bubblewrap fails to run with the docker seccomp profiles enabled
Claude Code and Codex in a devcontainer
A sandboxed development environment for running Claude Code and OpenAI Codex CLI with their low-friction agent modes enabled. Built at Trail of Bits for security audit workflows.
Why Use This?
Running coding agents with unrestricted command execution on your host machine is risky. Claude Code bypassPermissions and Codex danger-full-access can execute commands, install packages, and modify files without stopping for confirmation. This devcontainer provides filesystem isolation so the agent can work freely inside /workspace without getting broad access to your host.
Designed for:
- Security audits: Review client code without risking your host
- Untrusted repositories: Explore unknown codebases safely
- Experimental work: Let agents modify code freely in isolation
- Multi-repo engagements: Work on multiple related repositories
Prerequisites
-
Docker runtime (one of):
- Docker Desktop - ensure it's running
- OrbStack
- Colima:
brew install colima docker && colima start
-
For terminal workflows (one-time install):
npm install -g @devcontainers/cli git clone https://github.com/trailofbits/claude-code-devcontainer ~/.claude-devcontainer ~/.claude-devcontainer/install.sh self-install
Optimizing Colima for Apple Silicon
Colima's defaults (QEMU + sshfs) are conservative. For better performance:
# Stop and delete current VM (removes containers/images)
colima stop && colima delete
# Start with optimized settings
colima start \
--cpu 4 \
--memory 8 \
--disk 100 \
--vm-type vz \
--vz-rosetta \
--mount-type virtiofs
Adjust --cpu and --memory based on your Mac (e.g., 6/16 for Pro, 8/32 for Max).
| Option | Benefit |
|---|---|
--vm-type vz |
Apple Virtualization.framework (faster than QEMU) |
--mount-type virtiofs |
5-10x faster file I/O than sshfs |
--vz-rosetta |
Run x86 containers via Rosetta |
Verify with colima status - should show "macOS Virtualization.Framework" and "virtiofs".
Quick Start
Choose the pattern that fits your workflow:
Pattern A: Per-Project Container (Isolated)
Each project gets its own container with independent volumes. Best for one-off reviews, untrusted repos, or when you need isolation between projects.
Terminal:
git clone <untrusted-repo>
cd untrusted-repo
devc . # Installs template + starts container
devc shell # Opens shell in container
# Inside container:
claude # Claude Code
codex # OpenAI Codex CLI
VS Code / Cursor:
-
Install the Dev Containers extension:
- VS Code:
ms-vscode-remote.remote-containers - Cursor:
anysphere.remote-containers
- VS Code:
-
Set up the devcontainer (choose one):
# Option A: Use devc (recommended) devc . # Option B: Clone manually git clone https://github.com/trailofbits/claude-code-devcontainer .devcontainer/ -
Open your project folder in VS Code, then:
- Press
Cmd+Shift+P(Mac) orCtrl+Shift+P(Windows/Linux) - Type "Reopen in Container" and select Dev Containers: Reopen in Container
- Press
Pattern B: Shared Workspace Container (Grouped)
A parent directory contains the devcontainer config, and you clone multiple repos inside. Shared volumes across all repos. Best for client engagements, related repositories, or ongoing work.
# Create workspace for a client engagement
mkdir -p ~/sandbox/client-name
cd ~/sandbox/client-name
devc . # Install template + start container
devc shell # Opens shell in container
# Inside container:
git clone <client-repo-1>
git clone <client-repo-2>
cd client-repo-1
codex # or: claude
Authentication
Claude Code
Interactive Claude login works normally inside the container.
For headless servers or to skip the interactive login wizard:
claude setup-token # run on host, one-time
export CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN=sk-ant-oat01-...
devc rebuild # rebuilds with token
The token is forwarded into the container. On each container creation, post_install.py runs a one-shot auth handshake so claude starts without the login wizard.
This works around Claude Code's interactive onboarding wizard always showing in containers, even with valid credentials (#8938).
Codex
Interactive Codex login works normally inside the container:
codex
Codex will prompt you to sign in with ChatGPT or an API key. Its auth and config are stored in the persistent ~/.codex volume.
The container also adds the Trail of Bits Codex plugin marketplace with codex plugin marketplace add trailofbits/skills.
For headless use, export one of these on the host before creating or rebuilding the container:
export CODEX_ACCESS_TOKEN=<codex-access-token>
# or
export OPENAI_API_KEY=<openai-api-key>
devc rebuild
If both are set, CODEX_ACCESS_TOKEN wins. post_install.py persists the credential with codex login --with-access-token or codex login --with-api-key.
CLI Helper Commands
devc . Install template + start container in current directory
devc up Start the devcontainer
devc rebuild Rebuild container (preserves persistent volumes)
devc destroy [-f] Remove container, volumes, and image for current project
devc down Stop the container
devc shell Open zsh shell in container
devc exec CMD Execute command inside the container
devc upgrade [claude|codex|all] Upgrade agent CLI(s), defaults to all
devc mount SRC DST Add a bind mount (host -> container)
devc sync [NAME] Sync Claude Code sessions from devcontainers to host
devc template DIR Copy devcontainer files to directory
devc self-install Install devc to ~/.local/bin
Note: Use
devc destroyto clean up a project's Docker resources. Removing containers manually (e.g.,docker rm) will leave orphaned volumes and images behind thatdevc destroywon't be able to find.
Claude Session Sync for /insights
Claude Code's /insights command analyzes your session history, but it only reads from ~/.claude/projects/ on the host. Sessions inside devcontainer volumes are invisible to it.
devc sync copies Claude session logs from all devcontainers (running and stopped) to the host so /insights can include them:
devc sync # Sync all devcontainers
devc sync crypto # Filter by project name (substring match)
Devcontainers are auto-discovered via Docker labels. The sync is incremental, so it's safe to run repeatedly.
File Sharing
VS Code / Cursor
Drag files from your host into the VS Code Explorer panel. They are copied into /workspace/ automatically.
Terminal: devc mount
To make a host directory available inside the container:
devc mount ~/drop /drop # Read-write
devc mount ~/secrets /secrets --readonly
This adds a bind mount to devcontainer.json and recreates the container. Existing mounts are preserved across devc template updates.
Tip: A shared "drop folder" is useful for passing files in without mounting your entire home directory.
Security note: Avoid mounting large host directories (e.g.,
$HOME). Every mounted path is writable from inside the container unless--readonlyis specified, which undermines the filesystem isolation this project provides.
Network Isolation
By default, containers have full outbound network access. For stricter security, use iptables to restrict network access.
When to Enable Network Isolation
- Reviewing code that may contain malicious dependencies
- Auditing software with telemetry or phone-home behavior
- Maximum isolation for highly sensitive reviews
Example: Agents + GitHub + Package Registries
sudo iptables -A OUTPUT -d api.anthropic.com -j ACCEPT
sudo iptables -A OUTPUT -d api.openai.com -j ACCEPT
sudo iptables -A OUTPUT -d chatgpt.com -j ACCEPT
sudo iptables -A OUTPUT -d auth.openai.com -j ACCEPT
sudo iptables -A OUTPUT -d github.com -j ACCEPT
sudo iptables -A OUTPUT -d raw.githubusercontent.com -j ACCEPT
sudo iptables -A OUTPUT -d registry.npmjs.org -j ACCEPT
sudo iptables -A OUTPUT -d pypi.org -j ACCEPT
sudo iptables -A OUTPUT -d files.pythonhosted.org -j ACCEPT
sudo iptables -A OUTPUT -o lo -j ACCEPT
sudo iptables -A OUTPUT -j DROP
Trade-offs
- Blocks package managers unless you allowlist registries
- May break tools that require network access
- DNS resolution still works (consider blocking if paranoid)
Threat Model
The primary threat this project addresses is coding agents running arbitrary commands on your host machine. On a host machine, unrestricted agent modes can modify your shell config, delete files outside the project directory, or abuse locally stored credentials. The devcontainer confines that activity to a disposable container where the blast radius is limited to /workspace and any explicit mounts you add.
The container auto-configures:
- Claude Code
permissions.defaultMode = bypassPermissions - Codex
approval_policy = "never"andsandbox_mode = "danger-full-access"
This would be risky on a host machine, but the container itself is the sandbox.
The container includes common development tooling so you can do all development work inside it - not just run agents. The intended workflow is: clone a repository, start the devcontainer, and work entirely within it. If your project needs additional runtimes or tools beyond what's included, either add them to the Dockerfile for repeated use or install them ad-hoc with devc exec.
For the specific boundaries of what is and isn't isolated, see Security Model below. One nuance worth calling out: the devcontainer runtime automatically forwards your host's SSH agent socket (SSH_AUTH_SOCK) into the container. This lets code inside the container authenticate as you over SSH (e.g., git push), but the actual private key material stays on the host and is never exposed to the container.
Security Model
This devcontainer provides filesystem isolation but not complete sandboxing.
Sandboxed: Filesystem (host files inaccessible except explicit mounts), processes (isolated from host), package installations (stay in container)
Not sandboxed: Network (full outbound by default - see Network Isolation), git identity (~/.gitconfig mounted read-only), SSH agent (socket forwarded, keys stay on host), Docker socket (not mounted by default)
Container Details
| Component | Details |
|---|---|
| Base | Ubuntu 24.04, Node.js 22, Python 3.13 + uv, zsh |
| User | vscode (passwordless sudo), working dir /workspace |
| Agent CLIs | Claude Code, OpenAI Codex CLI |
| Tools | rg, fd, tmux, fzf, delta, iptables, ipset |
| Volumes (survive rebuilds) | Command history (/commandhistory), Claude config (~/.claude), Codex config/auth (~/.codex), GitHub CLI auth (~/.config/gh) |
| Host mounts | ~/.gitconfig (read-only), .devcontainer/ (read-only) |
| Auto-configured | Claude skills, Codex Trail of Bits marketplace, Claude bypassPermissions, Codex no-approval danger-full-access, git-delta |
Volumes are stored outside the container, so your shell history, agent settings, and gh login persist even after devc rebuild. Host ~/.gitconfig is mounted read-only for git identity.
Troubleshooting
"devcontainer CLI not found"
npm install -g @devcontainers/cli
Container won't start
- Check Docker is running
- Try rebuilding:
devc rebuild - Check logs:
docker logs $(docker ps -lq)
Codex auth not working
Check the login status inside the container:
codex login status
For a headless container, confirm CODEX_ACCESS_TOKEN or OPENAI_API_KEY is set on the host, then run devc rebuild.
Codex sandbox/bubblewrap fails with Colima
If Codex sandboxing fails inside the devcontainer, for example with codex --sandbox read-only, and you are using Colima, the Colima VM may be restricting unprivileged user namespaces through AppArmor. SSH into the Colima VM:
colima ssh
Then run:
echo 'kernel.apparmor_restrict_unprivileged_userns = 0' | sudo tee /etc/sysctl.d/20-apparmor-donotrestrict.conf
sudo sysctl -w kernel.apparmor_restrict_unprivileged_userns=0
GitHub CLI auth not persisting
The gh volume may need ownership fix:
sudo chown -R $(id -u):$(id -g) ~/.config/gh
Python/uv not working
Python is managed via uv:
uv run script.py # Run a script
uv add package # Add project dependency
uv run --with requests py.py # Ad-hoc dependency
Development
Build the image manually:
devcontainer build --workspace-folder .
Test the container:
devcontainer up --workspace-folder .
devcontainer exec --workspace-folder . zsh