositories)
- [Hardening Self-Hosted Runners](#hardening-self-hosted-runners)
- [Self-Hosted Actions Runner Controller (ARC) Runners](#self-hosted-actions-runner-controller-arc-runners)
- [Self-Hosted VM Runners (e.g. on EC2)](#self-hosted-vm-runners-eg-on-ec2)
- [Features at a glance](#features-at-a-glance)
- [View outbound network traffic at the job level](#view-outbound-network-traffic-at-the-job-level)
- [View outbound network traffic at the organization level](#view-outbound-network-traffic-at-the-organization-level)
- [View outbound HTTPS traffic at the job level](#view-outbound-https-traffic-at-the-job-level)
- [Detect anomalous outbound network traffic](#detect-anomalous-outbound-network-traffic)
- [Filter outbound network traffic to allowed endpoints](#filter-outbound-network-traffic-to-allowed-endpoints)
- [Determine minimum GITHUB_TOKEN permissions using Harden-Runner](#determine-minimum-github_token-permissions-using-harden-runner)
- [View the name and path of every file written during the build process](#view-the-name-and-path-of-every-file-written-during-the-build-process)
- [View process names and arguments](#view-process-names-and-arguments)
- [Detect tampering of source code during build](#detect-tampering-of-source-code-during-build)
- [Run your job without sudo access](#run-your-job-without-sudo-access)
- [Get real-time security alerts](#get-real-time-security-alerts)
- [Discussions](#discussions)
- [How does it work?](#how-does-it-work)
- [GitHub-Hosted Runners](#github-hosted-runners-1)
- [Self-Hosted Actions Runner Controller (ARC) Runners](#self-hosted-actions-runner-controller-arc-runners-1)
- [Self-Hosted VM Runners (e.g. on EC2)](#self-hosted-vm-runners-eg-on-ec2-1)
- [Limitations](#limitations)
- [GitHub-Hosted Runners](#github-hosted-runners-2)
- [Self-Hosted Actions Runner Controller (ARC) Runners](#self-hosted-actions-runner-controller-arc-runners-2)
- [Self-Hosted VM Runners (e.g. on EC2)](#self-hosted-vm-runners-eg-on-ec2-2)
Traditional security monitoring and EDR solutions are ineffective for CI/CD runners due to their ephemeral nature. These tools also lack the necessary context to correlate events with specific workflow runs in a CI/CD environment.
StepSecurity Harden-Runner addresses this gap by providing security monitoring tailored for CI/CD runners. This approach brings CI/CD runners under the same level of security scrutiny as other critical systems, addressing a significant gap in the software supply chain.
### Harden-Runner: Security Incidents Detected
- [Harden-Runner Detected the tj-actions/changed-files compromise](https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/harden-runner-detection-tj-actions-changed-files-action-is-compromised) ([CVE-2025-30066](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-mrrh-fwg8-r2c3))
- [Harden-Runner Detected a CI/CD Supply Chain Attack in Google’s Open-Source Project Flank](https://www.stepsecurity.io/case-studies/flank)
- [Harden-Runner Detected the NX Build System compromise](https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/supply-chain-security-alert-popular-nx-build-system-package-compromised-with-data-stealing-malware)
- [Harden-Runner Detected a CI/CD Supply Chain Attack in Microsoft’s Open-Source Project Azure Karpenter Provider in Real-Time](https://www.stepsecurity.io/case-studies/azure-karpenter-provider)
- [Harden-Runner Detected Anomalous Traffic to api.ipify.org Across Multiple Customers](https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/harden-runner-detects-anomalous-traffic-to-api-ipify-org-across-multiple-customers)
- [Harden-Runner Detected an Unexpected Microsoft Defender Installation on GitHub-Hosted Ubuntu Runners](https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/how-stepsecurity-harden-runner-detected-unexpected-microsoft-defender-installation-on-github-hosted-ubuntu-runners)
- [Harden-Runner Flagged an Anomalous Outbound Call, Leading to a Docker Documentation Update](https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/harden-runner-flags-anomalous-outbound-call-leading-to-docker-documentation-update)
### See It in Action
Harden-Runner secures over **8 million CI/CD workflow runs every week**, protecting thousands of pipelines, including those from popular open-source projects by **Microsoft, Google, and CISA**. See how top projects are using Harden-Runner and explore the insights:
➡️ [Who's using Harden-Runner?](https://docs.stepsecurity.io/whos-using-harden-runner)
## Quick Links
- [Getting Started Guide](#getting-started)
- [Why Choose Harden-Runner](#why-choose-harden-runner)
- [Features and Capabilities](#features)
- [Case Studies and Trusted Projects](#trusted-by-and-case-studies)
- [Environment Compatibility Matrix](#environment-compatibility-matrix)
- [How It Works](docs/how-it-works.md)
- [Known Limitations](docs/limitations.md)
- [Join the Discussions](#discussions)
- [Official Documentation](https://docs.stepsecurity.io/harden-runner)
---
## Introduction
Learn how Harden-Runner works through the video below, which shows how it detected the tj-actions/changed-files compromise. [View the interactive demo here](https://app.storylane.io/share/679y2zgzljov).
Harden-Runner provides network egress filtering and runtime security for GitHub-hosted and self-hosted runners. It is called Harden-Runner because it `hardens` the `runner` on which GitHub Actions workflows run.
<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oTAJ7Hy7nPU" target="_blank">
<img src="images/case-study.png" alt="Harden-Runner detected the tj-actions/changed-files Breach" title="This case study video shows how StepSecurity Harden-Runner detected the tj-actions/changed-files Breach">
</a>
Learn how Harden-Runner works through the video below, which shows how it detected a supply chain attack on a Google open-source project.
---
## Getting Started
<a href="https://youtu.be/Yz72qAOrN9s" target="_blank"><img src="images/case-study-thumbnail1.png" alt="Harden-Runner detected supply chain attack in a Google open-source project" title="This case study video shows how StepSecurity Harden-Runner detected a CI/CD supply chain attack in real-time in Google’s open-source project Flank"></a>
This guide walks you through the steps to set up and use Harden-Runner in your CI/CD workflows. For more details, refer to the [official documentation](https://docs.stepsecurity.io/harden-runner).
## 3,500+ open source projects use Harden-Runner
### **Step 1: Add Harden-Runner to Your Workflow**
To integrate Harden-Runner, follow these steps:
- Open your GitHub Actions workflow file (e.g., `.github/workflows/<workflow-name>.yml`).
- Add the following code as the first step in each job:
```yaml
steps:
- name: Harden Runner
uses: step-security/harden-runner@c6295a65d1254861815972266d5933fd6e532bdf # v2.11.1
with:
egress-policy: audit
**Tip**: Automate this step by pasting your workflow into the [StepSecurity online tool](https://app.stepsecurity.io/secure-workflow)
<details>
<summary>Click to view the full Getting Started Guide</summary>
### **Step 2: Access Security Insights**
Run your workflow. Once completed:
- Review the **workflow logs** and the **job markdown summary**.
- Look for a link to **security insights and recommendations**.
<p align="left">
<img src="images/buildlog1.png" alt="Link in workflow log" >
</p>
- Click on the provided link (e.g., [example link](https://app.stepsecurity.io/github/step-security/github-actions-goat/actions/runs/7704454287?jobid=20996777560&tab=network-events)) to access the **Process Monitor View**, which displays:
- **Network events**: Outbound network calls correlated with each step.
- **File events**: File writes tracked during the job.
<p align="left">
<img src="images/network-events.png" alt="Link in network events" >
</p>
</details>
---
## Why Choose Harden-Runner?
- **Prevent Exfiltration:** Prevent the exfiltration of CI/CD secrets and source code.
- **Detect Tampering:** Identify source code modifications during builds.
- **Anomaly Detection:** Spot unusual dependencies and workflow behaviors.
- **Simplify Permissions:** Determine the minimum required `GITHUB_TOKEN` permissions.
---
## Features
Harden-Runner offers a comprehensive suite of features to enhance the security of your CI/CD workflows, available in two tiers: **Community** (Free) and **Enterprise** (Paid).
### Community (Free)
- **CI/CD-Aware Event Correlation:** Each outbound network connection, file operation, and process execution is mapped to the exact step, job, and workflow where it occurs.
- **Automated Baseline Creation:** Harden-Runner builds a baseline for each job based on past outbound network connections.
- **Anomaly Detection:** Once the baseline is created, any future outbound calls not in the baseline trigger a detection.
- **Block Network Egress Traffic with Domain Allowlist:** Optionally use the automatically created baseline to control outbound network traffic by specifying allowed domains, preventing unauthorized data exfiltration.
- **Detect Modification of Source Code:** Monitor and alert on unauthorized changes to your source code during the CI/CD pipeline.
### Enterprise (Paid)
Includes all features in the **Community** tier, plus:
- **Support for Private Repositories:** Extend Harden-Runner's security capabilities to your private GitHub repositories.
- **Support for Self-Hosted Runners:** Apply security controls and monitoring to self-hosted GitHub Actions runners.
- **GitHub Checks Integration:** Enable GitHub Checks for Harden-Runner—if the baseline remains unchanged, the check passes; if it changes, the check fails, showing new outbound connections.
- **View Outbound GitHub API calls at the Job Level:** Monitor HTTPS requests to GitHub APIs
- **Determine Minimum GITHUB_TOKEN Permissions:** Monitor outbound HTTPS requests to GitHub APIs to recommend the least-privilege permissions needed for your workflows, enhancing security by reducing unnecessary access.
- **View the Name and Path of Every File Written During the Build Process:** Gain visibility into every file written to the build environment, including the ability to correlate file writes with processes, ensuring complete transparency.
- **View Process Names and Arguments:** Monitor every process executed during the build process, along with its arguments, and navigate the process tree to detect suspicious activities.
For a detailed comparison and more information, please visit our [Pricing Page](https://www.stepsecurity.io/pricing).
Explore the full feature set in the [Features Documentation](https://docs.stepsecurity.io/harden-runner).
---
## Trusted By and Case Studies
Harden-Runner is trusted by over 8000 leading open-source projects and enterprises, including Microsoft, Google, Kubernetes, and more.
Harden-Runner is trusted by leading open source projects and enterprises to secure their CI/CD pipelines.
### Trusted by
@@ -146,48 +69,304 @@ Harden-Runner is trusted by over 8000 leading open-source projects and enterpris
| --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| **CISA**<br>[Explore](https://app.stepsecurity.io/github/cisagov/skeleton-generic/actions/runs/9947319332?jobid=27479776091&tab=network-events) | **Microsoft**<br>[Explore](https://app.stepsecurity.io/github/microsoft/ebpf-for-windows/actions/runs/7587031851) | **Google**<br>[Explore](https://app.stepsecurity.io/github/GoogleCloudPlatform/functions-framework-ruby/actions/runs/7576989995) | **DataDog**<br>[Explore](https://app.stepsecurity.io/github/DataDog/stratus-red-team/actions/runs/7446169664) | **Intel**<br>[Explore](https://app.stepsecurity.io/github/intel/cve-bin-tool/actions/runs/7590975903) | **Kubernetes**<br>[Explore](https://app.stepsecurity.io/github/kubernetes-sigs/cluster-api-provider-azure/actions/runs/7591172950) | **Node.js**<br>[Explore](https://app.stepsecurity.io/github/nodejs/node/actions/runs/7591405720) | **AWS**<br>[Explore](https://app.stepsecurity.io/github/aws/aperf/actions/runs/7631366761) |
### Enterprise Case Studies
### Case Studies
- [How Coveo Strengthened GitHub Actions Security with StepSecurity](https://www.stepsecurity.io/case-studies/coveo)
- [Hashgraph Achieves Comprehensive CI/CD Security Without Compromising Development Speed](https://www.stepsecurity.io/case-studies/hashgraph)
- [Chainguard Secures GitHub Actions with StepSecurity](https://www.stepsecurity.io/case-studies/chainguard)
- [Harden-Runner Detects CI/CD Supply Chain Attack in Google’s Open-Source Project Flank](https://www.stepsecurity.io/case-studies/flank)
- [Kapiche secures their GitHub Actions software supply chain with Harden-Runner](https://www.stepsecurity.io/case-studies/kapiche)
- [Arcjet Enhances CI/CD Security with Harden-Runner](https://www.stepsecurity.io/case-studies/arcjet)
---
## Environment Compatibility Matrix
## Why use Harden-Runner
Harden-Runner is designed to work seamlessly across a variety of runner environments, providing consistent security insights and protections regardless of where your workflows execute. For self-hosted runners, audit mode is deployed directly to the runner infrastructure without requiring any changes to your existing workflows. For more details, refer to the [official documentation](https://docs.stepsecurity.io/harden-runner).
There are two main threats from compromised workflows, dependencies, and build tools in a CI/CD environment:
| Environment Type | Compatibility | Audit Mode Deployment | Workflow Changes for Audit Mode |
|------------------|---------------|--------------------------|-------------------|
| GitHub-hosted runners | ✅ Full support | Add Harden-Runner Action to workflow | Yes |
| Self-hosted VM runners | ✅ Full support | Include agent in runner image | No |
| Self-hosted bare-metal runners | ✅ Full support | Install agent as a service | No |
| Actions Runner Controller (ARC) | ✅ Full support | Deploy as DaemonSet | No |
| RunsOn Runners | ✅ Full support | Pre-integrated | No |
1. Exfiltration of CI/CD credentials and source code
2. Tampering of source code, dependencies, or artifacts during the build to inject a backdoor
## How It Works
Harden-Runner monitors process, file, and network activity to:
Want to know the technical details? Dive into the architecture of Harden-Runner and its integrations for GitHub-hosted and self-hosted runners in our [How Harden-Runner Works Documentation](docs/how-it-works.md).
| | Countermeasure | Prevent Security Breach |
| --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 1. | Monitor and block outbound network traffic at the DNS, HTTPS (Layer 7), and network layers (Layers 3 and 4) to prevent exfiltration of code and CI/CD credentials | To prevent the [Codecov breach](https://github.com/step-security/github-actions-goat/blob/main/docs/Vulnerabilities/ExfiltratingCICDSecrets.md) scenario |
| 2. | Detect if source code is being tampered during the build process to inject a backdoor | To detect the [XZ Utils](https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/analysis-of-backdoored-xz-utils-build-process-with-harden-runner) and [SolarWinds incident](https://github.com/step-security/github-actions-goat/blob/main/docs/Vulnerabilities/TamperingDuringBuild.md) scenarios |
| 3. | Detect poisoned workflows and compromised dependencies that exhibit suspicious behavior | To detect [Dependency confusion](https://github.com/step-security/github-actions-goat/blob/main/docs/Vulnerabilities/ExfiltratingCICDSecrets.md#dependency-confusion-attacks) and [Malicious dependencies](https://github.com/step-security/github-actions-goat/blob/main/docs/Vulnerabilities/ExfiltratingCICDSecrets.md#compromised-dependencies) scenarios |
| 4. | Determine minimum GITHUB_TOKEN permissions by monitoring HTTPS calls to GitHub APIs | To set [minimum GITHUB_TOKEN permissions](https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/determine-minimum-github-token-permissions-using-ebpf-with-stepsecurity-harden-runner) to reduce the impact of exfiltration |
---
## Getting Started
## Limitations
### Hardening GitHub-Hosted Runners
While Harden-Runner offers powerful features, there are certain limitations based on the environment, such as OS support. See the complete list in [Known Limitations](docs/limitations.md).
1. Add the `step-security/harden-runner` GitHub Action to your GitHub Actions workflow file as the first step in each job. You can automate adding Harden-Runner Action to your workflow file by pasting your workflow in the [StepSecurity online tool](https://app.stepsecurity.io/secureworkflow).
---
```yaml
steps:
- uses: step-security/harden-runner@17d0e2bd7d51742c71671bd19fa12bdc9d40a3d6 # v2.8.1
with:
egress-policy: audit
```
2. In the workflow logs and the job markdown summary, you will see a link to security insights and recommendations.
<p align="left">
<img src="images/buildlog1.png" alt="Link in build log" >
</p>
3. Click on the link ([example link](https://app.stepsecurity.io/github/step-security/github-actions-goat/actions/runs/7704454287)). You will see a process monitor view of network and file events correlated with each step of the job.
<p align="left">
<img src="images/network-events1.png" alt="Insights from harden-runner" >
</p>
4. In the `Recommended Policy` tab, you'll find a recommended block policy based on outbound calls aggregated from the current and past runs of the job. You can update your workflow file with this policy, or alternatively, use the [Policy Store](https://docs.stepsecurity.io/harden-runner/how-tos/block-egress-traffic#2-add-the-policy-using-the-policy-store) to apply the policy without modifying the workflow file. From now on, any outbound calls not in the allowed list will be blocked.
<p align="left">
<img src="images/recommended-policy1.png" alt="Policy recommended by harden-runner" >
</p>
#### Hands-On Tutorials
You can use [GitHub Actions Goat](https://github.com/step-security/github-actions-goat) to try Harden-Runner. You only need a GitHub Account and a web browser.
Hands-on Tutorials for GitHub Actions Runtime Security:
1. [Filter Egress Network Traffic](https://github.com/step-security/github-actions-goat/blob/main/docs/Solutions/RestrictOutboundTraffic.md)
2. [Detect File Tampering](https://github.com/step-security/github-actions-goat/blob/main/docs/Solutions/MonitorSourceCode.md)
### Support for Private Repositories
Hardening of runners used in private repositories is supported with a commercial license. Check out the [documentation](https://docs.stepsecurity.io/stepsecurity-platform/billing) for more details.
- To use Harden-Runner in a `Private` repository, you must install the [StepSecurity GitHub App](https://github.com/apps/stepsecurity-actions-security).
- This is needed to access the GitHub Actions API and to authenticate users to access the dashboard for private repositories.
- If you use Harden-Runner GitHub Action in a private repository, the generated insights URL is NOT public. Only those who have access to the repository can view it.
Read this [case study on how Kapiche uses Harden-Runner](https://www.stepsecurity.io/case-studies/kapiche/) to improve software supply chain security in their private repositories.
### Hardening Self-Hosted Runners
Hardening of self-hosted runners is supported with a commercial license. Check out the [documentation](https://docs.stepsecurity.io/stepsecurity-platform/billing) for more details. For hardening of self-hosted runners you must install the [StepSecurity GitHub App](https://github.com/apps/stepsecurity-actions-security).
#### Self-Hosted Actions Runner Controller (ARC) Runners
> Explore demo workflows using self-hosted ARC Runner and ARC Harden-Runner [here](https://docs.stepsecurity.io/harden-runner/how-tos/enable-runtime-security-arc).
Actions Runner Controller (ARC) is a Kubernetes operator that orchestrates self-hosted runners for GitHub Actions.
- Instead of adding the Harden-Runner GitHub Action in each job, you'll need to install the ARC Harden-Runner daemonset on your Kubernetes cluster.
- Upon installation, the ARC Harden-Runner daemonset monitors all jobs run on the cluster; you do NOT need to add the Harden-Runner GitHub Action to each job for `audit` mode. You do need to add the Harden-Runner GitHub Action to jobs where you want to enable `block` mode.
- The instructions for installing the ARC-Harden-Runner daemonset are shown in the dashboard. To enable access to these instructions, please email support@stepsecurity.io.
#### Self-Hosted VM Runners (e.g. on EC2)
> Explore demo workflows using self-hosted VM Runners and Harden-Runner [here](https://docs.stepsecurity.io/harden-runner/how-tos/enable-runtime-security-vm).
- Instead of adding the Harden-Runner GitHub Action in each job, you'll need to install the Harden-Runner agent on your runner image (e.g. AMI). This is typically done using packer or as a post-install step when using the https://github.com/philips-labs/terraform-aws-github-runner project to setup runners.
- The Harden-Runner agent monitors all jobs run on the VM, both ephemeral and persistent runners are supported; you do NOT need to add the Harden-Runner GitHub Action to each job for `audit` mode. You do need to add the Harden-Runner GitHub Action to jobs where you want to enable `block` mode.
- The instructions for installing the Harden-Runner agent on your self-hosted VM runners are shown in the dashboard. To enable access to these instructions, please email support@stepsecurity.io. This agent is different than the one used for GitHub-hosted runners.
## Features at a glance
For details, check out the documentation at https://docs.stepsecurity.io
### View outbound network traffic at the job level
> Applies to both GitHub-hosted and self-hosted runners
Harden-Runner monitors all outbound traffic from each job at the DNS and network layers
- After the workflow completes, each outbound call is correlated with each step of the job, and shown in the insights page
- For self-hosted runners, no changes are needed to workflow files to monitor egress traffic
- A filtering (block) egress policy is suggested in the insights page based on the current and past job runs
<p align="left">
<img src="images/network-events1.png" alt="Insights from harden-runner" >
</p>
### View outbound network traffic at the organization level
> Applies to both GitHub-hosted and self-hosted runners
You can view all unique network destinations from all workflow runs in your organization on the `Runtime Security` tab.
- The `All Observed Endpoints` menu provides a detailed list of all network destinations contacted by your Actions runners.
- For each listed endpoint, the `View Sample Workflow Runs` option enables you to examine individual GitHub Actions workflow runs that interacted with the endpoint.
For more details refer [Unified Network Egress View: Centralize GitHub Actions Network Destinations for Your Enterprise](https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/unified-network-egress-view-centralize-github-actions-network-destinations-for-your-enterprise)
<p align="left">
<img src="images/org-level.png" width="400" alt="View outbound network traffic at the organization level" >
</p>
### View outbound HTTPS traffic at the job level
> Applies to GitHub-hosted and self-hosted VM runners
Harden-Runner can monitor outbound HTTPS requests. This feature is supported with a commercial license.
- HTTPS events are monitored using eBPF (no MITM proxy is used)
- If a HTTP PUT/ POST/ PATCH call is made to GitHub APIs to a HTTP Path with a different organization than where the workflow is running, the call is marked as anomalous
- As of now, only HTTPS calls to `github.com`, `api.github.com`, `*.pkg.github.com`, and `ghcr.io` hosts are monitoried.
<p align="left">
<img src="images/https-events.png" alt="View outbound HTTPS traffic at the job level" >
</p>
### Detect anomalous outbound network traffic
> Applies to both GitHub-hosted and self-hosted runners
You can detect suspicious/ anomalous traffic using this feature even in `egress-policy:audit` mode.
- Anomaly detection feature creates a machine learning model of outbound network calls by analyzing the historical data of the same workflow in previous runs
- After the baseline is created, any anomalous outbound destinations are marked as anomalous in the insights page, and real-time alerts are triggered
- You can view the list of all anomalous outbound network traffic in the `Runtime detections` page on the dashboard
For more details, refer to [Anomalous Outbound Call Detection Using Machine Learning](https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/announcing-anomalous-outbound-call-detection-using-machine-learning)
### Filter outbound network traffic to allowed endpoints
> Applies to both GitHub-hosted and self-hosted runners
You can see recommended egress block policy in the `Recommendations` tab for each job. This is based on observed traffic across multiple runs of the job.
<p align="left">
<img src="images/recommended-policy1.png" alt="Policy recommended by harden-runner" >
</p>
Once you set these allowed endpoints in the workflow file, or in the [Policy Store](https://docs.stepsecurity.io/harden-runner/how-tos/block-egress-traffic#2-add-the-policy-using-the-policy-store) and switch to using `egress-policy:block`
- Harden-Runner blocks egress traffic at the DNS (Layer 7) and network layers (Layers 3 and 4)
- It blocks DNS exfiltration, where attacker tries to send data out using DNS resolution
- Wildcard domains are supported, e.g. you can add `*.data.mcr.microsoft.com:443` to the allowed list, and egress traffic will be allowed to `eastus.data.mcr.microsoft.com:443` and `westus.data.mcr.microsoft.com:443`
<p align="left">
<img src="images/blocked-outbound-call-3.png" alt="Policy recommended by harden-runner" >
</p>
### Determine minimum GITHUB_TOKEN permissions using Harden-Runner
> Applies to GitHub-hosted runners
Harden-Runner monitors outbound HTTPS requests using eBPF and uses the PATHs and VERBs of these HTTPS calls to recommend the minimum GITHUB_TOKEN permissions for each job in your workflow. This feature is supported with a commercial license.
- GITHUB_TOKEN is an automatically generated secret used to authenticate to GitHub APIs from GitHub Actions workflows.
- Harden-Runner can monitor the VERBs (e.g., `GET`, `POST`) and PATHs (e.g., `/repos/owner/repo/issues`) for calls made to the GitHub APIs from the runner.
- Each GitHub Actions API call requires a corresponding GITHUB_TOKEN permission. For instance, a GET request to the `/repos/org/repo/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack` endpoint requires the `contents: read` permission.
- The recommendation for the minimum GITHUB_TOKEN permissions are show in the `Recommendations` tab.
For more details, refer to [Determine Minimum GITHUB_TOKEN Permissions Using eBPF with Harden-Runner.
](https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/determine-minimum-github-token-permissions-using-ebpf-with-stepsecurity-harden-runner)
<p align="left">
<img src="images/token-perms-recommendation.png" alt="View recommendation for minimum GITHUB_TOKEN permissions" >
</p>
### View the name and path of every file written during the build process
> Applies to both GitHub-hosted and self-hosted runners
View the name and path of every file that was written during the build process. This feature is supported with a commercial license.
- Harden-Runner tracks every file written to the GitHub Actions working directory during the build process.
- In the insights page in the `File Write Events` tab you can see a file explorer view of each file that was written to.
- Clicking on any file reveals a list of processes that wrote to it, providing complete transparency.
<p align="left">
<img src="images/file-write-events.png" alt="View the name and path of every file written during the build process" >
</p>
### View process names and arguments
> Applies to both GitHub-hosted and self-hosted runners
View process names, PIDs, and process arguments. This feature is supported with a commercial license.
- Harden-Runner tracks every process that is run during the build process.
- Clicking on any process ID (PID) in the network events, file events, or HTTPS events shows the process that caused the event, along with the process arguments.
- You can walk up the process tree by clicking `View Parent Process` to understand the build process and detect suspicious activity.
<p align="left">
<img src="images/process-events-3.png" alt="View process names and arguments" >
</p>
### Detect tampering of source code during build
> Applies to both GitHub-hosted and self-hosted runners
Harden-Runner monitors file writes and can detect if a file is overwritten.
- Source code overwrite is not expected in a release build
- All source code files are monitored, which means even changes to IaC files (Kubernetes manifest, Terraform) are detected
- You can enable notifications to get one-time alert when source code is overwritten
- For self-hosted runners, no changes are needed to workflow files for file monitoring
<p align="left">
<img src="images/file-events.png" alt="Policy recommended by harden-runner" >
</p>
### Run your job without sudo access
> Applies to GitHub-hosted runners
GitHub-hosted runner uses passwordless sudo for running jobs.
- This means compromised build tools or dependencies can install attack tools
- If your job does not need sudo access, you see a policy
recommendation to disable sudo in the insights page
- When you set `disable-sudo` to `true`, the job steps run without sudo access to the GitHub-hosted Ubuntu VM
<p align="left">
<img src="images/recommended-policy1.png" alt="Policy recommended by harden-runner" >
</p>
### Get real-time security alerts
> Applies to both GitHub-hosted and self-hosted runners
Install the [StepSecurity GitHub App](https://github.com/apps/stepsecurity-actions-security) to get security alerts/ notifications.
- Email, Slack, and Teams notifications are supported
- Notifications are sent when anomalous outbound network/ HTTPS traffic is detected, outbound traffic is blocked, or source code is overwritten
- Notifications are not repeated for the same alert for a given workflow
## Discussions
Join the conversation! For questions, ideas, or feedback, visit our [Discussions Page](https://github.com/step-security/harden-runner/discussions).
- If you have questions or ideas, please use [discussions](https://github.com/step-security/harden-runner/discussions).
- For support for self-hosted runners and private repositories, email support@stepsecurity.io.
- If you use a different CI/CD Provider (e.g. Jenkins, Gitlab CI, etc), and would like to use Harden Runner in your environment, please email interest@stepsecurity.io
For enterprise support, email support@stepsecurity.io. Interested in using Harden-Runner in other CI/CD platforms? Reach out to interest@stepsecurity.io.
## How does it work?
---
### GitHub-Hosted Runners
## License
For GitHub-hosted runners, Harden-Runner GitHub Action downloads and installs the StepSecurity Agent.
Harden-Runner is open source. See the [LICENSE](LICENSE) file for details.
- The code to monitor file, process, and network activity is in the Agent.
- The agent is written in Go and is open source at https://github.com/step-security/agent
- The agent's build is reproducible. You can view the steps to reproduce the build [here](http://app.stepsecurity.io/github/step-security/agent/releases/latest)
### Self-Hosted Actions Runner Controller (ARC) Runners
- ARC Harden Runner daemonset uses eBPF
- You can find more details in this blog post: https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/introducing-harden-runner-for-kubernetes-based-self-hosted-actions-runners
- ARC Harden Runner is NOT open source.
### Self-Hosted VM Runners (e.g. on EC2)
- For self-hosted VMs, you add the Harden-Runner agent into your runner image (e.g. AMI).
- Agent for self-hosted VMs is NOT open source.
## Limitations
### GitHub-Hosted Runners
1. Only Ubuntu VM is supported. Windows and MacOS GitHub-hosted runners are not supported. There is a discussion about that [here](https://github.com/step-security/harden-runner/discussions/121).
2. Harden-Runner is not supported when [job is run in a container](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/using-jobs/running-jobs-in-a-container) as it needs sudo access on the Ubuntu VM to run. It can be used to monitor jobs that use containers to run steps. The limitation is if the entire job is run in a container. That is not common for GitHub Actions workflows, as most of them run directly on `ubuntu-latest`. Note: This is not a limitation for Self-Hosted runners.
### Self-Hosted Actions Runner Controller (ARC) Runners
1. Since ARC Harden Runner uses eBPF, only Linux jobs are supported. Windows and MacOS jobs are not supported.
### Self-Hosted VM Runners (e.g. on EC2)
1. Only Ubuntu VM is supported. Windows and MacOS jobs are not supported.
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required: false
default: "false"
disable-sudo:
description: "Disable sudo access for the runner account. Note: This parameter will be deprecated in the future. Please use disable-sudo-and-containers instead."
required: false
default: "false"
disable-sudo-and-containers:
description: "Disable sudo and container access for the runner account"
description: "Disable sudo access for the runner account"
required: false
default: "false"
disable-file-monitoring:
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## How Harden-Runner Works?
### GitHub-Hosted Runners
For GitHub-hosted runners, Harden-Runner GitHub Action downloads and installs the StepSecurity Agent.
- The code to monitor file, process, and network activity is in the Agent.
- The community tier agent is open-source and can be found [here](https://github.com/step-security/agent). The enterprise tier agent is closed-source. Both agents are written in Go.
- The agent's build is reproducible. You can view the steps to reproduce the build [here](http://app.stepsecurity.io/github/step-security/agent/releases/latest)
### Self-Hosted Actions Runner Controller (ARC) Runners
- ARC Harden Runner daemonset uses eBPF
- You can find more details in this [blog post](https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/introducing-harden-runner-for-kubernetes-based-self-hosted-actions-runners)
- ARC Harden Runner is NOT open source.
### Self-Hosted VM Runners (e.g. on EC2)
- For self-hosted VMs, you add the Harden-Runner agent into your runner image (e.g. AMI).
- You can find more details in this [blog post](https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/ci-cd-security-for-self-hosted-vm-runners)
- Agent for self-hosted VMs is NOT open source.
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## Limitations
### GitHub-Hosted Runners
* Only Ubuntu VM is supported. Windows and MacOS GitHub-hosted runners are not supported. There is a discussion about that [here](https://github.com/step-security/harden-runner/discussions/121).
* Harden-Runner is not supported when [job is run in a container](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/using-jobs/running-jobs-in-a-container) with built-in labels such as `ubuntu-latest`, as it needs sudo access on the Ubuntu VM to run. The limitation is if the entire job is run in a container. However, such jobs can be monitored when using custom VM images with GitHub-hosted runners. This is also not a limitation for Self-Hosted runners.
### Self-Hosted Actions Runner Controller (ARC) Runners
* Since ARC Harden Runner uses eBPF, only Linux jobs are supported. Windows and MacOS jobs are not supported.
### Self-Hosted VM (e.g. on EC2) and Bare-metal Runners
* Only Linux jobs are supported. Windows and MacOS jobs are not supported.
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[[IgnoredVulns]]
id = "GHSA-h5c3-5r3r-rr8q"
reason = "Untrusted headers are not processed"
[[IgnoredVulns]]
id = "GHSA-rmvr-2pp2-xj38"
reason = "Untrusted headers are not processed"
[[IgnoredVulns]]
id = "GHSA-xx4v-prfh-6cgc"
reason = "Untrusted headers are not processed"
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},
"homepage": "https://github.com/step-security/harden-runner#readme",
"dependencies": {
"@actions/cache": "^4.0.0",
"@actions/cache": "^3.1.4",
"@actions/core": "^1.5.0",
"@actions/exec": "^1.1.0",
"@actions/github": "^6.0.1",
"@actions/github": "^5.0.0",
"@actions/http-client": "^2.0.1",
"@actions/tool-cache": "^1.7.1",
"@babel/helpers": "^7.26.10",
"ansi-regex": ">=5.0.1",
"is-docker": "^3.0.0",
"node-fetch": ">=3.2.0",
@@ -40,7 +39,7 @@
"@types/node": "^16.9.0",
"@typescript-eslint/eslint-plugin": "^6.1.0",
"@typescript-eslint/parser": "^6.1.0",
"@vercel/ncc": "^0.38.3",
"@vercel/ncc": "^0.30.0",
"eslint": "^7.32.0",
"eslint-config-google": "^0.14.0",
"jest": "^29.3.1",
+13 -2
View File
@@ -1,9 +1,20 @@
import { isARCRunner } from "./arc-runner";
import { isArcRunner, sendAllowedEndpoints } from "./arc-runner";
it("should correctly recognize arc based runner", async () => {
process.env["GITHUB_ACTIONS_RUNNER_EXTRA_USER_AGENT"] =
"actions-runner-controller/2.0.1";
let isArc: boolean = await isARCRunner();
let isArc: boolean = await isArcRunner();
expect(isArc).toBe(true);
});
it("should write endpoint files", ()=>{
process.env["isTest"] = "1"
let allowed_endpoints = ["github.com:443", "*.google.com:443", "youtube.com"].join(" ");
sendAllowedEndpoints(allowed_endpoints);
})
+29 -24
View File
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
import * as cp from "child_process";
import * as fs from "fs";
import path from "path";
import { sleep } from "./setup";
export function isARCRunner(): boolean {
export function isArcRunner(): boolean {
const runnerUserAgent = process.env["GITHUB_ACTIONS_RUNNER_EXTRA_USER_AGENT"];
let isARC = false;
@@ -18,40 +18,45 @@ export function isARCRunner(): boolean {
function isSecondaryPod(): boolean {
const workDir = "/__w";
let hasKubeEnv = process.env["KUBERNETES_PORT"] !== undefined;
return fs.existsSync(workDir) && hasKubeEnv;
return fs.existsSync(workDir);
}
function getRunnerTempDir(): string {
const isTest = process.env["isTest"];
if (isTest === "1") {
return "/tmp";
}
return process.env["RUNNER_TEMP"] || "/tmp";
}
export function sendAllowedEndpoints(endpoints: string): void {
const startTime = Date.now();
const allowedEndpoints = endpoints.split(" "); // endpoints are space separated
let sent = 0;
for (let endpoint of allowedEndpoints) {
endpoint = endpoint.trim();
if (endpoint.length > 0) {
let encodedEndpoint = Buffer.from(endpoint).toString("base64");
let endpointPolicyStr = `step_policy_endpoint_${encodedEndpoint}`;
echo(endpointPolicyStr);
sent++;
for (const endpoint of allowedEndpoints) {
if (endpoint) {
const encodedEndpoint = Buffer.from(endpoint).toString("base64");
cp.execSync(
`echo "${endpoint}" > "${getRunnerTempDir()}/step_policy_endpoint_${encodedEndpoint}"`
);
}
}
if (sent > 0) {
applyPolicy(sent);
if (allowedEndpoints.length > 0) {
applyPolicy(allowedEndpoints.length);
}
const duration = Date.now() - startTime;
console.log(
`[harden-runner] sendAllowedEndpoints completed in ${duration}ms (sent ${sent} endpoints)`
);
}
function applyPolicy(count: number): void {
let applyPolicyStr = `step_policy_apply_${count}`;
echo(applyPolicyStr);
const fileName = `step_policy_apply_${count}`;
cp.execSync(`echo "${fileName}" > "${getRunnerTempDir()}/${fileName}"`);
}
function echo(content: string) {
cp.execFileSync("echo", [content]);
export function removeStepPolicyFiles() {
cp.execSync(`rm ${getRunnerTempDir()}/step_policy_*`);
}
export function arcCleanUp() {
cp.execSync(`echo "cleanup" > "${getRunnerTempDir()}/step_policy_cleanup"`);
}
+6 -20
View File
@@ -2,33 +2,19 @@ import * as core from "@actions/core";
import * as crypto from "crypto";
import * as fs from "fs";
const CHECKSUMS = {
tls: {
amd64: "2a5be06ab620340f6957ddd180450caab414671c8b7da1996d8e2755c1cd49fa", // v1.7.9
arm64: "e9d0ccf3e4e62ba15ff208ef6e0afa0ad5e323c3dfc50527342f436a85e65a55",
},
non_tls: {
amd64: "336093af8ebe969567b66fd035af3bd4f7e1c723ce680d6b4b5b2a1f79bc329e", // v0.14.2
},
};
export function verifyChecksum(
downloadPath: string,
isTLS: boolean,
variant: string
) {
export function verifyChecksum(downloadPath: string, is_tls: boolean) {
const fileBuffer: Buffer = fs.readFileSync(downloadPath);
const checksum: string = crypto
.createHash("sha256")
.update(fileBuffer)
.digest("hex"); // checksum of downloaded file
let expectedChecksum: string = "";
let expectedChecksum: string =
"a9f1842e3d7f3d38c143dbe8ffe1948e6c8173cd04da072d9f9d128bb400844a"; // checksum for v0.13.7
if (isTLS) {
expectedChecksum = CHECKSUMS["tls"][variant];
} else {
expectedChecksum = CHECKSUMS["non_tls"][variant];
if (is_tls) {
expectedChecksum =
"e45b85e29216eb1d217aad368bdb056bbd868a308925e7b2cf9133b06ab435d0"; // checksum for tls_agent
}
if (checksum !== expectedChecksum) {
+12 -42
View File
@@ -2,29 +2,22 @@ import * as fs from "fs";
import * as cp from "child_process";
import * as common from "./common";
import isDocker from "is-docker";
import { isARCRunner } from "./arc-runner";
import { isGithubHosted } from "./tls-inspect";
import { context } from "@actions/github";
import { arcCleanUp, isArcRunner, removeStepPolicyFiles } from "./arc-runner";
(async () => {
console.log("[harden-runner] post-step");
const customProperties = context?.payload?.repository?.custom_properties || {};
if (customProperties["skip-harden-runner"] === "true") {
console.log("Skipping harden-runner: custom property 'skip-harden-runner' is set to 'true'");
return;
}
if (process.platform !== "linux") {
console.log(common.UBUNTU_MESSAGE);
return;
}
if (isGithubHosted() && isDocker()) {
if (isDocker()) {
console.log(common.CONTAINER_MESSAGE);
return;
}
if (isARCRunner()) {
if (isArcRunner()) {
console.log(`[!] ${common.ARC_RUNNER_MESSAGE}`);
arcCleanUp();
removeStepPolicyFiles();
return;
}
@@ -32,14 +25,6 @@ import { context } from "@actions/github";
return;
}
if (process.env.STATE_customVMImage === "true") {
return;
}
if (process.env.STATE_isTLS === "false" && process.arch === "arm64") {
return;
}
if (
String(process.env.STATE_monitorStatusCode) ===
common.STATUS_HARDEN_RUNNER_UNAVAILABLE
@@ -48,11 +33,6 @@ import { context } from "@actions/github";
return;
}
if (isGithubHosted() && fs.existsSync("/home/agent/post_event.json")) {
console.log("Post step already executed, skipping");
return;
}
fs.writeFileSync(
"/home/agent/post_event.json",
JSON.stringify({ event: "post" })
@@ -97,22 +77,12 @@ import { context } from "@actions/github";
}
var disable_sudo = process.env.STATE_disableSudo;
var disable_sudo_and_containers = process.env.STATE_disableSudoAndContainers;
if (disable_sudo !== "true" && disable_sudo_and_containers !== "true") {
try {
var journalLog = cp.execSync(
"sudo journalctl -u agent.service --lines=1000",
{
encoding: "utf8",
maxBuffer: 1024 * 1024 * 10, // 10MB buffer
}
);
console.log("agent.service log:");
console.log(journalLog);
} catch (error) {
console.log("Warning: Could not fetch service logs:", error.message);
}
if (disable_sudo !== "true") {
var journalLog = cp.execSync("sudo journalctl -u agent.service", {
encoding: "utf8",
});
console.log("Service log:");
console.log(journalLog);
}
try {
+75 -43
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
import * as core from "@actions/core";
import * as fs from "fs";
import { STEPSECURITY_API_URL, STEPSECURITY_WEB_URL } from "./configs";
import { STEPSECURITY_WEB_URL } from "./configs";
export function printInfo(web_url) {
console.log(
@@ -35,15 +35,8 @@ export const processLogLine = (
if (matches) {
const [ipAddress, domain, pid, process] = matches.slice(1);
// Check if all values are non-empty and domain does not end with specified patterns
if (
pid &&
process &&
domain &&
ipAddress &&
!domain.endsWith(".actions.githubusercontent.com.") &&
!domain.endsWith(".blob.core.windows.net.")
) {
// Check if all values are non-empty
if (pid && process && domain && ipAddress) {
const status = ipAddress.startsWith("54.185.253.63")
? "❌ Blocked"
: "✅ Allowed";
@@ -59,12 +52,14 @@ export async function addSummary() {
return;
}
const correlation_id = process.env.STATE_correlation_id;
if (!correlation_id) {
const web_url = STEPSECURITY_WEB_URL;
const insights_url = `${web_url}/github/${process.env["GITHUB_REPOSITORY"]}/actions/runs/${process.env["GITHUB_RUN_ID"]}`;
const log = "/home/agent/agent.log";
if (!fs.existsSync(log)) {
return;
}
let needsSubscription = false;
try {
let data = fs.readFileSync("/home/agent/annotation.log", "utf8");
@@ -94,51 +89,88 @@ export async function addSummary() {
return;
}
// Extract owner and repo from GITHUB_REPOSITORY (format: owner/repo)
const [owner, repo] = process.env["GITHUB_REPOSITORY"]?.split("/") || [];
const run_id = process.env["GITHUB_RUN_ID"];
if (!owner || !repo || !run_id || !correlation_id) {
const content = fs.readFileSync(log, "utf-8");
const lines = content.split("\n");
let tableEntries = [];
for (const line of lines) {
processLogLine(line, tableEntries);
}
if (tableEntries.length === 0) {
return;
}
// Fetch job summary from API
const apiUrl = `${STEPSECURITY_API_URL}/github/${owner}/${repo}/actions/runs/${run_id}/correlation/${correlation_id}/job-markdown-summary`;
try {
const response = await fetch(apiUrl);
if (!response.ok) {
console.error(`Failed to fetch job summary: ${response.status} ${response.statusText}`);
return;
const insightsRow = `<p><b><a href="${insights_url}">📄 View Full Report</a></b></p>`;
await core.summary.addSeparator().addRaw(`<h2>🛡 StepSecurity Report</h2>`);
tableEntries.sort((a, b) => {
if (a.status === "❌ Blocked" && b.status !== "❌ Blocked") {
return -1;
} else if (a.status !== "❌ Blocked" && b.status === "❌ Blocked") {
return 1;
} else {
return 0;
}
const markdownSummary = await response.text();
// Render the markdown summary using core.summary.addRaw
await core.summary.addRaw(markdownSummary).write();
return;
} catch (error) {
console.error(`Error fetching job summary: ${error}`);
return;
}
});
tableEntries = tableEntries.slice(0, 3);
await core.summary.addRaw(`
<blockquote>
<p>Preview of the outbound network calls during this workflow run.</p></blockquote>
<h3>Network Calls</h3>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Process</th>
<th>Destination</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
${tableEntries
.map(
(entry) => `<tr>
<td><code>${entry.process}</code></td>
<td>${entry.domain.replace(/\.$/, "")}</td>
<td>${entry.status}</td>
</tr>`
)
.join("")}
<tr>
<td><code>...</code></td>
<td><code>...</code></td>
<td><code>...</code></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
${insightsRow}
`);
await core.summary
.addRaw(
`<p><i>Markdown generated by the <a href="https://github.com/step-security/harden-runner">Harden-Runner GitHub Action</a>.</i></p>`
)
.addSeparator()
.write();
}
export const STATUS_HARDEN_RUNNER_UNAVAILABLE = "409";
export const CONTAINER_MESSAGE =
"This job is running in a container. Such jobs can be monitored by installing Harden Runner in a custom VM image for GitHub-hosted runners.";
"This job is running in a container. Harden Runner does not run in a container as it needs sudo access to run. This job will not be monitored.";
export const UBUNTU_MESSAGE =
"This job is not running in a GitHub Actions Hosted Runner Ubuntu VM. Harden Runner is only supported on Ubuntu VM. This job will not be monitored.";
export const SELF_HOSTED_RUNNER_MESSAGE =
"This job is running on a self-hosted runner.";
export const SELF_HOSTED_NO_AGENT_MESSAGE =
"This job is running on a self-hosted runner, but the runner does not have Harden-Runner installed. This job will not be monitored.";
export const HARDEN_RUNNER_UNAVAILABLE_MESSAGE =
"Sorry, we are currently experiencing issues with the Harden Runner installation process. It is currently unavailable.";
export const ARC_RUNNER_MESSAGE =
"Workflow is currently being executed in ARC based runner.";
export const ARM64_RUNNER_MESSAGE =
"ARM runners are not supported in the Harden-Runner community tier.";
"Workflow is currently being executed in ARC based runner";
+2 -15
View File
@@ -2,22 +2,13 @@ import * as common from "./common";
import * as core from "@actions/core";
import isDocker from "is-docker";
import { STEPSECURITY_WEB_URL } from "./configs";
import { isGithubHosted } from "./tls-inspect";
import { context } from "@actions/github";
(async () => {
console.log("[harden-runner] main-step");
const customProperties = context?.payload?.repository?.custom_properties || {};
if (customProperties["skip-harden-runner"] === "true") {
console.log("Skipping harden-runner: custom property 'skip-harden-runner' is set to 'true'");
return;
}
if (process.platform !== "linux") {
console.log(common.UBUNTU_MESSAGE);
return;
}
if (isGithubHosted() && isDocker()) {
if (isDocker()) {
console.log(common.CONTAINER_MESSAGE);
return;
}
@@ -30,10 +21,6 @@ import { context } from "@actions/github";
return;
}
if (process.env.STATE_isTLS === "false" && process.arch === "arm64") {
return;
}
if (
core.getBooleanInput("disable-telemetry") &&
core.getInput("egress-policy") === "block"
-67
View File
@@ -1,67 +0,0 @@
import * as tc from "@actions/tool-cache";
import * as core from "@actions/core";
import * as cp from "child_process";
import * as path from "path";
import * as fs from "fs";
import { verifyChecksum } from "./checksum";
import { EOL } from "os";
import { ARM64_RUNNER_MESSAGE } from "./common";
export async function installAgent(
isTLS: boolean,
configStr: string
): Promise<boolean> {
// Note: to avoid github rate limiting
const token = core.getInput("token", { required: true });
const auth = `token ${token}`;
const variant = process.arch === "x64" ? "amd64" : "arm64";
let downloadPath: string;
fs.appendFileSync(process.env.GITHUB_STATE, `isTLS=${isTLS}${EOL}`, {
encoding: "utf8",
});
if (isTLS) {
downloadPath = await tc.downloadTool(
`https://github.com/step-security/agent-ebpf/releases/download/v1.7.9/harden-runner_1.7.9_linux_${variant}.tar.gz`,
undefined,
auth
);
} else {
if (variant === "arm64") {
console.log(ARM64_RUNNER_MESSAGE);
return false;
}
downloadPath = await tc.downloadTool(
"https://github.com/step-security/agent/releases/download/v0.14.2/agent_0.14.2_linux_amd64.tar.gz",
undefined,
auth
);
}
verifyChecksum(downloadPath, isTLS, variant);
const extractPath = await tc.extractTar(downloadPath);
let cmd = "cp",
args = [path.join(extractPath, "agent"), "/home/agent/agent"];
cp.execFileSync(cmd, args);
cp.execSync("chmod +x /home/agent/agent");
fs.writeFileSync("/home/agent/agent.json", configStr);
cmd = "sudo";
args = [
"cp",
path.join(__dirname, "agent.service"),
"/etc/systemd/system/agent.service",
];
cp.execFileSync(cmd, args);
cp.execSync("sudo systemctl daemon-reload");
cp.execSync("sudo service agent start", { timeout: 15000 });
return true;
}
-2
View File
@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@ export interface Configuration {
egress_policy: string;
disable_telemetry: boolean;
disable_sudo: boolean;
disable_sudo_and_containers: boolean;
disable_file_monitoring: boolean;
is_github_hosted: boolean;
private: string;
@@ -21,7 +20,6 @@ export interface PolicyResponse {
policyName?: string;
allowed_endpoints?: string[];
disable_sudo?: boolean;
disable_sudo_and_containers?: boolean;
disable_file_monitoring?: boolean;
disable_telemetry?: boolean;
egress_policy?: string;
-2
View File
@@ -36,7 +36,6 @@ test("merge configs", async () => {
egress_policy: "audit",
disable_telemetry: false,
disable_sudo: false,
disable_sudo_and_containers: false,
disable_file_monitoring: false,
private: "true",
is_github_hosted: true,
@@ -63,7 +62,6 @@ test("merge configs", async () => {
egress_policy: "audit",
disable_telemetry: false,
disable_sudo: false,
disable_sudo_and_containers: false,
disable_file_monitoring: false,
private: "true",
is_github_hosted: true,
+2 -11
View File
@@ -39,12 +39,7 @@ export async function fetchPolicy(
}
if (response === undefined && err !== undefined) {
// Preserve the original error's statusCode if it exists
const error = new Error(`[Policy Fetch] ${err}`);
if (err.statusCode !== undefined) {
(error as any).statusCode = err.statusCode;
}
throw error;
throw new Error(`[Policy Fetch] ${err}`);
} else {
return response.result;
}
@@ -61,10 +56,6 @@ export function mergeConfigs(
localConfig.disable_sudo = remoteConfig.disable_sudo;
}
if (remoteConfig.disable_sudo_and_containers !== undefined) {
localConfig.disable_sudo_and_containers = remoteConfig.disable_sudo_and_containers;
}
if (remoteConfig.disable_file_monitoring !== undefined) {
localConfig.disable_file_monitoring = remoteConfig.disable_file_monitoring;
}
@@ -75,7 +66,7 @@ export function mergeConfigs(
return localConfig;
}
function sleep(ms: number) {
function sleep(ms) {
return new Promise((resolve) => {
setTimeout(resolve, ms);
});
+102 -171
View File
@@ -5,6 +5,8 @@ import * as httpm from "@actions/http-client";
import * as path from "path";
import { v4 as uuidv4 } from "uuid";
import * as common from "./common";
import * as tc from "@actions/tool-cache";
import { verifyChecksum } from "./checksum";
import isDocker from "is-docker";
import { context } from "@actions/github";
import { EOL } from "os";
@@ -19,15 +21,10 @@ import { Configuration, PolicyResponse } from "./interfaces";
import { fetchPolicy, mergeConfigs } from "./policy-utils";
import * as cache from "@actions/cache";
import { getCacheEntry } from "@actions/cache/lib/internal/cacheHttpClient";
import * as cacheTwirpClient from "@actions/cache/lib/internal/shared/cacheTwirpClient";
import { GetCacheEntryDownloadURLRequest } from "@actions/cache/lib/generated/results/api/v1/cache";
import { getCacheServiceVersion } from "@actions/cache/lib/internal/config";
import * as utils from "@actions/cache/lib/internal/cacheUtils";
import { isARCRunner, sendAllowedEndpoints } from "./arc-runner";
import { isArcRunner, sendAllowedEndpoints } from "./arc-runner";
import { STEPSECURITY_API_URL, STEPSECURITY_WEB_URL } from "./configs";
import { isGithubHosted, isTLSEnabled } from "./tls-inspect";
import { installAgent } from "./install-agent";
interface MonitorResponse {
runner_ip_address?: string;
@@ -37,19 +34,11 @@ interface MonitorResponse {
(async () => {
try {
console.log("[harden-runner] pre-step");
const customProperties = context?.payload?.repository?.custom_properties || {};
if (customProperties["skip-harden-runner"] === "true") {
console.log("Skipping harden-runner: custom property 'skip-harden-runner' is set to 'true'");
return;
}
if (process.platform !== "linux") {
console.log(common.UBUNTU_MESSAGE);
return;
}
if (isGithubHosted() && isDocker()) {
if (isDocker()) {
console.log(common.CONTAINER_MESSAGE);
return;
}
@@ -68,9 +57,6 @@ interface MonitorResponse {
egress_policy: core.getInput("egress-policy"),
disable_telemetry: core.getBooleanInput("disable-telemetry"),
disable_sudo: core.getBooleanInput("disable-sudo"),
disable_sudo_and_containers: core.getBooleanInput(
"disable-sudo-and-containers"
),
disable_file_monitoring: core.getBooleanInput("disable-file-monitoring"),
private: context?.payload?.repository?.private || false,
is_github_hosted: isGithubHosted(),
@@ -91,18 +77,7 @@ interface MonitorResponse {
confg = mergeConfigs(confg, result);
} catch (err) {
core.info(`[!] ${err}`);
// Only fail the job if ID token is not available
if (err.message && err.message.includes('Unable to get ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST')) {
core.setFailed('Policy store requires id-token write permission as it uses OIDC to fetch the policy from StepSecurity API. Please add "id-token: write" to your job permissions.');
} else {
// Handle different HTTP status codes
if (err.statusCode >= 400 && err.statusCode < 500) {
core.error('Policy not found');
} else {
core.error(`Unexpected error occurred: ${err}. Falling back to egress policy audit`);
confg.egress_policy = 'audit';
}
}
core.setFailed(err);
}
}
fs.appendFileSync(
@@ -112,13 +87,6 @@ interface MonitorResponse {
encoding: "utf8",
}
);
fs.appendFileSync(
process.env.GITHUB_STATE,
`disableSudoAndContainers=${confg.disable_sudo_and_containers}${EOL}`,
{
encoding: "utf8",
}
);
core.info(`[!] Current Configuration: \n${JSON.stringify(confg)}\n`);
if (confg.egress_policy !== "audit" && confg.egress_policy !== "block") {
@@ -145,78 +113,28 @@ interface MonitorResponse {
} catch (exception) {
console.log(exception);
}
const cacheServiceVersion: string = getCacheServiceVersion();
switch (cacheServiceVersion) {
case "v2":
core.info(`cache version: v2`);
try {
const cacheFilePath = path.join(__dirname, "cache.txt");
core.info(`cacheFilePath ${cacheFilePath}`);
const twirpClient = cacheTwirpClient.internalCacheTwirpClient();
const compressionMethod = await utils.getCompressionMethod();
const request: GetCacheEntryDownloadURLRequest = {
key: cacheKey,
restoreKeys: [],
version: utils.getCacheVersion(
[cacheFilePath],
compressionMethod,
false
),
};
const response = await twirpClient.GetCacheEntryDownloadURL(
request
);
const url = new URL(response.signedDownloadUrl);
core.info(
`Adding cacheHost: ${url.hostname}:443 to allowed-endpoints`
);
confg.allowed_endpoints += ` ${url.hostname}:443`;
} catch (e) {
core.info(`Unable to fetch cacheURL ${e}`);
if (confg.egress_policy === "block") {
core.info("Switching egress-policy to audit mode");
confg.egress_policy = "audit";
}
}
break;
case "v1":
core.info(`cache version: v1`);
try {
const compressionMethod: CompressionMethod =
await utils.getCompressionMethod();
const cacheFilePath = path.join(__dirname, "cache.txt");
core.info(`cacheFilePath ${cacheFilePath}`);
const cacheEntry: ArtifactCacheEntry = await getCacheEntry(
[cacheKey],
[cacheFilePath],
{
compressionMethod: compressionMethod,
}
);
const url = new URL(cacheEntry.archiveLocation);
core.info(
`Adding cacheHost: ${url.hostname}:443 to allowed-endpoints`
);
confg.allowed_endpoints += ` ${url.hostname}:443`;
} catch (exception) {
// some exception has occurred.
core.info(`Unable to fetch cacheURL ${exception}`);
if (confg.egress_policy === "block") {
core.info("Switching egress-policy to audit mode");
confg.egress_policy = "audit";
}
try {
const compressionMethod: CompressionMethod =
await utils.getCompressionMethod();
const cacheFilePath = path.join(__dirname, "cache.txt");
core.info(`cacheFilePath ${cacheFilePath}`);
const cacheEntry: ArtifactCacheEntry = await getCacheEntry(
[cacheKey],
[cacheFilePath],
{
compressionMethod: compressionMethod,
}
);
const url = new URL(cacheEntry.archiveLocation);
core.info(`Adding cacheHost: ${url.hostname}:443 to allowed-endpoints`);
confg.allowed_endpoints += ` ${url.hostname}:443`;
} catch (exception) {
// some exception has occurred.
core.info(`Unable to fetch cacheURL`);
if (confg.egress_policy === "block") {
core.info("Switching egress-policy to audit mode");
confg.egress_policy = "audit";
}
}
}
@@ -224,7 +142,7 @@ interface MonitorResponse {
common.printInfo(web_url);
}
if (isARCRunner()) {
if (isArcRunner()) {
console.log(`[!] ${common.ARC_RUNNER_MESSAGE}`);
if (confg.egress_policy === "block") {
sendAllowedEndpoints(confg.allowed_endpoints);
@@ -239,37 +157,27 @@ interface MonitorResponse {
fs.appendFileSync(process.env.GITHUB_STATE, `selfHosted=true${EOL}`, {
encoding: "utf8",
});
core.info(common.SELF_HOSTED_RUNNER_MESSAGE);
if (confg.egress_policy === "block") {
sendAllowedEndpoints(confg.allowed_endpoints);
await sleep(5000);
if (!fs.existsSync("/home/agent/agent")) {
core.info(common.SELF_HOSTED_NO_AGENT_MESSAGE);
return;
}
return;
}
if (isGithubHosted() && process.env.STEP_SECURITY_HARDEN_RUNNER === "true") {
fs.appendFileSync(process.env.GITHUB_STATE, `customVMImage=true${EOL}`, {
encoding: "utf8",
});
core.info("This job is running on a custom VM image with Harden Runner installed.");
if (confg.egress_policy === "block") {
sendAllowedEndpoints(confg.allowed_endpoints);
await sleep(5000);
try {
if (process.env.USER) {
cp.execSync(`sudo chown -R ${process.env.USER} /home/agent`);
}
const confgStr = JSON.stringify(confg);
fs.writeFileSync("/home/agent/block_event.json", confgStr);
await sleep(5000);
} catch (error) {
core.info(`[!] Unable to write block_event.json: ${error}`);
}
}
return;
}
if (isGithubHosted() && fs.existsSync("/home/agent/agent.status")) {
console.log("Agent already installed, skipping installation");
return;
}
let _http = new httpm.HttpClient();
let statusCode: number | undefined;
let statusCode;
_http.requestOptions = { socketTimeout: 3 * 1000 };
let addSummary = "false";
try {
@@ -307,13 +215,6 @@ interface MonitorResponse {
encoding: "utf8",
}
);
fs.appendFileSync(
process.env.GITHUB_STATE,
`correlation_id=${correlation_id}${EOL}`,
{
encoding: "utf8",
}
);
console.log(`Step Security Job Correlation ID: ${correlation_id}`);
if (String(statusCode) === common.STATUS_HARDEN_RUNNER_UNAVAILABLE) {
@@ -323,36 +224,72 @@ interface MonitorResponse {
const confgStr = JSON.stringify(confg);
cp.execSync("sudo mkdir -p /home/agent");
chownForFolder(process.env.USER, "/home/agent");
cp.execSync("sudo chown -R $USER /home/agent");
let isTLS = await isTLSEnabled(context.repo.owner);
// Note: to avoid github rate limiting
let token = core.getInput("token");
let auth = `token ${token}`;
const agentInstalled = await installAgent(isTLS, confgStr);
let downloadPath: string;
if (agentInstalled) {
// Check that the file exists locally
var statusFile = "/home/agent/agent.status";
var logFile = "/home/agent/agent.log";
var counter = 0;
while (true) {
if (!fs.existsSync(statusFile)) {
counter++;
if (counter > 30) {
console.log("timed out");
if (fs.existsSync(logFile)) {
var content = fs.readFileSync(logFile, "utf-8");
console.log(content);
}
break;
if (await isTLSEnabled(context.repo.owner)) {
downloadPath = await tc.downloadTool(
"https://packages.stepsecurity.io/github-hosted/harden-runner_1.2.2_linux_amd64.tar.gz"
);
verifyChecksum(downloadPath, true); // NOTE: verifying tls_agent's checksum, before extracting
} else {
downloadPath = await tc.downloadTool(
"https://github.com/step-security/agent/releases/download/v0.13.7/agent_0.13.7_linux_amd64.tar.gz",
undefined,
auth
);
verifyChecksum(downloadPath, false); // NOTE: verifying agent's checksum, before extracting
}
const extractPath = await tc.extractTar(downloadPath);
let cmd = "cp",
args = [path.join(extractPath, "agent"), "/home/agent/agent"];
cp.execFileSync(cmd, args);
cp.execSync("chmod +x /home/agent/agent");
fs.writeFileSync("/home/agent/agent.json", confgStr);
cmd = "sudo";
args = [
"cp",
path.join(__dirname, "agent.service"),
"/etc/systemd/system/agent.service",
];
cp.execFileSync(cmd, args);
cp.execSync("sudo systemctl daemon-reload");
cp.execSync("sudo service agent start", { timeout: 15000 });
// Check that the file exists locally
var statusFile = "/home/agent/agent.status";
var logFile = "/home/agent/agent.log";
var counter = 0;
while (true) {
if (!fs.existsSync(statusFile)) {
counter++;
if (counter > 30) {
console.log("timed out");
if (fs.existsSync(logFile)) {
var content = fs.readFileSync(logFile, "utf-8");
console.log(content);
}
await sleep(300);
} // The file *does* exist
else {
// Read the file
var content = fs.readFileSync(statusFile, "utf-8");
console.log(content);
break;
}
await sleep(300);
} // The file *does* exist
else {
// Read the file
var content = fs.readFileSync(statusFile, "utf-8");
console.log(content);
break;
}
}
} catch (error) {
@@ -362,14 +299,8 @@ interface MonitorResponse {
process.exit(0);
})();
export function sleep(ms: number) {
export function sleep(ms) {
return new Promise((resolve) => {
setTimeout(resolve, ms);
});
}
function chownForFolder(newOwner: string, target: string) {
let cmd = "sudo";
let args = ["chown", "-R", newOwner, target];
cp.execFileSync(cmd, args);
}